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y B,.qp g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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svgv.....f SEP 2 41932 MEMORANDUM FOR:
Darrell G. Eisenhut, Director Division of Licensing FROM:
Richard H. Vollmer, Director Division of Engineering
SUBJECT:
ACTION ITEMS - DIABLO CANYON In response to your memo of September 14, 1982, the following items are attached; the item numbers correspond to those used in the enclosure to your memo.
Item 15 - Reevaluation of the BNL Report vis a vis PG&E Contentions Item 16 - Technical Qualifications of Phase II contractors Item 20 - Staff Evaluation Reports for ITR's 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 Item 21 - Scope of Reevaluation of DE and DDE Earthquake Item 24 - Continued / Expanded BNL Activities.
Item 9 - Teledyne/Bechtel independence - This matter has been under develop-ment by the LPM and AEAB. Our response will be under separate cover.
Item 13 - Close out open items from previous Region V inspections - Is noted as assigned to Region V.
There are however a number of items cited in the regions inspection report that fall properly within the scope of DE review.
A table listing those items, the reviewer and review schedule is also attached.
Drafts of the ITR evaluations and the responses to Items 15, 16, 21 and 24 were provided on September 23. The attached versions contain only editorial changes.
As the Commission paper evolves we will provide necessary DE input as expeditiously as possible.
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o Richard H. Vollmer, Director Division of Engineering
Enclosure:
As stated cc: See next page h
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STAFF REPORT EVALUATION
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REPORT TITLE:
' Interim Technical Report on Additional Verification
. and Additional Sampling Effective May 27, 1982' IDVP DESIGNATION:
P'105-4-839-001
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ORIGINATOR:
Robert L. Cloud Associates, Inc.
SUBMITTED BY:
WE' Cooper, Teledyne Engineering Services, INTRODUCTION The first interim technical report (ITR 1) for the Diablo Canyon Independent Design Verification Program (IDVP) has'been reviewed by the staff.
ITR 1 was. developed as a status report on the original generic sample.
In some areas e.g., buildings and large bore piping, the results from the original sample were not felt to be sufficient to close the item.
Problem areas were identified and' additional sampling was judged necessary to fully define the scope and severity of the problem.
Analyses of other. samples was completed with results that were ju'dged sufficient to close the item under review e.g., tanks and ITR's on that specific -subject are shown as being in preparation. Still other areas e.g. HVAC and conduit support were still under review at the time ~the report was released.
Subsequent to the publication of ITR 1, PGE announced that their Internal Technical Program (ITP) was to be expanded with the development of a joint PGE/Bechtel and that many of the items held open in ITR 1 were to be included. The staff has received some information concerning the scope and content of the PGE/Bechtel program.
The current staff understanding as to those recommendations of ITR 1 that are included in 1
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- the PGE/Bechtel program is reflected in the following summary and status for each of the nine items discussed in the report.
SUMMARY
OF REPORT Buildings, The review of the buildings was based on a sample of ~
the Auxiliary / Fuel Handling Building for independent-analysis.
Six issues were raised either as E01's or generic concerns.
Interim Technical Report No. 6 on the Auxiliary / Fuel handling building has just recently been issued and a total of 16 E01's.has been identified.
As a result of the concerns raised about the seismic analysis of the buildings relating to the structural configuration it was recommended that all of the safety related buildings 'be reviewed to assess the impact of design changes on the analysis.
In addition selected changes would be field verified.
It appears that PG&E has incorporated this compor.ent in their corrective action plan (ITP) section 2.1.1 thru 2.1.5.
Verification of this item will be performed by the IDVP.
l Piping The review of large bore piping discussed in ITR No. 1 i
l was based on a sample of ten piping analyses chosen for independent analysis. Approximately 40 issues were raised, either as E0I or generic concerns.
As a result of the large number of concerns identified
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,e a larger sample was spec'ified for purposes of'further t
defining the scope and extent of problems'that might
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require corrective action. The. larger sample was to -
consist of five additional piping analyses which would represent lines connected to large pipe analyzed by othersi other systems, and field-run computer analyzed pipe.
In addition, with regard to as built configuration, it was recommended that PG&E " Review and; revise as necessary all Piping Design Review isometrics" and further that PG&E " Review and revise pipe and pipe support analyses as required."
It appears that'this activity has been incorporated in the PG&E corrective action plant (ITP) section 2.2.1.
Verification that all aspects of the items identified in ITR No. I have been included and will be perforned by the IDVP.
Pipe Succorts The review of pipe supports was based on a sample of twenty supports chosen for field verification and independent analysis. The field verification is complete and the analysis is continuing. Three issues.
were. raised as either E0I's or generic concerns. The most pressing concern is the apparent omission of inertia load; associated with supports.
As a result of this concern of inertia load omission additional investigation is recommended. This investigation consists of documenting the method
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employed by the computer programs used, run simple problems to verify the conclusions and review one or more of.the initial pipe samples, s
It appears that this activity has been included as-a'.
portion of the PG&E corrective action plan (ITP) ~
T section 2.2.1.
Small Bore The review of small bore piping (less than 6") was Pioing based on a sample of 3 runs chosen for field verification and a review of the support spacing criteria. Approximately 10 issues were raised, either i
as E0I's or generic concerns.
As a result of these findings additional verification was recommended. This verification consists of reviewing and revising, as necessary, the isometrics and spacing criteria, analyze 5 examples of. axial pipe runs and lug design and rigorously analyzed 5 examples of small bore lines to verify the adequacy of the
" engineering judgement" used in treatment of conditions other than those covered by PG&E criteria..
It appears that this activity is included in the PG&E' T
corrective action plan (ITP) section 2.2.2.
Ecuioment The review of the six equipment types was 'ased on a b
sample of two valves, two iteus of electrical equipment, three tanks, one heat exchange, three pumps and two HVAC components chosen for independent 4
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analysis.
Eleven issues were raised as either E0I's or-generic concerns.. The results and recommendations of this original. sample have been. reported in-ITR No.: 3.
As a result of the concerns identified in the above review a larger sample was recommended so that the scope and extent of the problem could be defined.
The larger sample consisted of review of the analytical qualification of the main control board, the remaining two Hosgri required tanks, the two remaining Hosgri safety related pumps and an additional sample of two HVAC components.
It appears that PG&E is addressing this item in their corrective action plant (ITP) section 2.3.
Shake Table The review of the seismic qualification of equipment by shake table testing was based on a sample of 44 items divided into seven groups. The grouping was based on seismic inputs, test procedure, location and mounting.
Five issues were raised either as E0I's or generic concerns. The results and recommendations of this original sample have be'en reported in ITR No. 4.
As a result of this sample it was recommended that the field locations and mounting of all the equipment be field verified, excluding the NSSS vendor, and verify that the correct test spectra was specified.
It appears that PG&E is addressing this item in their corrective action plan (ITP), section 2.3.2.3.3.
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r Y Conduit The review of the conduit supports consisted of a-Supports sample of twenty supports for field review and twenty analysis'. The field review has been completed, however, the twenty analysis samples have not been selected. Three E0I's and three generic concerns were raised.
As a result of the findings, PG&E will perform a complete reevaluation of all of the supports and the IDVP will selectively verify the PG&E program.
HVAC Duct The review of the HVAC Ducts consisted of a sample of two sections for field review and independent analysis.
The field review is complete and the independent analysis is currently underway. Two E0I's have been issued and no generic concern has been identified to date.
It appears that PG&E is addressing this item on a generic basis in their corrective action plan (ITP),
section 2.5.
Hosgri Spectra The review of the seismic inputs into the design
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consisted of identifying and checking the spectra.
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Approximately 20 issues were raised, either E0I's or generic.
As a result of this review it was recommended that PG&E assemble and issue a controlled set of design spectra that carried a unique number for each spectra figure.
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~7-Also PG&E are to review all Hosgri qualifications against this set'of spectra including-the NSSS vendor.
E The 1DVP will selectively verify the applicability of the controlled sp'ectra. A set of controlled spectra-has been' issued by PG&E as DCM-17..
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EVALUATION:.
ITR 1 presents the first compilation of the error and open item (E01) reports developed by the IDVP. The grouping of the E0I's with the corresponding IDVP task from Phase I prograin plan Section 5.4.2, as given 'in Figures 3-2 through 3-9, provides an effective summary of the-IDVP. Although the IDVP review for a number of items has not been completed, ITR 1 offers, substantial evidence that the initial sampling plan is an effective means of examining the seismic adequacy of the Diablo Canyon plant features considered in the sample.
It appears that the majority, if not all, of the concerns identified in ITR 1 have been forwarded into the PGE/Bechtel internal technical program (corrective action olan).
Confirmation of this should be accomplished by further IDVP activities.
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g STAFF REPORT EVALUATION REPORT TITLE:
Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Independent-Design Verification _ Program, Interim Technical Report: Evaluation ~of the Quality Assurance 1 Program and Implementation Reviews, TR-5511 Revision 0, June 23, 1982 e
IDVP DESIGNATION: P 105-4-839-002-ORIGINATOR:
Teledyne Engineering Services SUBMITTED BY:
W. E. Cooper, Teledyne Engineering. Services',.
letter dated June 24, 1982 INTRODUCTION The second interim technical report (ITR 2) for the Diablo Canyon Independent Design Verification Program (IDVP) has been reviewed by the staff.
ITR 1 addresses evaluation of the quality assurance program and i
-its implementation for Diablo Canyon Unit 1.
The report provides Teledyne's conclusions on the Independent Design Verification Program (IDVP) with respect to the QA-related work performed by R. F. Reedy, Inc. (RFR) in accordance with Section 3.0 and'4.0 of the Phase I Engineering Program Plan (DCNPP-IDVP-001). The RFR review focused its attention of the quality assurance programs established and implemented by PG&E and six contractors who performed seismic design work.
The contractors are:
1.
ANCO Engineers i
2.
Cygna Energy Service 3.
EDS Nuclear, Inc.
4.
Harding Lawson Associates 5.
URS/J. A. Blume and Associates 6.
Wyle Laboratories
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SUPNARY OF REPORT Teledyne's conclusion based on'the Reedy work performed for ITR #2 is that no additional verification or sampling, beyond that specified!in
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Interim Technical Report 1,'is required in. response to the RFR report, in spite of the re' ported general lack of quality assurance control's-during the safety-related design activities performed prior to' June 1, 1978.
ITR 2 indicates that additional design verification and additional sampling already specified in ITR 1 was based on the lack of l
QA controls as well as on the design verification which had been previously completed (ITR 2, page 5). However, certain exceptions are identified for the Cygna (ITR 2, p. 33), HLA (ITR 2, p. 33), and URS/
J. A. Blume (ITR 2, p. 34) arec, of work where QA pr: gram elements ware lacking. The conclusion (ITR 2, pages 32-35) 1.s drawn that no additonal verification or sampling beyond that already identified is required-solely on the basis of the reported lack of QA controls.
ITR 1, submitted by Robert i.. Cloud Associates, Inc., recommends 30 acditional review, checking, verification or sampling activities based on the results of Phase I of the IDVP. These recommendations are based primarily on the Phase I design verification which had been completed but with the knowledge of the results of the RFR findings regarding QA deficiencies. The recommendations appear to broaden the scope of the Phase I effort to' provide reasonable assurance that the plant meets the technical criteria for licensing for the areas covered by Phase I.
The
. recommendations include some field verification effort.
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av CONCLUSIONS' Despite the general' lack'of'certain quality assurance: controls for PG&E' c
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and several.of its subcontractors as identified by.the RFR review, it isi -
T concluded that.the' recomendations. of. ITR 1 an'd-the. exceptions noted --
above in ITR 2'(pp. 33 and 34), when properly carriedioutl-a~nd with proper follow-up, should adequately demonstrate the acceptability of the-
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design effort addressed by Phase I of the IDVP and should resolve'ours concerns resulting from the lack of QA controls for certain design phase activities.
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STAFF REPORT EVALUATION REPORT TITLE:
Interim. Technical Report, Diablo Canyon Unit 1.-
. Independent Design Verification Program - Tanks -
Revision 0.
IDVP DESIGNATOR: P 10'5-4-839-003 ORIGINATOR:
Robert-L. Cloud Associates, Inc..
SUBMITTED BY:
WE Cooper, Teledyne' Engineering Services-INTRODUCTION The third interim technical report (ITR 3) for the Diablo Canyon Independent Design Verification Program (IDVP) has been reviewed by the staff.
ITR 3 was also selected as a vechicle for a staff audit'of the IDVP process and the activities of R.L. Cloud Associates in particular.
The audit was conducted on September 8, 9 and 10,1982 at the offices of R. L. Cloud Associates in Berkeley, California.
ITR 3 summaries the independent analysis and verification of the initial sample of tanks at Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant. The tank sample consists of the boric acid, starting air receiver, and the diesel generator oil priming tanks.. Based on the initial tank sample the IDVP concludes that the tanks represented by the sample at Diablo Canyon meets the applicable licensing criteria and that consequently no further sampling is required. Based on the staff review of ITR3, in conjunction-with the audit of the technical information assembled at R. L. Cloud Associates for their review, the staff concurs in this conclusion.
In addition the audit referenced above allowed the staff to trace, in detail, the review process employed at R. L. Cloud and to assess that
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process and the level of confidence ~that this position.of the IDVP
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provides. The staff concludes that the R. L. Cloud revies was thorough,:
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. compliance with the appro'ved program plan.
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SUMMARY
OF REPORT /
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~The tank' sample consisted of thel 3 -tanks types located inside various
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structures, namely the Boric. Acid Tank, Diesel Generator Starting Air Receiver Vertical Tank'and the Diesel Generator Oil Priming Tank. This sample represents the spectrum of ta'nk~ configurations within the plant.
-The boric acid tanks are used to store a boric acid' solution that will be injected into the reactor primary coolant loop.in the event rapid shutdown of the reactor is required. The tanks shells are 3/8 inch thick and the material is ASME SA-240 Type.304 stainless steel. Each tank is 10 feet in diameter and 15 feet 9 inches in height with a semi-elliptical bottom and a flat' top. Each tank rests on a skirt 3/8
. inch thick and 4 feet 6 inches tall. The ~ plant contains four.such tanks located in the Auxiliary Building on _ the elev 115 floor. The tanks are normally filled with a boric acid solution to within 1 foot 3 inches of
.the top. The tank weights 9000 lbs. empty and 76400 lbs.'when full. The skirt is anchored to the concrete floor by 36 - 1 inch diameter ASTM A-307 bolts distributed evenly along the skirt perimeter and are cast into the concrete floor. The baric acid is moved.to and from the tank by attached piping.
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The six diesel generator ' starting air receiver vertical tanks are used to store compressed air at 250 psi for. starting.the diesel engines. Two tanks are located on o'pposite sfie[ f.each diesel generator unit which -
are positioned at the northwest co'rner of ths turbine building. 'Each.
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d tank consists of a 3 foot diameter,1/2 inch thick cylin' er with a 1/2 -
inch thick elliptical head at both the top and bottom. Overall height is 8.5 feet and total weight is 2045 pounds. The material is ASTM. A-515 grade 70 stainless steel.
Each tank is supported by a skirt connected to a base plate anchored to the elev 85. concrete floor by 4 - 7/8 inch diameter bolts cast into the concrete floor.
The three diesel generator oil priming tanks are located at the northwest corner of Unit 1 Turbine Building at elevation 85.
Each tank-consisted of a 16 inch diameter stainless steel cylinder 13.25 inches tall with a flat top and bottom. The tanks are mounted on top of a 83 inch tall, 4 inch diameter schedule 40 A-53 steel pipe. The tank is supported laterally by two horizontal perpendicular braces anchored to the adjacent walls at elevation 92.
Each tank has a level indicator mounted external to the cylinder. Each tank assembly weighs 198 lbs when full of fuel oil and the support pipe weighs 93 lbs. The pipe support is anchored to the concrete floor at elevation 85 by four bolts. The procedures and methodology used by RLCA to evaluate the tank sample is summarized in the following steps.
1.
Acquire drawings and specifications and trace quality assurance for each document.
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Establish design criteria (FSAR, HOSGRI CRITERIA, CODES, REG.
GUIDES)
Establishenveldperesponsespectra'fofeachtank'considering'all 3.
tank locations, using the Hosgri Report response ' spectra and
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-damping.
4.
Perform field inspections to confirm tank locations, mounting, apertenance' and other design features.
5.
Estimate fundamental natural frequency using a simple single lumped mass single spring model. The Sloshing,effect of the contained-fluid was accounted for by using procedures from TID 7024 chapter
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6.
Using the fundamental frequency estimates, determine the corresponding acceleration from the envelope response spectra established above.
7.
Compare the seismic loading to that employed in the original design and adopt the more conservative loading.
8.
Use the equivalent static load method to evaluate the structural adequacy of the tanks by:
A.
Applying horizontal and vertical seismic loads at the center of gravity of the tanks.
B. Evaluating the stresses at critical locations (based on the analyist judgements) using standard engineering hand calculation formula and/or a finite element computer program.
9.
Comparing the computed stresses with allowable based on FSAR commitments as modified by the Hosgri Report.
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- 10. ~ Comparing the computed stresses with those presented inithe design reports..
Each step above was performed by one individual and' c'ecked by a,noth'er.
h A complete documentation file'was main'tained.
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-EVALVATION In some instances the RLCA calculations were more detailed and comprehensive that the PG&E design calculations, i.e. RLCA computed stresses at more locations or considered more design features than did PG&E in their original design calculations.
Specific examples include:
The evaluation of the diesel generator starting air receiver tank support skirt for buckling, RLCA considered the combined vertical and horizontal loads while PG&E considered only the vertical loads.
The evaluation of stresses in the weld between the diesel generator starting air receiver tank support skirt and the lower head, RLCA' developed a detailed ~axissymetric finite element model of the skirt-tank head region, whereas PG&E relied on the composite overall tank model to produce the stress fields.
It should be noted however that the tanks were originally designed to Section VIII of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code which could, by usual practice at the time of the original design, be interpreted to not e
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' require as comprehensive an analysis as-the one performed by RLCd. RLCA followed good current engineering practice in performing this-review.
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. The staff audit of RLCA.was based on the ITR 3.
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'theaudit,thestaffreviewedthehandandlimitedcomputerca'lculations'
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prepared by RLCA, the RLCA. field: notes and the construction drawings fo'r-
.the tanks. The staff found that the hand ~ calculations and computer.
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- analyses were well documented and reflected a full technical-understanding of the design requirements for the equipment under review, The calculations were properly based on the construction drawings and i-field verifications of the actual tank configurations. The calculations'
- showed the tanks were able to withstand the postulated loadings using F
current ASME code requirements.
Based on our review of ITR number 3 and the subsequent audit of the evaluation procedures and methods used by RLCA, the staff concurs with the IDVP conclusions that the methodology employed for design of the class of. tanks sampled was appropriate and that the tanks were capable of withstanding the specified seismic loading. Should subsequent reevaluation by the PGE/Bechtel program shows that the irput spectra are
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changed, the impact of that change must be assessed for the tasks evaluated.
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' STAFF REPORT EVALUATION.
REPORTTITLE:
' Interim Technical Report, Diablo Canyon Unit 1, Independent Design Verification Program - Shake Table Testing - Revision 0, dated July 23, 1982-IDVP DESIGNATION:
P 105-4-839-004
.0RIGINATOR:
Robert L. Cloud Associates, Inc.
SUBMITTED BY:
WE Cooper, Teledyne Engineering Services INTRODUCTION The fourth interim technical report (ITR 4) for the Diablo Canyon Independent Design Verification Program (IDVP) has been reviewed by the staff. This report was also selected as a vechicle for a staff audit of the IDVP process and the activities of R. L. Cloud Associates in particular. The audit was conducted on September 8,'9 and 10,1982 at the offices of R. L. Cloud and Associates (RLCA) in Berkeley, California.
The purpose of the ITR 4 was to determine if the seismic testing procedure employed for Diablo Canyon conformed to the licensing criteria. The equipment considered in ITR 4 was the Class IE electrical equipment and instruments liste'd in Table 10-1 of the Hosgri Report that were qualified by PG&E or a seismic service-related contractor. The content of the report is not entirely consistent with the title.
ITR 4 addresses only verification of the spectra identified for use in the l
test programs were appropriate. The title may infer to some a complete i
verification of shake test methods including equipment test mounting and its correspondence to field conditions, test anomalies and test i
proceedures. The staff understands, that these matters will be the subject of a subsequent ITR, l
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SUMMARY
OF REPORT Seven groups of items tests at Wyle labs were chosen as the sample. The
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individual groups contdined items from a common plant location.
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four individual items were evaluated.-
The seven groups are listed below.-
- Group I
- Switchgear area of the Turbine Building elev 119
- Group II
- Diesel generator area of the Turbine Building elev 85
- Group III - Cable spreading and control room area of the Auxiliary Building elevs 128 & 140
- Group IV
- Battary area of Auxiliary Building elev 115
- Group V
- Switchgear area of the Auxiliary Building elev 100
- Group VI
- Adjacent to switchgear areas of Turbine Building elev 119
- Group VII
- Control room of Auxiliary Building elev 140 The verification of spectra used for shake table testing purposes was undertaken following the complilatiori of the spectra set. The procedures and methodology used by MLCA to evaluate the shake table testingsampleissummarizedinttbfollowing. steps.
1.
Acquire a list of all PG&E and their contractor supplied equipment qualified by shake table testino.
2.
Determine the locations of all equipment.
3.
Field verify all equipment locations.
4 Establish worst case spec'tra for each equipment group by:
A.
Following the PG&E procedures in which all equipment was segregated into seven groups.
B.
Selecting a spectra that exhibits the greatest amplification considering all equipment locations.
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Using a Hosgri Report damping value or the one selected by PG&E if the.PG&E valueLis more conservative.
In some cases PG&E-h used a lower damping value which would produce a higher load' and is, therefore, more conservative.
I 5.
Compare worst case spectra to PG&E test spectra:
'A.
Test spectra were considered acceptable if a line drawn thru minimum spectral acceleration values enveloped the worst case spectra by a margin of 10% in acceleration at all frequencies except those frequencies less than'2 Hz. Motion at frequencies less than 2 Hz was judged to be unimportant in the qualifica-tion of equipment for Diablo Canyon because either the required spectra has a very low acceleration value at less than 2 Hz or because the equipment did not have a significant modal frequency at less than 2 Hz.
B.
For those frequencies where the 10% rule was viol'ated, the test spectra was accepted if a line drawn ~thru the local mean of the tests spectra exceeded the worst case spectra by 10%
(peak accelerations with significant frequency span were grossly underestimated' by the minimum curve).
6.
Compare worst case spe,ctra to PG&E target spectra.
EVALUATION The staff review of ITR 4 was performed in conjunction with an audit of the IDVP review process of RLCA. The audit of RLCA included review of of the compliation of Hosgri spectra by RLCA, review of RLCA field audit notes taken to record actual equipment location and configura' ion, t
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review of the procedures for generation of target test spectra, and-
-comparison of target spectra with actual test spectra and test-procedures. Th'roughout;this' review,'the staff found'that RLCA'had-instituted a good quality control program to track.the comprehensive-
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documentation used as the evaluation basis.' The staff concludes'thatL the procedures used by RLCA to verify the shake table testing of.the-
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Class IE electrical equipment are technically sound and the. conclusions reached by RLCA are supported by the facts developed.
Based on our review of ITR 4 and subsequent audit of the evaluation procedures and methods used at R. L. Cloud and Assocaites, the staff._
concurs with the IDVP conclusions that the response spectra used for shake table of Class IE electrical equipment were correctly employed.
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STAFF REPORT EVALUATION-REPORT TITLE:
Interim Technical Report, Diablo Canyon' Unit 1 -
Design Chai.n - Independent Design Verification Program Revision 0, August 19, 1982 su IDVP DESIGNATION:
P.105-4-839-005 ORIGINATOR:
Robert b Cloud Associates, Inc..
t SUBMITTED BY:
WE Cooper, Teledyne Engineering Services, letter dated-
. INTRODUCTION The fifth intorim technical report (ITR 5) for the Diablo Canyon Independent Design Verification Program (IDVP) has been reviewed by the staff.
ITR 5 presents the Phase I design chains for Diablo Canyon.
It also summarizes the methods used by Robert L. Cloud and Associates (RLCA) to develop the design chains. The design chains defined by RLCA illustrate structure of PG&E's evaluation of buildings, equipment and components for the postulated 7.5M Hosgri earthquake.
The purpose of--the design chains is to show internal and external PG&E interfaces, describe information passing between interfaces, and list the responsibilities of seismic service-related contractors and PG&E internal design groups prior to June 1978.
The design chains were developed by RLCA between October 1981 and March 1982.
Six seismic service-related contractors employed by PG&E prior to June 1978 were identified. These contractors became the basis for the quality assurance audit, done by R. F. Reedy, Inc., which was also specified in the Phase I plan and was the subject of ITR 2.
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SUMMARY
OF-REPORT RLCA developed the design chain using the following method.
F,irst, the-Hosgri Report was review'ed to define the sample space. Second, a PG&E seismic service-related contractor list was developed. Third,_a
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selectionprocesswasusedwhichscreenedoutthosecontractorswho. hadj no significant effect on the final Hosgri plant design. Also eliminated
- were contractors who performed work to establish Hosgri criter.ia or were involved in construction or field modifications.
In early October,1981, RLCA met with PG&E management and engineering personnel to develop an initial list of PG&E contractors who performed analysis, design _or testing for the plant from the project inception to June, 1978 (Reference 5).
As a result of these meetings, a list was established which consisted of PG&E contract numbers, start and end dates,.and a brief description of work-scope. This list served as a basis for additional meetings to discuss contractor work scope in detail.
For each of the contractors, RLCA attempted to meet with the staff member responsible for the PG&E interface.
In many cases, the exact scope of the contractor's work l
could not be established.
Five slightly different preliminary lists were also developed by PG&E between October,1981 and March 1982 (References 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10).
RLCA compared these lists to the-initial list. When differences were encountered, RLCA resolved them through further meetings and discussions.
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In April 1982, PG&E formally issued a list of contracts titled, "Diablo l
Canyon Consultant Contracts - Revision 2" (Reference 11). This list o
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iv included the coiltract number, work scope, contract dollar amount, PG&E i t--
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RLCA verified'that PG&E's formal' list was consistent with the
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previously gathered information and adopted the formal contractor. list :
for the design chain.'
The design chains presented in ITR 5 are organized according to the items evaluated by PG&E for the postulated Hosgri earthquake.
Each chain represents the sequence for the evaluation of major groups of.
items.
Design chains for the sixteen groups listed below are provided:
Buildings Piping Pipe Supports Head Exchanger Tanks' Pumps HVAC Equipment Valves Electrical Equipment Instrumentation Outdoor Water Storage Tanks 2
Buried Piping Buried Tanks HVAC Duct Supports Cranes Electrical Raceway Supports I
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- n Generally, the chain begins with the supplier of the drawings and response spectra generated by URS/Blume and ends with qualification.
Internal and external PG&E interfaces are shown in relation to the-information they transmit, review, analyze or test.
ITR 5 presents the IDVP conclusion that only the following six
- contractors had a significant effect on the seismic design and qualifications of the Diablo Canyon plant.
Seismic Service-Related Contractors j
Applied Nucleonics Incorporated ANCO Cygna Energy Services EES EDS Nuclear, Inc.
EDS Harding Lawson Associates HLA URS/ John A. Blume and Associates, Engineers Blume.
Wyle Laboratories Wyle EVALUATION The staff concurs that'the format and general content of ITR 5 satisfies the NRC requirement for definition of.the design chain network required in Phase I of the IDVP.
In the course of the staff review inquiries were made with R. L. Cloud Associates (RLCA) as to the criteria for l
exclusion of seismic service-related contractors that were judged to have no significant effect on final plant design.
RLCA identified 2 broad categories for excluded contractors. The first was highly specialized consultants who only participated at random times and.for small dollar value contracts.
The second category was consultants or I
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The staff concludes that these were appropriate criteria for exclusion.
The st' ff also concurs"therefore that the six contrac' ors. listed 'is' the,
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appropriate group to be considered in'the independent. quality assurance'
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Review Date 2
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Auxiliary Building Model BNL Staff ~
10/1/82-11/15/82 H. Polk-2.
(a)'Information'0niy
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(b) Criteria for measurement tolerances Region V' and piping supports-2.
(c) Examine Changes to IOVP Plan' Region V Arrange meeting to H. Polk coincide with other-audits.
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(d) Eqs 3 and 4 of the civil seismic H. Polk 10/1-11/15 design criteria memo (DCM C-17)
BNL Staff 3.
a.(i) Auxiliary Building Model Same as l'
'Same as 1 3.
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- b. Intake Structure H. Polk 10/82 3.
- c. Containment Polar Crane BNL Staff 10/1-10/30 H. Polk 4.
(a)PipingandSupports BNL Staff 11/82 M. Hartzman 4
(b)(i) Main Annuciator Cabinet BNL. Staff 11/82 NRC Staff i
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(b)(ii) Diesel Fule Oil Priming Tank BNL Staff Completed (addressed in ITR #3)
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(c)(i) Containment Polar Crane Same as 3.c Sames as 3.c l
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(c)(li) Containment piping affected BNL Staff 11/82 by the annulus 4.
(c)(iii)StructureModel M. Hartzman 11/82 4.
(c)(iv)MainAnnuciatorCabinet Sameas4.(b)(i)
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'(c)(v)'Containmentexhaustvent H. Polk
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(c)(vi) Annulus Spectra Revisions BNL Staff 10/1-11/15-4 H. Polk.
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(d) Piping as-build discrepancies Region V 5.
(a) Blume internal review-follow up H. Polk 10/82 5.
(b) Response Spectra Document Control Same as 2.(d)
Same as 2.(d)
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Item 15:
Reevaluation of the BNL report vis a vis PG&E contentions PG&E's contention _ that the BNL report is simply.a reiteration of.
findings already made'by PG&E has some merit but falls 'short of speakingL to the. full significance of the independent work'done at Brookhaven.
One principal purpose for the work undertaken by BNL, at the request of the staff, was to repeat the analyses performed by PG&E and URS/Blume:
for vertical seismic motion in the reactor annulus region..This work t
was initiated with the knowledge that some problems had already been identified in tne original design analysis. The staff felt, however, tha'. there was sufficient confusion as to the extent of the problems that did exist to warrant an independent view of the situation.
In ad.htion, the extent of the problems being discovered made it prudent to take a significant independent sample of past work in order to assure that the full extent of noncompliance with' acceptable design criteria was discovered.
Insofar as the differences between BNL results and original PG&E results 1
l can be.related to the early errors identified by PG&E, the BNL report l
offers no additional insight for the IDVP.
There were, however, several conclusions reached by BNL that coincided with subsequent findings of the IDVP (e.g., results of piping stress analyses).
Some matters, e.g.,.
smoothing techniques employed for floor response spectra, 'were not to I
L our knowledge investigated prior to the BNL report and still remain to l
be addressed prior to the satisfactory completion of the IDVP.
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H Item 16: Technical Qualification Phase II Contractors
_ The principal subcontractor to TES for the Phase II program are Robert L. Cloud Associates (RLCA), R. F. Reedy, Inc. (RFR) and Stone & Webster Engineering' Company (SWEC).
Phase II seismic structural and mechanical review is designated largely for RLCA. This is the same role that they played in Phase I, and we see no reason to question the continued participation of RLCA in this t
capacity. The quality assurance aspects are assigned to RFR. Again, essenti?lly the same assignment given during Phase I and we also see no reason to question their continued pursuit of these matters in Phase II.
In summary, the technical qualifications of RLCA and RFR were well.
established prior to Phase I and have been amply verified by their activities to date.
i The SWEC scope includes the selection of representative samples of safety-related systems designs and analysis performed by PG&E and service contractors, the development of the design chain for the sample activities, a review of the selected sample systems, and performance of representative calculations for the purpose of design process verification. The verification program includes review of the safety-l related system design requirements, including the electrical and control design requirements, equipment environmental qualification, and design analyses.
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' SWEC hao full responsibility for the concept, design and installation of systems similar to those available for sampling at Diablo Canyon. The staff has reviewed num'erous facilities designed by SWEC and audited their design process at both the quality assurance and ' technical ' level.
Based on this experience, we conclude that they are fully qualified to perfonn the functions assigned in the Phase I IDVP for Diablo Canyon.
Item 21:
Scope of Re-evaluation of DE and DDE Earthquake There are a number of differences between DE, DDE and Hosgri analyses.
The differences are in the areas of ground design spectra and associated acceleration time histories, damping values, models, analytical techniques, acceptance criteria, etc.
For example, there was no vertical seismic analyses performed in the DE and DDE analyses whereas in the Hosgri evaluation a vertical analysis was performed for each structure.
Due primarily to the low damping values used in the original DE and DDE analyses, design of some structural members, piping and equipment at Diablo Canyon was controlled by either the DE or DDE, even though the Hosgri input design spectra were higher than either the DE or DDE spectra.
For example, the Hosgri response spectra generated for the qualification of steam generator and its supports, reactor coolant pump, reactor vessel, fuel assemply, control rod drive mechanism, and auxiliary feedwater pump turbine were all enveloped by the corresponding DDE response spectra in varying degrees.
The results of CDE analyses were therefore used as total or partial bases for the qualification of these equipment. As a result, when the Hosgri evaluation was perforred
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.E analytical methodologies _ and assum'ptions made in the DE or DDE analyses.
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- c In the event that the IDVP commitment to look only at theHosgri analyses-would result in forfeit of the review of the DE or DDE design controlled items, a safety concern could exist (presuming some possible error that caused the DE or DDE result to be erroneous).
Given the very broad scope of the PGE/Bechtel corrective action program it seems unlikely that significant design deficiencies would slip thecugh the requalification process.
Further, based on the transcript of the September 1, 1982 meeting PGE/Bechtel is committed to a complete review of any conclusions made during the Hosgri evaluation which were based partially or entirely on the results of the DE and DDE analyses (transcript page 112).
i Item 24: Continued / Expanded BNL Activities There is, in our opinion, no question as to the desire for continued participation by BNL in the staff review of the IDVP.
In addition to BNL support through various technical assistance programs that provide l
continuing input to the staff review in the structual, rrechanical ard equipment qualification review areas, we are utilizing Dr. Paul Bressler i
of BNL as the reviewer for the flechanical Engineering Branch (the concentrated reviewer required by the IDVP for Diablo Canyon exceeds the 9
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In addition,'.we intend to utilize other BNL staff and their. consultants to assist in 4
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1 auditing future IDVP review of the PG&E corrective action plan.
1 In conjunction with the st'aff review we also recommend' t' at BNL C h
I undertake some additional independent analyses. Specifically:
1.
Independent horizontal seismic. analysis for the annulus structure; 2.
Seismic and stress analyses of one buried diesel oil tank, 3.
Independent analyses for two additional piping problems (one 'of WestinghousescopeandoneofPG&Escope).
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