B12434, Opposes State of Me Petition for Rulemaking Re Emergency Planning.Proposals to Expand EPZs & to Require Emergency Planning Be Resolved Prior to Fuel Load Not Supported by Technical Analysis.Supports Ongoing Source Term Research

Opposes State of Me Petition for Rulemaking Re Emergency Planning.Proposals to Expand EPZs & to Require Emergency Planning Be Resolved Prior to Fuel Load Not Supported by Technical Analysis.Supports Ongoing Source Term Research

ML20207R271
Person / Time
Site:	Millstone, Haddam Neck, 05000000
Issue date:	03/02/1987
From:	Mroczka E CONNECTICUT YANKEE ATOMIC POWER CO., NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY CO., NORTHEAST UTILITIES
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
B12434, NUDOCS 8703170043
Download: ML20207R271 (5)

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P.O. box 270 HARTFORD. CONNECTICUT 06141-0270 L L J 0,0,,07 ',"O,"co.~ (203) 665-50N March 2,1987 Docket Nos. 50-213 50-245 50-336 50-423 B12434 Re: 10CFR50.47 U. S. Nuclear Regulatery Commission Attn Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555 Gentlemen Haddam Neck Plant Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit Nos.1,2, and 3 Comments on Petition for Rulemaking Filed by the State of Maine On December 30,1986,(I) the Nuc! car Regulatory Commission (NRC) published for public comment a notice of a petition for rulemaking filed by the State of Maine regarding emergency planning. The petitioner asks the Commission to amend 10CFR50.47 as follows:

"1. Expand both the emergency planning zone for the plume exposure pathway and for the ingestion pathway;

2. Require that emergency planning be done before any construction of a nuclear facility is permitted and that the governor or governors of any affected States approve the emergency plans as a precondition to construction; and

3. Require that offsite emergency preparedness findings be made before any fuel loading and/or low power operations are permitted."

Connecticut Yankee Atornic Power Company (CYAPCO) and Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (NNECO) hereby respectfully submit the following comments.

Expanded Emergency Planninn Zones The zone p(resent EPZ) asregulations define the plume an area of approximately exposure 10 miles pathway in radius and theemergency ingestion planning exposure pathway EPZ as an area of approximately 50 miles in radius. These (I) 51 Federal Register 47025, December 30,1986. 1 0703170043 070302 i \

PDM ADOCK 03000213 F______________ PDR

U.S. Nucl;ir Rcgul:t:ry Ccmmission B12434/Page 2 March 2,1987 i

sizes were determined through an e(f rt conducted by a joint NRC/ EPA Task Force and set forth in NUREG-0396.l The bases for the existing EPZs were reiterated in NUREG-0654IFEMA-REP-1.(3)

The methods used to determine the size of these EPZs were technically

, extensive and very conservative. The evaluation was based on a full spectrum of accidents and corresponding consequences, utilizing WASH-1400 source terms.

The WASH-1400 data provided conservative predictions of radiological releases and conservative quantitative estimates of risk.

The State of Maine's proposal to expand the size of the EPZs is not technically justified, and is inconsistent with the Commission's concept of emergency planning. First, no data exist to support the need for a larger EPZ. Rather, the State of Maine relles only upon broad comparisons to the evacuation that was conducted around the Chernobyl plant in the U.S.S.R. af ter the accident at that facility in April 1986, without establishing any technical linkage to U.S. light water reactors. Second, the existing regulation is based on conservative data and a philosophy of prudent risk reduction. Further, the emergency preparedness associated with the current EPZs provide a more than sufficient planning basis in the extremely unlikely case that expansion of the EPZs should become necessary.

The NRC and the industry are currently re-evaluating the source terms that are the basis for the current emergency planning regulations. The effort is intended to provide a sound technical basis for the determination of the size of the EPZs, and preliminary results indicate that if any change in the size of EPZs is justified, it will be a reduction, not an inctease, due to the inherent conservatisms in both the source term data and the resulting determination of the size of the EPZs. This process, including any appropriate changes to EPZs, should be a!! owed to continue. There is no need to act prematurely on (4)the this issue; therefore, this aspect of the petition should be denied.

Additionally, simply increasing the size of the EPZs will not increase the effectiveness of emergency planning. Any changes in the emergency planning area should focus on increasing the effectiveness of emergency preparedness, such as focusing on the population at risk, while at the same time recognizing that the risk varies inversely with distance from the facility.

(2) NUREG-0396, EPA 520/1-73-016, " Planning Bases for the Development of State and 1.ocal Government Radiological Emergency Response Plans in Support of 1.lght Water Reactors", December 1973.

(3) NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, " Criteria For Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," November 1,1980.

(4) The NRC declined to act on Baltimore Gas & Electric Company's (BG&E) application to reduce the size of the plume EPZ around the Calvert Clif fs r facility. In a February 14,1986 !ctter, the NRC called BG&E's request

! " premature" because it was based on source term research that the Staff was still evaluating.

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U.S. Nuct:ir R:gulat:ry Commission B12434/Page 3 March 2,1987 ,

Finally, a petitioner who is dissatisfied with the plume exposure pathway EPZ boundaries at a particular site can petition the NRC to take appropriate action under 10CFR2.206. Appeal to FEMA under 44CFR350.15(a) is also an option which allows any individual to appeal a FEMA decision to approve a state's emergency plan.

Pre-approval of Emergency Planning The pctitioner's request that emergency planning be completed prior to any construction of the nuclear facility and that the approval of the governor of any effected state be a pre-condition to construction is presently unrealistic and inappropriate.

Since all four (4) of our nuclear units are fully operational, this aspect of the petition does not directly impact us at the present time. However, we offer our perspectives on this issue for the present and future generations of nuclear power plants.

For the present generation of nuclear power plants, we believe it is inefficient from both a planning and a licensing standpoint to address emergency planning in its entirety prior to starting construction. The engineering design and details needed to complete emergency planning are simply not available prior to construction. Emergency planning involves the development of complete emergency plans for the licensee, and for all state and local governments within the EPZs. In addition, detailed implementing procedures and logistic details (i.e., contracts with organizations providing support services, procurement of equipment, insta!!ation of the prompt notification system, training, exercises and drills) must be completed. Many of these emergency planning mattees rely on detailed information from the plant (e.g., emergency action levels) which is only available later in the construction phase of the plant.

The present two-step licensing process has led indus'ry and the regulators to a design / regulatory system in which only design information of a more preliminary nature is furnished on the front end of the design and construction process leaving open the potential for significant changes on the back end. Due to the uncertainties in the present licensing process pertaining to plant design and alte reviews, utilities have been hesitant to commit large investments up front to do detailed plant designs and complete the staffing of operational personnel. To have required emergency planning to be completed for the existing nuclear plants prior to construction would have resulted in unnecessary and inefficient expenditures of resources since many portions of this planning would have to be redone due to changes made a. the plant.

At present, if the governor does not approve a state's emergency plan, it cannot be implemented by the state agencies. However, the timing of the governor's approval of the emergency plan would be prematura if done as a precondition to construction.

1 (3) 47 Federal Register 30232.

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U.S. Nuclzr R;gulat:ry C:mmission B12434/Page 4 March 2,1987 i

l We believe that if nuclear power is to remain a viable option in the U.S., the future generation of nuclear power plants will consist of standardized plant designs that are licensed in a one-step approach. This process is envisioned to allow a utility to take an NRC approved standard plant design, integrate site-specific information into the design, and apply to the NRC for a construction operating license (COL). Prior to this application, an early site review (ESR) would be completed. The ESR could allow the public and the states involved to air their concerns about general emergency planning. Issues pertaining to the overall feasibility of emergency planning could be addressed. In other words, concerns that sufficient emet gency planning is impossible (or at least impractical) given local geography, demograph, meteorology, etc., could be addressed at this stage. These issues could be properly addressed before investment is made and before the plant is built. Given a finding that the site is adequate, these issues could not be raised in the COL reviews.

Due to the stability achieved through a standard design and the COL, utilities would be more willing to commit large up-front investments. All engineering design details would be completed prior to construction thus allowing most, if not all emergency planning to be completed. The development and implementation of the various emergency plans and implementing procedures ,

could be addressed at the COL review.

Approvals Prior to Fuel Loading Fhally, the petitioner requests that all offsite emergency preparedness findings be resolved before authorization is granted for fuel loading or low power operation. We oppose this proposal because the petition does not provide any sound technical support for the position. When the Commission enacted iOCFR50.47(d) in 1982 to differentiate emergency planning requirements applicable to the period of fuel load and low power operation, they gave extensive technical reasons for thh position. The Commission chose a level of emergency planning that was deemed adequate to assure the health and safety of the public during these phases of plant operation. Since the State of Maine does not dispute the Commission's technical basis, there is no reason to repeal this regulation.

For the present generation of nuclear power plants, the NRC's rule represents a balance between the need for complete review and the need for timely licensing decisions. For the future generation of nuclear power plants, based on the i standardized design and COL process, emergency planning issues could be ,

i addressed long before fuel load.  !

l l Conclusion in conclusion, CYAPCO and NNECO oppose the State of Maine's petition for

, rulemaking. The proposals to expand the EPZs and to require emergency l planning hsues to be resolved prior to fuel load are not supported by technical t analysis. However, we support the ongoing source term research which could l  ! cad to a generic re-evaluation of the size of the EPZs as we!! as the l reasonableness of the NRC evaluation of site-specific features in determining l appropriate EPZs. Any changes to the EPZs prior to completion of these efforts l Is viewed premature.

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U.S. Nucl ar Rrgulatory C:mmission B12434/Page 5 March 2,1987 We oppose the unrealistir. proposal to require all emergency planning details to be completed prior to authorization of construction for the present generation of nuclear power plants. However, for the future generation of nuclear power plant, a one-step licensing process could result in emergency planning issues being resolved prior to construct!on.

We trust that these comments will be useful in the NRC Staff's review of the State of Maine's petition for rulemaking.

Very truly yours, CONNECTICUT YANKEE ATOMIC POWER COMPANY NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY M

E. Ifroc~zka f Seni6r Vice President cc: Dr. T. E. Murley, Region I Administrator

3. 3. Shea, NRC Project Manager, Millstone Unit No. I D. H. Jaffe, NRC Project Manager, Millstone Unit No. 2 E. L. Doolittle, NRC Project Manager, Millstone Unit No. 3 F. M. Akstulewicz, NRC Project Manager, Haddam Neck Plant T. Rebelowski, Resident Inspector, Millstone Unit Nos. I and 2

3. T. Shedlosky, Resident inspector, Millstone Unit No. 3 P. Swetland, Resident inspector, Haddam Neck Plant i

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