ML20246K217
| ML20246K217 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Nine Mile Point, Robinson, South Texas, Cook, 05000000 |
| Issue date: | 08/24/1989 |
| From: | Haughney C Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Rossi C Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| OREM-89-030, OREM-89-30, NUDOCS 8909050409 | |
| Download: ML20246K217 (23) | |
Text
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August 24, 1989 k-MEMORANDUM FOR:
Charles E. Rossi. Director Division of Operational Events Assessment FROM:
Charles J.-Haughney Chief Events Assessment Branch Division of Operational Events Assessment
SUBJECT:
THE OPEFATING REACTORS EVENTS MEETING August 23, 1989 - HEETING 89 30 On August 23, 1989, we conducted an Operating Reactors Events meeting (89 30) to brief senior managers from NRR, RES, AE00. ACRS, Commission staff, and.
regional offices on selected events that occurred since our last meeting on i
August 16, 1989. Enclosure 1 lists the attendees. presents the significant elements of the discussed events.
, contains a summary of reactor scrams for the week ending 08/20/89.
i Ue identified 2 significant events for input into the NRC performance ir.dicator program.
j U
l Charles J. Haughney, Chief f.
Events Assessment Branch g,
Division of Operational Events Assessment l
Enclosures:
1 As stated l
l cc w/ Encl.:
See Next Page i
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-L. Yandell, NRR "J. Sniezek, NRR
- 11. Slosson,.HRR J.' Partlow, NRR.
R. Capra, NRR E. Jordan, AE0D R. Lo, NRR'
~J. Taylor,'EDO E. Adensam..NRR E. Beckjord.'RESL G. Dick, NRR W.; Russell, RI.
F. Hebdon NRR S. Ebneter, RII
- B. Davis, RIII.
.R. D. Martin,.RIV~
'J. B. Martin, RV W.; Kane, RI L. Reyes RII-:
'E.-Greenman, RIII J. Milhoan', RIV R. Zimmerman,'RV S. Varga, NRR.
B._Boger, NRR-G.;Lainas, NRR G. Holahan, NRR F. Congel; NRR E. Weiss',AEOD T. Martin, EDO.
-J.-.Lieberman, OE.
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August 24, 1989 MEMORANDUM FOR:
Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational Events Assessment FROM:
Charles J. Haughney, Chief Events Assessment Branch Livision of Operational Events Assessment
SUBJECT:
THE OPERATING REACTORS EVENTS MEETING August 23, 1989 - MEETING 89-30 On August 23. 1989, we conducted an Operating Reactors Events meeting (89-30) to brief senior managers from NRR, RES, AE00. ACRS, Cornission staff, and regional offices on selected events that occurred since our last meeting on August 16, 1989. Enclosure 1 lists the attendees.
g presents the significant elements of the discussed events.
Ericlosure 3 contains a suneary of reactor scrass for the week ending 08/20/89.
We identified 2 significant events for input into the NRC performance indicator program.
(Mbobb Charles J. Haughney, Chief Events Assessment Branch Division of Operational Events Assessment
Enclosures:
As stated cc w/ Enc 1.:
See Next Page
!v
,4-.-
ENCLOSURE 1
/m II LIST CF ATTEhCEES.
OPERATING REACTORS EVENTS BRIEFING (89-30)
August 23. 1989 NAME ORGANIZATION NAME ORGANIZATION J. Roe NRR/DLPQ T. Novak AEOD/DSP J. Sharkey OEDO J. Giitter NRR/PD3-1 P. Eng NRR/PD3-1 J. Thompson NRR/DOEA
- 1. Ahmed NRR/SICB R. Azua NRR/DOEA R. Karsch NRR/00EA C. Poslusny NRR/PD4 P. O'Connor NRR/PD4 S. Newberry NRR/ DEST P. Baranowsky-NRR/DOEA E. Brown AE00' T. Greene NRR/DOEA J. Thoma NRR/PD3-1 R.' Benedict NRR/00EA W. Troskoski DE B. Mozafari NRR/PD2-1 L. Norrholm OCM/KC P. Bobe AE0D/DSP J. Wechselberger NRR/DLPQ J. Guttmann SECY D. Trimble OCM/JC
. f-.s M. Malloy
'NRR/CPPD T. Foley NRR/DLPQ
.. (A j)
.D. LaBarge_
NRR/DRP1-2 H. Aldernan ACRS R. Lo NRR/PD2-1 E. Adensam NRR/PD2-1 s
E.:Rossi NRR/DOEA W. Minr.ers RES/DSIR R. Lobel NRR/00EA R. Perfetti OE L. Reyes RII L. Cunningham NRR/DREP G. Lainas NRR/ADR2 R. Xendall NRR/00EA M. Reardon NRR/00EA
ENCLOSURE 2 U
OPERATil1G REACTORS EVENTS ERiEF:"
59-30 EVENTS _ASSFSSNENT Jhb., -
LOCATION:
22B-11, WHITE 21 WELNESDAY, AUGUST 23, 19E9, 11:C0 A.M.
COOK UNIT :
REAC10R TRIP WITH MULTIPLE Il!STRUMENTATION AND ECUIPMENT FAllVRES (AIT UPDATE)
ROBINSON UfflT :
INADECl: ATE NPSH FOR AUX FEEDWATER PUMPS
,~s SOUTH TEXAS UNIT 1 RADIOACTIVE CONTAtlINATION CUTSIDE RADIATION CONTROLLED AREA i
NINE MILE P01hT UNIT 1 CONTAMINATION OF SUB-EASEMENT FROM LEAKINC RESIN DRUMS (AIT) 7-s)
(%/
CE-!C C00K' UNIT 2 EfACTOR TRIF FITH MULTIPLE INSTRUMENTATION f
)
AND ECUIPMENT FAILURES (AIT UEDATE)
~~
AUCUST 14, 1989 PROBLEM PARTIAL LCSS OF CONTROL ROOM IrlSTRUMENTATION AND LOSS CF ONE TRAIN OF THE SOLID STATE PROTECTION SYSTEM (SSPS).
Lifff FAILURE OF ONE OF FOUR 120 VAC SAFETY RELATED CONTROL ROOM INSTRUMENTATION DISTRIBUTION (CRID) PALELS.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE LOSS OF A SINGLE 120 VAC INSTRUMENT PANEL CAUSEL A REACTOR TRIP, LOSS OF SAFETY SYSTEM FEEUNDANCY, AND RESULTED IN LOSS OF CONTROL ROOM INSTRUMENTATION (IErlCAT10tlS AND CONTROLS) THAT COMPLICATED POSI-TRIP RECOVERY.
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DISCUSS 10E
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REACTOR WAS OPERATING AT ICC" POWER.
o o
FUSES ELEW IN A POWER RANGE DETECTCR CIRCUIT SUPPLIEL FROM CRID IV.
O CRID IV. AUTOMATICALLY TRANSFERRED FR0tl ITS NORMAL CLASS 1E SOURCE (250 VDC EUS "AE") T0 ITS BACKUP N01:-CLASS IE SCURCE
( C00 VAC EUS "11B").
SEE ATTACHED DIAGRAti.
o OPERATORS TRANSFERRED CRID IV POWER BACK TO THE NORMAL SOURCE:
HOWEVER, VOLTAGE LEVEL HAD DEGRADED TO APPR0X 85 VAC.
o CRID IV LOADS WERE SEPARATED THROUGH ACTUATION OF FUSES / CIRCUIT BREAKERS.
o REACTOR TRIP OCCURRED.
c A NUMEER OF RELAYS CHATTERED AND SOME CONTROL ROOM STATUS LIGHTS FLICKERED.
o ROOT CAUSE CETERMINED TO BE A FAILURE OF A SILICON CONTROLLED RECTIFIER (SCR) IN THE INVERTER STATIC TRANSFER SWITCH.
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AIT:
YES CONTACT:
R. KENDALL SIGEVENT:
YES_
REFERENCES:
10 CFR 50.72 #16318 AND MORNING REPORT 08/15/89
_______________._a
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(f o EFFECTS OF LOSS OF POWER TO CRIL IV LOADS lNCLUDED:
l LOSS OF AUTCMATIC STE/M LUMP VALVE (SEV) CONTROL CAPADILITY ABC LOSS OF SLV FOSITION.ItTICATI0I: IN lhE-C0f. TROL RCOM, 1
. LOSS.0F AUTOMATIC CONTROL FOR 2-(0UT OF 4) STEAM GEhERATOR (SG) FCWER OPERATED RELIEF VALVES (PORVS).
LOSS OF ALL FCUR~ WIDE RANGE STEAM GENERATOR (SG) LEVEL j
IhDICATION CHAhNELS (1 PER SG);AND LOSS CF ONE CF ThEEE NARROW. RANGE LEVEL' INDICATION CHANNELS PER SC.
LOSS CF' TRAIN *L" 0F THE SOLID STATE PROTECTION SYSTEM
-(PERFORMS REACTOR TRIP AND ESF INITIATION FUNCTIONS).
f10NITORING INSTRLMENTAT10N-FOR REACTOR COOLANT FLMP FOR NO. 4 0
3 CONTECL' ROD BOTTOM LIGHTS FAILED (bNRELATED TO CRID IV FAILURE).-
.0-SC LEVEL DECREASED BELOW ThE NARROW RA:'GE INSTRLMEhTS FOR APPR0X 15 MihbTES.
SG~ LEVEL WAS RECOVERED ON AUTOMATIC INIllATION OF i
TliE AUXILIARY FEEDWATER (AFW) SYSTEM.
e PtANT C00LDGKN WAS ACHIEVED USING S6 PORVs AND AFW (PRIMARY AND SECONDARY SYSTEM PARAMETERS REMAINED WIThlN EXPECTED ECUNDS FOR l
/
I A
A REACTOR TRIP FROM 100% POWER).
o CRID IV WAS MANUALLY TRANSFERRED-T0 THE ALTERNATE EACKUP SUPPLY-(NON-CLASS IE 120 VAC LIGHTING PANEL), AND FUSES REPLACED / BREAKERS j
RESET TO RECOVER INSTRUMENTS'AND CONTROLS.
j o
LACK-0F PCWER SUPPLY INDEPENDENCE FOR REDLhDANT WIDE RANCE SG l
LEVEL INDICATION CHANNELS IS AN UNRESCLVED ITEM F60M THE 1
' STAFF'S R.G. 1.97 REVIEW FOR D.C. CC0K.
o THE PLANT OPERATORS ARE TRAINED ON THE SIMULATOR FOR LOSS OF i
CRID POWER EVENTS.
PROCELURES EXIST FOR RECOVERY FROM LOSS OF CRID POWER EVENTS.
THE OPERATORS RESPONDED WELL DURING THE q
EVENT.
1 j
FOLLOWUE
- AN AUGMENTED INSPECTION TEAM (AIT) DISPATCHED TO THE SITE TO INVESTIGATE THE EVENT HAS COMPLETED ITS INITIAL REVIEW AND IS PREPARING A FINAL REPORT.
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4 AIT CO TLUSIONS i
j-THE OPERATORS PERFOMED WELL, UTILIZING EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES, ABN0fe%L OPERATINs PROCEDURES AND ALNN RESPONSE PHOGI)URES.
l THE ONLY COMPONENTS THAT WERE RENDERED INOPERABLE DURING THIS EVENT WERE A DIRECT RESULT OF NE FAILURE OF A SCR IN TE STATIC SWITCH.
THE SCR FAILURE WAS UNDETECTABLE, m E RESULT OF A CATHODE TO ANODE FAILURE, RESULTING IN AN OPEN CIRCUIT.
OTHER FAILURES OF WIS TYPE WERE f(JT FOUND AT D. C. COOK (B E CRIDS APPEAR TO HAVE A UN!QUE MODEL NUMBER AND WERE INSTALLED IN 1985) HOWEVER, gx ANY CONTROL ROOM INSTRLNENT DISTRIBUTION BUS SUPPLIED WITH TWO SOURCES OF POWER WIOi ARE SWITCED BY A STATIC TRANSFER SWITCH COULD BE SUSCEPTIBLE TO A SIMILAR FAILURE.
THEFEEDWATERDISCHARGECHECKVALVE(ih-103)ISANATw00DMORRILLPOWER ASSIST TO CLOSE VALVE, DID NOT FAIL, AND WAS NOT RELATED TO BE EVENT.
IWO CONTROL H0D BOTTDM LIGHTS FAILED, POWERED FROM CRP-3, AND WERE NOT RELATED TO T}E EVENT.
O em 2 SM0KE WAS DETECTABLE IN THE CONTROL 800M.
__ -___ _ -_________--__- _. -____ _ ____ ~~_. _ _ _ ~_"
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_ ROBINSON UNIT 2 INADELLATE NPSH LE_fUX FEfDWATER PUMPS.
AUCUST 16, 1989
' PROBLEM INADECLATE-NET POSITIVE SUCTION HEAD (NPSli) FOR THE AUX FEEDWATER PUMPS.
CAUSE-DESIGN DEFICIENCY.
ALL THREE PLMPS TAKE SUCTION FROM THE CST THRCLCH A: COMMON' SUCTION LlhE.
THE SIZE OF.THE SUCTICN LINE
'(6' INCHES) LED TO EXCESSIVE HEAD LOSS.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE POSSIBLE LOSS OF ONE OR MORE AUX FEEDhATER PLMPS DUE TO PUMP CAVITATION.
r DISCUSSI_0N v.INADECUATE NPSH FOR THE AUX FEEDWATER PUMPS UNDER ALL PLMP
. COMBINATIONS.
o, ' Tills PROBLEM IS EELIEVED 'TO EXIST DURING ANY PLANT CONDITION-WhERE Tile AUX FEEDWATER SYSTEM IS REGUIRED (E.G., NORMAL SHUTDOWN-OPERATION AND STEAM LINE BREAK).
IN 3986, THE LICENSEE EXPERIENCED A LOSS OF FEEDWATER TRANSIENT IN WHICH INADE00 ATE FLOW WAS NOTED.
(SEE TABLE 1)
CONTACT:
R. AZUA SIGEVENT:
YES
REFERENCES:
10 CFR 50.725 #16375, #16375, AND PNG-II-89-59 w
10B1NSONJ,.
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n.c ON'AUCUST-16, 1500, Ti1E LICEt.SEE BELIEVEE TilAT THE NPSH
,d PROBLEM EXISTED ChlY'WHEN THE STEAM LRIVEL' AUX FEEDWATER PUMP
- WAS INl0PEEAT10N, THUS TiiEY REMOVEL lite STEAM l'OlVEf; PUMP FR0!i SEhVICE BY LE-ENERGlZIt'C ThE BREAl;ELS TO Tile steth LRIVEtt PLMP STEAh SUPPLY' VALVES.
Tl1E LICENSEE Et!TEREE AN LCO WillCH FECulRES E
TilAT Tl'E PUMP BE EETURNED TO SEFVICE WITillh SEVEN CAYS CR BE IN HOT SliUTDOWi' VITilIN SIX HCURS.
o LICENSEE TECH SPECS RECUIRE A filNIMUM 0F 35,CCC GALLONS FOR TliE-AUX FEEDWATER PUMPS TO MAINTAIN HOT EliUTDOWN FCR 2 }l0URS.
DUE TO THE INADECUATE W SH AVAllABLE FOR THE STEAM DRIVEN PUMP-AN. ALMINISTEATIVE RfC' IflNENT TC l'AINTAIN CST LEVEL CREATER Tl!AN OR ECUAL TO C0% ws Pt ACED INTO ErFECT.
O CUESTION RAISEL LUCIt;C THIS REVIEW:
- 1. WHY LID Tile LICENSEE NOT IDENTIFY TliE NPSH INADECUACY FOLLCWING THE 3E00 LOSS OF FEECWATER TRAt.SIENT.
Tile L10ENSEE HAS BEEN UNABLE TC ANSWER THIS CUESTION YET.
o ON AUGUST 22, 1009, THE LICENSEE INITI ATED A PLANT S!!UTDOWN FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS FEStiLTS WillCH IDENTIFIED THE O-MCTOR DRIVEN AUX FEEDWATER PUMPS AS HAVINC SIMILAR NPSH PROBLEMS.
o THE LICENSEE ANTICIPATES THAT REPLACEMENT OF AUX FEEDWATER SUCT10t. PIPING WITH A LARGER DIAMETER PIPING MAY BE RECUIRED TO IMPROVE NPSH AT CATED FLOW.
FOLLOWUP o
THIS EVENT WILL BE FOLLOWED BY THE REGION 11 STAFF AND THE RESIDENT INSPECTORS.
- c. EAB WILL REVIEW THE POSSIBILITY THAT OTHER PLANTS MAY HAVE NPSH PROBLEMS IN THEIR AUX FEEDWATER SYSTEMS, OR OTHER SAFETY-RELATED PUMPS.
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f.UXil if,RY FEEDWATER PUMP fLOXS ICEC LOSS OF FEEDWATER EVENT LESJgN_f1Dh' RECCRDEC FLOWS 1.
"A" M01CR LCIVEN 3CC CPN 150-2CC GPM fuXILIARY FEEDWATER FUMP l
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2.
"L" MOTOR LRIVEN SCC EPM 150-:CC GPM AUXIIIARY FEEEWATER PUMP 3.
STEAM DRIVEN CC0 GPM 385 GPM AUXILIARY FEE 0 WATER FUMP
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IO RALICACTIVE COLJ15JhfllDf; CUTSIDE REPIlllLh CONTR0LI EL AREA -
AUCLST IC, 1955
.PlfIlf5 LICET.SEE DISCOVEEEE CONTAMINATION IN A NCRMALLY h0N-CENTAMit;ATED
'PART OF Tl.E EECHANICAL ELECTRICAL AUXILIARY EUILDING (MEAB) AND lit 1HE'1URBINE.DUILDING SCEF.-
[hLSE EESIGN ANL GFERATOR EEFCRS LED TO CChTAMINATION OF A NORMALLY NON-CONTAMINATED ALIILIARY STEAM CONDENSATE SYSTEM.
CONTAMINATION IN 11iE. TURBINE DUILLING SUMP liAS FUE TO A SYSTEM DESICN ERFOR, FAFETY SICNIFifANff o
ACTIVITY LEVELS Ilt THE AFFECTED SYSTEMS ARE HELL BEL 0ll ANY EEPORTABLE LIMITS.
THE SIGNIFICANCE IS THE POTENTIAL FCR CONTAMINATION 10 BE RELEASED THRU RALIDACTIVE /NON-RADIOACTIVE SYSTEM INTEFFACES AND A LACK OF UNDERSTANDING 0F THE IMPORTANCE OF THESE INTERFACES BY PLANT PERSONNEL.
c THERE WAS THE. POTENTIAL FOR THE RELEASE OF RADI0 ACTIVE MATERIAL TO'BE SPREAD THROUGH0bT THE PLANT IN UNRESTRICTED AREAS HAD (A FEW 0F) THE PRECbRSORS BEEN DIFFERENT.
-DISCLSS10N' o
FROM AUGUST 10, 1989 TO AUGUST 14, 1989, TKO VALVES IN THE LIQUID WASTE EVAPORATOR SYSTEM kERE INTENTIONALLY LEFT OPEN.
o DURING THIS PERIOD OF TIME, 1500 GALLONS ON LICUID WASTE WAS PROCESSED THROUGH ThE LICulD WASTE PROCESS SYSTEM (AT LEAST TWICE).
n O
AS A RESULT OF THE TWO VALVES (WL 392 AND WL 349) LEFT lh THE "0 PEN" POSITION, THE GAS STRIPPER OVERFLOWED AND SENT LICulD WASTE THRU THE CONDENSATE RETURN LINES OUTSIDE OF THE RCA TO THE INORGANIC BASIN, LOCATED BETWEEN THE COOLING PONL AND THE MEAB.
CONTACT:
J. THOMPSON SIGEVENT:
NO
REFERENCES:
PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION PNG-IV-89-51 AND PN0-IV-89-51A AND MORNING REPORT 08/n /E9
_ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _-_ _ _ _ _ --_ _ _ _ - _ _ _ o
(
'c THE LICENSEE LEFT ThE TWO VALVES IN THE OPEN POSITION ON PURPOSE f
LLE TO AREA CONTAMINATION CONSIDERATIONS.
l 0
LICUIL SAMPLES LETECTED C058 ' EI" AND 1 PRESENT.
CONTAMINATION LEVELS REPORTED WERE 10-4, UC1/hL (C05g) ANE u
10-6 UC1/ht (CROSS I).
o LICENSEE HAS ISOLATEL ThE AFFECTED SYSTEMS ANL WILL PERFORM Ai; ANALYSIS ON THE EXTENT OF THE SYSTEMS (AND/CR POTENTIAL SYSTEMS) INVOLVED.
o LICENSEE HAS NOTIFIEL INPO AND PLANS TO SLLMIT A VOLUNTARY SER.
f_01LO M o
EAD AND RIV WILL CONSIDER ISSulNO AN INFORMATION NOTICE ON THIS EVENT FROM A SYSTEMS INTERFACE PERSPECTIVE.
0 THE LICENSEE WILL NOT OPERATE THE AFFECTED SYSTEMS UNTIL CLEANUP IS COMPLETED IN THE NORMALLY NCN-RAD 10 ACTIVE PORTIONS
(
CF THE LICCIL WASTE AND SUPPORTINC SYSTEMS.
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'NINE MILE! POINT UNIT 1 7
C0t3fMINATION CF-SUE-DASEMENT PY L FAl:lEC_EM AUGUST ~El, 1989
. Ei:0BLEM RESif[STORACEDRUMSRELEASE-RAD 10ACTIVEMATERIAL.
CAUSE
~STANLlhC WATER IN'A ROOM FOR MAUY YEARS EVENTUALLY CORRLLED THE-STORAGE CRUMS.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE o
THERE-IS-A POSSIBILITY FCR RELEASE OF RAT 10 ACTIVE WASTE PROLLCTS 10 THE ENVIRONMENT.
c WORKER SAFETY COULD EE JEOPARDIZED.
DISCUSSION 0-~
NINE MILE POINT UNIT 1 IS CURRENTLY DEFUELED.
RESTART DATE HAS h0T EELN DETERMlf1ED.
0 1978 - TliE LICENSEE WAS RECUIREE TO DRAIN A RECIRCULATION LOOP.
0 lhSUFFICIENT WATER STORAGE WAS AVAILAELE.
0 0VERFLOW REACTOR WATER WAS EUMPED INTO A RADWASTE EUILDING SbB-EASEMENT.
c THE ROOM WAS USED FOR 55 CALLON DRUM STORAGE.
THE LRUMS WERE FILLED WITH DEMINERAllZER FILTER SLUDGE AND RESINS.
o EARLIER IN PLANT LIFE THEY HAL FUEL CLADDING EAMAGE WfilCH MADE ThE STOREL MATERIAL UNUSLlALLY RADIOACTIVE.
APPR0X 400 RAD /HR AT THE DRUM SURFACE (RECENT MEASUREMENT).
o THE FLOODING IN THE ROOM WAS SUFFICIENT TO DISLODGE THE CRUMS.
ThE. LICENSEE,HAS MAINTAINED WATER IN THE ROOM FOR AN EXTENDED o
PERIOD OF TIME.
~'u THE DRUMS OR THEIR RETAIN!tJG RINGS HAVE NOW CORRODED SPILLING THE CONTENTS ONTO THE FLCOR.
c THE LICENSEE HAS DEVELOPED BUT NOT IMPLEMENTED CLEAN UP PLANS FOLLOWUP
] AN AUCMENTED INSPECTION TEAM HAS DEEN SElff TO TliE SITE (08/
AIT:
_YES
' CONTACT:
R. KARSCH SIGEVENT:
TEL
REFERENCE:
IC CFR 50.72 # 16374
.I
n L
NfiE Nili POINT UNIT 1 CE-3C l :.~
L u
. THE CLJECTIVES OF THE INSPECTION ARE:
CEVID.'. THE CIRCUMSTANCES ASSCCI ATED WITE THIS EVEi.'T.
0
- o. DETEEP:1NE THE RAE10 LOGICAL SI.FETY IMPLICATIONS.
O EVALUATE THE PL AhhEE CORT <ECTIVE ACTICNS.
l l
1
____-_________-__---__A
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ENCLOSURE 3
- p, 3
08/22/89~
l PERFORMANCE int!CATDRS $1SN]F] CANT EVENTS ft f' NAE EVENT EVENT K SCRIPTION SIR SlSNIFICMCE I
. COOK 2 08/14/B9 FAILUNE OF A 120 VAC INSTRUMENT BUS CAUSED REACTOR TRIP.
1 POTENTIAL FOR OR ACTUAL DEGRADATION PARTIAL LOSS OF CONTROL R00R INSTRUMENTAL!DN AND FAILURE OF SAFETY-RELATED EDUIPENT OF ONE TRAIN DF THE PL H1 PROTECT 10N SYSTEM.
SRA G BULF 1 06/14/99 FAILURE OF TE CONEWSER 800T SEAL RESULTED IN A SCRM 1 PDTENTIAL FOR OR ACTUAL KGRAMilm NITH CDMPLICA110NE. DNE MSIV FAILED TO CLOSE N MANUAL OF SAFETY-KLATED EDUIPENT MD AUTO KMAND. DNE CONTROL R00 FAILED TO INERT KYOND PDSITI M 09. SCRM DISCHARGE VOLUME FAILED TO DRAIN.
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MMM-p e, IM;..,, y WK gets N/20/R.
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m
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. OEd4 9 F M it!
85 A
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e
'4'14 il' X !33 I' :X A E1! POT
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' ? 67 8 PERS380.
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M/19/R WATEVJE '
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o
, ; L.;, MII". CorfAFilSON OF WEDLV STATISTICS WITH ItELETRY AEF/CEE s,.
E FMS FCR LED: DOItG m <m,, m
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- * * " = ~
7 3
'It! CFLEE FGEFt ttt1EEF IC90
' 1*J3 1*G7 1%
1CES
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OF LED LV tED LY E LV LED Lv ' LEE) LY.
CCFftE ( 5)
AEACC REKE N.C KE MEFKE AE/CE s'
m t2.444 i 3 ) 4. 7 )
ee r-se ir ECUIF. FELATO 15'4 5
!.O
~.
!.5-4.!
5.4 F ES. FELATED(6 c15%
1 1.2
'1.0 1.0 1.8 2.0.
OTHERf7)
- 15.
O O.1 0.5 1.2 0.4 0.6
- SubtCtal 88 6
4.0 4.6 6.4 6.5 8.0
- FOER (15%
ECUIP. FELATED 15%
0 0.4 0.5 1.2 1.4 1.2 FES. FELATED :
L15%
O O.0 0.0 9.6 0.9 0.9 OT)ER 15%
0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.2
- Subtotal **
O O.7 0.9 2.1 2.4 2.4
- _ Total ***
6 5.0 5.5 B.5 8.9 10.4 FVtOW VS AlJTD KRAfE i
TYFE t&TER 1999 1988 1987 1996 1985 l.
CF-IEBtY IEDtY bEDtY LEDtY E 1Y SCFAr6 #4FAEE AVEFME AKFWWE AWFA(E ADAGE 1
YTD tWUW SCEAr6 O
O.8 1.0 1.4 1.0 1.0 l
ALJTD% TIC 93mS 6
4.2 4.5 7.0 7.9 9.4 l
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- NOTES; L1.-
PLANT SPECIFIC DATA BASED Oti INITIAL REVIEW OF SU.72 REPORTS a
FOR THZ WEEK OF INTEREST.- PERICD-IS MIDNIGHT SUNDAY THROUGH-MIDti1GFT SUNDAY.- SCRAMS ARE PEFINED AS REACTOR PROTECTIVE ACTUAT10t:5 WHICP RESULT IN ROC MOTION. ANC EXCLUDE PLA!!NED-TES1S OR SCRAliS AS PART OF PLANNED SHUTDOWN IN ACCORCANCE WITH A' PLANT PPOCEDURE. THERE APE 111 FEACTORS HOLDi!!G AN OPERATit:0 '11 CENSE.
'2.
COMPLICATIONS RECOVERY COMPLICATED BY EQUIPMENT FAILURES.0R PERS01:1!EL ERRORS UNRELATED TD CAUSE. OF SCRAM.
3.
PERSONNEL RELATED PROBLEMS INCLUDE HUMAN ERROR. F00CEDURAL DEFICIEt:CIES, AND eat:UAL STEAM GENERATOR LEVEL CONTROL PROBLEMS.
4
- 0THER" 1NCLUDES AUTOMATIC SCRAMS ATTPIBUTED TO ENVIRONMENTAL CAUSES (LIGHTNING), SYSTEM DESIGN, OR UNKNOWN CAUSE.
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