ML20235H595

Insp Rept 50-483/87-17 on 870602-04.Major Areas Inspected: Plant Emergency Preparedness Exercise Involving Observations by Five NRC Representatives of Key Functions & Locations During Exercise.One Exercise Weakness Identified

ML20235H595
Person / Time
Site:	Callaway
Issue date:	06/30/1987
From:	Hironori Peterson, Matthew Smith, Snell W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20235H581	List: ML20235H578 ML20235H595
References
50-483-87-17, NUDOCS 8707150195
Download: ML20235H595 (16)

See also: IR 05000483/1987017

Text

,

-7

-

.

b

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III l

l

1

i

Report No. 50-483/87017(DRSS) j

Docket No. 50-483 License No. NPF-30

i

Licensee: Union Electric Company i

Post Office Box 149 - Mail Code 400  !

St. Louis, M0 63166 j

Facility Name: Callaway Nuclear Power Plant l

I

Inspection At: Callaway Plant l

Reform, Missouri i

I

Inspection Conducted: June 2-4, 1987 1

, $$5

Inspectors: Ja es P. Patterson M /

I

l

Team Leader date ]

[db.

Marcia J. Smith

^

C/Jo/27

i

,,_- Date'

/' _ . s

q, _______-

/ H'rIri ee o O u<4J4 /fh

'

M ate

l Approved By: Wilh1 e C ief CMo/r?

!

Emergency Preparedness Dat'e

Section

Inspection Summary

Inspection on June 2-4, 1987 (Report No. 50-483/87017(DRSS))

Areas Inspected: Routine, announced inspectiori of the Callaway Nuclear

Power Plant's emergency preparedness exercise involving observations by

l five NRC representatives of key functions and locations during the exercise.

! The inspection was conducted by four NRC inspectors and one consultant.

Results: No violations, deficiencies or deviations were identified as a

result of this inspection. However, one exercise weakness was identified

regarding the medical drill. This is summarized in the enclosure to the

inspection report cover letter and further described in Section 5.d.

8707150195 870630

gDR ADOCK 05000403

PDR

_ _ _ _ _ _

- -. _

,

• !

-

<

l

1

DETAILS l

1. Nrsons Contacted

NRC Observers and Areas Observed

J, Patterson, Control Room, Operational Support Center (0SC) and

Emergency Operations Facility (E0F)

C. Brown, Control Room ,

, 't H

H. Peterson, lechnical Support Center (TSC) 5

,

M. Smith, OSC and Mini-Scenarios, No. 1, 4 and 6 '

R. Traub, TSC and E0F '

s

Union Electric Personnel

D.,Schnell, Vice President, Nuclear

C.' Naslund, Manager, 0perations Support

.

"

M. Stiller, Manager Nuclear Safety and Emergency Preparedne,ss (NSpnd EP)

R. Affolter, Superintendent, System Engineering l

R. McAleenan, Manager, Public Relations (Corporate) h

T. Stotlar, Supervisory Engineer, Quality Assurance

G. Hughes, Supervisory Engineer, NS and EP

T.' Rook,3rMning Supervisor

R. Mertz,' f a'diation Monitoring System Supervisor, Administration

D. Blumer, Senior Clerk, Stenographer i

M. Cleary, Supervisor, Nuclear Information '

G. Nevels, Supervisor, Nuclear Information ,

G. Woolly, Safety Representative ( t

A. White, Supervisor, Emergency Preparedness (EP), NS and EP

M. Faulkner, Nuclear Affairs Administrator, NS and EP x <

J. Dampf, Emergency Planner, NS and EP

'

v 3y(

R. Davis, Plant Maintenance Engineer A

s S. Crawford, Nuclear Affairs Administrator, NS and EP y

R. Daming, Engineer, NS and EP

P..Sudnak, Nuclear Affairs Administrator, NS.and EP

S. Harvey, Nuclear Affairs Administrator, NS and EP

E. Thornton, Engineering Evaluator, Quality Assurance s ,

J. Little, Assistant Engineer, Quality Assurance l

W. Hindrie, Assistant Engineer, NS and EP

1 S. Meniel, Engineer, Nuclear Operations .

D. Lewis, Nuclear Affairs Administrator, NS and EP

.

l

J. Loaker, Co. Op Engineer, NS and EP  !

2. Licensee Actions on Previously Identified items

, .

,

a. (Closed) Open Item No. 50-483/87006-01: Revised Emergency Action

, Levels (EALs) were completed by the licensee within a prior agreed

upon time and submitted to NRC Region III for review and approval

,

before being issued. These revised EALs have been incorporated into

n (RERP), Revision 10. One

,

the

specific EAL, Group 6, Radiation Releas P1p'e Events, Item F, Page 40 has

Radiological Emergency Response

/

2

x

_ _ _

.

.-

been revised as recommended by NRC. This EAL related to conditions

where EPA Protective Action Guidelines for offsite radiation dose

projections were exceeded outside the Exclusion Area Boundary (EAB),

resulting in an incorrect Site Area Emergency (SAE) designation.

This emergency classification was revised to indicate a General

Emergency, which was the correct classification. A typographical

error in a guidance section of NUREG-0654 contributed to the

licensee's original SAE designation. These EAL revisions have been

reviewed and approved for use as incorporated in RERP, Revision 10.

This item is closed.

b. (Closed) Open Item No. 50-483/87006-02: Procedure EIP-ZZ-00212,

Protective Action Recommendations, has been revised to cross

reference the information in Section 4.1.3 with information in

Attachment 5 and Attachment 6 of this procedure. These revisions ,

relating to evacuation time ' studies and plume arrival time

information now make the procedure more meaningful and efficient

for use in an emergency. This item is closed.

3. General

An exercise of the licensee's Callaway Nuclear Power Plant Emergency Plan

was conducted on June 3, 1987 testing the response of tra licensee to a

hypothetical accident scenario, resulting in a major release of radioactive

material to the environment. The attachment to trm report describes the

scope and objectives and narrative summary of the exercise. This was a

utility only exercise with the State of Micsouri and the counties of

Callaway, Gasconade, Montgomery and Osage participating for' training

purposes only. In addition, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)

representatives also participated to a limited extent, for training

purposes only.

4. G_egeral

e Observations

a. Procedures

This exercise was conducted in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50,

Appendix E requirements using the Callaway Nuclear Power Plant

Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures.

.

b. Coordination

The licensee's response was generally coordinated, orderly, and

timely. If the events had been real, the actions taken by the

licensee would have been sufficient to permit the State and local

authorities to take appropriate actions to protect the health and

safety of the public.

c. Observers

Licensee observers r nitored and critiqued this exercise along with

five NRC observrcs.

3- l

l

_ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

.

j

,.

I

l

d. Critique

'

The licensee held a critique at the Callaway Plant after the exercise

on June 3, 1987. The NRC. critique followed on the next day, June 4,

1987. Personnel who attended the NRC critique are listed in Section 1.

5. Specific Observations

a. Control Room (CR)

Use of the Simulator added to the realism of the emergency. Shift

turnover was well demonstrated at the outset of the exercise. Initial i

plant conditions were described and defined using the CR panels and l

display readings where applicable. The Shift Supervisor (SS) as the 1

initial Emergency Coordinator (EC), gave initial status briefing to l

his support staff and, in general, demonstrated good command and i

control throughout the emergency. Technical Specifications were l

referred to often and referenced when needed. The SS and his staff j

worked well together and maintained concentration on the various 1

emergency events happening within and outside the plant buildings. )

The Emergency Duty Officer (E00) was notified by the initial EC

immediately after the Notification of Unusual Event was declared. i

'

After arrival in the Control Room, the ED0 was immediately

briefed by the SS, and continued to be updated on the various

plant conditions before leaving to go to the TSC following the

Alert declaration.

Communications between the OSC and the TSC appeared to go well

throughout the exercise. The CR's responses to the many l

Mini-Scenarios were satisfactory, even when they did not relate j

directly to plant operation.

b. Technical Support Control (TSC)

The Technical Support Center (TSC) was activated upon the declaration

of the Alert, and was fully staffed within 30 minutes. The TSC

activation was well coordinated. Upon arrival, TSC personnel signed

in and immediately went to their assigned stations and expeditiously

prepared to assume their duties.

The Administrative Coordinator (AC) took charge in retting up the

logistics and systematically followed through the TSC activation

checklist. The Technical Assistance Coordinator (TAC) tock charge

of getting_ updates of plant conditions and setting up the technical

aspects of the TSC. Once the TSC was ready the AC notified the

Emergency Coordinator (EC) who was still in the Control Room (CR),

that the TSC was staffed and operational.

4-

_ _ _ _ _ _ .

'

.

1

!

!

l

!

!

The EC arrived at the TSC approximately 35 minutes after the Alert

was declared, and the transfer of command and control from the CR to

the TSC c: curred ten minutes later. The transfer of command and

control was delayed five to ten minutes because' communications had

not been completely transferred from the CR to the TSC. The EC

correctly and conservatively awaited until the communications were

properly and completely transferred before declaring the TSC fully

operational.

Health Physics personnel were quick in establishing a frisking l

station at the TSC entrance. Also, the area radiation monitors and  ;

habitability monitoring were quickly initiated. The HP Coordinator

had the foresight to request information on the in plant radiation

levels to consider whether these levels would increase sufficiently

enough to consider escalating the Alert condition to a Site Area

Emergency. Good discussions were held between the HP Coordinator

and the EC concerning the advisability of evacuating personnel or

dispatching emergency teams outside during the time of high wind  !

velocity. Also, the gasoline spill was considered as'a hazard to l

employees in the immediate area. HP and other procedures needed '

were referenced throughout the exercise. l

1

Security was adequately established at the TSC entrance. All i

personnel entering the TSC were checked and their identification. i

numbers recorded by a security officer stationed at the entrance.

This also ensured that people were frisking prior to entering the

TSC.

Personnel assembly and accountability was accomplished within 25  ;

to 27 minutes as coordinated by Security. The initial accountability j

resulted in 17 people unaccounted for. It took an additional i

15 minutes before those missing were accounted for. A list was f

misplaced when the personnel lists from various assembly areas were' i

being counted to get the total amount for accountability. This

mishandling of accountability lists also occurred during the 1986

exercise. More attention to detail is required by the Security

group responsible for this assignment.

l

The TSC personnel demonstrated a professional attitude, determination, '

and ingenuity throughout the exercise. Good cooperation between TSC

coordinators resulted in effective cperation of the TSC. The EC did

an excellent job of keeping the team directed at principal problem

areas, and the TAC did an exceptional job in the technical aspects 1

of rritigating the accident. The EC demonstrated good control and "

held periodic briefings and updates of information to good effect.

Throughout the exercise the TSC demonstrated excellent use of the

Gaitronics to inform and update the plant. Message flow within

the TSC and between onsite and.offsite response facilities was

adequate. Checklists, logs, and notification forms were appropriately

referred to and used by the TSC personnel. Procedures and forms were  ;

used extensively.

5  ;

I

i

---

1

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

.

.-

The TSC staff properly classified the Site Area Emergency using

their Emergency Action Level (EAL) tables. State, County and NRC

notifications were made in a timely manner,.within 15 minutes and

one hour time limits, respectively. Although personnel were able

to classify the emergency, the EAL tables tended to be cumbersome

and at times a hindrance to making a quick and effective

classification due to their overburdening complexity.

Status Boards were very well utilized, including those displaying

plant parameters, dose assessment, affected EPZ sectors, wind

direction, weather conditions, and chronology of key plant events.

The plant parameters board was updated in an excellent manner.

Personnel used a multi-color system whereby each color represented  ;

a specified time of the plant parameter update.- Arrows were used  ;

in trending of plant parameters. Also, parameters of interest

requiring trending were marked with an asterisk.

Prior to the declaration of a General Emergency the command and

control was transferred to the E0F. The transfer was conducted

efficiently and in a professional manner. Although the command

and control was transferred, the TSC maintained a high degree of

input, and continually kept updating all information throughout

the remainder of the exercise. Prior to terminating the exercise,

the EC organized a recovery briefing. Inputs and recommendations from

all the TSC Coordinators were collected and a prioritized preliminary

recovery action and activities list was formulated. The recovery

activity was adequate; but it did not cover the aspects of the

contaminated injured person, the fire, or prospective contamination

spread due to the spilled Steam Generator sample. Interfacing with

the EOF in respect to the recovery actions could be better organized

and improved.

Baced on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program I

was adequate; however, the following item should be considered for I

improvement- l

l

• Increased attention and improved handling techniques to

expedite assembly and accountability by the Security group is

needed,

c. Operational Support Center (OSC)

The OSC, in the maintenance area of the Service Building, was staffed

and operational within 20 minutes after the Alert was declared.

Personnel to be assigned to sepport items logged in on the status

board and were then directed to waiting areas in the machine shop

to stand by for assignments. The status board was maintained

throughout the exercise and was used as the mechanism to track

repair team status.

6

.,

( .-

i

!

I

A'speakerphone and the plant Gaitronics system were located.on l

the OSC Coordinator's desk-and.were efficiently used to inform-  !

l all' personnel in the OSC' management' area of plant status during -  !

L the exercise. Maintenance' foremen briefed personnel in the waiting ,

areas when plant status or exercise events changed. The speakerphone: 1

was a definite aid in communication between'the OSC Coordinator, his

'

,

[ . support leaders and the support teams.

l'

'

Communications from the OSC to Emergency Repair-Teams, Control Room

and the' Technical Support Center were adequate. Radio communications,

telephones and Gaitronics functioned well with one exception. One

telephone, which was the main means of communication with the'CR, TSC

and HPAC,.would fade out on occasion. OSC personnel tightened telephone

wiring and the problem appeared to be solved. The Gaitronics system

was used'as a backup means of communication to the radios used by the

repair teams.

Teams were dispatched with a good understanding of their mission

and destination. Maintenance foremen conducted team briefings .

using the briefing forms-in EIP ZZ-00220. Teams wer0 informed of

the duties of their mission, conditions of plant, haza ds they may.

encounter, reporting requirements, and dosimetry reading: requirements.

Each team was furnished with a copy of the briefing form before

leaving to report to Health Physic-Assess Control (HPAC) for further

instructions. Habitability of the OSC was monitored by'a Health-

Physics (HP) technician. Frisker stations were located at the main

OSC area and the waiting area. HP technicians, accompanying the

repair teams, monitored the frisking techniques of all personnel as

l they returned from their assignments into the waiting area. Access

Control maintained surveillance of the second frisker located at the

entrance of the OSC area. While present in these areas, the inspector

did not observe any participants not following frisking requirements.

Radiological controls for emergency repair teams consisted of a review

of known rdiation levels in the assigned areas, routing to avoid any

high rtal, cion levels, and the issuance of adequate dosimetry. Actual

exposure levels received were recorded and monitored in the HPAC.

Adequate Recovery planning by the OSC Coordinator and key support

staff included the consideration of personnel, time and equipment

required to repair, replace and decontaminate plant equipment.

Work Requests and a list of personnel required for a second shift

were developed. This information was later made available to the

'

TSC as part of the licensee's overall recovery plan.

OSC personnel maintained a high level of interest throughout the

exercise and demonstrated a thorough knowledge of duties and

responsibilities required for their emergency positions. The OSC

i

Coordinator and support foremen adequately demonstrated the ability

i to assign and control ten in plant repair teams, which was a

difficult assignment.

.

7

_. - _--

.

.-

!

d. Mini-Scenario Events

This emergency exercise included six distinct and unique events

which occurred independent of any deteriorating plant conditions,

which by themselves were leading to a General Emergency. The NRC

Observer / Evaluator Team was able to observe activities in three of

the six events. Description and findings are described as.follows:

The security event (Mini-Scenario No. 1) which was the initiating I

event for the exercise began at.0735 when a suspected explosive J

device was detected in a briefcase by a security guard. Security

personnel responded in a well organized and timely manner, contacting j

the CR and Burns Security immediately. The suspect explosive device j

was isolated, physically controlled, and Security officers simulated j

evacuation of the Main Access Facility. The on-shift Security

Supervisor adequately managed the situation in accordance with

procedcres. Security personnel demonstrated their ability to j

respond in accordance with plant security procedures in a swift and l

efficient manner.  !

Mini-Scenario No. 4 related to a response to a leak in a sulfuric

acid bulk storage tank located outside the turbine building. When

summoned, two Chemical Foreman and a helper decided not to don

respirators or Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus because of the

hazard of breathing toxic fumes. They decided to let the acid

fill up the well area around the base of the tank until it was all

expelled. The area was quickly cordoned off with colored tape

marked " danger." This was a good preventative measure. However,

they did not recognize the inherent danger of the acid fumes

penetrating through fresh air intake ducts into the side of the

turbine building. Eventually, someone in the EOF recommended closing

off the fans inside the turbine building to lessen the danger of

mote fume intake from outside.

The inspector observed two plant employees properly don protective

clothing to demonstrate their ability to respond to the chemical spill

incident onsite. Face shields were donned to demonstrate some

protection from breathing in soda ash, an acid neutralizer which was  !

simulated as being shovelled over the area of released sulfuric acid. '

After the two employees " dressed down," the Controller allowed them to

return to the " holding area" in the Maintenance Machine Shop adjacent

to the OSC. They were not debriefed at that time. The inspector

observed that the OSC determined this team's location as soon as  !

the OSC was made aware that a release took place. This demonstrated

good coordination, use of status board information, and action to

determine a support team's location.

Mini-Scenario No. 6 involved response by the licensee's Fire Brigade

(FB) and the Medical Emergency Response Team (MERT). The incident

included a car fire with'an injured, radioactively contaminated

man. The NRC observer considered the response time to be excessive

8

._

,

. .

,

!

s

for both emergency teams. Approximately 30 minutes elapsed from the j

Security guard's radio notification of the event until water was

'

poured on the fire. Fire fighting techniques and other aspects of

the fire-related event are described in a separate NRC Inspection j

Report No. 50-483/87018.  ;

The OSC received notification of this emergency by a telephone call, }

not by Gaitronics as directed by the Procedure, EIP-ZZ-00224. The 1

MERT personnel had to wait for the FB at the emergency van. While i

at the van, MERT personnel checked the van to assure that necessary

equipment was available. The HP technician also reported to the

van. The energency van with both the MERT and FB did not arrive at  !

the fire scene until 1257, nearly 20 minutes after the first message l

was sent by the Security Guard. At the FB station and also at the

fire scene, the inspector observed good interaction and discussion

between those with radiological control responsibilities and the FB

team leader regarding the potential for exposure to radioactive

contamination. As observed, the HP technician did not always get i

cooperation from the fire fighters at the scene in avoiding j

contamination. The FB was intent on extin0uishing the fire, which i

was their main objective. MERT personnel satisfactorily demonstrated I

their capability to assess the extent of the man's injuries and

adequately administered first aid. Coordination, cooperation and

adherence to procedures were the basic faults of the MERT and FB. 1

i

Several important, yet basic concepts, were not adhered to in the

Medical / Contaminated Injured Man scenario event. The guidelines of ]

Procedure EIP-ZZ-00224, Injury or Illness Procedure for Callaway

Plant, which were evaluated as not being followed by the MERT and/or

the HP technician assigned to the team follow: Each comment is .

followed by the referenced section of the procedure. 1

1

(1) The HP technician did not arrive on the accident scene with any

anti-contamination clothing or radiation identified rope or

radiation warning signs. If the suspected contaminated area

had been cordoned off, it would have prevented some of the

response personnel in the area from being contaminated. It

may have prevented a FB member from dragging a hose over l

radioactively contaminated ground, when an alternate path to

the fire would have been as effective as a vantage point in

extinguishing the fire. (Attachment 3)

(2) Frequent checks or changes of gloves were recommended during

treatment of the injured man. No gloves were used by the MERT

in treatment of the injured man. (Attachment 2)

(3) The results of contamination surveys were not relayed to the

Control Room at any time during the event. (Attachment 2)

9

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - -

'

.

i

l

l

(4) Notification of the MERT to respond to the emergency. scene

~

was not made on the Gaitronics as observed by the inspector

The MERT and FB were activated through a telephone call to the

OSC Coordinator (Section 5.2.1).

(5) The MERT did not demonstrate the transfer of the injured man

to a stretcher using appropriate techniques to prevent the I

spread of contamination. The final transfer of the injured {

person to the ambulance crew was simulated, but appropriate,

according to the agreed upon scenario pre-conditions

(Section 5.4). 1

l

MERT adequately demonstrated their capability to assess the extent '

of the man's injuries and adequately administered first aid.

However, the coordinated effort of the MERT and the HP technician to

adequately demonstrate a meaningful, disciplined response for a

contaminated injured man was unsatisfactory and did not comply with i

EIP-ZZ-00224. This is designated as an Exercise Weakness. Open i

Item 50-483/87017-01.

The current EIP-ZZ-00224 is somewhat disjointed, since part of it

refers to responding to events occurring in the Radiation Control l

Area (RCA) and other sections do not specify where the emergency i

conditions occur. This procedure should be clarified and simplified

where applicable. Also, current training methods should be

evaluated to consider more emphasis on coordination and better

communications with the Control Room and OSC. l

e. Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)

The Recovery Manager (RM) held frequent and meaningful briefings I

on plant status or other emergency related activities. The State of I

Missouri, Bureau of Radiation Health, and State Emergency Management

Agency (SEMA) actively participated in the exercise at the EOF.

Both these state agencies were included in the RM's briefings and

provided input in decisionmaking when offsite actions or concerns

were involved. A FEMA representative also participated throughout the

exercise. These agencies used this exercise as a training session

to interact and coordinate actions with the licensee. The NRC

obsern, concluded that there was good interaction among these

offsite agencies, the RM, and his support groups. Ali were equally

involved and part of a combined coordinated effort to mitigate the

effects of the emergency.

The HP Dose Assessor could have been more effective and decisive in

his recommendations to the RM. One example was the delay in

obtaining information on the approximate time that the plume would

leave the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ). The Dose Assessment

Coordinator had some difficulty in deciding which location to use to

I

l

l

l

10

L-

'. ,

. 1

1

obtain radiation levels from the tube leaks in Steam Generator "B."

This tube leaking resulted from one safety relief valve (SRV)

lifting and sticking in the open position. The radiation monitor

reading associated with the Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV)

could have been used, although the radiation levels obtained there

would have been much higher than that of the SRV, the area in question.

The controller issued a contingency message which clarified the ,

event, although the observer. felt he could have delayed that message i

for a few more minutes without affecting the scenario's progress.

The Dose Assessment group could have availed themselves of plant

engineering expertise from the Senior Reactor Operator (SRO)

assistant to the RM, or someone in the Technical Support Group

for this dose level value for the leaking Steam Generator "B."

The actual location of the centerline.of the plume was tracked on  ;

the status board in the Radiological Assessment room adjacent to the

main E0F room. This centerline designation was based on actual

field team measurements rather than on the plume model itself.

Good discussions were held on the initial plus follow-up Protective

Action Recommendation (PAR) among the RM, his suppcrt group leaders,

and the State Representatives. The final PAR agreed upon by all was  ;

a decision to shelter all residents within a five mile radius and also  !

to shelter the three affected sectors up to ten miles. The complete I

sheltering decision was based on the licensec's own evacuation time

studies for the counties involved, which concluded that the longest

time involved was three hours and 45 minutes. This time span would

have exceeded the duration of the' plume. The total number of i

residents involved was approximately 250 individuals living in remote-

rural areas. After careful review and examination of the relevant-

emergency factors, the NRC observer concludad that this was a

justifiable decision.

The Technical Support Group provided very good support throughout

the time the NRC observers were present. It was this group that

provided the recommendation to the OSC to shut off the circulation

,

i

system in the Turbine Building when sulfuric acid fumes were

detected entering the building through the outer air vents.

,

'

As the release was contained and upon receipt of recent field team j

radiation monitoring data and other emergency related data, the RM )

was prepared to remove his current sheltering PAR. Before he could i

make this decision, the announcement was made that the exercise was l

terminated. This was poor coordination between the Lead Controllers

and the RM. The RM should have been contacted prior to this j

happening, to permit the final PAR or removal of the PAR. One

noteworthy addition to the EOF and TSC participants was the use i

of one licensee staff person who played the role of the NRC {

representative and interacted in both ERFs as an NRC representative.

11

l

- - - - - - 1

'

.

,

Recovery planning was demonstrated to some extent in the E0F. A

caucus was held in a separate meeting room away from the main E0F.

Each support group leader was asked to speak on his plans for his

particular area of expertise. Only-the Technical Support Team

,

'

Leader had some suggestions an# meaningful information on recovery

plans. The other support groups appeared somewhat reluctant to make

a contribution. The RM mentioned several general areas of concern,

including any damage which might affect crops, farms and buildings

and asked someone to contact .the licensee's legal- counsel for help.

The TSC Emergency Coordinator was contacted by.speakerphone for

input from his support groups. Poor reception hampered

this input, although it cleared up.just before the E0F group was

ready to disperse. The NRC. Team Leader suggested that the EC and .

his two key support leaders from the TSC come to the EOF and i

participate directly with this group to aid in communication.

1

Overall, the E0F demonstrated a good coordinated effort, but could l

improve in the area of recovery and re-entry, including more planning  ;

to include an outline of definitive topics. Time must be allocated  !

in the scenario scheduling to permit an adequate recovery '

demonstration with definitive input from supporting groups.

6. Exit Interview  !

The inspection team held an exit interview the day after the exercise on

June 4, 1987. The NRC team leader discussed the scope and findings of the i

inspection including a probable Exercise Weakness-in_ Mini-Scenario No. 6,- l

the car fire and injured, contaminated man. The inspectors also  !

discussed the content of the report to determine if the licensee ,

considered that any of the information was proprietary. The licensee  !

responded that none of the information should be proprietary. l

Attachments: Callaway 1987 Exercise Scope and Objectives and Narrative Summary.

- l 4

'

12

l 7

_ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _____

- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

,

, ,

. .

6

CALLAWAY PLANT

-

ANNUAL EXERCISE -

fg June 3, 1987

.

The overall objective of the Annual Exercise is to demonstrate the level of -

energency preparedness which exists for the Callaway Plant. The Exercise '

will demonstrate the adequacy of the Radiological Emergency Response Plan l

and appropriate Implementing Procedures for the Callaway Plant, the State of

Missouri, and the counties of Callaway, Osage, Montgomery and Gasconade, j

The following specific objectives will be demonstrated:

ONSITE (Callaway Plant)

1) The ability to activate the On-Shift Emergency Organization.

(

2) The ability to activate the On-Site Emergency Organization. j

l

.3) The ability to activate the EOF Emergency Organization.

4) The ability to activate the Emergency Public Information Organization. l

5) The ability to request support from private sector organizations, and

the ability to coordinate such support.

6) The ability to request support from local agencies and the ability to

'

coordinate such support.

l

7) The ability to recognize and evaluate emergency conditions. '

8) The ability to take actions to corre'et or mitigate the emergency con-

dition.

9) The ability to properly classify and declare an emargency.

10) The ability to properly perform notifications.

11) The ability'to provide continuous assessment for control of plant

operations.

.

12) The ability to perform environmental assessment to predict offsite

doses for the protection of the health and safety of the public within

the Plume Exposure EPZ.

13) The ability to perform offsite field monitoring in support of dose

assessment activities and protective action recommendations.

14) The ability to implement in-plant radiological controls.

15) The ability to assess the status of the reactor core and determine the

extent of damage.

t ) 16) The ability to implement protective actions for plant personnel.

.

-1- 02/24/87

i)

_-. -

. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . ..

, ,

,

..j - ,

-

4

-

, p.:s lp

'

k' ,

i,

(' .

+

.6'~

i

. ..  !

!

CALLAVAY PLANT' .

n

Mg ,

June 3. 1987

'

!

17) The ability to alert personnel on-site. '

r

18) The ability to perform personnel accountability.

19) The ability to control access and maintain plant security.

20) The ability to monitor protective action EBS messnes from the counties

in the Plume Exposure Pathway EPZ. ~

j

l

21) The ability to recommend protective actions for the general public to

the counties in the Plume Exposure Pathway EPZ.

22) The use of protective equipment and supplies to minimize radiological  !

exposure ' contamination, or firefighting hazards.

23) The' ability to control contamination on-site.

i

24) The ability to control radiation exposure. 1

25) The ability to provide first aid to injured /ill on-site personnel,

including contaminated victims.

26) The availability of emergency equipment in the TSC.

~

.

27) The availability of emergency equipment.in the OSC-Maintenance Area.

28) The availability of emergency equipment in the OSC-HPAC.

29) The availability of emergency equipment in the E0P. L

c

>

b

30) The availability of emergency equipment in the JFIC..

31) The analysis capabilities of the JAS8. '

, 32) The ability to determine when to enter the recovery phase, j

1 .

j

! 33) The ability to plan for short-term recovery objectives. . J

'

' l

34) The ability to conduct a post-drill / exercise critique.

-

.

,

!

!

. . . . . .

'-.

.

-2- 02/24/87

g

__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ __ ___ . _ _ . . . _ _ _ ___.____-)

?. .

.

r . . . ,

,We

q Mp p T, ' i

'

.g,,'

'

4

i(

7 ,

n. .

+

,

-

._

.. ,

W$q

>

y($ $ $. ' #@

g

p, m. <_

, 1. _ Q .

, r.

y

• ' '

p ' '

QQgy ;f v .

'

,

h ~

ANN

'

.

EXERC SE- 9 &Qyf ML;Ogyr gy

,

v > . s m, s93

a p;4xD-hp + A 2 w"

,

1

NARRATIVE 8128dARYi i

-

+

x wwy  ;

~

,

-

A

x

gg.

'q i

i

.[ ~s .

,.# 1,I ~

The plant is operating at 80% power and. increasing to _ full' load. Thel unit ~ -

tripped 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> ago due to a rod contreifsystem failure Q Bepairs were

completed and restart commenced 14 houis!ago. Prior to;thaltrip theLusit'

s.

Total EFFD on Core II is 318. l[ M '

hadbeenatfullpowerfor:23daysstaoscompletion'of

,  : *:

'

'

1. ,g ,

During the power increase [ ihe National'Wedther; Service issues a tornade '

watch for Central Missouri lasting,until 10 a.m. The'8ecurity 5hift super-

visor reports that a bomb device has' been found in~ a briefcase}tta;the.MAF, '

The Shif t Supervisor should declare 'an' Unusual' Event: based,onja (securitys

threat or' attempted entry or sabotage'and should activate [the; "0n-shiftp

Emergency Organization. ,

_ k' j . A QMM y < -

'

.

. w a , , _ cb .

A loose' parts monitor alaru is received and RCS activity lbegins to? slowly.

~

. trend upward. As activity increases, a plant shutdown;is.commenedd(sad [

'

whenactivityreaches'300uci/m1,anAlertshoul.dbe(declarodibylthetEmer-

gency Coordinator. ' The On-site .'hergency Organization should belectivated.

5m..., . # . 7.; Jr ;

A severe thunderstorm strikes th...e.plintf site with wiiInd speeds,, exceeding?

~

'q 85 mph. . Severe danage to non-power' blo'ck buildingelandLequipasst.results.'

- A tornado strikes Mokane south'of the plant and theajeasseefd! trip 7ef?the N

Cal-Bland transmission line as the store' moves lto thi g Q Thelaiorissey

Coordinator should declare a: Site hersency and'the Corporate Bastgency $

~

Organizations should be activated.t 7 QMM St@$4

' ~

<

- ti g;yge, -

Steam Generator 'B' closehireesit-

main steam' isolation

.ing'in's stuck open.steamisafetiylvalve 7

endra valve inadvertent 1[fliginSG level. -

reactor?tripTea 1

'

The transient causes several: tubes"ia' SGi'B' tolleald L This" ^

iteW 1

! secondary leak.wihh the;open.lsaf4ty?resultsfin al radieActfisi creleasefsej '

the"stasephere. > The EnergencyJCoordnasterjobsolfdeslare@ " $3mer R

I t

'gency? based'on'the!radiesettvi

actions b'ased @ release R Astema'icToff-sttM

on thelceneralf BnergencyFleelude'febel'iirimig?for$fWo t

proteep ' b b '

Prot'octihnact%nstbeseafoEradistles O '

radius'

levels mayand five miles downwisd@if ta fise?. miles;andisbeltirtAfoot7

,

] include evacuation out e

miles. However, the' inability to evacuate'the five mile (sectorsibefore

~

plume arrival, will necessitate. a recommendation of ' sheltering [in these?

~

sectors. ,

.

r

.

n. . -r l > gW,l

I The Hot Lab becomes contaminated [ necessitating use offth,eJEOF Lab M A1

vehicle fire is reported by theLMaint' nance e Training'Centier' involving ;an L

injured Health Physics Technician sad potential for contamination. The,.

fire brigade and MERT should1 respond.to'the scene.- .

i

The plant is cooled to below 200'F, which terminates.the release' to atmos-

phere. Actions are initiated to transition to a recovery organization.

m)

,

-1- 04/10/87

%

• .

0

0 *

6 I _

1

.

0

t2

.

0

0

5 I

1

9

t1 '

.

. 8

t1

0

0 7

4 I t1

1 .

d

e

6 c

t1 n

e

m

t5 m

0 1 o

0

3 I

c

1 n

w .

. o e

t3 4 d d t

1 1 e t i

h u s .

s h

E

i s n

l o .

. N 0 b t e

.,.

I 0 a n s s

. L 2 I

t a . d a

1 s l y n e .

E e p t i l d

M i w e e

I s . - v r t

T n i i h . a

o r t t g s d n

t2 i u i c i a e i

1 t o m a h g t m

i s i .

a r

0

t90 1

d s l S n e n e

0 n i C o l i t

1 I 1 1 o M . c R . b m

1 C - y- e d t o a e

d t p h e l n t s

l i i S g s u n a

i

a m r e

i a a

h h b f

n

o

o

c l

e

i o e '. ce n:d n

t r e - e

.

. d y r

la f S .

d eT o e o r k e

a s

l

l . F

/

0 d y r s d a s

p .

e a a d * .

0 d e b a d e l l b . i e 0 d

0 I

n u l e s c i s

, e y r en t n 0 . e

1

a s d c e a e r e i 2 d t

s n e c b d t s . b c i e a . e a

s i u d x o p u n f t t o sn r n

n o e d y e l i t e o b t a i

ig h c

f t e c n c r g d p o o l m

t8

t7

e t

b a c v i l

e e

n y r n i

t a e l

g

V'T

I e

l

l

r n /

a m e a ne t l

. e e t

d i c r

l c d

e e

t

wiE v c r d S n m E k mf p o a

0 e v i e e n M i s ~- c i m o - y e

0 s o e l t d m a b l e d h a c y r s

.

9 I

i d d a c

u a

E l G r a r e s s r e i

.

0 c a

r n b s

t

r e -

B S

T

u 'B

'

r

e

w ru d S

t t

n n o r

v c

e r m u S e t l

'B

/ n r j n S a e c e

x o o n C l i a

E T B U R A S C

x G e a n i A l e e x

'

E S G C I W P P R R E

'

-

-

.

t6

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

0

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 1 4 51 6 7 8 1 9 0

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ~c

0 .

-

8 I t5

0

- ' t4

Cb

+3

it

+2

.

0

0

7 t1

0

.