ML20148F872

Summary of 970509 Crngp Restart Panel Eighth Meeting in Atlanta,Ga.Panel Members Listed

ML20148F872
Person / Time
Site:	Crystal River
Issue date:	05/19/1997
From:	Jaudon J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
References
NUDOCS 9706050071
Download: ML20148F872 (19)

Text

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4 A A a  %- n.a-, .# h- 7 M4 Ag,Je .-+44 44.u d--.e.- 4 3 _. s pn anoo UNITED STATES r

.- 'o,} NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 8 o REGION il '

I g g ATLANTA FEDERAL CENTER e,  ! 61 FORSYTH STREET. SW, SUITE 23T85 4, f' - ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303

+

-y 1997 MEMORANDUM T0: F l l

FROM: ns , aud . Direct .

Division o actor Safety l

SUBJECT:

MINUTES OF THE CRYSTAL RIVER RESTART PANEL EIGHTH MEETING HELD MAY 9. 1997

.The Crystal River Restart Panel met 'in the Region II offices May 9,1997. The following panel members were at the meeting:

Johns P. Jaudon. Chairman  !

Frederick J. Hebdon. Vice-Chairman Kerry D. Landis Stephen J. Cahill The status of current inspections and the management meeting completed May 9.  ;

1997. between the NRC and Florida Power Corporation were discussed. The- t matrix of outstanding issues was reviewed and updated. It.is attached for )

information. The panel noted that. . based on information from inspectors.'the '

quality and completeness of licensee packages reviewed recently for individual items on the matrix had improved significantly.

The panel' determined that the next meeting should occur onsite June 18 and 19.

1997, and that F. Hebdon would ascertain suitable dates for a July management meeting in headquarters.

'Dockett 50-30

Attachment:

As stated cc w/att:

'L. Reyes ORA /RII S. Collins..NRR J. Johnson. DRP/RII S. Varga. NRR i F. Hebdon. NRR  !

H.-Christensen, DRS/RII l K. Landis, DRP/RII-S. Cahill.' SRI /RII L. Raghaven. NRR R. Schin DRS/RII G. Tracy. OEDO Public' _ i[i  ;

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I-Attachment A CRYSTAL RIVER 3 ISSUES CHECKLIST R ITEMS (TO BE INSPECTED BY THE NRC BEFORE RESTART)

Status as of May 9, 1997 The Crystal River Restart Panel met on November 13, 1996, and-developed seven general areas under which the restart issues will be grouped. Those seven areas are:

1. Knowledge of design and licensing bases and adequacy of design margin [

2. Regulatory knowledge and perspective

3. Operator performance and knowledge

4. Marginally effective engineering organization .

5. Management oversight; including quality assurance, self assessment, and corrective action

6. Corrective actions for NRC violations

7. Other .

Total Restart (R) Items: 136

1. Open 100

1. Closed 36 ,

t ISSUE DESCRIPTION AREA NRC LEAD IR/SER LICENSEE COMMENTS WRC STATUS STATUS LICENSEE *S RESTART LIST OF DE!!CN-RELATED ISSUES (D.I.s)(per 10/28/96 Itr from FPC) i CR3 D.I. 1 HPI pump recirculation to the makeup tank 1 RI Cahill D-1 LER 97-08 R

• See URI 96-01-02 IFT t 96-17-02, IR 96-17 t

CR3 D.I. 2 HPI system modifications to improve SBICCA margins 1 Schin D-2 See tJRI 96-01-02 LER R

• 96-06, IR 96-17 CR3 D.I. 3 LPI pump mission time (NRR for boron precip. review) 1 RI/NRR D-3 See IJRI 96-201-01 IR R

• h 96-17 CR3 D.I. 4 Reactor building spray pump 1B NPSH 1 RI Sanchez D-4 See URI 96-201-02, IR R

• 96-17 t i

CR3 D.I. 5 Emergency feedwater system upgrades and diesel generator load 1 Schin D-5 See IIRI 96-12-01: EEI R impact 96-12-02, IR 96-17 ,

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=m-ISSUE DESCRIPTION AREA NRC LEAD IR/SER LICENSEE CONGNTS NRC STATUS STATUS CR3 D.I. 6 Emergency diesel generator loading 1 Fillion/ D-6 See EE! 96-12-02, IR R

• Schin 96-17 CR3 D.I. 7 Fellure modes and effects of loss of DC pcwer 1 Miller D-7 See URI 96-12-01 LER R

• 96-07, IR 96-17 CR3 D.I. 8 Generic Letter 96-06 (Thermal overpressure protection for 1 RI Cahill/ D-8 See IR 96-12 R

• Containment piping, penetrations, and coolers) Crowley LICENSEE'S OTHER RESTART ITEMS RMG 29/30 Seismic mounting of I:R Rad Monitor 1 Lenahan/RI D-19 R

• BWST NPSH NPSH concern with ECCS pumps when SFP pumps are running in 1 Thomas D-18 Review SP-630 test R

• BWS and Recirc results following MUT event MUV-27 Section XI leakage testing 1 R-21 R

• FIVE AREAS oF CONTINUING CONCERN, MITH IPAP RECOM* ENDED INSPECTION AND RII RECOMMENDED ADDITIONS Panagement - NRC inspect Problem Identifications focusing on CA audits 5 RI Cahill/ OP-2, OP-3 Inspect New PC system R

• Oversight - and the problem reporting system. - Increased inspection of QA Thomas FPC closing CP-2 IPAP Problem Analysis and Evaluation; focusing on root cause Recommended evaluations.

Inspection Marginally - NRC inspect Engineering Problem Identification and 4 Schin OP-4 50.59 R Effective Resolution; with emphasis on licensee evaluatic-ns for OP-6 Engineering significant issues and work backlons.

Organization - Also inspect Quality of Engineering; with emphasis on H

- IPAP CFR $0.59 screening and safety evaluations, accuracy of the Recommended .F_Sf_R , and management oversight. Inspect the licensee's FSAR Inspection Review Project and assess the identified FSAR errors.

Lack of - NRC inspect Engineering Safety Focus; focusing on proper 1 Schin OP-7, OP-8, R Adequate identification of discrepancies with the plant's design basis D-13 D-15 Knowledge of in the corrective action system. D-16 the Design - Also inspect Engineering Problem Identification and Basis - IPAP Resolution; focusing on programs for identifying design basis Recomended issues and capturing them in the corrective action program.

Inspection - Also inspect Quality of Engineering; focusing on sensitivity / understanding by the engineering /licensinq staff of the plant's design basis.

- Also assess the design margin, including the licensee's

• • wtent nf condition" reviews Lack of - NRC inspect 50.59s, operability, reportability 2 Schin OP-5. OP-4 R Regulatory Knowledge and Compliance With Regulations -

IPAP Recommended Inspection 2

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e ISSUE DESCRIPTION AREA NRC LEAD IR/SER LICENSEE COMMENTS NRC STATUS STATUS INSPECTOR FOLLOWUP SYSTEM tJRI 95-02-02 Control room habitability envelope leakage. Excessive 1 Schin R-12 leakage paths through doors, dampers, and drains due to See TIA 95003: FPC TS R Change Request No. 208 design errors and lack of surveillances/ preventive of 8/28/96; LERs 96-maintenance 04, 94-10, 95-01, 95-04-01, 95-09: irs 95-02, 95-09, 95-11, 95-16, 95-21: FPC ltrs.

of 5/26/95 and 10/23/95

, URI 96-01-02 Discrepancies in the high pressure injection design basis 1 Schin D-9, D-1 analysis See CR3 D.I. 1: R

• CR3 D.I. 2

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UR1L96-0U01f >Discrepanciesiin'the'EDBD.and'the FSAR tegarding.the: -; 1.}: iCrowley} '.eIRlL96fi9(

+;"

p ..: .. . > - . . ~

.See EEI 96-19t07 prevention of ' post'-LOCA: boron precipit atien '

(Ri C C

' .:. . . - : . . , . .. . < . . . . , .: . :: -..w.. .n. .....: ...v/

URI.96-05-02j TDasign concerns:with main ste W line hangersJused,in}seismicj ild ) RIS. d.IR197-01S ( Df 515 iSee:VIO.-96-05-01n-1R2 CJ s and other dynamie: load applicationeg- f-gRaghavan?

' Coordina t e : with .' L.; ' '

W."

• Raghavanr

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URI9(-062039 [Non-Safetyjrelated;transferfswitch?used!in E5 status [ Ih..

Indicating: light' circuitry E'"

519' lillionf ' 31R(97f04): i:D-h ?

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URI(96*12-012- tEmergencyJFeedsater;1ow'NPSH to;both; pumps;due to. postulated? URj96fl9I (Schin?;

" ' ' '~ " [1E i D117 ;/ /  : . .: . :S See: CR3 D;I . ' S t . .. . . . R; CD laingle; failure > "P4 *

CR3,D;Ie 7s'EE!J96-19-K

? O3,%C4;' -0S/ +06' URIk96M-03ll ' '

Nalibre to condUcU seqk5$$ed NEENtAbaIISpehifINatid M.-.. . .

W"

[M)l[2 IIIAE)' Aib$i[0N OP[I8 l. -

TSee!MPAI8L601 1CV 9E - i R,i'C ?.

i nurveillance testing on setety related circuitry % tGLt96-01D ' ' " '~ ^'

':el)J See'IR 91-01

URI 96-201-01 tong term plant cooldown following a small break 14CA 1 RI Cooper / D-3 See CR3 D.I. 3: See IR R

• assuming a single failure in the decay heat drop line NRR 96-11. NRR taking responsibility for this item.

URI 96-201-02 NPSH for building spray pump has very little margin, and some 1 RI Sanchez D-4 See CR3 D.I.

• 4 R calculation factors were nonconservative URI 96-201-03 Operating curves 16, 17, and 18 in OP-103B are not validated 4 Hopper 0-1 by licensee R URI 96-201-04 Nonsafety-related positioners on safety-related valves 1 Thomas R-7, D-10 See IR 96-08, IR 97-01 R

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URI-96s2017 05L Service. water: system heatuloadsldid nob considerfmaximumy: .. , .:.

i-it iCrowley) LIR+96-19/ $ 0-lif <See;EEI;96-19-06( R,-f C y input heat"f0P-103Bi' Curve'151 ~ ' ~ '

URI 93-201-07 EDG not protected against water spray from failure of fire 1 Fillion D-52 protection deluge system in EDG room R lURt97,-01-06j :HPI: system designg licensing basis 2[and)[TS concernsi h [S$brh ~

[See IR M 06 - R2:C I* ?!

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tRI: 97- 01+ 0 8':. ~ Adequacylof:. procedures toitakeithe: plant:F from hot' standby to ! :20 $Thomass . fIRl97-023

.RJ O

cold shutdown from'outside the' control' room <fAm endif W ~ '

URI 97-02-02 Deletion of water quality requirements from the FSAR 2 Thomas /NRR

• R LER 95-13-01 Design deficiency may cause makeup tank v.srtexing resulting 1 Mellen D-48 LER 95-13-00 closed in R in failure to meet Appendix n requirements IR 96-06 4

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ . _ _ _ . - _ _ _ _ _ - ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

s Issus DESCRIPTION AREA NRC LEAD IR/SER LICENSEE CCAO!ENTS NRC STATUS STAWS LER 96-15-00 Failure to verify RB penetrations closed per TS 1 RI Cooper 0-2 See EA 96-365 R

• LER 96-18-01 VIC B (02013)

EE1:96}10$01? [P5urlexaAplbskt,failurejto[fbllokrefu'elingprocedureiFPNDN k N'- lNopperi Nkfg iSee EA 96016 L(010A4)h  : R. :, b Failure to' assure.rooticause analysis and corrective 1actio 6 :

c..

EEIf96y10+020

'taken to preclude % repetition /were; adequate.after refueli:

(52 [ Hopper;;. 4 ,

3 095'j. See'EA 96A316tt020iN t R /! C E

' Incident : (no PR'issuedia ' ' ' ' '

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. EDG : loading U.10s due to" Inadequate t10?CFRL50.59l evaluationsf "

.,[43 Achinh...:. + ' R 12 7:D- 6 'i-i De Usee EA 96+366/ 96-46S; ;R. C' ithree; examples (onelmodifIcatien'E:twolptocedure changes)s NFillion:'

14 U 0-15. 196-527?

V10 A (01012,

ops 5 s ?O10224.01032) L. See;;.

CR3:D.I.:5f:CR3 D.Is'6

m. .. xc EEi.9 Nil-Ob [IrkNgde te horrect ihe factihns [ f or[1 3erretsFtwo: examples ' ' 'DTCFOO" ' . $ 9 ' eva lbationl '

h ' i.$chnl CP-its "

{SeelEA 96-365let'ali VIO C:(03013)v

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'EEI)6512-043

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[ ops' 6s' D-14 ' '

{: (SeejEAi9Cd65:etlals RLC7 NRC inspect' 11eensee's'extenttof' condition reviews.' :VIO B"102013h

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'Three:inadequatetrocedurss[fer[ containment.penetratieni

. EEI.9s-19-01x Mc W'~%

-- l Rh. . . . . , . . . LOP-15i 'SeeiEA:96536SCet'al, . R( CJ Fsurveillances< ' " " ' ' '

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• e SVIO B'(0201311

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'EEI 96419+02f. ;l Inadequate corrective actions foriinadequate containment (:: M.+  ;#if' % '

qOP-163 [See EA 96+365'etfali  : R O CJ-.

penetration surveillances 'VIO C-f03013)r EE,ths-19-03i .:EFWNPSHMSQdue5!671nadequateI.10)CFRhojN9[saf$tyjevaihhthn}

t [O [Nhhih} p.?(h (bh38) iShe E'A 96 2 365 etihl;1..  ! Ri;I C.L i crorta; modification

• q:::

,v10 ' Ar to1042) .:. see IR.:: '97-04e

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. .. ~:v.=.. v, (Faibrelto. update l applicable!designlddcumentshoitncorporatej EEI 96 219-040l !1 d

';" JShomaal ~ ' ^P D 'l9 3 fSee EA596-36S ethat' tRs; C O ErW design:informatien'(ErP+2. assumed operatingpwhen EFP+1] "" - '

""'s "

s VIO 'B i (02013 h ' '

Ftrips'at 5004 PCS pressure)> -

LEEkh6-19-0N $Ni bre'to kncludela'ppIkbabke design'i N ormatIon $nI t b . kih (Ybo[EN IDk405 v

[See'EA'96i3651.et ali' Rii C.

4 design . input; requiremente fore an EW modificationMEFP+2 M.

afl0.B ;102013) r.

. . , 'f'' J icontinuing'to. operate'afterEFP-17tripsatt500#7C5}pressurej

and hydraulie requirements)x ' ' " ' ' ' ' ^ ' W

........ x. ... s. s. - . . . 7, . . , . . . .

ErW.USQ:due to: removing tho'automatie openisignallfrom'ASVe ,

'EEI196-19.C6i '

111 Thomasb "

Ra4}; '

x'See2EA 96-365'et al,, R, p C.2 204; reducing-the reliability of'EFP4'.'" ' k VIO AciO105237~'

. c .. . . .. . .. . . . . .:. , ; ..c.+c

, . , ". . . , . , e . : >y< - . ' ' :LCrowleys

'  ; . s.e . = . , . . .. n LInadeqdate 50j5hevaluation for: post.-LOCA boron.. precipitations

. EEI 9da19..07.i- [311 .. - > iSee:EA.S6-365Eet~alh. tR,S C ?:

fcontrol'iE ^"'l

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i OP-1Ts ,M 5VIO AE(01062).1 Verify >

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,.1... Eprocedures(and ...

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M-:: Edocumentation.; adequate s prior to restart .' "-

-Est:96-19-ce) i trrerlin" design caIchi tiorisSor:lEwisystem heaC16adsj . .

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cil: 1 C.. roe...N, .yj . . .

5.p ;DI2 B l;

. . . See' EA :961 3 65..et-. al, .Ri Cf EEI 97-06-01 Inadequate safety evaluations for added operator actions for 1 Schin R

• design basis SBIDCA mitigation EA 95-16 Use of non-conservative trip setpoints for safety-related 6, 1 Mellen Ce13 See IR 95-16 IR 95- R (was EEI 95- equipment (SLIII). Additional examples identified in IR 95- 21 IR 97-01, IR 97-02 02-04) 16

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- EA 95-126v . -Nine instances.wbere operators-violated procedures for( W Tt. 16 53K l5c'hins . . . . . . . , . , .19h0M " $R % iSee IR1944047 1R$ CN

'VIOKI.A'(waso  ? pressure /levell(SLIIIN '

A

- EEI:95-22-011: ' ' "

5

==. ,

ISSUE DESCRIPTION AREA NRC LEAD IR/SER LICENSEE CCDOMNTS NRC STATUS STATUS

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ItA 95-126~

- Conduct (aL unauthorized tests . of) WTNit hout.110 LCFRJ $0'. $9 9 16SS37 iSchin?95 5:97-070 iCP-10V CSee!!RJ-96 Ed4 $' ,R2 CW~

?v10 1.B f(was E  ;.' evaluation -(SI.III) ) Additionali examplet j (fourJtestie)f. .x . i .

tidentified inJ1/18/.9631stter5.

titled EN 95-126,and4EA196-185)wi.

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2EI'95-22-02)1 . s n(See URIi96-04'08):C" ~ ~' ' "~~'

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W EA 95-126, Failure to take adequate corrective actions for operator 6, 5 Schin D-37 R VIO I.C.1 concerns regarding OP-1038, Curve 8, for MUT pressure / level (was EEI 95- limits (SLIII)

• 22-03)

EA 95-126 Corrective actions for an inadequate Curve B (two STI's and a 6, 5 RI Cooper / O-1. D-37 R

• VIO I.C.2 revised Curve 8A & 88) were also incorrect (SLIII) Schin (was EEI 95-22-03)

EA 95-126, Design controls failed to ensure adequate safety margin for 6, 1 RI Cooper / CP-6, CP-13

• R VIO I.D.1 HPI pumps for certain LOCA scenarios (SLITI) Schin (was EEI 95-22-04)

EA 95-126 Swapover of ECCS pumps

• suction from BWST (at five feet) to 6, 1 RI Cooper / OP-13 R

• VIO I.D.2 reactor building sump was inadequate (SLIII) Schin (was EEI 95-22-04) -

EA 95-126. EOPs allowed single LPI pump to supply two HPI pumps, with 6, 1 RI Cooper / OP-13 R

• VIO II.A (was insufficient NPSH for LPI pump (SLIII) Schin EEI 95-22-04)

EA 95-126, Failure to take adequate corrective actions for tank 6, 5 RI Cooper D-37 R

• VIO II.B (was volumes / level / suction point (SLIV)

EET 95-22-03)

EA 95-126. Failure to ensure fire water storage tank contained adequate 6, 1 RI Cooper D-37 R

• VIO II.C (was volume of water (SLIV)

EEI 95-22-03)

CA 96-316 Four e.itamples of f ailure to follow refueling procedure FP-203 3 Hopper R (01014).

(was EEI 96-10-01)

EA 96-316 Failure to assure root cause analysis and corrective actions 5 Hopper n (02014), taken to preclude repetition were adequate after refuel (was EEI 96- incident (no PR issued) 10-02)

EA 96-365. EDG loading USQs due to inadequate 10 CFR 50.59 e,aluations: 4 Schin/ R-2, D-6, D- See CR3 D.I. 5: CR3 R 96-465, 96- three examples (one modification & two procedure changest Fillion 14 D-15 D.I. 6 527, VIO A OP-5 (01012, 01022, and 01032). (was EEI 96-12-02 EA 96-365 et EFW NPSH USQ due to inadequate 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation 1 Schin R al, VIO A for a modification (01042).

twas EEI 96-19-03) 6

=.

ISSUE DESCRIPTION ARIA NRC LEAD IR/SER LICENSEE COBOGMTS NRC STATUS STAWS EA 96-365 et EFW USQ due to removing the automatic cpen signal from ASV* 1 Thomas al, VIO A R 204 reducing the reliability of EFP-2 (01052).

• was EEI 96-19-06)

EA 96-365 et Inadequate 50.59 evaluation for post-LOCA boron precipitation 1 RI Verify procedJres and R

• al. VIO A control

• documentation adequate (01062). prior to restart, twas EEI 96-19-07)

EA 96-365 et Use of unverified calculations to support modifications. 4 Schin OP-6 al. VIO B NRC inspect licensee's extent of condition reviews. R (02013).

(was EEI 96-12-04)

EA 96-365 et Three inadequate procedures for containmerat penetration 4 RI Cooper R

• al, VIO B surveillances (02013).

(was EEI 96-19 01)

EA 96-365 et Failure to tipdate applicable design documer ts to incorporate 1 Thomas R al. VIO B EFW design information (EFP-2 assumed operating when EFP-1 (02013). trips at 5003 RCS pressure)

(was EEI 96-19-04)

EA 96-365 et Failure to include applicable design information in the 1 Thomas al, VIO B R deign input requirements for an EN modification (EFP-2 (02013). continuing to operate after EFF-1 trips at 5004 RCS pressure

{was EEI 96- and hydraulic tequirements) 19-05)

EA 96-365 et Error in design calculations for SW systeu heat loads 1 Crowley/

• R al. VIO B Mellen (02013).

(was EEI 96-19-09)

EA 96-365 et Inadequate corrective actions fcr 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation 5 Schin R al. VIO C errorss two examples (03013).

(was EEI 96-12-03)

EA 96-365 et Inadequate corrective actions for inadequate containment 1 RI Cooper

• al VIO C R penetration surveillances (03013).

(was EEI 96-19-02)

VIO 93-16-07 Inadequate EOP and AP procedures 6, 3 Hofper 0-3 OP-19 See IR 96-04 IFI 96- R 04-03, IR 96-08 VIO 95-16-03 Inadequate procedure for operation of the makeup pump 1A 6, 1 RI Cahill 0-8 See LER 96-10 R

• cooling water VIO 95-21-03 Failure to isolate the class 1E from the non-class 1E 6, 1 Thomas / D-30 See LER 95-25, LER 96- R electrical circuitry for the RB purge and mini-purge valves RI 02, IR 97-01 IR 97-02 7

==-

ISSt7E DESCRitTION AREA NRC LEAD IR/SER LICENSEE COBOENTS NRC STATUS STATUS VIO 96-01-01 Inadequate corrective action for HM flow i9dication problem 6, 5 RI Cooper D-53 See LER 96-05 R

• VIO 96-01-06 Failure to correctly translate design basis of SW system into 6, 1 RI D-54 procedures, drawings, and instructions R VIO 96-04-02 Failure to take prompt corrective action in revising 6, 5 Hopper 0-9

• R procedure VP-580, Plant Safety verification (for STAS). VP-580 contained outdated and incorrect information.

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Jrailu'er to'ereateta[PR and(OCR forEdamaged mainfsteamzlinef

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VIO-.96405-014 .~

- - - - ($h 54 i- Rii . .-  !: IR r97t olt- :3.O(10 ([ ~ fSee:llRIs96-QS*02i Seep :R/ C;*

hangers 4 IRaghavani RIR497-024 IR 97-02'

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V10 9N$kO5 g jFailure[to.[ follow; procedures . - ' " ' _forp.Jpdating

desY.gnjbasisj -(64 4,j. [Crowley# QRf 9]-0l'.[ j0P.8p D-55? -

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ioperators on boric acid addition :: lines 4 W VIO 96-06-04 No evaluation on non-FSAR vital battery charger configuration 6, 4 RI Cooper R-18

• R LVIO.M+0s-0?f: :LPR. bot:..knitiated;ito resolve}CitEVS teAth failu'rej. gg. ${N [tNhhah (ER N 62) $0b2h .  : R,j C f

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VIO 96-08-01 Corrective action not taken on make-up system audit findings 6, 5 RI Cahill OP-24 R *

& excessive vibration on spent fuel pool pump cooling fan motor

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changes

to procedures; described.in:the'FSAR.for controlling? ' ' ~ ' ' '

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uprate' - ' . ' ' ' -

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VIO 96-09-05 Failure to incorporate design change of MUV-(4 into 6, 4 Thomss/ OP-27 operations procedures R Crowley VIO 96-09-06 Three examples of design control errors (erroneous 6 4 M. Miller OP-8 calculation inputs and ISI boundary) R VIO 96-09-07 Untimely corrective actions for the EPIC system concev:s and 6, 5 Thomas CP-28 See IR 97-01 R problems VIO 96-11-04 Reactor building sump not const ructed in accordance with 6, 1 RI D-56 See IR 97-02 R approved construction drawings VIO 96-15-02 Failure of reactor coolant pump oil collection system to 6, 7 W. Miller D-57 See IR 97-02 R retain oil leaking from reactor coolant pump VIO 96-20-01 Failure to adhere to reactor coolant system cooldown limits 3 RI Cooper OP-29

• R VIO 96-20-02 Failure to follow procedure AI-400C for review and 7 RI Cooper OP-30

• development of Maintenance Procedure PM-191, Main R Turbine / Generator, Feedwater 7brbine Layup VIO 97-01-01 Inadequate clearance tagging requirements 3 RI Cahill

• R 8

==-

ISSUE DESCRIPTION AREA NRC LEAD IR/SER LICENSEE COMMENTS NRC STATUS STATUS VIO 97-01-02 Failure to follow procedures, resulting in inadvertent EDG 3 RI Cooper R

• start VIO 97-01-04 Failure to perforia TS surveillance for spent fuel pool level 3 RI Cooper R

• VIO 97-01-07 Instrument loop uncertainty setpoint calculation assumptions 4 Mellen See IR 97-02 R

• not translated into procedures

• VIO 97-01-09 Inadequate corrective actions for cable ampacity 4 Fillion R =

VIO 97-02-01 Failure to follow equipm.m A.^ts control procedural 3 RI R

• requ1rements ,

via M-02-03 Adequate procedures not in ef fect to take the plant from hot 1 Thomas R

• standby to cold shutdown from outstae the control room VIO 97-02-04 Failure to conduct TS logic testing 1 M. Miller See CL 96-01 R *

.irl[35-1$-01E.. EDesignre'qu.irementaltoMN.r6edoverpressure).}$erviSwsEEdf

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IFI 95-15-02 Design requirements for dynamic LOCA effects per surge line 1 RI D-58 See IR 95-21 and TIA R

• effects96-013

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IFI 95-15-04 Code requirement for thermal relief valves on decay heat 1 RI Sanchez D-60 See IR 95-21 and TIA R

• removal heat exchangers96-014 - Issued IFI 95-15-05 Relief valves removed from heat exchangers 1 RI Sanchez D-61 See IR 95-21 and TIA R

• 96-014 IFI 96-03-15 Evaluate the licensee *s revised TS Bases and related 10 CFR 2 RI Cahill R-14 R *

$0.59 analysis for HPI flow indicators IFI 96-17-02 Potential for HPI/LPI recirculation resulting in make-up tank 1 RI Cahill D D-1 See CR3 D.I. 1 R

• overflow IFI 96v17-04 Adequacy of 10 CFR 50 Appendix R fire study and documentation 1 W. Miller D-43 R

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IFI 96-201-12 Conduit sizing criteria - jamming ratio not considered 1 Fillion D-45 Identified in IPAP R repcrt as IF-96-201-02

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,  ;,,  :.as 17-96a701 03' 2 IFI 96-201-14 EDG protective trips not bypassed during emergency mode of 1 Fillion D-12 Identified in IPAP R operation report as IF-96-201-04 IFI 96-201-15 Verification of motor starting data 1 Fillion D-4 6 Identified in IPAP R report as IF-96-201-05 IFI 96-201-16 Coordination of Second level undervoltage relay (SLUR) 1 Fillion D-47 Identified in IPAP R setting vs. Inverter coeration _ report as IF-96-201-06 9

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==.

ISSUE DESCRIPTION AREA NRC LEAD IR/SE1 LICENSEE CCNMENTS NRC STAWS STATUS IFI 96-201-17 Coordination of SLUR and fuse protection 1 Fillion D-31 Identified in IPAP R report as IF-96-201-07 IFI 97-02-05 Outstanding issues associated with the emergency diesel 1 RI Cooper

• generator power uprate modification R IN 97-06 Weaknesses in plant-specific emergency operating procedures 3 Hopper / e Inspect licensee's

• for refilling the secondary side of dry once-through steam RI Cooper ECPs - in FPC planned R

generators uporade MULTI-FLANT ACTIONS MPA #L507; Pressure locking and thermal binding of safety-related gate 2 NRR D-4 9 GL 95-07 valves. Currently in staff review.- An RAI is outstanding. R Expected completion?

MPA EL601: Testing of safety-related logic circuits - 2 Miller GL 96-01 Licensee response in staff review. More details are R-1 11/96 - the licensee R

• required. This issue requires attention. has identified testing deficiencies that must be fixed prior to re st a rt (VIO 97-02-04)

MPA #L503: Circumferential cracking of SG tube flaws. 2 Blake/NRR R-17 CL95-03 Licensee response in staff review. R LICENSE AMENDMENT / RELIEF REQUESTS CCHE Control com-slex habitability envelope - Including TS-208 and 2 Schin/NRR R-12 R TIA 95-03 need to be addressed. Licensee submittal does not provide adequate TS action.

USQs Licensee request and NRC review and issue license amendments NRR R-2, R-4 for all Unreviewed Safety Ouestions (UsQsl R USQ EDG Load Uprate Fillion/

NRR R-2 See EEI 96-12-02 CR3 R D.I. 6 USQ ASV 204 Thomas / R-4 See EEI 96-19-04, CR3 R NRR D.I. S USQ DH-4 5- FI (post-LOCA boron precipitation issuel Crowley/ R-5 See URI 96-201-01, URI R

• NRR 96-04-01 USQ EDG Load List Update Fillion/ R-6 See EEI 96-12-02, CR3 R NRR D.I. 6 USQ ITS 3.0.3 relief for LPI/DH to allow modification of air operators for DCV 17, 18, 177, 178 7tymas/ R-7 See URI 96-201-04 R ,

NRR '

I LR'.' Conduct an ILRT or seek an Amendment to utilite Method B of NRR Appendix J to 10 CFR 50 R-10 R

• OTHER ISSUES b

10

e y

ISSUE DESCRIPTION AREA !Otc LEAD IR/SER LICENSEE CNS NRC STATUS STRTUS LTOP Current TS does flot address LTOP prevention or mitigation. 2 biRR/RI R-16 R system branch will R

• On the basis of GL 88-11, the licensee submitted inforination send letter to to demonstrate that L1DP in B&W plants have less than 1 in licensee that they 100 reactor yeart probability of occurrence and as a result have to submit TS.

per GL 88-11 non-appendix G methodology can be used for PT Short term action to curves. Such a PT curve would provide for hig9er LTOP enable change PORY pressure and temperature and would provide operational setpoint/ limit RCS P

'lexibility. Staff denied the request in 1995 and requested a to 1008 a .* vised response. The licensee expecte to respond late 1997.

Appendix R Append ix R design basis issues review by FPC consultant. NRC 1 W. Miller / D-11 R review oren Appendix R issues to assdre that there are no Fillion/

restart % operability issues imbedded in them. NRR Operator NRC review operator workarounds list to assure that there are 3 RI Cahill M-2. C-7 See VIO 96-09-07 R

• Workarounds no restart or oparability issues contained in ther

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': completes rm Ar-License Verify license conditions are met 2 RI R-15 R Conditions RC Loop In a survey inspection, the staff noted that certain branch 2 NRR D-62 R Piping pipes off the primary coolant loop were not analyzed as Code Analyses class 1 p!pe (i.e.. no fatigue analysis) as required by the Code. Need NRR technical branch's opinion on this Sources for issues include: IFS, SIMS, NUREG 1435 (Status of Safety Issues at Licensed Power Plants), Resident's OIL, PM's OIL NOTE: Open allegations, OI investigations, and emerging / draft issues are listed separately.

11

CRYSTAL RIVER 3 ISSUES CHECKLIST

-N ITEMS (INSPECTION PRIOR TO RESTART IS NOT NEEDED)

Total Non-Restart (N) Items: 84

1. Open 76

1. Closed 8 '

ISSUE DESCRIPTION AREA NRC LEAD 1RIS-1t LICENSEE STATUS COMMENTS NRC STATUS t!CENSEE'S RESTART LIST OF DESIGN RELATED ISSUES (D.I.s)(per 10/28/96 Itr from FPC)

LICENSEE'S OTHER RESTART ITEMS -

OTSG Tubes Adequacy of OTSG tube stress-relieved rolled joints is questioned. EM)G 7 See licensee Precursor N (G) analysis of a Davis-Besse pulled OTSG tube. current test data. and limited Card PC 96-5077 of fleid experience conflict with test data from 1972 dich ' qualified' a 11/6/%. (No TIA) stress-relieved rolled joint.

FIVE AREAS OF CONTINUING CGICERN. WITH IPAP RECOMMENDED INSPECTION AND Ril RECOMMENDED AM)lTIONS INSPECTOR FatLOWUP SYSTEM

IS[95Nbk$ $Ikce$iIfe M i h $ik3 @

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[itMh tRI %-03-04 Neasuring of percent through-wall indications with an unqualified 7 See IR %-06. Generic N (G) procedure issue being addressed by NRR. (no TIA)

URI E 03-05 Eddy current sam le expansion based on degraded tthe percentages 7 See IR E 06. N (5) tRI E 06-10 Justification for removal of Thermo-lag protection from the source range 1 N (5) instru entation LEI %-07-03 Incorrect information provided by contractors 7 **

N (S)

URI % 201-06 Preferred offsite electrical power source with plant shut dowi (500 kw 1 N (5) switchyard) is not qualified. Note: Until this issue is resolved.

Itcensee is not using 500 Ky switchyard as an electrical peer source.

tRI %-201-09 Testing to qualify relays beyond manufacturers' ratings was inadecrxte  ?

N (S) 12

==-

15500 DESCRIPTION ARCA NRC LEAD 1R/SER 1.!CEysr'. STATUS COMMENTS NRC STATUS EA 97-012 failure to maintain protected area barriers 7 See IR 97 01 N (5)

• LER 93 02-02. Switchyard cable failure caused degraded voltage of Class IE electrical 7 LER 93-02-01 closed in IR N (1)

LER 93-02-03 buses and actuation of EDG 95-09 LER 94-06-01. Deficiency in understanding of technical requirements leads to 2 LER 94-06 00 closed in IR N (D)

LER 94-06-03. nonconservative RPS setpoint and potential violation of TS .

%-16. See EA 95-16.

LER 94-06-04 LER 94 06-05 LER 95 09 00 Minimal release during sulfur dioxide delivery causes actuation of toxic 7 See IR 95 11. N (1) gas monitor resulting in control room emeroency ventilation actuation LER 95-10 01 Inadequate procedure causes low tooling water flow to makeup ptro 1 LER 95-10-00 closed in IR N (I) resulting in operation outside the cesign basis 95-16. See also URI 95 11-02. V!fl 95-16-03.

LER 95 17-00 SW flow to control room coolers controlled by air operated v & a which 1 See IR 95-16. VIO % N (D) could fail open  %

LER 95-18-00. Inadequate TS note allowed delayed entry into TS LCO 2 See NCV 95-18-05.

LER 95-18-01.

N (1)

LER 95-18-02 LER 95-19 00 teak instrumentation for SW flow to RBCUs incapable of measuring 90 gpm 1 See IR 95-18. N (1)

LER 95-23-01. Inconsistent design asstrptions cause building spray flow rates to be 1 LER 95 23-00 closed in IR N (1)

LER 95-23-02 outside design basis  % -04 .

LER 95-25 00. Inadequate isolation of safety /non-safety related circuits 1 See VIO 95-21-03. See IR N (D)

LER 95-25-01 97-02.

LER 95-28-00. BWST vacuum breaker has inadequate relief capacity LER 95-28 01 1 See IR 95-21. N (I)

LER 96 01-01 EFIC control circuits misrouted: Appendix R concern 1 LER 96 01-00 closed in IR N (I) 96-04: See also NCV %-

01-03 LER 96-02-00 Minipurge valve has safety /non-safety related circuits without isolation 1 See VIO 95 21-03. N (I)

LER 96 03-00. RCS cooldown rate exceeded during cooldown 3 LER 96-03-01 See llRI 95-21-04 N (!)

LER 96 04-00 CCHE control danpers found damaged & leaking 1 See URI 95-02-02. IR 95- N (D) 21.

LER %-05-01 SW flow to RBCUs could exceed design 1 LER %-05-00 closed in IR N (0) 96 04 See also VIO %-

01-01.

~ LER %-05-00;.

g ,

W. I instrtr.e.nt.l. error. }o.u. Id.[.r. es.uld. .i.n..H. P.1.. _otro[ru. n. oh.O.l

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5ee.0:1 2rik9520EIR96-040 ' ' ' ' ~

sjD)$ CI' LER 96-07-00. HPI line SBLOCA/ LOOP / loss of dc bus could have inadequate HPI flow 1 See IR %-01. CR3 0. I. 2. N (D)

LER 96-07-01 inst etrientation LER 96 08-00 Ambiguous TS note results in not performing RCS leak surveillance prior to 2 N (5)

Made 2 LER 96-09-00 failure to reattach instrtrient tubing to seismic stoports after 1 See llRI 96 03-06. IR 96- N (!)

modification leads to operation outside desion basis 05.

13 ,

- _ - . . ,. - -._.c .-. - - ~ . . ~

=

ISSUE DESCRIPTION AREA NRC LEAD IR/SER LICENSEE STATUS COMMENTS NRC

. STATUS LER %-10-00 tow flow in SW system cooled comonents causes operation outside design 1 See VIO 95-16-03. N (D) basis LER 96-11-00 Personnel error causes testing deficiency resulting in condition 1 See W A (L601 (GL 96 01). N (0) prohibited by improved TS (GL 96 01 issues) 1.ER 96di 00[

tER 5 12-01 Medan obth$Niga besiUaud! h bN.teryMgedhedng}

ginadequateteit'resultsfeceptedjn.ertog '" '

k# '

e

..s-.

1*.

NU601{ *

, ;5dV1096/0507[ N (0); C :

. i~

LER 9012 02{ ^

LER 96 13-00 Operator error resulted in the inadvertent actuation of DCP-1A 3 See NCV 96 03-02. N (1) 1.ER 96-15-00 Personnel errors cause cable separation / isolation concerns resulting in 1 See IR 96-04. N (1) operation outside the design basis (toxic gas monitors)

LER 96 16-00 CREYS filter testing did not meet T5 specs 2 RI N (5)

LER %-19-00 Non-safety related switch used in safety related wiring for E5 status 1 See tRI 96-06-03. See IR N (D) lights 97-04 LER 96-20-00 Unreviewd safety questions concerning EDG overicading caused by 4 R-2. 0-6. 0 14 See EEI %-12-02. N (0) interpretation of regulatory requirements 0-15. OP-5 LER 96-23-C0 Personnel error leads to missed surveillances resulting in violation of 2 See VIO %-15-01. N (D)

Technical Specifications (missed rmote shutdown panel EFW pmp pressure instrtrent channel check)

LER 06-24 00 Plant modification causes unanalyzed condition regarding e m y 1 See URI E 12-01, N (D) feedwater LER 56-25-00 Personnel error causes testing deficiency resulting in condition 1 See W A #L601 (GL % 01). N (D) prohibited by Technical Spectfications (12 contacts in Es logic were not being tested)

VIO 94-25-01 Failure to properly control the Control Comlex Habitability Envelope 6. 7 See tRI 95-02-02. N (D)

(door blocked open for maintenance work)

VIO 94-27-021- l Failure t'o matN.e 10 CFR 50.d /eports.titheNwiAn theN15dk f6[2k

$IR;9h0h [0P M , 1 N(1)[C'.

> time +

MeIR.9502[IR9508)

~V 0.94 27,03

' f alldre to make one required 50.CFR 50.d report to. e.e .Nffwithin thh required time ~ ~ ' ~' '

b.S '

ik97 ION

' ~ ' ' '

' - OP N'

" f5ceIR9508? .N(1)$Ci VIO E 01-05 Two example: of failure to update FSAR as required by 10 CFR 50.71(e) 6. 4 N (5)

VIG 96 02-01 Failure to maintain 0.2 footcandles in the protected area 6. 7 See IR 96-07, N (5)

VIO 96-02-04 Failure to maintain secondary alarm station operable and inadequate 6. 2 N (5) e mpensatory measures VIO %-03-11 Failure to follow radiation work permit requ'ren m ts 6. 7 N (5)

V!O 96-03-12 Failure to report the transport of a radioactively contaminated individual 6. 2 N (5) offsite VIO 36 03-13 Unescorted visitor personnel within the protected area 6. 7 N (5)

VIO 5 05-04 Licensee approved eddy current acceptance criteria different from TS 6. 2 N (5) requirernents 14

==.

ISSUE e

DESCRIPTION NtEA NRC LEAD IR/5ER LICENSEE STATUS- COMMENTS NRC STATUS

.. .. ~ .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . = . . . . . . . ..m.:~.. ~,.:.._ ..~..x.

.VIO 96 06 06; 6[2f; thependix,Rh 61R Sy04)

ticensfrg d.? sign batis -Failure"to timely nottfyy

the NRC.of a' condytjan outside s ..g

. ;N (5)i C t V10 95-07-01 Failure to protect safeguards information 6. 7 N (5)

V!O 96-07-02 Failure to conplete screening elements for Fitness for Duty Personnel 6. 7 N (5)

V10 96 09-01 Failure to folicw a maintenance procedure resulting in the inadvertent 6. 7 initiation of the control room emeroency ventilation systm N (5)

VIO t-6-09-02 Unescorted visitor personnel within the protected area 6. 7 N (5)

VIO %-11-01 Inadeouate work instructions to prevert the inadvertent start of the A EDG 6. 7 N (5)

VIO 96-11-03 Personnel performing work on the reactor building stry without logging 6. 7 N (5) ento a clearance, as recut ed by a proved WR VIO %-15-01 Failure to perform a required T5 surveillance for the remote shutdoet 6. 2 See LER %-23 panel N (5)

IFI 94-13-09 Review periodic verification plans - MOV (GL 89-10 item) 2 See IR 95 11. IR 95-21: N (1)

See GL. 89-10 IFI 95-02-05 Resonance noise in vicinity of MUV-25 7 N (5)

IFI 95-08-03 Emergency Operating Procedure update program 3 See iR 95-16. VIO 93-16 07 N (5)

IFI 95-11-01 SCBA requirements for personnel during a toxic gas release 2 N (5)

IFl 95-21-02 Modification to the standby feedwater pu p recirculation line 1 N (5)

IFl %-03-16 Review of MAR 96-02-09-01. HPI flow indicators. Installation package and 1 functional testing results N (5)

IFI 96 04-03 Effect of setpoint calculations on E0P revisions 1 See V10 93-16-07 N (D)

IFI 96-05 06 Large break loss of cootant analysis generic concerns 1 N (5)

~ . , . . .  : .~.,..,.,...wc., .a . : : : m. a.. . ..:.,..a . . .

.. . , . . . - . n .. . .y  :..>

IFT 96-06-09: #D dicienciesfin Mecati$tiffre~ barrier;. n ::.2 ... program procedures lar4doctrientationl I47: , gS

-liR9615? 1 , s '

e i N .(5)F.C ?

Iil %-08-02 Reactor building cavity cooling piping thermai relief protection 1 See D.I. 8. GL %-06 N (D)

IFI %-15-03 Actions taken to resolve post accident recriticality concerns Jue to I NRR reviewing, ganeric B&W localized boron dilution N (G) issue EE! 97-04-G1 Failure to make an emergency phone report witMn the time requirements of 7 RI Cahill 10 CFR 73.71 N (5)

• EE! 97-0-1 02 Failure to hand carry a sospected reportable issue to the shift manager 2 RI Cahill for reportability review N (5)

• EEI 97-04-03 ikynt failure to repor'. 5tside design basis conditions 1. 2 Schin N (5,

• 15

D ISSUE DESCRIPTION AREA NRC LEAD IRISER tlCENSEE STATUS COMMENTS NRC '

, STATUS multi.PtANT ACTICHS 1

MPA 19105: Seismic qualification of equipment. Licensee's criteria and procedures 2 Expected ccroletion N (5)

GL 87 02 approved. Some issues are pending and would be resolved thru audit Decent)er.

(scheduled for Mar 97). Licensee s field waltdown results are currently in staff review MPA #9111 (IPE): IPE and IPEEE - These are in staff review. Not a restart itet. 2 N (S)

MPAaB118 (IrEEE)

MPA #t602: NRC8 Novement of heavy loads over spent fuel pool 2 N (5) 96-02 - ticensee re ynse in staff review This would not te a restart issue.

MPA #L208: Thermolag - Licensee plans to use Mecatiss 2 See IR %-01: IR %-06 N (5)

GL 92-08: BU 92- (an alternate material), scrne reanalysis of APPENDIX R. and sme 01 exemption. Fire barrier tests of Hecatiss including Av ecity tests are in staff reviaw This also may not te restart issue MPAf L201: Reactor vessel structural integrity. RAI to licensee on 7/22/96. Only a 2 N (5)

GL 92-01 Rev 1. data base issue. not a restart item.

._2.0. P I M$NAi;.' [SorIfN[dkNdatiE3i3censee respons[k[jd65.3[aff.revieltoI' 2; '

N RdNE. :Closedb$NRCtoFPCj i

-GL 95-04 iccreence AInis may have to be addressed prion to restart 1because of"'3 Aof;5/1/973 'N(S)[di

" sensitivity to spent fuel pool issues - ' ' '

^ ~ ~ ' '

letter catett S/1/97 --

s MPA . MOV testing & survelliance. This item is closed with the exception of IFI 2 See Ifl 94 18-09 N (1)

GL BTTO 94-18-09 on pertodic verification. With is to be follmed to after a new ganeric c(munication is issued.

LICENSE AMENI.NENT/ RELIEF RE0tKSTS R.G. 1.97 RG 1.97 instnrentation - Stbcool monitors etc category change. License 2 N (5)

Instnpent s amer *ent may be approved by Decenter.

Biometrics & Biometric exemption to allcw t. king security badges offsite - Staff review 2 N (S)

Sacurity is emected to t>e ccrplete tom Core flood Relief request RE: Core flood nozzle - Staff needs more info. PM will 2 N ($)

Nozgle keep RIT informed s OT5G Tthes OTSG tthe testing - Licensee proposed a revised OTSG tube acceptance 2 See VIO 96-05-04 N (S) f criteria.

Ono issues Pressurizer During Refuel 9 a sub-surface flaw was discovered. The licensee performed 2 N ($)

Nozzle flaw better inspection during RIO and found the flaw to be acceptable. The new inspection results in reduced flaw size and consequently acceptance criteria (dith is based on ratio of flaw to thickness) changes. Staff review in prooress.

Criticality The licensee did not carry a previously approved exeaction from part 70 2 N ($)

Monitor (70.24?) requirements to Part 50 license. Need legal interpretation of the stattis of the euerption.

Sources for 1ssues include: IFS. SIMS. NUREG 1435 (Status of Safety Issues at Licensed Power Plants). Resident's OIL.

PM's CIL 16

NOTt. Open allegations. OI investigations, and emergingedraft issues are listed separately.

LIST OF ACRONYMS USED AP Abnormal Operating Procedure BWST Borated Water Storage Tank ,

C Closed CCHE Control Complex Habitability Envelope CFR Code of Federal Regulations CR3 D.l. Crystal River 3 Design Item CREVS Control Room Emergency Ventilation System EA NRC Escalated Enforcement Action EDBD Engineering Design Basis Document ECCS Emergency Core Cooling System EDG Emergency Diesel Generator EEI NRC Escalated Enforcement Item E0P Emergency Operating Procedure FSAR Final Safety Analysis Report GL NRC Generic Letter ILRT Integrated Leak Rate Test (of the Reactor Building)

IFI NRC Inspector Followup Item LER . Licensee Event Report LOCA Loss of Coolant Accident LPI Low Pressure Injection LTOP Low Temperature Overpressure Protection MPA NRC Multi-Plant Action MUV Makeup Valve N (D) Not an NRC Restart Item (because the issue is duplicated by a restart item)

N (G) Not an NRC Restart Item (because it is a generic issue affecting multiple operating plants and is being addressed by NRR)

N (I) Not an NRC Restart Item (because previous inspection of the issue is adequate for restart)

N (S) Not an NRC Restart Item (because resolution of the issue is not needed for safe restart)

NOV NRC Notice of Violation NPSH Net Positive Suction Head OCR Operability Condition Report OP Operating Procedure OGRV Power Operated Relief Valve PR Problem Report R NRC Restart Item RB Reactor Building RCS Reactor Coolant System RMG Radiation Monitor 17

SFP Spent Fuel Pool.  :

TIA. NRC Task Interface Agreement (between NRC offices)

TS Technical Specifications URI NRC Unresolved Item US0 Unreviewed Safety Question  ;

VIO NRC Violation OFFICIAL RECORD COPY DOCUMENT NAME: S:\DRS\ RESTART.CR3\ RESTART.597 i

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