ML20207H808

Responds to 880803 Request That Rept on Emergency Exercise at Yankee Rowe Be Sent to Constituent.Nrc Exercise Rept Encl.Fema Rept on Offsite Portion of Exercise Not Yet Issued

ML20207H808
Person / Time
Site:	Yankee Rowe
Issue date:	08/23/1988
From:	Zech L NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO)
To:	Conte S HOUSE OF REP.
Shared Package
ML20207H812	List: ML20207H808 ML20207H817
References
NUDOCS 8808300042
Download: ML20207H808 (4)

Text

_ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .

's l

. August 23, 1988 l

The Honorable Silvio 0. Conte Member, United States House of Representatives Federal Building 78 Center Street Arterial Pittsfield, Massachusetts 01201

Dear Congressman Conte:

I am responding to your letter of Au U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (gust 3,1988, requesting that theNRC) provide emergency exercise conducted at_ Yankee-82w0to your constituent, Ms. Joy MacNulty.

The biennial exercise of the onsite and offsite emergency plans for the Yankee-Rowe nuclear plant was conducted April 26-27, 1988, and the Connonwealth of Massachusetts and the States of Vermont, New Hampshire, and New York parti-cipated in it.

As you may know, NRC and the Federal Eniergency Management Agency (FEMA) are the two Federal agencies tasked to evaluate emergency preparedness at and around nuclear power plants. fella evaluates the adequacy of the State and local emergency offsite response, and NRC evaluates the adequacy of the onsite emergency response. I am enclosing a copy of the NRC exercise report; the FEMA report on the offsite portion of the exercise has not been issued yet. FEMA has scheduled a remedial exercise for the last week of August to demonstrate the correction of deficiencies identified during the April exercise, and FEMA has indicated that a final report will not be issued until after the exercise. I will be pleased to send you a copy of the report when NRC receives it from FEPA.

I trust that this information is responsive to the concerns of lis. NacNulty.

If you require additional information or if there are any questions, please let me kncw.

Sincerely, v v.- sicaed by Yict.or steuy Victor Stello, Jr.

Executive Director for Operations

Enclosure:

NRC E ercise Report I

D: RR Iy/ CGC fd ED 3 t

TE .t# sa, EJRei VSkilo 08/s// 08/g /88 08 g/88 PEPB:DREP SC: :DREP C):fP: EP D:Dh AD : NRR RTHogan:lr FX or WMra) vets FJC '1 TTlartin 08//b /88 08/11 /88 08/15/88 08/g3/88 08/ 88 0 ///88 I

&(QI ,

8803300042 880823 gl PDR ADOCK 05000029 i p PDC

_..,.._____y-____--______

, )

1 l

Congressman Conte l Distribution: ,

V5tello, EDO l TEMurley, NRR -

JHSniezek, NRR TTMartin, NRR .

FJMiraglia, NRR 1 FPGillespie, NRR FJCongel, NRR WDTravers, NRR FKantor, NRR RTHogan, NRR LJCunningham, NRR RJBarrett, NRR RHWessman, NRR MBFairtile, NRR DFMossburg, ED0-3882 MCBridgers, ED0-3882 SECY 88-0717 MEcoons, NRR,88,,86 Centys1; Files?'

PDR ED0 R/F WTRussell, R1 SDEbneter, R1 RRBellamy, R1 ,

PEPB R/F C4 t l

l l

l l

l 1

JUN 0 71959 Docket No. 50-29 Yankee Atomic Electric Company ATTN: Mr. Bruce L. Drawbridge Vice President and Manager of Operations 1671 Worcester Road Framingham, Massachusetts 01701 Gentlemen:

Subject:

Inspection Report No. 50-29/88-08 This letter refers to the routine safety inspection of your Annuai Emergency Preparedness Exercise conducted by Mr. T. Tuccinardi of this office and other members of an NRC team on April 26-28, 1988, at the Yankee Atomic Power Station, Rowe, Massachusetts. Discussions of our findings were held by Mr. T.

Tuccinardi with you and your staff at the conclusion of the inspection.

The areas examined during the inspection are described in the NRC Region I l Inspection Report (enclosed). Within these areas, the inspection consisted of selective examination of procedures and representative records, interviews with personnel, and observation of the emergency exercise by team members.

Within the scope of this inspection, no violations were observed. Yankee Atomic Power Station performance during the exercise demonstrated the. ability to implement the Emergency Plan and the Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures  :

in a manner that would provide adequate protective measures for the health and safety of the public. I No reply to this letter is required. Your cooperation with us in this matter is appreciated.

Sincerely, cri 'nf c.igned Cy: I Ha. .'d R. Ge%my l Ronald R. Bellamy, Chief Facilities Radiological Safety and Safeguards Branch Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards

Enclosure:

l Region I Inspection Report No. 50-29/88-08 ,

l OFFICIAL RECORD COPY IR YR 88 0001.0.0 05/19/88 ,

h\ 4 4recr6T4n'880607 #

PDR ADOCK 05000029  : U" '

o nCn D f.:.

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I Report No. 50-29/88-08 Docket No. 50-29 License No. OPR-3 Category C Licensee: Yankee Atomic Electric Company 1671 Worcester Road Framingham, Massachusetts 01701 Facility Name: Yankee Atomic power Station Inspection At: Rowe, Massachusetts Inspection Conducted: Acril 26-28, 1988 Inspectors: O.- M /1 h71)Pp I. T %ccipa?S , Emergency P @ aredness date Specialtrt, FRSSB, DRSS C. Conklin, EPS, FRSSB, DRSS W. Lazarus, EPS, FRSSB, DRSS R. Christopher, EPS, FRSSB, DRSS H. Eichenholz, SRI Yankee C. Carpenter, RI Y qkee Approved b A 6[//((

W La reparedness date Inspection Summary: Inspection on April 26-28, 1988 (Inspection Report No.

(50-29/88-08)

Areas Inspected: A routine, unannounced emergency preparedness inspection and

. 1988.

observation of the licensee's annual emergency exercise performed on April 26, The inspection was performed by a team of six NRC regional and resident personnel.

Results: No violations were identified. The licensee's emergency response actions for this exercise were adequate to provide protective measures for the health and safety of the public. ,

l l

cSOO6150455 880607 PDR ADOCK 05000029 Q DCD  ;

Details 1.0 Persons Contacted W. Riethle, Manager, Radiation Protection Group W. McGee, Public Affairs Director J. Gilman, Radiation Protection Group J. Hawxhurst, Radiation Protection Group J. Kay, Technical Services Manager A. Kadak, Vice President J. Gedutis, Senior Chemist R. Mellor, Technical Director T. Henderson, Assistant Plant Superintendent J. Robinson, Director, Environmental Engineering G. Babineau, Radiation Protection Manager A. Tatro, Training Instructor B. Wood, Administration Manager D. McDavitt, Radiation Protection Engineer G. Morgan, Technical Services K. Jurentkuf f, Plant Operations Manager B. Drawbridge, Vice President N. StLaurent, Plant Superintendent The above listed persons were present at the exit meeting.

In addition, other licensee personnel were contacted, interviewed and observed during the inspection.

2.0 Emergency Exercise The Yankee Atomic Power Station unannounced, backshift exercise was conducted on April 26, 1988, from 4:30 to 11:00 p.m. The Commonwealth of Massachusetts and State of Vermont participated fully. The Commonwealth of Massachusetts and the States of Vermont, New Hampshire and New York conducted field monitoring activities and a ingestion pathway exercise on April 27, 1988.

2.1 Pre-exercise Activities The exercise objectives, submitted to NRC Region I on January 20, 1988, were reviewed and determined to adequately test the licensee's Emergency Plan. On March 2, 1988, the licensee submitted the complete scenario package for NRC review and evaluation. Region I representatives had telephone conversations with the licensee's emergency preparedness staff to discuss the scope and content of the scenario. As a result, minor revisions were made to the scenario which allowed adequate testing of major portions of the (mergency Plan (EP) and the implementing procedures, and also provided the opportunity for licensee personnel to demonstrate those areas previously identified by the NRC as in need of corrective action.

3 NRC observers attended a licensee briefing on. April 26, 1988.

Suggested NRC changes to the scenario were made by the licensee in the areas of technical support and radiological data. The licensee stated that certain emergency response activities would be simulated and that controllers would intercede in exercise activities to prevent disruption of normal plant operations.

2.2 Scenario The exercise scenario included the following key events:

1. Loop 1 pressure indicator failure;

2. Plant mode reduction in accordance with Technical Specifications;

3. Switchgear Room Fire Suppression System "TROUBLE" indication; 4 Fire Emergency;

5. RCS pump begins to vibrate;

6. Control rod drop incident;

7. Second control rod drop incident causes a reactor scram signal initiation; the reactor fails to scram, however, a manual scram of the reactor from Switchgear Room is successful;

8. Loss of feedwater, fream Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR) radiation alarms, and safety relief sticks;

9. Release to atmosphere begins several minutes later;

10. Release of radioactive materials to environment; and

31. Relief valve closed and plant stabilized, commence recovery.

2.3 Activities Observed During the conduct of the licensee's exercise, NRC team members made detailed observations of the emergency response organization activation and augmentation, the emergency response facilities (ERFs) activation and operations, and the actions of emergency response personnel during the operation of the ERFs. The following activities were observed.

1. Recognition of initiating conditions, correlation of these with Emergency Action Levels (EAls), selection and use of emergency operating procedures,'and completion of notification to offsite governmental authorities;

. . E* ,

g

2. Staffing and activation of ERFs;

3. Communication between and within ERFs;

4. Formulation of Protective Action Recommendations;

5. Performance of technical support, simulated repair and corrective actions;

6. Capability of the Health Physics organization to maintain radiological controls;

7. Communications with offsite agencies; and

8. Interaction between Emergency Director, and state and county representatives in the EOF.

3.0 Exercise Observation 3.1 Eyercise Strengths The NRC team noted that the licensee's activation and augmentation of the emergency organization, activatfon of the emergency response facilities, and use of the facilities, were generally consistent with their emergency response plan and implementing procedures. The team also noted the following actions of the licensee's emergency response organization that were indi ative of their ability to cope with abnormal plant conditions.

1. Excellent communication with, and utilization of, offsite teams for offsite survey data and plume tracking. i

2. Frequent and quality briefings were conducted in the Technical Support Center (TSC), and eterall, TSC command and control was- l 1

excellent.

3. Plant methods, procedures, and performance of emergency notifications was very good.

)

- i 3.2 Exercise Weaknesses he NRC identified the following exercise weaknesses which need to oe evaluated and corrected by the licensee. The licensee conducted l

an adequate self critique of the exercise that also identified some l of these areas. l

1. Communication between the Emergency Response Facilit'f es (ERFs) was weak. Numerous instances of poor communication were in evidence, both between and within ERFs as evidenced by the following examples:

i

(

y ,, , , .,

5 l -

When discrepancies were found at the Emergency Operations Facility betweer, the METPAC dose assessments model and field survey team results, a conservative decision to use the field team data was made. However, the rationale for this decision was never communicated to the Technical Support Center (TSC) or Control Room (CR). TSC and CR should be kept abreast of offsite issues. The recording of offsite radiological data in the TSC is also referenced in procedure OP3324, "TSC Operations".

TSC was not kept abreest of the scenario event h ss of feedwater". Knowledge of the loss of feedwater should have caused the TSC staff to examine and project s/fe".s on the reactor. Though this event made lfttle diff;rence on the progress of the scenario, the TSC was e , aware of this and a loss of feedwater could have had ,najor effects.

The Engineering Support ~ Center (ESC) had it ' "~n of minor core damage prior to the_ declaration ; .m ieneral E.3,ergency (GE). This knowledge was never a, 't '" a to the staff in the TSc. Had the TSC examined thest Heations, the GE may have been declared earlier.

The CR was not kept abreast of what issues were being examined in the TS'J or in the EOF. Since the CR is in fact running the plant, they should be kept advised of corrective measures being considered in the TSC, and the effects of the accident offsite.

The area of communications between ERFs will be examined in a subsequent inspection (50-29/88-08-01).

i

2. The Recovery Manager in the EOF used forms for notification of state and local officials that were nrt in the official "EOF Operation Procedure". The licensee stated that the forms it 1

l had used had been agreed upon by the licensee, and state and local officials, but had not yet been included in the EOF Operation Procedure. The inclusion of the authorized notifica-tion forms in current procedures will be examined in a subse uent inspection (50-29/88-08-02).

l 3.3 Other Areas Requiring Follow-up

1. Recovery Manager (RM) performs routine administrative functions as well as the "orange n one" communications.. This often left the RM unavailable to confer with his staff, as well as interact with state officials in the EOF. The licensee stated that this arrangement was made with the affected states. However, the RM l could be relieved of many of these Administrative duties, '

allowing him time to maintain better command of the EOF as well as interact with state and local officials.

o 6

2. Protective Action Recommendations (PAR's) were not developed and presented in a structured manner. As an example, while the licensee was relaying a PAR to state officials, new information resulted in an attempt to analyze and change che PAR on the spot. Although the licensee and state officials stayed with the original PAR, several minutes were spent discussing a change in the PAR. Additionally, the RM was not included in the discussion, nor was the data validated.

3. The TSC has no method of tracking technical issues being examined by the TSC staff. For example, when the ESC suspected that there may have been fuel overheat and potential degradation, the issue was not pursued by TSC staff nor was a record of the data kept for follow-up.

4. The scenario had the potential to :dversely affect licensee perfc mance. In particular, plant data did not accurately' reflect cperator actions, and there were significart differences between projected versus actual field measurements.

4.0 [icensee Action er. Previously Identified items (Closed) 50-29/87-03-02 (IFI) Field team results were not displayea or distributed to response personnel in the EOF.

During the exercise, data flow from the field teams through the communications system to health physics (HP) personnel was observed. The data flowed well and HP personnel were supplied with a constant stream of information. The data was analyzed +r.d used to modify Protective Action Recommendation decisionmaking. The states were constantly involved and did in fact receive the data and its implications. Cose assessors aggressively pursued disparities between projected and actual doses, and made conservative decisinr in view of these differences. Plume tracking during the scenario was me.;e difficult by constant scenario wind shifts, however, offsite teams performed well in spite of the difficulty. Based on these observations, this item is closed.

4 5.0 Licensee Critique The NRC team attended the licensee's post-exercise critique on April 28, 1988, during which key licensee controllers discussed observations of the exercise. The licensee indicated that these observations would be evaluated and appropriate corrective actions taken, i.0 Exit Meetiro anc NRC Critique The licensee was informed no violations were observed. Althodgh weak-nesses were identified as noted in detail 3 above, the NRC team deter-mined, that within the scope and limitation of the scenario, the licensee's performance demonstrated they could implement their Emergency Plan and emergency procedures

y in a manner that would adequately provide protective measures for-the k health and safety of the public.

Licensee management ackr.owledged the findings . d indicated they would evaluate xnem and take appropriate action regarding the itemr identified.

1

}

b 1

d

)

l 4

I i 1 4

. l l

i u

i i

I

_ . _ . . . . . . _ . - . . _ . . - - _ _ . _ _ - _ . - . . . . . ----...-- - ,-- --- .---,----,-,.- - -r - , , - - - - - - - - - -

% . ~ . - __ ,

4 gm mt!

g UNITE 3 STATES 8 o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 5 l WASHINGTON, D. C. 20666 -

1

% ,, v dj )

EDO Principal Correspondence Control ,

y .'

.)-

1 FROM: DUE: 08/24/88 EDO CONTROC: 0003882 DOC DTs.08/03/88 FINAL REPLY:

R ;p. Silvio O. Conte TOs Chairman Zech FOR SIGNATURE OFa ** GRN ** CRC NO: 88-0717 Ehecutive Director DESC: ROUTING '

ENCLOSES LETTER FROM JOY MACNULTY REQUESTING COPY Russell

, OF REPORT EMERGENCY EVACUATION DRILL FOR THE i YANKEE ATOMIC PLANT OR THE STATUS THEREOF j DATE: 08/10/88 l l

ASSIGNED TO: ' CONTACT:

NRR Murley

-~ -

l SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS OR REMARKS:

Reply to Pittsfield, MA Office.  !

NRR RECEIVED: AUGUST 10, 1988 l ACTION: cDREP:CONGEL )  !

?

i NRR ROUTING: MURLEY/SNIEZEK MIRAGLIA MARTIN GILLFSPIE M BURG , , , , , , _ ,

ACTKN DUE TO NRR DIRECTOR'S C.

BY <lim,a 2) R, /9 W

E

. . . . ns

• s.

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY CORRESPONDENCE CONTROL TICKET PAPER NUMBER: CRC-88-0717 LOGGING DATE: nug 9 88

- ACTION OFFICE: EDO AUTHOR: S.O. Conte--Const Ref AFFILIATION: U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES LETTER DATE: Aug 3 88 FILE CODE: ID&R-5 Yankee Atomic

SUBJECT:

Req cpy of report emergency evacuation-drill report-for the Yankee Atomic plant or the status thereof -

ACTIONt' Direct Reply DISTRIBUTION: OCA to Ack, Docket SPECIAL HANDLING: None NOTES: Joy MacNulty DATE DUE: Aug 19 88 SIGNATURE: . DATE SIGNED:

AFFILIATION:

I l

I l

l 1

1 i

4 l

7 Rc:'d Off. E00 Date .  %~1-ST Timd .- ~

di 40 p EDO---003082

- ~ , , - _ .

.