ML20215B006

Requests That Commission Conduct Public Hearings & Shut Down Facility Permanently.Facility Twin of Doomed TMI Reactor & Operating Record Incredibly Dangerous

ML20215B006
Person / Time
Site:	Rancho Seco
Issue date:	08/26/1986
From:	Bradley T AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED
To:	Palladino N NRC COMMISSION (OCM)
References
CON-#486-0580, CON-#486-580 2.206, NUDOCS 8610060326
Download: ML20215B006 (2)

Text

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. SN 00(.KETED usNFC August 26, 1986

'86 SEP -3 P4 :14 l

Honorable Nunzio J. Palladino Chairman 0FFl0E # .. - .

' l Nuclear Regulatory Commission 00CKEipyg.' ' /"i 1717 h" St . , N.W. d^**

Washington, D.C. 20555 1 NCr.ZTMUMEU-h.M 'b )

PR00. & UTIL F1' - - __ - l>

SUBJECT:

Request for Public Hearings on Closure of Rancho Seco l

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Dear Chairman Palladino:

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The Rancho Seco Nuclear Power Plant, located near Sacramento, California, is America's most dangerous nuclear power '

facility. I call upon the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to conduct public hearings and then to shut down Rancho Seco permanently.

The simple fact that Rancho Seco is a twin of the docmed Three Mile Island reactor is enough reason to closely scrutinize the plant's operation. But Rancho Seco's troubled operating record offers many more reasons for concern.

In just eleven years of operation, Rancho Seco has suffered nearly 100 unplanned outages -- including the worst overcooling in industry history in 1978 and two severe overcoolings just last year. In fact, Rancho Seco has already suffered as many

" incidents" as most nuclear power plants endure in twenty years.

Furthermore, both NRC records and independent investigations reveal that Rancho Seco has been plagued by poor management, inadequate training, and sloppy maintenance. Indeed, in nearly every year of operation, Rancho Seco has experienced an increase in the number of operating mistakes, equipment failures i and procedural and inspection violations. (In the only two years l in which Rancho Seco did not experience increases in violations, the plant was closed for about two-thirds of the time.)

Fortunately, Rancho Seco has been completely shut down since it suffered the third worst overcooling accident in industry history in December, 1985. As you know, the NRC is now deciding when, and under what circumstances, Rancho Seco may begin operations again.

I believe that an unbiased review of the evidence supports the conclusion that Rancho Seco should never be reopened. But whatever the evidence, I urge the NRC to give interested members of the public an opportunity to testify, at open hearings, concerning the future of Rancho Seco. The residents of 8610060326 860326 PDR ADOCK 05000312 P PDH

l the Sacramento area, who would ba catastrophically j ', impacted by an accid nt at Rancho Seco, hava a right to bn heard, and heard powerfully, on this critical issue.

Furthermore, the public has a right to know about the horrendous mismanagement at Rancho Seco -- mismanagement that continues at this very moment. For example, the NRC national office's most recent evcluation of the start-up plan prepared by Rancho Seco's management (a copy of which is attached hereto) reveals yet additional management errors. Incredibly, the NRC report concludes that the Rancho Seco start-up plan -- after months and months of preparation -- fails even to address the major problems that led to the near-catastrophe in December, 1985. See NRC Report, subpoint 1, page 1. In addition, the NRC report highlights three other significant deficiencies in the Rancho Seco start-up plan. In short, after eight months of work, Rancho Seco's management cannot even begin to assure the public that the plant will be operated safely if it is reopened.

In light of Rancho Seco's incredibly dangerous operating history, and in view of the continuing inability of the plant's managers to behave competently, I urge the NRC to conduct public hearings and then to permanently close Rancho Seco.

Sincerely, ,

, Pitt 1 TOM BRADLEY l Enclosure l

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[ ',, UNITED STATES  !

I NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

/ [ k, c (/( hy W AsmNGTON. O. C. 20555

%, uly , 1986 RECElVED LICENSEE - Sacramento Municipal Utility District jg(24lggg FACILITY - Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station RANCHO SECO SUBJECT -

SUMMARY

OF MEETING HELD ON JUNE 12, 1986 WITH SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT By letter dated May 30, 1986, the Sacramento Municipal Utility District (SMUD)

I submitted a preliminary version of its Action Plan for Performance Improvement at the Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station. In its letter SMUD stated that

' the preliminary plan was not intended to be used for detailed review but was i intended to be a communicatinns vehicle to serve as the basis for discussions between the NRC staff and SMUD. On June 12, 1986, a meeting was held between

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8 representatives of SMUD and the NRC staff in Bethesda, Maryland to discuss the scope and content of the action plan. Enclosure 1 is a list of the attendees.

Enclosure 2 is a copy of the material presented by SMUD at the meeting. -

SMUD provided a brief overview of the organizational changes and management personnel additions made to improve management performance. They also described the nature of the Plant Performance (PP) and Management Improvemer.t j Program (MIP) process. As shown on Enclosure 3, the PP and MlP process involves the steps of " input," " evaluation," " disposition", and "impl emen ta ti on . " Recommendations for consideration in the PP and MIP process will consist of input from six investigative groups. The six investigative groups are (1) Selected Projects, (2) Precursor Reviews, (3) Plant Staff

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Interviews, (4) Detenninistic Failure Consequences, (5) BWOG Stop-Trip Program, and (6) December 26 Event and Nureg-1195 Action List. The inputs i

will be evaluated and prioritized by the Recomendation Review and Resolution Board. Disposition of the recommendations will be made by the Performance Analysis Group and implementation will be accomplished by the existing organization and procedures. The licensee indicated that the review groups will continue working after restart. The criteria the licensee is using for l

prioritizing restart actions are those that (1) assure the plant remains in .

the post-trip window, (2) assure compliance with license requirements, and (3) preclude the need for " Heroic Operator Action."

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SMUD then gave a brief description of the Preventative Maintenance Program that is currently underway. The program will include inspection of over 300 i

manual settings valves,on maininspection steam valves. of selected motor operator valves, and reverifying SMUD also described their proposed systems i

test program. The program consisted of primarily surveillance tests, test of systems and components on which modifications were made or maintenance performed, and integrated systems startup tests. In addition, SMUD is studying the Davis-Besse and TMI test programs and some selected systems testing may be performed.

The NRC staff had the following major coments:

I' h 1.

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The preliminary version of the Action Plan does not indicate that the rpt,rospectiye matters raised by the Incident Investigation Team in Chapter 7 li p4 al.% n-e hct J 2cC L 8 4 A p & g RECEIVED A4 a,>at% wy M ,< dewy-s ewa,w JUL 2 31986 Wm

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t of NUREG-1195 will be addressed. The staff considers that SMUD must address these matters prior to res tart.

2. It is not clear which of the items described in the Action Plan are to be completed prior to restart, and on what schedule; nor is there sufficient discussion of why other items need not be resolved prior to restart. For a number of items, the Action Plan indicates that resolution will .be initiated prior to restart, but no schedule is provided for completion.

3. Although the Action Plan appears to include both a systems review and a, test program, it does not adequately describe the depth or interrelationship of these elements. The NRC staff believes that the test program should be developed and its scope justified based on the systems review and configuration evaluations.

Based on the limited detail provided in the preliminary version of-4he Action Plan and the schedules indicated, the NRC staff is concerned that the test program appears to include little more than the normally expected post-outage startup testing.

4. The Action Plan makes frequsnt references to utilizing information to be developed by the B&W Owners Group but lacks clarity regarding the interaction between SMUD and the Owners Group, and confirmation that the BWOG schedules are consistent with SMUD's plans for restart.

1D Sydney Miner, Project Manager l Project Directorate #6 1 Division of PWR Licensing-B Encisoures:

As Stated cc w/ enclosures: .

! See next page I

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