ML20234F402

Forwards Addl Info Re Facility Responses to IE Bulletin 85-003,per NRC 870818 Request.Water Hammer Due to Valve Closure Not Considered in Determination of Differentials for Valves Listed in 860730 Response

ML20234F402
Person / Time
Site:	Robinson
Issue date:	09/17/1987
From:	Zimmerman S CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
References
IEB-85-003, IEB-85-3, NLS-87-201, NUDOCS 8709230113
Download: ML20234F402 (3)

Text

_

k~ CNLL i Carolina Power & Light Cornpany SEP 171987  ;

SERIAL: NLS-87-201 i i

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTENTION: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 l H. B. ROBINSON STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT, UNIT NO. 2 DOCKET NO. 50-261/ LICENSE NO. DPR-23 ,

REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CONCERNING l l THE HBR2 RESPONSES TO IEB 85-03 i Gentlemen: I Attached is the additional information requested by your letter dated August 18,1987.

l The attachment provides that information necessary for the staff to resolve its comments and questions regarding previous HBR2 responses to IE Bulletin No. 85-03 Action (e). Please note that the final report for HBR2 detailing the completion of the bulletin requirements is scheduled for submission to the staff by January 15,1988.

Should you have any questions concerning this issue, please contact Mr. A. W. Schmich at (919) 836-8759.

Yours very truly, f S.

& nee =--. -

erman M ager l Nuclear Licensing Section AWS/ mss (5'287AWS)

Attachment cc: Dr. J. Nelson Grace Mr. K. Eccleston Mr. H. Krug l

G s ;y .n . ; ;. , s.

. ,; n ; , - , .,.,,

411 Fayettenite $'reet + P. O. Box 1551

• Haleigh, N C. 27602 urazr=nwrzeamracarmammurm fj[

t .

L:.

CAROLINA POWER AND LIGHT H. B. ROBINSON UNIT 2 Response to NRC Request for AdditionalInformation Concerning Robinson Responses to IE Bulletin 85-03 The following prcvides specific information for each of the information request items regarding IEB 85-03 Action (e).

Item 1: Has water hammer due to valve closure beca considered in the determination of pressure differenticils? If not, please explain.

CP&L Response:

Water hammer due to valve closure has not been considered in the determination of pressure differentials for the valves listed in the July 30,1986 response. Dynamic effects including water hammer, however, have been considered in the test configurations with system alignments duplicating configurations assumed for the design bases to the maximum extent practical. No unusual dynamic effects have been noted during valve testing.

Item 2: According to Table 2 of the response of 07-30-86, MOVs SI-867A & B (formerly used for BIT inlet isolation) are placed in the normally open I position. However they are shown normally closed on FSAR Figure 6.3.2-1, Sheet 1 (Ref Dwg CP200-5379-1082, Sheet 1, Rev.12). Please resolve this apparent discrepancy.

CP&L Response:

The SI-867 A & B valves were changed to the normally open position by a plant modification. The FSAR Figure was revised in the most recent update, Amendment 5, ef fect!.a July 22,1987 to reflect the plant modification and now agrees with the table.

Item 3: Please expand the proposed program for action ltems b, c, and d to include the following details as a minimum:

(a) commitment to a training program for setting switches, maintaining valve operators, using test equipment and interpreting test results.

(b) commitment to justify continued operation of a valve determined to be inoperable.

(c) description of a method possibly needed to extrapolate valve stem j thrust measured at less than maximum differential pressure.

l l

l 2086NEL/ppo

4 CP&L Response:

The training program for setting switches and maintaining valve operators will be developed consistent with the schedule for completion of IEB 85-03 requirements. Training on use of the test equipment and on interpreting test results has been provided at the Limitorque factory for involved plant craf t and technical personnel. Further discussion of the training resulting from IEB 85-03 will be provided in the final response to be bulletin.

The operability of safe shutdown eqaipment, including valves whose positions .

change to serve a safety function, are governed by the plant Technical Specifications. Should any test or inspection identify a valve to be inoperable, continued operation in accordance with these Specifications would require formal justification and review. l I

The methodology for extrapolating valve stem thrust measured at less than l maximum differential pressure is being developed. A description of this '

methodology will be included in the final response to IEB 85-03.

l l

l I

2 l

l l

2086NEL/ppo L-___-