ML20210N688
| ML20210N688 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 09/24/1986 |
| From: | Gridley R TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | Youngblood B Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8610060616 | |
| Download: ML20210N688 (63) | |
Text
r o .sr TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401 SN 157B Lookout Place SEP 241986 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attention: Mr. B. Youngblood, Project Director PWR Project Directorate No. 4 Division of Pressurized Water Reactors (PWR)
Licensing A U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555
Dear Mr. Youngblood:
In the Matter of ) Docket Nos. 50-327 Tennessee Valley Authority ) 50-328 IE Inspection Report Nos. 50-327/86-20 and 50-328-86-20, transmitted by letter from J. A. Olshinski to S. A. White dated April 23, 1986, contains unresolved item 50-327/86-20-09 and 50-328/86-09, Containment Isolation Design Pertaining to the Chemical and Volume Control System. By my letter dated May 30, 1986, we submitted information on this issue in response to a telephone call during which NRC had requested additional information on Sequoyah's containment isolation system.
Enclosed is a supplement to this previous submittal reflecting agreements reached in a meeting between TVA and NRC project management and staff on August 13, 1986, and as documented in meeting minutes issued by NRC on August 15, 1986.
Please direct questions you may have concerning this issue to T. S. Andreychek at (615) 870-7470. In addition, please provide TVA with written confirmation of the closeout of this issue upon completion of the Staff's review.
Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
/
R. G idley, Di ector Nuclear Safety and Licensing Enclosure cc: See Page 2 G K OY PDR e An Equal Opportunity Employer
Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation cc (Enclosure):
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II Attn: Dr. J. Nelson Grace, Regional Administrator 101 Marietta Street, NW Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323 Mr. Carl Stahle, Sequoyah Project Manager U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 7920 Norfolk Avenue Bethesda, Maryland 20814 Mr. G. G. Zech Director, TVA Projects U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marietta Street. NW. Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323
, , ENCLOSURE REVISED RESPONSE - NRC-OIE INSPECTION REPORT NOS. 50-327/86-20 AND 50-328/86-20 JOHN A OLSHINSKI'S LETTER TO S. A. WHITE DATED APRIL 23, 1986 Unresolved Item 50-327/86-20-09 and 50-328/86-20-09 BACKGROUND IE Inspection Report Nos. 50-327/86-20 and 50-328/86-20 identified an unresolved item (URI) concerning five (5) chemical and volume control system (CVCS) containment penetrations. The penetrations involved are X-16, the normal charging supply, and penetrations X-43A, -43B, -43C, and -43D, the four reactor coolant pump (RCP) seal injection lines. The URI was identified during an Operational Readiness inspection. The issue involves the lack of j conformance to the explicit requirements of 10CFR50 Appendix A General Design j Criteria (GDC) for containment isolation.
As a result of several telecons between NRC and TVA pertaining to this issue, NRC requested that TVA prepare a submittal to provide full information for all containment penetrations which have isolation schemes differing from those explicitly allowed in GDC 55, 56, and 57, i.e., for those employing alternate isolation schemes found acceptable on other defined bases. A discussion of the design basis for the containment isolation system for SQN was also to be Provided as well as clarification of TVA's position at the time of licensing regarding the SQN design relative to the 10CFR50 GDCs. A TVA submittal on this issue dated May 30, 1986, was transmitted to NRC for review.
A meeting was held in Bethesda, Maryland on August 13, 1986, between TVA and NRC to discuss the results of the NRC review pertaining to both the five subject CVCS penetrations and the SQN containment isolation design in general. The submittal was discussed at length with initial and new NRC issues addressed. The principal issues involved the containment isolation design for the five CVCS lines, the designated isolation design for the ECCS lines, and NRC concern over interpretation of submittal statements concerning the " applicable design criteria" for SQN. It was agreed that a revised
- submittal would be prepared by TVA to differentiate between the design and I
licensing basis for the containment isolation system for SQN, to provide additional technical basis for the alternate isolation scheme employed at SQN
! for the RCP seal injection lines, and to redesignate certain remote manual and l automatic valves as containment isolation valves. Each redesignated l containment isolation valve was to be evaluated for leak testing requirements
! in accordance with 10CFR50 Appendix J. A subsequent telecon was initiated by NRC on August 21, 1986, in which several additional NRC concerns were identified for TVA investigation and response in the revised submittal.
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TVA RESPONSE The two attachments to this submittal provide the containment isolation design information requested by NRC. Attachment 1 provides clarification of the design and licensing bases for the containment isolation system for SQN and discussion of all penetrations identified by NRC for specific evaluation and response. This includes, but is not limited to, the five subject CVCS penetrations. Attachment 2 provides a revised tabulated listing of pertinent information for SQN containment penetrations, segregating those penetrations for which their design meets the GDCs explicitly (as defined in GDCs 55, 56, and 57) from those for which their design employs alternate isolation schemes which are found acceptable on other defined bases. The two tables providing
. this information have been resubmitted in entirety from the initial submittal, not just the changes, to provide continuity of the document. Information provided in both attachments reflect understandings and agreements reached in the August 13, 1986 meeting unless otherwise stated.
SUMMARY
The containment isolation system for SQN has employed designs which either meet the requirements of GDC 55, 56, and 57 explicitly or which are found acceptable on other defined bases. In all cases, the designs provide redundant isolation barriers such that any single failure would not result in release of containment atmosphere to the environment. Clarification of the
, design as presented in this submittal will be incorporated into section 6.2.4 and table 6.2.4-1 of the SQN FSAR during the next annual update, contingent upon NRC approval.
The five subject CVCS penetrations have been evaluated as follows. The normal charging line, after redesignation of an automatic isolation valve as the outboard isolation barrier, meets the explicit requirements of GDC 55. The
- design of the seal injection lines, with local manual valves and a closed 3
system designated as providing the outboard isolation barrier, meets the requirements of GDC 55 by employing a design found acceptable on other defined bases. This resolution, contingent upon NRC review and approval, should
- provide adequate basis for closure of the subject URI.
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. . 3 ATTACHMENT 1 CLARIFICATION OF RESPONSE TO NEC QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE DESIGN AND LICENSING BASIS FOR THE CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM FOR THE SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT As a result of NRC review of TVA's submittal of May 30, 1986, on this subject, NkC requested clarification of the design and licensing basis for the containment isolation system (CIS) for SQN and additional information regarding the design basis for specific penetrations of concern to NRC. The following discussion will address both issues, with reference to the May 30 submittal and subsequent NRC/TVA discussions regarding designs for specific penetrations.
As stated in the previous submittal, the initial design for the CIS for SQN was provided by Westinghouse using their " Systems Standard Design criteria Nuclear Steam Supply System Containment Isolation," 1.14 Revisions 0 and 1.
These documents reflected the requirements of Criterion 53 of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) July 1967, " Proposed General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plant Construction Permits," which was the applicable regulatory requirement at the time. The AEC General Design Criteria (GDC) 55, 56 and 57 were issued in 1971, and provided more explicit isolation requirements.
Revision 2 to the Westinghouse design standard was issued in 1973 to reflect these requirements; however, Westinghouse did not recommend backfit of the design for SQN, as the initial design was considered technically adequate.
Both the previous and new design standards provided for redundant isolation such that no single failure would cause release of the containment atmosphere to the environment. The difference in isolation provisions between the two Westinghouse standards, as is germane to this issue, involves the use of a closed system alone outside containment as an isolation barrier. It was believed by TVA that this use of closed systems in the SQN design met the GDCs as an isolation scheme acceptable on other defined basis. Thus, when SQN was licensed in 1980, the licensing basis for the SQN CIS was the 10CFR50 GDCs.
The following provides specific discussion of the original design provisions and bases, indicated NRC concerns, and TVA's reevaluation of the isolation provisions for the five subject CVCS penetrations and for additional specific penetrations or classes of penetrations for which NRC questions have been raised. Specific details for each penetration may be found in Tables 2.1 and 2.2 of attachment 2 to this submittal.
A. Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Water Injection Line Penetrations X-43A, -43B, -43C, and -43D The provisions for containment isolation relating to these four lines consist of a check valve inside containment to provide the inboard isolation barrier and a closed seismically qualified, TVA class B system outside containment which is continuously pressurized postaccident by the high head safety
4 injection pumps. It is desirable for certain transients and accidents that these lines remain in service to protect the reactor coolant pump (RCP) seals and, therefore, these lines are not automatically isolated by an isolation signal. Additionally the system design provides the following features. A second check valve which is not missile protected is provided in series on each line inside containment. Each line has also been provided with a locally operated manual needle valve outside containment. A single supply line feeding the four injection lines passes through an in-service seal water injection filter and can be isolated at the filter outlet with a local manual isolation valve. A line fed from the outlet of a redundant filter and a filter bypass line connects to the in-service filter discharge line, but both sources are normally isolated by local manual valves. The valves may be operated by reach bars extending from the concrete cubicle. (Reference FSAR figure 9.3.4-1 for TVA flow diagram.)
The initial concern of the I&E inspector regarding the design of these lines was the lack of conformance to the explicit requirements of GDC 55, i.e., no automatic isolation valve is provided outside containment. As previously stated, it is desirable to maintain injection flow to the RCPs following certain transients and accidents to protect the RCP seals. Therefore, these lines are not automatically isolated by an accident isolation signal. GDC 55 allows that certain classes of lines may employ alternate isolation schemes (from those explicitly delineated) if found acceptable on some other defined bases. TVA has previously taken credit for the closed system outside containment as providing the outboard isolation barrier. This originated from the initial design philosophy which considered a closed system alone to be an acceptable isolation barrier inside or outside containment. Following review of TVA's May 30, 1986 submittal, NRC indicated use of the closed system alone outside containment did not constitute an acceptable isolation scheme for these penetrations. The available local manual isolation valves were discussed as additional isolation provisions. NRC requested evaluation of the alternate isolation method proposed--check valve inside containment and closed system with local manual valves outside containment--be discussed in detail to ensure adequate provisions exist for isolation of these lines should the need arise postaccident.
i postaccident, these lines will be left in service and will be supplied by the high head safety injection pumps (centrifugal charging pumps) which also provide seal flow and normal charging flow in nonaccident conditions. Under normal, transient and accident conditions, at least one of the centrifugal charging pumps (CCPs) will remain in operation providing ECCS/ charging flow / seal flow as required. Therefore, a water seal will be continuously provided on the subject penetrations at a pressure greater than 1.1 Pa to preclude air leakage outside containment through these lines. The closed
, system piping outside containment meets the requirements for a closed system I
outside containment as provided in the SQN FSAR Section 6.2.4 and therefore provides a reliable barrier. This piping is leak tested (visual inspection) in accordance with NUREG 0737 position III.D.1.1 and is included in the ASME Section XI in-service pressure test program for SQN. If for some unexpected l
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, ., 5 ratson it brcom s nicsssary or d:sirable to isolate thasa linss postaccidtnt, the locally operated manual valves are available. NRC requested use of these valves be evaluated, and either the needle valves or seal injection filter valves be redesignated as outboard containment isolation valves. The results of this evaluation follow.
The seal water injection filter valve (filter outlet) is the preferred method of isolation. The seal injection filter outlet valve is located in a concrete block cubicle on El. 690, approximately 100 feet from the containment wall, but may be operated with a reach bar from outside the cubicle in the auxiliary building general spaces. This valve allows isolation of all lines quickly with a single valve operation (the alternate filter and filter bypass line are normally isolated), and would be accessible postaccident from a dose consideration. The needle valves on the individual injection lines are located in the El. 690 pipechase at SQN, approximately two feet from the containment (shield building) wall, in close proximity to many ECCS injection lines, CVCS lines, and the boron injection tank (BIT). For the design basis accident and when in the recirculation mode, this area would be inaccessible from'a dose standpoint. Based upon these considerations, the seal injection filter outlet valves and the filter bypass valve will be redesignated as outboard containment isolation valves.
These redundant isolation provisions--the inboard check valves, the closed system, the water seal, and the seal injection filter isolation valve--provide assurance that no single failure could result in release of containment atmosphere to the environment. Therefore, protection of the health and safety of the public is ensured and this isolation design is considered acceptable on other defined bases as presented above.
The seal water injection filter outlet and bypass valves have been evaluated with reference to testing requirements for containment isolation barriers in accordance with 10CFR50 Appendix J. These valves are not subject to Type C testing, as a water seal is provided on these penetrations postaccident with a guaranteed 30-day water supply and injection pressure greater than 1.1 Pa, even with consideration of a single active failure. This seal system satisfies the provisions of Standard Review Plan (SRP) 6.2.6.
B. Normal Charging Line Penetration X-16 The provisions for containment isolation relating to this line consist of a check valve inside containment to provide the inboard isolation barrier and a closed seismically qualified, TVA class B system which is pressurized continuously postaccident by the high head safety injection pumps (CCPs) to provide the outboard barrier. Additionally, two automatic isolation valves are provided outside containment which isolate on the safety injection (SI) signal.
The initial concern of the I&E inspector regarding the design of this line was that per the SQN FSAR Table 6.2.4-1, TVA did not identify an cutboard containment isolation valve as required by GDC 55. TVA har previously taken credit for the closed system outside containment as providing the outboard isolation barrier. This originated from the initial design philosophy which considered a closed system alone to be an acceptable isolation barrier inside or outside containment. The two automatic accident isolation valves were L
. . 6 r:cogniz:d cs system isolation valvas, n:cessary for ECCS purposts, not for containment isolation purposes. While differing from the explicit requirements of GDC 55, the scheme was considered acceptable on an other defined basis, in that redundant isolation capability was provided such that any single failure would not result in release of containment atmosphere to i the environment. Following review of TVA's May 30, 1986 submittal, NRC indicated use of the closed system alone outside containment did not constitute an acceptable isolation scheme for this penetration. Use of the available automatic isolation valves was discussed.
As requested by NRC, TVA has redesignated one of the outboard automatic isolation valves (the valve closest to containment) as the outboard containment isolation barrier. This designation will bring the containment isolation design for this penetration into explicit compliance with GDC 55.
The redesignated outboard isolation valve has been evaluated with reference to testing requirements for containment isolation barriers in accordance with 10CFR50 Appendix J. This valve is not subject to Type C testing, as a water seal is provided on this penetration postaccident with a guaranteed 30-day water supply and injection pressure greater than 1.1 Pa, even with consideration of a single active failure. This seal system satisfies the provisions of SRP 6.2.6.
C. Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Lines - penetrations X-22, -33, -32,
-21, -20A, -208, -17, -108, -109 The basic provisions for containment isolation relating to this class of lines consist of missile protected check valves inside containment on each branch (a small test line branches off each main line inside containment isolated with a normally closed globe valve) and a closed seismically qualified, TVA class B system outside containment. These essential lines must be available postaccident to supply ECCS flow as required and therefore cannot be automatically isolated by an isolation signal. Additional design features are provided for these lines. With one exception, each line has been provided with a remote manual valve outside containment which can be operated from the control room to isolate the line should the need arise postaccident.
Additionally, there are other check valves located inside containment in each branch line which are not missile protected.
Following NRC review of the TVA May 30, 1986 submittal, it was noted that TVA did not identify in the submittal Table 2.2 or in the FSAR Table 6.2.4-1 an outboard isolation valve on these lines as required by GDC 55. It was acknowledged that the explicit requirements of GDC 55 could not be met for these lines in that automatic isolation could not be provided; however, NRC stated that the alternate isolation scheme for these lines considered acceptable by NRC on other defined bases was the use of remote manual valves on the seismically qualified ECCS systems. This scheme was identified as the acceptable alternative in the Standard Review Plan 6.2.4. TVA has previously taken credit for the closed systems outside containment as providing the outboard isolation barriers. This originated from initial design philosophy which considered a closed system alone to be an acceptable isolation barrier inside or outside containment. TVA had, therefore, considered this scheme acceptable on other defined bases in that redundant isolation was provided such that any single failure would not result in release of containment atmosphere to the environment.
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As requested by NRC, TVA has redesignated the remote manual valves available on the ECCS lines as outboard containment isolation valves. This designation j will bring the isolation design for these penetrations into compliance with 1 GDC 55 on the other defined bases designated in SRP 6.2.4. The one exception j to the above provisions was discussed with NRC and basis for acceptability provided as follows.
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- The design features for penetration X-17 at SQN, the RHR pump supply to the loop 1 and 3 hot legs, consist of primary and secondary (missile protected) check valves on the two primary branch lines inside containment, a remote
, manual motor-operated valve on the single supply line to the branches inside i containment, and a closed seismically qualified, TVA Class B system outside containment. (Additionally, inside containment there is a normally closed remote manual valve on a small test line branch off the single supply line and 4
a relief valve on a second branch off the single supply line.) This design
- deviates from the previously discussed isolation scheme for ECCS lines in that
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the remote manual valve is located inside containment with the outboard
! barrier provided by the closed system alone. It is our position that this design is acceptable in that redundant isolation barriers are provided in the form of the check valves, the closed safety system grade piping, and
- capability for remote manual isolation postaccident if the need should arise.
No single failure would result in release of containment atmosphere to the
- environment. As requested by NRC, TVA has therefore redesignated the inboard remote manual valve as an additional containment isolation valve and believes the design for this penetration meets GDC 55 on other defined bases.
1 The redesignated remote manual valves for the ECCS lines have been evaluated i with reference to testing requirements for containment isolation barriers in
! accordance with 10CFR50 Appendix J. For the injection line penetrations from the high head and intermediate head safety injection pumps (CCPs and safety injection pumps), a water seal is provided on these penetrations postaccident with a guaranteed 30-day water supply and injection pressure greater than 1.1 Pa, even with consideration of a single active failure. Therefore,~these lines are not subject to Type C leak testing.
For the injection line penetrations from the low head safety injection pumps (RHR pumps), a water seal is provided postaccident by operation of both RHR l pumps with a guaranteed 30-day water supply and an injection pressure greater than 1.1 Pa.
I j With a single active failure of an RHR pump, the water seal will not be maintained on the associated penetration (s) during the recirculation mode.
- However, any leakage past the primary and secondary check valves and the j remote manual valve would be into a seismically qualified closed system of j safety system grade piping. (Both the primary and secondary check valves are
- leak tested with water as pressure isolation valves to a requirement of less
! than or equal to 1 gpm at a nominal RCS pressure of 2235 psig.)
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! The piping outside containment meets the requirements for a closed system j outside containment as presented in section 6.2.4 of the FSAR. There is testing performed which verifies integrity of this piping. This testing
, includes annual inspections in accordance with NUREG-0737 position III.D.1.1, I
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8 in-service pressure testing in accordance with ASME Section XI, and quarterly ASME Section XI pump tests. As the RRR system is a dual purpose system used during normal operation, an additional opportunity is provided to verify system integrity.
Most importantly, these RHR ECCS injection lines must be available to provide water to the core postaccident to prevent fuel damage. The addition of inline block valves to permit leak rate testing in accordance with 10CFR50 Appendix J would reduce the reliability of these lines to perform their primary safety function following a LOCA.
The combination of a water seal system, a qualified closed system, inspection and testing to verify system integrity, and the need for reliable operation of the ECCS system provides the bases for why the low head safety injection penetrations are not subject to Type C leak rate testing.
The redesignated remote manual valves for the UHI lines have been evaluated with reference to testing requirements for containment isolation valves in accordance with 10CFR50 Appendix J. The UHI system is normally filled with water from the accumulator up to the primary check valves going into the reactor head. The differential pressure between the RCS and the UHI system keeps the check valves closed during normal operation. Valves 87-21 and 87-23 (as well as 87-22 and 87-24) are normally open which provides immediate availability of the UHI system when it is needed under accident conditions.
When the RCS pressure falls below approximately 1,200 psig, the UHI system begins to discharge into the reactor, and when the accumulator reaches low level, valves 87-21 and 87-23 (as well as 87-22 and 87-24) close, retaining a water seal with pressure much greater than 1.1 Pa on the outboard side of these valves. This water seal and pressure is maintained by the remaining water level in the UHI water accumulator and the pressure acting upon this water head from the UHI gas accumulator (nitrogen blanket). If for some unexpected reason residual pressure in the UHI system decreases, the pressure would, at worst, equalize with pressure inside containment. Any leakage or interaction between containment atmosphere and the UHI system volume would be contained by the closed, seismically qualified, TVA Class B system outside containment.
The above discussion provides basis for why the UHI penetrations are not subject to Type C leak rate testing.
D. Containment Spray and RHR Spray - Penetrations X-48A, -488, -49A, -49B The basic provisions for containment isolation relating to these lines consist of missile protected check valves inside containment and a closed seismically qualified, TVA Class B system outside containment. These essential lines must be available postaccident to provide containment depressurization and therefore are not automatically isolated by an isolation signal. As an additional design feature, each line has been provided with a remote manual valve outside containment which can be operated.from the control room to isolate the line should the need arise postaccident.
Following NRC review of the TVA May 30, 1986 submittal, it was noted that TVA did not identify in the submittal Table 2.2 or in the FSAR Table 6.2.4-1 an outboard isolation valve on these lines as required by GDC 56. It was L
. . 9 acknowledged that the explicit requirements of GDC 56 could not be met for these lines in that automatic isolation could not be provided; however, NRC stated that the alternate isolation scha7e for these lines considered acceptable by NRC on other defined bases was the use of remote manual valves on the seismically qualified systems outside containment. This scheme was identified as the acceptable alternative in the Standard Review Plan 6.2.4.
TVA has previously taken credit for this closed system outside containment as providing the outboard isolation barrier. This originated from initial design philosophy which considered a closed system alone to be an acceptable isolation barrier inside or outside containment. TVA had, therefore, considered this scheme acceptable on other defined bases in that redundant isolation was provided such that any single failure would not result in release of containment atmosphere to the environment.
As requested by NRC, TVA has redesignated the available remote manual valves on these spray lines as outboard containment isolation valves. This designation will bring the isolation design for these penetrations into compliance with GDC 56 on other defined bases as endorsed in SRP 6.2.4.
The redesignated remote manual valves for the two containment spray lines have been evaluated with reference to leak testing requirements for containment isolation barriers in accordance with 10CFR50 Appendix J. A water leg is maintained in the riser between the closed remote manual valve and the containment spray ring header under normal operation. The motor-operated gate valves in the containment spray lines are presently leak tested (with water) to verify there is sufficient inventory in the risers to maintain a water seal on the gate valves for 30 days even after shutoff of the containment spray pumps. The water seal ensures there will be no leakage of containment atmosphere to the environment. These provisions are described in FSAR Section 6.2.4.2.1. Additionally, any throughline leakage would be contained within the closed seismically qualified TVA Class B system outside containment.
The redesignated remote manual valves for the two RHR spray lines have also been evaluated with reference to leak testing requirements for containment isolation barriers in accordance with 10CFR50 Appendix J. A water leg is also maintained in the risers for the RRR spray lines under normal operation. The motor-operated remote manual valves are not leak tested to verify water inventory as the RHR pumps are intended to be operated continuously postaccident which would maintain pressure on the system and a water seal on the backside of the remote manual valves. This would additionally prevent loss of the water leg in the riser postaccident. The water seal as provided therefore prevents leakage of containment atmosphere to the environment.
Additionally, any throughline leakage would be contained within the closed seismically qualified TVA Class B system outside containment. (See discussion in the previous section (C) on ECCS low head safety injection system lines.)
In consideration of the above, the redesignated remote manual valves in the containment spray and RHR spray lines are not subject to Type C testing.
E. SI Relief Valve Discharge to pRT Penetration X-24 The provisions for containment isolation relating to this penetration consist of a check valve inside containment to provide the inboard isolation barrier and closed seismically qualified, TVA class B systems--safety injection, CVCS, L
. . 10 and containment spray--outside containment to provide the outboard barrier.
Relief valves which provide overpressurization protection for the respective systems are located on these systems outside containment and relieve into a discharge header back into containment through the penetration to the PRT.
Questions were raised in the August 21, 1986 telecon held between NRC/TVA concerning the containment isolation design for this penetration. NRC requested the relief valves be redesignated as the outboard containment isolation barrier (s) in addition to the closed systems as opposed to the closed systems alone outside containment. Additionally, the question was raised regarding the different provisions for this line as delineated in the Westinghouse Revision 1 standard and the Revision 2 standard.
As requested by NRC, TVA has redesignated the relief valves as outboard containment isolation barriers in addition to the closed systems. The SQN design for this penetration meets the GDCs on other defined bases. Review of the two Westinghouse design standards and discussions with Westinghouse indicate the Revision 1 design is as reflected in the SQN design described above. The use of the relief valves as containment isolation valves in this application is acceptable as containment pressure is applied in the opposite direction that the valves relieve. The Westinghouse revision 2 standard does not depict this penetration. Westinghouse has explained that as an effort to minimize the number of containment penetrations, the Revision 2 design assumes the relief discharge is not routed back into containment but instead into the CVCS holdup tanks in the auxiliary building.
All of these relief valves are located in closed systems which are pressurized postaccident and are discussed in previous sections of this report. As such, these lines are not subject to Type C leak testing. The discussion of the justification for not leak rate testing these valves is provided in the previous sections on the ECCS, CVCS, and spray systems.
F. Hydrogen Purge Penetration X-40D Containment isolation for the hydrogen (H2 ) purge penetration is provided by a blind flange equipped with double 0-ring seals. The flange is located outside containment in the auxiliary building. This isolation scheme has been found acceptable by NRC per Standard Review Plan 6.2.4 Section II.f.
In the August 21, 1986 NRC/TVA telecon, NRC stated that while the isolation scheme is acceptable (from a containment isolation standpoint) for a line that is not used at power or postaccident, use of a blind flange would not be acceptable for a line that would have to be opened to mitigate the consequences of an accident. NRC expressed concern that the provisions of this line for containment isolation could be in conflict with necessary provisions for the H2 Purge system, i.e., meeting the requirements of 10CFR50.44. In response, TVA has reviewed both the isolation provisions for this penetration and the system design requirements per 10CFR50.44. The findings of this review are presented as follows.
Containment H2 purge capability was initially required by 10CFR50.44(e) to provide a backup to the redundant safety-related hydrogen recombiners which were designed to provide H2 control following design basis accidents such as a large break LOCA. The design for GON was reflected in the prelicensing FSAR section 6.2.5 and system approval granted by NRC in section 6.2.5 of the L
. . 11 original SER for SQN. As a result of TMI-2 (NURBG 0737), SQN was required to install an H2 mitigation system to provide hydrogen control capability for a postulated degraded core event which would result in generation of substantially larger amounts of hydrogen than produced in the design basis LOCA. This system at SQN is composed of igniters that are designed to burn H2 near the lower flammability limit.
A conflict resulted between the function and operation of the H2 purge system and the igniter system. The operation of the purge system (preigniters) was based on an assumption of a maximum 5-percent metal-water reaction which would not produce the much larger volumetric quantities of hydrogen that a degraded core event would produce. Emergency procedures required the line to be opened if the hydrogen concentration inside containment exceeded 3 percent by volume. The igniters are designed to handle the hydrogen produced by metal-water reaction involving up to 75 percent of the fuel cladding. Emergency procedures require early initiation of igniter operation in the event of a LOCA, high containment pressure, or degraded core event. The conflict arose where the procedures would have unnecessarily required and resulted in the containment being vented to the environment, albeit through filters, during a degraded core event coincident with igniter operation. As such, TVA concluded that the requirement for operation of the purge system postaccident should be deleted, and the emergency procedures requiring its operation be revised. A description of these changes was provided in Appendix R of TVA's Report of the Safety Evaluation of the Interim Distribution of Ignition System for Sequoyah Unit 1. This report was submitted to NRC in a TVA letter from L. M. Mills to A. Schwencer dated September 2, 1980. Approval of the system changes presented in this report was provided by NRC in SER Supplements 3 and 4 for SQN unit 1 and SER Supplement 5 for SQN unit 2.
In summary, a H2 purge system was included in the H2 control system provided for SON in accordance with the requirements of 10CFR50.44. Use of this system was initially intended as a backup to the fully redundant hydrogen recombiners to be used for control of hydrogen gas produced following a postulated LOCA. As a result of TMI-2 and the potential for a degraded core event, hydrogen igniters were later installed to handle the much larger volume of hydrogen produced by such an event. While the hardware still remains to provide capability for controlled purging, it is not intended to be used at SQN for postaccident hydrogen control. Purging and venting containment to the environment, especially during a degraded core event, is undesirable and unwarranted. The system was never required to be safety grade (beyond containment isolation provisions) and the air supply is nonqualified. Use of this system would unnecessarily result in additional release of containment atmosphere (filtered) to the environment. Therefore, while the system as installed and described in the FSAR has been found acceptable to NRC, it is not intended to be used at SQN under postaccident conditions.
In consideration of the above, the design for penetration X-40D meets the requirements of GDC 56 on other defined basis (per Standard Review plan 6.2.4) and does not degrade the hydrogen control system for SQN.
A general question was expressed by NRC in the August 21, 1986 telecon concerning other containment penetrations employing blind flanges as the isolation scheme and whether they might be removed with the unit at power or L
. . 12 postaccident. Penetrations at SQN which employ blind flanges as the containment isolation barrier are not intended to be opened postaccident.
Additionally, these blind flanges are not removed when containment integrity is required, i.e., are only opened in Modes 5 or 6.
G. Containment Vacuum Relief Penetrations X-Ill, X-Il2, X-113 The provision for containment isolation for each of these penetrations consists of two outboard isolation valves in series attached to penetration sleeves extending from the containment shell. The valve closest to containment is a power-operated isolation valve which is actuated by a set of redundant pressure sensors independent of those for other containment isolation valves, and the outer valve is a spring-loaded check valve .
In the NRC/TVA telecon held August 21, 1986, NRC expressed concern over the isolation provisions for these penetrations. The apparent concern was the lack of an isolation valve inside containment and consequences of a break in the " piping" outside containment between the isolation valve and containment shell. It was suggested that a demonstration of this " piping" as "superpipe" (SRP 3.6.2) could serve to resolve their concerns. A discussion of the design and response to NRC concerns is provided as follows.
The three vacuum relief lines are required to relieve pressure from the annulus into primary containment in the event of an inadvertent containment spray or air return fan actuation to prevent unacceptable pressure differentials from existing across the containment shell (see FSAR section 6.2.6). Both valves are located outside containment to allow the valves to be located as close to containment as possible yet provide reasonable access for maintenance, inspection, and testing. The use of this design was specifically identified as an exception to containment isolation design criteria in the FSAR at the time of the plant licensing (see section 6.2.4).
The first isolation valve outside containment in each line is bolted directly to the containment penetration sleeve. This sleeve is designed and fabricated per the ASME Boiler and pressure Vessel Code,Section III, Winter 1971 Addenda, subsection NE, and falls under the jurisdictional boundaries of Class MC according to NE-1142. The penetration sleeve between primary containment and the first outer isolation valve is part of the containment vessel. Each electrical penetration and process pipe penetrating containment also has a class MC sleeve that a penetration assembly is welded into. Active isolation is provided on process lines but not on the Class MC sleeve.
The provisions of Standard Review plan 3.6.2 are used to provide protection from pipe whip and jet impingement due to a break in a process line as an initiating event. The application of Standard Review plan 3.6.2 to the integrity of containment sleeves after an LOCA represents an inappropriate use of the criteria.
For the above reasons TVA believes that the present design of the vacuum relief lines is acceptable on other defined bases and provides redundant isolation capability to ensure protection of the health and safety of the public.
I l
t _ .__. , - --- - . - - - ----- - -- - -- - - - -
]
, . 13 ATTACHMENT 2 REVISED RESPONSE TO NRC QUESTION REGARDING SPECIFIC DESIGN OF CONTAINMENT PENETRATIONS FOR SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT As a result of NRC review of TVA's previous submittal on this issue of May 30, 1986, TVA is resubmitting a summary of the isolation provisions for all containment penetrations to reflect the results of that NRC review (presented by NRC in a subsequent NRC/TVA meeting and NRC/TVA telecon) as generally discussed in Attachment 1 of this submittal. The design of the containment isolation system for SQN is again being presented in the form of two tables following consideration of the 10CFR50 Appendix A GDC 55, 56, and 57 on a penetration-by penetration basis. Based on these GDCs and the 10CFR50.2 definition (v) for reactor coolant pressure boundary, we have identified for each penetration: (1) penetration classification (GDC 55, 56, or 57); (2) physical configuration (barrier inside, barrier outside); (3) the applicable PSAR figure (if available); and (4) the other defined bases for acceptability if the isolation scheme does not explicitly meet the GDCs. Supporting description, notes, and/or references are provided as appropriate.
The above information is provided in the form of two tables. Table 2.1 lists the penetrations for which the design correlates with the explicit GDC designated isolation schemes. Table 2.2 lists penetrations for which their design employs alternate isolation schemes which are found acceptable on other defined bases. Only principal process line isolation barriers are identified; penetration branch takeoffs such as vent, drain, and test lines and instrumentation sensing taps are not addressed within the scope of this presentation.
i l
l i
i I
1 I
l
- - - - - - - - - - - _ . - - . , - . . - . - . ,__ - .,, - . -_- - - . ~ . - - - - - _ . - - . .
F -
TI.012 2.1 P:ge 1 Cf 24 ,
Design Correlates to Explicit 1
10CER503DC__ Require!!ats__ .
Penetration Inside Outside FSAR Pestratie DsstEJPLica ClassiltsaL100' Barr. ice 111 Barrierts1 EinuEn EcL/NQLes a 004 Lo er Comp. Purge Enh. 56 30-56 30-57 9.4.7-1 a to5 Instr. 23. Purge E.h. 56 30-58 30-59 9.4.7-1 A 0 04. Upper Comp. Purge E=h. 56 33-50 30-51 9.4.7-1 a 607 Upper Comp. Purge Exh. 56 30-52 30-53 9.4.7-1
'CDC 55. 56, 57 .
maiE-- Autonutic Poe.er Operated Valve unless otherwise indicated as follows:
(LC) Locked Closed Manual Valve (at) Remote Manual valve (Cv) Check Valve
F T bla 2.1 P ge 2 cf 24 .
Design Correlates to Empiteit 1
Penetratton Inside Outside FSAR Psustatigg Qgserietion C13ssificatioD' Barrier (s) Barrierfs1 Eisure RcL/Eolts a-uu4A Upper Camp. Purge Supply $6 30-08 30-07 9.4.7-1 a 0098 Upper Comp. Purge Supply 56 30-10 30-09 9.4.7-1 A oI0A tower Comp. Purge Supply 56 30-15 30-14 9.4.7-1 a 0103 Lo w r Comp. Purge Supply 56 30-17 30-16 9.4.7-1
'60C 55, 56. 57 kOTE-- Autonutic Power Operated valve unless othtrwise indicated as follows:
(LC) Locked Closed m nual valve
( Ett) Eemote mnual valve (CV) Check Valve
r Tabla 2.1 PIge 3 Ef 24 .
Design Correlates to Explicit 1
- Penetration Inside Outside FSAR PEMiraL100 OtScrintion Classification' Barrierfs) Rarrierts) Elgurg gg Mitgtes X oil Instr. Ihn. Purge Supply 56 30-20 30-19 9.4.7-1 E c12A Feedwater (FW)/ Aux. 57 Closed System 3-33, 3-164 10.4.7-2 The FW valve. 3-33. tsolates Feedwater ( AFW) 3-164A. 3-174 and on an SI signal. The AFW 10.4.7-12 valves open to control S/G 1evel on pump start. Remote manual operation available. Do not receive containment isolation signal.
K 0128 Feedwater (FW) 57 Closed System 3-47 10.4.7-2 Valve automatically and isolates on an SI signal.
10.4.7-12 Does not receive a cor.tain-ment isolation signal.
X ol2C Feedwater (FW) 57 Closed System 3-87 10.4.7-2 See X-0128 and 10.4.7-12
'0DC 55. 56. 57 l
NOfE-- Autcmatic Power Operated Valve unless otherwise indicated as follows:
l (tC) Locted Closed Manual valve l (RM) Remote Manual Valve l
(CV) Check Valve
. . . - - - . . - - . - - . , - - - ..- .- .- - -~ ~
F Tab 12 2.1 Page 4 af 24 .
Design Correlates to Empiteit 1
10Crg50 GDC Reautrements =
Penetration Inside Outstde FSAR restrattoo Descriauen Classificaugo' garrterfst narrierts1 Elsure RefdNotes a ol2D Feed ater (FW)/ 57 Closed System 3-100, 10.4.7-2 The FW valve. 3-100 Aum. Feedwater (FW) 3-171, and isolates on an SI 3-171A. 10.4.7-12 signal. The AFW valves 3-175 open to control S/G 1evel on pump start. Remote manual operation avatlable. Do not receive containment isolation stgnal.
m 8144 Stm. Gen. 81 dn. 57
- Closed System 1-14 10.4.8-1 " Valve 1-182 ts available.
43-58 x 0148 Stm. Gen. alwdn. 57 " Closed System 1-32. 14.4.8-1 " Valve 1-184 ts available.
43-64 a 094C Sta. Gen. B1mdn. 57
- Closed System 1-25, 10.4.8-1
- Valve 1-183 is available.
43-61
'GCC 55, 56, 57 201E-- Automatic Power Operated Valve unless otherwise indicated as follows:
(LC) Locked Closed Manual valve
( htt) Remote Manual Valve (CV) Cneck valve
F Tib12 2.1 Pzge 5 of 24 Design Ctrraltt2s to Exolteit 1
10CERSLGDC__RcQuiriaents _ .
Penetration Inside Outside FSAR romtration Descrinunn ClASSific3t100' earrierts) garrieth) Eisute BcL B40tn a otto Stm. Gen. Blado 57 " Closed system 1-07, 10.4.8-1
- Valve 1-151 ts available, 43-55 x 016 Normal Charg6ng 55 62-543 (CV) 62-90 9.3.4-1 valve 62-90 is an auto-62-709 (LC) matic containment iso-and Cicsed lation valve in that it System closes on a Safety Injection stenal which generates a Phase A contatrunent isolation signal. Therefore this penetration fully meets GDC 55. See additional discussion for this penetration in Attachment 1 of this document.
M 023 PASF Hot teg 3 - 55 43-310 (RM)43-309 (RM) valves are closed with power Train B -
removed during normal operation.
A ctSA Przr. Stm. Sample 55 43-11 43-12 a 0250 Przr. Ltquid Sample 55 43-02 43-03
'CCC 55. 56. 57 MOTE - Automatic Po er Operated valve unless otherwise indicated as follows:
(LC) Locked Closed Manual Valve
( Ett) Remote Manual Valve (CV) Check Valve
r Tcb12 2.1 P ge 6 Cf 24 .
Design Correlates to Expiteit i
10CFR$Q_LQC RecuirgLngats
- Penetration Inside Outside FSAR PostrJ L)0!) DeaCI12L1Qn Classification' Bartjer(s) Barrierts1 Einute Ref d ates X 02nB Control Air - Train B 56 Unit 1 32-102 9.3.1-6 32-297 (CV)32-295 (LC) a e2e4 Centrol Air - Train B 56 Unit 2 32-103 9.3.1-6 32-348 (CV)32-341 (LC)
X 02 ?C ILkT 56 52-504 (LC)52-505 (LC) a o29 CCS from RCP Coolers 56 70-89 70-92 UI 9.2.1-2 70-698 (CV) U2 9.2.1-3
'CDC 55. 50, 57 hu!E-- Automatic Power Operated Valve unless otherwise indicated as follows:
(LC) Locked Closed Manual valve
( Rrt) Remote Manual valve (CV) Check Valve
Ttbla 2.1 P ge 7 ef 24 ,
Desten Correlates to Empiteit 1
10CFR50 GDC Reautrements .
Penetration Inside Outs 1de FSAR PomLrdLIV) Qtscription CIA $stftratieg' Barrierfs) Barrierfst figurg R C MgLgs A-030 Acctas. to Hu Tank 56 63-71 63-84 6.3.2-1 63-23 A 034 Control Air - 56 Unit 1 32-110 9.3.1-6 monesser.ttal 32-377 (CV)32-375 (LC)
A 034 Control Air - 56 Unit 2 32-111 9.3.1-6 monessential 32-387 (CV)32-385 (LC)
A-o39A N2 to ACCLanulator- 56 77-868 (CV) 63-64 11.2.2-5 ,
i l
'GLC 55, 56. 57 1
hoIE-- Automatic Power Operated Valve unless otherwise indicated as follows:
(LC) Locked Closed Manual Valve (RM) Remote Manual valve
! (CV) Crwck valve 1
i e
F Tccle 2.1 Page 8 (f 24 ,
Design Correlates to Empiteit 1
10CFf50 GDC Recut remnts .
Penetration Instde Outside FSAR Pse.strat!go Osscrtating Classi fication' Barrierfs) Barrier (s) Eisult Ref d Oles a 0398 Na to PRT 56 77-849 (CV)64-305 11.2.2-5 x o40A Aua. Feedwater 57 Closed System 3-156 10.4.7-12 valves open to 3-156A control S/G 1evel 3-173 on pump start. Remote maewal operation available. Do not receive containment isolation sisnal.
a 0408 Au4. Feed =ater 57 Closed System 3-148 10.4.7-12 See X-0404 3-14sA 3-172 a 641 Floor Sump Pues Disch. 56 77-127 77-128 9.3.3-1
'GDC 55. 56. 57 WJfE-- Automatic Power Operated Valve unless otherwise indicated as follows-(LC) Locked Closed Manual Valve (en) Remote m nual valve (CV) Check Valve
r Tabl2 2.1 Page 9 cf 24 ,
Design Correlates to Empiteit 1
IQCFR50 GDC Recuirements .
Penetration Inside Outstde FSAR t' sis t CJ L? QG Qi:1Cf1RLign Classifi n tion' garrierts1 Barrierts1 Eigyte RgG/ Note:;i X 042 Primary Water $6 81-502 (CV) 81-12 X 044 Seal Water Return 55 62-61 62-63 9.3.4-1 62-639 (CV) a u45 RCDT & PRT to Vent Hdr. 56 77-13 77-19 11.2.2-1 77-20 A 04o RCDT Puno Discharge 56 77-09 77-10 9.3.6-1 84-511 (LC)
'GDC 55. 56. 57 ad)TE-- Automatic Power Operated valve unless otherwise indicated as follows:
(LC) tocked Closed Manual valve (EM) Remote Manual Valve (CV) Check Valve
r TL';13 2.1 Prge 10 (f 24 ,
Design CcrrelstOs ts Empiteit 1
10CER$9_GDC Remdtgment s .
Penetration Inside Outside FSAR P6 'NtrAU DO Cg1CflRIGO ClassificatioD' Barrierfs1 barrittlil Elgung Ref,/30tes a 041A Glycol In 56 61-192 61-191 61-533 (CV)
A 0478 Glycol Out 56 61-194 61-193 61-680 (CV)
X C50A RCP Therm. Barr. Return 56 70-87 70-90 9.2.1-2 70-687 (CV) x 0508 RCP Therm. Barr. Supply 56 70-679 (CV)70-134 9.2.1-2
' M 55, 56, 57 h01E-- Automatic Power Operated Valve unless otherwise indicated as follows:
(LC) Locked Closed Manual Valve (RM) Remote Manual Valve (CV) Check Valve
7tbla 2.1 P ge 11 g.f 24 ,
Design Correlates to Explicit 1
1CCFR50 CDC Reouirements
- Penetration Inside Outside FSAR
("s:PC f.E2L100 QCicriotiGO Classification' Barrierfs) Barrierfs) Figure EcWNotes A-051 Fire Protection 56 26-1260 (CV)26-240 9.5.1-10 x c52 CCS to RCP Oil Coolers 56 70-692 (CV)70-140 9.2.1-2 a-osc ERCW Supply to Lower 56 67-5620 (CV)67-107 9.2.2-3 Comp.
a 057 ERCW Return frorn Lower 56 67-111 67-112 9.2.2-3 Comp. 67-575D (CV)
'GDC 55. 56 57 40fE - Automotic Power Operated Valve unless otherwise indicated as follows:
(LC) Locked Closed Manual Valve (RM) Remote Manual valve (CV) Check Valve
7 ,
Ttbla 2.1 Page 12 af 24 .
Design Correlates to Explicit 1
10CFR50 GDC Reeui rements
- Penetration Inside Outside FSAR Pgoctratigo Ogscriction Classification 8 Barrierts) BarrieClil EisuCe RefdMQLes
- 054 ERCW Supply to Lower 56 67-562A (CV) 67-83 9.2.2-3 Comp.
x 059 ERCW Return from Lower 56 67-87 67-88 9.2.2-3 Conp. 67-575A (CV) x 060 ERCW Supply to Lower 56 67-5628 (CV) 67-99 9.2.2-3 Comp.
4 061 ERCW Return from Lower 56 67-103 67-104 \
9.2.2-3 Comp. 67-5758 (CV)
'GDC 55, 56, 57 140lt - Automatic Power Operated Valve unless otherwise indicated as follows:
(LC) Locked Closed Manual Valve (RM) Remote Manual valve (CV) Check Valve
r Ttb12 2.1 PJge 13 if 24 Design Cerralat;s t2 Explicit 1
Penetration Inside Outside FSAR fotstrJLiG9 QchCLiDL100 CIA 15tficA W 3 Barrierfs) Barrittisl Elgure Ec[Jhalts A 002 ERCW Supply to tower 56 67-562C (CV) 67-91 9.2.2-3 Comp.
x 063 ERCW Return frun tower 56 67-95 67-96 9.2.2-3 Comp. 67-575C (CV) x uo4 Instr. Rm. Chill Water 56 31C-223 31C-222 Eeturn 31C-752 (CV) x ous Instr. Rm. Chill Water 56 31C-225 31C-224 Supply 31C-734 (CV)
'GDC 55. 56, 57 NOTE-- Autanatic Power Operated Valve unless otherwise indicated as follows:
(tC) Locked Closed Manual Valve =
(RM) Remote Manual valve (CV) Check valve
Ttbla 2.1 P!ge 14 cf 24 .
Design Correlates to Explicit 1
10CFR50 GDC Rgouirements ' -~
Penetration Inside Outside FSAR PtitNLr# LiOO DC5CIjRLiGO CIA 111LiCallD0' garrierfil Barrier (s) figung ggf.,139tgs x 066 Instr. Rs. Chill Water 56 31C-230 31C-229 Return 31C-715 (CV) x 067 Instr. En. Chill Water 56 31C-232 31C-231 Supply 31C-697 (CV)
X 068 Upper ERCW Supply to 56 67-5800 (CV)67-141 9.2.2-3 Cooler x 069 Upper ERCW Supply to 56 67-580A (CV)67-130 9.2.2-3 Cooler -
'GDC 55, 56, 57 N01E-- Automatic Power Operated Valve unless otherwise indicated as follows:
(LC) Locked Closed Manual Valve (RH) Remote Manual Valve (CV) Check Valve
Tib13 2.1 P:ge 15 cf 24 , ,
Design Correlates to Explicit-1-
. 10CER50._GDC Renuirements .
Penetration Inside Outside FSAR fut)CICAL100 DeSEElDLlOD Classification' Sarrierfs) Barrier (s) Eigurg Rgft/Netes X-070 Upper ERCW Return from 56 67-297 67-139 9.2.2-3 !
Cooler 67-5858 (CV) '
x 078 Upper ERCW Return fran 56 67-296 67-134 9.2.2-3 I
t Cooler 67-585C (CV) x - 012 Upper ERCW Return 56 67-298 67-142 9.2.2-3 from Cooler 67-585D (CV)
I i
4 l X 073 Upper ERCW Return from 56 67-295 67-131 9.2.2-3 2
Cooler -
67-585A (CV) l
'GDC 55, 56, 57 NOTE-- Autenatic Power Operated valve unless otherwise indicated as follows:
(LC) Locked Closed Manual valve -
(RM) Remote Manual Valve (CV) Check Valve a
4
Trbis 2.1 Page 15 cf 24 .
Design Correlates to Explicit 1
10CFR50 GDC ReSuirements
- Penetration Inside Outside FSAR fc!!sLCdL10D Delcriotion Classification' Barrierfs) Barrier (s) Eigutg Eg[,fggigs X-074 Upper ERCW Supply 56 67-5808 (CV)67-138 9.2.2-3 X 075 Upper ERCW Supply 56 67-580C (CV)67-133 9.2.2-3 X 07b Service Air 56 UI 33-704 (LC) U1 33-740 (LC)
X 077 Demin. H20 56 59-633 (CV)59-522 (LC) 9.2.3-2 59-529 (LC) i
'GDC 55, 56, 57 huiE-- Automatic Power Operated Valve unless otherwise indicated as follows:
(LC) Locked Closed Manual Valvo (RM) Remote Manual Valve (CV) Check Valve
Ttbla 2.1- Psge 17 ef 24 Design Ccrrelatss to Explicit 1
Penetration Inside Outside FSAR PunsLCAL100 Descrintino Classificationi Barrierfil Barrierfil Fiaure Ref./ Notes X 078 Fire Protection 56 26-1296 (CV)26-243 9.5.1-10 X-Uno Lower Comp. Press. Relief 56 30-40 30-37 9.4.7-1 x oui R:DT to Gas Analyzer 56 77-16 77-17 11.2.2-1 X 082 Refueling Cavity Pump 56 78-560 (LC)78-561 (LC) 9.1.3-1 Suction
' GOC 55. 56. 57 NOTE-- Automatic Power Operated Valve unless otherwise indicated as follows:
(LC) Locked Closed Manual Valve (RM) Remote Manual Valve (CV) Check Valve
-. .- - - . - - ~ . . ~ . , - - - -
Table 2.1 Paga 18 cf 24 Design Cc.rralatts to Explicit 1
10Cfg$0 GDC Rggyirements ,
l Penetration Inside Outside FSAR Punstratico DescCis on Classificaunn' Barnerlsl BarCisCisl EisuCe RcL/ Notes
.s x 083 Refueling Cavity Pump 56 78-558 (LC)78-557 (LC) 9.1.3-1 Discharge r
X-Ou4A PRT to Gas Analyzer 56 68-308 68-307 x 085A Excess Ltdn. HX to 55 43-75 43-77 Boron Analyzer 1
x 0578 ILRT P-TAPS 56 52-502 (LC)52-503 (LC)
'GDC 55, 56, 57 I40TE-- Automatic Power Operated Valve unless otherwise indicated as follows:
(LC) Locked Closed Manual Valve (RM) Remote Manual Valve (CV) Check Valve 1
1 4
4 J
- - - - - . - . - ~ _ - . . . . - - - - - - - - - - - -.- - . . . ,- . - - . - - - . - . _ .
Tabla 2.1 Pagt IS cf 24 4
Design Cerrelates to Explicit I
___10CFR19 GDC Reauirements e 1
Penetration Inside Outside FSAR Pvf!strat iou Destdation CIA 511ficAliG0 8 Barrierts1 Barriet111 EiguCA Refa/NGLCS i
X-0570 ILRT P-TAPS 56 52-500 (LC)52-501 (LC) 4 I
I
- X 090 Control Air - Train A 56 Unit 1 32-80 9.3.1-6
X 090 Control Air - Train A 56 Unit 2 32-81 9.3.1-6 32-358 (CV)32-353 (LC)
X-091 PASF Hot Leg 1 4 55 43-251 (RM)43-250 (RM) See X-023 Train A 1
4
, 'GDC 55, 56, 57 140lE-- Automatic Power Operated Valve unless otherwise indicated as follows: '
(LC) Locked Closed Manual Valve (RM) Remote Manual Valve (CV) Check Valve i
Tsbla 2.1. Page 20 cf 24 Design Ccrralatas to Explicit 1
10CFR50 GDC Rgautrements
- Penetration Inside Outside FSAR l'ultulf a L100 DcsCElDLlDD Classi ficR100 3 Barrier (sl Baffffflil E12WC2 Rc[ J 0tes X TJ93 Accumulat'or Sample 56 43-34 43-35 X 094A Upper Rad. Mon. - 56 90-109 90-107 Intake X 0948 Upper Rad. Hon. - , .5,6 90-108 90-107 Intake X 094C Upper Rad. Hon. - 56 90-110 90-111 Return
'GDC 55, 56, 57 NOIE-- Aut omatic Power Operated Valve unless otherwise indicated as follows:
(LC) Locked Closed Manual Valve (RM) Remote Manual Valve (CV) Check Valve
Ttble 2.1 Pr,33 21 af 24 ,
Design Correlates to Explicit 1
10CFR50 GDC Reouirements -*
Penetration Inside Outside- FSAR Ps0ctrAL120 QR5criptian ClassiFicaliOD' BarrierL11 Barrierfs) F1aure Ref./ Notes X 095A Lower Rad. Mon. - 56 90-115 90-113 Intake x 095B Lower Rad. Hon. - 56 90-114 90-113 Intake X 095C Lower Rad. Mon. - 56 90-116 90-117 Return X-090C Hot Leg Sample-Loops 55 43-22 43-23 2 and 3
'GDC 55, 56, 57 NOTE-- Automatic Power Operated Valve unless otherwise indicated as follows:
(LC) Locked Closed Manual Valve (RM) Remote Manual valve (CV) Check Valve
(-- -- . - - _ _
6 Tabl9 2.1 Page 22 cf 24 Design Cc:rrelatts to Exp1tcit 1
Penetration Inside Outside FSAR i
PcilulCAL100 Descriotina Classification Barrier (s) Barrierfs1 Elgutg gg[,fgglgs 4 093 ILRT P-TAPS 56 52-506 (LC)52-507 (LC) x lot PASF Containment Air 56 43-319 (RH)43-318 (RH) See X-023 Intake - Train B A 102 AFW Test Line 57 Closed System 3-351C (LC) x 103 PASF Liquid Otscharge 56 43-461 (CV)43-317 (RH) See X-023 Note - Applies to to Containment 43-341 (RH) outboard valves only.
'GDC 55, 56, 57 NOTE-- Autonatic Power Operated Valve unless otherwise indicated as follows:
(LC) Locked Closed Hanual Valve (RH) Remote Manual Valve (CV) Check Valve
Table 2.1 Pste 23 cf 24 ;
Design Correlates to Explicit 1
10CFR50 GDC Reautrements___ -
Penetration Inside Outside FSAR PuncLrat100 DCSCI1DLlRD CIAssificAL10D I Barrittlil Barrier (s) Elgurg Bef,/MeLes A 104 AFW Test Line 57 Closed System 3-352C (LC)
X 106 PASF Air Discharge to 56 43-460 (CV)43-325 (RM) See X-023 Note - Applies to Containment 43-307 (RM) outboard valves only.
X 110 UHI Valve Test Line 55 87-7 87-9 6.3.2-15 87-8 9
x 114 Glycol Floor Cooling 56 61-122 61-110 6.5.6-2 61-745 (CV)
'GDC 55, 56, 57 NOTE- Automatic Power Operated Valve unless otherwise indicated as follows:
(LC) Locked Closed Manual Valve (RM) Remote Manual Valve (CV) Check Valve
__ . _ . ___ ._. _ _ , _ . .__-..- .- ._ . _ . .. , _ _ . . _ .__ _. . . ~ . .._ _ _ __ _ ._ .
4 Table 2.1 Page 24 c'f 24 Design Ccrrelates to Expiteit 1
- 10CFR50 GDC Reauirements -.
+
1 1
i i
Penetration Inside Outside FSAR t
l'cDVLf AL10.0 QCSCflAL190 Classificat. iga l
) Barrierfs) Barrierf s1 - Einuft Etf J 9tti I
j X 115 Glycol Floor Cooling 56 61-97 61-96 6.5.6-2 61-092 (CV)
}
i X-Il64 PASF Containment Air 56 43-288 (RM)43-287 (RM) See X-023 Intake - Train A i
i I
k i
i I
4 i 'GDC 55, 56, 57 e
NOIE- Automatic Power Operated Valve unless otherwise indicated as follows:
) (LC) Locked Closed Manual Valve (RN) Remote Mariual Valve (CV) Check Valve
)
1 1
i i
Table 2.2 Page I af 24 .
Design Correlates to 1
10 CFR 50 CDC on Other Defined Basis
- Penetraticn Inside Outside FSAR PtfwlfdL)90 OthEElE1190 Classification' Barrierfs) Barrierfs) Eigutg Qther Defined B4111 Ref./NOLg1 1
x 001 Equipment Hatch 56 Hatch ---
6.2.4-12 Double 0-Ring provides redundancy for hatch seal.
P R 002A Personnel Airlock 56 Airlock Door Airlock Door 6.2.4-13 Two doors, both with double resilient seals and sechanical interlocks.
X 0028 Personnel Airlock 56 Airlock Door Airlock Door 6.2.4-13 Two doors, both with double resilient seals and mechanical inter-locks.
I I x 003 Fuel Transfer Tube 56 Blind Flange ---
6.2.4-14 Double resilient seals
{ provide redundant
! flange seal.
x 005 Spare 56 --- --- ---
Penetration is a seal-
, welded spare and is a 4
single passive barrier as is primary containment.
'GDC 55. 56, 57 N01E -AutomJtic Power Operated Valve unless otherwise indicated as follows:
(LC) Locked Closed Manual Valve (RM) Remote Manual Valve (CV) Check Valve (RV) Relief Valve
n . . - . - - - - - - . - . . . - - .
Tabla 2.2 P:g2 2 af 24 Design Correlates to 1
11 CFR 50 CDC on Other Defined Basis .
Penetration Inside Outside FSAR Rggivitating DescrintiGO Classification 8 Barrierfs) Barrierfs) Fiaure Other Defined Basis Rat.LNQLas A us3A Main Steam 57 Closed System 1-04, 1-147, 10.3.2-1 The safety relief valves 1-15, 1-05, & outside containment Safeties (5) reoutred to ensure ,
transient and accident condition secondary side heat removal mechanism are acceptable as contain-ment isolation valves.
They have setpoints greater than 1.5 Pa as allowed by Standard Review Plan 6.2.4 Section II.g.
A u13B Main Steam 57 Closed System 1-11, 1-148, 10.3.2-1 See X-013A l-12, and Safeties (5) x Ol3C Main Steam 57 Closed System I-22, 1-149, 10.3.2-1 See X-013A 1-23, and Safeties (5)
'CDC 55, 56, 57 NOTE-- Automatic Power Operated valve unless otherwise indicated as follows:
(LC) Locked Closed Manual Valve (RM) Remote Manual Valve (CV) Check valve (RV) Relief Valve
Tabla 2.2 Pigt 3 cf 24 ,
Design Correlates to 1
jj CFR 50 GDC on Other Defined Balls
- Penetration Inside Outside FSAR ProstratjQQ Dgscriott20 Classification' Barrierts) Barrierfs) Fiaurg Other Defined Basis Rgf./ Notes X~ul3D Hatn Steam 57 Closed System 1-29, 1-150, 10.3.2-1 See X-013A 1-16, and 1-30 and Safeties
]
(5) i I
x-015 CVCS Letdown 55 62-72 62-77 9.3.4-1 One of the inboard 62-73 isolation valves is l 62-74 a pressure relief 62-662 (RV) valve 62-662, which relieves to the PRT. The relief valve is acceptable because containment pressure is acting opposite the direction i
that the valve relieves.
thereby aiding the valve to seat.
A 017 RHR Return 55 63-172 (RM) Closed Systen 5.5.7-1 Remote manual valve See additional 63-640 (CV)63-172 is located discussion of 63-643 (CV) inside containment in this penetra-63-158 (RM) series with check tion in Attach-63-637 (RV) valves63-640 and ment I of this63-643. Remote document.
manual valve 63-158 is used for Section XI
'GDC 55, 56. 57 NOTE -Automatic Power Operated Valve unless otherwise indicated as follows:
(LC) Locked Closed Manual valve (RM) Remote Manual Valve ,
(CV) Check valve (RV) Reitef valve
. . . ~. . .
Ttbla 2.2 P!ge 4 cf 24 4 Design Correlates to 1
s 10 CFR 50 GDC on Other Defined _ BASIS Penetration Inside Outside FSAR funstEAliQD Descript1QD Classification' Barrierts) Barrierfs1 Fiaure Qther Defined Basis Ref./NQ1gs pressure boundary testing and is administratively controlled. Relief valve 63-637 is acceptable because containment pressure is acting opposite the direction that l
' the valve relieves, thereby aiding the valve to seat.
i x und Spare 56 --- --- ---
See X-008 i
6.3.2-1 63-72 (RM)
- Containment Isolation and Closed for the RHR sump line System penetrations consists of: (1) a closed system outside containment, (2) a containment isolation valve (63-72) outside
- containment in the auxiliary building which is a controlled leakage structure.
This valve is remotely controlled from the nairs control room.
'i2M: 55. 56. 57
, NOTE--Autonatic Power Operated Valve unless otherwise indicated as follows:
! (LC) Locked Closed Manual Valve (RM) Remote Manual Valve (CV) Check Valve j (RV) Relief Valve i
Tchla 2.2 P:ge 5 (f 24 .
Desten Correlates to i
10 CFR 50 CDC on Other Defined Basis Penetration Inside Dutside FSAR PctistrAllDO Qescricitan Classification' Barrierfs) Barrierfs) Fiaurp Qther Defined Basis Ref /ggLes This same discussion is given in the FSAR. This isolation schese is acceptable per SRP 6.2.4 Section II.e and resolu-tion to NCR SQN NE8 8203.
- 63-73 (RM) 6.3.2-1 " Containment isolation for and Closed for the RHR sump itne System penetration consists of:
(1) a closed system outside containment, (2) a containment isolation valve (63-73) outside
' containment in the auxiliary butiding which is a controlled leakage structure. This valve is remotely controlled from the main control room.
This same discussion is given in the FSAR. This isolation scheme is accep-table per SRP 6.2.4 Section II.e and resolution' to NCR SQN NEB 8203.
'uX: 55. 56, 57 4 NOTE--Automatic Power Operated Valve unless otherwise indicated as follows:
(LC) Locked Closed Manual valve (RM) Remote Manual Valve (CV) Check valve (RV) Reitef Valve i
1
Ttbla 2.2 Pige 6 af 24 ,
Design Correlates to 1
JO CFR 50 CDC on QLher Def1DCd. Basis l
Penetration Inside Outside FSAR Pgnetrating pgscriotion ClassificatinD' EAEEltflil Barrierfs1 Fiaure . Other Defined Basis Ref./Notts x 020A SIS - RHR Pump 55 63-633 (CV) 63-94 (RM) '6.3.2-1 See SRP 6.2.4 Section II.b Discharge - Train B 63-635 (CV) and Closed for acceptability of out-63-112 (RM) System board remote sunual valve.
A test line adjoins this line inside containment between the check valves and primary containsnent. The
+
isolation valve.63-112 in the test line is remote senually actuated from the main control room. This valve is open for short periods of time during norsel operation for the performance of SIS and RHR system venting as described in Technical Specification 4.5.2.
i Thus, this valve does not automatically close when the containment isolation
- or safety injection signal is initiated during the venting of the SIS and RHR system. This is accep-l
) table because administrative
'LDC $5. 56, 57
, NOTE - Automatic Power Operated Valve unless otherwise indicated as follows:
t (LC) Locked Closed Manusi Valve (RM) Remote Manual Valve (CV) Check Valve (RV) Reitef Valve
Tabla 2.2 Page 7 cf 24 .
Design Correlates to 1
10 CFR 50 CDC on Other Defined Basis Penetration Inside Outside FSAR Phnvlt3LjQQ Of5CC1RLiGO Classification' Barrierfs1 Barritr(11 Fioure Other Defined Basis Ref./Natts controls exist in the test documents to assure valve closure after testing and containment integrity is not compromised during testing since flow is being maintained into containment by pump operation.
x 0203 SIS - RHR Pump 55 63-632 (CV) 63-93 (RM) 6.3.2-1 See SRP 6.2.4 Section II.b Discharge - Train A 63-634 (CV) and Closed for acceptability of out-63-111 (RM) System board remote manual valve.
For discussion of remote manual valve 63-111. see same discussion under X-020A for valve 63-112, 4 u21 SI Pump Discharge to 55 63-547 (CV)63-157 ( RM) 6.3.2-1 See SRP 6.2.4 Section II,b Hot Legs - Train B 63-549 (CV) and Closed for acceptability of out-63-167 (RM) System board remote manual valve.
For discussion of remote manual valve 63-167. see discussion under X-020A for valve 63-112.
'QX: 55, 56 57 NOTE -Automatic Power Operated Valve unless otherwise indicated as follows:
(LC) tocked Closed Manual Valve (RM) Remote Manual Valve (CV) Check valve (RV) Relief Valve
T: bis 2.2 ~ Pipe a cf 24 . ,
Desien Correlates to 1
JO CFR So GDC on Other Defined Basis
- Penetration Inside Outside FSAR PsputraL190 Dt5Cristion Classification 3 Barrierft1 Barrierfs) Fieure Other Defined Basis Ref./NgLas X-022 BIT Charging Pump 55 63-581 (CV) 63-25 (RM) 6.3.2-1 See SRP 6.2.4 Section II.b Discharge 63-174 (RM) 63-26 (RM) for acceptability of out-63-697 (LC) board remote manual valves.
and Closed For discussion of remote System manual valve 63-174, see discussion under X-020A for valve 63-112.
x 024 SI Relief Valve 56 68-559 (CV)62-505 (RV) 5.1-1 Relief valves are See discussion Discharge 72-512 (RV) acceptable because in Attachment 1 72-513 (RV) containment pressure of this63-511 (RV) is acting opposite the document for 63-536 (RV) direction that the' further infor-63-535 (RV) valve relieves, mation on this63-534 (RV) thereby aiding the penetration.63-626 (RV) valve to seat.63-627 (RV) and Closed System
'GDC $5. 56, 57 NOTE--Automatic Power Operated Valve unless otherwise indicated as follows:
(LC) Locked Closed Manual Valve (RM) Remote Manual Valve (CV) Check valve (RV) Relief Valve i
Ttbla 2.2 P ge 9 ef 24 ,
Design Correlates to I
10 CFR 50 CDC on Other Defined Basis
- Penetration Inside Outside FSAR Penstr3LiQO Qtscriotion Classification' Ba rri er(s) Barrier (s) Eigutt Other Defined Basis Ref./Natts X 025B dP Sensor 56 --- * --- "The containment pressure sensors are located out-side of and as close as practical to the contain-ment. The lines and pressure sensors are missile protected and designed to safe shutdown event requirements. These sensors employ redundant bellows as isolation barriers. Design required to parmit actuation of equipment necessary to mitigate the consequences of an accident.
A ul5C Rn Vessel Level 55 * * ---
"The reactor vessel level indication system (RVLIS) is required postaccident for continual indication of the water level in the reactor vessel. The capillary sensing lines which transmit pressure from the reactor vessel to instruments in the Auxiliary Building are armored and designed to withstand DBE conditions.
Any containment isolation
'GDC 55, 56, 57 NOTE -Automatic Power Operated Valve unless otherwise indicated as follows:
(LC) Locked Closed Manual valve (RM) Remote Manual Valve (CV) Check Valve (RV) Relief Valve
Table 2.2 P:ge 10 cf 24 ,
Design Correlates to 1
19_CEL50_GDC_ca_0thcC _Def_ined. 8a111 Penetration Inside Outside FSAR PutistrdtlDO DCSCflRLiGD Classification 3 Barrier (s) Barrierf s t Elgutg Qther Defined Basis E t f, IngLg5 valves installed in the RVLIS Capillary lines will jeopardize the perfgrmance of the system. For this reason. isolation of these capillary lines is accomplished by a sealed sensor located inside containment and an isolator located outside containment.
These devices utilize a type of bellows which transmits pressure while preventing mixing of the fluids on either side of the isolation devices. The capillary line is armored 3/16 inches 0.D. stainless steel tubing and is filled with demineralized water and sealed. A postulated shear of this capillary line on either side of the containment would not allow a leak to develop through the containment boundary.
This design is described in FSAR Section 6.2.4.3.
'uDC 55, 56. 57 NOTE--Automatic Power Operated valve unless otherwise indicated as follows:
1 (LC) Locked Closed Manual Valve (RM) Remote Manual Valve (CV) Check Valve (Rv) Relief Valve
.. . . _ . . - _ . _ . _ . ._ _ __ _ _ . . _ . . _ _ _ _ _._ . . . . . - . .. _ _ _ . , m-, _..
Ttble 2.2 P ge 11 cf 24 e Design Correlates to I
10 CFR 50 GDC on Other Defined _gglis.
4 Penetration Inside Outside FSAR Ptostratigo Dg5CCiD11AD Classification Barrior(s) ban cM' figytt Other Defined Basis Ref./NgLes A UZ6A dP Sensor 56 --- * ---
"See X-0258 i
- x-02bC Ra vessel Level 55 * * ---
- See X-025C x U2/A dP Sensor 56 --- * ---
"See X-0258 ;
A ut/B dP Sensor 56 --- * ---
"See X-0258 L
x U270 Ra Vessel Level 55 * * ---
"See X-025C *
- a 02s Spare 56 --- --- ---
See X-008 t
- A ull Spare 56 --- --- ---
See X-008 i
i i
j 'GDC 55, 56, 57
- NOTE--Autanatic Power Operated Valve unless otherwise indicated as follows:
)
(LC) Locked Closed Manual Valve (RM) Remote Manual Valve (CV) Check Valve
. (RV) Relief Valve I
I 1
l i
i l
0 4
1
Tchts 2.2 P:ge 12 cf 24 ,
Design Correlates to 1
10 CFR 50 CDC on Qther DefinecLBa111 Penetration Inside Outside FSAR Psust t'a( 100 DisEf1RL100 CIA 11111CAllD0' Bd[Li2Clil BarrieClil Elsute Olugr_ Defined Basis Ref./ Males e u32 SI Pump Discharge 55 63-545 (CV)63-156 (RM) 6.3.2-1 See SRP 6.2.4 Section II.b to Hot Legs - Train A 63-543 (CV) and Closed for acceptability of out-4 63-21 (RM) System board remote manual valve.
} For discussion of remote 4
manual valve 63-21, see discussion under X-020A
! for valve 63-112.
e us3 SI Pump Discharge 55 63-553 (CV) 63-22 (RM) 6.3.2-1 See SRP 6.2.4 Section II.b 63-555 (CV) and Closed for acceptability of out-63-551 (CV) System board remote nunual valve.63-557 (CV) For discussion of reacte 63-121 (RM) senual valve 63-121. See I
discussion under X-020A for valve 63-112.
l A 035 CCS from Excess 57 Closed 70-85 9.2.1-2 See X-053
- Ltdn. HX System i
1 4 uJo Spare -
56 --- --- ---
See X-008
- 'G C 55. 56, 57
' NOTE -Automatic Power Operated valve unless otherwise indicated as follows:
(LC) Locked Closed Manual Valve (RM) Ret:cte Manual Valve (CV) Check valve (RV) Relief valve 6
1 1
l 4
.___m.. . . ,
Ttble 2.2 Page 13 ef 24 ,
Design Correlates to I
, 10 CFR 50 GDC on Other Defined Basis 1
Penetration Inside Outside FSAR i l'O NLfaL190 OtsCEID1.1DD Classificatior}' Barrierfs) Battfer(s) Elsure Other Defined Basis Ref./ notes
, x 037 Spare 56 --- --- ---
See X-008 ;
x u33 Spare 56 --- --- ---
See X-008 i
4 x u39C Spare 56 --- --- ---
See X-008 l
x u390 Spare 56 --- --- ---
See X-008 2
j A U40C Spare 56 --- --- ---
See X-008 1
A 010D H2 Purge Supply 56 ---
Blind ---
See X-003 See discussion Flange of this penetration in
- Attaciument I of j this document.
1 f
'GDC 55. 56 57 '
, f40TE--Automatic Power Operated Valve unless otherwise indicated as follows:
(LC) Locked Closed Manual Valve (RH) Remote Manual Valve (CV) Check Valve
- (RV) Relief Valve l I i .
l l
I i
_ _ . _ ._. . . _ _ _ . . . _- .=.__m.__ _. . _ ._
Ttbl2 2.2 Prge 14 af 29 ,
Design Correlates to I
10 CFR 50 CDC on Other DefiDCd_B&511 t
Penetration Inside Outside FSAR PunsLtdL100 Ot1Gt191120 Classification' Barrierfs) Barrierfs) Fleure Qther Defined Basis Ref./NGLg5 1 x u43A To RCP Seals 55 62-563 (CV)62-546 9.3.4-1 Local manual valves Further discus-I 62-549 62-546 and 62-549 are ston regarding
,62-550 normally closed valves. isolation and and Closeo Valve 62-550 can be meeting the GDC System isolated when the need on other defined to isolate is deter- basis is mined. provided in Attachment 1 of this document.
IA v438 To RCP Seals 55 62-561 (CV) See X-043A 9.3.4-1 See X-043A x 043C To RCP Seals 55 62-562 (CV) See X-043A 9.3.4-1 See X-043A l
A u130 To RCP Seals 55 62-560 (CV) See X-043A 9.3.4-1 See X-043A
'CDC 55. 56. 57 r40TE - Automatic Power Operated Valve unless otherwise indicated as follows:
(LC) Locked Closed Manual Valve i (RM) Remote Manual Valve (CV) Check Valve (RV) Relief Valve j l
l t
f
_ .- . - _ . _ . - _ _ _ - - - .- .-.. - -- -- . . - - , - ~ . . .--
Ttbla 2.2 Page 15 cf 24 ,
Design Correlates to 1
19_CFR 50 GDC on Other Defined _ Basis Penetration Inside Outside FSAR
! Ps!ICL CAL} 90 Ot1Criotion Classificatio3 3 Barrierts) Barrierfs) Fieure Other Defined Basis Ref /Notts i
I X-04sA Containment Spray 56 72-547 (CV) 72-39 (RM) 6.2.2-2 See SRP 6.2.4 See further j and Closed Section II.b discussion of j System for acceptability of this penetration i
remote manual valve in Attachment 1 outside containment. of this document 2
x ut:B Containment Spray 56 72-548 (CV) 72-2 (RM) 6.2.2-2 See X-048A See X-04AA and Closed System I X ui9A RHR Spray 56 72-556 (CV) 72-40 (RM) 6.2.2-2 See X-048A See X-048A and Closed System i
x u49u RHR Spray 56 72-555 (CV) 72-41 (RM) 6.2.2-2 See X-048A See X-04sA and Closed 1
System i
e k
'GDC 55, 56, 57 140TE-- Automatic Power Operated Valve unless otherwise indicated as follows:
(LC) Locked Closed Hanual Valve (RM) Remote Manual Valve (CV) Check Valve (RV) Relief Valve i
Table 2.2 PIge 15 cf 24 ,
Design Correlates to 1
~
10 CFR ED_GDC_on_0Lbst_Def tDCd_B2515 Penetration Inside Outside FSAR tuftstf2Lig0 Ocictintion classification' Barrierfs) Barr.itrial Fiqure Q1her Defined Basis Ref./NQLes A c53 CCS to Excess 57 Closed 70-143 9.2.1-2 This penetration directly Ltdn. HX System neets GDC 57 except there is a relief valve.70-703, on the closed system inside containment. The relief valve is acceptable because containment pressure is acting opposite the direction that the valve relieves, thereby aiding the valve to
, seat. Penetrations
. X-053 and X-035 are 4 part of the same loop.
x us4 Thimble Renewal 56 ---
Blind 6.2.4-15 See X-003 Blind flange Flange is never removed except in Mode 5 or 6.
A 055 Spare 56 --- --- ---
See X-008
'GDC 55, 56, 57 i h0TE--Automatic Power Operated Valve unless otherwise indicated as follows:
(LC) Locked Closed Manual Valve (RH) Remote Manual Valve (CV) Check Valve (RV) Relief Valve
TLbla 2.2 P ge 17 cf 24 ..
- q. s . ..
Design Correlates to 1
10 CFR 50 GDC on Other Defined Basis
- Penetration Inside Outside FSAR l'st tsit d L100 DesCC.lRL190 Classification' Barrierts) Barrierfs) Fieure Other Defined Basis ggf.,fggLes i
X 079A Ice Blowing 56 ---
Blind 6.2.4-16 See X-003 See X-054 Flange
. X-019B Negative Return 56 ---
Blind 6.2.4-16 See X-003 See X-054 l Flange l
x 0848 Spare 56 --- --- ---
See X-008 J x 084C. Spare 56 --- --- ---
See X-008 4
x 084D Spare 56 --- --- ---
See X-008 4
x 0858 dP Sensor 56 --- ---
"See X-025B x un5C Spare 56 --- --- ---
See X-008
, 'GDC 55. 56. 57 4
NOTE-- Autanatic Power Operated Valve unless otherwise indicated as follows:
(LC) Locked Closed Manual Valve (RM) Remote Manual Valve (CV) Check Valve (RV) Relief Valve I
Tabla 2.2 Pzge 18 sf 24 Design Correlates to '
1 10 CFR 50 GDC on Other Dgfined B1513 Penetration Inside Outside FSAR h f Nt t3L100 QCS EiDLiGD C11SSifiEA1190' Barrierfs) Barrier (s) f_igutg Qther Defined Basis Ref./NOLg1 x ca50 Spare 56 --- --- ---
See X-008-X OdoA Rx Vesstl Level 55 * * ---
"See X-025C i
x unbB Rx Vessel Level 55 * * ---
"See X-025C
, x 0860 Rx Vessel Level 55 * * ---
"See X-025C 1
x 0n60 Spare 56 --- --- ---
See X-008 4
x U674 Spare 56 --- --- ---
See X-008 l.
- x on7C Spare 56 --- --- ---
See X-008 i,
4 i
d
'CDC 55, 56, 57 NOTE -Automatic Power Operated Valve unless otherwise indicated as follows:
(LC) Locked Closed Manual Valve (RN) Remote Manual Valve (CV) Check Valve (RV) Relief Valve
Tabl2 2.2 Para 19 (f 24 ,
Design Correlates to -
1 10 CFR 50 GDC on Other Defined Basis
- Penetration Inside Outside FSAR Pwutration Descr.isiina Clasilf_tratinn' Barrietill Barrierts1 E.isure Other_. Defined Basis Ref /Meles X uan shutdown Maint. 56 ---
Blind ---
See X-003 See X-054 Access Flange x 0n9 ' Spare 56 --- --- ---
See X-008 X 092A H2 Analyzer 56 43-207 (Auto Closed --- Closed system outside open on pump System containment provides start) outer barrier. This line is required postaccident for Ha monitoring.
Penetrations X-092A and X-0928 are part of the same closed loop.
Valves43-207 and 43-208 are both located inside contalmnent.
H2 Analyzers discussed in Supplement 2 to SQN's SER.
A u928 H2 Analyzer 56 43-208 (Auto Closed ---
See X-092A open on pump System start)
A u9eA Spase 56 --- --- ---
See X-008
'CDC 55. 56, 57 h01E -- Automatic Power Operated Valve unless otherwise indicated as follows:
(LC) Locked Closed Manual Valve (RH) Remote Manual Valve (CV) Check Valve (RV) Relief Valve
Ttbla 2.2 P;g? 20 Cf 24 ,
Design Correlates to ~
1 10 CFR 50 GDC on Othgr_ Defined Bashi Penetration Inside Outside FSAR Psnutfatl20 OtsCIIDtion C]assificatigg I BAffjer(s) garrigrisl Eigurg Qther Defined Basis Re M otes A uvuB Spare 56 --- --- ---
See X-008 X 099 H2 Analyzer 56 43-202 (Auto Closed --- Closed system outside open on pump System containment provides start) outer barrier. This Itne is required postaccident for H2 monitoring.
Penetrations X-099 and X-100 are part of the same closed system.
Valves43-202 and 43-201 are both located inside containment.
N-100 H2 Analyzer 56 43-201 (Auto Closed ---
See X-099 open on pump System start)
X 105 Spare 56 --- --- ---
See X-008
'GDC 55. 56, 57 i NOTE -Automatic Power Operated Valve unless otherwise indicated as follows:
(LC) Locked Closed Manual valve t
(RM) Remote Manual Valve (CV) Check Valve (RV) Relief Valve
Tabla 2.2 Pige 21 af 24 ,
Design Correlates to
- 1 -
10 CFR 50 GDC on Other Defined Basis Penetration Inside Outside FSAR fCtstr4L100 Qt1CClR1193 Classification' Barrierfs) Barrierfs) Fiaure Other Defined Basis Ref./NQLas X 107 RHR Supply 55 74-2 (RM) Closed 5.5.7-1 Closed system outside 74-505 (RV) System containment provides outer barrier. Valve 74-1 is available in series with containment isolation valve 74-2 and both are normally closed with interlocks to prevent inadvertent opening. The relief valve is acceptable because containment pressure is acting opposite the direction that the valve relieves, thereby aiding the valve to seat.
A los UHI 55 87-562 (CV) 87-21 (RM) 6.3.2-15 See SRP 6.2.4 Section and Closed II.b for acceptability System of remote manual valve outside containment.
A 109 UNI
30-46 9.4.7-1 The containment vacuum See Attachment 30-571 (CV) and relief system isolation 1 of this 6.2.4-17 valve is located in document for series with a vacuum further relief (check) valve discussion, both outside of con-
'QC 55, 56 57 E01E-- Autenatic Power Operated Valve unless otherwise indicated as follows:
(LC) Locked Closed Manual Valve (RM) Remote Manual Valve (CV) Check valve (RV) Relief Valve
Ttbla 2.2 P:ge 22 cf 24 Design Correlates to
- I 10 CFR 50_.GDC og_QLDRC_Qtfj0ed Basis Fenetration Inside Outside FSAR Punctrat100 ER1CC1RLiGO Classification 3 BarrigtLsl Barrierfs) Fiaure Other Defined Basis Egf /Ngtts tainment. The closing of the isolation valves are actuated by a set of redundant pressure sensors independent of those for other containment isolation valves. The closing is powered by redundant air supplies. The spring- loaded vacuum relief valves are normally closed and have position indicators in the Main Control Room to indicate the open or closed positions.
These valves are not considered as simple check valves.
A 112 Vacuum Relief 56 ---
30-47 9.4.7-1 See X-Ill 30-572 (CV) and 6.2.4-17 X-Il3 Vacuum Relief 56 ---
30-48 9.4.7-1 See X-Ill 30-573 (CV) and 6.2.4-17
'GDC 55, 56, 57 NOTE - Automatic Power Operated Valve unless otherwise indicated as follows:
(tC) Locked Closed Manual Valve (RN) Remote Manual valve (CV) Check Valve (RV) Relief Valve l
i 0
-Tchle 2.2 P:ge 23 af 24 e
Design Correlates to .
I i
10 CFR 10 GDC on Other Defined Ba113 Penetration Inside Outside FSAR Pstn:LEdL190 Descrintion G assjf_igatign' Barrierfs) Barrier (s) Fiaure Qther Defined Basis Ref./NgLei x II6B Spare 56 --- --- ---
See X-008 x-116C Spare 56 --- --- ---
See X-008 x-lisD Spare 56 --- --- ---
See X 008 x 117 Shutdown Haint. 56 ---
Blind ---
See X-003 See X-054 Access Flange A lla Layup Water 56 ---
Blind ---
See X-003 See X-054 Treatment Flange X 319 Spare 56 --- --- ---
See X-008 A 120 Spare '
56 --- --- ---
See X-008
'GDC SS. 56, 57 h0TE Automatic Power Operated Valve unless otherwise indicated as follows:
(LC) Locked Closed Manual Valve (RN) Remote Manual Valve (CV) Check valve (RV) Relief Valve
_ _ . ~ . . _ _ __ __ - _ _ . . _ . _ _ . ._ .. . _ _ , .
Tabla 2.2 P ve 24 Cf 24 &
Design Correlates to 8 1
', 9 10 CFR 50 GDC on Other Defined Balls Penetration Outside FSAR ht'st t e t100 Dt5CC1911DD C AS11D CAL 190' . Inside Barrierfs) Barrierfs1 U gutt Qther Defined 84111 Ref./ Notes X 120E thru Electrical 56 Epony Epoxy ---
Standard dual passive x-170E Penetrations Seal Seal epoxy barrier electrical penetration assembly design - pressurized
, between the seals with Ns.
l x 125E Spare 56 --- --- ---
See X-008 j
i I
- X 130E Spare 56 --- ... ---
See X-008 1 4 155E Spare 56 --- --- ---
See X-008 i
1 1
x lo2E Spare 56 --- --- ---
See X-008 I
i l
l 1
'CDC 55, 56, 57 r40TE -Automatic Power Operated Valve unless otherwise indicated as follows:
(LC) Locked Closed Manual Valve (RM) Remote Manual Valve
!. (CV) Check valve i
, (RV) Relief valve i
4 J
i k
4 9
4 4