ML20141G171

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Summary of Crngp Ninth Meeting Held 970618-19 at Crngp Re Status of Current Insps,Plans for Future Insps & Crngp 3 Checklist.Updated Checklist Encl
ML20141G171
Person / Time
Site: Crystal River Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 06/27/1997
From: Jaudon J
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
References
NUDOCS 9707030319
Download: ML20141G171 (22)
v • d • e


Text

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  1. j e aroug'o UNITED STATES 8.

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION o

REGION ti g

j ATLANTA FEDERAL CENTER 4

61 FORSYTH STREET, SW, SUITE 23T85

[

ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303 June 27.

997 MEMORANDUM TO:

File FROM:

Johns audon. D're or Divis n of Reactor Safety g

t

SUBJECT:

MINUTES OF THE CRYSTAL RIVER RESTART PANEL NINTH MEETING HELD JUNE 18-19,1997 The Crystal River Restart Panel met at the Crystal River site on the afternoon of June 18 and again on the morning of June 19. 1997.

The following panel members attended the meeting.

Johns P. Jaudon, Chairman Harold O. Christensen Kerry D. Landis Stephen J. Cahill Lakshminaras Raghaven Additionally, the following NRC staff attended the meeting in whole or part for support and information.

Fiarc L. Dapas representing office of the EDO Loren R. Plisco.NRR Caudle Julian Bob Schin The status of cne current inspections and plans for future inspections were

+

discussed.

The Crystal. River 3 Issues Checklist was reviewed and updated.

New issues were discussed and decided to be either restart or non-retart

. issues.

The updated checklist is attached. On the afternoon of June 18, the panel conducted a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> tour of the power plant, including an extensive tour inside the containment.

The panel observed that housekeeping and plant

~ material condition is much improved.

)

On June 19.-1997, the panel conducted a public management meeting with the

-licensee at the FPC training center.

Following that meeting, the panel chairman responded to questions from the public and press.

ji

/\\

The panel scheduled the next meeting for July 15, 1997, in Region II.

Docket: 50-302

'[

Attachment:

As stated cc w/att - See page 2 ll!!Illf!lll!!I!!)lll!!,!!!)ll!l i. I 9707030319 970627 PDR ADOCK 05000302 G

PDR

,i File 2

cc w/att:

L. Reyes. ORA /RII S. Collins, NRR J. Johnson. DRP/RII S. Varga, NRR F. Fedbon. NRR H. Christensen, DRS/RII K. Landis. DRP/RII S. Cahill SRI /RII L. Raghaven, NRR R. Schin DRS/RII G. Tracy, OEDO CPUBLICup l

i g0039 L

.40/ ;

y Attachment A CRYSTAL RIVER 3 ISSUES CHECKLIST R ITEMS (TO BE INSPECTED BY THE NRC BEFORE RESTART)

Status as of June 19, 1997 The Crystal River Restart Panel met on No. ember 13, 1996, and developed seven general areas under which the restart issues will be grouped.

Those seven areas are:

1.

Knowledge of design and licensing bases and adequacy of design margin 2.

Regulatory knowledge and perspective 3.

Operator performance and knowledge 4.

Marginally effective engineering organization 5.

Management oversight; including quality assurance, self assessment, and corrective action 6.

Corrective actions for NRC violations 7.

Other Total Restart (R) Items: 146

  1. Open 106
  1. Closed 40 IISUE DESCRIPTIOtt AREA NRC LEAD IR/SER LICENSEE COBAGNTS NRC CLOSURE STATUS STATUS LICENSER'S RESTART LIST OF DESIGN-RELATED ISSUES (D. I. s) (per 10/28/96 Itr froan FPC)

CR3 D.I. 1 HPI pump recirculation to the makeup tank 1

RI Cahill D-1 LER 97-08, R

See URI 96-01-02, IFI 96-17-02, IR 96-!?

CR3 D.I. 2 HPI system modifications to in: prove SBICCA margins 1

Schin/NRR D-2 See URI 96-01-02, LER R

96-06, IR 96-17 CR3 D.I. 3 LPI pump mission time (NRR for boron precip. review) 1 RI Cooper /

D-3 See URI 96-201-01, IR R

NRR R-9 96-17 CR3 D.I. 4 Reactor building spray pump 1B NPSH 1

PI Sanchez D-4 See URI 96-201-02, IR R

96-17 CR3 D.I. 5 Emergency feedwater system upgrades and diesel generator load 1

Schin D-5 See URI 96-12-01; EEI R

96-12-02, IR 96-17 impact

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MRC LEAD IQ/SER LICEISEE rnumesETS BEtc ~

ISSUE-DESCRIPTION.

CLOSURE SfATUS STATUS CR3 D.I. 6 Emergency diesel generator loading 1

Fillion/

D-6 See EEI 96-12-02, IR R

Schin 96-17, LER 96-20, LER 96-25 CR3 D.I. 7 Failure modes and effects of los.s of DC power 1-M. Miller D-7 See URI 96-12-01 LER.

R 96-07, IR 96-17 CR3 D.I. 8 Generic Letter 96-06 (Ttiermal ovJrpressure protection for 1

RI Cahill/

D-8 See IR 96-12, LER 97-R Cbntainment piping, penetrations, and coolers)

Crowley 04 I

LICBwsEE*s oTERR mBSTART ITusS RMG 29/30 Seismic mounting of HR Rad Monitor 1

Lenahan/RI D-19 R

BNST NPSH NPSH concern with ECCS pumps when SFP pumps are running in 1

Thomas D-18 Review SP-(30 test R

BWS and Recirc results following MUT -

event MUV-27 Section XI leakage testing 1

R-21 R

FIVE a OF umaimuAmw r'n"N",

WITE IPAP RECransenED IMSPECTION AED RII RECnememED ADDITIONS i

j Management

- NRC inspect Problem Identification; focusing on OA audits 5

RI Cahill/

P-2 Inspect New PC system R

Oversight -

and the problem reportina system. - Increased inspection of QA Thomas P-3 FPC closing OP-2 IPAP Problem Analysis and Evaluations focusing on root cause

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Recumnended.

evaluations.

Inspection

[

Marginally

- NRC inspect Engi.neering Problem Identification and 4

Schin P-4 50.59 R

Effective Resolution; with empnasis on licensee evaluations for P-6

[

Engineering significant issues and work backlogs.

Organization

- Also inspect Quality of Engineering; with emphasis on 10

- IPAP CFR 50.59 screeninq and saf ety evaluatio-is, accuracy of tIIe j

Recommended FSAR, and management oversicht.

Inspect the licensee *s FSAR Inspection Review Project and assess tne identified FSAR errors.

Lack of

- NRC inspect Engineering Safety Focus; focusing on croper 1

Schin D-13 R

Adequate identification of discrepancies with the plant's desian basis D I Knowledge of in the correct ive action system.

D-16

[

the Design

- Also inspect Engineering Problem Identification and P-7 y

L Basic - IPAP Resolutions focusing on crocrams for identifyino desian basis P-8 I

Recomended issues and caoturing them in the corrective action procram.

Inspection

- Also inspect Quality of Engineering; focusing on-r sensitivity / understanding by the engineerinq/licensina staff l

of the plant's design basis.

L

- Also assess the design margin, including the licensee's l

  • extent of condition" reviews s

Lach of

- NRC inspect 50.59s, operability, reDortability 2

Schin P-4 R

P-5 Regulatory Etnowledge and

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Compliance i

With t

Regulations -

IPAP Recommended Inspection h

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ISSUE DESCR2PTION AREA NRC LEAD IR/SER LICENSEE COMMENTS NRC CLOSURE STATUS STATUS INSPECTOR FOLLONUP SYSTEM URI 95-02-02 Control room habitability envelcpe leakage. Excessive 1

Schin R-12 See TIA 95003; FPC TS R

leakage paths through doors, dampers, and drains due to Change Request No. 209 design errors and lack of r reillances/ preventive of 8/28/96; LERs 96-maintenance 04, 94-10, 95-01, 95-04-01, 95-09; irs 95-02, 95-09, 95-11, 95-16, 95-21, 97-05; FPC ltrs. of 5/26/95 and 10/23/95 URI 96-01-02 Discrepancies in che high pressure injection design basis 1

Schin D-9, D-1 See CR3 D.I.

1; R

analysis CR3 D.I.

2

~

URI'96-04-01.

DiscrepanctiE in the EDBD and the PSAR.regarding thel.

1^

Crowley.

IR 96-19

.See EEI 96 19-07.-

R,. C :

preventior af. post-LOCA bornn precipitation-URI 96-05-02s Desigrt ' m rns with main-steam line hangars used in seismic-s1 RI, --.

IR 97-01.

D-51D

See VIO 96-05-012.

R, C-

. and o'.er dynamic load. applications i Raghavan.

Coordinate wit.h Lv

Rachavan -

URI.96-06.6 0 3..

. No" safety'relsted transfer switch used in ES statusL

1 Fillion'

'IR 97-04'.

'D R, C '

it, icating light circuitry'

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URI-96+12-01

'E trgency Feedwater low NPSH t.o both pumps due to' postulated; I.

..Schin

IR:96-19 DI17 J'

,See CR3.D.I.-Sy Ri C 5 ss* gle: failure ^

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CR3 D.IU 7;-EBI 96*19C 03,

-04, NOSi -06 '?

URI 96-17 03

_Fa. lure to. conduct required Technical Specification..

4-M.: Miller.::

.IR'97-02i OPa18 J

'See MPA #L601. (GL 96 6-

. R,' C :'

i 1

sur eillance testing cn safety related circuitrv fGL'96-01) 011.ESee IR 97-01 plant cooldown following a small break LOCA 1

RI Cooper /

D-3 See CR3 D.I. 3; See IR R

URI 96-201-01 Long t,

,1 assu-ning gingle failure in the decay heat drop line NRR 96-11.

NRR taking responsibility for this it em.

URI 96-201-02 NPSH for building spray pump has very little margin, and some 1

RI Sanchez D-4 See CR3 D.I.

4 R

calculation facecrs were nonconservative URI 96-201-03 Operating curves 16, 17, and 18 in OP-103B are not validated 4

Hopper 0-1 R

by licensee URI 96-201-04 Nonsafety-related positioners on safety-related valves 1

Thomas D-10 See IR 96-08, IR 97-01 R

R-7 URI-96a201-05.

Se wice water' system heat loads did not consider maximum.'

12 Crowley -

.IR 94-19' 1.

See EEI?96-19-08' R, C:

input heat -(OP-103Bf Curve 15)'

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URI 96-201-07 EDG not protected against water spray from failure of fire 1

Fillion/

D-52 R

protection deluge system in EDG room M. Miller /

W. Miller 13 SchinE

'IR 97-05" See IR 9146 R. C.*

URI 97601-06..

HPI system. design,' licensing basis : and TS concerns '

URI-97-01-06.

Adequacy of procedures to take ;the plant f rom bot standby' to :

2 ':.

Thomasi itR:9h02-R. C ':

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cold shutdown from outside the control room 'fAppendir R) "

URI 97-02-02 Deletion of water quality requirements from the FSAR 2

Thomas /NRR P-5-B R

URI 97-05-02 50.59 safety evaluation does not address operation of the 1

Thomas /

R atmospheric dump valves from remote shutdown panel during an Raghaven Appendix R fire event 4

L

ARNA NRC LEAD IR/SER LICEIISEE CCIAEERITS IIstC 18903 DESCRIPTIC0r me?

STATUS STATUS URI 97-05504 LER and VIO not supplemented by date stated in licensee 2

nomas Review commitment R.

tracking system I

response

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' Design deficiency may cause taakeup-; tank ~vortexing^resulting g' ' ~

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LER 95+1& 00 closed?in;
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'in failure to meet % +-Mix'R requirements > "

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LER 96-18-00, Failure to verify RB penetrations closed per TS RI Cooper 0-2 See EA 96-365 R

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LER 96-18-01 R

LER 96-21-00 Delayed entry into technical specification required action 3

RI Cahill involving an inoperable Reactor Protection System channel R

LER 96-22-00, Design error regarding hot shorts results in operation 1

LER 96-22-01 outside Appendix R design basis 1

Schin/NRR See D.I.2 R

LER 97-05-00 Unanalyzed condition re small break LOCA & EFW R

LER 97-09-00, Inadequate design resulted in RCP lubricating oil collection 1

W. Miller /

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LER 97-13-00 Functional testing of EDG-1A room temperature may exceed 1

M. Miller 120*F s3'?' ]-

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1 Mellen P-13 See IR 95-16, IR 95-R (was EEI 95-equipment (SLIII).

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B. EI: 3542-.0213 tidentified'rinc1/18/9611etterstitled.EA 95a124 : end:EA 96155k@'

EA 95-126.

Failure to take adequate corrective actions for operator 6, 5 Schin P-11 R

VIO I.C.1 concerns regarding CP-103B, Curve 8, for MUT pressure / level L

iwas EEI 95-limits (SLIII) 22-03) s

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EA 95-126 Corrective actions for an inadequate Curve 8 (two STI's and a 6, S RI Cooper /

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VIO I.C.2 revised Curve SA & 88) were also incorrect (SLIII)

Schin (was EEI 95-

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22-03) t EA 95-126, Design controls failed to ensure adequate safety margin for 6, 1 RI Cooper /

P-6 R

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(was EEI 95-t 22-04) l EA 95-126 Swapover of ECCS pumps' suction from BWST (at five feet) to 6, 1 RI Cooper /

D-35 R

VIO I.D.2 reactor building sump was inadequate (SLIII)

Schin-(was EEI 95-t 22-04) t EA 95-126, EOPs allowed single LPI pump to supply two HPI pumps, with 6, 1 RI Cooper /

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VIO II.A (was insufficient NPSH for LPI pump (SLIII)

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EEI 95-22-04) t EA 95-126, Failure to take adequate corrective actions for tank 6, 5 RI Cooper P-12 R

VIO II.B (was volumes / level / suction point (SLIV) r EEI 95-22-03)

EA 95-126, Failure to ensure fire water storage tank contained adequate 6,

1 RI Cooper D-37 R

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J VIO II.C (was volume of water (SLIV)

EEI 95-22-03) p EA 96-316 Four examples of failure to follow refueling procedure FP-203 3

Hopper 0-4' R

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r

o ISSUE DESCRIPTION mera NRC LEAD IR/SER 1,ICDISFE COMMENTS MRC C:4SURE STATUS STRTUS__

EA 96-316 Failure to assure root cause analysis and corrective actions 5

Hopper C-5 R

(02014).

taken to preclude repetition were adequate after refuel (was EEI 96-incident (no PR issued) 10-02)

EA 96-365.

EDG loading USQs due to inadequate 10 CFR 50.59 evalaations; 4

Schin/

D-6 See CR3 D.I.

5; CR3 R

96-465, 96-three exanyles (one modification & two procedure changes)

Fillion D-14 D.I.

6 527, VIO A D-15 (01012, P-5 01022, and R-2 01032).

(was EEI 96 02 EA 96-M5 et EFW MPSR USQ due to inadequate 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation 1

Schin D-38 R

al. VIO A fez a modification (01042).

(was EEI 96-19-03)

EA 96-365 et EFW USQ due to removing the automatic open signal from ASV-1 Thomas R-4-A R

al, VIO A 204, reducing the reliability of EFP-2 (01052).

(was EEI 96-19-06)

EA 96-365 et Inadequate 50.59 evaluation for post-IDCA boron precipitation 1

RI Cooper P-17 Verify procedures and R

al, VIO A control documentatica adequate (01062).

prior to restart.

(was EEI 96-19-07)

EA 96-365 et Use of unverified calculations to support modifications.

4 Schin D-14 R

al, VIO B NRC inspect licensee's extent of condition reviews.

P-6 (02013).

!was EEI 96-12-04)

EA 96-365 et Three inadequate procedures for containment penetration 4

RI Cooper P-15 R

al, VIO B surveillances (02013).

(was EEI 96-19-01)

EA 96-365 et Failure to update applicable design documenta to incorporate 1

Thores D-39 R

al, VIO B EFW design information (EFP-2 assumed operating when EFP-1 (02013).

trips at 500# RCS pressure)

(was EEI 96-19-04)

EA 96-365 et Failure to include applicable design information in the 1

Thomas D-40 R

al, VIO B design input requirements for an EFW modification (EFP-2 (02013).

continuing to operate after EFP-1 trips at 500# FCS pressure (was EEI 96-and hydraulic requirements) 19-05)

EA 96-365 et Error in design calculations for SW system heat loads 1

Crowley/

D-28 R

al, VIO B Mellen (02013).

(was EEI 96-19-08) 7

p ISSUE DJSCRIPTION anWa NRC LEAD IR/SER LICENSEE CCESGNTS NRC CIASURE FTATUS STATUS EA 96-365 et Inadequate corrective actions for 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation 5

Schin P-14 R

al, VIO C errors; two examples (03013).

(was EEI 96-12-03)

EA 96-365 et Inadequate corrective actions for inadequate containment 1

RI Cooper P-16 R

al, VIO C penetration surveillances (03013).

twas EEI 96-19-02)

EA 97-094 Failure to report an unanalyzed condition that significantly 2

Schin/

See LER 97-001, IR 97-R VIO A2(01021) cornprend sed plant safety. Inadaquate NPSH for EFW pump RI Cahill 04 EA 97-162, Inadequate safety evaluations for added operato* actions for 1

Schin P-5-C R

VIO 01013 design basis SBIDCA mitigation (was EEI 97-06-01)

VIO 93-16-07 Inadequate A r AP procedures 6,

3 Hopper 0-3 See IR 96-04, IFI 96-R P-19 04-03, IR 96-09 VIO 95-16-C3 Inadequate procedure for operation of the makeup pump 1A 6,

1 RI Cahill 0-8-A See LER 96-10 R

  • cooling water VIO 95-21-03 Failure to isolate the class 1E from the non-class 1E 6,

1 Thomas /

D-30 See LER 95-25, LER 96-R electrical circuitry for the RB purge and mini-purge valves RI 02, IR 97-01, IR 97-02, IR 97-05 VIO 96-01-01 Inadequate corrective action for HPI flow indication problem 6,

5 RI Cooper D-53 See LER 96-05 R

VIO 96-01-06 Failure to correctly translate design basis of SW system into 6,

1 RI D-54 R

procedures, drawings and instructions VIO 96-04-02 Failure to take prompt corrective action in revising 6,

5 Hopper 0-9 R

procedure VP-580, Plant Safety Verification (for STAS).

VP-580 contained outdated and incorrect information.

VIO 96405-01.

Failure:to create a: PR 'and OCR for damaged.tnain steam.line.

6/ 5 RI.

.IR 97 C+101 See URI-96-01-02: See..

R,' C i

Raghavan:

TR 97-02' IR 9L02 -

hangars VIO 96-05-05 Failure to.,' follow proce.duTes for updati q 11esign basis i-6F 4 l Crowley; l IR. 97.. 01 -

. OP-8/ D-55 R,.C-'

VIO 56+05+07/

Inadequate receiving; inspections for battery chargers M endor,:-

6 d4 ;

LSchin' IR 97JC11:

GP-20i A, C.

tests)

'VIO 96;45-G8' Failure to. follow purchasing procedures'for inverters 1 6,141 Schinj IR:97-01;.

'CPh21]

R.C-

.~

w.

'No procedure.for decinerallred water flush performed byi 64c3'

RIa IR 97-02i

'OP-22 :

R,' ' C '

VIO 96-06-021 operators en boric' acid addition lines.

VIO 96-06-04 No evaluation on non-FSAR vital battery charger configuration 6, 4 RI Cooper R-18 R

.VIO 96-06-07.

,PR not. initiated to resolve CREVS-test failure:;

6;J.5

....Lenahan/.1 9 LIR 97-02 CP-23.'

R C; Crowleyv VIO 96-08-01 Corrective action not taken on make-up system audit findings 6,

5 RI Cahill P-24 R

& excessive vibration on spent fuel pool pump cooling fan motor 8

IRECE DESCRIPTIOlg m1 NRC LEAD IR/SER LICEN31E CrmtwurTS NRC C1OSURE STATUS STATUS ~

.... v; S :....

V10 96-09-03 Fabure to perform a 10 CFR 50159 safety evaluation for

6. 30 Thomas 5 IR 97-C2 CP-251 RMC

? changes to procedures described'in the FSAR for controlling; dissolved hydrogen concentration in the' RCS -

VIO 96-09-04s Failure to upd. ate..operat.ing.cu. rv. es' to' reflect.1981' po.we. r x

O4; Thomasi lIR Nft P-26?

~

R., Cu 7

u VIO 96-09-05 Failure to incorporate design change of MUV-64 into 6,

4 Thomas /

P-27 R

operations procedures Crowley

__ j VIO 96-09-06 Three examples of design control errors terroneous 6, 4 RI Cooper P-8 R

calculation inputs and ISI boundary)

VIO 96-09-07 Untimely corrective actions for the EFIC system concerns and 6, 5 Thomas P-28 See IR 97-01 R

problems VIO 96-11-04 Reactor building sump not constructed in accordance with 6,

1 RI Cooper D-56 Sea IR 97-02 R

approved construction drawings VIO 96-15-02 Failure of reactor coolant pump oil collection system to 6,

7 W. Miller D-57 See IR 97-02 LER 97-R retain oil leaking from reactor coolant pump 009, PC 97-3387 VIO 96-20-01 Failure to adhere to reactor coolant system cooldown limits 3

RI Cooper P-29 R

VIO 96-20-02 Failure to follow procedure AI-400C for review and 7

RI Cooper P-30 R

development af Maintenance Procedure PM-191, Main Turbine / Generator, Feedwater Turbine Layup VIO 97-01-01 Inadequate clearance tagging requirements 3

RI Cahill 0-12 R

VIO 97-01-02 Failure to follow procedures, resulting in inadvertent EDG 3

RI Cooper 0-13 R

start VIO 97-01-04 Failure to perform TS surveillance for spent fuel pool level 3

RI Cooper M-9 R

VIO 97-01-07 Instrument loop uncertainty setpoint calculation assumptions 4

Mellen D-26 See IR 97-02 R

not translated into procedures VIO 97-01-09 Inadequate corrective actions for cable ampacity 4

Fillion/

D-22 R

M. Miller VIO 97-02-01 Failure to follow equipment status control procedural 3

RI O-13-A R

requirementa VIO 97-02-03 Adequat e procedures not in effect to take the plant from hot 1

Thomas P-19-A R

standby to cold shutdown f rom outside the control room VIO 97-02-04 Failure to conduct TS logic testing 1

M. Miller R-1-A See GL 96-01 R

VIO 97-05-01 Failure to follow equipment tagging control procedural 3

RI Cahill R

requirements VIO 97-05-03 Incorrect information in annunciator response procedure for 3

Thomas R

inverters IFI.95al$-cif nDesi;rn requirements for nitrogen overpressure ' { service water} f 1(1

'L. Mellen.

(11:97+D1:

D Need to review..

R; C 1

-licensee's' calculation :

a conclusient. See IR' 95-21' 9

a"1 NRC LEAD I2/SER LICENSEE CCEGENTS WRC IISUE DESCRIPTION CLOSURE STATUS STAWS IFI 95-15-02 Design requirements for dynamic IhCA ef fects per surge line 1

RI Sanchez D-59 See IR 95-21 and TIA R

96-013 effects IFI 95-15 b3-Design requirements for reactor.coclant pump cooler failure.

.t$

Thomas Ik 97 D 59 i See IR 95-21 and TIA..

R, ' C '

E 9-014-IFI 95-15-04 Code requirement for thermal relief valves on decay heat 1

RI Sanchez D-60 See IR 95-21 and TIA R

96-014 - issued removal heat exchancers IFI 95-15-05 Relief valves removed from heat exchangers 1

RI Sanchez D-61 See IR 95-21 and TIA R

96-014 IFI 96-03-15 Evaluate the licensee's revised TS Bases and related 10 CFR 2

RI Cahill R-14 R

_50.59 analysis for HPI flow indicators IFI 96-17-02 Potential for HPI/LPI recirculation resulting in make-up tank 1

KI Cahill D-1 See CR3 D.I.

1, LER R

97-008 overflow IFI 96-17-04 Adequacy of 10 CFR 50 Appendix R fire study and documentation 1

W. Miller D-43 R

IPt 96-201-11.-

Design basis.for decay heat / core flood / reactor-coolant piping.

1.

Crowley '

1R 97-02 D Identified in'IFAP' R, C report as IF+96 201-01 temperature-IFI 96-201-12 Conduit sizing criteria - jamming ratio not considered 1

Fillion/

D-45 Identified in IPAP R

M.

Miller report as IP-96-201-02 IFI 96a201-13 Cable ampacities.- several cables exceed rating,-including' if Fillion.

IR.97-01.

. D Identified in IPAF R. C '

DHP-1 report as IF-95-201-03,

IFI 96-201-14 EDG protective trips not bypassed during emergency mode of 1

M.

Miller D-12 Identified in IFAP R

report as IF-96-201-04 operation IFI 96-201-15 Verification of motor starting data 1

billion /

D-46 Identified in IPAP R

M.

Miller recort as IF-96-201-05 I

'IFI 96-201+16 Coordination of Second level undervoltage relay:(SLUR) 1-Fillion/-

IR:97-05' D Identified'in IFAP RC*

setting vs. Irrrerter operation M. Miller report-as'1F-96-201-06 IFI 96-201-17 Coordination of SLUR and fuse protection 1

Fillion/

D-31 Identified in IFAP R

M. Miller report as IF-96-201-07 IFI 97-02-05 Outstanding issues associated with the emergency diesel 1

RI Cooper D-6-G R

oenerator power uprate modification 1N 37-06:

Weaknesses in plant-specific emergency operating procedures 3'

RI CooperJ EOPs A in FPC planned.

R, C

  • Hopper /'

IR 97-07 O-14.

Inspect licensee's-for refilling the secondary side of dry once-through steam generators uporade MULTI-PLANT ACTIONS MFA #L507; Pressure locking and thermal binding of safety-related gate 2

NRR D-49 New PC 97-1517 R

GL 95-07 valves. Currently in staff review. An RAI is outstanding.

identifies that EFIC valves open/close was Expected completion 7 not taken into consideration MPA #L601; Testing of safety-related logic circuits -

2 M. Miller R-1 11/96 - the licensee R

GL 96-01 Licensee response in staff review. More details are has identified testing deficiencies that must required. This issue requires attention.

be fixed prior to rest a rt (VIO 97-02-04) 10

ISSUE WCRIPTICat Etwa NRC LEAD IR/SER LICENSEE CGGGNTS NRC CLOSURE STATUS STATUS MPA#1,50N

'CircufpferentiallcrackingofSGth[ flaws.

21

.Blake/NRR%

'R-17[

SeeNRClhtter5/19/97 R, C

Licensee response in staf f review.'-

~ -

L2CINSE AMENDMENT / RELIEF REQUESTS CCHE Control complex habitability envelope - Including TS-208 and 2

Schin/NRR R-12 Withdrawn FPC ltr.

R TIA 95-03 need to be addressed. Licensee submittal does not 4/18/97. See also FPC provide adequate TS action.

ltr. 5/15/97 for comit ment s.

USQs Licensee request and NRC review and issue license amendments NRR R-2, R-4 R

for all Unreviewed Saf ety Questions (USOs)

USQ EDG Load Uprate Fillion/

R-2 See EEI 96-12-02, CR3 R

NRR D.I.

6 USQ ASV 204 Thomas /

R-4 See EEI 96-19-04, CR3 R

NRR D I.

5 USQ DH-45-FI (post-LOCA boron precipitation issue)

Crowley/

R-5 Fee URI 96-201-01, URI R

NRR 96-04-01 USQ EDG Load List Update Fillion/

R-6 See EEI 96-12-02 CR3 R

NRR D.I.

6 USQ ITS 3.0.3 relief for LPI/DH to allow modification of air Thomas /

R-7 See URI 96-201-04 R

cperators for DCV 17, 18, 177, 176 NRR ILRT Conduct an ILRT or seek an Amendment to utilize Method B of NRR R-10 R

Appendix J to 10 CFR 50 CTHER ISSUES LTOP Current TS does not address LTOP prevention or mitigation.

2 NRR/RI R-16 NRC ltr. 2/4/97 R

On the basis of GL 88-11, the licensee submitted information requested licensee to to demonstrate that LTOP in B&W plants have less than 1 in submit a TS amendment.

100 reactor years probability of occurrence and as a result On 4/7/97 FPC j

per GL 88-11 non-appendix G methodology can be used for PT submitted an exemption curves. Such a PT curve would p; ovide for higher LTCP enable request to use Code pressure and temperature and would provide operational case N514.

Exemption flexibility. Staff denied the request in 1995 and requested is an review process.

a revised response. The licensee expects to respond late TS amendment 1997.

reflecting the approved exemption will be submitted by July.

Short term action to change PORV setpoint/ limit RCS P to 100#.

  1. ppendix R Appendix R design basis issues review by FC consultant. NRC 1

W.

Miller /

D-11 R

review open Appendix R issues to assure that there are no Fillion/

restart or operability issues imbedded in tham.

M. Miller /

NRR 11

.. T

,7

.r 1

,k ISSUE MSCRIPTION N

BRC LERD 2R/SM LI-N W'

CIASURS STATUS STATUS i

Operator NRC review opera *or workarounds list'to assure that there are 2

RI Cahill 0-7 See VIO 9#-09 R Morkarounds no restart or operability issues contained in them

'E

1 +5s :

.. :.; a.:,

c. :- s.,....

,.: :n.

B. =.M.i JRQ "qgp;-
Phase 4 review 'n.::B..L "R/Fv 135tc, 7::iew (11eensee* a! 50;54 f ;1ett.or"_. response 1(d. ue;6g :./. sthm3
.x

~ -

n.:s_..

. x;s
... : n.m e.=. c ;. :.
9.,..

.;:..;..>.;-::= x. x..

.~:...:,c.:...:.,

sv 3/p :: =

m af:,

7 wf

'S8K,4f Letteri::

c

.3:.y_m q

.h.

2

m

.8~

c9

g 3 q,

~

License Verify license conditions are met 2

KI Cahill R See FPC ltr 5/20/97.

R

+

Conditions Several license conditions were not.

m i

met.

g l

r RC loop In a adrvey inspection, the staff noted that certain branch 2

NRR' D-62' See NRC ltr 4/7/97 R

t a

Piping pipes off the prinary coolant loop were not analyzed as Code.

RAI. FPC has 60 days' t

Analyses Class 1 pipe (i.e., no fatigue analysis) as required by the to respond.

Code.

Need NRR technical branch's opinion on this i

e Sources for issues include:. IFS, SIMS, NUREG 1435 (Status of Safety Issues at. Licensed Power e

Plants), Resident's OIL,-PM's OIL NOTE:

Open allegations, OI investigations,.and emerging / draft issues are listed serm ately.

[

r

-[

+

h s

f t

i r

r t

4 n

i 12-t m

.m mm u...

m

. m m.m.

. x m

CRYSTAL RIVER 3 ISSUES CHECKLIST N ITEMS (INSPECTION PRIOR TO RESTART IS NOT NEEDED)

Status as of June 19, 1997 Tatal Non-Restart (N) Items: 108

  1. Open 97
  1. Closed 11 ISSUE DESCRIPTION AREA NRC t.EAD 1R/5ER LICENSEE STATUS COMMENTS NRC CL0stRE STATUS LICENSEE'S RESTART LIST OF DESIGN-RELATED 159E5 (D.I.s)(per 10/28/% ltr from FPC)

LICENSEE *S OTTR RESTART ITEMS OTSG Tubes Adequacy of OTSG ttbe stress-relieved rolled joints is questioned. BWOG 7

See licensee Precursor N (G) analysis of a Davis-Besse pulled OT5G tube current test data. and itmited Card PC %-5077 of field experience conflict with test data from 1972 which ~ qualified" a 11/6/%. (No TIA) stress-relieved rolled joint FIVE AREAS OF CONTINUING CONCERN. WITH IPAP RECOMMENDED INSPECTION AND Rl! RECOMMENDED ADDITIONS d.

INSPECTOR FOLLOWlP SYSTEM tRI95-2504S Excesshe cooldowrt rate.P 5!

!IR 96

_SeeCR3D,Ih1[

N (5); C -

URI %-03-04 Measuring of percent through-wall indications with an unqualified 7

See IR %-06. Generic N (G) procedure issue being addressed by NRR (no TIA)

URI 90 03-05 Eddy current sanple expansion based on degraded tube percentages 7

See IR %-06.

N (S)

URI %-06-10 Justification for renoval of Thermo-Lag protection from the source range 1

N (S) instretation t$l9607/03?

jincorrect jnformation provided bycontfactMO Sk 97 h3[

~

N.(5).C*

URI %-18 06 Failure to adhere to 10 CFR 50.54(p)(1) - Phys. Security Plan submitted "a IR %-18 decreased plan effectiveness 13

ISSUE DESCRIPTION AREA NRC LEAD IR/SER LICENSEE STATUS COMMENTS NRC CtOSURE STATUS URI %-201-06 Preferred offsite electrical power source witn plant shut down (500 kw 1

N (5) switchyard) is not qualified. Note: thril this issue is resolved.

Itcensee is not using 500 KV switchyard as an electrical pwr source URI %-201-09 Testing to qualify relays beyond manutacturers' ratings was inadequate 1

N (5)

EA 97 012 Failure to maintain protected area barriers 7

See IR 97-01 N (5)

LER 93-02-02.

Switchyard cable failure caused degraded voltage of Class IE electrical 7

LER 93 02-01 closed in IR N (I)

LER 93-02-03 buses and actuation of EDG 45-09 LER 94-06-01.

Deficiency in understanding of technical requirements leads to 2

LER 94-06-00 closed ir. IR N (D)

  • LER 94 06-03.

noncenservative RP5 setpoint and potential vriation of T5 95-16. See EA %-16.

LER 94-06-04 LER 94-06-05.

IER 94-06 06 LER 94-09-02 Unauthorized tests involving maketp tank level and pressure N (D)

  • LER 95-09-00 Minimal release during sulfur dioxide delivery causes actuation of toxic 7

See IR 95-11.

N (I) gas mnnitor resulting in control room mergancy ventilation actuation LER 95-10-01 Inadequate procedure causes low cooling water flow to makeup pmp 1

LER 95-10-00 closed in IR N (!)

resulting in operation outside the design basis 95-16. See also LEI 95-11-02 VIO %-16-03 LER 95-17-00 SW fitw to control room coolers controlled by air operated valves which 1

See IR 95-16. VIO % N (D) could fati noen 06 LER 95-18-00.

Inadequate T5 note allowed delayed entry into TS LCO 2

See NCY 95 18-05.

N (I)

LER 95-18-01.

lER 95-18-02 LER 95-19-00 Leak instrtrientation for SW flow to RBCUs incapable of measuring 90 gpm 1

See IR %-18.

N (I)

LER 95-23-01.

Inconsistent design asstrptions cause building spray flow rates to be 1

LER %-23-00 closed in IR N (I) lfR 95-23-02 outside design basis

%-04 LER 95-25-00.

Inadequate isolation of safety /non-safety related circuits 1

See YIO 95-21-03. See IR N (D)

  • LER 95-25-01.

97-02. IR 97-05. LER 95-25-01 closed in IR 97-05 LER 95-25-0?

LER 95-28-00.

BWST vacuta breaker has inadequate relief capacity 1

See IR 95-21.

N (I) tER 95-28-01 LER 96-01-01.

EFIC control circuits misrouted. Appendix R concern 1

LER %-01-00 closed in IR N (I)

  • LER %-01-02

%-04 See also NCV %-

01-03 LER 96 02-00L Minipurge valve has safety /non-safety relatedlctreuits without Isolationj 1;

'IR 97-05?

See VIO 95-21-03.-

4 (D; C*

LER 96-03-00.

RCS cooldown rate exceeded during cooldown 3

See URI 95-21-04.

N (I)

(ER %-03-01 i

LER 96-04-00 CCHE control dampers found damaged & leaking 1

See URI 95-02-02. IR 95-N (D) 21 LER %-05 01.

SW flow to RBCUs could exceed design 1

LER %-05-00 closed in IR N (D)

  • LER 96-05-02
  • % -04.

See also VIO %-

01-01 14

f 1

{

.i 155tE DESCRIPTION MtEA

!stC LEAD IR/SER.

LICENSEE STATUS CapetENTS IstC cLoStstE STATUS

'C M'

IM.M Siik

?. !1t.97.M.--- %*

f, nhMM30% ^

j$)M

.[

M96-50U$,

Mi..M.m.M.i.r_ror.M.., Mi..litiN. pp%, houti

-g 3 %,

10t3 D 1? 2? - '- " ~~

yg g,gp LER %-07-00.

WI line SBLOCA/ LOOP / loss of dc bus could have inadequate HPI flow 1

See !R 96-01. CR3 D.I. 2.

N (D)

LER %-07-01 instrtmantation LER %-08-00 kbiguous T5 note results in not performing RCS leak surveillance prior to 2

N (5)

Mode 2 i

t LER 95 09-00 Failure to reattach instrtraent ttbing to seismic stoports after 1

See URI E 03-06. IR 96-N (!)

I modification leads to m eration outside design basis 05 LER 96 10-00 Low flow in SW system cooled comonents causes operation outside design 1

1

~See VID 95-16-03.

N (D)

[

basis i

LER %-11-00 Personnel error causes testing deficiency resulting in condition 1

See MPA fL601 (GL %-01).

N (D) prohibited by improved T5 (GL %-01 issues) n..

...~ -. a.

.m;

..,r...w r

~. c,

.w

...,.s,.

. g :,.w..~

.,..x cu e...

~

..v.

. ~

an

..,,..c..r:,

. ~.,

. m.

/

e (tJA W 12-005 itberation outside design basis taused by battery chargers having; Til N'

~

f!R 97-Oti f5ee V10 96-000MM Lu to); sci

^=

w.+

r 4

l ",

?.

' ' ~ " L.,

f.,

~

' M;;f'~ '$ '.

e

'- i iter E 12-01F,

?. inadequat. e. test:resu. l.t.s. a,ccepted. in. erro. r. ?.

g g

p.

y

.gg LER 96 13-00 Operator error resulted in the inadvertent actuation of DCP-1A -

3 See NCV 96 03-02.

N (I) i i

LER 96-15-00 Personnel errors cause cable separation / isolation concerns resulting in 1

See IR 96 04.

N (I).

E operation outside the design basis (toute gas monitors) t LER 90 16-00 CREV5 filter testing did not meet T5 specs 2

RI N (5)

[

LER %-19-00.

Non-safety related switch used in safety related wiring for E5 status 1

See L 'I %-06-03. See IR N (D) '

LER % 19-01 lights 97-04 7

t LER 90 20-00 Unreviewed safety questions concerning EDG overloading caused by 4

R-2. D-6. D-14 See EE' 96-12-02.

N (D)

[

interpretation of regulatory requirents D-15. OP-5 t

LER E 23-00 Personnel error leads to missed surveillances resulting in violation of 2

See VIC %-15-01.

N (D),

i Technical Specifications (missed remote shutdCw) panel EFW punp pressure l

instruent enannel chect)

LER %-24-00.

Plant modification causes trianalyzed condition regarding emergency 1

See tRI %-12-01.

N (D) *

(ER %-24-01 feedwater F

LER 96 25-00 Personnel error causes testing deficiency resulting in condition 1

See WA #L601 (GL %-01)

N (D)

I.!

prohibited by Technical Specifications (12 contacts in E5 logic were not oping tested)

LER 97-01-00 Ineffective change management results in unrecognized NPSH issue affecting N (D)

  • EDW availability L

i i

LER 97-501-00 Maintenance activities in circulating water system result in protected N (5) *

(See EA 97-012) area breach 4

LER 97-502-00 Security zone out of service N (5)

  • i j

~

LER 97-02-00 Out of calibration fuel storage pool wate" level transmitters N (D) *

(See VIO 97 !

i 04)

LER 97-07-01 P

15 i

ISSUE DFSCRIPTION AREA NRC LEAD IR/SER LICENSEE STATUS COMMENTS NRC tLOSURE STATUS LER 97-03-00.

Personnel error causes testing deficiencies (GL 96-01)

See VIO 97-02-04 N (D)

  • LER 97 03-01.

LER 97 03-02.

LER 97-03-03.

lER 97-03-04 LER 97-04-00.

Thermal relief valves inside the containment do not meet requirements for GL 96-06 N (D)

  • Sea 0 1 8 tER 97-04 01 desion basis accidents LER 97-06-00 Surveillance testing results in reduction of EDG ratirg limit due to see D.I.6 N (D)
  • inadequate acceptanca LER 97-07-00.

Bailding temparature variations larger than assaned. resulting in unknown See VIO 97-01-07 N (D)

  • LEP 97-07-01 instrtrwmt uncertainties LER 97-08-00 Potential of HPI punp recirculation capability resulting in possible MUT RI Cahill See CR3 0.1.1 N (0)
  • ovarficw or possible pum failure LER 97-10-00 HVAC was not considered for manual oparation of safe-shutdown equipment in See URI 97-05-02 N (D)
  • post-fire conditions resulting in non-comliance of APP R See MPA#L5C7 N (D)

GL 95-07 LER 97-12-00 CI system contaiment penetrations not designed for containment isolation GL %-06 N (D)

  • See D I 8 VIO 94-25-01 Failure to properly control the Control Conplex Habitability Envelope
6. 7 See URI 95-02-02.

N (0)

(door blocked oren for maintenance work)

N (!)f C time-

-l:SeeIR95-02/IR95-08 V10 94-27-02 i railure to make tac 10 CFR 50 73 reports to the NRC within the required ;

6i.20 1R 97-04L CP-4; 4.

VIO 94-27-03 E

" Failure to make one required 10 CFR 5032 report to the NFLwithin the :

6, 2 '

'IR 97-04 OP-4

-See IR 95--08:

M(D.C required time ?

VIO 96 01-05 T w exawles of failure to update FSAR as required by 10 CFR 50.71(e)

6. 4 N (5)

VIO 96 02-01 Failure to maintain 0.2 footcandles in the protected area

6. 7 See IR 96 07 N (5)

VIO 96 02-04 Failure to maintain secondary alarm station operable and inadequate

6. 2 N (5) compensatory maasures VIO %-03-11 Failure to follow radiation work permit requirements
6. 7 N (5)

VIO 96 03-12 Failure to report the transport of a radicactively contaminated individual

6. 2 N (5) offsite VIO 96-03-13 Unescorted visitor personnel within the protected area
6. 7 N (5)

VIO 96 05-04 Licensee approved eddy current acceptance criteria different from TS

6. 2 h (5) requiremants UID 90%-06 :

Fatlure to timely notify the NRC of a condition outside the Appendix R ?

~ 6l 20 LIR 97-04L N (S); C Licensing design basis - ~

VIO 96-07-01 Failure to protect safeguards information 6, 7 N (5)

VIO %-07-02 Failure to complete screening elements for Fitness for Duty Personnel

6. 7 N (5) 16

ISSUE DESCRIPTION AREA NRC LEAD IR/5ER LICENSEE STATUS ComE35 NRC CLOSURE STATUS VIO 96-09-01 Failure to follow a maintenance procedure resulting in the inadvertent

6. 7 N (5) initiation of the errtrol room emergancy ventilatian systm VIO %-09-02 Unescorted visitor personnel within the protected area
6. 7 N (5)

VIO 96 11-01 Inadequate work instructions to prevent the inadvertent start of the A EDG

6. 7 N (5)

VIO %-11-03 Personnel performing work on the reactor building stro without logging

6. 7 N (5) onto a clearance as required by approved WR VIO 96 15-01 Failure to perform a required T5 surveillance for the rette shutdom
6. 2 See LER %-23 N (5) pavl VIO 97-03-01 Failure to maintain control of badge / key card N (5)
  • IFI 94 18-09 Review periodic verification plans - MDV (GL 89-10 item) 2 See IR 95-11. IR 95-21; N (I)

Saa GL 89-10 IFI 95-02 05 Resonance noise in vicinity of MUV-25 7

N (5)

IFI 95-08-03 Emergency Operating Procedure update program 3

See IR 95-16. VIO 93-16-07 N (5)

IFI 95-11-01 SCBA requirements for personnel during a toxic gas release 2

N (5)

IFI 95-21-02 Modification to the standby feeowater pmp recirculation line 1

N (5)

IF1 96 03-16 Review of MAR 96 02-09-01. HPI flow indicators. Installation package and 1

N (5) functional testing results IFI 96-04-03 Effect of setpoint calculations on E0P revisions 1

See V10 93-16-07 N (D)

IFI 96 05-06 Large break loss of coolant analysis generic concerns 1

N (5)

IFI 96 06-09 '

Def1ctencies irt Pecatiss fire barrier pro 9 ram proceduces and docmentation1 45

'IR96-15[

N ($)f C IFI %-08-02 Reactor building cavity cooling piping thermal relief protection 1

See D. I. 8. GL %-06 N (0)

IFl 96-15-03 Actions taken to resolve post-accident recriticality concerns due to I

NRR reviewing. generic B&W N (G) localizad boron dilution issue IFI 96 18-08 Adequacy of licensee s corrective actions for security audit findings 5

N (5)

  • EA 97-009 Loss of control of a security badge & subsequent failure to imediately 2

Stratton See IR 97 03 N (5)

  • report loss & rmove badga frm security emputer EA 97-012. VIO Failure to have adequate security procedures reflecting security upgrades 2

Stratton See IR 96 18 N (5)

  • A(1) 01013 (was EE1 %-18-01)

EA 97-012. VIO Failure to respond to a protected area alarm 2

Stratton See IR %-18 N (5)

  • A(2) 01023 (was EEI 90 18-02) 17

ISSUE DESCRIPTION AREA NRC LEAD IR/SER LICENSEE STATUS COMMENTS WC CLOSURE STATUS EA 97-012. VIO Failure to assess more than one protected area alare 2

Stratton See IR 96-1B N (5)

  • A(3) 01033 (was EE! %-18-03)

EA 97 012. VID Failure to maint=in protected area barrier at Circulating Water System 2

Stratten See IR %-18 N (5)

  • A(4) 01043 (was EE! %-18-04)

EA 97-012. VIO Iredequate arms repository 2

Stratton See IR %-19 N (5)

  • A(5) 01053 (was EEI %-18-05)

EA 97-012. VID B Failure to report changes to Physical Security Plan per 10 CFR 50 54 2

Stratton See IR %-18 N (5)

  • C1063 (was EE!

requirements

%-18-07)

EA 97-094 Failure to make an emergency phone report within the time requiremnts of 7

RI Cahill See EA 97-094 N (5)

EA 97-094 Failure to hand carry a suspected reportable issue to the shift manager 2

RI Cahill See EA 97-094 N (5)

VIO C(01043) for reportability retiew (was eel 97 02)

EA 97-094 Repeat failure to report outside design basis conditions

1. 2 Schin See EA 97-094 N (5)

VIO Al(01013)

(was eel 97 03)

EA 97-161.

Continued failure to protect Safeguards information 2

Stratton See IR 97-03 N (5)

  • VIO A 01013 VIO B 01023 (was EE1 97 03-02)

C3!LTI-PLANT ACTIONS MPA #8105:

Seismic qualification of equipment. Licensee's criteria and procedures 2

FPC walkdown id'd approx.

N (5)

  • GL 87-02 approved. Some issues are pending and would b3 resolved thru audit 100 outliers. Staff had (scheduled for Mar 97). Licensee s field walkdosi results are currently telephone discussions on in staff review.

5/16. Phone streary docunented in NRf ltr 5/27. FPC comitted to characterize the outliers for safety significance by JLO. FPC also conmitted to resolve the outliers or provide JC0 pr kr to restart MPA #8111 (IPE);

IPE and IPEEE - These are in staff review. Not a restart item.

2 N (5)

MPAC0118 (IPEEE)

MPA OX602: 16CB Movement of heavy loads over spent fuel pool 2

N (5)

%-02

- ticensea response in staff review This would not be a restart issup MPA #L2n8; Thermolag - Licensee plans to use Mecatiss 2

See IR 96-01; IR %-06 N (5)

GL 92-08. BU 92-(an alternate material), some reanalysis of APPENDIX R. and some 01 exenotion. Fire barrier tests of Mecatiss including Ampacity tests are in staff review This also may not be restart issue 18

ISSUE DESCRNTION AREA MtC LEAD IR/SER LICENSEE SVATUS CuleOTS NRC Ct05tRE STATUS WAfL201:

Reactor vessel structural integrity. RAI to licensee on 7/22/%; Only a 2

N 15).

B. 92-01 Rev 1.

data base issue, not a restart item.-

Supp 1

^

lClosedIMC tIFPCYU NS C$

0 dafEx a$af3dn3d$ensee risponsel$MtIst) $$Nevied$) ;.

M

[

N NrN.

b..

I Ekbd0d[.,;C

.cmei e. is may have to be addressed prior;to restart because ofi ^gN Af 5/1/97J M, M

-letter:cated 5/1/97 i 8

.y G.L96-04 i Wt

+

  • sensitivity to spent fel: coni-issues 4 " ~

~'

~"

~

~~ *~^

~7 MPA MOV testing & surveillance. This item is closed with the exception of IFI 2

See IFI 94-18-09 N (1)

GL 8TT0 94-18-09 on periodic verification, which is to be followed @ after a new

.i generic cceanunication is issted LICENSE AMD O U T/ RELIEF REQUESTS R.G. 1.97 RG 1.97 instrutentation - Sitcool monitors etc - category change. License 2

N (5)

Instruments amend"ient may te approved by December

?

Biometrics &

Biometric exemption to allow taking security badges offsite - Staff review 2

Exerption issued 5/7/97.

N (S)

  • Security.

is expected to be comlete soon.

FPC nas 90 days to i glement A d icodh ~

71keNEENguesERENNi$o$0[bc$lkdStAN Ae$d[morelinftditlNih

[2%.

~Y

'N M}eddde[EEUUNh; ilSM

'^

~ ~ "^ '

~~ '

't keep stir.-informedf ' ' ' ' ' ~

" ~ ~ ' ' ' ' ' '

. Nozzle-OT5G Tubes OT5G tube testing - Licensee proposed a revised OTSG tube acceptance 2

See VIO %-05-04 ~

N (5) criteria w

OTHER ISSUES i

I Pressurizer During Refuel 9 a sib-surface flaw was discovered. The licensee performed 2

N (5)

Nozzle Flaw better inspection during R10 and fou1d the flaw to be acceptable. The new inspection results in reduced flaw size and consequently acceptance criteria betich is based on ratio of flaw to thickness) changes. Staff review in progress Criticality The licensee did not carry a previously approved exemption fran part 70 2

N (5)

Monitor (70.24?) requirements to Part 50 license. Need legal interpretation of the status of the exemption Sources for issues include: IFS. SIMS. NUREG 1435.(Status of Safety Issues at Licensed Power Plants). Resident's OIL.

PW s 0IL NOTE: Open allegations. 01 investigations. and emerging / draft issues are listed separately.

i NOTE: An Asterisk (*) in far right column denotes a change from previously issued report.

t LIST OF ACRONYMS USED 1

AP Abnormal Operating Procedure

.BWST Borated Water Storage Tank C

Closed 19

CCHE Control Complex Habitability Envelope CFR Code of Federal Regulations CR3 0.I.

Crystal River 3 Design Item CREVS Control Room Emergency Ventilation System EA NRC Escalated Enforcement Action EDBD Engineering Design Basis Document ECCS Emergency Core Cooling System EDG Emergency Diesel Generator EEI NRC Escalated Enforcement Item E0P Emergency Operating Procedure FSAR Final Safety Analysis Report GL NRC Generic Letter ILRT Integrated Leak Rate Test (of the Reactor Building)

IFI NRC Inspector Followup Item LER Licensee Event Report LOCA Loss of Coolant Accident LPI Low Pressure Injection LTOP Low Temperature Overpressure Protection MPA NRC Multi-Plant Action MUV Makeup Valve N (D)

Not an NRC Restart Item (because the issue is duplicated by a restart item)

N (G)

Not an NRC Restart Item (because it is a generic issue affecting multiple operating plants and is being addressed by NRR)

N (I)

Not an NRC Restart Item (because previous inspection of the issue is adequate for restart)

N (S)

Not an NRC Restart Item (because resolution of the issue is not needed for safe restart)

NOV NRC Notice of Violation NPSH Net Positive Suction Head DCR Operability Condition Report OP Operating Procedure PORV Power Operated Relief Valve PR Problem Report R

NRC Restart Item RB Reactor Building RCS Reactor Coolant System RMG Radiation Monitor SBLOCA Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident SFP Spent Fuel Pool TIA NRC Task Interface Agreement (between NRC offices)

TS Technical Specifications URI NRC Unresolved Item USQ Unreviewed Safety Question VIO NRC Violation 20

,

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