ML20195B221

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Summary of Operating Reactors Events Meeting 88-23 on 880607.List of Attendees,Events Discussed & Summary of Reactor Scrams Encl
ML20195B221
Person / Time
Site: Peach Bottom, Fermi, Limerick, Vogtle, 05000000
Issue date: 06/08/1988
From: Lanning W
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To: Rossi C
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
OREM-88-023, OREM-88-23, NUDOCS 8806210342
Download: ML20195B221 (15)
v • d • e


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'f elON 9 9 E MEMORANDUli FOR: Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational Events Assessment Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation FROM: Wayne Lanning, Chief Events Assessment Branch Division of Operational Events Assessment Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation SUdJECT: THE OPERATING REACTORS EVENTS HEETING June 7, 1988 - MEETlHG 88-23 On June 7, 1988 an Operating Reactors Events meeting (88-23) was held to brief senior managers from NRR and Regional Offices on events which occurred since our last meeting on May 31, 1988. The list of attendees is included as Enclosure 1.

The events discussed and the significant elements of these events are presented in Enclosure 2. Enclosure 3 presents a summary of reactor scrams. One signi-ficant event was identified for input to NRC's performance indicator program.

One event was suggested for long-term followup.

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{ Wayne Lanning, Chief Events Assessment Branch Division of Operational Events Assessment Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures:

As stated i cc w/Enclo.:

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gr CC; T. Murley, 12G-18 J. Sniezek,12G-18 F. kiraglia, 12G-18 J. Forsyth INP0 E. Jordan, AEOD D. Kubicki, 8H-7 E. Beckjord, NL-007 D. McPherson, 12G-18 W. Russell, RI W. Lyon, 8E-23 B. Davis, RIII D. Moran, 13D-18 9 d. Nelson Grace, O!! H. Berkow, 14H-22 R. D. itartin, RIV J. B. Martin, RV W. Kane, RI L. Reyes, RII E. Greenman, RIII J. Callan, Rly D. Kirsch, RV S. Varga, 14E-4 D. Crutchfield, 13A-2 B. Boger, 14A-2 G. Lainas, 14H-3 G. Holahan, 13E-4 L. Shao, 8E-2 J. Partlow, 70-24 B. Grir,es, 9A-2 F. Cengei, 10E-4 E. Weiss, AEOD S. Black, 12E-4 T. Martin, 12G-18 J. Stone, 9D-4 R. Hernan, 13H-3 H. Bailey, AE0D J. Guttnenn, SECY A. Thadani, 7E-4 S. Rubin, AE00 i

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\...s/j JUN 4 4 S iEMORANDUM FOR: Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational Events Assessment Office of heclear Reactor Regulation FROM: Wayne Lanning, Chief Events Assessment Branch Division of Operational Events Assessment Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

SUBJECT:

THE OPERATING REACTORS EVENTS HEETING June 7, 1988 - NEETING 88-23 On June 7, 1988 an Operating Reactors Events meeting (88-23) was held to ,

brief senior managers from NRR and Regional Offices on events which occurred '

since our last meeting on May 31, 1988. The list of attendees is included as Enclosure 1.

The events discussed and the significant elements of these events are presented in Enclosure 2. Enclosure 3 presents a summary of reactor scrams. One signi-ficant event was identified for input to NRC's performance indicator program.

Cr.e event was suggested for long-term followup.

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lN E WaynpLanning, Chief Events Assessment Branch Division of Operational Events Assessment Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation i

Enclosures:

As stated 1 cc w/Enclo.: l See Next Page )

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4 ENCLOSURE 1 QSTOFATTENDEES i OPERATING REACTORS EVENTS,BRIEFlhG (68-23)

June 7, 1988  :

NAME ORGANIZATION NAME ' 0RGANIZATION W.Lanning NRR/00EA P. Baranowsky - NRR/00EA J. Carter NRR/00EA R. Scholl - NRR/00EA-T. Iturley NRR E. Rossi NRR/00EA D. Kubicki NRR/ECEB D. McPherson NRR/00NRR W. Lyon NRR/SRXB D. Moran OSP/TVA ,

H. Berkow NRR/PD22

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ENCLOSURE 2

- 0PERATING REACTORS EVENTS BRIEFING 88-23 EVENTS ASSE.SSMENT BRANCH LOCATION: 12-B-ll WHITE FLINT-TUESDAY, JUNE 7, 1988.,_11:00 A.M. ,

V0GTLE WATER LEAKAGE INTO CONTROL ROOM PEACH BOTTOM 2/3 CARD 0X SYSTEM IN CONTROL ROOM GENERIC ISSUE LOCA DURING SHUTDOWN I

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88-23 V0GTLE WATER LEAKAGE INTO CONTROL ROOM JUNE 3, 1988 PROBLEM ADVERSE SYSTEMS INTERACTION BETWEEN FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEM AND PLANT SAFETY SYSTEM CAUSE POTENTIAL PLANT DESIGN INADEQUACIES SIGNIFICANCE FIRE IN "B" TRAIN CABLE SPREADING ROOM COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF ALL CONTROL ROOM MONITORING CAPABILITY DISE)M108

  • ON JUNE 3, 1988 WITH UNIT AT 100% POWER, SPURIOUS ACTUATION OF FIRE SYSTEM CAUSED DELUGE SYSTEM PRE-ACTUATION VALVE TO OPEN
  • DRAIN COULD NOT HANDLE BLEED LINE FLOW
  • SMALL AMOUNT OF WATER OVERFLOWED AND FOUND WAY UNDER DOOR TO "B" TRAIN CABLE SPREADING ROOM
  • WATER SEEPED THROUGH PENETRATION SEAL INTO CONTROL ROOM BELOW, WETTING THREE PROCESS PANELS AND CAUSING ONE PORV TO OPEN
  • LICENSEE EVENT REVIEW INDICATES POTENTIAL ADVERSE SYSTEMS INTERACTION l
  • IN THE EVENT OF A FIRE IN THE "B" TRAIN CABLE SPREADING ROOM A) THE "B" TRAIN ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION COULD BE DISABLED B) THE "A" TRAIN ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION COULD BE DISABLED BY FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEM WATER LEAKING INTO THE ,

CONTROL ROOM

88-23 2

FOLLOWUP

  • LICENSEE HAS COMPLETED THE FOLLOWING CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

-SEALED ELECTRICAL PENETRATIONS WATERTIGHT i

-lNSTALLED TEMPORARY DRAIN LINES FROM THE PRE-ACTUATION FIRE SUPPRESSION DELUGE VALVES

-BUILT AN EIGHT INCH BERM WITH SANDBAGS AT ENTRANCE TO "B" TRAIN CABLE SPREADING ROOM

-DISABLED THE "B" TRAIN CABLE SPREADING ROOM FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEM AND ESTABLISHED CONTINU0US FIREWATCH

  • REGION 11 HAS DISPATCHED A FIRE PROTECTION SPECIALIST TO THE SITE
  • INFORMATION NOTICE UNDER CONSIDERATION i l CONTACT: D. OUDINOT

REFERENCE:

50,72 # 12471 4

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88-23 PEACH BOTTOM 2/3 CARD 0X SYSTEM IN CONTROL ROOM PROBLEM CARBON DIOXIDE UNDER PRCSSURE (285 PSIG) WAS INTRODUCED INTO THE CONTROL ROOM (FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM). A POSTULATED RUPTURE WOULD CAUSE BOTH CONTROL ROOMS TO BE UNINHABITABLE.

CA!1SE THE CARD 0X SYSTEM WAS ARMED BY LIFTING A N0ZZLE OFF ITS HOOK SIGNif!CANCE CONSECUENCES OF HOSE FAILURE IN CONTROL ROOM AND DISCHARGE OF CO2 NOT EVALUATED. INSUFFICIENT TIME TO TAKE ACTIONS TO ACTUATE ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL.

DISCUSSION

  • BOTH REACTORS SHUT DOWN
  • BLISTERED HOSES DISCOVERED OCT 1, 1987
  • CARD 0X SYSTEM FOR C.R AND TURBINE DECK TAKEN OUT-0F-SERVICE OCT 1, 1987  ;
  • NEW H0SES INSTALLED NOV 19, 1987 ,
  • DURING VERIFICAT10!i TEST MARCH 24, 1988 A HOSE ON TURBINE DECK i

RUPTURED

  • LICENSEE QUOTED AS SAYING CONTROL ROOM COULD BECOME UNIHABITABLE 2 MINUTES AFTER FAILURE OF H0SE l

EOLLQWUP

  • ASSESS FIX AT PEACH BOTTOM FOR ACCEPTABILITY l
  • PREPARE GENERIC C0hMUNICATION THAT IDENTIFIES ADVERSE SYSTEM l

!NTERACTION CAUSED BY FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS /0PERATION l

CONTACT: JERRY CARTER

REFERENCE:

50.72 # 12455

' L 88-23 GENERIC ISSUE LOSS OF RCS INVENTORY DURING LOW COOLANT LEVEL OPERATION JUNE 8, 1988 PROBLEM SUDDEN LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM INVENTORY WHILE CONDUCTING STEAM GENERATOR TUBE INSPECTIONS AND MODIFICATIONS WITH HOT LEG N0ZZLE DAMS IN PLACE 1

CAUSE PROCEDURAL INADEQUACIES COMBINED WITH OPERATOR ERRORS AND l TNSTRUMENTATION INACCURACIES (RVRLIS)

SIGNIFICANCE THE LOSS OF RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL CAPABILITY DURING LOW REACTOR COOLANT LEVEL OPERATION HAS LED IN SEVERAL CASES TO B0ILING IN THE REACTOR VESSEL. IF THIS SHOULD OCCUR, PRESSURIZATION OF THE REACTOR VESSEL CAN LEAD TO SUDDEN UNCOVERING OF THE CORE BY THE EXPULSION C00LANT THROUGH ANY OPENING IN THE COLD LEG SIDE OF THE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM.

DISCUSS 10_N

  • DURING THE SECOND REFUELING 0F DIABLO CANYON UNIT 1, IN THE SPRING 0F 1988, DEFICIENCIES IN THE PROCEDURES TO BE USED DURING THE STEAM GENERATOR TUBE INSPECTIONS WERE IDENTIFIED THAT C0'lLD i SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF A SUDDEN EJECTION OF REACTOR COOLANT FOLLOWED BY UNCOVERING 0F THE CORE  ;
  • WITH THE RCS DRAINED DOWN TO MID-LOOP OPERATION, THE LICENSEE l REMOVED THE S/G MANWAY COVERS FOR ACCESS TO HOT & COLD LEG PLENUMS,  ;
  • N0ZZLE DAMS ARE THEN PLACED IN THE HOT AND COLD LEG SIDES IN I

THE S/G PLENUM N0ZZLES S0 THAT THE Rx VESSEL LEVEL CAN BE RAISED T0 INCREASE NPSH FOR THE RHR PUMPS WITHOUT REFILLING THE S/G's.

  • THE PROBLEM-!F TilF H0T LEG DAMS ARE INSTALLED BEFORE THE COLD LEG DAMS, THEN A SMALL INCREASE IN Rx VESSEL , PRESSURE (APPR0X 2.5 PSI), AS WOULD BE SEEN FROM A LOSS OF RHR CAUSING STEAM BUILDUP IN THE VESSEL, WOULD CAUSE Rx COOLANT TO BE EXPELLED RAPIDLY FROM THE OPEN COLD LEG MANWAYS, AND UNC0VER THE TOP 0F THE CORE

88-23 2

  • LOSS OF RHR CAPABILITY (WITH DAMS IN PLACE) COULD CAUSE BOILING IN THE CORE WITHIN 8-15 MINUTES
  • AN OPENING IN A RCS COLD LEG, SUCH AS ONE CAUSED BY THE OPENING OF A REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM PUMP OR A LOOP ISOLATION VALVE (IN SOME PLANTS), WOULD VENT THE SPACE OF THE AFFECTED COLD LEG, MAltlTAINING THIS SPACE AT ATMOSPHERIC PRESSURE, ANY PRESSURE INCREASE WOULD BE PROPAGATED THROUGHOUT THE REMAINDER OF THE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM AND FORCE THE COOLANT LEVELS IN THE VESSEL DOWN WHILE THE DISPLACED COOLANT THAT WOULD BE FORCED UP AND OUT OF THE AFFECTED COLD LEG OPENIN
  • NOTE THAT THIS MECHANISM, INVOLVING COOLANT EXPULSION THROUGH A COLD LEG OPENING, DOES NOT REQUIRE PLUGGING 0F THE STEAM GENERATOR N0ZZLES
  • IN 88-36 (T0 BE ISSUED JUNE 8, 1988) STATES 30 MINUTES AS APPR0X TIME TO B0ll-THIS IS DIABLO CANYON SPECIFIC, ASSUMING REAL-WORLD NUMBERS
  • POSSIBLE FIXES WOULD BE TO ENSURE THAT A S/G HOT LEG MANWAY AND i ASSOCIATED HOT LEG PIPE ARE KEPT OPEN TO PROVIDE AN ADECUATE VENT PATH WHEN OPENING UP THE COLD LEG SIDE
  • IN ADDITION, NOT INSTALLING THE LAST HOT LEG N0ZZLE DAM UNTIL A SUFFICIENT VENT PATH HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED WOULD HELP PREVENT A PRESSU DIFFERENTIAL FROM EJECTING A N0ZZLE DAM.

EOLLOWUE

  • NRR AND RV T0 ISSUE IN 88-36, "POSSIBLE SUDDEN LOSS OF RCS INVENTORY DURING LOW COOLANT LEVEL OPERATION"
  • RSB HAS LEAD FOR ISSUING A BULLETIN ON LOSS OF RllR DURING LOW l

RCS INVENTORY CONTACT: JOHN THOMPSON (x21175) ,

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I 1 F4;e N:. 1 06/03/03 FERFCRMahCE !OlCATORS 5!SN1FICANT EVINi$

FiANT 41TI EVENT E'iE%TCESCRIFTICN GiR $16h!FICAkCE IATE FEDI : (4/Ci!!! IWi!CnN CCOLINS LOST Wlfii CNLY AVAILAILE RWR PLPP 0 FCIENTIAL FCR CR AtigAL g[p;;At tg DEAthEAOED. OF SAFETY RELATED Eh!8 PENT l

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j ENCLOSURE 3 REACTOR SCRAM SUMMAM NEEK ENDIN6 05/29/00

1. PLANT SPECIFIC DATA i SITE UNii F0sER SI6 MAL CAUSE COMPLl- YTD yid fiD DATE i CAi!0NS A60VE BELON TOTAL 151 151 0 2 2 05/30/88 BRAIDWOOD 2 0M EQUIPMENT NO 1 38 A UNKNOWN NO 2 0 2 06/01/89 SUMMER NATURAL PHENOM NO 2 0 2 06/01/09 SUSQUEHANNA 1 100 A i YES 2 1 3 06/01/896!N%A 1 98 A EQUIPMENT 06/02/8BIqRC4 2 94 A 0%tN0tN N3 3 0 3 l 21 A E2VIFRENT NO 2 0 2 06/02/93 N!b!MILEPOINT 2 3 1 4 06/04/69 CATAnlA 2 38 M OFERATOR ERROR NO 4  ;

8A 0FERATOR ERECR NO 1 3 06/05/2iFERRf 1 l

SUMMARY

OF CCMPLICAi!0NS

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S!TE UNIT CCRPLICAi!CNS l

l 61N%A 12 M0Y FAILED 10 0FE5 ATE AS EIPECTED.A doric ACID TANK LEVEL SENSOR FAILED I HI6H,THERE NAS A RUID FR!MARf SYSTEM COOLDOWN AND A LEAKlh6 REACTOR VESSEL HEAD l VENT I  ;

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1. PLANT SPECIFIC DATA BASED ON INITIAL REVIEW OF 50.72 REPORTS FOR THE WEEK OF INTEREST. PERIOD IS MIDNIGHT SUNDAY THROUGH l

MIDNIGHT SUNDAY. SCRAMS ARE DEFINED AS REACTOR PROTECTIVE ACTUATIONS WHICH RESULT IN ROD MOTION, AND EXCLUDE PLANNED i

TESTS OR SCRAMS AS PART OF PLANNED SHUTDOWN IN ACCORDANCE WITH A PLANT PROCEDURE. THERE ARE 109 REACTORS HOLDING AN OPERATING LICENSE.

2. COMPLICATIONS: RECOVERY COMPLICATED BY EQUIPMENT FAILURES OR PERSONNEL ERRORS UNRELATED TO CAU5F. OF SCRAM,  ;

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3. PERSONNEL RELATED PROBLEMS INCLUDE HUMAN ERROR, PROCEDURAL '

DEFICIENCIES, AND RAhUAL STEAM GENERATOR LEVEL CONTROL PROBLEMS.

i 4 "0THER" INCLUDES AUTOMATIC SCRAMS ATTRIBUTED TO ENVIRONMENTAL CAUSES (LIGHTNING), SYSTEM DESIGN, OR UNKNOWN CAUSE. j l

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