ML20246P777

Summary of Operating Reactors Events Meeting 89-26 on 890712.Events Discussed & Significant Elements of Events Presented in Encl 2.List of Attendees Also Encl

ML20246P777
Person / Time
Site:	Summer, Seabrook, Crystal River, 05000000
Issue date:	07/13/1989
From:	Haughney C Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Rossi C Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
OREM-89-026, OREM-89-26, NUDOCS 8907200309
Download: ML20246P777 (14)

Text

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%L 1 s toeg EEMORANDUM FOR: Charles E. Rossi Director Division of Operational Events Assessment FROM: . Charles J. Haughney, Chief Events Assessment Branch Division of Operational Events Assessment

SUBJECT:

THE OPERATING REACTORS EVENTS HEETING July 12, 1989 - MEETING 89-26 On July 1E, 1989, an Operating Reactors Events meeting (89-26) was held to brief senior managers from NRR, ACRS, RES, Commission Staff, and Regional Offices on events which occurred since our last meeting on July 5, 1989.

The list of attendees is included as Enclosure 1.

The events discussed and the significant elements of these events are presented in Enclosure 2. A summary of reactor scrams for the week ending 07/09/89 is presented in Enclosure 3. One significant event was identified for input into the NRC performance indicator program.

Original signsa by:

Charles J. Haughne" Charles J. Haughney, Chief Events Assessment Branch Division of Operational Events Assessment

Enclosures:

As stated cc w/ Encl.:

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. J. Taylor, E00 . J. Hayes NRR

'E. Beckford,'RES E. Adensam, NRR W. Russell, RI S. Ebneter, RII B. Davis, RIII-R. D. Martin, RIV-J. B. Martin, RV W. Kane, RI L. Reyes, RII E. Greenman, RIII L. Callan, RIV R. Zimmerman, RV S.'Varga,-NRR B. Boger, NRR G.:Lainas NRR L. Shao, NRR B. Grimes, NRR F. Congel, NRR~

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$L 2 s'q MEMORANDUM'FOR: Charles.E. Rossi Director Division of Operational Events Assessment FROM: Charles J. Haughney, Chief Events Assessment Branch Division of Operational Events Assessment

SUBJECT:

THE.0PERATING REACTORS EVENTS MEETING July 12, 1989 - MEETING 89-26 On July 12, 1989, an Operating Reactors Events meeting (89-26) was held to brief senior managers from NRR, ACRS, RES, Comission Staff, and Regional Offices on events which occurred since our last meeting on July 5, 1989.

The list of attendees is included as Enclosure 1.

The events discussed and the significant elements of these events are presented in Enclosure 2. A sumary'of reactor scrars for the week ending 07/09/89 is presented in Enclosure 3. One significant event was identified for input-into the NRC performance indicator program.

, _A'!,=A Charles J. H g ey, Chief Events Asses nt Branch Division of Opera'ETen.1 L=nu, assessment

Enclosures:

As stated cc w/ Encl.:

See Next Page

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I qt ENCLOSURE 1 LIST OF ATTENDEES OPERATING REACTORS EVENTS BRIEFING (89-26)

July 12, 1989 NAME ORGANIZATION NAME- ORGANIZATION S. Varga NRR/DRP D. Tondi NRR/SELB J. Dyer OEDO J. Partlow NRR/ADP J. Zwolinksi NRR/DRIS R. 'Wessman NRR/PD1-1 W. Scott NRR/DLPQ P. Chopra NRR/SELB W. Troskoski DE D. Matthews NRR/DRP L. Reyes RII C. Rossi NRR/DOEA C. Vandenburgh NRR/RSIB C. Haughney NRR/00EA J. Guttmann SECY .

A. Vietti-Cook OCM/JC G. Wunder NRR/PD2-2 E. Butcher NRR/ILRB R. Lobel NRR/00EA W. Johnson RI D. Trimble OCM/JC H. Alderman ACRS R. Benedict NRR/00EA J. Hayes NRR/PD1-2 E. Adensam NRR/DRP S. Saba NRR/SELB F. Rosa NRR/SELB R. Kendall NRR/D0EA P. Baranowsky NRR/D0EA J. Bess RIV R. Woodruff NRR/DOEA G. Marino RES/DSIR J. Donohew NRR/ADSP M. Reardon NRR/DOEA N. Fields NRR/DOEA J. Carter NRR/DOEA

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3 ENCLOSURE 2-L:

OPERATING REACTORS EVENTS ERIEFING 89-26

-EVENTS ASSESSMENT-BRANCH LOCATION: 12B-11, WHITE FLINT WEDNESDAY, JULY 12, 1989, 11:00 A.M.

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I SEABROOK UNIT I MANUAL REACTOR TRIP WITH COMPLICATIONS (UPDATE) (AIT}

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-CRYSTAL-RIVER UNIT 3 ONSITE ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM. PROBLEMS

. SUMMER UNIT I DEGRADED GRID VOLTAGE l

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89-20 SEABROOK UNIT J UALUIL REACTOR TRIP WITH CCMPIICATIONS (UPDATE) (AIT)

JUNE 22, 1989 EEDELEB A MINOR TRANSIENT OCCURRED WHILE CONDUCTli1G THE NATURAL CIRCULATION STARTUP TEST. THE REACTOR WAS MANUALLY TRIPPED FROM ABOUT 2% POWER.

LhDEE A STEAM DUMP VALVE (SDV) TO THE MAIN CONDENSER FAILED TO MODULATE CLOSED CN DEMAND (MANUALLY FRCM THE CONTROL ROOM), RESULTING IN A PRlhARY SYSTEN PERTURBATION.

SAFETY SIGNIFlfAEff REACTOR OPERA 110N OCCURRED OUTSIDE THE BOUNDARY CONDITIONS SPECIFIED IN THE TEST PROCEDURE.

LISCUSSION o ON JUNE 22, 1989, THE LICENSEE CONLUCTED A NATUEAL CIRCULATION TEST AT LOW POWER FOR PURPOSES OF OPERATOR TRAINING.

o THIS EVENT WAS PERFORMED ON THE LICEl:SEE's SIllulATOR IN 198E.

O THE NATURAL CIRCULATION TEST WAS CONSISTENT WITH FSAR

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GUlrELINES AND REGULATORY CUIDE 1.68, " INITIAL TEST PROGRAMS FOR WATER-COOLED NUCLEAR PKR PLANTS".

o SHORTLY AFlER TRIPPING THE RCPs, RCS TEMPERATURE AND FRESSURIZEE LEVEL LECREASED.

o TEllFEFATURE AND LEVEL FURTHER DECREASED BECAUSE OF A FAILED OPEN SEV.

o THE TEST PROCEDURE CALLS FOR A MANUAL REACTOR TRIP IF PRESSURIZER LEVEL DECREASES TO 17%. PRESSURIZER LEVEL DECREASED BELOW 17%

FOR 4 TO 5 MINUTES, EUT THE REACTOR WAS NOT TRIPPED.

o THE OPERATORS SUDSECUENTLY TRIPPED THE REACTOR AFTER PRESSURIZER PRESSURE AND LEVEL HAD BEEN RES10 RED AND WERE RAPIDLY INCREASING.

c THE PLANT RESPONSE TO THE TRANSIENT INITIATED BY TRIPPING OF THE RCP's (AND TO THE SDV FAILURE) FAS AS EXPECTED.

CONTACT: J. THOMPSON SIGEVENT: NO

REFERENCES:

10 CFR 50.72 #15933 AND PNC-I-89-48 (DATED 06/22/89)

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SEABROOK UNIT 1 89-26 o THE RAPID INCREASE IN RCS PRESSURE AFTER LEVEL WAS RESTORED TO 17% WAS DUE TO Tile CLOSURE OF THE SDV, CVCS LETDOWN ISOLATION, LACK OF-PZR SPRAYS, AND CONTINUED CVCS CHARGING. THE PRESSURE RESPONSE WAS AS EXPECTED GIVEN THE AB0VE CONDITIONS.

O AT NO TIME WAS ANY SAFETY SYSlEM BYPASSED OR TURNED OFF.

o 'THE l'NITIAL TEST CONDITIONS RECulRED THE REACTOR 1TO BE CRITICAL AT LOW POWER (LESS THAN 5%). THIS WAS ACHIEVED BY:

(1) HEAVY B0 RATION (1150 PPM) DDE TO THE NEW CORE CONDITIONS AND (2) CONTROL ROD BANK "D" AT 130 STEPS (0UT OF 228 STEPS),

BANKS "A", "B", AND "C" WERE FULLY WITHDRAWN.

O CONSEQUENCES OF A ROD WITHDRAWAL ACCIDENT UNDER THE ABOVE CONDITIONS ARE BOUNDED BY THE SAFETY ANALYSIS.

AIT FINLJBES (PRELIMINARY) o THE OPERATORS SHOULD HAVE TRIPPED THE REACTOR WHEN PRESSURIZER LEVEL DECREASED TO 17%, BUT DID NOT.

O FAILURE TO ADHERE TO TEST PROCEDURES RESULTED FROM MISUNDERSTANDING 0F PROCEDURAL IMPORTANCE AND DESIRE TO SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETE ThE TEST (THE OPERATORS HAD CONTROL 0F THE REACTORS THE TEST PROCEDURE BOUNDARY CONDITIONS WERE CONSERVATIVE).

O AN APPARENT HIERARCHY OF IMPORTANCE EXISTED BETWEEN PROCEDURES (TEST-PROCEDURES NOT CONSIDERED AS IMPORTANT AS OPERATING PROCEDURES AND TECH SPECS),

o ThERE APPEARS TO BE N0 GENERIC IMPLICATIONS REGARDING ADECUACY OF PROCEDURES OR EQUIPMENT PERFORMANCE FROM THE EVENT.

FOLLOWUP o THE PROJECT NANAGER AND THE REGION WILL FOLLOW LONG-TERM CORRECTIVE ACTION.

o DEST /RSB WILL DETERMINE APPROPRIATENESS OF CONDUCTING STARTUP NATURAL CIRCULATION TESTS WITH THE REACTOR CRITICAL VERSUS USING DECAY HEAT.

89-26 CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 CNSITE ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM PROBLEMS JUNE 16, 21, 29, AND 30, 1989 PROBLEM INADEQUACIES IN THE ONSITE ELECTRIC POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM.

CAUSE LACK 0F ADE0VATE CONTROL OVER DESIGN PROCESSES.

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE POTENTIALLY Ih0PERALLE EMERGENCY POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM.

DISCUSSION o ON JUNE 16, 1989, WHILE AT 12 PERCENT POWER, A REACTOR TRIP OCCURRED DUE TO THE LOSS OF ALL RCPs. THE RCPs TRIPPED ON UNDERVOLTAGE, DUE TO A LOSS OF THE PRIMARY SOURCE OF 0FFSITE POWER. THE SECONDARY SOURCE WAS OUT-0F-SERVICE. ,

c BOTH EMERGEhCY DIESELS STARTED ANL LOADED 0M THE LOOP.

c ON JUNE 21, 1989, BOTH STAT 10h BATTERIES WERE FOUND BY THE RESIDENT INSPECTOR TO HAVE SEVERAL CELLS INDICATING HIGH ELECTROLYTE LEVELS.

o ON JUNE 26, 1989, EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR "B" WAS CECLARED INOPERAELE DUE TO LOW CRANKCASE VACUUM, PLACING THE UNIT IN ,

A 72 HOUR TECH SPEC ACTION STATION AND RESULTING IN THE REACTOR ,'

BEING PLACED IN HOT SHUTDOWN ON JUNE 29, 1989.

o ON JUNE 30, 1989, A LIGHTING STRIKE CAUSED A LOSS OF OFFSITE 3 POWER AND THE SUBSECUENT START AND LOADING OF THE OPERABLE i EDG.

c AS DURING THE JUNE 16, 1989 EVENT, BATTERY CELLS WERE AGAIN l FOUND TO HAVE HIGH ELECTROLYTE LEVELS FOLLOWING THE l 1

JUNE 30, 1989 EVENT.

CONTACT: N. FIELDS SIGEVENT: YES__

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REFERENCE:

10 CFR 50.72's 15886, 15923, 15986, 15995 AND MORNING REPORT OF JULY 5, 1989 E _ _ _ __ _ _

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CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 89-26 EACKGROUND o EECAUSE OF THE INADECUATE CAPADILITY OF THE CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 1 AND 2 SHARED STARTUP TRANSFORMER (WHICH ALSO SERVES AS CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 SECONDARY PREFERRED OFFSITE POWER SOURCE), LICENSEE VOLUNTARILY ENTERS TECH SPEC LC0 WHENEVER THE STARTUP TRANSFORMER IS SUPPLYING POWER TO UNIT 1 OR UNIT 2.

o BECAUSE THE EDGs HAVE BEEN DETERMINED TO BE OF INSUFFICIENT CAPABILITY TO SUPPLY ALL SAFEGUARDS LOADS, THE LICENSEE WAS GRANTED, A TEMPORARY TECH SPEt EXEMPTION WHICH ALLOWS THE 1E BATTERY CHARGERS, AS WELL AS S0/.E OTHER SAFEGUARDS LOADS, TO BE AUTOMATICALLY SHED ON A LOOP ColNCIDENT WITH AN ESF SIGNAL.

o THE LICENSEE RELIES ON THE BATTERIES TO PICK UP ALL IE CC LOADS FROM THE ELGs DURING THE PERIOD THE CHARGERS ARE OFF LINE.

O THIS EXEMPTION NECESSITATES THE USE OF THE BATTERIES AS THE SOLE SOURCE OF DC POWER DURING LOOP EVENTS WITH ESF. CHARGERS ARE PROCEDURALLY RECONNECTED TO THE SAFEGUARDS BUSES.

o CRIGINALLY ASSESSMENT OF THE ROOT CAUSE OF DATTERY ELECTROLYTE LEVEL PROBLEMS ASSLMED CHARGERS HAD BEEN SHED, RESULTING IN

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BATTERIES UNDERG0ING DISCHARGE / CHARGE CYCLE. SINCE NO ESF SIGNAL WAS PRESENT, LICENSEE STATES THAT CHARGERS WERE NEVER SHED; ROOT CAUSE EVALUATION OF ELECTROLYTE LEVEL FLUCTUATIONS ARE GNG0 LNG.

lALOM!P o LICE;3dEE IS PREPARING A MODIFICATION PROGRAM TO INCREASE THE CAPABILITY OF THE EDGs.

o LICENSEE IS DETERMINING A ROOT CAUSE OF THE HIGH ELECTROLYTE LEVELS IN THE BATTERY CELLS.

o LICENSEE WILL INSTALL A DEDICATED SECONDARY PREFERRED POWER SOURCE FOR CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3.

o HEADCARTERS AND REGIONAL PERSONNEL ARE FOLLOWING LICENSEE'S ACTIONS.

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89-26 SUMMER UNIT 1 DECRADED GRID VOLTAGE JULY 11, 1989 1 PROBLEM A SIGNIFICANT DECREASE IN GRID VOLTAGE OCCURRED FOLLOWING A REACTOR TRIP AT SUMMER.

CAUSE THE GRID UPSET CAUSED BY THE LOSS OF ABOUT 900 MWE LED TO THE SUBSEQUENT ADDITIONAL LOSS OF ABOUT 700 MWE (A HYDR 0 STATION AND A C0AL UNIT).

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE AN UNANALYZED GRID CONDITION OR UNEXPECTED GRID PERFORMANCE (LOAD SHEDDINC) MAY EXIST THAT APPEARS TO HAVE POTENTIALLY WIDE-SPREAD IMPACT AND IMPLICATION. (LCSS OF 0F. SITE POWER.)

DISCUSSION o SUMMER HAL A TURBINE TRIP FROM 100% POWER BELIEVED TO HAVE BEEN CAUSED BY MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES.

o VOLTAGE DEGRADED AND DIESEL GENERATORS STARTED AUTOMATICALLY AND LOADED.

o NON-SAFETY BUSES CONTINUED TO BE POWERED FROM OFFSITE SOURCES (230KV TO 205 AND 115KV TO 102).

o DUKE POWER ALSO EXPERIENCED DEGRADED VOLTAGE (CHARLOTTE HOUSE i POWER WAS 90V), AND SUPPLIED POWER TO SUMMER'S NETWORK.

o LOAD SHEDDING ON THE GRID DID NOT OCCUR.

FOLLOWUP ASSURE CONFORMANCE TO GDC-17.

CONTACT: J. CARTER SIGEVENT: NO

REFERENCE:

10 CFR 50.72 #16061

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Page;No.'. .

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-07/10/89 :

y PERFORMANCE INDICATDRS S!6NIFICANT EVENTS ENCLOSURE:3!

~ EVENT' . EVENT DESCRIFT10N' '$TRSIGNIFICANCE (TPLANTNAME'.'

.i o  : DATE:

' 05/06/89 SINGLE FAILURE OF A SELECTOR SWITCH FOR A VOLTMETER COULD 0PDTENTIALFORORACTUALDEBRADAT]DN-

.clWDIAN FOINT 2-

• - ~ RESULT IN LDSS OF.ALL AC DUSES.=. DEAB NDTIFIED BY PROJECT- 0F SAFETY-RELATED EDUliMENT.

MANASER FROM A TELCON PM HAD WITH RI.

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. c; EACTOR SCMM Sl#NIRY EEK EEING 07/09/89

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. MTE ' SITE- tm!T PDER SIGNAL CAuf CurFLI- VfD: yid -YTD: '

CATIONS ABOVE JELOW ~ TOT 4.

151 '15%

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07/N/89SOUTHTEXAS 1:":100A . EGulPIENT ' E 3 'O 07/ W W 1 300 M EDU! PENT. 2 2 o-07/09/99 Sis lRy 3 . 35 A ERllPIENT - E- 3 o; j a

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. NOTES-l

1. PLA'4T SPECIFIC DATA BASED ON ' INITIAL REVIEW 0F 50.72 REPORTS j FD';< THE WEEK OF INTEREST. PERIOD IS MIDNIGHT SUNDAY THROUGH 1 FIDNIGHT SUNDAY. SCRAMS ARE DEFINED AS REACTOR PROTECTIVE 1 ACTUATIONS WHICH RESULT IN R0D MOTION, At:0 EXCLUDE PLANNED - fj TESTS OR SCRAMS AS PART OF PLANNED SHUTDOWN IN ACCORDANCE '

l it!TH A PLANT PROCEDURE. THERE ARE 111 REACTORS HOLDING AN.

OPERATING LICENSE.

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2. COMPLICATIONS:' RECOVERY COMPLICATED BY EQUIPMENT FAILURES OR.

PERSONNEL ERRORS UNRELATED TO CAUSE OF SCRAM.

3. PERSONNEL RELATED PROBLEMS INCLUDE HUMAN ERROR, PROCEDURAL DEFICIENCIES, AND MANUAL STEAM GENERATOR LEVEL CONTROL PROBLEMS.

4. "0THER" INCLUDES AUTOMATIC SCRAMS ATTRIBUTED TO ENVIRONMENTAL CAUSES (LIGHTNING). SYSTEM DESIGN,'OR UNKNOWN CAUSF.

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