ML20211F272
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SUPPLEMENTAL SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT DIABLO CANYON NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNITS 1 &2 RESOLUTION OF IDVP FOLLOW-UP ITEMS
. Follow-up Items, Table C.8.3 o.f__Diablo_ Canyon SER_}upolement II.
No.
19 The following is d' discussion of the resolution of the fifteen followup items originally identified in Diibto Canyo,n SER Supplement No. 18 and subsequently listed in Table C.8.3 of SER Supplement No. 19.
These items are a result of further action required by the staff to complete closeout of work undertaken by PGRE to resolve concerns originally identified by the IDVP.
They are all of a confirmatory nature and are primarily concerned with submittal of confirmatory documenta-tion testings or as-b6itt verification.
1.
PG&E will perform a startup test of AFWS runout control system to confirm dynamic stability.
(SSER 18, page C.4-3).
An analysis performed.by the IDVP indicated that the pressure control.setpoints for the AFWS runout control L
system may not be low enough to permit minimum required flow t o the steam generators when only one motor-driven AFW pump is operating.
PG8E changed the low oump i
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' discharge' pressure setpoints and committed t o perf orm a startup test of'the runout control system to confirm dyn'amic stability.
The IDVP review of the new setpoints and startup test committment indicated that the proposed resolution was acceptable..The staff concurred with this resolution in SSER 18.
The test'will be completed prior.
to entering Mods 3.
The AFWS is not required to be operable by plant technical specifications prior to entering Mode 3.
Therefore it is acceptable to the staff to defer the testing to Step 2.-
Followup resolution:
By letter dated December 6, 1983, the licensee stated that a test of the AFWS runout control system and steam generator level control valves will be conducted during the startup testing of the AFWS at hot standby conditions (M. ode 3) in order to verify proper component operability.
c$ OCS test '
. The licensee will provide the results prior to Mode 2 (c r i t i c a l i t y Based on staff review of the informations the staff finds the response acceptable and considers this item resolved.
2.
PG&E will delete from design drawing steam trap in steam s u op t,y line for turbine-dr:ven pump of AFWS.
(SSER 18e Page C.4-5).
The IDVP performed a fiald walkdown of the AFWS to verify c o m e. ! ! c n : e Of the as= built installation with the l
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The as-built installation was con-firmed to meet design drawings except that a steam
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trap on the turbine-driven AFW pump steam supply line was not p r o v id e d.
PG8E indicated that the' design-drawings would'be revised to delete the steam trap on the steam supply line because satisfactory testing of-the turbine-driven pump was completed without the need for tne trap.
The IDVP confirmed that the actual AFWS installation was acceptable and no technical concern existed.
The staff concurred with the above resolution in SSER 18.
The staff will verify incorporation of the drawing change and confirm as-built drawings prior to entering Mode 3.
The AFWS is not required to be operable by plant technical specifications prior to entering Mode 3, Therefore.it is a c c e p t a b'l e to the staff to defer as-built confirmation to Step 2.
Followup Resolution:
By letter J ted December 6, 1983, the licensee subnitted revised drawings indicating the as-built condition of the AFWS.
Based on staff review of these drawings, this' item is considered resolved.
3.
PG8E will revise FSAR to reflect acceptability of as-built conditions regarding separation and color coding of electrical circuits for A FWS- (S S ER 18e page C.4-8),
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. Discrepancies regarding the as-built conditions for
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E separation add color coding of AFWS electrical circuits was identified by;the IDVP.
PG&E committed to revise FSAR Section 8.3.3.to' reflect acceptability ofc as-built' conditions regarding separation and' color coding.
The staff concluded in SSER 18 thak'these concerns have been-acceptably resolved and that plant modifications or addi-tional verification is not required.
FSAR revisions concerning AFWS electrical circuit separation and color coding will be submitted by PG&E prior to entering Mode 3.
The AFWS is not required to be operable by plant techni-cat specifications prior to entering Mode 3.
Therefore it is acceptable to the staff to defer the FSAR revision to Step 2.
Followup resolution:
a.
Separation.of. electrical instrumentation circ h Section 8.3.3 of Amendment 58 to the FSAR (Pages 8.3-19 through-20a) has been changed by letter dated December 6, 1983 to indicate that exposed _ wiring at end connections for instrument circuits may be separated by less than 5 inches of air space with no barrier separation.
In other words, bare uninsulated instrumentation circuit wire can be touching mutually i.
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redundant bare uninsulated circuit wire and mee't licensing criteria'that is to be specified in the FSAR.
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By letter dated December-12, 1983, the l'icensee further-revised the FSAR to state'that, exposed terminals of' Low energy. instrumentation devices are separated by'at least one inch.
Based on the low energy nature of' the circuits and their rigid or-fixed location of-the exposed terminal connection, the staff concludes that one inch of separation provides sufficient independence and is, therefore, acceptable.
Section.8.3.3 of the FSAR has also b'een revised to indicate that unit cases are relied upon for adequate separation for low-energy devices.
Based on this revision and further clarification provided by the1 applicant, the-staff concludes that each of the mutually redundant instrumentation devices.have their own unit cases and that separation between the devices is provided by two thicknesses of metallic or elec-trical insulat ing mate rial.
This separation pr6vides.
sufficient independence and is, therefore, a c e'e p t a b l e.
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In addition, Section 8.3.3 :of the FSAR has been ch ang ed t'o indicate that any one of nine methods defined in the FSAR f or separation of mutu ally redundant circuits in boards and panets also app
- Lies-to devices Located on the hoards and panets.
The staff concludes that each of the nine methods pro-vides sufficient independence and is, therefore, acceptable.
This item is considered resolved.
b.
, Color coding of electrical circujtj Section 8.3.3 of Amendment 36 to the FSAR (Pages 8.3-28b and 8.3-29) has been changed by letter e
dated December 6, 1983 to indicate that non class TE control, indication, and annunciation circuits that are routed in Class 1E.aceways are color coded and installed as Class 1E.
The change meets current review guidelines defined in the SRP for this area and is, therefore, acceptable.
The Licensee also changed Section 8.3.3 of the FSAR to indicate that non Class 1E control, indication, and annunciation circuits routed in Class 1E raceways, (1 ) are designed with sufficient m
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propagate to the mutually redundant device and (2) are colored consistent with the safety-related device, trains or circuit so that the color may not reflect the color of their electric power source.
Based on the sta.ff, review of the additional information, the staff concludes that these circuits have been routed with sufficient independence and are, there-fore, acceptable.
This item is considered resolved.
4.
PGSE wilL correct table in environmental qualification report with respect to flow transmitters and flow control salves in AFWS.
(SSER 18, page C.4-12)
The IDVP review of the environmental qualification of AFWS equipment indicated that a flow transmitter and flow control valve, which are exposed to a harsh l
L environment resulting from a high energy line break, were not listed as Located in harsh environments.
PG8E responded by noting that the flow transmitter was i dentified under a differant identification t-number and that vendor provided justification for j,
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interim operation pending completion of the environ -
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mental qualification.. The flow control valve was conditionally, qualifiedi subject to an ongoing' maintenance surveillance programs but-was. erroneously '
l i.s t e d as a component not sub'j e c t to.acharsh' environ-ment.
PG8E will correct errors in the qualification report tables.
The IDVP withdrew its concern on this matter.
The staff concurred with the IDVP resolution of this matter in SSER 18.
Environmental qualification (EQL documentation for the AFWS will-be revised and submitted by PG&E prior to entering Mode 3.
The AFWS is not required to be operable by plant technical spec'i fi c at ions prio r t o ent e ring Mode 3.
Therefore it is acceptable to th'e staf f to defer EQ documentation updateg to Step 2.
Followup resolution:
By letter dated December 6, 1983, PGEE stated that the format of the equipment qualification tables I
has been completely revised, so that there is one table which identifies the qualification documenta-tion for all Class 1E equipment.
This new tabler identified as PG&E Drawing 050909, supersedes the e
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previous table and correctly identifies the auxiliaryIeedwater flow transmitters and control-
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valves.and the qualification files that apply. :An.
attachment to the letter provided'the pages of_the new table that identify the applicable qualification files.
The staff finds that the above information corrects the errors in the qualification report tables.
During a meeting with-PGSE (see followup item 12) the staff reviewed the qualification files i denti-fied for these flow transmitters and control valves and conc luded that the information in the files demonstrates' that this equipment is environmentally qualified.
Therefore, the staff concL'udes that this-followup item is resolved.
5.
PG8E will conduct analyses to determine qualified life of motor capacitor for steam generator control-i h
valves.
CSSER 18, page C.4-12)
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The IDVP review of the environmental cualification of AFWS equipment. indicated that steam generator level control valves may not be qualified for' harsh environments resulting from high energy Line breaks as required because the motor capacitor qualification report was not yet complete.
The qualification report did include justification for interim operation with replacement of this com-ponent fotLowing 20,000 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> of operation.
PGSE indicated that an anblysis to determine the qualified Life of this components is being conducted.
The.IDVP concluded that the PG&E response resolved this c'o n c e r n.
The staff concurred with the con-clusions of the IDVP on this matter in SSER 18.
4 Submittal of the analysis regarding motor capacitor qualification Life is required prior to entering Mode 3.
The steam generator level control valves Con the AFW Lines) are-not required to be operable by plant technical specifications prior to entering 4
Mode 3.
Therefore it is acceptabte to the staff to defer completion of the staff review of the analyses to Step 2.
In any event, justification for interim operation has previously been submitted by PG&E.
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7 Followup resolution:
By Letter. dated December 6, 1983, PGSE stated that.
the' qualified Life of the motor capacitor forc the steam generator Level control valves'is docu -
mented in Qualification F Le IH-14.
The ra'diation aging of the capacitor is documented in Reference 23 of that file, Gulf Radiation Technology Report No.
4 GULF-RT-C1294, " Radiation Testing of a Hydramotor 4
Actuator," amended March, 1975.
The thermal aging is documented in Reference 28 of that file, " Aging Analysis - ITT General Controls NH 92. Actuators,"
which used the Arrhenius Equation and test data given in Reference 16 of the file, ITT General Controls Report No. RDE-2504, " Nuclear Qualification Aging Test - NH90 Series Hydramotor."
The staff discussed this fotLowup item with PGSE on December 22, 1983.
During that discussion PG&E was requested to submit the qualification documentation identified above for staff review.
The information i'
was submitted by Letter from PGSE dated December 22, 1983.
The staff is ctrrently revi' ewing this
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, documentation, and finalTresolution:offthis followup item is required prior'to; full' power auth'orization.-
' Ho w ev'e r, the staff has prev'ioustyfdetermine'd, a's
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a result of reviewing PGSE Qualification ~ File'IH during a 1981 audit of;the Licensee's qualification documentation, that an interim aging qualification for 2.0 years had been adequately justified.
There-fore, the staff concludes that this *oltowup item is resolved with respect to low power operation.
6.
PG&E wilL amend FSAR to indicate that pipe breaks are not postulated in steam supply line to turbine-driven pump of AFWS.
(SSER 18, page C.4-16).
The IDVP review of high energy line cracks indicated that certain AFWS components were exposed to a postulated break in the steam supply line to the turbine-driven AFWS pump.
PGEE reevaluated the high energy line crack analysis against the FSAR commitments (Giambusso letter dated December 18, 1972).
It was determined that the
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Line established in the IDVP analysisuns a source af f ecting the motor-driven AFW pumps and pressur e trans-mitters (Located on the steam supply line to the turbine-driven AFW pump downstream of the flow control valve) was not subject to cracks because it is not pressurized during any normal plant operating conditions, including
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startup and shutdown.
PG&E committed to revise the FSAR to indicate the above point.
The IDVP agreed with the above resolution.
The staff concurred with the resolution in SSER 18.
FSAR revisions confirming AFWS turbine steam supply line pipe break resolution will be submitted by PG&E prior to entering Mode 3.
The AFWS is not required to be operable prior to entering Mode 3.
Therefore it is acceptable to the staff to defer the FSAR revision to Step 2.
FotLowup resolution:
By Letter dated December 6, 1983, the Licensee submitted to FSAR Section 3.6.1.2 which states W changes that pipe breaks are not postulated in the AFWS turbine of the steam supply valve l
steam supply tirp downstream L
because the Line is not pressurized during normal plant operating conditions, including startup and shut-down.
Based on the above change to the FSAR, this item is considered resolved.
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PG&E will amend FSAR to include all' changes for equip-ment qualification (CP. YDS and AFWS) that resuited from reanalysis of pipe break environments outside contain-1 ment.
(SSER 18, page C.4-16)
The IDVP review of high energy line cracks indicated that certain AFWS and CR\\PS components may not have been qualified for the resulting environments.
PG&E performed a reanalysis of the blowdown jet temperature from the-postulated high energy line crack source affecting the AFWS level valves using the ANS Standard 58.2 methodology in lieu of the NSC method documented in the FSAR.
The results of this reanalysis showed a jet temperature below the qualification temperature for the valves.
PG&E committed to revise the FSAR to incorporate this reanalysis.
Additionally, for cables / wires and splices in the AFWS and CRVPS identified as targets by the IDVP, PG$E responded by providing documentation that indicated that the affected cables / wires and splices were environ-mentally qualified for the resulting high energy line crack blowdown jet.envirnnment and further committed to update environmental qualification documentation.
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The ~ IDVP concurred with the above resolutions.. The staff concurred.with the resolut' ion,in SSER 18.
FSAR-.
revisions confirming satisfactory resolution of jet impingement temperature methodology and cable / wire; t
e qu i p,m e n t oualification documentation will be submitted by PG&E prior to exceeding 140*F (Modes 5 and 6).
No environmental qualification concerns are present at such a low temperature since a harsh environment cannot result.
Therefore it is acceptable to the staff to defer documentation to Setp 2.
(Also see items 13 and 14 below.)
Followup resolution:
By letter dated December 6,
1983, the licensee submitted
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states changes to FSAR Section 3.6.4.3 which that ANS 58.2 met 6odology will be used in addition to the NSC method previously identified for determining qualification temperatures for equipment resulting from jet impingement.
Refer to Item 14 for discussion of cable / wire jet impingement temperature qualification documentation.
Based on the above change to the FSAR, this item is considered resolved.
8.
PG&E will revise FSAR licensing commitment regarding need for protective shields !or AFWS components (valves) against effects of moderage energy line breaks.
(SSER 18, page C.4-17) l
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that two AFWS_ valves were.not provided with protective shields ~as documen'ted.in a Licensing commitment.
.P'G8E-indicated that the flow control valves (suction supply valves from the alternate AFWS water sourcer the raw water storage reservoir) are not required to operate to ensure AFWS safety function following the postulated-moderate energy line break; therefore, they are not required to be protected from the pipe break effects.
PG&E committed to revise the Licensing commitment to delete the need for protective shields for these valves.
The IDVP agreed with this response.
The staff' concurred with the resolution in SSER 18.
PGEE tetter dated June 15, 1983, documents deletion of the protective shields for the long-term water supply valves for the AFWS.
Therefore this concern has been closed out.
a Followup resolution:
This item is considered resolved as indicated above.
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9.
Staff will confirm that any modifications required in safety related systems with respect to pressure / tempera-ture rating and power operated valve operability are implemented.
(SSER 18, page C.4-26)
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' compliance with of the auxiliary feedwater system (dFWS) design pressures isolation of low pressure portions of the system from high pressure portions, and the specification of low differential pressure for the motor-operated steam supply valves to the AFW turbine-driven pumps the IDVP determined that additional sampling in these areas was required.
PG&E undertook a review of the above concerns for all safety-related systems within their design scope.
This generic review resulted in several modifications to safety-related systems as documented in PGEE letter dated October 7, 1983, which have been completed.
The staff will verify that required modifications docu=
mented in PG&E lette r dated October 7,1983, are in place prior to Step 2.
Prior to Step 2, the plant will not be in an operating condition which would result in pressure /
temperature rating and power operated valve operability considerations.
Therefore it is acceptable to the staff to defer as-built verification to Step 2.
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t Followup resolution:
By lett'er dated December 6,'1983, the Licensee. con-
~ firmed'that-the modifications to.the various safety-
.I related fluid systems as' a resuf'tiofthenewdeter-minations for pressure / temperature rating, differential pressure across power-operated valves and high/ Low pressure isolation provisions have been completed with the exception of the AFWS pump turbine overspeed setpoint change.
The setpoint change wilL be accomplished when steam is availabte from reactor coolant pump heat during Mode 4 operations.
The.
Licensee wilL webbb inform the staff of the change prior to Mode 2 (criticality).
This is acceptable to the staff.
This item is considered resolved.
10.
PG&E wilL verify assu=ptions regarding closing / openings
,of doors and operation of ventilation systems in their continuing pressure / temperature environmental reanalysis (SSER 18, page C.4-27)
As a result of the IDVP concerns regarding the method for establishing pressure / temperature environments foltowing postulated high energy pipe breaks outside containment, PGEE undertook a reanalysis in this area.
Specific concerns identifiad by the IDVP were with respect to assumptions regarding door positions and t
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ventilation system operation.
PG&E wilL provide verification of the1 assumptions regarding-the above
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aspects.oflthe reanalysis and wilL submit the reanalysis results including assumptions prior to exceeding 140*F.
No environmental qualification concerns are present at low temperature.
Therefore it is acceptable to
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the staff to defer verification of the assumptions to Step 2.
Followup resolution:
By Letter dated December 4, 1983, the licensee sub-mitted information regarding the assumptions in the reanalysis of pressure / temperature environments following postulated high energy pipe breaks outside containment.
The response verified that doors assumed to remain closed were designed for the resulting pressure.
Replacement doors were required in order to assure the validity of the analysis for area e
GE/GW of the auxiliary building.
The licensee also verified that failure pressures for doors in other plant areas were applied in the subcompartment pres-surization analyses.
In addition, the licensee
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1 determined that assumptions regard'ing ventilation system.op'eration would not produce enh'anced results as was originally felt but rather~would reduce con :
servatism in the resu'lting environments.
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in order to maintain conservatism, ventilation's stems-were not modeled in the reanalyses.
The above satisfactorily confirms the pressure / temperature reanalyses assumptions.
This item is considered resolved.
I 11.
PGSE will make modifications and provide revised docu-mentation as necessary based on results of pressure /
s temperature environmental reanalysis.
(SSER 18, page C.4-27)
As a result of the IDVP concerns regarding the method for establishing pressure / temperature environments following postulated high energy pipe breaks outside containment < PG&E undertook a reanalysis in this area.
The IDVP review of the-resulting pressure and temperature transiedt conditions 4
determined that the reanalyses methodology for the remaining auxiliary building areas was consistent with'that > sed in areas GE and GW and in the turbine building.
PG&E indicated that results obtained are conservative for the break compa.t-ment.
PG&E has committed to make any modifications necessary as a result of this reanalysis, and provide revised docu-
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.3 mentation o,f-this work., The'IDVP co6cluded that the reanaly se s sat isf'ac to ri ty resolved the IDVP concerns.-
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Because of'this conclusions the IDVP determined that a fur -
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ther verification of the.PG&E, continuing effor,t in the 3
of pressure and temperature, conditions and associated tion 5
envi ronmeist al cuali fi c at ipit of safety-related equipmen't 4
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P,G3E will submit the results of the pressure /
not necessary.
t e'in p e r a t u r e envihonme'n.tal reanalysis and complete necessary
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modifications or provide justification for interim operation-s s v.
140 F. Any lodifications-requ' ired would prior ~to exceeding s
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be;outside c'ontainment and woul,d be expected tog e of a' minor No environm' ental qualification concerns are present nature.
l at low temperature.
Therefore it is acceptable to the staff
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t fi Follouup Resolution:
-s By letter dated recamber 6r 17'll e the licensee submitted c
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i n.f o r m a t i o n regarding the results of the canalyses of pres-
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sure/ temperature transient environmente resulting from
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The licensee postu~ lated pipe breaks outside containment.
. 1, number of modifications ~ are s
has i~ndicated that a s
required in order to assure that the r e s;u l t. i ng conditions-
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remain within f5e e :; s i pm e n t qualificeti~on envelop.
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t By letter dated December: 13, 1983, the. licensee
' stated.that,these._mooifications wilL be compt'eted
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e heatup[(i.e., Mode 4 and Mod'e-3) prior.to plant with the exception of installation of redundant.
Class 1E isolation controls and instrumentation for the CVCS letdown Line and auxiliary steam Line.
The licensee further stated that prior to Mode 4, this modification wilL either be completed or justification wilL be provided for a later comple-r tion.
The modification wilL be completed prior to Mode 2 (criticality).
On the basis of the above' commitment and requirement, this item is considered resolved.
12.
Staff wilL evaluate results of reanalysis.with respect to assuring environmental qualification l
of equipment.
(SSER 18, page C.4-27) i l
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As s' result'of the IDVP concerns regarding the method.
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for establishing pressure / temperature environments
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fotLowing postulated high energy pipe-breaks outside '
containment, PG&E' undertook reanalysis in this area.:
t Included in the PG&E effort is a verification of environmental qualification of equipment to the environ-ments resulting from the reanalysis.
The staff will confirm satisfactory environmental qualification (EQ) has~been provided to the reanalyzed environments (see-item 11 above) or acceptable interim operation justi-fication has been provided prior to exceeding 140'F.
No.
environmental qualification concerns are present at 4
tow temperature.
Therefore it is acceptable to the staff to defer EQ confirmation to Ctep 2.
Foltowup resolution:
The staff has reviewed and found acceptabler the method of reanalysis used by PGSE to establish pressure /
temperature environments following postulated high-energy pipe breaks outside contcinment as previously.
indicated in $SER'18.
PG&E Bas stated" that the reanalyzed environments are documented in design criteria Memorandum DCMM-73.
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PG&E has also stated (in a' Letter dat'ed December 12,
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were reviewed to ensure that the. Listed qualifica -
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tion temperatures for each which would tie sub'j e c t ed k
to the reanalyzed environments were greater than the temperatures listed in.DCMM-73.
For simplicity, the worst case temperature from DCMM-73 for any. device was compared with the qualification temperature given in the file for that device.
All devices subjected to the reanalyzed environments were found to be qualified to operate in the worst case environment in which their operation is required.
- Further, the devices are qualified to the revised environ-ment within the margins required in NUREG-0588.
NRC Region V staff performed an audit of the PG&E environmental qualification files to verify that the licensee had performed the review necessary to ensure that equipment was qualified to the l
reanalyzed environments.
Documentation to support the licensee's statement that the review had been performed could not be found in all the files.
As a result of this finding, NRR staff and a member of
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J one of its contracts met with PG&E in San Francisco-s
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on De c emb'e r,19 and 20,.1983 to discuss. resolution.
of this item and to_further audit the licensee'sl files.
During this meet'ing PG&E reiterated thSt:
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that this effort had not yet been completed docu-
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mented.
As a result of the staff's audit of the Licensee's files, we have concluded that the equip-ment associated with those files are qualified for-the reanalyzed environments.
PG&E had committed to complete the documentation of the review for all affected files by December 31, 1983, and to confirm to the NRC in writing that this effort,has been-completed.
Based on the above information, the results of the staff's audit and PG&E's commitments identified above, we conclude that this followup item is satisfactority resolved.
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PGEE wilL revise FSAR-to incorporate'use of ANS 58.2 jet impingemqnt temperature calculational method where
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applicab'Le.
(SSER 18, page C.4-14 and 16L The-IDVP review of high energy' pipe crack concerns indi -
cated that jet impingement may result in temperatures in excess of the qualification value for,certain AFWS and CRVPS components.
PG8E utilized the ANS 58.2 Jet impingement temperature calculation method in Lieu of that identified in the FSAR to verify that the quali-fication temperature was not exceeded.
PG&E committed to revise the FSAR to incorporate use of ANS 58.2 jet impingement temperature catculational method.
The -
IDVP reviewed this metnod and verified that it provides acceptable results.
The staff concurred in this resolu-tion in SSER 18.
FSAR revisions confirming use of ANS-58.2 jet impingement temperature catculational method wilL be submitted by PG&E prior to exceeding 140'F0 No environmental qualification concerns are present at low temperature.
Therefore it ic acceptable to the staff to defer FSAR revi.sions to Step 2.
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Followup resolution:'
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[ solution of}%y Refer to Item 7 'above for discussion of the r
this' item.-
This item is considered resolved.
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14.
PG&E will revise equipment qualification documentation to include AFWS cable / wire other than that previously identified.
(SSER 18, page C.4-16)
The IDVP review of high energy pipe crack concerns indicated that cable / wire other than that previously identified as'-
environmentally qualifie'd for use in the AFWS was utilized, J
and was subject to high temperature jet impingement.
PG8E provided documencation which indicated that the cable / wire was qualified ts the resulting jet impingement temperature.
PG&E committed to revise the environmental qualification documentation.
The IDVP reviewed the documentation and concurred with the resolution.
The staff concurred with-(
I this resolution in SSER 18.
Equipment environmental qualification documentation confirming sat is f act ory qualification of cables / wires will be submitted by PG&E prior to exceeding 140 F.
No envir8nmental qualification l
concerns are present at low temperature.
Therefort it is L
acceptante to the staff to defer documentation to Step 2.
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1' Foltowup resolution:
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By letter dated December 12,1983, PG&E. stated that Class 1E cables / wires installed outside containment have been environmentally qualifieds-and that these cables inctude-the folLowing types:
'1 ) Raychem Flametrol cable;' 2) Okonite EPR/Hypalon cable; 3) Okonite XLPE. cable; and 4) Rockbestos XLPE cable.
No other types of Class IE cables have been installed outside containment which are subjected to /
bigh energy line breaks.
These four types of cables have Been tested to 540'FA with 480 Vac betwaen Lines fer for more than 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />, and alL'four types passed the test.
The results of the tests are documented in the fotLowing reports and are available in Project files:
1)
Raychem Flametrol - Test report EM #1030; September 24, 1974.
i 2)
Okonite EPR/Hypalon - Okonite letter report; October 14, 1974.
3)
Okonite XLPE - Engineering report #367-A; January 7, 1983.
4)
Rockbestos XLPE - Test report S.O..
- 24408-5; March 3, 1983.
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The staff requested PGSE to submit the f i r s t.Lt wo.
reports fdentified above in order 1to perform:an'~
audit review of the information in the Licensee's.
files.
After reviewing.these documents,we con ;
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cluded'that the Raychem Flametrol cable had been-qualified for at Least 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> at 540'F', but that the Okonite EPR/Hypalon cab,Le had been demonstrated to be qualified for only 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
We discussed WM this PGSE to determine whether 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> was an acceptable length of tine for this cable to be qualified, and subsequently met with the Licensee (see foltowup Item 12) to further discuss resolu-tion of this foltowup item.
At that meeting, PG&E informed the staff that:
1.
The cables identified above are not subject to direct jet impingement since they are enclosed in conduit.
2.
Some of these conduits may be subjected to jet impingement from a postulated high energy Line break.
0 3.
The 540 F temperature used for' qualification of the cables was determined based on the maximum temperature of the steam inside the pipe prior to the postulated break.
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' 4.,.( Th'e cables'have been demonstrated. qualified forLthis
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temperature for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
Since the plant. operator' t
wilL identify the break'and take action'to'. isolate it - in less than'two hours,' demonstrating qualifica tion'for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> is adequate.
PG8E has committed to document the above in a letter to the NRC by December. 31, 1983.
The cons'eqpences of jet impingement on these cable con-duits'is being reviewed by the staff.
However, resolu-tion of the jet impingement issue is not related to the resolution of this followup item.
Based on our audit of the licensee's documentation, the above information, and PGSE's commitment to document that information in writing by December 31, 1983, the staff concludes that this fotLowup item is satisfactorily resolved.
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15.
PGSE will revi,se.'FSAR to in corporat e ~ results of moderate energy line. break analyses on the CRVPS.' (SSER.18, Page C.4-17) k.
The IDVP review of moderate energy line breaks indicated that PG&E had failed to meet its licensing commitment by.
not including the CRVPS in the original moderate energy line break analysis.
PG&E provided a subsequent analysis indicating that only one CRVPS electrical train is affected by the postulated break identified by the IDVP.
When comp, bined with a single failure in the redundant electrical train, a loss of the CRVPS would occuri resulting in degrada-tion of c o n t r o,l room habitability.
Howevers safe shutdown can be provided from the remote shutdown panel in the event the control room becomes uninhabitable.
The IDVP concurred with this anal _ysis.
The staff also concurred.with this s
resolution in SSER 18.
FSAR revisions confirming satisfactory moderate energy line break protection for the CRVPS will be submitted by PG&E prior to initial criticality.
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w m;: i shutdown capability is provided in the event of loss.of the i,
6 CRVPS due to a moderate energy line break.as. indicated above.
Moreover, because no fission product inventory is'presenti-(:
control room h'ab it ab ility-- is ' not of concern and-offsite release consequences are not present.
Therefore it-is acceptable to the staff to defer the FSAR rev-ision to Step 2.
Followup resolution:
By letters dated December ~6 and 12, 1983, the licensee-sub-mitted changes to the.fSA8 whi,ch indicate that moderate energy line beeak prot'ection for the CRVPS is not required since safe shotdown can be achieved from the hot.
shutdown panet should the CRVPS be lost and the control room become uninhabitable.
Based on the above change to the FSAR, this item is considered resolved.
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ENGINEERING SERVICES e
MEETING ANNOUNCEMENT UNCONTROLL'cD COPY DEPARTMENT OCNPP-IOVP BY W. E. Cooper
SUBJECT:
Phase II E0I Resolution Stone & Webster Engineering Corp.
LOCATION: 245 Suamer St. Boston, MA ROOM:
SWEC Offices, Check w/ guard DATE:
wamIadg.nl5;tms3$
TIME:
8:30 - 5:00 CRGANIZATION DCP, IDVP (TES & SWEC)
AGENDA:
To discuss resolution / completion packages provided by the DCP for Phase II E0I's in the following technical areas:
I.
Pipe Break Nnalysis A.
Pressure / Temperature Analysis (Input and Output) 8.
Flooding Analysis C.
Damage Assessment (Jet / Whip Effects)
II. System / Component Design A.
Design Conditions / Component Sizing B.
Qualification / Classification C.
Systems Operation D.
Design Implementation III. Separation A.
Electrical Separation / Single Failure Analysis B.
Fire Protection v '3 Aa.bfo o
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