ML20202G498
| ML20202G498 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Mcguire, Palisades, Turkey Point, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Rancho Seco, McGuire, 05000000 |
| Issue date: | 05/22/1986 |
| From: | Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| To: | Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| References | |
| ACRS-2414, NUDOCS 8607150405 | |
| Download: ML20202G498 (26) | |
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Gus-Miq 1 %W >" i P " 7,' @ p rJj) 09 a C CERTIFIED COPY DATE ISSUED:May 22, 1986 MINUTES ACRS REACTOR OPERATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE WASHINGTON, D. C.
APRIL 9, 1986 A meeting was held by the Reactor Operations Subconnittee on April 9,1986.
A notice of the meeting was published in the Federal Register on March 1, 1986 (Attachment A). The schedule of items covered in the meeting is in Attachment B. The list of attendees is in Attachment C. A list of the meeting handouts is in Attachment D. The handouts are filed with the office copy. Herman Alderman was the Designated ACRS Staff Member. The meeting was convened at 8:30 a.m.
Principal Attendees NRC Staff J. Ebersole, ACRS Subcommittee Chairman D. Allison C. Mark E. Wiess D. Moeller H. Bailey G. Reed A. Dromerick C. Wylie J. Fair D. Mcdonald S. Elrod R. Perfetti R. Hernan E. Jordan H. Silver L. Reyes W. Orders M. Caruso G. Lapinsky g71 5 860522 2414 PDR i i
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,4 MINUTES / REACTOR OPERATIONS 2 APRIL 9, 1986 MEETING Opening Statement - J. Ebersole, Subcommittee Chairman Mr. Ebersole noted that the subcommittee will continue to review recent operating events. He noted the purpose of the meeting was to glean some perspective about these events in view of taking some action if it is appro-priate. He stated the action would be by letter and its purpose would be to reduce the future accident potential which we may see from the precusor characteristics of these events. He also noted that he would like to have the subcommittee help him identify the particular events which are appropri-ate to carry to the full Committee.
Dennis Allison, Events Analysis Branch, Inspection and Enforcement Mr. Allison noted that originally they had planned to discuss a cracked main steam line feeder. He noted that the stress analysis people are reviewing the calculations and at this time are not sure if the cause is a heat failure or a design mistake. Mr. Allison remarked that they probably would bring this event to the next Reactor Operations Subcommittee meeting.
Mr. Allison then introduced Henry Bailey who discussed the Rancho Seco Battery problem.
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' 3 MINUTES / REACTOR OPERATIONS APRIL 9, 1986 MEETING Ranch Seco, Class 1E Station Battery Problems 2/8/86 - H. Bailey, Inspection and Enforcement This event cor.v.rned the class 1E Station battery at Rancho Seco. During a vendor inspection of the batteries extensive erosion of the battery was discoverad. The batteries are about 15 years old.
The Staff's concerns are that during a seismic event the battery could fail and result in a loss of all D.C. power. The Staff was also concerned about the lack of technical specifications that would discover this type of battery failure.
Follow-up actions to this event include:
o The adequacy of the licensees' battery surveillance program is under review by Region V. Concerns include the rated Load Test at each refueling as well as the erosion problem.
o Rancho Seco plans to replace the lead type batteries with a lead calcium battery.
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. s MINUTES / REACTOR OPERATIONS 4 APRIL 9, 1986 MEETING Subcommittee Discussion Dr. Moeller asked if the technical specifications would cover the erosion of batteries.
Mr. Bailey noted that the tech. spec. are directed to specific gravity and the voltage current test.
Mr. Ebersole asked what would be the failure mode of the batteries in a seismic event. Mr. Bailey replied the implication was that the plates would fall and the battery capacity would be lost.
Mr. Ebersole asked if the battery chargers could tolerate an open circuit battery without overvoltage on the connected loads.
Mr. Bailey didn't know the answer.
Failure of Standby Liquid Control System, Vermont Yankee, February 8, 1986 -
Eric Wiess, Inspection and Enforcement This event concerns the failure of a Standby Liquid Control System (SLCS) squib valve to fire during a annual test. The squib valves had incorrect i
pin-to-bridge wire grouping. The control room indication of " circuit ;
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s MINUTES / REACTOR OPERATIONS 5 APRIL 9, 1986 MEETING continuity" was false in that the control room indication was that the circuitry was proper. The significance of this event was that other plants could have defective squib valves and if the problem occurs in the future, the false control room indication is misleading.
The problem occurred because the squib valves at Vermont Yankee had incorrect configurations with the bridgewire connections between pins,1 and 2 and 3 and 4 The bridgewire detonates the primer charge. The correct l
configuration calls for bridgewires between pins 1 and 4 and 2 and 3.
Mr. Wiess pointed out that Vermont Yankee was complying with a General Electric Service Information Letter. The original wiring called for two hot leads to one neutral. The service information letter called for two hot leads to two neutral leads to increase reliability. This plant ended up with the configuration of hot-hot, neutral-neutral which prevented the firing.
, Mr. Wiess noted that this was not the primary cause of failure. The primary cause was that the manufacturer of the squib valve primer charge assembly had distributed defective components. If the squib valve had been properly internally wired, then it would have fired. .
Mr. Wiess remarked about the desirability of testing in the plant as opposed to bench testing. He noted the interplay between the wiring in the plant and that in the squib valve is crucial.
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MINUTES / REACTOR OPERATIONS 6 APRIL 9, 1986 MEETING Subcommittee Discussion Mr. Ebersole asked if the two bridgewires are put in to achieve redundant detonation. Mr. Bailey replied if they had not tried to achieve this redun-dancy, then the complications about false circuit continuity indication and the failure to fire would all go away, i
Mr. Reed asked if this was a design error or an operating maintenance error.
Mr. Weiss replied that the root cause was a manufacturing defect in the squib valves.
Dr. Mark asked if there was a simple way for the plant owner to determine if the squib valves are properly wired.
Mr. Wiess responded that the local terminal box can be checked for proper wiring. That in combination with continuity checks plus receipt checkino plus the additional quality assurance that is done at the factory should give you a high level of confidence.
3 Mr. Wylie asked if the Bridgewires have a significant resistance. Mr. Wiess replied affirmatively. He noted that the resistance can be measured as long
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MINUTES / REACTOR OPERATIONS 7 APRIL 9, 1986 MEETING as the current is less than 10 milliamps. Mr. Wylie noted that this answers Dr. Mark's question. The resistance can be checked if you so desire.
Primary Coolant System Leakage, Palisades - T. Wambach, Project Manager The significance of this event concerns chronic leakage problems, multiple marginal equipment performance, increased burden on the operating shift and l
ALARA considerations.
The Palisades Safety Injection System has 4 tanks containing borated water l
under 200 pounds pressure, which are isolated from the safety injection lines l
by a motor operated valve and a check valve. The motor operated valve is normally open. If a loss of coolant accident should occur the system pres-sure drops and when it falls below 200 pounds, the borated water is injected into the primary coolant by means of the safety injection lines.
Palisades has had problems with leakage past the check valves. The borated water in the safety injection tanks was being diluted. When the safety injection tanks became out of specifications regarding the boron level, there was a lot of valve manipulation to drain and refill or just refill. The maneuvering of the valves for the fill and drain process is difficult and resulted in numerous event reports.
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MINUTES / REACTOR OPERATIONS 8 APRIL 9, 1986 MEETING Palisades had problems with various valves leaking. Some of the valves were in high radiation areas so they were faced with ALARA consideration. The plant was shut down on March 7th to repair reactor coolant pump seals and a number of valves. So far, all the leakage has been fixed and the plant has been operating at 100%/ power.
Follow-up Actions o Four fill and drain valves and four pressure control valves re-paired o In-Board safety injection check valve from safety injection tank-B repaired o Technical specifications changed to allow up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> to identify leakage prior to shutdown, i
Subcommittee Discussion '
Mr. Ebersole asked about the nitrogen in the S.I.T., is it allowed to inject directly into the primary loop. The reply was yes. Mr. Ebersole also asked if there was any inadvertent way for the nitrogen to be driven to the primary system if there wasn't a large LOCA break. Mr. Wambach replied that the pressure from other safety systems would keep the check valve closed.
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. MINUTES / REACTOR OPERATIONS 9 l APRIL 9, 1986 MEETING l
Mr. Ebersole asked about the current leak-before-break concept in PWRs. This l concept seems to eliminate large break LOCA's. In view of this, Mr. Ebersole asked why these safety injection tanks are not capped off. Mr. Wambach replied that the Staff hasn't gotten to that point yet.
Turkey Point Unit 3 - Lack of design documentation to support valve positions in component cooling water system, February 24, 1986 - D. Mcdonald, NRR This event involved the component cooling water discharge valves throttled to 30% since the start of plant operation.
The significance of this event is the lack of design documentation to support the valve positions in the component cooling water system. The problem was originally identified during a safety system review performed by the licens-ee. The concern was when the licensee went to look for the bases for having the valves in the 30 percent position they found they did have design docu-mentation to support the operation under normal conditions. Taking the limiting failure of loss of off-site power, loss of one diesel generator, they were not sure that they would meet the minimum design flow through the Component Cooling Water System. An additional concern is that this is a support system, and provides cooling water to multiple safety-related system components and decay heat removal in a recirculation mode and for heat removal from the containment.
MINUTES / REACTOR OPERATIONS 10 APRIL 9, 1986 MEETING The licensee contacted Westinghouse to determine the minimum flow require-ments. Westinghouse indicated that generically the bounding value of minimum flow would be 4000 gpm. Based upon the 4000 gpm and calculations they decided they could not get 4000 gpm.
Based upon this information, the licensee contacted the pump manufacturer to assure there would not be a pump run-out condition with additional flow.
They made the determination to open the valves to 100 percent.
In the process of doing additional analyses Westinghouse verified that the minimum flow requirement was not 4000 gpm but 2500. The as-found condition appears to not to be as far off as the actual required. This was confirmed by a series of flow balance tests.
Subcommittee Discussion Mr. Ebersole asked if you lost the component cooling water header what would be the consequences. Mr. Mcdonald replied that it would require some kind of manual action to try to isolate wherever the break might be.
Dr. Moeller commented about the plant operating for 14 years with the valves throttled to 30% and then when it was detected, the plant was shutdown. Mr.
Mcdonald responded that the plant wasn't shutdown immediately. The decision to shutdown came after a period of time.
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MINUTES / REACTOR OPERATIONS 11 l APRIL 9, 1986 MEETING ;
Mr. Reed asked if these valves set at 30% were locked and sealed. Mr. Elrod replied that he didn't know how they were fixed in position but they were fixed in position.
Dr. Mark asked if the spent fuel pool flow was cut off, how long could they operate without any problem.
Mr. Mcdonald replied they probably could operate for a considerable period of time without boiling.
Crystal River 3 - Fracture of Reactor Coolant Pump Shaft, January 1,1986 On January 1,1986 Crystal River 3 experienced a complete fracture of a reactor coolant pump shaft while operating the plant at 92 percent power.
O Follow-up inspections revealed cracks in the other three reactor coolant pump shafts, and in addition cracks have been recently identified at the Davis-Besse plant which is also e Babcock and Wilcox plant that uses pumps very similar to those used at Crystal River.
The significant issues associated with this event are that the plant exhibit-ed a shaft break with very little warning and resulted in a very rapid decrease in reactor coolant flow and a reactor trip. The fact that cracks have been identified in multiple shafts in multiple plants indicate generic applicability.
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MINUTES / REACTOR OPERATIONS 12 APRIL 9, 1986 MEETING The flow rate dropped from the four pump to the three pump value in approximately three seconds and the reactor tripped on power / flow mismatch in about five seconds.
Upon inspecting the A pump at Crystal River, they found the fracture had occurred in the region of the hydrostatic bearing along the thermal barrier.
In addition, they found that all four of the cap screws used in holding the inpeller to the shaft were broken and one of the guide pins which takes some of the torque was broken.
The cause of the failure at this point is somewhat uncertain.
Subcommittee Discussion Dr. Mark asked if this is the first event of this kind with this type of pump. Mr. Caruso recponded that he thcught it was the first. Dr. Mark asked how long had this pump been in operation. The reply was that the plant went into operation in 1977. Mr. Reed commented that this was the first event in which a shaft has broken. Mr. Caruso mentioned a shaft break accident at Surry in 1973.
McGuire, Nuclear Service Water System Potential Flow Deficiencies Uader l
Design Bases Conditions, March 11, 1986 - H. Bailey, Inspection and Enforce-ment l
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l MINUTES / REACTOR OPERATIONS 13 APRIL 9, 1986 MEETING The event relates to the dual plant operability test of the nuclear service water system not being performed until January 28, 1986. The test should have been run when Unit 2 came on live in June 1983. This resdited in the plant being operated for almost three years in a condition where the nuclear service water system was not tested under the most limiting conditions. The significance is that the nuclear service water system flow may not have met the design basis during this time.
The nuclear service water functional test was run when Unit I came on line.
When Unit 2 came on line the test was run for Unit 2. The tests should have I been run when both units were in operation under actual conditions through a common line.
The design basis for the system requires a LOCA in one unit, and a loss of off-site power, and a failure of Lake Norman because the dam is not seis-mically qualified. In addition a single failure is assumed so that we one train is available. Under these limiting conditions, two pumps take suction from the standby service water pond through one line. The plant with the LOCA requires 15,000 GPM and the plant without the LOCA requires 6000 gpm.
The previous testing did not test this total flow of 21,000 gpm.
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1 The problem was discovered as a result of troubleshooting some low flow problems they were having in the system. As a result of the low flow J
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. MINUTES / REACTOR OPERATIONS 14 APRIL 9, 1986 MEETING problems they went back to Westinghouse and had Westinghouse do some recalcu-lations which resulted in lower flow requirements.
The flow problems turned out to be a combination of corrosion and silting from Lake Norman.
While they were testing and rebalancing to the lower flows, they discovered with the original flows that would have been required earlier there was some inbalance. The system was tested positively on January 28, 1986.
Follow-up Actions o The Licensee is studying long term improvements to the silting problem.
o Tnere was a meeting between Region II and the licensee on March 14, 1986.
o The nuclear service water system performance is still under review by Region II and headquarters.
Subcommittee Discussion .
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. U MINUTES / REACTOR OPERATIONS 15 APRIL 9, 1986 MEETING Mr. Ebersole asked if the silting has the capability of being disturbed by
.. seismic events so that you have a sudden stoppage. Mr. Bailey replied that he imagined it would certainly affect it.
Regarding valves that are fixed in position, Mr. Ebersole asked if an opera-tional procedure allows the valves to be opened further under upset con-ditions. Mr. Debbs replied that the system pretty much aligns automatically upon accident except for the containment spray heat exchanger which is required about an hour into the accident. This requires a manual operation.
- Mr. Reed asked if there were strainers on the pump discharge or suction. Mr.
Orders replied that they had suction strainers with backflush capability.
Mr. Moeller asked about the silt buildup. He asked if the silt in the lake bottom is ever cleaned out or does it continue to build up.
Mr. Bailey replied that he didn't know if any dredging was done at Lake Norman.
Implementation of the Safety Parameter Display System - George Lapinsky, NRR This is a sumary of the results of a survey done for the Division of Licens-ing. The survey was a status check on the quality and the state of implemen-tation of the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) at operating reactors.
MINUTES / REACTOR OPERATIONS 16 APRIL 9, 1986 MEETING The survey was of six operating reactors. At three of the six, the SPDS was malfunctioning or unavailable to the point where it couldn't be considered to be operational.
The significance is that three of the six systems didn't fulfill the regulatory requirements. In addition, the SPDS provides invalid and inaccu-rate information that could mislead users.
Mr. Lapinsky noted that the original guidance for the SPDS called for it to be very reliable as well as Class lE and seismically qualified. .This was later evolved into a downgraded system in order to provide some flexibility.
Follow-up Actions o The regions have been asked to check the SPDS's in their area.
o Findings have been put into a draft NUREG that should be out in June.
o Two separate contracts have been developed for reviews of SPDS's on the assumption that all the SPDS's in the industry may have to be reviewed.
o A recommendation was made regarding the possibility of developing technical specifications for the SPDS's.
Subcommittee Discussion
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MINUTES / REACTOR OPERATIONS 17 APRIL 9, 1986 MEETING Dr. Moeller asked how much more the good SPDS's cost than the unacceptable ones. Mr. Lapinsky replied they cost much less.
Mr. Ebersole pointed out that when the SPDS fails, it should fail in a way that you know it has failed. Mr. Lapinsky concurred.
Mr. Ebersole asked about INP0's commsnts regarding SPDS's. Mr. Lapinsky replied that as far as he knew INP0 hadn't made any comments.
Dr. Mark asked about the relative costs of SPDS's. Mr. Lapinsky said one that wasn't very good cost 80 million dollars for two plants. Another that was good cost 3 million dollars.
Start-up with Degraded HPSI (update) 11/3/85, McGuir_e,- W. Orders, Region 2 This event concerned the loss of instrument air which led to a safety in-jection on Unit 1. What happened was a failure of a flexible hose causing a loss of instrument air to both units. There are no check valves in the discharge lines in the compressor. If there was a check valve installed then losing the compressor would not have taken the whole system out.
One of the loads coming off the instrument air lines is the main feedwater control valves. When the feadwater control valves are lost then feedwater is-
MINUTES / REACTOR OPERATIONS 18 APRIL 9, 1986 MEETING lost and both units scram due to low steam generator level. Unit I had a safety injection due to Lo-Lo steam generator level.
During a safety injection valves NV-141 and NV-142 normally close to isolate the VCT from the safety injection flow path, and valves 221 and 222 which allow suction from the refueling water storage tank open. All this occurred during the safety injection.
When the licensee went back into the restart mode, they attempted to open valves 141 and 142 from the control rooms. The valves would not open. The equipment operators discovered the motor operators were burned out and opened them manually.
The bottom line was the plant was started up with valves 141 and 142 inopera-ble. The root cause was the licensee determined the valves were in a branch line of the flow path and thought it would not affect the flow path.
The safety significance was with valves 141 and 142 open and inoperable the VCT couldn't be isolated during a safety injection. ,
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The VCT would be at a higher pressure than the refueling water storage tank and would have about 136 ppm baron. In the event of a safety injection, the j suction would come from the VCT and the boron concentration would be 136 ppm rather than the normally required 2000 ppm boron. The VCT would be depleted
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MINUTES / REACTOR OPERATIONS 19 APRIL 9, 1986 MEETING of its borated water and the hydrogen cover would be injected into the -
suction pumps. This could lead to gas binding of the pumps.
Palo Verde, Reactor Trip (Update) 1/9/86 - R. Hernan, NRR This update was a turbine trip test which was supposed to verify the ability to respond to a 100% load rejection.
During the test the non-essential loads failed to transfer from the generator output due to frequency mismatch.
What was supposed to happen during the load rejection tests, was a sequence which that as soon as the generator output breakers trip, the 13.8 KV busses are supposed to pick up the loads. The transfer is prompted by a synchronizing relay which is supposed to act within 20 milliseconds.
4 The basic problem with the plant design is that the fast transfer doesn't occur when the relay acts. The remedy, until they decide if they are going
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to modify the design, is to supply the nonessential loads directly from the
- grid on a continuing basis.
J Subcommittee Discussion of Topics for the Full Committee The following topics were chosen for full Committee discussion.
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i, MINUTES / REACTOR OPERATIONS 20 APRIL 9, 1986 MEETING o Rancho Seco o Vermont Yankee o Safety Parameter Display System o Turkey Point The meeting was adjourned at 12:26 p.m.
NOTE: Additional meeting details can be obtained from a transcript of this meeting available in the NRC Public Document Room,1717 H St.,
NW., Washington, D.C. or can be purchased from ACE-Federal Report-ers, 444 North Capitol Street, Washington, D. C. 10001,(202) 347-3700.
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. 9904 Federal Regist:r / Vol. 51 No. 55 / Frid;y, Mrrch 21,1980 / N2tices - , --
financial data such as salaries, and Authority to close meeting:%is obte!r.cd by e p peld telephone call to
' personalinformation concerning detenn! nation was made by the the cognizant ACRS staff member. Mr. '
Individuals associated with the Committee Management Officer Herman Alderman (telephone 202/634-proposals. pursuant to provisions of section 10(d) 1414) between 6:15 A.M. and 5:00 P.M.
Authority to close meeting-This of Pub.L.92-463.The Committee
- Persons plann!ng to attend this meeting determination was made by the Management Officer was delegated are urged to contact one of the above ~
Committee Management Officer the authority to make such named individual one or two days pursuant to provisions of section10(d) determinations by the Director NSF. before the scheduled meethy to be of Pub. L 92-463.He Comnittee mi july 6,1979. advised of any changes in scradula, etc.,
Management Officer was delegated Dated: March ia.19es. which may have occurred..
the authority to make such determinations by the Director, NSF*
M Rebecca Winkler'
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Dated: Mani tr, ten .-
N" Morton W. IJbarkin, on July 6.1979.These matters are (m Doc. e6-6292 Filed 3-2o-46; 8:45 am}
within exemptions (4) and (6) of 5 hsisMm're Direc@W
" " Cd*8 "
- JIeF[eW. ,
U.S.C.552b (c). Government in the Sunshine Act. (FR Doc. 36-42a2 Filed 3-a>4e: 8.45 aml Dated: March ta. seas. NUCLEAR REGULATORY "j"* ***' **" .
M. Rebecca Winkler. %MMISSION f
CommineeManagement O$cer: Y Adsfaory Commtttee on Reactoe Im Doc.86-6291 Mled 3-2o 40; E45 am) Advlsory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, Subcommittee on Reector Safeguards, Subcommittee on Davie- Operations; Meeting mumacooe mee w
- Besse (Restart); Meeting
- The ACRS Subcommittee on Reactor
. Operations will hold a meeting on Apri! '
. Be e( s art) ame 9,1986, Room 1046.1717 H Street NW "I April 9.1986, Room 1167,1717 H Street. Washington, DC.
' In accordance with the Federal NW Washington, DC. The entire meeting will be open to Advisory Committee Act, Pub. L,92- The entire meeting will be open to public attendance. .
463, as amended, the National Science public attendance. De agenda for the subject meeting Foundation announces the following The agenda for the subject meeting shall be as follows:
shall be as follows:
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meeting:
Name: Advisory Panel for Wednesday, April A 1906-A30 ojn.
Wednesday, April A 1986 1:30 P.M.
Psychobi ology. Until12.30p.m.
Untilthe Conclusion ofBusiness
^p De Subcommittee will continue its The f abcommittee will review recent
, s?m p m. e e a'y operat.4 events.
Place: National Science Foundation, review f the Davis-Besse restart.
g Oral statements may be presented by Oral statements m
- i. 1800 G Street. NW., Room 1243, members of the public with the members of the cpubh,ay with the be presente
concurrence of the Subcommittee concurrence of the Subcommitte ' ,
[ Type of meeting: Part Open- Open April Cha rman; written statements will be
- 9. 9:00 a.m.-1100 a.m. Closed Apnl 9, Chairman: written statements will be c
accepted and made available to the accepted and made available to the g 1000 a.m.-5:00 p.m. Closed Apnl to and 11,8.30 a.m.-5SO p.m. Committee. Recordings will be permitted Committee. Recordhge will be permitted f ~
only dun'ng tbs: portions of the only during those portions of the Contact person: Dr. Fred Stollnitz, meeting when a transcript is being kept.
Program Director, Psychobiology meeting when a transcript is being kept, i
and questions may be asked only by and questions may be asked only by -
- Program. Room 320. National Science Foundation. Washington, DC 20550, members of the Subcommittee,its members of the Subcommittee.ita consultanta, and Staff. Persons desiring consultants, and Staff. Persons desiring Telephone (202) 357-7949. to make oral statements should notify Summary minutes
- May be obtained to make oral statements should notify from the contact person as listed. the ACRS staff member named below as the ACRS staff member named below as far in advance as is practicable so that far in advance as is practicable so that Purpose of subpaneh To provide advice and recommendations concerning . appropriate arrangements can be made. appropriate arrangements can be made.
! During the initial portion of the
- suppert for research in psychobiology. During the initial portion of the meeting, the Subcommittee may j Agenda: Open~ April 9. 9:00 a.m.-11:00 a.m. General discussion of trends and meeting. the Subcommittee. along with any of its consultants who may be exchange preliminary views regarding opportunities in Psychobiology. present, may exchange preliminary matters to be considered during the I balance of the meeting.ne
.- Closed-to review and evaluate views regarding matters to be-research proposals as part of the considered during the balance of the Subcommittee will then hear
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selection process for awards. meeting.
presentations by and hold discussions with representatives of the NRC Staff i Resson for closing %e proposals being The Subcommittee will then hear and other interested persons regarding j reviewed include information of a presentations by and hold discussions with representatives of the NRC Staff, this review.
- proprietary or confidential na ture, Further information regardIng topics Its consultanta, and other interested includina technicallnformation: .
to be discussed, whether the meeting financiaidata. such as salaries; and persons regarding this review, Further information regarding topics has been cancelled or rescheduled, the personalinformation conceming l ' to be discussed, whether the meeting Chairman's ruling on requests for the individuals associated with the opportunity to present oral statements f proposals.%ese matters are within has been cancelled or rescheduled. the Chairman's ru!!ng on requests for the and the time allotted therefor can be
{*
exemptions (4) and (6) of U.S C.
552b[c), Government in the Sunshine opportunity to present oral statements obtained by a prepaid telephone call to the cognizant ACRS staff member.Mr.
e Act. and the time allotted therefor can be 5 -
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Fed:rel Rigistrr / Vol. 51. No. 55 / Fridsy. March 21. 1986 ? Ndices ' " , '
" 9905 *
, ' Herman Alderman (telephone 202/634- Dated at Bethesda, Maryland, this 17th day 1. Portions of Diesel Generefor Ta'e ting 1414) between 8.15 A.M. and 5:00 P.M. .of March 198& -
Persons planning to attend this meeting For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission ~
. gys cat'egory includes Suve'lllance 2 are urged to contact the above named
. Requirements 4A1.1.2g.7) and . .,s b. :.?.
Fitricia G.Norry.
individual one or two days before the 4A1.1.2g.8) . i ' .g ' - .* N M-
- Director. Office ofAdministmtion. ' -
t ocheduled meeting to be advised of any ' (FR Doc e6-a265 Filed 3-aMec s.45 am) 3. Phase A and Q Costalsmen% tion changes in schedule, etc which may . caos ream.as have occurred. ' - -
Dis category includes Surveillance.' ',
~ Requirements 4.6.1.ad.2); 4.612a.: . ...
Dated March 17.19ee.
Morton W. Ilharkin. ., [ Docket No. 50-4131
. .* 4.7.3b.1); 4A2c.; 4.6.3.2b.; 4A8.2; 4.7.3b.1)
,, and 4.7.4b.1) , ,1 ' , I ',N. ,. .w.. ic, ssistant L ecutire Directorfor Pm/cet Duke Power'Co., et at; Conalderation 4. ESF Actuation on Imee of.Offsite' N
- of leauance of Amendment To Facility Power 'ii, , , , , , ' , , . . . , ,'. q
( e64:53 Filed 3-:o.as; a 45 am)
- "** Operating Ucense and Proposed No . This category includes Surveillance Significant Hazards Conalderation Requirements 4.7.4b.2); 4A1.1.2p 4); J.
Determination and Opportunity for ' 4.8.1.1.2g 6)a): 4A1.1.2g.6)b] and.
Hearing
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Documents Containing Reporting or .
4 A1.1.2g 9) .. ....~.. . .
Record Keeping Requirements; Office . - The postponement of Surveillance -
of Management and Budget Review e U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
. Requirement 4 A6.2 for the Con.tainment Commission (the Commission)is Valve injection Water System also .
ACENcy: Nuclear Regulatory considering issuance of an amendmen!
to Facility Operating Ucense No. NPF- requires a one. time exemption from the Commission.
- 35. Issued to Duke Power Company, et 24 month maximum surveillance interval ACTION: Notice of the Office of required by 10 CFR 50. Appendix J.
Management and Budget review of al. (the licensee). for operation of the Catawba Nuclear Station. Unit i located . Section Ill.C.2.(b) regarding Type C local -
information collection. leak rate tests.This exemption to in York County, South Carolina. i Appendix J !s currently under .
sumummy: The Nuclear Regulatory ne proposed amendment would consideration by the NRC staff. - -.
Commission has recently submitted to extend. on a one. time basis, by a In accordance with the previous the Office of Management and Budget maximum of five months until the first Surveillance Requirements integrated (OMB) for review the following proposal refueling outage (currently scheduled on tests are conducted to verify the overall .
for the collection ofinformation under September 28,1986) those 18. month ESF capability.The licensee,a the provisions of the Paperwork Technical Specification (TS) application considers that the extension Reduction Act (44 U.S.C. Chapter 35). surveillances associated with the
.1. Types of submission: revision. requested is justified based en the fact -
Engineering Safety Features (ESF) which that other periodic surveillances !
2.The title of the information can only be conducted with Unit s in required by the Technical Specifications collection: 10 CFR 50 63. Sta tion Cold Shutdown or Refueling. Normally, on individual components such as diesel Blackout.
- since such refueling outages occur about generators, pumps, valves, fans and
- 3. How often the co!!ection is esery 18-months, extension beyond the circuits will continue to be performed as required. One time. 18-month surveillance interval required required. These periodic surveillances
- 4. Who will be required or asked to by the Technical Specifications for the ensure that individual components will report: Nuclear power plant licensees ESF testing is usually not necessary, remain operable.
and applicants for operating licenses. However, due to the extended length of Before issuance of the proposed
- 5. An estimate of the number of Unit 1 startup program and cycle 1. the license amendment the Commission will responses: 125. licensee must either request an have made findings required by the
- 6. An estimate of the total number of extension or be forced to shutdown Atomic Energy Act of1954, as amen /.eu hours needed to complete the prior to the first refueling outage. (the Act)and the Commission's requirement or request: 15,000 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br />. %e proposed amendment is in regulations. .
- 7. An indication of whether section accordance with the licensee's request %e Commission has made a proposed 3504[h). Pub.1 9%511 apphes: No. dated February 12.1988, as determination that the amendment .
- 8. Abstract.NRCis requesting a supplemented by letters dated March 3. request involves no significant hazards clearance for proposed rule to CFR 4. and 11.1986. The changes would be consideration. Under the Commission's 50 63. Station Blackout which requires accomplished by adding a footnote regulations in 10 CFR 50.92. this means licensees and applicants for operating usually stating that this st'rveillance that operation of the facility in
- licensees to submit information to need not be performed until prior to accordance with the proposed
- support the length of time nuclear power entering Hot Shutdown. Hot Standby or amendment would not (1) involve a plants can withsrand a totalloss of all Startup, as applicable, following the significant increase,in the probability or ,
alternating current power. Unit 1 first refueling outage. The ~ consequences of an accident previously
.acoressts: Copies of the transmittal footnote would be added to the evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of may be inspected or obtained for a fee Surveillance Requirements included in a new or different kind of accident from from NRC Public Document Room.1717 the following categories: any accident previously evaluated; or (3)
H Street. NW., Washington. DC 20555. 2. ESF Actuation on Safety injection I"I" ' 'Ignificant reduction in a ..
POR FVM*HER INFDAMaTION CONTACT .
This category includes Surveillance T foll 'provides an analysts Comments and questions should be '
Requirementa 4.1.2.2c: 4.3.1.1. Table 4.3.- using the standards of to CFR 50.92. I directed to the OMB reviewer. 1, item 17; 412.1: 4.3.2.2; 4 5.1.1.1d.: (1) This proposed amendment would lefferson B. Hill (202) 3957340. 4.5 2e.: 4.5.31: 4.7.3b.1); 4.7.3b.2); not significantly increase the probability
- NRC Clearance officer's R. Stephen
- 4.7.4b.1); 4.7.4b.2); 4.7.7d.2) and or consequences of an accident Scott, (301) 492-8585. 4.81.1.2g 10)
~
previously evaluated. The prcbability of 5
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kWNMr b REVISION OF APRIL 1, 1986 Tentative Schedule for ACRS Subcomittee Meeting on April 9, 1986 8:30 a.m.
Room 1046, H Street RECENT SIGNIFICANT EVENTS 8:30 a.m. 2/8/86 Introductory Remarks - Subcomittee Chairman Date Plant Event ,
V 8:40 a.m. 3/13/86 Palo Verde 1 Pipe Support Failure 2/8/86 Vt. Yankee Failure of Standby Liquid vs:00a.m. Control System i
Palisades Review of Startup Experience l d:20a.m. 2/20/86 Including RCS Valve Leakage 1
/9:40 a.m. 3/3/86 Turkey Point Component Cooling Water System Problems v 10:00 a.m. 3/16/86 Crystal River Reactor Coolant Pump Shaft Failure
- BREAK ***
/10:20 a.m.
3/11/86 McGuire Nuclear Service Water System
- 10:35 a.m.
Potential Flow Deficiencies
/11:00 a.m. 12/16/86 ---- Implementation of TMI Action Item I.D.2 - Safety Parameter Display System at Operating Reactors 41:30a.m. 11/3/85 McGuire 1 Startup)with (Update Degraded HPSI 1/9/86 Palo Verde ReactorTrip(Update) v/11:50 a.m. 1 12:15 p.m. Subcommittee Discussion 12:30 p.m. ADJOURN 1
,. l H. ALDIN!AN l
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1 vBCOMMITTEE MEETING ON REACIDR OPERATTONS __ l Room 1046, 1717 H St. N.W., Washington, D.C.
JATIO:1:
April 9, 1986 DATE:
ATTENDANCE LIST PLEASE PRINT:
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. ACRS SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING ON REACIOR OPERATIONS LOCATION Room 1046, 1717 H St. NN., Washington, D.C.
DATE April 9, 1986 ATTENDANCE LIST PLEASE PRINT:NAME AFFILIATION hfu 3 k//sYoit .A/MC JTAFF /s -Esf d Spic. th&t.53 4 M c .57A 2 .rz=Mc bw fx $ Al& C. lT F lFA43
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- AITAONENT D HANDOUTS REACTOR OPERATIONS SUBCOWITTEE MEETING, APRIL 9,1986 4
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- 1. NRR and I.E. Presentations 9
- 2. Safety Injection Valve Issue - William T. Orders, Senior Resident Inspector, McGuire 1
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