ML20247D344

Summary of Operating Reactors Events Meeting 89-19 on 890510.List of Attendees,Events Discussed & Significant Elements of Events & Rept of long-term Followup Assignments & Summary of Scrams for Wk Ending 890507 Encl

ML20247D344
Person / Time
Site:	Millstone, Calvert Cliffs, Comanche Peak, 05000000
Issue date:	05/16/1989
From:	Lanning W Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Rossi C Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
OREM-89-019, OREM-89-19, NUDOCS 8905250367
Download: ML20247D344 (17)

Text

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational Events Assessment l

FROM: Wayne D. Lanning, Chief i Events Assessment Branch Division of Operational Events Assessment

SUBJECT:

THE OPERATING REACTORS EVENTS MEETING '

May 10, 1989 - MEETING 89-19 On May 10, 1989, an Operating Reactors Events meeting (89-19) was held to brief senior managers from NRR, AE0D, RES, Commission Staff, and Regional Offices on events which occurred since our last meeting on May 5, 1989.

The list of attendees is included as Enclosure 1.

The events discussed and the significant elements of these events are presented in Enclosure 2. Enclosure 3 presents a report-to-date of long-term followup assignments and a summary of reactor scrams for the week ending 05/07/89.

Two significant events were identified for input into the NRC performance indicator program.

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Wayne D. Lanning, Chief Events Assessment Branch Division of Operational Events Assessment

Enclosures:

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational Events Assessment FROM: Wayne D. Lanning, Chief Events Assessment Branch Division of Operational Events Assessment

SUBJECT:

THE OPERATING REACTORS EVENTS MEETING May 10, 1989 - MEETINE 89-19 On May 10, 1989, an Operating Reactors Events meeting (89-19) was held to brief senior managers from NRP, AE00, RES, Comission Staff, and Regional Offices on events which occurred since our last meetirg on May 5, 1989.

The list of attendees is included as Enclosure 1.

The events discussed and the significant elements of these events are presented in Enclosure 2. Enclosure 3 presents a report-to-date of long-term followup assignments and a sumary of reactor scrams for the week ending 05/07/89.

Two significant events were identified for input into the NRC performance indicator program.

Wa e D. Lanning, Chi f Events Assessment Bra h Division of Operational Assessment

Enclosures:

As stated cc w/ Encl.:

See Next Page

ENCLOSURE 1 LIST OF ATTENDEES OPERATING REACTORS EVENTS BRIEFING (89-19)

May 10, 1989 NAME ORGANIZATION NAME ORGANIZATION F. Miraglie NRR/ADT E. Rossi NRR/DOEA V. Benaroya AE0D/DSP J. Konklin NRR/DRIS J. Hall NRR/PD3-3 E. Adensam NRR/DRP M. Malloy NRR/CPPD N. Fields NRR/DOEA J. Lyons NRR/CPPD A. Gilbert NRR/DOEA R. Heal NRR/DREP R. Auluck NRR/ADSP R. Perfetti OE B. Clayton OEDO W. Troskoski OE J. Rajan NRR/ DEST J. Partlow NRR/ADP B. Grimes NRR/DRIS W. P. inners RES/DSIR P. Baranowsky HRR/DOEA R. Lobel NRR/D0EA B. Boger NRR/ADR-1 S. McNeil NRR/PD1-1 M. Reardon NRR/DOEA R. Barrett NRR/DREP

EllCLOSURE 2 l

OPERATING REACTORS EVENTS BRIEFING 89-19 EVENTS ASSESSMENT BRANCH LDCATION: 12B-11, WHITE FLINT WEDNESDAY, MAY 10, 1989, 11:00 A.M.

CALVERT CLIFFS UNIT 2 V' BORIC ACID BUILDUP AT PRESSURIZER HEATERS COMANCHE PEAK UNIT 1 HOT WATER INTRUSION INTO AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM (UPDATE)

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MILLSTONE UNIT 2 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE PLUG CRACKING

89-19'

[ALVERT CtlEES_]JNIT 2 BORIC ACID BUILDUP AT PRESSURIZER HEATERS MAY 5, 1989 PROBLEM BUILDUP OF BORIC ALID CRYSTALS ON THE HEATER SLEEVES (22 0F 120)

LOCATED ON THE BOTTOM HEAD OF THE PRESSURIZER.

i GISE POSSIBLE CRACKS IN THE INCONEL SLEEVES WELDED TO BOTTOM OF PRESSURIZER VESSEL, LICENSEE STILL INVESTIGATING ROOT CAUSE.

SAFET1 SIGNIFICANCE DEGRADATION OF REACTOR COOLANT B0UNDARY.

DISCUSSIQB o ON MAY 4, 1989, WHILE IN MODE 6, THE LICENSEE DETERMINED THAT APPROX-22 0F 12C PRESSURIZER HEATER SLEEVES HAD BORIC ACID BUILDUP IN UNIT 2.

c ON MAY 5, 1989, INITIATED PLANT SHUTDOWN OF UNIT 1 TO MODE 5.

c VISUALLY INSPECTED UNIT I FOR BORIC ACID BUILDUP, NONE FOUND.

o UNIT'1 IS PRESENTLY SHUTDOWN.

o AS OF MAY 9, 1989, LICENSEE IS REMOVING INSULATION AR0UND PRESSURIZER TO MAKE THE AREA ACCESSIBLE FOR DETAILED INSPECTION.

SIMILAR EVENT AT ARKANSAS UNIT 2 ( APRIL _2L_JSBZ.)

o THE LICENSEE DISCOVERED A NON-IS0LABLE LEAK AND PITTING AT THE BOTTOM OF THE PRESSURIZER, o THE CAUSE OF THE LEAKAGE IS BELIEVED TO BE POOR WELDING BY THE CONTRACTOR (CE), AND EXPOSURE OF ELECTRICAL INSULATION WITHIN THE SHEATH TO WATER WHICH RESULTED IN EXPANSION OF THE INSULATION AND AXIAL CRACKS IN THE PENETRATION SLEEVE AND SEAL WELD. THIS EVENT LED TO STRESS CORROSION FAILURE OF THE HEATER SHEATH MANUFACTURED FROM INCONEL.

CONTACT: D. SOLOR10 SIGEVENT: YES-

REFERENCES:

10 CFR 50.72 # 15540

CALVEP.T CLIFFS UhlT 2 89-19 I

l FOLLOWUP I o RESIDENT INSPECTOR WILL FOLLOWUP AND THERE WILL BE A REGIONAL REVIEW. i o EAE WILL CONTINUE TO FOLLOW FOR ROOT CAUSE DETERMINATION, 1

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89-19 l COMANCHE PEAK DNIT 1 HOT WATER INTRUSION INTO AUXJiljRY FEEDWATER SYSTEM (UPDATE)

APRIL 23, 1989 EEDELES BACKFLOW 0F HCT STEAM GENERATOR INVENTCRY INTO AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM PIPlhC.

ChDEE OPERATOR ERROR AND MECHANICAL FAILURES.

l SAFETY SIShlfffah[f AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM INOPERABLE.

DISCUSSJDB o ON APRIL 23, 19ES, DURING HOT FUNCTIONAL TESTING OF THE AUXILIARY FEEDWATER (AFW) SYSTEM, HOT STEAM GENERATOR INVENTORY FLOWED INTO AFW SYSTEM PIPING.

o A COMBINATION OF OPERATOR ERROR AND MECHANICAL FAILURES ,

CONTRIBUTED TO THIS EVENT.

o MAY 3, 1989, POST-EVENT TESTING HAS DETERMINED THAT THE CHECK VALVES ASSOCIATED WITH THE DISCHARGE HEADERS FOR BOTH MOTOR DRIVEN AUX FEEDWATER PUMPS (MDAFWP) AND TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMPS (TDAFWP) ARE INEFFECTIVE AS FLOW OR PRESSURE B0UNDARIES.

o THE FEED LINE CHECK VALVES FOR EACH STEAM GENERATOR WERE SATISFACTORILY TESTED FOR BACKLEAKAGE, INDICATING ONE OR BOTH VALVES IN EACH SERIES OPERATED AS DESIGNED.

o LICENSEE'S VIEW IS THAT THE FLOW PATH FOR STEAM GENERAT9R BACKLEAKAGE MAY HAVE INVOLVED THE MAIN FEEDWATER BYPASS ISOLATION VALVE AND THE FEEDWATER PRE-HEATED ISOLATION VALVE.

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o THE PLANT IS li, COLD SHUTDOWN. ON THURSDAY, MAY 11, 1988, THE  !

LICENSEE WILL BRIEF THE REGION AND OSP PERSONNEL ON THEIR FINDINGS. i o FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL TESTING, CHECK VALVE DISASSEMBLY WILL COMMENCE l THIS WEEKENL (MAY 13 AND 14, 1589) AT THE EARLIEST. )

o AN AIT WILL BE DISPATCHED TO THE SITE TO VIEW THE VALVE DISASSEMBLY.

CONTACT: N. FIELDS SIGEVENT: YES_*

OSP MORNING REPORT OF MAY 1, 5, AND 8, 1989 l

REFERENCES:

• REPORTED AS A SlGEVENT ON 05/03/89, OR BRIEFING # 89-18

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[11LLSTONE UNIT 2 i STEAfi CENERATOR TUDE A R_ CRACKING MAY 2, 1989 PRC31fM THE LICENSEE FCUf;E S1EAM CENERATOR TUDE FLUC CRACKING INDICATIONS If; A NEWLY-IDEf:TIFIED HEAT CF WESTII;GHOUSE PLUGS.

fM.Ef THE RCCT CAUSE FCR CRACKING IN ThE NEWLY-IDENTIFIED HEAT OF PLUGS HAS NCT YET EElf; LETERMINED.

SAFETY SIChlfjfEff THE ADECUACY Of WESTINGHOUSE CORR 0SICN TEST IS CUESTIONED. ALSO, ThE h00T CAUSE CF RECEld PLLC CRACKING (INADECUATE ANNEALINC) MAY NCT EE THE CNLY MECliAfilSh FOR PLUG CRACKING. PLUG FAILURE CAN LEAD TO A STEAh CENERATCR TUDE RUPTURE ACCIDENT.

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o MILLSTONE 2 WAS IN A REFUELIf!G OUTAGE IN APRIL 1989, c 24E HCT LEC PLLGS CAME FROM CNE OF THREE PREVIOUSLY-IDENTIFIEL HEAT OF PLUCS (3513, 3962, AND 3278) THAT WERE INADEQUATELY ANNEALED ANL PARTICULARLY SUSCEPTIBLE TO PURE WATER STRESS CCRRCSION CEACKING (PWSCC).

L 50 HCT LEG PLUGS CAME FR0h THE NEWLY-IDENTIFIED HEAT OF PLUGS (4513) ALSC SUSCEPTIBLE TO CRACKING. 176 COLD LEG PLUGS CAME FECM THIS HEAT, DUT ARE NCT SENSITIVE TO THE N IIRE MECHANISM EUE TO THE LOW TEfiPERATURES AT THE COLD LEG.

c THE MILLSTONE E PLUGS FRCM THE PREVIOUSLY-IDENTIFIED HEATS WERE REPAILEL VIA THE PLUC-IN-PLUG (PIP) DESIGN, HOWEVER, PLUGS FROM THE NEWLY-IDENTIFIEL HEAT WERE IDENTIFIED AFTER lHE MILLSTCNE : RESTART.

CCNTACT: A. CILDERT SIGEVENT: _._@_

REFERENCE:

MCRNINC REPORT C5/1C/ES

filLL5 TONE UhlT 2 89-19 ,

1 c il 0F THE SL ll0T LEG PLUGS FROM HEAT 4523 ARE CONSERVATIVELY l FROJECTED TO REACH MINIMUM LIGAMEf4T (MINIMUM CR0dS-SECTIONAL ]

AREA 0F PLbG NECESSARY TO CONFIDENTLY PREVENT TENSILE FAILURE i 0F THE PLUG) DURING THE CURRENT OPERATING CYCLE - THAT IS, f

WITHIN 45 EFFECTIVE FULL POWER DAYS.

FOLLCWUP NRR MET WITH CRGR ON MAY 10, 1989 ON THE PROPOSED BULLETIN DEALING WITH FAILURE OF WESTINGHOUSE MECHANICAL PLUGS. THE BULLETIN RECbESTS THAT ALL PWRs DETERMINE WHETHER THEY USE ANY OF THE 4 HEATS OF WESTINGHOUSE-DESIGNED PLUGS AND IF THEY DC, THAT THEY IMPLEMENT AN ACTION PLAN TO MAINTAIN RCS BOUNDARY INTEGRITY L'NDER WORST-CASE CONDITIONS.

c THE MATERIALS ENGINEERING BRANCH (EMTB) WILL BE MEETING WITH THE L'CENSEE LATER THIS WEEK (WEEK OF MAY 8 - 13, 1989). THE LICENSEE hlLL PROPOSE AN ACTION PLAN AT THAT TIME. EMTB IS REVIEWIkG THIS ISSUE ON A PLANT-BY-PLANT BASIS.

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'05/10/E7 FEFJDRMANCE INDICATORS 516NIFICANT EVENTS EdCLOSURE 3 i PLANT NAME Et'ENT EVENT DE33 1Pij0N GTR SIGNIFICANCE DATE CALVERT CLIFFS 2 05/05/89 PDRIC ACID Full UF CN FFESSURllER HEATERS ON $0TTOM 0F 0 PDTENTIAL FOR DR ACTUAL DEGRADATION PRESSURIZER. OF PRIMARY COOLANT PRESSURE B0UNDARY COGAN NE PEAL 1 04/23/59 HOT WATER INTFUSION INTO AUI FEECWATER FIPINS CUE TO 1 PDTENTIAL FOR M ACTL'AL DEGRADATION CdECr VALVE FA! LURE- DF SAFETY-RELATED EDUlFMENT

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C&f!0IS AB0ft BIL01 TOTAL 158 151 05/01/89 AllAlS&S Lf 1 50& Pits 0HIL 10 2 0 2 05/02/8910Gfli /2 60 & IQUIPEllt 10 1 0 1 05/03/89PILGilg  : :1 25A Pits 0litt NO 2 0 2 0& IQUIPEll? B0 0 1 1 05/03/69 Sal 010ll! 431 05/05/89Gl&BGGULF %1 5& IGUIP5ilf 10 0 1 1 "3 90 8 IQUIPHIIT 10 1 0 1 05/06/89 IILLSf0BI I

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.N0TES' I. . PLANT SPECIFIC DATA BASED ON INITIAL REVIEW 0F 50.72 REPORTS' FOR THE WEEK OF INTEREST. PERIOD IS MIDNIGHT SUNDAY THROUGH MIDNIGHT SUNDAY. SCRAMS ARE DEFINED AS REACTOR PROTECTIVE

.ACTUATIONS WHICH RESULT IN ROD MOTION, AND EXCLUDE PLANNED TESTS OR SCRAMS AS PART OF PLANNED SHUTDOWN IN ACCORDANCE WITH A PLANT PROCEDURE. THERE ARE 111 REACTORS HOLDING AN OPERATING LICENSE.

< 2. ' COMPLICATIONS: RECOVERY COMPLICATED BY EQUIPMENT FAILURES OR PERSONNEL ERRORS UNRELATED TO CAUSE OF SCRAM.

3. PERSONNEL RELATED PROBLEMS INCLUDE HUMAN ERROR, PROCEDURAL DEFICIENCIES, AND MANUAL STEAM GENERATOR LEVEL CONTROL PROBLEMS.

4. "0THER" INCLUDES AUTOMATIC SCRAMS ATTRIBUTED TO ENVIRONMENTAL CAUSES(LIGHTNING),SYSTEMDESIGN,ORUNKNOWNCAUSE.

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