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o MEMORANDUM FOR:
Patricia A. Sullivan, Chief Administrative Branch, SECY FROM:
George W. Knighton, Chief Licencing Branch No. 3 Division of Licensing, ONRR
SUBJECT:
PUBLIC MEETING TRANSCRIPT A public meeting will be held on September 28, 1983, from 10:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. in Room 5033 of the Air Rights III Building in Bethesda, MD.
Please arrange for a court reporter to attend the meeting and prepare a transcript.
The transcript is required the next day.
If any further information is needed, please contact H. Schierling at X27100.
Driglesisigmd W George W. Xalghias George W. Knighton, Chief Licensing Branch No. 3 Division of Licensing, ONRR 1
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3
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SEP 3 01983
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Docket No.: 50-275 MEMORANDUM FOR:
George W. Knighton, Chief Licensing Branch No. 3 Division of Licensing FROM:
Hans Schierling, Project Manager Licensing Branch No. 3 Division of Licensing
SUBJECT:
DIABLO CANYON UNIT 1 TRIP REPORT - MEETING
SUMMARY
SEPTEMBER 6 AND 7, 1983 On September 6, 1983 members of the NRC staff toured the Diablo Canyon, Unit 1 facility under guidance of the Diablo Canyon NRC Senior Resident Inspector. The group was accompained by representatives of the Diablo Canyon Project. A list of participants in the plant tour is attached.
The group viewed modifications made as a result of the verification program tb Unit 1 structures, systems and components including the following specific items:
main control board cabinents in control room columns and beams in annulus steel structure including connections polar c'rane inside containment pipe supports electrical raceway supports fuel handling building superstructure turbine building modifications diesel generator air intake and exhaust rupture restraints in auxiliary building l
On September 7,1983 the NRC group mest with representatives from PG&E at the PG&E Energy Center near the Diablo Canyon site. A summary of the meeting was prepared by P. Morrill of NRC Region V and is attached.
]h) b Hans Schierling, Pr ject Manager Licensing Branch No. 3 Division of Licensing
Enclosures:
As stated 7k cc: See next page Ol
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r-Diablo Canyon Mr. J. O. Schuyler, Vice President Nuclear Power Generation-c/o Nuclear Power Generation, Licensing Pacific Gas and Electric Company 77 Beale Street, Room 1435 San Francisco, Califo,rnia 94106 Philip A. Crane, Jr., Esq.
Resident Inspector /Diablo Canyon NPS Pacific Gas & Electric Company c/o US Nuclear Regulatory Connission Post Office Box 7442 P. O. Box 369 San Francisco, California 94120 Avila Beach, California 93424 Mr. Malcolm H. Furbush Ms. Raye Fleming Vice President - General Counsel 1920 Mattie Road Pacific Gas & Electric Company Shell Beach, California 93440 Post Office Box 7442 San Francisco, California 94120 Joel Reynolds, Esq.
John R. Phillips, Esq.
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Janice E..Kerr, Esq.
Center for Law in the Public Interest Caiifornia Public Utilities Commission 10951 West Pico ~ Boulevard 350 McAllister Street Third Floor San Francisco, California 94102 Los Angeles, California 90064 Mr. Frederick Eissler, President Paul C. Valentine, Esq.
Scenic Shoreline Preservation 321 Lytton Avenue Conference, Inc.
Palo Alto, California 94302 4623 Hore Mesa Drive Santa Barbara, California 93105 Dr. William E. Cooper Project Manager - 5511 Ms. Elizabeth Apfelberg Teledyne Engineering Services 1415 Cozadero 130 Second Avenue San Luis Obispo, C.A 93401 Waltham, Massachusetts 02254 Mr. Gordon A. Silver Mr. Dick Blankenburg Ms. Sandra A. Silver.
Editor & Co-Publisher 1760 Alisal Street South County Publishing Company San Luis Obis'po, CA 93401 P. O. Box 460 Arroyo Grande, California 93420 Harry M. Willis, Esq.
Seymour & Willis Norton, Burke. Berry & French, P.C.
601 California Street, Suite 2100 2002 E. Osborn Road San Francisco, CA 94108 P. O. Box 10569 Phoenix, AM zona 85064 Mr. Richard Hubbard MHB Technical Associates Mr. W. C. Gangloff Westinghouse Electric Corporation Suite K 1725 Hamilton Avenue P. O. Box 355 San Jose, CA 96125 Pittsburg, Pennsylvania 15230 Mr. John Marrs, Managing Editor David F. Fleiscitaker Esq.
San Luis Obispo County Telegram Tribune P. O. Box 1178 1321 Johnson Avenue Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73101 P. O. Box 112 San Luis Obispo, CA 93406
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Diablo Canyon
- Arthur-C. Gehr Esq.
Snell & Wilmer 3100 Valley Center Phoenix, Arizona 85073 o -
Mr. Lee M. Gustafson, Director Federal Agency Relations Pacific Gas & Electric Company 105017th Street, N. W.
Suite 1180 Washington, D. C.
20036 Regional Administrator - Region V US Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1450 Maria Lane Suite 210 Walnut Creek, California 94596 Dr. Jose Roesset 3506 Duval Road Austin, Texas 78759 Michael J. Strumwasser,'Esq.
Special Council to the Attorney General State of California 3580 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 800 I
Los Angeles 90010 Mr. Thomas H. Harris San Jose Mercury News 750 Ridder Park Drive San Jose, California 95190 Mr. Mark Gottlieb Califernia Energy Commission 1111 Howe Avenue, MS 27 Sacramento, California 95825 Maurice Axelrad. Esq.
Lowenstein, Newman, Reis and Axelrad 1025 Connecticut Avenue, NW Washington, D. C.
20036
Participants in Diablo Canyon Unit 1 Plant Tour September 6,1983 NRC H. R. Denton D. G. Eisenhut J. P. Knight H. E. Schierling T. W. Bishop M. M. Mendonca P. J. Morrill Diablo Canyon Project H. Friend W. White R. Etzler R. Patterson G
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UNITE] STATES ATTACHMENT 2 y
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WALNUT CREEK. CALIFORNIA 94596 SEP 2 01983 Docket Nos. 50-275, 50-323 j
MEMORANDUM FOR:
G. Knighton, Chief, Reactor Licensing Branch No.3, NRR H. Scherling, Diablo Canyon Project Manager, NRR FROM:
P. J. Morrill, Reactor Inspector, RV
SUBJECT:
DIABLO CANYON READINESS FOR OPERATION MEETING MINUIES, SEPTEMBER 7, 1983 The purpose of this memo is to forward our meeting minutes of the subject meeting. We recommend that these minutes be incorporated with your observations and be issued to the licensee and public document rooms to document the issues raised and the licensee's committments. Should you have questions or comments please contact me at TrS 463-3740.
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P. J. Morrill Reactor Inspector
Enclosure:
As' stated cc w/ enclosure:
J. Martin, RV T. Bishop, RV D. Kirsch, RV R. Scarano, RV J. Crews, RV P. Morrill, RV M. Mendonca, RV vWY
MEETING MINUTES Diablo Canyon Readiness for Operation September 7, 1983 A meeting to discuss operational readiness of the Diablo Canyon Unit I nuclea plant was held on September 7, 1983, at the Licensee's Public Information Center. Those present included representatives of the NRC, the licensee, the Governor of the State of California, and the Intervenors. The principle attendees are listed bclow.
NRC:
H. R. Denton, Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation D. G. Eisenhut, Director, Division of Licensing, Nuclear Reactor Regulation J. P. Knight, Assistant Director for Components and Structures, Division of Engineering H. E. Schierling, Project Manager, NRR J. B. Martin, Regional Administrator, Region V T. W. Bishop, Director, Division of Resident, Reactor Projects and Engineering Programs M. M. Mendonca, Senior Resident Inspector, Diablo Canyon P. J. Morrill, Reactor Inspector, Region V Licensee:
G. Haneatis, Executive Vice President, Facilities Development H. Friend, Project completion Manager J. Schuyler, Vice President, Nuclear Power Generation J. Shiffer, Manager, Nuclear Plant Operations R. Thornberry, Plant Manager J. Hoch, Project Manager B. Lew, Licensing Manager State of California:
R. B. Hubbard, MHB Technical Associates, Consultant to the Governor Intervenors:
S. A. Silver, Mothers for Peace On September 6, 1983, the NRC personnel listed above visited the site to observe first hand the operational readiness of the facility. Based upon PG&E's presentations and the facility tour, the NRC staff raised the following issues of concern for licensee consideration and action.
A.
Control Room Readiness for Operation:
The NRC staff observed that (1) the shift supervisor was in an office which is adjacent to the control room but does not have a good view of the control room, (2) operations personnel and their shift assignments were not identified either by name tags or by a status board, (3) the control room was occupied by a number of personnel who were not actively working and whose purpose was not clear, and (4) the licensee's shift turnover requires uncompenseated overtime. The staff also stressed that any confusion regarding who was in charge of the facility or its operation would be totally unacceptable and that the PG&E management should consult with another, recently
2 licensed utility to discuss the problems of starting up one nuclear p1' ant while the adjacent plant was being constructed. Licensee personnel acknowledged the NRC's comments. They stated that they would consult with the other utility and would consider how to enhance control room conditions.
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B.
Operational Exper'ience: The staff questioned the licensee's personnel regarding operational experience and the augmentation of the eperators with Westinghouse personnel. The staff pointed out that this was PG&Es first large reactor plant and that.well planned, deliberate, and controlled actions were essential to a safe and trouble free start-up test program. The licensee's personnel concurred and stated that supplimentary personnel from Westinghouse would be used to augment their staff during the start-up testing.
C.
Overall Facility Control and Management: The staff stated that given the large construction and engineering presence on site it may be difficult for the licensee's operations staff to retain control of the facility and to manage the various activities occuring on-site. The staff also observed that the licensee's ambitious schedule was similiar to that recently attempted by another California utility and which app' eared to the staff to be a -precursor to major items of noncompliance.
In the case of the other utility, the schedule was changed to delay the start-up of a second unit until the first unit's start-up was complete to ensure adequate management attention. The staff stressed that PG&E should consult with asnagement of the other utility to better define and understand the problems encountered and corrective actions required. The PGGE personnel acknowledged the NRCs comments. They stated that they would contact the other utility and were currently revaluating the schedule for Diablo Canyon Unit 2.
D.
Need for On-site Engineering: The NRC staff described the necessity for L
adequate on-site engineering support of the plant operating staff and the improvement in plant safety to be realized by a well staffed and qualified engineering support group. Licensee representative explained that, with the exception of _ major modifications, engineering would be controlled and conducted by PG&E Nuclear Plant Operations, the same group responsible for the safe operation of the facility.
E.
Public Address System: The NRC staff questioned the PGEE personnel as to how personnel in the plant would be informed of plant casulties and the status of the plant announcing system, which PG&E personnel had committed l
to evaluate at the last SALP meeting. The NRC personnel observed that,,
aside from the plant operators who have two way radios, the only way to communicate with personnel in the plant was with the bell system (similiar to those used in department stores) or by the use of emergency sirens. PG&E personnel acknowledged that this item cid not have high i
priority and that they would speed up their evaluation and implementation of a plant communication system. NRC representatives stated that this should be complete prior to initial criticality.
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F.
Hot Functional Testing: The NRC staff observed that the licensee's letter of August 10, 1983, did not contain a commitment to complete an additional hot functional test program prior to fuel loading.
In light y
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3 of the extensive modifications made to the facility in safety-related areas, the large number of construction personnel on site, malicious mischief observed on-site, threats of sabotage, and the de-activitation of the security system, the staff questioned the decision by PG&E to not conduct a hot functional test prior to fuel load. Licensee personnel
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stated that the surveillance tests, piping system stress walkdowns, and security inspections described in their letter of August 10, 1983 letter, would provide assurance that the plant was fully operational prior to fuel load.
G.
Post Core Load Construction Activities: The NRC staff questioned PG&E i
personnel as to what construction activities would take place durini and i
after core loading. PG&E personnel stated that construction activity in the control room would be completed prior to fuel loading. During following discussions the staff questioned the extent of work to be
-completed on the done service crane in the containment. PG&E personnel stated that the crane work area would be boxed in to preclude falling debris, would not be directly over the reactor (which was protected by the missle shield), and the work would not be done during fuel loading.
When questioned, PG&E personnel stated that the heaviest structural members to be added would likely be steel plates weighing approximately 200 pounds.
H.
Systems Interaction Program: The NRC staff questioned the status of the Systems Interaction Program. Licensee representatives stated that the study had been given' a lower priority, but that the study for Unit I would be completed six months after initial operation of Unit I and that Region V would be informed when the study was complete.
I.
Emergency Response Facilities: The NRC staff stated that emergency facilities and their readiness should be closely followed by the licensee.
At the conclusion of the NRC/ licensee discussions representatives of the r
Governor and the Intervenors were offered the oppertunity to present their views.
Mr. R. Hubbard, representing the Governor raised-the following issues.
J.
It was not clear how the operability of systems which had been modified would be verified. The licensee was placing a great deal of reliance upon surveillance testing which was not the purpose of the surveillance tests. During tours of the facility some calibration stickers over one year old were observed (impling that calibrations may be out of date).
K.
The PG&E approach has been to complete various activities in parallel, which saves time but may result in a questionable product unless integrated control of engineering, construction, and operations was utilized. Because of this parallel approach and possible lack of integrated control, the PG&E approach is questionable.
L.
It was not clear when PG&E would be finished, or what the status of the project was since there was no presentation of how many itecs were left to be modified, the rate of closure of open issues and modifications was unspecified, and many items had been consolidated by PG&E.
e
4 M.
Diablo Canyon is PG&E's first large PWR. The PG&E organization has a lack of operating experience in this area and may not be competent to operate the facility.
Ms. S. Silver, of the Mothers for Peace supported Mr. Hubbard's issues and raised the following issues of her own..
N.
It does not seen appropriate for PG&E to complete the Seismic Interaction Study and perform modifications while the plant is operating, and afterwards tell the NRC and the public the results.
(Mr..Denton of the NRC staff explained that the previous NRC silence did not indicate acceptance and that'the staff would have to evaluate this situation.)
O.
Many items had been placed on the "back-burner" (such as the plant announcing system and the Seismic Interaction Study) and will not get done. These items deserve the concern of all involved.
P.
The emergency sirens are not seismically qualified.
Q.
Plant security should have been retained. The sabotage event related to the gouges in the reactor coolant system, the bomb threats, and the presence of over 7000 personnel at the site are causes for concern.
R.
Personnel with allegations are reluctant to come forward since their j
candor endangers their jobs, places them in the hot ' seat, and, even if some of their allegations are true, results.in their public ridicule.
(Mr. Denton of the NRC staff acknowledged the problem and stated that the U.S. Labor Department was now involved to eliminate the job threat problem. )
S.
Loading the fuel before construction is complete is an item of concern.
In addition, holding hearings on the safety of the facility after fuel loading is inappropriate.
If the facility is to operate at all, then it must be as safe as possible at all times.
At the conclusion of the meeting, Mr. Denton thanked Mr. Maneatis, the PG&E staff, Mr. Hubbard, representing the State, and hs. Silver, representing the Mothers for Peace for their comments.
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