ML20247D529

Summary of Operating Reactors Events Meeting 89-31 on 890830.Significant Event for Input Into NRC Performance Indicator Program Identified

ML20247D529
Person / Time
Site:	Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Summer, LaSalle, 05000000
Issue date:	09/05/1989
From:	Haughney C Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Rossi C Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
OREM-89-031, OREM-89-31, NUDOCS 8909150002
Download: ML20247D529 (18)

Text

-

e ... .

SEP 0 61988 MEMORANDUM FOR: Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational Events Assessment

'FROM: Charles J. Heughney, Chief Events Assessment Branch Division of Operational Events Assessment

SUBJECT:

THE OPERATING REACTORS EVENTS MEETING August 30, 1989 MEETING 89-31 On August 30, 1989, we conducted an Operating Reactors Events meeting (89 31) to brief senior managers from NRR, AE0D, ACRS, RES, Comission Staff, and **

regional offices on selected events that occurred since our last meeting on August 23, 1989. Enclosure 1 lists the attendees.

Enclosure 2 presents the significant elements of the discussed events.

Enclosure 3 contains a sumary of reactor scrams for the week ending 08/27/89 ,

and a comparison of weekly statistics with industry averages. We identified one significant event for input into the NRC performance indicator program.

S' . !

/d/

Charles J. Haughney, Chief Events Assessment Branch Division of Operational Events Assessment

Enclosures:

As stated ,

cc w/ Encl.: 1 See Next Page l

DISTRIBUTION

' Central File; )

EAB Reading File j Circulating Copy. EAB Staff MLReardon, EAB ')fhjl 3j ('

BBenedict, EAB y LKilgore, SECY ) y4/k PDR f Q$

bW : d, ar,$I g

IFC :EAB/DDEA :C:EAB/DC  :  :  :  :

.....:../AN.......:............:............:............:............:............:...........

IAME :MLReardon :CJHaughney :  :  :  :  :

IATE :08/3/ /89 :0 9/ l /89 :  :  :  :  :

0FFICIAL RECORD COPY 8909150002 890905 ~~

PDR ORG Mb h hh ht,hhhf NRRB

_ _ __ _ ___ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _M _& __

s; ,

7_ y .W ;, ,

o. i = ,q cc: . *

'T. Murley, NRR D. Hood, NRR

'F. Miraglia, NRR- D. Matthews, NRR

~J. Sniezek, NRR J. Hayes NRR E.JJordan, AE00 E. Adensam, NRR J. Taylor, EDO ,

P. Shemanski, NRR E. Beckjord, RES M. Slosson, NRR W. Russell, RI R. Capra, NRR S. Ebneter, RII B.~ Davis, RIII R. D.' Martin, RIV J. B. Martin, RV W. Kane, RI L. Reyes, RII

'E. Greenman, RIII L. Callan, RIV R. Zimnerman, RV S. Varga, NRR B. Boger, NRR G. Lainas, NRR

.L. Shao, NRR.

'B. Grimes, NRR F. Congel, NRR E. Weiss, AE00 T. Martin, EDO J..Lieberman, OE-J.-Guttmann, SECY

'A. Thadani, NRR S. Rubin, AE00 J. Forsyth, INP0 R.-Barrett, NRR M. Harper, AE00 R. Newlin, GPA H. Alderman, ACRS I

.___________________.____________w

L ,

y

[ 1,.

k, g

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION r,,

f WASHINGTON D. C. 20555

% .. / *e.

September 5, 1989 MEMORANDUM FOR: Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational Events Assessment FROM: Charles J. Haughney, Chief Events Assessment Branch Division of Operational Events Assessment

SUBJECT:

THE OFERATING REACTORS EVENTS MEETING

, August 30, 1989 - HEETING 89-31 On August 3J,1989, we conducted an Operating Reactors Events meeting (89-31) to brief senior managers from NRR, AE0D, ACRS, RES, Cosmission Staff, and regional offices on selected events that occurred since our last meeting on August 23, 1969. Enclosure 1 lists the attendees.

Enclosure 2 presents the significant elements of the discussed events.

Enclosure 3 contains a sumary of reactor scrams for the week ending 08/27/89 and a comparison of weekly statistics with industry overages. We identified one significant event for input into the NRC performance indicator progras.

} '

_h,ef Charles J. Hau y, Chief Events Assessment Branch N/

Division of Operati....i events a>>cassent l

Enclosures:

As stated cc w/ Encl.:

See Next Page

{

C_____.__.._______.___ m

+

ENCLOSURE.1 l

LIST OF ATTENDEES OPERATING REACTORS EVENTS BRIEFING (89-31)

. August 30, 1989 NAME ORGANIZATION NAME ORGANIZATION E. Adensar NRR/DRP J. Roe NRR/DLPQ J. Hayes NRR/DRP C. Rossi NRR/DOEA R. Borchardt OED0' J. Partlow NRR/ADP W. Troskos ki OE W. Minners RES/DSIR M. Reardon NRR/DOEA T. Greene NRR/DOEA L. Norrholm OCM/KC J. Raleigh NRR/00EA G. Hamer NRR/DET S. Stein NRR/DRIS J. Carter NRR/00EA D. Hood NRR/PD2-3 R. Xarsch NRR/DOEA A. Gilbert NRR/DOEA P. Schemanski NRR/PD3-2 C. Daily ACRS H. Ornstein AE0D S. Long ACRS L. Kintner NRR/PD4 S. Newberry NRR/SICB A. Gibson Region II H. Li NRR/SICB P. Cortland NRR/TVA R. Lobel NRR/DOEA S. Va.rga NRR/DRP T. Gody, Jr. NRR/PD3-3 D. Trimble OCM/JC G. Lainas NRR/DSP M. Slosson NRR/PD1-1 ,

P. Baranowsky NRR/DOEA D. Matthews NRR/PD2-3 R. Benedict NRR/DOEA P. Bobe AE0D/DSP R. Capra NRR/PD1-1 1

r

_ ---._______--____.__--_-_-_--__--____________.-.__- - ____-_- - _ _ - - _ _ _ m

[. . .

ENCLOSURE 2 I

f .

OPERATING REACTORS EVEhTS BRIEFING 89-31 EVENTS ASSESSMENT BRANCH LOCATION: 1E;B-1L WHITE FLINT WEENESDAY, AUGUST 30, 1989, 11:00 A.M.

MCGUIRE Uf!T I STEEL CONTAINMENT VESSEL CORROSION SUMMER UNIT 2 REPEAT EVENT SPURIOUS PRESSURIZER SAFETY VALVE OPENING LASALLE UNIT 2 S' CRAM WITH POSSIBLE RPS MALFUNCTION t;INE MILE POINT UNIT ] CONTAMINATION OF SUB-BASEMENT SY !.EAKING LRUMS ( AIT UPDATE)

GENERIC ISSUE S0LENCID VALVE FAILURES

g, - '

q

'f' .

. 59-31 I

P NCGUIRE UNIT 2 STEEL CONTAINMENT VESSEL CORROSION ,

AUGUST 24, 1989

'l FRCELE5 CORROSION CF STEEL CONTAINMENT VESSEL.

CAUSE COLLECT 10h 0F WATER ON FLOOR OF AhNULUS BETWEEN CONTAINMENT VESSEL AND CONCRETE SHIELL LUILDING. i SAFETY SI6NIFICANCE POTENTIAL WEAK SPCT IN CONTAINMENT VESSEL.

DISCUSSION o PROTECTIVE COATING DEGRADED, PERMITTING CORROSION OF STEEL.

o AREA AEOUT 1-1/2 INCHES HIGH BY ABOUT 30 FEET LONG, DIRECTLY ALOVE ANNULUS FLOOR.

c 1/16 INCH GENERAL CORROSION, PITTING TO 1/10 INCH.

O STEEL.IS 1 INCH THICK.

O ADEQUATE REMAINING WALL THICKNESS.

O INSPECTION ACCESS IS LIMITED DUE TO AIR DUCTS.

c SOURCE OF WATER IS UNKNOWN, BUT LICENSEE IS LOOKING FOR'IT.

MAY BE LEAKING VALVES OR FLOOR SUMP OVERFLOW.

o WEEKLY SURVEILLANCE.

o REPAIR AT NEXT REFUELING - CLEAN, WELD DEPOSIT, DIFFERENT C0ATING.

l o UNIT 1 CHECKED 8/29/E9. l FOLLOWUP REGION-MAY PERFORM ITS CWN INSPECTION OR PARTICIPATE IN LICENSEE'S INSPECTION.

I 1

CONTACT: R. BENEDICT SIGEVENT _ED_

REFERENCE:

10 CFR 50.72 #16392

j.. .

' ~

. 89-31 SUMMER UNIT 1 REPEAT EVENT SFURIOUS PRESSURIZER SAFETY VALVE OPENING AUGUST 25, 1989' i

PROBLEM A' PRESSURIZER CCEE SAFETY VALVE OPENED SPURIOUSLY DURING POWER OPERATION, CAUSE LOSS OF LOOP SEAL (ROOT CAUSE UNKNCWN).

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT AND POTENTIAL CHALLENGE TO PLANT SAFETY SYSTEMS.

BACKGROUNT o MAY 28, 19ES, SUMMER UN!T 1 HAD A SPURIOUS OPENING OF "C" PRESSURIZER CODE SAFETY OLVE DURING 100% POWER OPERATION l

(2250 PSIA),

e "C" AND "E" WERE REPLACED. ("B'" WAS REPLACED DUE TO SEAT LEAKAGE.)

o TESTS ON FAULTY VALVES AT A h' TEST FACILITY ~ IN CALIFORNIA WERE INCONCLUSIVE--THE LICENSEE FOUND NO DEFECTS IN THE VALVE.

c llCENSEE HAS EEEN CONTINUALLY MONITORING ALL PRESSURIZER CODE SAFETY VALVES FOR VALVE BODY TEMPERATURE (LOOP SEAL LEAKAGE RAISES THE TEMPERATURE) SINCE THE JUNE STARTUP.

DISCUSSION o SAFETY VALVE "A" HAS BEEN LEAKING SINCE SHORTLY AFTER THE JUNE STARTUP.

O CN AUGUST 15, 1989, SUMMER UNIT 1 HAD SPURIOUS OPENING OF "A" PZR CODE' SAFETY VALVE EURING 100% POWER OPERATION.

SIGEVENT YES

-CONTACT: A. GILBERT.

REFERENCE:

10 CFR 50.72 #16404

_ _ _ _ _ _ ______ A

-SUMMER UNIT 1 ES-31 c FESPONSE WAS SIMILAR TO MAY EVENT RESPONSE:

- REACTOR-COOLANT SYSTEM PRESSURE DECREASED CUICKLY.

- MANUAL REACTOR TRIP AT ABOUT'2000 PSI, N0 SAFETY INJECTION.

SETPCINT IS 2E75 PSI.

- SAFETY VALVE "A" RESEATED; PRESSURE LEVELED AT ABOUT 3950 PSI.

- LICEhSEE BROUCHT PLANT TO COLD SHUTDOWN.

c VALVE "A" HAS EEEN REPLACED ANE IS EXPECTED TO BE TESTED.

c REPLACEMENT VALVE IS A REFURBISHED VALVE.FROM THE SAME WESTINGHOUSE FACIllTY IN CALIFORNIA. (THE SAME TYPE OF REPLACEMENT AS KAS USED FOR "E" AND "C" VALVES IN MAY.)

O LICENSEE PLANS TO STAhTUP THIS WEEKEND.

FOLLOWUP REGION 11 IS FOLL0hlNG THIS EVENT. MECHANICAL ENGINEERING BRANCH AND AEOD ARE LOOKING AT THE GENERIC ASPECTS OF THIS PROBLEM.

1 i

-.-~,--.-._--...-...-.._--_---.-------..--_._--_:___---_--...___--_.__..._.---_.__------__--__--.-__._-

e e

a 4

e t

l I --

= -

w-s o:- _ _

E j

-;e

$5 s

E S

e' NJ 7:  !

8 7 S e

$ 5

• u 3 $

" i W\

P

\ W 5 \ \ $

g r

e4n bue b=_e w\N, e

a j- 4 n:e"yf (

g =

x

[

.. .yg p qv s

_,q (

l k_ \'A E \ _N _  !

l

_O l

- 89-31 LASALLE UNIT 2 SfRAM WITH POSSIBLE RPS MALFUNCTION ALGUST 26, 1989 PROELEM AFTER RECEIPT OF A SCRAM SIGNAL ; CF 8 INDICATING LIGHTS FOR RPS SUECHANhELS REMAINED LIT INDICATING POSSIBLE STICKING OF A SCRAM CONTACTOR.

LAUlf UNKNOWNAT,T.pl{ TIME.

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE FAILURE OF TWO C0hTACTORS Ih CERTAIN CHAhhELS COULD LEAD TO AN ATWS. ONLY ONE CCNTACTOR IS SUSPECTEL TO HAVE MOMENTARILY STUCK.

DISCUSSIGh t LASALLE UNIT 2 WAS AT 10% POWER TESTING TURBINE STOP VALVE CLOSURE WHEN THE REACTOR AUTO SCRAMMED.

O TWO OF EIGHT RPS SCRAM LIGHTS STAYED ON, INDICATING THAT THE SCRAM VALVES DID NOT OPEN.

O MANY PIECES OF EGUIPMENT WHICH COULD HAVE PREVENTED THIS EVENT OR PROVIDED INFORMATION TO UNDERSTAND WHAT HAPPENED EITHER FAILED OR WERE INOPERATIVE, E'.G.,

- MSSV POSITI0h INDICATION FOR THE #3 VALVE SHOWED FULL OPEN,

- TURBINE FIRST STAGE PRESSURE CHART RECORDER HAD RUN OUT OF INK, ALARM TYPER DATA RECORDER FAILED BECAUSE THE INPUT WAS OVERLOADED DUE T0 hulSANCE ALARMS.

STARTREK WAS NOT WORKING BECAUSE IT HAD NO INPUT SIGNAL.

o THE SCRAM CONTACTOR "K14E" MAY HAVE BEEN SLOW TO OPEN, CAUSING SCRAM LIGHTS "A2" AND "A3" TO REMAIN LIT.

v THE OPERATOR OBSERVED THAT SCRAN LIGHTS "A2 AND "A3" WERE STILL IIT AFTER SCRAM ACTUATION.

f SIGEVENT TBD CONTACT: RULY KARSCH

REFERENCE:

10 CFR 50.72 #10411

p; -

. 1 e

LASALLE UNIT : 89-3.1 c THE OPERATCR MANUALLY SCRAMMED THE REACTOR 13 SECONDS AFTER-  !

THE AUTO SCRAM.

FOLLOWUF 7- .0 THE LICENSEE WILL CONDUCT THE FOLLOKING INVESTIGATIONS:

TRACE THE PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE HISTORY OF'THE SCRAM C0f. TAC 10RS, CCNTUCT A FAULT TREE ANALYSIS TO DISCOVER IF THERE ARE'ANY

. OTHER WAYS TO PRCCUCE THE DESERVED SYMPTOMS, DC A REVERSE CALIER/ TION STL'LY TO DETERMINE IF INSTRUMENTATION MALALJL'ETMENT ALCNE COULD CAUSE THIS EVENT, O IN AEDITION THE LICENSEE WILL PROVIDE DETAILS RECARDING ALL THE DESERVED ECUIPMENT MALFUNCTICAS AND PROVIDE AN EXPLANATION THAT-TIES UF ALL THE LOOSE ENDS.

o REGICN 111 SENT AN ELECTRICAL SPErIAtIST TO THE SITE.

c NRR/ICSB Will EE THE FOCAL POINT FOR ONC0 LNG FOLLOWUP.

'N

, (f 4

t

i 89-31 NINE* MILE-POINT UNIT 1 CONTAMINATION OF SUB-BASEMENT BY LEAKING DRUMS (AIT UPDATE)

AUGUST 21, 1989 PROBLEM RESIN STORAGE DRUMS SPILL RADI0 ACTIVE MATERIAL DUE TO THEIR BEING LEFT UNCOVERED.

AIT FINDINGS

, o SUB-BASEMENT WAS USED FOR OVERFLOW FROM DRAINING OPERATIONS SINCE PLANT WAS LICENSED. (NOT UNCOMMON FOR PLANTS OF THAT VINTA6E DUE TO UNDER DESIGN OF RAD WASTE SYSTEM).

O IN 1581 SIGNIFICANTLY MORE WATER WAS DUMPED INTO THE ROOM, FOUR FEET OF WATER INSTEAD OF ONE FOOT.

o AT THAT TIME THE ROOM HELD DRLMS FULL OF SPENT RESIN. THE DRUMS'WERE OPEN WAITING FOR THE RESINS TO DRY OUT.

O THE WATER DISLODGED THE DRUMS SPILLING THE CONTENTS ONTO THE FLOOR.

O AIT DETERMINED THAT THERE IS NO RELEASE PATHWAY FOR LIOUID OR SOLID RAD WASTE. AIRBORNE RELEASE IS MONITORED VIA THE PLANT STACK.

o POSSIBLE ENFORCEMENT ACTION BECAUSE THE LICENSEE DID NOT FILE A 50.59 ANALYSIS AND FSAR UPDATE.

I i

l CONTACT: R. KARSCH AIT YES i -

REFERENCE:

10 CFR 50.72 #16374 SIGEVENT __hD_

L_______.__. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _

09-31 GENERIC ISSUE POTENTIAL COMMON MODE FAILURE OF MSIVs PUE TO ASCO VALVES EXCEEDINC OUALIFIED OPERATING LIFE EfLD E E ALL SOLEN 0ID YALVES USED AT GRAND GULF TO ACHIEVE MSIV CLOSURE HAr EEGRADED ELASTCMER SEAT MATERIAL, fillff SOLEN 0ID VALVES APPEAR TO HAVE HAD AN IMPROPERLY CALCULATED CUALIFIED LIFE DECAUSE IMPROFER TEMPERATURES IN THE REGION OF THE ELASTOMER WERE USEL.

SAFETY SIGNIFICANff POTENTIAL FOR'CCMMCh MODE FAILURE OF MSIVs EXISTS DUE TO OPERATION EEYOND THE ACTUAL llFE EXPECTANCY OF THE SOLENGID VALVES.

DISCUSSION o SOLEN 0ID VALVES WIDELY USED IN MANY SAFETY-RELATED SYSTEMS.

o COMMON MOLE FAILURE MECHANISMS IDENTIFIED FOR ASCO MODEL NP 83:3 ELASTOMER DEGRADATION STICKINC INTERNALS o CRAND GULF CALCULATED QUALIFICATION LIFE IN 1985 USING SINGLE C0ll HEATUP DATA: LIFE WAS 8.6 - 5.9 YEARS.

O DUAL C0ll HEATUP DATA BECAME AVAILABLE IN 1987 SEAT TEMPERATURE ABOUT 100 F ABOVE AMBIENT.

0 RECALCULATED QUALIFICATION llFE AS 2.9 YRS.: ACTUAL WAS 4.5 YRS.

I o BOTH BWRs AND PWRs HAVE ASCO DUAL COIL S0LEN0ID VALVES.

O MANY GENERIC COMMUNICATIONS ISSUED.

MOST RECENTLY INFORMATION NOTICES 88-43 AND GE SIL 481.

FOLLOWUP ~

o ASCO IS PREPARING A SERVICE BULLETIN TO DESCRIBE THE CHANGES IN TEMPERATURE INFORMATION AND WHAT TO DO TO ASSURE A VALID CUALIFICA' TION LIFE FOR ACTUAL OPERATING CONDITIONS.

O AN IN IS BEING LRAFTED TO ALERT THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY.

c AECD COMPLETING CASE STUDY ON SOLEN 0ID VALVE FAILURES.

CONTACT: J. CARTER

REFERENCES:

10 CFR 50.72 #16355

n .

• I 1 , Cr) CATALOG ' NUKJ IR NP 8323 A20E AC/AC ,

4 . -

CD r.

f . -7 sotesoio 'A' 3

N

. y '

./'

, Colt J l )

u CORE DISC

/g ~

~~

k lower Dist

.o

i. r ,

Coll s

7 ,

- a l f SOLENotD'B' ISI*C 2.19' C 22.T 'C iTG'c 170 *C G6*C I G 3 *C 175 *C i 2.l

• C 115'C 49'C i47*C I Go *C 108*C 99'c 25*C 126'C I41'C 88*C 77"C AMBIENT COIL SOL. 'A' Coll- SQL.'B' . CORE DISC LOWER DISC TEMR MAXINUM TEMPERATURE I I I nm i i l I i i i MA'XIMV M TEMPERATURES OF Colt AWD CRnTICAL ELASTOMERS WITH \ALVE ENER61 ZED AND No FLOW an ao. sv oanlmloate

_ l * * " iMANUF ACTURING TOL[MANCE$ TQ

< ' eO taaw=- SW8l7-717 sE IN ACCORDANCE WITH ASCO NONE BINI ca O av daa d a^ d a O PaoCaouns uptoos oa. aw., i #^u ******d'" aO d d d O caecso I G.V.17 7 37 enT on. .~. i .

,,, ,,,, ,, ,,,,,,,, ,,,,gn ge wamy use nemtts

.... tv. .u ... ., us.. .. .

e oe p eve o F\/2 E 3 i c. ses FhAn h... Ca.. ==^ =

^~- gesIv e ,t.... . ....

itcAutomatte

. .. Sw .. o u nu urna 4 . .. . . . .

. .~... ,.,.

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ = _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .

- MACTOR SCRM SUMMRT

. EEK EMBlu 08/27/99

!. PLANT SPECIFIC MTA 4

HTE iiill UNIT P0NER 110rAL CAUSE C0frL1- YTD m fit CAT!DN5 AB0VE ELON TOTAL 151 131 N/22/09 316 ROCK PCIRT 1 96 A EDU! PENT NO 1 0 1 08/23/89 SOUTH TEIA$ 2 100 A EDUIPENT N0 4 1 5 N /24/f9 CATANie 1 90 M EDU! PENT N0 3 0 3 08/25/89 $UMMER 1 97 R EDU! PENT NO 4 0 4 N/26/09 LASALLE 2 10 A - E90! PENT NO 0 1 1 08/26/09 RCSUIRE 1 100 A E9UIPMENT NO 2 0 2 N /26/99 DUANE ARNOLD 1 98 A EDUIPMENT NO 5 0 5 O

e 1

i -

k i

l l

• l

_ _ . - . . - . _ _ - - . - . . _ - . - _ . - - _ . _ _ - - . _ _ _ . - _ - - _ - - - - .----___J

y , . . . . .. .

re

.'s e_:- n s >

b:;. =. ,

_c; }

• 2 age No,* : ; .l c Ll0/25/89' '

j ,. PERFORMANCE INDICATORS SIGNIFICANT EVENi$ ENCLOSURE 3 LANT,NAMEi EVENT- EVENT DESCRIPTION .

STR SIGNIFICANCE.

. g,.

j.: \

n. .

f; BIN 50N 21 06<16/B' INCEDUATE NPSH FOR AUI FEIDNATER PUMPS.

O POTENTIAL FOR OR ACTUAL DEGRADATION h . DF SAFETY RELATED EDUIPMENT' I i

-l 1

1 l

1 i

.l

j L'

I l< .{ ;

0 4

l

_ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __-m.._ . _ _ _ - _ _ __ _ _ _ . . - . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ - . _ . _ _ - _ _ _ . _

i

,- , II. COMPARISON OF WEEKLY STATISTICS WITH INDUSTRY. AVERAGES.

SCRAMS FOR WEEK ENDING 08/27/89

. SCRAM CAUSE POWER NUMBER 1989 1988 1987 1986 1985 OF WEEKLY WEEKLY WEEKLY WEEKLY WEEKLY SCRAMS (5) AVERAGE AVERAGE AVERAGE AVERAGE AVERAGE' YTD (3)(4) (8)(9)

• • POWER >15%

EOUIP. RELATED >15% 6 3.0 3.1 3.9 4.3 5.4 PERS. RELATED(6) >15% 0 1. 2 ' 1.0 1.3 1.G 2.0 OTHER(7) >15% 0 0.1 0.5 1.2 0.4 0.6

• • Subtotal **

6 4.3 4.6 6.4 6.5 8.0

• • POWER <15%

EOUIP. RELATED- <15% i O.4 0.5 1.2 1.4 1.3 PERS. RELATED <15% 0 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.8 0.9 OTHER <15% 0 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.2

• • Subtotal * * - .

1 0.7 0.9 2.1 2.4 2.4

• • • Total ***

7 5.0 5.5 8.5 8.9 10.4 MANUAL VS AUTO SCRAMS TYPE NUMBER 1989 1988 1987 1986 1985 OF WEEKLY WEEKLY WEEKLY WEEKLY WEEKLY SCRAMS AVERAGE AVERAGE AVERAGE AVERAGE AVERAGE YTD 2 0.9 1.0 1.4 1.0 1.0 MANUAL SCRAMS 5 4.2 4.5 7.0 7.9 9.4 AUTOMATIC SCRAMS

,a .

]

^

i-NbTES

1. PLANT SPECIFIC DATA BASED ON INITIAL REVIEW OF 50.72 REPORTS FOR THE WEEK OF INTEREST. PERIOD IS MIDNIGHT SUNDAY THROUGH MIDNIGHT SUNDAY. SCRAMS ARE DEFINED AS REACTOR PROTECTIVE ACTUATIONS.WHICH RESULT IN ROD MOTION, AND EXCLUDE PLANNED TESTS OR SCRAMS AS PART OF PLANNED SHUTDOWN IN ACCORDANCE WITH A PLANT PROCEDURE. THERE ARE 111 REACTORS HOLDING AN OPERATING LICENSE.

2. COMPLICATIONS: REC 0VERY. COMPLICATED BY EQUIPMENT FAILURES OR-PERSONNEL ERRORS UNRELATED TO CAUSE OF SCRAM.

3. PERSONNEL RELATED PROBLEMS INCLUDE HUMAN ERROR, PROCEDURAL DEFICIENCIES, AND MANUAL STEAM GENERATOR LEVEL CONTROL PROBLEMS.

4. "0THER" INCLUDES AUTOMATIC SCRAMS ATTRIBUTED TO ENVIRONMENTAL CAUSES (LIGHTNING), SYSTEM DESIGN, OR UNKNOWN CAUSE.

f

.______ _- ___ _ _ _ - _ - _ -