ML20151W768

Discusses Failure of Smud to Keep Pledge to Ratepayers to Go Beyond Minimal Get by Commitment of Mgt in Past to Be Thorough & Complete in Exploring All Possible Problems at Facility

ML20151W768
Person / Time
Site:	Rancho Seco
Issue date:	02/18/1988
From:	Southard E AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED
To:	Stello V NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO)
Shared Package
ML20151W743	List: ML20151W740 ML20151W768
References
NUDOCS 8805030487
Download: ML20151W768 (4)

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C February 18, 1988 To Whom It May Concern WHY HASti'T SMUD KEPT IT' S WORD 7

' An Unexamined Risk at Rancho Seco Approximately two years ago SMUD,.the Sacramento Metropolitan Utility District, made a pledge to its ratepayers to go beyond the minimal "get by" commitment of it's management in the past, ,

to be thorot.gh and complete in exploring all possible problems at Rancho Seco Nuclear Power Plant, beyond HRC, Nuclear Regulatory Cowission, requirements, BEFORE it was restarted.

They have failed by this pledge to recognize a very disturbing series of events that have gradually come to the public s attention over more than 15 years. Each of the following facts lead me to the conclusion that an independent full-scale re-analysis of seismic and design criteria used to build Rancho Seco is owed to all of Greater Sacramento and the people of the Western United States, before restart.

Per the NRC in a letter date stamped November 12, 1986 to California Senator Alan Cranston from Victor Stello, Jr.,

Executive Director for Operations, the Rancho Seco Nuclear Power Plan t , " could withstand an earthquake of magnitude 0.0_to 6.5 in the Foothills __ Fault Zone even if it occurred at the closest point to the plant site." plant.which is approximately 13 miles from the

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The sci.entific calculations, when the plant was designed, were based upon a belief that the closest fault line was 25 miles from the plant site in a fault zone inactive in the modern geolc.gical era. This is per data found in the Nuclear Library in the documents from when the plant was designed in the late 1960's.

During the d6 sign and early construction of Rancho Seco i certain geological facts about earthquake movements were believed to be true, and therefore used as part of the engineering standards that the design of the plant was based upon. In 1971, when the plant was partially built, the closeness of Caltech's seismic instruments to the 6.4 San Fernsndo earthquake, Feb 9th, changed the factual criteria that needed to be considered by structural design engineers. That closely watched quake caused more, "ground ,

acceleration " or shaking, than previously calculated for a quake of that size. That means the relationship between the magnitude of a quake and the amount of possible motion was underestimated in the design of the plant. Motion is what causes damage like pipe ruptures, falling masonry or loss of elect r ical services. .

In August of 1975 at Lake Oroville, in the same fault zone as the plant, we had a quake of 5.7, roughly 85 miles north.

In July 1986 therc was t. 6.0 qucke in a difforent fault zone, the Bishop quake, 160 miles southeast. It ALSO, was un an histor-ically inactive fatit zone, per a State of California Geologist as heard on a TV News broadcast at that time. Rancho Seco sits roughly between these two.

We have recer.tly been assured by the NRC that none of this is important because the plant is designed to withstand a bigger quake than ever experienced. Yet, we already have proof that the unexpected, unexperienced historically, can happen in our foothills.

For me that leaves the NRC reassurance sounding hollow.

There is another stream of facts that correlate to the ones above that me.ke them far more pertinent to whether we are safe to trestart. To help tie them together let me describe the Richter 3cale clearly. In the Richter Scale which measuccs earthquakes, 8905030407 990426 PDR ADOCK 05000312 # ito.. 003516 l

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p.2 cach sucessding wholo nurbar has a segnitude of 10 incraasa in strength. That means that a 6.0 is 10 times more powerful than a 5.0, or to say it another way that a 5.0 has 10% of the power of a 6.0. To shift a decimal point one space changes a 'ene' to a 'one-tenth', the equivalent of one whole number on the Richter Scale.

November 19, 1979, New West Magazine, after a three ronth investigation, reported the following: a Mr. Ron Clary was a structural engineer for Bechtel when this plant, they built, was under constuction; and he seueral years later worked for the NRC at their Bethesda headquarters. (His credentials are that both there organizations felt he was expert enough to hire him and trust his engineering work over a period of years.) Clary, anonymously at first, stepped forward and told the NRC that, after the Rancho Seco cooling towers and spent-fuel building (which holds the high level radiation vaste) were already partially built, that he, 1) found a simple math error of a decimal, that an error of the order of 10 magnitude had been made. He states that the error continued into the as-built drawings. "Clary realized the decimal point error could mean .that Bechtel had built the spent-fuel storage building substantially less strong than it should be." He kept proof of it after, he said, his boss at Bechtel covered the error over instead of remedying it. Later he reported it to the NRC. 2) Clary also has stated that while at Bechtel, after the San Fernando earthquake, that fellow engineers at Bechtel said, "they cranked in these new numbers, the ground acceleration and all, through the computers and BOOM - the cooling towers fall down...

so what do they do? Do they rebuild those towers? ...no they keep refining them to stay up. Course whether that model represented the structure by the time they got finished is another question."

For this he never had written proof, so his allegations were dismissed by the NRC without investigation.

Per the New West article, the NRC investigated the math error without asking'Clary to testify, and reported that there was no truth to Clary s charges. Yet, when Clary read that report, and then went to the Investigation and Enforcement Branch of the NRC with his proof, they immediately re-opened the investigation.

However, NRC then confirmed Clary vns right, but said that it wasn't significant and ignored the coverup as if it hadn't existed.

The factual data and calculations used by NRC to justify this opinion, to me, need to be re-examined especially after the Bechtel wiring and piping drawings of the plant as-built have had to be rechecked bemause of other Bechtel errors. New Vest further stated, our, "investigation did confirm that clary's charges are serious, and that the NRC's sole documentation for its dismissal of Clary's charges comes from the very company it was investigating."

They of how, if continued, the (cooling by)towers visualwere inspection, to list Clary's description to one side or the other, they could damage parts of the piping into the containment and emergency core ecoling system was confirmed."

To my knowledge this has never been resolved, just forgotten.

Let me point out that if the plant is built for a 6.0 to 6.5 earthquake strength, then that decimal error implies that an important part or the plant is constructed for a 5.0 to 5.5 strength instead of that represented by the NRC to Alan Cranston. In that same letter to Senator Cranston the NRC logical arguement for the plant's safety is based upon, "No earthquake of this size or larger has occurred anywhere along the entire Foothills Fault Zone during historical time..." Well by the same logic, if the plant in part is only structurally built to 5.0 to 5.5 strength, then the 5.7 Lake Oroville quake in size, if repatW owld be a clear and present danger to the integrity of the plant.

To come full circle, New West added, SMUD's then General Manager, William Walbridge, at a board meeting in January of 1979, denied he'd ever heard of these charges. "Later Walbridge admitted he had in fact received and initialed the NRC report," about the Clary charges.

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In 1986, SMUD represented to the public that all the issues raised during the plant's life were reviewed and chat the restart plan was thorough. Then why were tnese facts, known to SMUD, overlooked? To be realistic this is an issue in which neither Bechtel. nor the NRC appears unbiased. Per SMUD's mission statement, reading, "safety, which is primary," we deserve, let me make that stronger, we are owed by their obligation to us as public servants, an independent re-analysis o f the seismic and design criteria used to baild the plant, especially for the spent-fuel storage building and the cooling towers.

Some of the quantitative seismic and geologic basic assumptions upon which Bechtel designed and built ;5* Rancho Seco Plant stand as compromised. SMUD through E*chtel geologists responded to field geological questie.ns caly asked of them in May of 1986 specifically arising fres <cacern over

. the 197;f Lake Oroville quake. NRC s review of U... has taken 13 years, so far. Is this responsible response time?

The NRC stands compromised as to its review of geologi:al criteria. To date, even though it is a quantitative design engineering question, only qualltative, subjective, independent.

o review has been done; - 13 years.

1 place this in the public record of the State of California, so that SMUD, and all other responsible agencies are aware and therefore are legally, morally and financially obligated for any consequences due to failure to act upon now clearly disclosed discrepancies that both the NRC and Bechtel appear to have failed to rectify by a fair and independent engineering agency. When the owner of Rancho Seco, SMUD, knowingly condones its agents actions and judgements, it is clearly liable for the consequences. Do notice that the spent-fuel building is at issue regardless of whether the plant restarts.

I ask that a quantitative review be done based upon today's geological knowledge and evidence, before that plant restarts.

It's potential destructive capability (a la Chernobyl or worse)

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affects far more than the voters within the SMUD limits. I ask for representation. I ask for your action.

Sincerely,

.5.t.

• Elaine Southard 5691 Connie Court Loomis, Ca. 95650 cc: California State Senate Committee for Energy and Public Utilities California State Assembly Utilities and Commerce Committee SMUD Board of Directors Victor Ste11o.J3. NRC Exec. Dir, for Operations U.S. Congress oversight co's of NRCc/o Sen. Alan Cranston American Nuclear Insurers Sacramento County Board of Supervisors Sacramento Union Sacramentans for Safe Energy 4

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