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Insp Rept 50-333/86-14 on 860825-28.Violation Noted: Unqualified Cable Splices in Limitorque Motor Valve Operator Internal Wiring
	ML20215D280
Person / Time
Site:	FitzPatrick
Issue date:	09/25/1986
From:	Anderson C, Cheung L, Thomas Koshy; NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20215D274	List: ML20215D271; ML20215D280;
References
	50-333-86-14, NUDOCS 8610140067
	Download: ML20215D280 (8)
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Report No. 50-333/86-14

Docket No. 50-333

License No. DPR-59 CATEGORY C

Licensee: Power Authority of the State of New York

P. O. Box 41

Lycoming, New York 13093

Facility Name: FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant

Inspection At: Scriba, New York ,

Inspection Conducted: August 25 - 28, 1986

Inspectors: .

T.eonar S. Cheung, Reactor En er ' date

Thomar, K

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ly Reactor Engineer

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Approved by: v

C. Jj Anderson, Chief, Plant Systems

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Section, EB, DRS

Inspection Summary: Inspection on August 25-28, 1986 (Inspection Report

No. 50-333/86-14).

Areas Inspected: Announced inspection of Limitorque valve operator internal

wiring and accessories to determine if the licensee 1) had adequately

established environmental qualification of the wiring and accessories in

accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.49 and 2) had adequately

addressed the concerns of IE Information Notice 86-03, " Potential Deficiencies

In Environmental Qualification of Limitorque Motor Valve Operator Wiring".

Results: Potential 10 CFR 50.49 violation involving unqualified cable splices

in Limitorque motor valve operator internal wiring.

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DETAIL

1.0 Persons Contacted

1.1 New York Power Authority

P. Arduini, Chief Electrician

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R. Baker, Maintenance Superintendent

R. Converse, Resident Manager

W. Fernandez, Superintendent of Power

M. Hansen, EQ Engineer

H. Keith, I&C Superintendent

J Kerfein, QC Supervisor

J. Lazarus, Assistant Plant Engineer

D. Lindsey, Opeation Superintendent

B. Lonberger, Plant Maintenance Supervisor

R. Mathews, I&C General Supervisor

R. Patch, QA Superintendent

V. Walz, Technical Service Superintendent

R. Wiese, Jr. , Maintenance Engineer

A. Zeller, QC Inspector

1.2 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

A. Luptak, Resident Inspector

denotes those persons present at exit meeting.

2.0 General Information

Various licensees have discovered Limitorque motor valve operators with

jumper wires different from those tested by Limitorque in its environ-

mental qualification program and internal wiring of its Limitorque oper-

ators that either could not be identified or qualification that could not

be established.

3.0 Corrective Actions by Licensee

In response to the NRC Information Notice No. 86-03, " Potential Defici-

encies In Environmental Qualification of Limitorque Motor Valve Operator

Wiring", the licensee had reviewed the document's applicability to

FitzPatrick site, and performed inspections on all Limitorque valve

operators requiring environmental qualification (EQ). There were 12

Limitorque valves inside the drywell and 104 outside. Of the 12 valves

inside the drywell, 4 valve operators (02 MOV-35A, B, C, D) had been

replaced by new ones and the details were documented in LER 86-007-00

" Valve Operator Non-compliance with 10 CFR 50.49" dated April 18, 1986,

and NRC inspection report 50-333/86-04. The other 8 valve operators were

inspected and upgraded per JAF procedure No. MI-86-024, IP#1 "Limitorque

Valve Actuator Qualification Inspection / Upgrades", Revision 0, dated

March 5, 1986.

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Of the 104 Limitorque operators located outside the drywell, 94 had been

inspected and upgraded per procedure No. MI-86-024, IP #2 "Limitorque

Valve Actuator Qualification Inspection / Upgrades", Revision 0, dated

May 14, 1986; 3 operators (23 MOV-17, 57, 59) had been inspected, also

per MI-86-024, IP #2, but not yet upgraded because these valves could not

be stroke tested and/or de-energized during normal plant operation. The

licensee had committed to upgrade these 3 operators during the next mini

outage in September 1986. The remaining 7 operators ( 10 MOV-17,13

MOV-16, 23 MOV-16 and 60, 29 MOV-77,01-125 MOV-11 and 12) were inspected

and upgraded per MI-86-024, IP#1 because of their inaccessibility

during normal plant operation.

4 The licensee stated that during these inspection upgrade activities, the

majority of the control wiring (jumper cables) in the Limitorque

operators had been replaced with Raychem Flamtrol cables or Rockbestos

Firewall III cables. The original (replaced) cables were sent to

independent laboratories for analysis and identificaticn. The licensee

claimed that all original cables were qualified (at least to DDR

Guidelines) and the qualification documents were in the EQ files.

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NRC

will review these documents during future inspections.

4.0 Physical Inspection

4.1 Scope

The inspector randomly selected a sample of 10 Limitorque operators

located outside the drywell for incoections. No operators inside

the drywell were selected because of inaccessibility during this

inspection period. The ten operators selected could be de-energized

without affecting normal plant operation. The Limitorque valves

selected were:

Valve No. Service

10 MOV-57 RHR to radwaste isolation

10 MOV-67 RHR isolation

10 MOV-148 A&B RHR service water cross-tie

10 MOV-149 A&B RHR service water cross-tie

27 MOV-113 Drywell air exhaust bypass valve

27 MOV-122 Drywell air exhaust bypass valve

29 MOV-200 A&B Leak collection system master isolation

The covers of these 10 Limitorque operators were removed for close

examination. Items inspected for each operator included limit

switches and rotor shafts, torque switches, jumper and field wiring,

terminal blocks and cable splices.

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4.2 Findings

The inspector noticed that all control (jumper) wiring in these 10

operators were either Raychem Flamtrol cables or Rockbestos Firewall

III cables and that all terminal blocks were not wired. However,

the following findings were observed:

A. During the course of the inspection, the inspector identified

two Limitorque operators (27 MOV-122, 27 MOV-113), located in

the Reactor Building, elevations 326' and 338', containing nine

potentially unqualified cable splices, 6 in one operator and 3

in the other operator. These splices were covered with PVC

electrical tapes. Upon notification by the inspector, the li-

censee's craftsman removed the PVC tapes, revealing red colored

tapes, identified by the licensee to be Okonite T-95 tapes.

The test samples used to qualify. 0konite cable splices were

constructed in accordance with the instructions detailed in JAF

document SK-00/20248-1 dated June 18, 1984, which required the

application of both Okonite T-95 (red tape) and Okonite No. 35

(black tapes). Hence, the environmental qualification of the

identified cable splices was not established.

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The licensee was told that the above 9 splices constituted a

potential violation of 10 CFR 50.49 requirements. (50-333/

86-14-01). ,

Subsequent to this finding, the licensee initiated corrective

action to replace the PVC electrical tapes with Okonite No. 35

tapes. However, installation and QC inspection records were

not available for NRC's review before completion of this

inspection.

Since the post accident environment inside the drywell is more

severe than that outside, the licensee was told of NRC's con-

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cerns that the Limitorque operators inside the drywell might

contain similar cable splices. The licensee committed to

conduct full inspection on the cable splices in the Limitorque

operators inside the drywell during the mini-outage scheduled in

September, 1986.

B. During the course of physical inspection of Limitorque

operators, the inspector observed that the rotor shafts of the

limit switches and the limit switch bodies were made of

different materials. There are four types of materials (red

Durez, black Durez, white Melamine and brown Fibrite) used by

the manufacturer for the rotor shafts and limit switch bodies.

Two of these materials (red Durez and black Durez) were not

qualified for inside drywell operation.

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Procedure MI-86-024 IP#1 (Inspection / upgrades of MOV inside

drywell), Appendix II item H.6 required the torque switches and

limit switch to be verified (identified by colors). However,

verification of the rotor shaft materials were not specifically

addressed. Absence of this verification requirement in the

procedure could lead to undetected rotor shafts made of

unqualified materials even though the limit switch bodies were

made of qualified materials. Discussion with one of the

licensee's craftsmen revealed the fact that verification of the

color shaft materials might be ignored when the limit switches

were being inspected. This confirmed NRC's concern of possible

unqualified rotor shaft material inside the drywell.

This item is unresolved pending NRC's review of licensee's

corrective action: 1) verification of limit switch rotor shaft

materials in Limitorque operators inside the drywell; 2)

verification requirement of limit switch rotor shaft material

be included in procedure M1-86-024, IP #1 (50-333/86-14-02).

C. During the course of site inspection, on August 26, 1986, the

inspector noticed a safety related Rosemount transmitter ( 27

PT 102 B, Rosemount Model 1151, not required for-EQ) in operat-

ing status with a plastic cap (used for shipping only) at the

alternate conduit entry point. The installation section of

Rosemount Instruction Manual 4260/4261 dated February 1986

requires the plastic cap be replaced with plugs and sealing

compound, in order to prevent moisture accumulation in the

electronic housing. Subsequent to this finding, the licensee

identified one other Rosemount transmitter (27 FT 664) with

a similar condition.

The licensee promptly took corrective action to replace these

plastic caps with stainless steel plugs and sealing compound.

The record of these activities were documented in their Work

Request Form Nos. 27-043219 and 27-0432201, both dated August

27, 1986. The inspectors did not identify any other similar

plastic caps in Rosemount transmitters and had no further

questions at this time.

5.0 EQ File Detail Reviews

5.1 Okonite Cable Splices EQ File

5.1.1.The inspector reviewed the EQ file of Okonite cable splices (File

No. 285) to ascertain whether the file contained sufficient

evidences that these cable splices were qualified for the environ-

mental conditions in which they must operate, and that the

qualification documents in the file were auditable.

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5.1.2. Documents reviewed in this determination included:

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SCEW sheet of Okonite cable splices, Revision 0,

dated February 12, 1986.

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Patel Engineers report No. PEI-TR-82-4-41 " Final Assessment

Report on Okonite Tape Splice Insulation for Power and Control

Cables and..." Revision A dated May 8, 1985.

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Patel Engineers report No. PEI-TR-842900-1 " Final Test Report

on Okonite Tape Splice Insulation for Power and Control Cables

and..." Rev. A, dated May 8, 1985.

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Patel Engineers report No. PEI-TR-82-4-202 " Test Procedure for

Okonite Tape Splice Insulation for Power and Control Cables and

... " Rev. C, dated September, 1984.

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Medtherm Corporation document " Functional Testing and Thermal

Aging of Cable Splice Specimens" dated October 3, 1984.

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Corporate Consulting Development Report No. 1865-0 "Certifica-

tion Test Report" dated September 27, 1984. -

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JAF document SK-00/20248-1 " Cable Splice Assemblies for JAF Test

Program", Revision 1, dated June 18, 1984.

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JAF maintenance procedure No. 71.1 " Termination and Insulation

of Electrical Power and Control Cables", Revision 3, dated

November 17, 1981.

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JAF procedure No.15-E-08 " Insulation of Electrical

Terminations and Splices", Revision 0, dated March 14, 1986.

5.1.3 Findings

The Okonite cable splice samples used for the qualification test

were constructed using procedures described in JAF document

SK-00/20248-1, which required a minimum of four layers (equivalent

to two half-lapped layers) of Okonite T-95 tape over exposed metal

surfaces. However, in section H.1.8 of the installation procedure

No. IS-E-08, no minimum number of layers was specified. This

procedure could lead to construction of unqualified cable splices by

the craftsmen. The procedure is relatively new (dated March 14,

1986). The inspector also reviewed the old procedure MP 71.1 dated

November 17, 1981 (used before March 14, 1986). Section 7.1.12 of this

procedure did state the requirement of three half-lapped layers of

Okonite T-95 tape, which is more conservative than the test samples.

, This item is unresolved pending NRC's review of licensee's

corrective actions: 1) the cable splices constructed using the new

procedure is equal to or more convervative than the tested samples;

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2) verifying that no unqualified cable splices were installed using

th,e new procedure. (50-333/86-14-03).

5.2 Rockbestos Firewall III and Raychem Flamtrol Cable EQ Files

5.2.1 The inspector reviewed the EQ files of Rockbestos Firewall III

Cables and Raychem Flamtrol Cables to determine whether the files

contained sufficient evidence that these cables were qualified for

the environmental conditions in which they must operate, and that

the qualification documents in the files were auditable.

5.2.2 Documents reviewed in this determination included:

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Rockbestos report #QR-5805 " Report on Qualification Tests for

Firewall III Irradiation Cross-linked Polyethylene

Constructions for Class IE Service in Nuclear Generating

Station", dated October 8, 1985.

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JAF plant specific qualification report for Rockbestos Firewall

III and SIS cables, dated April 30, 1986.

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Patel Engineers technical report PEI-TR-82-4-121 " Evaluation of

the of the Raychem Flamatrol Cable for Use in the James A.

FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant", Revision B, dated August 19,

1982.

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SCEW sheet for Rockbestos Firewall III Cables, Revision 1,

dated May 12, 1986.

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SCEW sheet for Raychem 60B0211-14 Cables dated August 22, 1986.

5.2.3 Findings

Within scope of this review, no deficiencies were identified.

6.0 Unresolved Itens

Unresolved items are matters which more information is required in order

to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, or violations.

Unresolved items identified during this inspection are discussed in

Details, paragraphs 4.2 and 5.1.3.

7.0 Exit Meeting

The inspector met with licensee and construction representatives (denoted

in paragraph 1.0) at the conclusion of the inspection on August 28, 1986

at the plant site.

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The inspector summarized the scope of the inspection, the inspection

findings and confirmed with the licensee that the documents reviewed by

the team did not contain any proprietary information. The licensee

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agreed that the inspection report may be placed in the Public Document

Room without prior licensee review for proprietary information (10 CFR

2.790).

At no time during this inspection was written material provided to the

licensee.

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ML20215D280

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