ML20245A385
| ML20245A385 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Beaver Valley, Salem, Indian Point, 05000000 |
| Issue date: | 05/30/1989 |
| From: | Lanning W Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Rossi C Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| OREM-89-020, OREM-89-20, NUDOCS 8906210297 | |
| Download: ML20245A385 (17) | |
Text
_ - _ - _ -
1
- l-W 8 0 Iggg MEMORANDUM FOR:
Charles E. Rossi Director Division of Operational Events Assessment FROM:
Wayne D. Lanning, Chief Events Assessment Branch Division of Operational Events Assessment
SUBJECT:
.THE OPERATING REACTORS EVENTS MEETING May 24, 1989.- MEETING 89-20 Cn May 24, 1989, an Operating Reactors Events meeting (89 20) was held to brief senior managers from NRR, AE00, RES, Commission Staff, and Regional Offices on events which occurred since our last meeting on May 10, 1989.
The list of attendees is included as Enclosure 1.
Please note that no Operating Reactors Events meeting was held the week of May 17, 1989.
.The events discussed and the significant elements of these events are presented C in Enclosure 2.
A summary of reactor scrams for the week ending.05/14/89 and 05/21/89 ere presented in Enclosure 3.
Two significant events were identified
.for input into-the NRC performance-indicator program.
Mcimi En: a pf Wayne D. Lanning, Chief Events Assessment Branch Division of Operational Events Assessment
Enclosures:
As stated cc w/ Encl.:
See Next Page DISTRIBUTION e CentraMue.
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-T. Murley, NRR P. Tam, NRR F. Miraglia, NRR J. Stolz, NRR J. Sniezek, NRR D. Brinkman, NRR E.' Jordan, AE00 R. Capra, NRR J. Taylor, ED0 J. Stone, NRR E. Beckjord, RES W. Butler, NRR W. Russell, RI S. Ebneter, Ril
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Davis, Rlli R. D. Martin, RIV J. B. Martin, RV W. Kane, R1 L. Reyes, RII E. Greenman, R111 L.' Callan, RIV.
R. Zimmerman, RV S. Varga, NRR B. Boger, NRR G. Lainas, NRR L. Shao, NRR B. Grimes, NRR F. Congel, NRR E.' Weiss, AE0D T. Martin, ED0 J. Lieberman, OE J. Guttmann, SECY A. Thadani, NRR J. Richardson, NRR
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-MEMORAt400M FOR:
Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational Events Assessment FROM:
Wayne D. Lanning, Chief Events Assessment Branch Division of Operational Events Assessinent
SUBJECT:
THE OFERAT114G REACT 0f:S EVEt4TS MEETlf4G May E4,1989 - MEET 1t1G 89-20 On May 24, 1989, an Opereting Reactors Events raeeting (89-20) was held to brief senior managers f rom tiRR, AE00, RES, Comission Staf f, end Regionel Of fices on evcnts which occurred since our last n:etting on May 10, 1989.
The list of ettendees is included as Enclosure 1.
Please note that no Operating Reactors Events irecting was held the week of May 17, 1969.
The events discussed and the significant elements of these events are preser.ted in Enclosure 2.
A summery of reector screrts for the weeks ending 05/14 and 05/21/89 are presented in Enclosure 3.
Two significant events were identified for input into the 14RC performance indicator program.
O t
tu: w Lhe.
Wayne D. Lenning, Chief Events Assessinent Branch Divisicr. of Operational Events Asscssment
Enclosures:
As stated cc w/ Encl.:
See l' ext Page I
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ENCLOSURE'l LIST OF ATTENDEES OPERATING REACTORS EVENTS BRIEFING (89-20)
May 24, 1989 NAME ORGANIZATION NAME ORGANIZATION T. Murley D:NRR A. Thadani NRR/ DEST D. Brinkman NRR/PD1-1 J. Dyer NRR/DRIS V. Benaroya AEOD/DSP L. Norrholm OCM/KC R. Karsch '
NRR/D0EA W. Lanning NRR/00EA F. Rosa NRR/SELB R. Lobel NRR/00EA M. Reardon NRR/DOEA J. Stone NRR/PD1-1 J. Carter NRR/DOEA D. Neighbors NRR/PD1-1 J. Knight NRR/ DEST P. Gwynn OCM/LZ J. Hayes NRR/PD2-1 M. Chiramal AE0D/ROAB J. Guttmann SECY L. Tran NRR/ DEST
- 5. Newberry NRR/ DEST K. Connaughton OCM/JC 1
R. Borchardt OEDO J. Stolz NRR/PD1-4 P. Tam NRR/PD1-4 W. Minners RES/DSIR D. Moran NRR/TVA G. Leines RES/DSIR i
4 4
9
I ENCLOSURE 2 i
OPERATING REACTORS EVENTS BRIEFING 89 20 EVENTS ASSESSMENT BRANCH
. LOCATION:
12B-11, WHITE FLINT WEDNESDAY, MAY 24, 1989, 11:00 A.M.
BEAVER VALLEY UNIT'1 FAILURE OF AMSAC POWER SUPPLY CAUSES REACTOR TRIP ANC SAFETY INJECTION INDIAN POINT UNIT 1 SINGLE FAILURE OF SWITCH CN UNDERVOLTAGE DETECTION CIRCulT CAN CAUSE LOSS OF VITAL POWER SALEM UNIT 1 LOSS OF RHR DUE TO INADVERTENT ACCUMULATOR DISCHARGE 2
L 69-20 EEAVER VALLEY UNIT 1 FAILURE OF AMSAC POWER SUPPLY CAUSES REACTOR TRIP AED_ SAFETY INJECTION MAY 18, 1989 PROBLEB THE FAILURE CF NON-SAFETY-RELATED ATWS MITIGATING SYSTEM ACTUATION CIRCUlTRY (AMSAC) INSTALLED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ATWS RULE (10 CFR 50.62) CAUSED A PLANT TRANSIENT WHEN 10 STEAM DUMP VALVES (SDV) OPENED:
DURING POWER OPERATION LAUSE LOSS OF AMSAC POWER.
SAFETY SifNIFlfahff o
THE FAILURE OF NON-SAFETY-RELATED ECUIPMENT CAUSED A PLANT TRAUSIENT RESULTING IN CHALLENGES TO PLANT SAFETY SYSTEMS.
o Tile EFFECTS OF FAILURES OF CIRCUlTRY (INSTALLED DURING PLANT MODIFICATIONS) CN PLANT OPERATION WAS NOT SUFFICIENTLY ANALYZED, AND THE CIRCUIT DESIGN WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TO PREVENT CONTROL SYSTEM INTERACTIONS THAT COULD RESULT IN PLANT TRANSIENTS.
DISCUSS 10h o
UNIT WAS OPERATING AT E9 POWER o
120 VAC CIRCUIT BREAKER PROVIDlNC POWER TC THE AMSAC PANEL WAS INADVERTENTLY OPENED (DELIEVED TO EE PERSONNEL ERROR).
o LOSS OF POWER TO AMSAC CAUSED CURRENT TO VOLTAGE (1/V)
CONVERTERS TO " LOAD EChN" THE TURBINE IMPULSE PRESSURE INSTRUMENT i.00PS. LA'JSING OTHER INSTRUMENTS FED FROM THE LOCP TO SENSE ERR 0NEOUS/ FALSE CONDITIONS NOT INDICATIVE OF ACTUAL PLANT CONDITIONS (SEE FIGURE 1).
o THIS f.ESULTED IN 10 SLVs OPENING; RCS PRESSURE DECREASEC TO IS50 PSI AND TEMPERATURE DECREASED TO 510*F.
CONT!(T:
R. KENDALL SIGEVENT NC
REFERENCE:
10 CFR 50.72 # 15639
l BEAVER VALLEY UNIT 1 89-20
^
o AMSAC FUNCTIONED AS DESIGNED (1.E., DID NOT ACTUATE ON LOSS OF POWER).
AMSAC IS DESIGNED TO START AFW AND TRIP THE MAIN TURBINE UPON SENSING LOW MFW FLOW.
TURBINE IMPULSE PRESSURE IS USED AS A PERMISSIVE ABOVE 40% POWER (SEE FIGURE 2),
o CORRECTIVE ACTION IS TO INSTALL ADDITIONAL ISOLATORS AT THE INPUT TO AMSAC TO PREVENT LOSS OF AMSAC POWER FROM AFFECTING THE INSTRUMENT LOOP.
O THE AMSAC FOR BEAVER VALLEY UNIT 1 WAS DESIGNED AND SUPPLIED BY FOXEORD.
THIS DESIGN MAY BE GENERIC TO OTHER WESTINGHOUSE PLANTS.
FOLLOWUP EAB TO DETERMINE GENERIC APPLICABILITY AND PREPARE AN INFORMATION NOTICE, IF NECESSARY.
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IEDJAN POINT UNIT 2 SINGLE-FAILURE OF SWITCH ON UNEERVOLTAGE DETECTION CIRCUIT CAN CAUSE LOSS OF VITAL POWER MAY P, 1989 PROBLEM A SINGLE FAILURE COULD DISABLE ALL EMERGENCY BUSES.
fMSE A-SHORT CIRCUlT IN A BUS SELECT SWITCH FOR THE CONTROL ROOM VOLT METER CAN BLOCK LOAD SECUENCING ONTO THE EMERGENCY BUSES.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE THIS IS A LOW PROBABILITY EVENT, BUT THE CONSEQUENCES ARE LOSS CF ALL SAFEGUARD LOALS.
DISfi!S_S10h o
REACTOR CURRENTLY IN REFUELING OUTAGE.
0-AN NRC TEAM INSPECTION AT INDIAN POINT UNIT 2 DURING THE FIRST WEEK OF MfY IDENTIFIED THIS DESIGN DEFICIENCY.
O ALL-FOUR INDEPENDENT 400V DIESEL BACKED SAFETY BUSES COME TOGETHER AT A SELECTOR SWITCH FOR THE EMERGENCY BUS VOLT METER Ik THE CONTRCL ROOM.
o THE WIRING TO THIS SWITCH INCLUDES UNDERVOLTAGE SENSORS FOR STARTING THE DIESELS AND SECUENCING LOADS ONTO THE EMERGENCY BUSES.
o A SHORT CIRCUIT IN THAT ShlTCH CAN LE-ENERGIZE THE UNDERVOLTAGE RELAYS FOR ONE CR MCRE EMERGENCY BUSES PEEVENTING SEQUENCING 0F' SAFEGUARD LOALS GR POSSIBLY STRIPPING OFF LOADS ALREADY POWERED BY THE BUS.
EQLLDl!1!f 0
THIS ISSUE MUST BE RESOLVED PRIOR TO RESTART.
O REGION I WILL DETERMINE 1F THIS DEFICIENCY EXISTS AT INDIAN FOINT UNIT 3.
O REG 10N 1 WilL DETERMINE ACCEPTABILITY OF LICENSEE'S FlX.
CONTACT:
R. KARSCH SIGEVENT YES REFERETE:
TELECON FROM REGION 1 TO PROJECT MANAGER
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89-20 SALEM UNIT 1 LOSS OF RHR DUE TO INADVERTENT ACCUMULATOR DISCHARGE MAY 20, 1989 PROBLEM RHR FLOW LOST FOR APPR0XIMATELY 50 MINUTES,
.CMSE GAS BINDING 0F THE RHR PUMPS DUE T0 INADVERTENT RELEASE OF NITROGEN FROM AN ACCUMULATOR TANK INTO THE RCS AND RHR SYSTEMS SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE DECAY HEAT REMOVAL IS A CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION.
DISCUSSION o
PLANT SHUTDOWN MARCH 23, 1989, FOR REFUELING (MODE 5),
o REACTOR VESSEL HEAD REPLACED, AIR IN REACTOR VESSEL HEAD AND STEAM GENERATOR TUBES, PZR RELIEF VALVES BLOCKED OPEN, c
PRE-STARTUP TESTING OF ACCUMULATOR DISCHARGE CAPABILITY, o
ACCUMULATOR ISOLATION VALVES UNBLOCKED, OPENED, AND CLOSED.
o INCREASE IN PRESSURIZER LEVEL INDICATES ACCUMULATOR OPERABILITY.
o ACCUMULATOR 13 ISOLATION VALVE NOT UNBLOCKED (OPERATOR ERROR) o VALVE 13 OPENED BUT COULD NOT BE RECLOSED FOR 70 SECONDS, o
ACCUMULATOR 13 PRESSURE FROM 615 PSI TO 62 PSI.
o RCS PRESSURE FROM 14 PSI TO 52 PSI, o
PRESSURIZER LEVEL 34L TO E5%.
o PRESSURIZER LEVEL 65% TO 100% WITH ACCUMULATOR ISOLATED, o
RHR DISCHARGE DIVERTED TO RkST 10 LOWER PZR LEVEL, o
RCS PRESSURE, RHR FLOW, AND RHR PUMP CURRENT DECREASING.
o OPERATING RHR PUMP 12.c]UNEED DIFFERENT BUT NOT LIKE CAVITATION, o
RHR PUMP 11 dTARTED.
FLUCTUATING CURRENT, o
NO FLOW IN BOTH PUMPS.
0 EDTH RHR FUNPS STOPPED AND VENTED.
c RHR PUMP 12 RESTARTED AhD STOPPED (NO FLOW, LOW CURRENT),
O CFAVITY FitL OF RCS.
CONTACT:
W. JENSEh SIGEVENT
_YES_
REFERENCES:
10 CFR 5C.71 # 15675 AND MORNING REPORT 05/23/E9 i?
SALEM. UNIT 1 89-20 0
WATER GDSERVED FROM RHR VENTS.
0 EOTH RHR PUMPS STARTED.
o RCS HEAD VENTS CLOSED.
O RHR WAS LOST FOR.50 MINUTES.
O RHR HEATUP WAS FROM 90*F TO 122*F.
O LICENSEE TO MODIFY ACCUMULATOR ISOLATION VALVE CONTROL PANEL.
O GENERIC EVALUATION BY WESTINGHOUSE INDICATES ACCUMULATOR NITROGEN DISCHARGE IS NOT A PROBLEM FOLLOWING LOCA (NUREG-0611, P. Vill-33).
FOLLOWUP o
REACTOR SYSTEMS BRANCH REPRESENTATIVE SENT TO SITE.
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SALEM UNIT 1 a
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- g ENCLOSURE 3
~ Pege No. -
1 05/24/B9-PERFORMANCE INDICATORS S!6NIFICANT EVENTS PLAN 7 NAME EVENT EVENT DESCRIPTION GTRSIGNIFICANCE DATE NINIGILEFDINT2 02/04/89 PENETRATIONS HAVE BEEN FOUND WITHOUT SEALS AND WITH 0 PDTENTIAL FOR OR ACTUAL DEGRADATION
.lNADEGUATE SEALS,.AS A RESULT, INTERNAL FLOODING BYFASS OF SAFETY-RELATED EQUIPMENT WATER TISHT CAMS AND AFFECT ESF CABLINS, HENCE ESF OPERABILITY.
SALER 1 05/20/89 LDSS OF RHR FNM INADVERTENT ACCUMULATOR NITR06EN O PDTENTIAL FDR OR ACTUAL DEGRADATION DISCHARGE.
OF SAFETY-RELATED EQUIPMENT'
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AEACTOR SCRAM
SUMMARY
WEEKENDING 05/j4/99 J. PLANT SPECIFIC DATA DATE SITE UNIT POWER 516NAL CAUSE COMPL1-YTD YTD YTD CAtl0NS ABOVE DELOW TOTAL 152 151 05/11/89 BRAIDWD0D 2
67 A EQUIPMENT ND 1
0 1
05/11/B9 MILLSTONE 3 100 A PERSONNEL ND 2
0 2
05/12/89 VD6fLE 2
78 A EQUIPMENT NO 2
0 2
Itatf01SCligSU5 Half Witt18D11005/21/89
- 1. PLAlf SPICillC NfA Mf!
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tilf TOWEB SIGNAL CAUSt COEPL1-ffD ffD ffD l
C&fl0l5 iB0ft BILOW f0fAL 151 151 05/18/89!!afil1ALLIT 1
69A IQVlftlif YES 3
0 3
05/16/890!$flBCillt 1 100i FIRS 0il!L f!S 1
1 2
05/19/68?!ACEB0ff0E 20A IQUIPf!If 50 1
0 1
f SUBHlifofCMPLICifl0l!
SifI Clilf 00lPLitif10I5 516814 1 AUIll!Alf it!Dvifil Aff0AfD - LOAD !!!!Cf
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.c NOTES 1.
PLANT SPECIFIC DATA BASED ON INITIAL REVIEW 0F 50.72 REPORTS FOR THE WEEK OF INTEREST.
PERIOD IS MIDNIGHT SUNDAY THROUGH MIDNIGHT SUNDAY.
SCRAMS ARE DEFINED AS REACTOR PROTECTIVE ACTUATIONS WHICH RESULT IN R0D MOTION, AND EXCLUDE PLANNED TESTS OR SCRAMS AS PART OF PLANNED SHUTDOWN IN ACCORDANCE WITH A PLANT PROCEDURE.
THERE ARE 111 REACTORS HOLDING AN OPERATING LICENSE.
2.
COMPLICATIONS: RECOVERY COMPLICATED BY EQUIPMENT FAILURES OR PERSONNEL ERRORS UNRELATED TO CAUSE OF SCRAM.
3.
PERSONNEL RELATED PROBLEMS INCLUDE HUMAN ERROR, PROCEDURAL DEFICIENCIES, AND MANUAL STEAM GENERATOR LEVEL CONTROL PROBLEMS.
4.
"0THER" INCLUDES AUTOMATIC SCRAMS ATTRIBUTED TO ENVIRONMENTAL CAUSES (LIGHTNING), SYSTEM DESIGN, OR UNKNOWN CAUSE.
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