ML20215D280
| ML20215D280 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | FitzPatrick  |
| Issue date: | 09/25/1986 |
| From: | Anderson C, Cheung L, Thomas Koshy NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20215D274 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-333-86-14, NUDOCS 8610140067 | |
| Download: ML20215D280 (8) | |
See also: IR 05000333/1986014
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Report No.
50-333/86-14
Docket No. 50-333
License No.
CATEGORY
C
Licensee:
Power Authority of the State of New York
P. O. Box 41
Lycoming, New York 13093
Facility Name:
FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant
Inspection At:
Scriba, New York
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Inspection Conducted: August 25 - 28, 1986
Inspectors:
.
T.eonar
S. Cheung, Reactor En
er '
date
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Thomar, K
ly Reactor Engineer
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Approved by:
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C. Jj Anderson, Chief, Plant Systems
date
Section, EB, DRS
Inspection Summary:
Inspection on August 25-28, 1986 (Inspection Report
No. 50-333/86-14).
Areas Inspected: Announced inspection of Limitorque valve operator internal
wiring and accessories to determine if the licensee 1) had adequately
established environmental qualification of the wiring and accessories in
accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.49 and 2) had adequately
addressed the concerns of IE Information Notice 86-03, " Potential Deficiencies
In Environmental Qualification of Limitorque Motor Valve Operator Wiring".
Results: Potential 10 CFR 50.49 violation involving unqualified cable splices
in Limitorque motor valve operator internal wiring.
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DETAIL
1.0 Persons Contacted
1.1 New York Power Authority
P. Arduini, Chief Electrician
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R. Baker, Maintenance Superintendent
- R. Converse, Resident Manager
W. Fernandez, Superintendent of Power
- M. Hansen, EQ Engineer
- H. Keith, I&C Superintendent
- J Kerfein, QC Supervisor
- J. Lazarus, Assistant Plant Engineer
- D. Lindsey, Opeation Superintendent
B. Lonberger, Plant Maintenance Supervisor
R. Mathews, I&C General Supervisor
- R. Patch, QA Superintendent
- V. Walz, Technical Service Superintendent
- R. Wiese, Jr. , Maintenance Engineer
A. Zeller, QC Inspector
1.2
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- A. Luptak, Resident Inspector
- denotes those persons present at exit meeting.
2.0 General Information
Various licensees have discovered Limitorque motor valve operators with
jumper wires different from those tested by Limitorque in its environ-
mental qualification program and internal wiring of its Limitorque oper-
ators that either could not be identified or qualification that could not
be established.
3.0 Corrective Actions by Licensee
In response to the NRC Information Notice No. 86-03, " Potential Defici-
encies In Environmental Qualification of Limitorque Motor Valve Operator
Wiring", the licensee had reviewed the document's applicability to
FitzPatrick site, and performed inspections on all Limitorque valve
operators requiring environmental qualification (EQ).
There were 12
Limitorque valves inside the drywell and 104 outside. Of the 12 valves
inside the drywell, 4 valve operators (02 MOV-35A, B, C, D) had been
replaced by new ones and the details were documented in LER 86-007-00
" Valve Operator Non-compliance with 10 CFR 50.49" dated April 18, 1986,
and NRC inspection report 50-333/86-04. The other 8 valve operators were
inspected and upgraded per JAF procedure No. MI-86-024, IP#1 "Limitorque
Valve Actuator Qualification Inspection / Upgrades", Revision 0, dated
March 5, 1986.
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Of the 104 Limitorque operators located outside the drywell, 94 had been
inspected and upgraded per procedure No. MI-86-024, IP #2 "Limitorque
Valve Actuator Qualification Inspection / Upgrades", Revision 0, dated
May 14, 1986; 3 operators (23 MOV-17, 57, 59) had been inspected, also
per MI-86-024, IP #2, but not yet upgraded because these valves could not
be stroke tested and/or de-energized during normal plant operation. The
licensee had committed to upgrade these 3 operators during the next mini
outage in September 1986. The remaining 7 operators ( 10 MOV-17,13
MOV-16, 23 MOV-16 and 60, 29 MOV-77,01-125 MOV-11 and 12) were inspected
and upgraded per MI-86-024, IP#1 because of their inaccessibility
during normal plant operation.
The licensee stated that during these inspection upgrade activities, the
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majority of the control wiring (jumper cables) in the Limitorque
operators had been replaced with Raychem Flamtrol cables or Rockbestos
Firewall III cables. The original (replaced) cables were sent to
independent laboratories for analysis and identificaticn.
The licensee
claimed that all original cables were qualified (at least to DDR
Guidelines) and the qualification documents were in the EQ files.
NRC
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will review these documents during future inspections.
4.0 Physical Inspection
4.1 Scope
The inspector randomly selected a sample of 10 Limitorque operators
located outside the drywell for incoections. No operators inside
the drywell were selected because of inaccessibility during this
inspection period. The ten operators selected could be de-energized
without affecting normal plant operation. The Limitorque valves
selected were:
Valve No.
Service
10 MOV-57
RHR to radwaste isolation
10 MOV-67
RHR isolation
10 MOV-148 A&B
RHR service water cross-tie
10 MOV-149 A&B
RHR service water cross-tie
27 MOV-113
Drywell air exhaust bypass valve
27 MOV-122
Drywell air exhaust bypass valve
29 MOV-200 A&B
Leak collection system master isolation
The covers of these 10 Limitorque operators were removed for close
examination.
Items inspected for each operator included limit
switches and rotor shafts, torque switches, jumper and field wiring,
terminal blocks and cable splices.
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4.2 Findings
The inspector noticed that all control (jumper) wiring in these 10
operators were either Raychem Flamtrol cables or Rockbestos Firewall
III cables and that all terminal blocks were not wired. However,
the following findings were observed:
A.
During the course of the inspection, the inspector identified
two Limitorque operators (27 MOV-122, 27 MOV-113), located in
the Reactor Building, elevations 326' and 338', containing nine
potentially unqualified cable splices, 6 in one operator and 3
in the other operator. These splices were covered with PVC
electrical tapes.
Upon notification by the inspector, the li-
censee's craftsman removed the PVC tapes, revealing red colored
tapes, identified by the licensee to be Okonite T-95 tapes.
The test samples used to qualify. 0konite cable splices were
constructed in accordance with the instructions detailed in JAF
document SK-00/20248-1 dated June 18, 1984, which required the
application of both Okonite T-95 (red tape) and Okonite No. 35
(black tapes). Hence, the environmental qualification of the
identified cable splices was not established.
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The licensee was told that the above 9 splices constituted a
potential violation of 10 CFR 50.49 requirements.
(50-333/
86-14-01).
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Subsequent to this finding, the licensee initiated corrective
action to replace the PVC electrical tapes with Okonite No. 35
tapes. However, installation and QC inspection records were
not available for NRC's review before completion of this
inspection.
Since the post accident environment inside the drywell is more
severe than that outside, the licensee was told of NRC's con-
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cerns that the Limitorque operators inside the drywell might
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contain similar cable splices.
The licensee committed to
conduct full inspection on the cable splices in the Limitorque
operators inside the drywell during the mini-outage scheduled in
September, 1986.
B.
During the course of physical inspection of Limitorque
operators, the inspector observed that the rotor shafts of the
limit switches and the limit switch bodies were made of
different materials. There are four types of materials (red
Durez, black Durez, white Melamine and brown Fibrite) used by
the manufacturer for the rotor shafts and limit switch bodies.
Two of these materials (red Durez and black Durez) were not
qualified for inside drywell operation.
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Procedure MI-86-024 IP#1 (Inspection / upgrades of MOV inside
drywell), Appendix II item H.6 required the torque switches and
limit switch to be verified (identified by colors). However,
verification of the rotor shaft materials were not specifically
addressed. Absence of this verification requirement in the
procedure could lead to undetected rotor shafts made of
unqualified materials even though the limit switch bodies were
made of qualified materials. Discussion with one of the
licensee's craftsmen revealed the fact that verification of the
color shaft materials might be ignored when the limit switches
were being inspected. This confirmed NRC's concern of possible
unqualified rotor shaft material inside the drywell.
This item is unresolved pending NRC's review of licensee's
corrective action:
1) verification of limit switch rotor shaft
materials in Limitorque operators inside the drywell; 2)
verification requirement of limit switch rotor shaft material
be included in procedure M1-86-024, IP #1 (50-333/86-14-02).
C.
During the course of site inspection, on August 26, 1986, the
inspector noticed a safety related Rosemount transmitter ( 27
PT 102 B, Rosemount Model 1151, not required for-EQ) in operat-
ing status with a plastic cap (used for shipping only) at the
alternate conduit entry point. The installation section of
Rosemount Instruction Manual 4260/4261 dated February 1986
requires the plastic cap be replaced with plugs and sealing
compound, in order to prevent moisture accumulation in the
electronic housing. Subsequent to this finding, the licensee
identified one other Rosemount transmitter (27 FT 664) with
a similar condition.
The licensee promptly took corrective action to replace these
plastic caps with stainless steel plugs and sealing compound.
The record of these activities were documented in their Work
Request Form Nos. 27-043219 and 27-0432201, both dated August
27, 1986. The inspectors did not identify any other similar
plastic caps in Rosemount transmitters and had no further
questions at this time.
5.0 EQ File Detail Reviews
5.1 Okonite Cable Splices EQ File
5.1.1.The inspector reviewed the EQ file of Okonite cable splices (File
No. 285) to ascertain whether the file contained sufficient
evidences that these cable splices were qualified for the environ-
mental conditions in which they must operate, and that the
qualification documents in the file were auditable.
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5.1.2. Documents reviewed in this determination included:
SCEW sheet of Okonite cable splices, Revision 0,
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dated February 12, 1986.
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Patel Engineers report No. PEI-TR-82-4-41 " Final Assessment
Report on Okonite Tape Splice Insulation for Power and Control
Cables and..."
Revision A dated May 8, 1985.
Patel Engineers report No. PEI-TR-842900-1 " Final Test Report
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on Okonite Tape Splice Insulation for Power and Control Cables
and..."
Rev. A, dated May 8, 1985.
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Patel Engineers report No. PEI-TR-82-4-202 " Test Procedure for
Okonite Tape Splice Insulation for Power and Control Cables and
" Rev. C, dated September, 1984.
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Medtherm Corporation document " Functional Testing and Thermal
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Aging of Cable Splice Specimens" dated October 3, 1984.
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Corporate Consulting Development Report No. 1865-0 "Certifica-
tion Test Report" dated September 27, 1984.
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JAF document SK-00/20248-1 " Cable Splice Assemblies for JAF Test
Program", Revision 1, dated June 18, 1984.
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JAF maintenance procedure No. 71.1 " Termination and Insulation
of Electrical Power and Control Cables", Revision 3, dated
November 17, 1981.
JAF procedure No.15-E-08 " Insulation of Electrical
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Terminations and Splices", Revision 0, dated March 14, 1986.
5.1.3 Findings
The Okonite cable splice samples used for the qualification test
were constructed using procedures described in JAF document
SK-00/20248-1, which required a minimum of four layers (equivalent
to two half-lapped layers) of Okonite T-95 tape over exposed metal
surfaces.
However, in section H.1.8 of the installation procedure
No. IS-E-08, no minimum number of layers was specified.
This
procedure could lead to construction of unqualified cable splices by
the craftsmen. The procedure is relatively new (dated March 14,
1986). The inspector also reviewed the old procedure MP 71.1 dated
November 17, 1981 (used before March 14, 1986).
Section 7.1.12 of this
procedure did state the requirement of three half-lapped layers of
Okonite T-95 tape, which is more conservative than the test samples.
This item is unresolved pending NRC's review of licensee's
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corrective actions:
1) the cable splices constructed using the new
procedure is equal to or more convervative than the tested samples;
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2) verifying that no unqualified cable splices were installed using
th,e new procedure.
(50-333/86-14-03).
5.2 Rockbestos Firewall III and Raychem Flamtrol Cable EQ Files
5.2.1 The inspector reviewed the EQ files of Rockbestos Firewall III
Cables and Raychem Flamtrol Cables to determine whether the files
contained sufficient evidence that these cables were qualified for
the environmental conditions in which they must operate, and that
the qualification documents in the files were auditable.
5.2.2 Documents reviewed in this determination included:
Rockbestos report #QR-5805 " Report on Qualification Tests for
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Firewall III Irradiation Cross-linked Polyethylene
Constructions for Class IE Service in Nuclear Generating
Station", dated October 8, 1985.
JAF plant specific qualification report for Rockbestos Firewall
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III and SIS cables, dated April 30, 1986.
Patel Engineers technical report PEI-TR-82-4-121 " Evaluation of
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the of the Raychem Flamatrol Cable for Use in the James A.
FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant", Revision B, dated August 19,
1982.
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SCEW sheet for Rockbestos Firewall III Cables, Revision 1,
dated May 12, 1986.
SCEW sheet for Raychem 60B0211-14 Cables dated August 22, 1986.
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5.2.3 Findings
Within scope of this review, no deficiencies were identified.
6.0 Unresolved Itens
Unresolved items are matters which more information is required in order
to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, or violations.
Unresolved items identified during this inspection are discussed in
Details, paragraphs 4.2 and 5.1.3.
7.0 Exit Meeting
The inspector met with licensee and construction representatives (denoted
in paragraph 1.0) at the conclusion of the inspection on August 28, 1986
at the plant site.
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The inspector summarized the scope of the inspection, the inspection
findings and confirmed with the licensee that the documents reviewed by
the team did not contain any proprietary information. The licensee
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agreed that the inspection report may be placed in the Public Document
Room without prior licensee review for proprietary information (10 CFR 2.790).
At no time during this inspection was written material provided to the
licensee.
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