ML20217D293
| ML20217D293 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crystal River  |
| Issue date: | 04/03/1997 |
| From: | Jaudon J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20217D186 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-97-252 NUDOCS 9710030112 | |
| Download: ML20217D293 (40) | |
Text
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0 in as 'oq UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGloN 11 101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W., sulTE 2000 t 8 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 3G3234199
'59*...+/
Apdl 3,1997 MEMORANDUM TO:
File FROM:
John audon, Dir ctor Divisi 1 of Reactor Safety
SUBJECT:
MINUTES OF THE CRYSTAL RIVER RESTART PANEL SEVENTH MEETING HELD MARCH 21,1997 The Crystal River Restart Panel met at the facility site on March 21,1997. The following panel members and others attended the meeting:
Panel Members:
Johns P. Jaudon, Chairman Frederick J. Hebdon, Vice-Chairman Kerry D. Landis Laksminaras Raghaven Harold O. Christensen Others:
Robert P. Schin Billy R. Crowley Todd Cooper The panel noted that a new Resident inspector, S. Sanchez, will report on board April 7, 1997 Mr. Sanchez will increase the resident insp6ctor manning at the site to the "N+2" level through the period of expected period of plant restart.
The status of current inspections and the results thereof were discussed, it was noted that the licensee was experiencing difficulty in bringing issues on the restart list to closure and developing closure packages that were complete and which could pass the licensee's quality assurance review. It was determined that the resultant NRC management decision to reduce the number of inspectors assigned to the every other week closure inspections was appropriate.
Future inspection schedules were discussed. The tentative inspection plan, which includes open item follow-up, process, and specific inspections is attached for information. This inspection plan includes a Safety System Functional Inspection (SSFI) as an independent means to validate the licensee's system readiness reviews. It was also noted that the Regions 11 and NRR had completed their initial review of the licensee's response to the EDO's request for design information (i.e., the 50.54(f) letter).
The date for the next meeting was discussed and tentatively set as April 16,1997.
Subsequent to the meeting it was determined that April 16 was not a satisfactory date.
9710030112 970929
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O',MEALI97-252 PDR
I o
I l.
File 2
Accordingly, the next Panel meeting will be held in the Region ll offices on May 1,1997. The next onsite meetu,g and management meeting with the licensee will be scheduled separately.
Docket: 50 302 C
Attachments:
A.
Inspection Schedule l
B.
Restart Open item Check List l
4
)
cc w/atts:
L. Reyes, ORA /Ril -
S, Collins, NRR 4
J.-Johnson, DRP/Ril S. Varga, NRR F. Hebdon, NRR H. Christensen, DRS/Ril i
K. Landis, DRP/Ril S. Cahill, SRl/Ril L. Raghaven, NRR R. Schin, DRS/Ril G. Tracy, OEDO a
4 1
a f
e i
i 4-a 4.
A ttach m ent A Attachment A CRYSTAL RIVER 3 ISSUES CHECKLIST R ITEMS (TO BE INSPECTED BY THE' NRC BEFORE RESTART) l Status as of February 24, 1997 The Crystal River Restart Panel met on November 13, 1996, and developed sev,en general areas under which the restart issues will be grouped.
Those seven areas are:
4 1.
Knowledge of design and licensing bases and adequacy of design margin 2.
Regulatory knowledge and perspective
- 3..
Operator performance and knowledge 4.
Marginally effective engineering organization 5.
Management oversight; including quality assurance, self assessment, and corrective action 6.
Corrective actions for NRC violations 7.
Other ISSUI DESCRIPTION AAEA BrRC LEAD 2R/SER LICENSEE CCpOGNTS 3rRC STATUS LICENSER *S RES7 ART LIST OF DESICN-RELATED ISSUES (D.f.s)(per 10/28/96 Itr from PPC)
STATTS CR3 D.I. 1 HP2 pump recirculation to the makeup tank 1
RI D-1 See 1:RI 96-01-02 IFI R
96-17-62. IR 96-17 CR3 D.I. 2 NPI syst a modifications to impeowe SBtDCA margins 1
R1 0-2 See 17R1 96-01-02, LER R
96-06, IR 96-17 CR3 D.I. 3 LP1 pump mission time 1
lanahan/
D-3 See URI 96-201-01, In a
NRR 96-11 CH3 D.I. 4 Reactor building spray pump 18 NPSN 1
Lenahan D-4 See t?lt! 96-201-02. IR R
96-17 CR3 D.I. S Emergency feedwater system upgrades and diesel generator load impact 1
Schin D-5 See URI 96-12-01: EEI R
96-12-82, 1R 96 17 CR3 D.I. 6 Emergency diesel generator loading 1
Fillion D-6 See EEI 96-12-02 IR R
95-17 CR) D.I. 7 Fa!!are modes and effects of loss of DC power 1
Fillion D-7 See t;RI 98-12-01. LER R
96-07 IR 95-17 CR3 D.J. s Ceneric Letter 96-06 (7hermal overpressure protection for 1
Lenahan/
D-8 See IR 96-12 R
Containment piping. penetrations. and cooterol Crowley 1
1 I
I
4
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f,
~
ISSUS DESCRIPTION A33A NFC LEAP IR/SgR
- LICENSEE COBSEENTS ymC STATUS LICENSSE*$ OTHER RESTART ITEDt3 '
STATUS RM2 29/30 Seisele sonitoring of HR Rad Monitor 1
14nahan D-19 R
SWST MPSM NPEN concern with ECCS pumps when SFP pumps are running in DWS and Rectre 1
Thomas D-19 R
P!YR ARIAS OF COMTINUING CONCERN, if1TR 2 PAP RBCODGEENDED INSPECT!0er AseD RII RSCOD9 TENDED ADOTTI0erf Management
- Mac inspect Probles identifications focusing on On audits
}
Owsreight -
and the problem report lne system.
S Crowley/
OP-2. OP-3 Inspect New PC system R
h Increased inspection of OA Thomas IPAP Psoblem Anal Rscomumended evaluations.ysis and Evaluations focusing on root 5
cause Inspection Marginally
- MRC inspect Engineering Problem identifiestion and cffective 4
Schan OP-e 59.59 Resolutions with emphasis on licensee evaluations for Engineering stentitcant issues and work backloes.
OP-6 R
Organization
- Also inspect Quailty of Engineering with emphasis on e
- IPAP CPR 50.$9 screentne and safety evaluations, accuracy of t 1
R7comumended e
FSAR, and management oversteht.
Zarpection b
Lack of
- NRC inspect Engineering Safety Focuss focusing on groper Ad squete 1
Schin identification of discrepanetes with the olant's dessen basis OP-7, OP-8, Knowledge of R
[
in the corrective ace ton system.
D-13 D-15 the Design
- Also inspect En9&neering Problem Identification and D-16 Basis - EPAP Resolutions focusing on proerams for identifyine desten basis R5comunended
_ Issues and capturine them in the corrective action program.
Inrpection
- Also inspect Quality ot Engineering focusing on sensitivity /understandine by the engineertne/licenstne staf f of the plant's design basis.
- Also assess the design margin, including the licenses *e
- ewtent of condition
- reviews Lack of
- WRC inspect 50.59s, operabliftv, reportability -
2 Schin Sansitivity OP-5, OP-e i
for the Need a
j to Comply With g
tegulations -
IPAP 2ecommended inspection I
Operator
- NRC inspect Safety Focuss focusing on s-
__teation within 3
21 Parformance -
opeJations, communication with other site groups, and IPAP overg.ime R
Escommended Inrpectton l
1 i
t s
2
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23stTI DESCRIPTION AAmA snte LEAD 1R/sta LIcumsEE CcreewTs STATUS wac twsprefoR roLLoomy sysTert sTattrs tJR1 95-02 -02 Control room habitability envelope leakage.
Excess 1we 1
Schin leshage paths through doors, dampers, an:1 drains due to design errors and lack of surveillances/ preventive See TIA 95303: FPC TS R
maintenance Change Request No. 20s of 9/28/96: Leas SE-04, 94-10, 95-01, 95-04-01,95-09s irs 95-02, 95-09, 95-11, 95-16,95-21s FPC ltre, of 5/26/95 sad 10/23/95 501 96-01-02 Discrepancies in the high pressure injection design basis analysis 1
At D-9 See CR3 D.I. 1:
R CR3 D.I. 2 0
A T i $h h[d
[wwddMhIN*h (g$ hDOd@f) N F T " b E N gi Q 7% 0:M
+s - M fhw E
t prevention?of Ypost614CA? boron'precipit ationW:' 4%dNWf'W!+ h@is
%g M f@g%Q
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., f 9
0 7 jy Rj C URI 96-05-02 Design concerns with smain steam line hangars used in seismic and other dynamic load applications 1
- Lenahan, i
Raghavan see VIO 96-05-els R
Coordinate with L.
Raghaven 10! $6-06-03 Non-safety related transfer switch used in ES status indicating light circuitry 1
Fillion D-21 pw:nmn.q
- mag R
(Eme rgency;inswmwwun w' both; pump >;q>ue o pos..sq w y
@ U 96p12-01 g f
gmp ppegw my Isingleifs11ure NFeedwaterl # low;NPSWjto s>d tulated d 11Wg jsch1Pev:e y.;p ;xcepwm GS;n..C'V.d*
3Df17/c_.n wy pp :q n,3 mm.7;;rs x gg 3 w4ev m p;Q % #UP3@.; &gp %q g,. M gJ."4 m %gM:@2@ %y tn '
f g;3
!!4,96-19A qq 3See CR31.D.ItissW Qi. m ; R,1 C Q.,
%@E
.ATy
< n8 Wm MpW<WwMW WFN3 T X NMe j# 7 O
a CR1 sD. I.p s H Erl d 6 +19-fi, Na
<W R.M % 2G&& :-:d+O J- %
L 2
i 03 p.04; -Osyn 0sn n.
% ' &y URI 96-17-03 Fa!!ure to conduct required Technical Specification
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surveillance testing on safety related circuitry ICL 96-011 4
Fillion See MFA SL601 1CL 96-R 013 tfRt 96-201-01 tong term plant cooldown following a small break LOCA assuning a single fa!!ure in the decay heat drop !!ne 1
Crowley/
D-3 See CR3 D.I. 3s See IR R
I l-arRR 96-11, NRR taking responsibility for this item.
tOI 96-201-02 NPSH for building spray pump has very little margin, and some calculation factors were nonconservative 1
Lenahan D-4 See CR3 D.I. 4 R
i URt 96-201-01 Operating curves 16, 17, and It in OP-103B are not validated 4
leopper 0-1 by licensee m
t01 96-201-04 Nonsafety-related positioners on safety-related valves 1
Thomas R-7, D-10 See IR 96-Se R
2 ms om-a
.mwm.n~wgumomeym itfRi f 96-201s054, $ 5ervice i ma t o rs eystam Aea c Doade;pw'not/ cons ide r: mamisum WWnnw m ww.p.w ng did
!. w.nyprCrowlera.JW e1R?t6 fits fo-ib&iest ISeelEsI;76(19 os2':a.r 7p 5+ y n i
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pp m,s mmggy 4 mww.w y n
< ? WsA P W WinputVhe s t% tope 10354'f brve *15) MrhN++dece+rshmMdf0M N JG
't @6 :
74 NNMW k%W* MWhvd Y
- OM'W%"W~
- M 1R3 CQ tfRI 96-201-07 MWW" EDC not protected agatr.st water spray from fa!!ure of fire 1
Fillion protection deluge system in EDG room R
LER 95-13-01 Design deficiency may cause askeup tank vorteming resulting in f ailure to meet Appendim R requirements i
Hellen LER 95-13-00 closed in R
o IR 96-06 LER 96-18 00, Failure to verify RB penetrations closed per TS LED 95-18 01 1
El 0-2 R
EE! 96-10-01 Four examples of failure to follow refueling procedure FP-203 t/v %
'Nf. 6 9 5t 3
-,, r 4d i s t 4 *1 j s
R Ett 96-10-02 N O"' i Failure to assure root cause analysis and correct 1we actions i
Hopper b
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b taken to preclude repetition were adequate af ter refuel incident (no PR issuedi R
h, { e,7 ggd y
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ISSUE DESCRIPTION ARRA NRC LEAD IR/SER LICENSRE h as WRC STATUS STaTvs EEI 96-12-02 EDG loading USQs due to inadequate 10 CFR 50.59 evaluations:
4 Schin/
k three examples lone modification & two procedure changes)
R-2. D-6 D-Enforcement conference R
Fillion 14 D-15 1/24/96-See CR3 D.I.
07-5 5r Cat D.I. 4 EEI 96-12-03 Inadequate corrective actions for le CFR 50.59 evaluation errores two examsles 5
Schin Enforcement conferene R
s 1/24/3 EE! 95-12-04 Use of unverf fled calculations to support modifications.
4 Schin 0P-6 Enforcement conference R
3 NRC inspect Itcensee*e eetent of condition reviews.
1/24/94 EE1 96-19-01 Three anadequate procedures for containment penetration surveillances 4
RI
-t Enforcement conference R
1/24/96 EEI 96-19-02 Inadequate corrective actions for inadequate containment l
1 RI S
1 penetratton surveillances Enforcement conferewee R
1/24/96 EEI 96-19-03 EFW MPSM USO due to inadequate 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation for a modification 1
Schin t
Enforcement conference.
1/24/96 Ett 96-19-04 Failure to sepdate applicable design h nts to incorporate 1
Thomas ETW design information (EFP-2 assumed operating when EFP-1 Enforcement conference R
i trips at 5008 RCS pressurel 1/24/96 EE! f4-19-05 Failure to include applicable design information in the 1
Thomas V
destyn input requirements for an EFW modification (EFP-2 Enforcement conference R
continuing to operate af ter EFP-1 trips at 5008 RCS pressure 1/24/96 and hydraulle requiremental EEI 96-19 06 EfW USO due to removing the automatic open signal from ASV-1 Thomas
"'s 204, reducing the reliability of EFP-2 Enforcement conference R
1/24/96 i
EE! 96-19-07 Inadequate 50.59 evaluation for post-toCA boron precipitation 1
Crowley s ts control Enforcement conference A
1/24/96. Verify procedures and h
ntation adequate prior to restart.
EER 96-19-00 Error in design calculations for SW system heat loads 1
Crowley tl Enforcement conference R
1/24/96 EA 95-16 Use of non-conservative trip setpoints for safety-related 6 1 Mellen
[
twas EEI 95-equipment (SL111).
Additional esamples identified in IR 95-See IR 95-16 IR 95-21 R
02-04) 16.
L FA $5-126 Nine instances where operatore violated procedures for MUT i
Nov I.A (was pressure / level ISLI!!).
6, 3 Schin Ett 95-22-01)
See IR 96-04 R
L
~ 55 126.
Conduct of unauthorized tests of MUT without 10 CFR 59.59
- 6. 3 Schin EOV I.B twee evaluation (SLIIll. Additional examples (four testst See IR 96-04 R
q
Fa!!ure to take adequate corrective actions for operator
- 6. 5 Schin k
NOV 1.i
, concerns regarding OP-1038. Cbrve 8, for MLFT pressure / level R
twas EEI s.-
' b etive actions for en inadequate Curve 8 ftwo STI's and a
R (uss EM Ss-32-OL
@ r (,.3t'f 9 *, *f ed 'l I.
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@rs,'lm o n 'f,, e q 4.ero -w, w,w o, r..c# 5.-w %-wr,Sc-m
> v% c C. Q e i 1 - i n.G i s.f a t,tn,e, %' %*,*.
I pp p u. o s. @ b ai (p ee?)
WSAt'baf>%b M k W b 4
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ISSUR DESCRIPfrost ARRA Nec LEAD IR/SSR LIC3erSEE COsosDf75 STATUS NRC EA 95-126, Design controls failed to ensure adequate safety margin for STATUS NOV I.D.1 NPI pumps for certain thCA acenarios (SLIll) 6, 1 RI OP-6 (was EEI 95-R 22-04)
EA 95-126, Swapover of ECCS pucps' suction from tuST (at five feet)
NOV 3.D.2 to 6, 1 Rt. Mellen (was EEI 95-reactor bu!! ding sump was inadequate (SLI!Il R
22-04)
EA 95-116 EOPs allowed single LPI pump to supply two NPI pumps, with NOV II.A (was insufficient NPSN for LPI pump (SLIIll 6, 1 Rt Ett 95-22-04) a EA 95-126, Failure to take adequate corrective actions for tank NOV II.B twas 6, 5 Rt volumes / level / suction point ISLIV)
L EEI 15 22-03)
R EA 95-126 Failure to ensure fire water storage tank contained adequate NOV II.C (was 6, 1 RI volume of water (SLIV)
Ett 95-22-03)'
A VIO 93-16 07 Inadequate EOP and AP procedures 6, 3 Hopper e-3 See IR 96-04, IFZ 96 R
84-03 In 96-04 VIO 95-16-03 Inadequate procedure for operation of the makeup pump 1A 6,
1 R!
N b
cooling water R
V10 95-21-03 Failure to isolate the class 1E from the non class SE electrical circuitry for the RB purge and mini-purge valves 6, 1 Thomas /
~
21 R
M-f_ H -CP"L v!O 96-01-01 Inadequate corrective action for NPI flow indication problem 6, 5 21
- "b N
R VIS 96-01-06 Failure to correctly translate design basis of Sw system into and instructions 4, 1 RI procedures, drawings, A
V10 96-04-02 Failure to take prompt corrective action in revising 6, 5 Nopper procedure VP-580, Plant Safety Verification (for STAsl.
WP-R 500 contained outdated and incorrect information, v!O 96-05-01 Failura to create a PR and OCR for damaged main steam line 6, 5
- Lenahan, hangars see tnt! 96-05-02:
R Raghavan Coordinate with L.
Raghavan VIO 94 05-05 Failure to follow procedures for updating dealga tasis 6, 4 Crowley documents I
ppg OP-8 R
e V!3 96-05-07 I
ate receiving inspections for battery chargers (vendor 6, 4 Schin gcpy C
a
~
VIO 96-05-00 Fa!!ure to follow purchasing procedures for inverters 6, 4 Schin g{fl Jg Q
A VIO 96-06-02 No procedure for demineralised water flush performed by 6, 3 R1 operators on horie acid addition lines A
V10 96 06-04 No evaluation on non-FSAR vital battery charger configuration 6, 4 RI A
VIO 96-06-07 PR not initiated to resolve CREYS test fa!!ure 6,5 1,anahan R
e 5
9 IS$UE DESCRIPTIO3t ARIA NRC LEAD IR/SER *
!.ICENSEE CCDeWrTS WRC
~
STATUS STATUS VIO 96-08-01 Corrective action not taken on make-up system audit findings 6,
5 R1
& emeessive vibration on opent fuel pool pump cooling fan R
motor v!3 96-09-03 Fa!!ure to perform a 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation for 6, 3 Thomas changes to procedures described in the FSAR for controlling t
dissolved hydrogen concentration in the RCs VIO 96-09-04 Failure to update operating curves to reflect 1991 power 6, 4 Thomas M g. gv",
R uprate
)
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VI3 96-09-05 Failure to incorporate design change of MtN-64 into
- 6. 4 Thomas /
Licensee operations procedures R
Crowley Denied Vio VIO 96-09-06 Three eaamples of design control errors (erroneous 6, 4 M. Miller OP- 0 calculation inputs and Ist boundaryl R
VIO 96 09-07 tJntimely corrective actions for the EFIC system concerns and 6, 5 Thomas problems a
VIO 96-11-04 Reactor building sump not constructed in accordance with 6 1 RI approved construction drawinge R
V10 96-15 02 Failure of reactor coolant pump oil collection system to 6, 7
- w. Miller retain oli leaking f rom reactor coolant pump R
VIO 96-20-01 Failure to adhere to reactor coolant system cooldown limits 3
RI VIO 96-20-02 Failure to follow procedure Al-400C for review and 7
R1 development of Maintenance Procedure PM-191, Main Turbine /Cenerator, Feedwater hsrbine 1.ayup J
IF1 95-15-01 Design requirements for nitrogen overpressure ! service waterl 1
L Mellen Need to review a Q g r)*f-- 01 licensee's calculation a conclusion. See IR 95-21 IFI 95-15 02 Design requirements for dynamic thCA effects 1
See IR 95-21 and TIA R
96-013 IF1 95-15-01 Design requirements for reactor coolant pump cooler fa!!ure 1
See IR 95-21 and TIA R
95-014 1F1 95-15-04 Code requireeent for thermal relief valves on decay heat 1
removat heat exchangers See IR 95-21 and TIA R
96-014 IFI 95-14-05 Relief valves removed from heat enchangers 1
See IR 95-21 and TIA R
96-014 IFI 96 03-15 Evaluate the licensee's revised TS Bases and related 10 CFR 2
Rt 50.59 analysis for HPI flow indicatore R
IFI 96-17-02 Potential for HP!/LPI recirculn ton resulting in make-up tank 1
R1 overflow See CR3 D.I. 1 R
IFI 96-17-04 Adequacy of 10 0FR 50 Am;.01x R Itre study and documentation 1
- w. Mllter a
IFI 96-201 11 Design basis for decay heat / core flood / reactor coolant piping 1
tenahan temperature Identified in IPAP R
report as IF-96-201-01 IFI 96-201-12 Conduit sising criteria - Jamning ratto not considered 1
Fillion Identified in IPAP R
report ao tr-96-201-02 p
m
.m
.._m f.
ISSUI DtSCRISTIOtt AREA NRC LEAD
!a/SmA -
LICENsna COMMINTS I.
Cable ampacities - several cables exceed rating, including NRC,5 STx7vs 1F1 96-201-13
- Tm7 DHP-1 1
F1111en Identified in IPAP R
IFI 96-201-14 EDO protective trips not bypassed during emergency mode of report a s IF-96 -201 -0) operation 1
Fillion D-12 Identified in IPAP R
IFI 96-201-15 verification of motor starting data report as IF-96-201-04 1
Fillion Identified in IPAP R
1FI 96-201-16 Coordination of Second level undervoltage relay 151bR) report as IF 96-201 05 settinq vs. Inverter operation 1
Fillion Identified in IPAP R
IFI 96-201-17 report as fr-96-201-06 Coordination of STER and fuse protection 1
Fillion Identified in IPAP
,y-R report as fr-96-201-07 MULTI-PLANT ACTIONS MFA SLSO73 Pressure locking and thermal binding of safety-related gate CL 95-07 valves. Currently in staf f review. An RAI is outstanding.
2 NMR Expected completion?
R MPA SL6013 Testing of safety-related logic circuits -
CL 96-01 Licensee response in staff review. More details are R-1 2
Fillion This issue requires attention.
11/96 - the licensee R
required.
has identified testing deficiencies that must be fined prior to MFA SL501:
restart Circumferential cracking of SC tube flaws.
CL95-01 Licensee response in staff review.
2 Blake/NRR R
LICENSE Awwmns/ RELIEF REQUESTS CCHE Control complex habitability envelope - including TS-200 and TIA 95-03 need to be addressed.
2 Schin/Wan provide adequate TS action.
Licensee autenittal does not 3
R USOo Licensee request and trRC review and issue license amendments for all Unreviewed Safety Ouestions stFSOs t R-2, R-4 srR R A
USO EDG toad Uprete Fillion/
R-2 prRR See EE! 96-12-02, CR3 R
USO ASV 204 D.r. 6 Thomas /
R-4 See EEI 96-19-04 CR3 R
NRR U30 DM-45-FI D.I. $
Crowley/
R-5 srRR See tst! 96-201-01, URI R
96 04-01 USQ EDG toad List Update Fillion/
R-6 entR See EEI 96-12-02 CR3 2
D.r. 6 USO ITS 3.0.3 relief for LP!/DH to allow modification of air operators for DCV 17, 10, 177, 179 Thomas /
R-7 See URI 96-201-04 R
NRR II.RT Conduct an ILRT or seek an Amendment to utilise Method 3 of Appendix J to 10 CFR 50 NRR I
Ny I; 9-).gsts e M4 ons+ n a 9-t s P. M (u. g,,,,,,,,
t1. 4 r e.s e t r,. -
4 M:iM.1 t+-5 6 L PO e.... t 1 4 9t-+
1e a==m.
m
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23 SUE 9tsCm1PT20sf Amak agite Lamp 2m/ste
- LICEBESBS
- e.== = ISS*JrS syntws
' CEeWENTS test o
stattra LTOP Ostrcat TS does not address LTOP yr;- ilen er ett1 ation.
On the boele of CL 90-11. the licensee owbnitted Informetlen 9
2
)
to demonstrate that LTOP in saw ytante bewe 1eee then 1 in
- 2. erste= branch will R
169 reactor yeare probeb!!!ty of occurrence and as a reewit eend letter to
'I per CL 99-11 non-eppendiz C methodelegy con Ise weed for FT licensee that ther Such a PT cerve would prownde for higher LTOP enable have to outantt TS.
curves.
preeswre and temperatore and would proeide operetienet fleetbility. Staff denied the request in 1995 and regweeted a revloed response.
i 1997 The licensee espects to respond late 1
!@. Jim R
?.,.. Jim R design beste looves review by FFC c;c...Itant.
j j
review open ";, _ Jim R 1 esses to seesee that these are no W. Miller /
D-11 BINC j
~
i restert er operebtlity teowee lebedded in then.
Fillion/
3 Het I
Operator IIRC review operator workeroende 21st to assere that there are teorkereundo no restert er operability toewes contained In thee 21 M-2 See VIO 96-09-47 a
so.sef 1.etter one review 11e; u u o so.54f letter response 14.e 2/9/971 en p
}
deofgn besee b" M"* Y saia R
License verify license conditione are met
[
conditions at t
1 RC Loop in a ewevey inepection, the staf f noted that certeln breach l
gPg9 P1 ee off the primary coolant loop were est snelysed se Code P
2 seen
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Analyses Cleos 1 pipe 11.e., no f ats,we snelretes es regenred by the a
Code.
Need SIRR technical branch *e opinton on thio
(
4 i.
I 2
l i
Sources for issues include: IFS, SIMS, NUREG 1435 t
Plcnts), Resident's OIL, PM's OIL (Status of Safety Issues at Licensed Power 1
i i
NOTE:
Ope:1 allegations, OI investigations, i
and elaerging/ draft issues are listed separately.
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CRYSTAL RIVER 3 ISSUES CHECKLIST N ITEMS (INSPECTION PRIOR TO RESTART IS NOT NEEDED) 1 statwo es of retweary 24 ss97 l
155DE DE50t!PT10N ARIA lutC LEAD TRfstt
'LIG NS E STATUS CD9EE75 amt stafys LICrustt*$ RISTztT LIST cr CC5tos-RttATED 155UES (D.I.s)(per 18/28/96 Itr free TPC) t!CTN5ft*3 On(t RESTART titMS OT'4 Tibes Aderreacy of Of% t* stress-retteved rolled jotats is guesticmed. BG 7
See Itcensee Freew ser 3 (G) analysts of a Dawls-8 esse pelled CTW tiee. cwrent test data, and Instted Card pt 5 5c77 of field tapertence ctrflict with test data from 1972 =Aldt *gsaltfled a 1116/ E tuo TIA) stress-retsewed retI d.9. etat.
FIVE AREAS D' CDfTTHU11C CDICERN. trf7M ! PAP RfCDe(MOED fusPECTfDt AS Rif F CDeTIOFD AM)fif7.5 I
tesrtCTat rattawur Sv$7tw d h5-25 h.'
I[kisstvefet$15ewANt[bd%) MhNb[ [^ k.M hI[ h[$q f ht%M' U h:
Mbb 5.i[I[N YkN;%
tRI 503-04 ficaswing of percent ttrcugh-= ell Indicattes with an erupaallfled 7
See la 96-06. Geacete n (C) proce&are issue betag addressed by setz.
tan Tras tRI 96-03 C5 Eddy carent sample enpansten based en degraded tiee percenta9es F
3e-It % 06.
k u G) t tRI % 06-10 Justificattan far removal of Therno-Lag protectlan from the source range 1
i lastetawatatim l s G) tRI 5 07-03 Incorrect taformattori provided by crmtracters F
W ($1 CJ 96-201-06 Preferred effstte electrical peer setree wtth plant sP=4 doet 600 to 1
E G) swttchyard) 1s not OsaI1 fled. note: it:tiI thes essue ts resolved, licensee is not erstnq 500 EV swetchyard as an eIcetrical pm.ar source.
tRI % 201-C9 Testlag to qualify relays beytmd manufactrers' rattags was inadegante 1
N G3 ttR 93-02-07.
Switchyard cable fattwe caused degr&Jed voltage of Class it electrical 7
1[2 93-C2-t1 closed tse it N (13 Lit 93-07-03 buses and actuetton of itG 95-89 13
t s
113UC OCSCRtrites AREA NRC time tR/$tt
- LICEN5tt STATU5 CtreOrts unC ttR 94-5 01 LER 94-4 03 Deficiency la enderstanding of tectaitcal regefrements leads to 37atv5 2
tia 94-06-H.
nonttrservative RP5 setpotat and potential violatim of 75 ttR 94-86-88ciesed la IR a (c) 11R 94-M-05 W 16. See ER 95-16.
ttR W 99-00 Hintesi release dWrfng selfer dioalde *1twery causes actuatten of tortC 7
gas amtter resettine ta cetret roon -er =*ntilatim actuatten See IR 95-II.
N (t)
LER 5 10 01 Ic_1 de procedure cacses low coottng meter flee to adew pump I
resulting la operettet outside the estyt basis ttt 95-IS-80 c1esed la It a (t)
W 16. see also tRI &
1t-87. VIO W16-03 LIR M-47-00 SW flon to cetrol roan coolers controlled by att aperated valves.Atch I
could fall epen See IR 5 16. ifD W et-u (03 g6.
LER %-18-00 Ir;1, te T5 note allched delayed entry late *5 ttD tit M 88 2
ttt 95-18-0?
See 3CF 95-18-05.
- (t) ttR 95-19-00 teet fastr_. 4attae for SW flee to 80CDs sacapable of acasuring 90 gym -
3 See it 95-13.
s (13 tit 573-01.
Incenststent destyi assumpttens cause buttotas spray flon rates to be 114 % -73 07 cutsede e st e bases 1
tra 523-00 closed in ta m (t)
LER 95-25-00 1 ^
W 94 ttR 95-?$-01
,.ete isolatten of safety /non-safety related circutts 1
See vio 95-21-a3.
am ttQ M-28-00, 94T vacuum breder has tc_1, te retter capacity LER 5 79-01 I
See IE E21.
N (!)
tta 96-01-01 Ef1C control circuits misrouted: Aspendta a coicera I
tra wel.00 closed sa la w (I; W 84: See aise aCV W 81-83.
I.ER 96-02-00 Minspurge valve has safety /ne-safety related circuits without tsolation 1
See V10 5 21-83.
N til LO 96-03-00 RC5 cooldoni cate e=ceeded thring cooldoni tER 96-03-01 3
See tRI 5 21-94 a E13 ttR E 04-00 CDE cetrol b.s found dansged & leding 1
See tRI M-87-82. it 95 Em 71.
tfR 96-05-01 SW flon to atCUs could e=ceed *styi t
ttt 96-05-00 closed la IR
- (0) 96-04 See also v10 %
91-01.
t 0 5 06-00 rf instrument errer could result in WI pump reneut LER %-WOI 1
See la W 20. la 5 0s.
a (D)
(R3 0 f. 7.
LER 96-87 00 rf Ilne 58t0CA/ttXP/ loss of dc bus could have 1;;Mte WI fles tra 5 0f-01 enstrumantatten I
See 14 W C1. CR3 D.I. 2.
N (D)
Ltt 5 08-00 Aubiguous T5 note ressits in not perfe= tag RC5 lest svwfllance prior to 2 tt* ?
m (5)
((R %-09-w0 fatture to reattach instrument tietap to setssic sepperts after I
andtficattee teses to operetten outst,se
- sty bests See tst! 96-83-06. It %
N (t) 95.
L O 5 16-00 to, flow to SW system cooled ctpyments causes operstlen outstde estyi I
basis See vio 95-16-83.
N EM LtR 96-11-0G Niwwel +ii-causes testing deftetency resulting la coidttlen prcMbited by layreved 11 (R Wel issuest 1
See w t R 661 (GL 96 81).
N (01 1
10
e e
125UE 0150t!PTION mttA SAC LEAD 11/3ER ~
t!CEN$tt STAT!f5 COT (WT5 sett s m et f
t[R % 12-00 Operattom outside destgm basis ceased by battery chargers havtag 4
LER % 12-01, tnadequate test results accepted in errer ip g See VTO %C5-C7 m (D) t[O 96-12-02
^
LIR 5 13-00 (berater e.
resulted in the inadvertent actustIm of DCP 14 3
t See aCV 96-43-C2.
s (t)
LIR 5 15-00 Persomet 6c e cause cable separation /tsolattom concerns resulting in 1
operattom outside the deste bests (teste gas emitars See IR 5 04 n (1)
LIR 5 16-00 CRIVS filter testing did not meet 75 specs 2
RI a (5)
LtR 96-19-00 Nm-safety related switcta used in safety related wiring for [5 states 1
lights See tRI 95-%C3.
s (0)
LER % 25-00 threwtewd safetr questtms ccmcerntag IIG everloading caused by 4
interpretatte of regulatory require =ents R-2. 3-6. 0-14 See Eli % 12-C2.
u tc) 0-15. OP 5
((R 96-23-00 Persomel eiw leads to missed sweet 11ances resulttag 11 violatte of 2
Technical Spectficattens (alssed remote shutom.n paar? EFW gnny pressure See 710 5 15-c1.
e (D) instremt chamel chect)
LtR 96-24-00 Plant modtficatten causes enanalyted cirufttlam regardlag emergairy 1
feed ater See tRI % 12-01.
m (0)
LER 96 25-00 Persemet error causes testtag defectency ressittag in credition 1
prehlbited by Tectatical Spectfscattens t12 contacts in ($ logic mere ret See PFA R601 (GL 96-01).
N (D) t*1 ret tested) 710 94 25-01 Fatture to preperty centrol the Centrol Covien Mabitability Envelepe
- 6. 7 fonor biected een for maintenance serti SeetR1 5 02-2Z.
s (U3 VIO 94-27-02 Fallure te mane tw 10 CTR 50.73 reports so the tutC within the required
- 6. 2 det Jm W-4 See it 5 02. IR 5 08.
m (t)
C time VfD 94-27-03 fattere to make one required 10 CTR 50.72 report to the NRC within the G. 2 reertred ttar 7-a See IR % Cs.
gp, i m (t)
C VIO % 01-05 Two esasples of fatture to todate FSAR as required by 10 CTR 58.71te)
- 6. 4 m (53 VIO 96-02-01 Tallare to malatein 9.2 footcandles in the pretected area
- 6. 7 See IR % 8y.
s til V10 96-02-04 Tallure to maintata secipidary alarm statte eperable and inadequate
- 6. 2 ctroensatory neaswes N (5)
VIO 5 03-11 Fatture to follow radiatten sert permit regatrements
- 6. 7 m (5)
V!O %-03-12 fatture to report the trenywi of a rad!sactively contaminated indtet&aal offstte
- 6. 2 m (5)
?!C %-03-13 thescorted etsster p,iwnel within the protectro area
- 6. 7 m (5)
VIO % 05-04 Licensee.w..M eddy current acceptance criteria different from T3
- 6. 2 requiremaat s m (5)
VIO 96-06-06 Failure to timely notefy the IRC of a conditte outside the 4pendte R
- 6. 2
) e, y.g
- (5)
C ttreastag dest e bests V10 5 07-01 Failure to protect safeguards safermatte
- 6. 7 N (5)
e IS M Ot30t!Pfl0E ARIA NRC LEAD IJt/SER
- LICENME STATUS CDet[WT5 getC 5taTUS tto 96-07-02 titlere to ctrplete screening elearnts for fitness for Outy Persennel
- 6. 7 m (5)
VIO 5 09-01 Tallure to follo, a maintenante procedire resulting in the ined ertent
- 6. 7 intttation of the cetrol rowse empropacy vaattletton systes N ($3 Y10 96-09-02 thescorted *tsster personnel within the protected area
- 6. 7 m (5)
V 3 % Il-01 Ir4wte nort instructims to prevent the inadvertent start of the A (IG
- 6. 7 m (5)
VIO 96-11-03 Fersenet performing nort on the reactor twtiding su, withod logging
- 6. T mte a t1earance. as remstred tw kr..:: ut a c)
Y10 5 15-01 fatitre to perform a required T5 servestlance for the reacte shutdcam
- 6. 2 16: LM %P" raael u G) ift 94-18-09 pertew periodic vertficatim plans - 70f (GL 89-10 fteel 2
See it 15-11. It 15-21:
s (1)
See CL 89-10 Ifl 95-02-05 Wesonante noise in vicinity of itN-25 7
N ts)
Ifl 95-08-03 fuergency (berating Procedire todate progree 3
See IR 95-16. 710 93-16-07 s (5) ift % 31-01 SCBA requirteents for gxiw wl during a toute gas release 2
m (5)
Ifl 95-21 02 fiadtficattm to the stener feedeter pu, rectrculatte line 1
a (5)
ITI 96-03-16 Review of twt 5 02-09-01 IFI flow indicators. Insta11stle package and I
f tncttmai testtag restrits w (3)
If! E 04-03 Effect of setpoint calculattens on (OP revistes 1
See VIO93-15-07 s (0)
If! % 05-06 Large treat less of coolant analysts generic cmceras I
a (5)
.s a - n.
f.,
.--,n.
,nnn 2
- !TI, % 06-09 <
- feftctencies la,Mecattss; fire barrierfprogeme procedures ed doctsamtatioC L4 i,gi n.w%u_, /.
- IR 96-15
" T-
~
j N, (5)c C.
Ifl 96-08-02 Reactor twt! ding cavity cooltag piping thermal retter protecttei i
See 0.I. 8. GL 96-c5 m (c)
If! 96-15-03 Actions taken to resolve post-accident reerttica11tr concerns due to 1
localtred toren ottution mRR revi n'q. generte scs s (G) tstwe MULTI-PtAvf ACTIONS WA #9105:
Setssic qualificattm of entstgnent. Ltcensee's criteria and proceares 2
CL 87-02 approved. See tssues are pending and neuld te resolved thrw audit Espected cceptetten N G)
(scheduled for Mar 97). Licensee s field waltd:ws results are currently Decester.
in staf f review.
ffA C111 (IFE):
IPt and IPt((. These are in staff restew. 8bt a restart ttee.
2 WAf9tl8 (IPf tO N G)
WA II602: satCS L.,... of heavy 1 cads ever spent fuel pool 2
%-02
- ttcensee response in staff review. This sculd not be a restart itsw.
N G3 12
d
^
l, 15'UE CE5CRIPTION NttA tutC ttAD IR/5ER
- LICIN$(( STAft$
CDg(RTS st[
W A fL206:
Thersolag - Licensee plans to ese Necettst 57afts GL 92-08: 90 92 tan alternate material), same reanalysts of APMN011 R. and some 2
el Fire barrier tests ef Mrcattss including #gacity tests are la See IR 96-81: It %C6 N (5) esenotion.
staff review This also may not te restart issue.
IPAf L201:
CL 92-01 Rev 1 Reacter vessel stru tural tetegrity.
Sicp 1 data base assue. not a restart ites. RAI to 11censee en 7/22/96. Oily a 2
m (5)
W A h 604:
Borafles degradation. Ltrensee resperise is just ta. Staff rewtew to GL 5 04 2
cc m e.
Ihts may have to be addressed prter to restart becawse of sens9tietty to spent foal pool 1ssues.
N (51 tfA 707 testing & sirveillance. This Stee is clesed with the enceptim of IFI 2
CL STIO 94-18-09 tri periodic irertficatten, iAttti ts to be fo11ched se after a new See ITI 94-18-89 5 (Il generic cturumicatt m is issued.
t!CIN'J AMENDMENT /RftffF REQUESTS R.G 1.37 RG 1.97 f ast-,..tation - Sieccol sanf ters etc - category change.
lastrwents e- ~M may be aiv c; by Dac -6
~
Escense 2
8tonetrics 8 N til Security 8tonetric emettes to allor tating secwity t'
. offstte - St=ff rewtew 2
is espected to be cenotet_e soon.
N (5)
Core Flood Retter request RE: Core flood notale - Staff needs more Info.
hortle Pfl avill 2
keep RtI informed.
N (il CT5G 7 tees Of5G tube tests:q - Licensee proposed a revised CT5G tiee acceptance c-1t eria.
2 See VIO % 05-04 N (5)
{
OTitt 159]E5
\\
i Pressurtter morale flaw (bring Refuel 9 a sib. surface flaw ones discovered. The 11cwee perforved 2
better taspection during att and found the flaw to be acceptabte.
The new inspaction results en reduced flaw stre and consequently acceptance N ts) criteria (=Alch is based en ratto of flaw to thicsness) changes.
revtew in preryess.
Staff Criticality Montter The Itcensee did not carry a preeteusly.w...
^ esenytten free part 78 2
(70.24?) requirements to rart 50 license. need legal Interpretattoi of the status of the ;,-glen.
N (33 Sources for issues include: IFS. SIH5. EJRtG 1435 (Status of Safety Issues at Licensed Power Pnants). Resiaent.~s OIL PM's OIL NOTE:
Open allegations. OI investigations. and emerging / draft issues are listed separately.
LIST OF ACRONYMS USED AP Abnormal Operating Procedure B1'ST Borated Water Storage Tank b
O 13
e C
Closed CCHE Control Complex Habitability Envelope
~
CFR Code of Federal Regulations CR3 D.I.
Crystal River 3 Design Item CREVS Control Room Emergency Ventilation System EA NRC Escalated Enforcement Action EDBD Engineering Design Basis Document ECCS Emergency Core Cooling System EDG Emergency Diesel Generator EEI NRC Escalated Enforcement Item t
EOP Emergency Operating Procedure FSAR Final Safety Analysis Report GL NRC Generic Letter ILRT Integrated Leak Rate Test (of the Reactor Building)
IFI NRC Inspector Followup Item LER Licensee Event Report LOCA Loss of Coolant Accident LPI Low Pressure Injection LTOP 1.ow Temperature Overpressure Protection HPA NRC Multi-Plant Action HUV Makeup Valve N (D)
Not an NRC Restart Item (because the issue is duplicated by a restart item)
N (G)
Not an NRC Restart Item (because it is a generic issue affecting multiple operating pla addressed by NRR)
N (I)
Not an NRC Restart Item (because resolution of the issue is not nee N (S)
NOV NRC Notice of Violation i
NPSri Net Posit.ive Suction Head OCR Operability Condition Report OP Operating Procedure PR Problem Report R
NRC Restart Item RB Reactor Building RCS Reactor Coolant System RMG Radiation Monitor SFP Spent Fuel Pool TIA NRC Task Interface Agreement (between NRC offices)
TS Technical Specifications URI NRC Unresolved Item USO Unreviewed Safety Question VIO NRC Violation DFFICIAL RECORD COPY DOCUMENT HAME: S:\\DRS\\EB\\CRISSUE1.350 I
14
Attachment B CRYSTAL RIVER INSPECTION PLAN April 2.1997. 4:33pm--
INSPECTION NUMBER OF PLANNED TYPE OF INSPECTION -
PROCEDURE /
TITLE / PROGRAM AREA INSPECTORS INSPECTION COMMENTS TEMPORARY DATES INSTRUCTION OPERATIONS IP 71707 PLANT OPERATIONS 3
MONTHLY CORE INSPECTION PROGRAM -
RESIDENT INSPECTORS IP 92901 FOLLOWUP - OPERATIONS 3
MONTHLY REGIONAL INITIATIVE INSPECTION OF THE RESTART ISSUES -
IP 92720 CORRECTIVE ACTIONS RESIDENT INSPECTORS IP 42001 EMERGENCY OPERATING 1
06/02/97 INSPECT SIGNIFICANT EOP PROCEDURES REVISIONS DUE TO SAFETY 3
12/01/97 SYSTEM MODIFICATIONS DURING EXTENDED SHUTDOWN OPERATOR - INITIAL EXAM 3
06/02/97 LICENSEE REQUESTED INITIAL EXAMS FOR 4 SRO UPGRADES 3
06/16/97 AND TWO ROs IP 71001 LICENSED OPERATOR 1
11/10/97 CORE INSPECTION PROGRAM REQUALIFICATION PROGRAM EVALUATION IP 93806 OPERATIONAL READINESS 6
12/08/97 EVALUATE READINESS FOR ASSESSMENT TEAM RESTART FOLLOWING EXTENDED INSPECTION (ORAT)
SHUTDOWN IP 71715 SUSTAINED CONTROL ROOM 6
TBD 24 HOUR SUSTAINED CONTROL AND PLANT OBSERVATION ROOM OBSERVATION OF UNIT RESTART FOLLOWING EXTENDED SHUTDOWN
2 INSPECTION NUMBER OF PLANNED TYPE OF INSPECTION -
PROCEDURE /
TITLE / PROGRAM AREA INSPECTORS INSPECTION COMMENTS TEMPORARY DATES INSTRUCTION MAINTENANCE IP 61726 -
SURVEILI.ANCE 1
BIMONTHLY CORE INSPECTION PROGRAM -
OBSERVATIONS RESIDENT INSPECTORS IP 62703 MAINTENANCE OBSERVATIONS MONTHLY IP 62700 MAINTENANCE PROGRAM 1
05/19/97 REACTOR BUILDING COATINGS IMPLEMENTATION INSPECTION IP 73753 INSERVICE INSPECTION CORE INSPECTION PROGRAM IP 62700 MA!NTENANCE PROGRAM 1
06/23/97 MAINTENANCE PROCEDURES, PM IMPLEMENTATION BACKLOG, MT&E, AND ENGINEERING INTERFACE ENGINEERING IP 37550 ENGINEERING 2
03/31/97 CORE AND REGIONAL INITIATIVE 1
04/14/97 INSPECTIONS WITH FOCUS ON IP 37551 ONSITE ENGINEERING 1
04/21/97 QUALITY OF ENGINEERING 2
06/02/97 CORRECTIVE ACTIONS, LERS.
IP 40500 EFFECTIVENESS OF LICENSEE 2
06/16/97 OPERABILITY, REPORTABILITY CONTROLS IN IDENTIFYING, 2
07/14/97 50.59 EVALUATIONS, RESOLVING, AND PREVENTING 2
08/25/97 ENGINEERING SUPPORT TO PROBLEMS 2
09/29/97 OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE, SELF ASSESSMENT, DESIGN IP 92903 FOLLOWUP - ENGINEERING CONTROL, AND RELATED l
RESTART ISSUES
I l
l I
[
o I
INSPECTION NUMBER OF PLANNED TYPE OF INSPECTION -
i PROCEDUREI TITLE / PROGRAM AREA INSPECTORS INSPECTION COMMENTS f
TEMPORARY DATES
[
' INSTRUCTION i
l' CONTROLS IN IDENTIFYING.
THE PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION lP 40500 EFFECTIVENESS OF LICENSEE 4
05/05/97 MANAGEMENT OVERSIGHT OF RESOLVING, AND PREVENTING AND RESOLUTION PROCESS, PROBLEMS ROOT CAUSE EVALUATIONS, AND RELATED RESTART ISSUES
+
IP 37001 10 CFR 50.59 SAFETY 3
07/07/97 MANAGEMENT OVERSIGHT OF EVALUATION PROGRAM 50.59 EVALUATIONS,
}
REPORTABILITY, OPERABILITY
{
IP 40500 EFFECTIVENESS OF LICENSEE EVALUATIONS, AND RELATED i
CONTROLS IN IDENTIFYING, RESTART ISSUES RESOLVING, AND PREVENTING l
PROBLEMS IP 37700 DESIGN CHANGES AND 4
07/28/97 MANAGEMENT OVERSIGHT OF MODIFICATIONS THE DESIGN CONTROL PROCESS AND RELATED RESTART ISSUES IP 37702 DESIGN CHANGES AND MODIFICATIONS PROGRAM IP 40500 EFFECTIVENESS OF LICENSEE 4
08/11/97 EVALUATE CORRECTIVE ACTION CONTROLS IN IDENTIFYING, PROCESS RESOLVING, AND PREVENTING
{
PROBLEMS IP 92720 CORRECTIVE ACTIONS l
IP 92702 FOLLOWUP ON CORRECTIVE 1
TBD EVALUATE IMPLEMENTATION OF i
ACTIONS FOR VIOLATIONS THE SETPOINT PROGRAM l
AND DEVIATIONS q
.{
l
4 INSPECTION NUMBER OF PLANNED TYPE OF INSPECTION -
PROCEDURE /
TITLE / PROGRAM AREA INSPECTORS INSPECTION COMMENTS TEMPORARY DATES INSTRUCTION IP 40500 EFFECTIVENESS OF LICENSEE 4
09/15/97 MCAP EVALUATION CONTROLS IN IDENTIFYING, RESOLVING, AND PREVENTING PROBLEMS IP 92720 CORRECTIVE ACTIONS IP 93801 SAFETY SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL 1
09/08/97 TWO SAFETY SYSTEMS INSPECTION (SSFI) 5 09/22/97 SELECTED DUE TO EXTENSIVE 5
10/06/97 DESIGN BASIS REVIEW AND SYSTEM MODIFICATIONS IP 40500 EFFECTIVENESS OF UCENSEE 3
10/97 MANAGEMENT OVERSIGHT OF CONTROLS IN IDENTIFYING, FSAR SELF ASSESSMENT, RESOLVING, AND PREVENTING RESOLUTION PROCESS, AND PROBLEMS RELATED RESTART ISSUES PLANT SUPPORT IP 71750 PLANT SUPPORT ACTIVITIES 3
MONTHLY CORE INSPECTION PROGRAM -
RESIDENT INSPECTORS IP 64704 FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM i
08/18/97 APPENDIX R - FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM, AND MECATISS INSTALLATION IP 81700 PHYSICAL SECURITY 1
03/17/97 SAFEGUARDS - CORE AND PROGRAM FOR POWER REGIONAL. INITIATIVE INSPECTION REACTORS 4
08/04/97 OF SECURITY MANAGEMENT OVERSIGHT OF SECURITY IP 92904 FOLLOWUP - PLANT SUPPORT 2
09/22/97 SYSTEM UPGRADE AND SECURITY PLAN REVISION
i u
l INSPECTION NUMBER OF PLANNED TYPE OF INSPECTION -
PROCEDURE /.
TITLE /PROGRAI4 AREA INSPECTORS INSPECTION COMMENTS TEMPORARY DATES INSTRUCTION i
IP 84750 RADIOACTIVE WASTE 1
06/16/97
, CORE INSPECTION PROGRAM i
TREATMENT, AND EFFLUENT AND ENVIRONMENTAL 1
06/23/97 MONITORING I
I IP 86750 SOLID RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT AND TRANSPORTATION OF l
RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS Ti 2515/133 IMPLEMENTATION OF REVISED 49 CFR PARTS 100-179 AND 10
[
CFR PAR 171 IP 83750 OCCUPATIONAL RADIATION 1
07/14/97 CORE INSPECTION PROGRAM EXPOSURE j
08/25/97 IP 82701 OPERATIONAL STATUS OF THE 1
09/15/97 CORE INSPECTION PROGRAM EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS (EP) PROGRAM IP 54704 FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM 1
10/06/97 CORE INSPECTION PROGRAM i
I l
L
e e
1-w
- pska assoq'o, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION UNITED STATES T
A t A
l May 19 7 MEMORANDUM T0:
Fi FROM:
oins
.Ju
- n. Dire ivision of Reactor Safety
SUBJECT:
MINUTES OF THE CRYSTAL RIVER RESTART PANEL EIGHTH MEETING HELD MAY 9, 1997 The Crystal River Restart Panel met in the Region 11 offices May 9,1997.
The following panel members were at the meeting:
Johns P. Jaudon Chairman Frederick J. Hebdon, Vice Chairman Kerry D, Landis Stephen J. Cahill The status of current inspections and the management meeting completed May 9.
1997, between the NRC and Florida Power Corporation were discussed. The matrix of outstanding issues was reviewed and updated.
It is attached for information.
The panel noted that, based on information from inspectors, the quality and completeness of licensee packages reviewed recently for individual items on the matrix ha' improved significantly.
The panel determined that the next meeting should occur onsite June-18 and 19.
1997, and that F. Hebdon would ascertain suitable dates for a July management meeting in headquarters.
Docket: 50-30
Attachment:
As stated cc w/att:
L. Reyes. ORA /RII S. Collins. NRR J. Johnson. ORP/RIl S. Varga, NRR F. Hebdon NRR H. Christensen. DRS/RII K. Landis DRP/Ril S, C6 hill. SRl/RII L. Raghaven. NRR R. Schin. DRS/RIl G. Tracy. OEDO Public GbIOlwway^t i
^
Attachment A CRYSTAL RIVER 3 ISSUES CHECKLIST R ITEMS (TO BE INSPECTED BY THE NRC BEFORE RESTART)
Stat..e of ~,,.
1,,,
The Crystal River Restart Panel met on November 13, 1996, and developed seven general areas under l
f which the restart issues will be grouped.
Those seven areas are:
1.
Knowledge of design and licensing bases and adequacy of design margin 2.
Regulatory knowledge and perspective 3.
Operator performance and knowledge L
4.
Marginally effective engineering organization i
5.
Management oversight; including quality assurance, self assessment, and corrective action i
6.
Corrective actions for NRC violations 7.
Other i
Total Restart (R) Items: 136
- Open 1.00 i
- Closed 36 ISSUE DESCRIPTION ARE&
INtc STATUS STAT"JS LICENSEE *S RESTART LIST OF DESIt35-RE1ATED ISSUES (D.I.s)(per 10/20/,6 Itr from FFC)
CR3 D.I.
1 RPI pump recirculation to the makeup tank 1
RI Cahill D-1 LER 97-0-0, R
See tml 96-01-02, IFI
% 02. Is %-17 CR3 D.I. 2 HPI system modifications to iv rove SBLOC7 margins 1
Schin D-2 Sae tRI 94-01-02. LER R
l 94-04 In M-17 i
CR) D.I.
3 LPI puv mission ti ne (NRR for boron precip. reviewi 1
RI/NRR D-3 See t*I 94-201-01. IR R
94-17 CR3 D.I. 4 Reactor buildirry spray puv 1B NPSM 1
RI Sanchez D-4 See tPI 96-201-02, IR R
I M-17 CR3 D.I. 5 Emergency feedwater system upgrades and diesel ger3erator load 1
Schin D-5 See t*I 94-12-01; EEI R
imped 94-12-02 1R 34-17
issue DESOLIPTION assa gmCtaan IR/SWt LIC M CN MRC STa7US STmTus
- CR3 D.I. 6 Esergency diesel generator loeding i
Fillion/
D-6 See EEI 96-12-02, II R
Schin 94-17 CR3 D.I. 7 Failure inodes and effects of loss of DC power 1
Miller D-7 See 121 96-12-01, in R
94-CT. IR 94-17 CR3 D.I. O Generic Istter 96-06 (Thermal overprassure protection for 1
RI Chhill/
D-6 See IR 96-12 R
P r*2 P* net r at ions, and coolerst Cro=1*y Containment pi i
LICarKER'S OTW RESTART ITWM RMG 29/30 Seismic wourtting of ER Rad 9kzsitor 1
Lena*.an/BI D-19 R
BWST NPSN NPSH concern with ECCS pumps when SFP purps are running in 1
Thomas D-10 Reef ew SP-430 test R
PwS and Recire.
results folicwing MCT eweet ML% 27 Section II leakage testing 1
R-21 R
FIVE AREAS OP v.ma wvusw CONCERN WITE IPAP --_-
_ INSPECTICN AIE? RIT -- -
ADDITItNW Management
- NRC inspect Problem Identification: focusing on CA audits 5
RI Cahill/
CP-2, CP-3 Inspect New PC systeen R
Oversight -
and the creblem rarart im system. - Increased inspectxon of CA Thomas FPC closity CP-2 IPAP Problem Analysts and Evaluat2ons focusing on r M cause Rum,.Ad evaluat lens.
Inspection Marginally
- NRC inspect Engineering Problem Identification and 4
Schin CP-4 50.59 R
Effective Resolution: with esphasis on 11 cans ** avsluat lans fer CP-5 Engin** ring sivificant issues and w rk barnlogs.
Organization
- Also inspect Quality of Engineering with enphasis on M
- IPAP CFP $0.59 s* reenim and safety evaluations, amrew of th*
R e ----m.. M FSAP, and manacament ever s t et. Inspect the licensee's FSAR Inspee+ 1on E*wsew Prnya -t and ascese t na identified FSAR arrors.
Iack of
- NRC inspect Engineering Saf ety Focus; focusing ort rrat*r 1
Adaquate.
identification of discrocancies with the clant's desivt basis D-13, D-15, Cnowledge of 2 n t he cerraat a va an zen system.
D-16 the Design
- Also inspect Engineering Problem Identification and Bosis - IPAP Resolution: focusing on trogra-s fer idWifyim desivt basis R_ -.ad issues and cacturim tha* in in* carr m ava actacn ert-tram.
Inspection
- Also Anspect Quality of Engineering tocuszng on saasit ivity/u-dars* endim by th* emin** rim / lie
- tsim s* af f et in* rient's desart basms.
- Also assess tn* deste marsin. includi99 the licensee *s
- ,eac+
af
-~-A f + 1 ~. - review.
Iack of
- NRC inspect 50.59s, cearability, rarart abilit y 2
Regulatory Knowledge and Comoliance Oith Regulations -
IPAP Rum. -.ad inspect ion l
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e I'; SUE DESCRIPTItat ARIA
'3rRC LEAD IRfSEE LICENSEE CCDsWNTS SEC STATUS STATUS 11rSFECTOR PU11CurUF SYSTEN URI 95-02-02 control room habitability envelope leakage. Excessive 1
Schin R-12 See TIA ?t'M b FPC TS R
leakaga paths through doors, da pers, and drains due to Chano E*ta+yt Mn. 2t8 design errors and lack of surveillances/ preventive of 9/2f/95: 1235 M-emint enance C4, 94 - 1 C, 95-01, 95-04-C1, 95-09: I?s 95-C2, 95-C9, 95-11, 95-16, 95-21: FPC ltrs.
cf 5/26/95 and 10/23/95 URE 96-01-C2 Discrepancies in the high pressure injection design basis 1
Schin D-9, D-1
$** CR3 D.I. 1; E
analyste CT3 D f.
2 mt 96-C6-C1 Discrepancies in the EDBD and the FTAR regarding the -
1 Crowley IR 96-19 See EEI 95-19-07 R, C pr*vantion of post-Is0CA bcron precipitatten i
1:RI 96-05-02 Design concerns with main eteem line hangers used in scissue 2
R.I, IR 97-C1 D-51 See VIO 94-OS-C1, IL, C and other dyrwale load applications Raghav.*
Coordinate with L.
am-havan 1:1 96-06-03 Non-safety related transfer switch used in ES status 1
Fillion '
G 97-04 D-21' R, C indicating licht circuitry CRI 96-12-01 Emergency Feedwater low ??PSif to both pumps due to postulated 1
Schin IR 96-19 D-17 See CR3 D.I 5:
R. C single failure CR3 D I 7r EEI 94 a), -c4,
-05.
-oa t:RI 96-17-03 Failure to conduct regaired Technical Specification 4
M Miller IR 97-02 CP-It See MPA S1401 (Cf. 96-R. C e
eurveillanem t*Pring on saf ety related cirmitry (7!. 96-01)
- C17,
$** IR 97-C1 URI 96-201-01 Long terna plant coeldown following a small break LOCA 1
RI Cocpar/
D-3 See CR3 D.I.
3: See IR R
assuming a single f ailure in the d* Cay heat drop line EER 96-11.
NSR ta8t i"Py responsibilit y f or this ite.
URE 96-201-02 MPSH f or building spray pw=p has very little margin, arri some 1
R1 San-hez D-4 See CR3 D.I.
4 R
calculat ion f acects we e none nservat iva L7I 96-201-03 Operating curves 16, 17, and 18 in OP-103B are not validated 4
Repper 0-1 R
by licens**
URI 96-201-04 Monsaf ety-related positioners on saf ety-related valves 1
Thcomas R-7, D-10 S** IR 96-08 IR ?7-01 P
v t,U 96-201-05 Service water system heat loads did not consider nazisus 1
Crculey IR 94-19 O-1 See EEI 96 19-De RC j
Anput heat (OP-1039 Curve 151 t91 9=-201-07 EDG not protected against water spray from failure of fire 1
Fillion D-52 R
prc4 *ct inn del uo* vrys+== in EDG room URI 97-01-06 EPI system design, licensing basis, and TS concerns 1
SrM a See IR 97-06 PC*
1 I
t:RI 97-01-Ca Adequacy of procedures to take the plant free hot standby to 2
Thones IR 97-02 R. C i
co1d shutdw f rtw ce* side the centrol rorms tAprend,r P1 i
URI 97-C2-02 De1etion of water quality retairementa f rom the FSAR 2
Thomas /NFR R
I IIR 95-13-01 Design defielency may cause makeup tank vortening resulting 1
Peellen D-49 IER 95-13-00 closed in R
in fa11ure to m**t Appendi a R reTaire=*nt s TN 94 - Os l
4
[
ISSCE DESCRIPTION asta NEC 1.IAD 12,4ER f.ICENSEE CC3stEIFTS NBC STATUS STATUS LER 96-16-00.
Failure to verify RB penetrations closed per TS 1
R1 Cocper 0-2 See EA 96-365 A
LFR 96-19-01 VIO B f02011)
EEI 96-10-01 Four examples of failure to follow refueling procedure FP-203 3
Moper C-4 See Eh 96-316 (01014)
R. C EEI 96-20-02 Failure to assure root cause analysis and corrective actions 5
McSper 0-5 See EA 94-316 40TC14)
R. C taken to preclude repetition were adeTeate af ter refuel incid*nt (no Pit issaed6 EEI $4-12-02 EDG loading tDQs due to inadequate 10 CFE 59.59 evaluations:
4 Schin/
R-2 D-6, D-See EA 96-365 96-465.
R. C three examples (one modification & two procedure changest FAllion 14, D-15, 96-52?, v!O A (01C12 CP-5 01022, 01032). See CR 3 U. I. S t Ot3 t' T. 6 EE1 96-12-01 Inadevaate corrective actions for 10 CFR 5C.59 evaluation -
5 Sctun CP-14 See E4 96,e65 et al, R. C errorst two examples VIO C t030131 EEI 94-12-04 Use of unverified calculations to support modifications.
4 Schin CP-6, D-14 See EA 96-36$ et al.
R. C Muc inepect licens***o ertant of etw11 tion reviews vio B te2913!
l
- EI 96-19-D1 Dree inadequate procedures fer centainment*penetratien 4
R. C surveillances vio B 4020133 EEI 96-19-02 Inadequate corrective actions for inadequate containment 1
RI CF-16 See EA S6-365 et al.
R. C f
penetration surveillaves YTO C 1010137 EEI 96-19-05 EFW NPSM CSQ due to inadeTaste to CTR 53.59 safety evaluatien 1
Schin D-38 Se= EA 96-365 et al, P. C for a modification VIO A (01042), see IR j
97-04 EE1 96-19-04 Failure to update applicable design documents to incorporate 1
Thomas D-39 S** EA 96 - M S *t a l.
R. C ETN design information (EFP-2 assaned operating when EFP-1 YIO B (020133 trips at Scos PCS pressures EE1 94-19-05 Failure to include applicable design information in the 1
Thcunas D-40 See EA 96-345 et al, R, C design irgmt requiremenr9 for an EDt modification (EFP-2 VI*J B tc2013) centinuirag to operate after EFP-1 trips at SCOS FCS pressure and hydraulic reTairementsi EEI 96-19 06-FFW t!SQ daa to removing the automatie open signal from ASV-1 Thomas
{ b4 See EA 96-165 et al, SL, C 204 reducina the reliability of EFP-2 YTO A ICID529 EEI 96-19-07 Inndequate 50.59 evaluation for post-14CA beron precipitation 1
Crewley CP-17 See EA 96-365 et al, R. C control YIO A (010621. Verify proce %res a-rj l
documentation adevaate pr ior to res* *rt.
EE1 94-19-C9 Error in design calculations for SW systes heat loads 1
Crewley D-29 See E4 96-365 et al, R. C YTO 8 tc20131 EEI 97-06-01 Inadequate saf et y evaluations f or added operatcr actions for 1
Schin R
design basis SBL/X"A mit igat ion i
L EA 95-36
'Use of non-conservative trip setpoints for safety-related 6,
1 Pellen CP-1)
S** IR 95-16 IR 95-R (was EEI 95-equipment (SLIII).
Additional exag les identified in IR 95-
- 21. IR 97-ci. IR 97-02 i
02-04) 16.
EA 95-126, Nine instances where cperators violated procedures for WT 6 3 Schin 97-07 R-13 See IF #6-04 R.' C
- t710 1. A (was pressure / level (SLIII).
Eri 95-22-01) l r
l l
5
.nummmmmcs.
ISSUE DESCRIPTIost amma 3sRC LEAD IQfSMt LICMESEE CO M MRC
^
STRTTS STATUS Conduct' of wasuthoriAed teets of 9EUT withon:t 10 CTR 54.3P
- 6. 3 EA ?$-1261.
evaluation ' (31.III). Additional esamples (four tests) -
Schinf 37-07 CP-10 See IR M-94 R, C E-VIO 1.3 (was'.
' ~
BEI 95-22-02)<
idsstified in 1/1S/96 letter titled 24 95-126 and En 96-1955.
(See URI 96 04) -
EA 95-126, Failure to take adegaate corrective actions for operator 6, 5 Schin D-37 R
VIO !.C.1 concerTre regarding OP-1039, Curve 8, for M'JT pressure / level (was EEI 95-.
limits (SLIIII 22-031 EA 95-126 Corrective actions for an inadetsate Curve 8 (two STI's and a 6, 5 RI Cooper /
O-1. D-37 R
VIO 1.C.2 revised Curve SA & SB) were also incorrect (SLIII)
Schin (eas EEI 95-22-019 ER 95-126, Design controls f ailed to ensure adequate safety margin for 6 1 RI Ceeper/
VIO I.D.1 HPI pumps fcr certain LOCA scenarios (SLIII)
Schin (was EEI 95-22-049 EQ 95-126, Swapover of ECCS pumps
- suctica free BNST (at five feet) to 6, 1 RI Cbcper/-
OP-13 R
VIO I.D.2 reae.or building supp was inade?> ate (SLIIII Schin (was EEI 95-22-04)
ER 95-126 EOFs allowed single LFI pupp to supply two RFI pupps, with
- 6. 1 RI Cooper /
OP-13 R
VIO 11.A (was insufficient NPSH for LPI puny (SLIII).
Schin EET 95-22-04)
EQ 95-126, Failure to take adequate corrective actions for tank 6, 5 RI Ceeper D-37 R
VIO II.B (was volumes / level /suctios point (SLIV)
EET 95 22-03)
EQ 95-126, Failure to ensure fire water storage tank contained edequate 6, 1 RI Cbeper D-37 R
VIO II.C (was volume of water (SLIV)
EET 95-22-03)
ER 96-316 Four examples of failure to follow refueling procedure FP-203 3
Hopper R
(01014).
(was EEI 96-10-015 EA 96-316 Failure to assure root cause analysis and corrective actions 5
Hopper R
402014).
taken to preclude repetition were adequate after refuel (was EEI 96-incident (no PR issued) 10-02)
ER 96-365, EDG loading U30s due to inadequate 10 CTR 50.59 evaluationsi 4
Schin/
R-2. D-6. D-See CR3 D.I. 5: CR3 R
96-465, 96-three examples (one modification & two procedure changes)
Fillion 14 D-15 D.I. 6 527 VIO A OF-5 (01012, 01022, and 01032).
twas EET 96-12-02 EQ 96-365 et EFW NPSN USQ due to inadequate 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation 1
Schin R
al. VIO A
.for a sodificatson (01042).
(was EEI 96-19-031 6
ISSUE DESCRIPTICIf.
m E 1ARD IR/SM L2 -
N M
STATUS STATUS EA 96-365 et EFW USQ due to removing the autcoatic open signal from ASV-1 Thomas R
al, VIO A 204, reducing the reliability cf EFP-2 (01052).
(was EEI 96-19-061 EA 96-365 et Inadequate 50.59 evaluation for post-IDCA boron precipitation 1
RI verify procefures and R
al, VIO A control documentation adaquete (01062).
prior to restart-(tas EEI 96-19-07)
EA 96-365 et Use of unverified ca:culations to support modifications.
4 Schin OP-6 R
al, VIO B NRC inspect licensee's extent of condition reviews.
(02013).
(was EEI 96-12-04)
EA 96-365 et Three inadequate procedures for contaarsnent penetration 4
DI Cooper R
al, VIO B surveillances (02013).
(was EE! 96-19-03)
EA 96-365 et Failure to update applicable d* sign documents to incorporate 1
Thomas a
al. 710 B EFW design information (EFP-2 assumed operating when ETP-1 (02013).
trips at 5005 RCS pressure)
(was EE1 96-19-04)
EA 96-365 et Failure to include applicable design information in the 1
Thomas R
al. VIO B design input requirements for an E N modification (EFP-2 (02013).
continuing to operate af ter ETP-1 trips at 5008 RCS pressure (was EEE 96-and hydraulic requirements) 19-05)
EA 96-365 et Error in desig n calculations for SW system heat loads 1
Crowley/
R al, VIO B Mellen (020131.
(was EEI 94-19-08)
EA 96-365 et Inadequate corrective actions for 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation 5
Schin R
al, VIO C errors two examples (03013).
(was EEI 96-12-03)
EA 96-365 et Inadaquate corrective actions for inadequate containment 1
RI Cooper R
al, VIO C pene ration surveillances (030131.
(was EEI 96-19-02)
VIO 93-16-07 Inadequate EOP and AP procedures 6, 3 Hopper 0-3, OP-19 See IR 96-04, IFI 96-R 04-03. IR 96-09 VIO 95-16-03 Inadequate procedure for operation of the makeup pump 1A 6, 1 RI Cahill 0-9 See LER 94-10 R
cooling water VIO 95-21-03 Failure to isolate the class IE from the non-class 1E 6, 1 Thomas /
D-30 See LER 95-25 LER 94-R electrical circuitry for the RB purge and mini-purge valves RI 02, IR 97-01. IR 97-02 7
asummmmmmmm ISSUE des?.I;; O N
STaft!S STATUS VIO 96-01-01 Inadequate corrective action for HPI flow indication problem 6, 5 RI Cooper D-53 See LER 94-05 R
VIO 96-01-06 Failure to correctly translate design basis of SW system into 6, 1 RI D-54 R
proe dJres, drawings, and inst ruct ions VIO 96-04-02 Failure to take prompt corrective action in revising 6 5 Ropper 0-9 R
procedure VP-580 Plant Safety verification (for STAS).
VP-580 contained outdated and incorrect inf ormat ion.
VIO 94-05 Failure to create a PR and CCR for damaged mai.n steam line E, S RI, IR 97-01 0 10 :
See INLI 96-s5-02. See R,' C
- hanerars Raghaven IF 91-02 IR 97-C2 VIO 96-05-05i Fanure to follow procedures for updating design basis' 4, 4 -
Crowley."
IR'97-01 CP-b h R. C documents VIO 95-05-07
' Inadequate receiving inspecticos for battery chargers tvendor 62'4 Schin IR $7-01 OP-20 R.~ C t ast el '
VIO 96-05-06 Failure to follow purchasirs precedures for loverters 4, 4 Setun.
IR 97-01 CP-21 "
R, C VIO 94-04-02 No procedure for demineralized water flusti performed by '
6, 3 RI.
,IR 97-02 OP-22 R. C '
operators e boric acid addition lines
~
VIO 96-06-04 No evaluation on non-FSAR vital battery charger configuration 6,
4 RI Cooper R-16 R
VIO 94-06 PR not initiated to resolve CREVS test failure
- 6. 5 lanahan/.
Ilt 97-02 CP-23 '
R. C Crewler VIO 96-08-01 Corrective action not taken on make-up syste-audit findings 6 5 RI Cahill CP-24 K
& excessive vibration on spent fuel pool pump cooling fan mot or VIO'96-09-03 Failure to perform a 10 CPR 50.59 safety evolustien for.
- 6. 3
' Thomas' IR 97-02 CP ),
C changes to procedures described in the FSAR for contrciling -
dissolved hydtcwy*n concentration in the Rc5 VID 96-09-04 Failure to update operating curves to reflect 1941 power 6, 4 Thomas IR 97-02 CP RC uprate-VIO 96-09-C5 Failure to incorporate design change of MUV-64 into 6, 4 Thomas /
CP-27 R
operat ions procedures Crowley VIO 96-09-06 Three exag les of design control errors (erroneous 6,
4 M. Miller CP-8 R
calculation inputs and Isf boundaryl VIO 96-09-07 Untimely corrective actions for the EFIC system concerns and
- 6. 5 Thomas CP-29 See In 97-01 a
problems v
VIO 94-11-04 Reactor building sug not constructed in accordance with 6,
1 RI D-56 See IR 97-02 R
approved const ruct ion drawirvas VIO 96-15-02 Failure of reactor coolant pug oil collection system to 6, 7 W. Hiller D-57 See IR 97-02 R
retain oil leaking f rom reactor coolant pump v!O 96-20-01 Failure to adhere to reactor coolant system cooldown limits 3
RI Cooper CP-29 R
VIO 96-20-02 Failure to follow procedure AI-400C for review and 7
RI Cooper CP-30 R
development of Maintenance Procedure PM-191. Main Tur bine/Geanerat or, Feedwater Turbine Layup VIO 97-01-01 Inadequate clearance tagging requirements 3
RI Cahill a
- 8
ISSUE DESCRIPTICor ARIA NRC LEAD IR/EEE LICERSTE CcesterTS mRC STATOS STATUS VIO 97-01-02 Failure to follow procedures, resulting in irmadvertent EDG 3
F.I r"soper R
st a rt I
a VIO 97-01-04 Failure to perforin TS surveillance for spent fuel pool level 3
.'I Cooper R
l VIO 97-01-07 Instrument loop uncertainty setpoint calculation assumptions 4
Mallen S*e IR 97-02 R
ret translated int o procedures V10 97-01-09 Inadequat e cor recc ive actions for cable ampacity 4
Fillion R
t VIO 97-02-01 Failure to f ollow equipment status control procedural 3
RI R
requiremants VIO 97-02-03 Adequate procedures not in effect to take the plant f rom tur.
1 Thomas R
st andby t o en!d shut down f rom out e ida t he cent rol room VIO 97-02-04 Failure to condaet TS logic testing 1
M. Miller See C:. 96-C1 R
IF2 95-15-C1 Der 1grt requirements for nitrogen everpressure (service water) 1 L
- ellan IR 97-01 D-41 r.eed to review R. C licensee's ca.lculation
( conclusion. See IR 95-21 IFI 95-15-02 Design requirementa for dynaele 14CA ef f ects per eurge line 1
RI D-54 See IR 95-21 and T'IA R
- f f ect s94-011 IFI 15-15-03 Desigrt require ents for reacter coolant pump cooler failure 1
Thomass IP 97-05 D-59 Sea IR 95-21 and TIA R. C
- 9-014 IFI 95-15-04 Ccrie requirement for thermal relief valves on decay heat 1
RI Sanchez D-40 S** IR 95-21 and TIA R
remrrval heat exchafvyers96-014 - isioned IFI 95-15-05 Relief valves removed f rcen heat exchangers 1
RI Sanchez D-61 S** IR 95-21 and TIA R
96-014 l
IFI 96 03-15 Evaluate the licensee's revised TS Bases and related 10 CFR 2
RI Cahill R-14 R
$0.59 analysis for HFI flow indicators IFI 96-17-02 Potential for HPI/LFI reeirculation resulting in make-up tank 1
R1 Cahill D D-1 S** CR) D.I.
1 R
j overfIow e
IFI 96-17-04 Adaquacy of 10 CFR 50 Appendix R fire study and documentation 1
W. Miller D-43 R
I IFI 96-201-11 Design basis for decay Seat / core flood / reactor coolant piping 1
Crowley 11 97-02 D-44 identified in IFAP R. C f
temperature r*Iw rt me IF-94-201-01 IFI 56-201-12 Conduit sizing criteria - jamening ratio not considered 1
Fillion D-45 Idant ified in IFAF R
r e tt as IF-96-201-02 IFI 96-201-13 Cable aepacities - several cables exceed rating, including 1
Fillion IR 97-01 D-22 Identified in IFAP R. C CH P-1 rey rt es IF 94-701 C3 IFI 96-201-14 EDG protective trips net bypassed during emergency mode of 1
Fillion D-12 I4*ntifiac in IFAP R
t operation r*oart as IF 46-201-04
[
}
IFI 96-201-15 Verification of motor starting data 1
Fillion D-46 Identified in IFAP R
rap-rt me IF 94-201-05
[
IFI 96-201-16 Coordination of Second level undervoltage relay (SIER) 1 Fillion D-47 Identified in IFAP R
i setting vs. invert er oper at ion report as IF-94-201-06
{
\\
1 9
i
2SSUE DESCRIPTION AREA WRC LEAD IO/SER LICusSEs etzserTS autC STRTUS STE M IFI 96-201-17 Coordination of SLLit and fuse protection 1
Fillien D-31 Iderrtified in IFAP R
report me IF-94-201-07 IFI $ 7-02-05 Outstandang issues associated with the emergency diesel 1
RI Cbeper R
generator power uprate modificar ices IN 97-04 Weakaesses in plant-specific emergency operating procadares 3
Morrer/
Inspect license **s R
for :efilling the secondary side cf dry once-through steam RI Cooper EOFs - in FFC plafmed o*ner at or s wed.
MULTI-FLANT ACTICNS f*PA SL507; Pressure locking and thermal binding of safety-related gate 2
NRK D-49 R
CL 95-C7 valves. Ctarrently in staf f review. An RAI is outstanding.
Erpact *d enlet ion?
MFA #L601; Testing of safety-related logic circuits -
2 Miller R-1 11/96 - the license
- R CL 96-c1 Licensee response in staff review. More details are has idertified testing retiired. 'Ihis issue requires attention.
defielencies that surt be fix*d prier to rest a rt tV70 97-02-045 MPA #L503:
Circureferential crack!e of SG tube flaws.
2 Blake/NRR R-17 R
~*
CL95-01 Licensee rampnns* in s review LICENSE ANENINGNT/FELIEF REQUESTS CCNE Control complex habitability envelope - Including TS-2C8 and 2
Schic/NRR R-12 R
TIA 95-03 need to be adfreesad. Licensee submittal does not provide adequat e TS an ion.
USQs Licensee request and NRC review and issue license a " 4 as NRR R-2, R-4 m
l for all tMraviewed Safet y Quest ions itsQs )
-f USQ EIC Load Uprate Fillion/
R-2 S** EE! 96-12-C2, CP)
R MFR D f.
6 USQ ASV 204 Thomas /
R-4 See EEI 96-19-04, CR)
R NWR D.T.
S USO DH-45-FI (post IDCA boron precipitation issue!
Crowley/
R-5 Se* t*I 94-201-01. M I R
NFR 94-04-01 USQ EDG Load List Update Fillion/
R-6 See EEI 94-12-C2, CR3 R
NER D T.
USQ ITS 3.0.3 relief for LP1/DH to allow WJdif1 Cation cf air Thomas /
R-7
$*e URI 96-201-04 R
eparators for DCV 17, 18 177, 178 NPR IIST Conduct an IIRT or s**8t an A=wndment to utilire Method B ef MRR R-10 R
Appendi n J t o 10 CFR % D OTHER ISSUES 10
ISSUE DEDCRIPT1tMt M
MCEms IR/SM LIC M M
M stavar sTarus LTOP Chrtent TS does not address LTOF prevention or mitigation.
2 3 DER /RI R-16 R. system branch will R
On the basis of CL 88-11, the licensee submitted information seemi letter to to demonstrate that LTCP in B&W plants have less than 1 in licensee that they 100 reactor years probability of occurrence and as a result have to submit TS.
per CL 88-11 non-appendia G methodology can be used for PT Short term action to curves. Such a PT curve would proeide for higher LTOP enable change FCNrv pressure and te v erature and would provide operational setpoint/ limit RCS P flexibility. staff denied the request in 1995 and requested to 10cc a revised respnse The licensee expects to respermi late 1997.
Appendix R Appendim R design basis issues review by FPC consultant. MRC 1
W. Miller /
D-11 R
review open Appendix R issues to assure that there are no Fillica/
restart or operability iseums imbaddad in them.
NRR Cperator NRC review operator workarounds list to assure that there are 3
RI Can111 M-2. O-7 See VIO 94-09-07 R
uorkarounds no rest a rt er operability issues contained in them SL54f Letteri IWec rwrisw license **s 53,54f 3etter rosycose Jess '2/7/971 ;ca p usan 3-4 passe 2 review p, c.
design bases-esselete License verify license conditions are met 2
RI R-15 R
Cbnditions RC toop In a survey inspection, the staff noted that certain branch 2
NRR D-62 R
Piping pipes off the primary coolant Icep were not analyzed se Cbde Analyses Class 1 pipe ti.e., no fatigue analysist as required er the Code.
Need WRR techniest branch's opinion on this Sources for issues include: IFS, SIMS, NUREG 1435 (Status of Safety Issues at Licensed Power j
Plants), Resident's OIL, PM's OIL i
i NOTE:.Open allegations, OI investigations, and emerging / draft issues are listed separately.
i i
}'
i l
4
?
4 1
]
11 l
~.
. ~.. _. - - _..
CRYSTAL RIVER 3 ISSUES CHECKLIST
~~
N ITEMS (INSPECTION PRIOR TO RESTART IS NOT NEEDED) i i
4 Status as of *tay 9, 1997 Total Non-Restart (N) Itemas : 84
- Open 76
- Closed 8
j 135UE DESCRIPTION AREA 90tC t.EAD 14/SER LICEW5EE STATUS CDeEETS est:
I STa'ty5 1
4
]
LICEle5EE*$ RESTART LIST OF DESIGB-RELATED ISSUES (D.I.s)(per 10/28/96 Itr from FPC) i I
tICFN'JE*5 OTWR RESTART ITEMS I
i 015G Tubes Adaauscy of GT3G ttee stress-reiteved rolled fotets is e.estioned BWOG 7
See litanssa precursor u (G) analysis of a Davts Basse pulled GT5G tide. current test data. and Itetted Card PC 94 50 U cf field experience cmflict with tes.t data from 1972 #1ch *gualtfts a 11/6/% tie TIA) i strass-reltavad rolled fotat J
i' i
FIVE arf AS OF CCMTI4tf!NG CONCT134. IdITH IPAP RfCDef1OID TW5PECT10s MR) Rif RICDieEICID ADDITIONS i
t IN9TCTOR F0tt OWIP SYSTTM W I 95-21 04' Excessive coo 1&w rate 3
M E20 '
5ee G3 C.I.1 W ($s. C WI 96 03-04 Measurtag of percent through-wall indications with an isigualtited 7
Saa IR 96-06 Genarte n (G) procedure tssue being addressed by i
supe em Tin URI 96 03-05 Eddy current sanple emansion based on dagraded tube partentagas 7
See IR 96-06.
- (5) i WI 96-06-10 Justtficatten for renovel of Themo-Lag protection frow the source raage 1
m ($)
testrunantatton t
f WI %-07 03 Incorrect information providad by contractors 7
a (5)
WI %-20106 Preferred offsite electrical praer source with plant shut de m (500 tv 1
m (3) switchya-d) is not qualified Note. Letti this tssue is resolved ttcans=* 15 not trsing cog gV switchva'd as an #3Petrical prnwar 50urra WI 96-20109 Testing to quaitfy relays tryond manufacturers' ratings was inadequate 1
m (s)
I 12 t
i
_____m 15511 IE50tIPTIC3 AREA listC LEAD IR/SE2 LICENSEE ST^.tT75 CDPs(NT5 NRC STan5 EA 97-012 f atlure to maintain protactad area barriers 7
See 19 9741 m (5)
- LER 93 l'2-02.
Switctiyard cable fatise cared degradad voltaga of Class IE electrical 7
ten 93 02 C1 cloX in IR a (1) tf R S3 0? O f bosas a vf actustices of Fr6 xy LER 94 06-01.
Deficiency in wWrstanding cf tectvvical reoutreammts leads to 2
Lfs E06-00 clow3 in IR R (D) tER 94 06-03 nonconsereattwe RPS setpoirt end pctenttal viclatton of T5 E 15 Sa= tA % 16 LER 94-06 04 tFR 94 fE 05 LER 95 09-00 M'nimal release esing sulfur dioxtda deltvary causes actuatton of to tc 7
Saa IR E li n(D cas imnitor ratulting in conerni corri amarsmr, vMilation actuation LER 95 10-01 Inadequate procedse causes low cooling water fim, to mee.c pn 1
LER EIO 00 cicsac in IR W(D resulting in operatton outside the dasign basis W 16 5** a%o 1F1 %
11-O' VIO %-14 03 LER E 17-00 SW flow to control room coolers ctrtrolled ty air eterated valves etcM 1
$** IR E 16. VfD % 01-t (D) could fail nren 06
( E R E 18- 00.
In&quate T5 note allow delay =d entry into T5 LCD 2
Sea NOr E t9 05 m (1)
LER W 16-01.
t is W 18 02 LER W 19 00 ted tretrtriantation for 9 flon to RBCUs incapable of meesurirg 90 gcni 1
Sa IR 95-18 m (1)
LER E 23 01 Inconsistant dastgn asstartions cause building spray f1me rates to be 1
LE81 94-23 09 closed tn IR 4 (!)
tFR W 23 07 nutsida desi7t basis
% G4 LER 95 25-00.
In@quate isolation of safety /non-safety related circutts 1
Sea VIO 95 71 43 Sa= IR 4 (D) t f R 0; ?S 01 97 C' LER 95 28 00.
!%l5T vacuum breder has in&quate rettef capacity 1
Saa IR E 21 m (!*
ttR W 28 01 LER E 01-01 EFIC control circutts misecuted. Appandie R concern 1
LER E01-00 cloM in In n (13 W O4 5.* also not W 01 03 LER E02-00 t't itpurga valve has safety /non-safety related circuits without isolatton 1
Sea VIO 95-21-03 m (!)
LER %-03-00.
RCS cocidown rate e caadad during coofdtwi 3
See LFI E 21-04 m (t)
IIR %-OLO1 LER 96-04 00 CCHE control darpers found damaged & led ing 1
5** URI E C2 0'.
IR 95-4 (D) i 21 LER 96 05-01 SW flow to R3CUs could e caed dasign 1
1Es %C5-00 closed in 18 m (D)
WO4 Sa= atso v?O %
Cl et j
LER E06-00.
HPI instrument error could resat in @I gry runout 1
Wilen IR 97-06 Saw IR 95-23. IR %04 t (UL C tJR E0r c3 93 c t p.
s LER E07-00.
HPI lina 55t0CA/100P/ loss of dc bus could have in@auate WI flow I
see IR 96 01 CR3 D I. 2 m (0)
(f p % 07-01 s ne t nrse at t nn LER E 08 00 Aribiguous T5 note results in not twforwng RCS leak surveillance prior to 2
m (5)
Mnda 2 l
LER 96 09 00 Failure to reattach instrtrumt titing to seisanc supports after 1
Sa= (FI E 03-06. IR %-
4 (!)
andif tratton Imads to oraratinn cutsida dastan basis Cs 13 i
.m._
... ~ -
--= - >- --- -- - ~ ~ - - -- -. -.
~
i l
ISSUE DESCRIPTI0le stEA 8RC LIA0 TR/50t L;CEW5EE STATUS CDetisTS E
i STATUS p
LIR 96-10-00 tow flav m SW system cooled cmponents causes weratier outside dasign 1
See 110 95-15-03.
4 CD)
I basis i
4 LER E ll 00 Personnet creer causas testing deficiency resuittng in condition 1
Sae WA K 601 (GL E 01).
N (D)
]
ornhibited tw terrev-d T5 (Gt E01 essuas)
((R E125 "
- g Operation outside design basi 5 Ca-ased by battery chargers heetes-IR 97 See V10 96-&01-.
'Il (D). C 4:
tfR W 12-0.
4 inadequa*.e test results accepted in errer -
' ~
4 x
(Ell %)? 0?
I (berator error rasuited in the inadvertent actuatist of DCP-1A LER % 13-00 3
See NCV % C3-02.
4 (1) l 4
i LIR E 15-00 Personnal errors cause cable separation /tsolation concerns resulting in 1
See IR % C4 m (I) i i
nearatton outstoa tv dastgn bases (teatc cas enettors)
[
f LIR W 16-00 CREYS fittar testing did not meet T5 specs 2
RI a (5) i
[
LER E 19-00 Non safety related switch used in safety related wiring for [5 status 1
Saa fJRI %06-03. Sa* !#
4 (D) j.
lights 97-04 LER % 20-00 thirevi=wed safety seestions concerning EDG overicading caused by 4
R-2. 94. D-14 See EEI 96-12-02.
2 (D) i intarpratatim of retelatory ransir== pets D-15 %5 LER %23 00 Personnal error leads to missed survetilances resulting in violatten of 2
See VIO W 15-01 m (D)
Technical Spectf stations (missed remote shutdows panel EFal puv pressure instrunant channal chart) l LER % 24-00 plant sodtfication causes uwlyzed condttimi regarding emargancy 1
Sae(Fi % I2-01.
2 (D) fea%at er
=
i '
i LER E25-00 Personnet error causes testing defectency resulting in condition 1
See
- A M CI (GL E 01).
m (D) prtetbited by Technical Spacif trattens (12 contacts in E5 logic mere not being testadt i
VIO 91-25-01 Failure to properly caitrol the Control C&cles Habitabtitty Envelare
- 6. T See LFI E 02-02.
4 (D)
I (dmr tanr*ad nran fer matp*anance wrt )
I i'
Failre to aske two 10 C/It 5033 reports to the MC iwithin the reedred
- 6. 2e t (1). C i
UID 94-27-02 IR 97-04 OP-4 Sae IR E 02. 1K 95-45.
j time-110 94-27-03.
Failure to make one required la (TR 50.72 report to the spC within tfe
- 6. 2' '
!* 97 OP-4 --
See IR 506.
W (1). C rmuired time 3
VIO E 01-05 T.o exavles of fatfure to tedate TSAR as reestred by 10 CFR 5011(c)
- 6. 4 m (5) i I
i v!O % C2-01 Tatture to maintain 0 2 footcandles tn the prctacted area
- 6. 7 Sea IR W 37 m,5)
VIJ E 02 04 Fatture to maintain secondary alarm station operable and tnadeauste
- 6. 2 m (5) t cravansetery amasures i
f v10 E 03-11 Fat ture to fo11ew radiation wort parwit require==ts
- 6. 7 m (5)
L VIO % C3-12 Failure to report the transport cf a rad'oactively contaminated indt*1 dual
- 6. 2 5 (5) f offsita v
t l
VIO % C3-13 Unescorted visitor parsonr=1 within the protected area
- 6. T u (5) l VIO E 05-04 Licensea approved eddy current acceptance criteria differe9t from T3 62 m (5) i requiramants 1,
j 14 4
-~
m.
ISSUE
!ESGl1PTION AREA 18tC LEAD IR/SE2 LICEWSEE ST;TUS COMutuTS mRC stams VIQ 9Fr06 Federe to timely actify the
- sditim outside the 40encha R
- 6. 2 1R 97'04 R G), C ttcmsieg desf 7t bests V10 96-07-01 Fatture to protect safegeerds informetton
- 6. 7 m d)
VID 96 07-02 Tailure to ctrofete scraemeg elms for Fitness for Duty Persomet
- 6. 7 m (5)
VIO %-09 01 Fatlure to follow a matntenance procedure resulting in the MAWM
- 6. 7 m (5) imt tatir i ef t** tweni cmn ey verwiletim ytm VIO 96-09 02 thescorted vtsttar pwsomel within the protected area
- 6. 7 m (5)
VIO 96 11-01 Inadaquete.crt *nstructionv to prevent the inadvar*M start of the A EDG
- 6. 7 m (5)
V10 96-11-03 Persomel performing work on the react 3r butidmg sse wtthout Icggtng
- 6. 7 m (5) mto a cle.rance as rat;1 rad by a~revad WR t
VIO 951:i 01 Failure to parfom a rataired T5 surveillance for the rmcte shutt>n
- 6. 2 saa LIR W23 m 15) penal IF! 94-18 09 Review partodic verificatton plans - NOV (GL 89-10 item) 2 See TR 95-11. IR 95 21:
4 (!)
Sa* G PS 10 IFI 95-02 05 Pasoreite netse in vicinity of MUV-25 7
m (5)
IFI 95-08-03 Emargmcy Operating Freedwe pdate prog-am 3
Sa IR 9516. VIO 93-16-07 N (5) f IFI 95 11-01 SCBA requt mants for parsorval during a tonic gas release 2
m (5)
IFI 95 21 02 ft>dification to the standby feedmeter pire rettrculatton Itne 1
m (5)
IFI 96 03-16 Raviaw of 'r# WC2 09 01. HPI ficw ><xticators, installation pactaga and I
a (5) funettonal twt W results l
IFI % 04-03 Effect of setroint calculations on ECP revistons 1
5ea VTO 93-16-07 N (D)
(
IFT %-0546 Large break loss of coolant aaaiysts ganeric concerns 1
m (5)
IFl E 06-09 Def tetencies m Pbcatiss fire barrier program procedures and docientattart 4
IR W IS E (5) C IF1 90 08-02 Reactor budding cavity cooling piping themal rettef protection 1
See 0 1. R GL W O6 m (D)
IFI 96-15 03 Acttcns ta6an to resolve post-acctdant recrtticality concerns due to 1
NPR revtew ng ganpric Mw
= (G) laraltrad tnrnn et tutim maa a
EEI 97 04 01 Fatture to mase an amargmcy phone report w1 thin the time rensirews of 7
RI Caht11 m (5)
- 10 N R 73 71 EE! 97-04 07 Fatlure to hand carry a suspected reportable issue to the shift managar 2
RI C# ill n (5)
- fnr repnrtei ht y review EE! 97 04-03 Repeat fatlure to report outside castgn basis conditions
- 1. 2 Schin n (5)
- i r
15 i
.. -.~
~n,
.~, - ~~
IS$1E DESCRIPTION AREA istC LEAD IR/5ER LICENSEE STATUS CDPM NTS Is!C STATUS C3LTI-PLANT ACTIONS W A #3105:
Seismic qualification of equipwr:t. Licensee's criteria and procedures 2
bpected crepletion N ($)
GL 87 02 approved Some issues are pending and mould be resolved thru sud1t Dece ter.
(scheduled for Mar 97). Lice see s field waltdan results are currently i
in staff review k
IPE and IPEEE - These are in staff review. Not a restart it m.
2 m (S)
WAfell8 (IPEEE)
WA fx602; NRCS Movment of heavy loads over spent fuel pool 2
N (S) 96 02
- tiewisee re<ponse in staff review This would not ba a restart issue W A at208.
Thermelag - Licensee plans to use Mecatiss 2
See IR 90 01: IR %-06 N (S)
GL 92-08. BU 92-(an alternate material). scue reanalysis of APP [NDIM R. and some 01 emenption. Fire barrier tests of Mecatiss including Ampacity tests are in staff review This also may not be restart issue l
MPAf L201:
Reactar vessc 2tructural integrity. RAI to licensee on 7/22/96. Only a
?
N ($1' GL 92 01 Rev 1.
data base issue. not a restart item.
Siw 1 e
TPA R 604;
'BorafleEdegradation3'iLicensee reS.ponse'ik josth3Qft reviaw to.
2j NNC ltri,
Closed ty kto FPC[
N(S)N 6 9004:
ccupence.: z This may have to be addressed prier to restart Mca.n ef '
of 5/1/9T letter cated S/1/77 sensitivity to spent fuel pool issues ' ' '
2 t
MPA NN testing & surveillance. This item is closed with the exception of IFI 2
See IFI 94-18-09 N (1)
GL STIO 94 18 09 on periodic verification. which is to be followed up after a new generie ccrmunication is issued l
LICENSE AM[ElMENT/Rft1FF REffKSTS
[
t RG 1 97 RG 197 instrumentation - Subcool monitors etc - category change. License 2
N (S)
[
Inst rtrent s amendavmt may te approved by Cecemte
{
Biometrics &
Biometric exenetion to allow taking security badges offsite - Staff review 2
- i. (S)
Secu-it y is cepacted ta be c eplete soon Core Flood Relief request RE: Core flood nozzle - Staff needs more info. PM will 2
N (S) l Nc?Zie keep R!l informed OTSG Tees OTSG tube testing - Licensee proposed a revised OTSG ttee acceptante 2
See VIO 96-05-04 m (S) criteria l
l OTE R ISSE S Pressurizer During Refuel 9 a sub-surface flaw was discovered The licensee performed 2
N (S)
Not21e Flaw better inspection during RIO and found the flaw to be acceptable. The new inspection results in rechced fim size and consequantly acceptance criteria (Jiich is based on ratio of flew to thickness) changes Staff i
revim in proorr+;
Criticality The licensee did not carry a previously approved enerption fran part 70 2
N (S)
Monitor (70 24?) requirements to Part 50 'icense, Need legal interpretation of s
the status of the emmption j
Sources for issues include: IFS. SIM5. NUREG 1435 (Status of Safety Issues at Licensed Power Paants). Resident's OIL.
PM's OIL 16
. ~. - -.
L
' NOTE: upen allegations. '01 investigations; and emerging /dro.c issues are listed separately.
LIST OF ACRONYMS USED l
AP Abnormal Operating Procedure BWST Borated Water Storage Tank.
C Closed t
l CCHE Control Complex-Habitability. Envelope CFR
' Code of Federal Regulations CR3 D.I.
Crystal River 3 Design Item L
CREVS-Control Room Emergency Ventilation System EA NRC Escalated, Enforcement Action EDBD Engineering Design Basis Document ECCS Emergency Core Cooling System 1
EDG Emergency Diesel Generator EEI NRC Escalated Enforcement Item E0P Emergency Operating Procedure l
FSAR Final Safety Analysis Report' 1
GL NRC Generic Letter
{
i
.ILRT Integrated Leak Rate Test (of the Reactor Building).
IFI NRC. Inspector' Followup Item LER Licensee Event Report LOCA Loss of Coolant Accident LPI Low Pressure Injection LTOP Low Temperature Overpressure Protection MPA NRC Multi-Plant' Action t
MUV Makeup Valve N (D)
Not an NRC Restart Item (because the issue is duplicated by a restartLitem)
N (G)
Not 'an NRC Restart Item (because it is.a generic. issue.affecting multiple operating plants and is being i
addressed by NRR)
N (I)
Not an NRC Restart Item (because previous inspection of the issue is adequate for restart)
[
N (S)-
Not an NRC Restart Item'(because. resolution of the issue is not needed for safe restart)
NOV NRC Notice. of Violation NPSH Net Positive Suction Head
?
OCR Operability Condition Report i
OP Operating Procedure i
PORV Power Operated Relief Valve PR Problem Report e
R NRC Restart Item RB Reactor Building RCS Reactor Coolant System
)
RMG Radiation Monitor.
-17
SFP Spent Fuel Pool TIA NRC Task Interface Agreement (between NRC offices) 4
~'
TS Technical Specifications URT NRC Unresolved Item USQ Unreviewed Safety Question
'~
VIO NRC Violation 0FFICIAL RECORD COPY DOCUMENT NAME: 5:\\DRS\\ RESTART.CR3\\ RESTART.597 I
18
- e8 'My'
- UNITED STATES
\\
o,,
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
- p h
ATLANTA F ERA CENTER
- /_
61 FoRSYTH STREET. SW. SUITE 23T85 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303 June 27, 997 MEMORANDUM T0:
File W
l FROM:
Johns audon. D re or Divis n of Reactor Safety-l
SUBJECT:
MINUTES OF THE CRYSTAL RIVER RESTART PANEL NINTH MEETING HELD JUNE 18-19.1997 The Crystal River Restart Panel met at the Crystal River site on the afternoon of June 18 and again on the morning of June 19. 1997. The following panel members attended the meeting.
Johns P.-Jaudon Chairman Harold 0. Christensen Kerr D. Landis
-Ste en J. Cahill Lak hminaras Raghaven Additionally, the following NRC staff attended the meeting in whole or part for support and information.
Marc L. Dapas-representing office of the ED0 Loren R. Plisco.NHR Caudle Julian Bob Schin 1
The status of the current inspections and plans for future inspections were discussed. The Crystal River 3 Issues checklist was reviewed and updated.
-New issues were discussed and decided to be either restart or non-retart issues. -The updated checklist is attached. On the afternoon of June 18.- the panel conducted a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> tour of the power plant, including an extensive tour inside the containment.
The panel observed that housekeeping-and plant-material condition is much improved.
On June 19, 1997. the panel conducted a public management meeting with the
-licensee at the FPC training center.
Following that meeting, the panel chairman responded to questions.from the public and press.
-The panel scheduled the next meeting for July 15. 1997, in Region II.
Docket: 50-302
Attachment:
As stated cc w/att --See page 2 Ciiu(10 h D Il ~
VO LICf00 o
File 2
cc w/att:
L. Reyes. ORA /Ril S. Collins. NRR J. Johnson. DRP/RII S. Varga. NRR F. Fedbon. NRR H. Christensen. DRS/Rll K. Landis. DRP/RII S. Cahill. SRl/RII L. Raghaven. NRR R. Schin. DRS/Ril G. Tracy. DEDO PUBLIC
=
Attachment A CRYSTAL RIVER 3 ISSUES CHECKLIST R ITEMS (TO BE INSPECTED BY THE NRC.BEFORE RESTART)
Status as of June 19, 1997 The Crystal River Restart Panel met on November 13, 1996, and developed seven general areas under which the restart issues will be grouped.
Those seven areas are:
1.
Knowledge of design and licensing bases and adequacy of design margin 2.
Regulatory knowledge and perspective 3.
Operator performance and knowledge 4.
Marginally effective engineering organization 5.
Management oversight; including quality assurance, self assessment, and corrective action 6.
Corrective actions for NRC violations 7.
Other Total Restart (R) Items: 146
- Open 106
- Closed 40 I
ISSUE DESCRIPTION AREA NRC LEAD IR/SER LICENSEE CC3WGNTS NRC C1hSURE STATUS STATUS LICENSEE *S RESTART LIST OF DESIGN-RELATED ISSUES (D.I.s)(per 10/28/96 Itr from FPC)
CR3 D.I.
1 HPI pump recirculation to the makeup tank 1
RI Cahill D-1 LER 97-08 R
See URI 96-01-02, IFI 96-17-02. IR 96-17 CR3 D.I. 2 HPI system modifications to improve SBIACA margins 1
Schin/NRR D-2 See URI 96-01-02, LER R
96-06, IR 96-17 CR3 D.I.
3 LPI purnp mission time (NRR for boron precip. review) 1 RI Cooper /
D-3 See URI 96-201-01, IR R
6 NRR R-9 96-17 CR3 D.I. 4 Reactor building spray pump 1B NPSH 1
RI Sanchez D-4 See URI 96-201-02, IR R
96-17 CR3 D.I 5
Emergency feedwater system upgrades and diesel generator load 1
Schin D-5 See URI 96-12 01: EEI R
impact 96-12-02, !R 96-17 i
i
\\
ISSUE DESCRIPTION sera NRC LEAD Z2/SER LICENSEE CC39GNTS NRC CLOSURE STATUS STATUS CR3 D.1, 6 Emergency diesel generator loading 1
Fillion/
D-6 See EEI 96-12-02, IR R
Schin 96-17, LER 96-20, LER 96-25 CR3 D.I. 7 Failure modes and ef fects of loss of DC power 1
M. Miller D-7 See CRI 96-12-01, LER R
96-07, IR 96-17 CR3 D.I.
8 Generic Letter 96-06 (Thermal overpressure protection for 1
Af Cahill/
D-8 See IR 96-12, LER 97-R Containment piping, penetrations, aad coolers)
Crowley 04 LICENSEE *S OTHER RESTART ITEMS RM 29/30 Seismic mounting of HR Rad Monitor 1
IAnahan/RI D-19 R
BWST NPSH NPSH concern with ECCS pumps when SFP pumps are running in 1
Thomas D-18 Review SP-630 test R
BWS and Recire results following M:R event MUV-27 Section XI leakage testing 1
R-21 R
FIVE AREAS OF CONTINUING CONCERN, etITH IPAP RECOMMENDED INSPECTION AND RII RECCs9 ENDED ADDITIONS Management
- NRC inspect Problem Identifications focusing on OA audits 5
RI Cahill/
P-2 Irsspect New PC system R
Oversight -
and the problem reporting system. - Increased inspection of QA Thomas P-3 FPC closing CP-2 IPAP Problem Analysis and Evaluation; focusing on root cause Recommended evaluations.
Inspection Marginally
- NRC inspect Engineering Problee Identification and 4
Schin P-4 50.59 R
Effective Resolution; with emphasis on licensee evaluations for P-6 Engineering significant issues and work backloqs.
Orginization
- Also inspect Quality of Engineering with emphasis on LO
- IPAP CFR 50.59 screening and safety evaluations, accuraev of the Recommended iSAR and management oversight.
Inspect the licensee's FSAR Inspection E e,w Project and assess the identified FSAR errors.
Lack of
- NRC inspect Engineering Safety Fneus focusing on proper 1
Schin D-13 a
- Adequate identification of discrepancies with the olantas design basis D-15 Knowledge of in t he correct ive act ion system.
D-16 the Design
- Also inspect Engineering Problem Identification and P-7 Basis - IPAP Resolutions focusing on programs for identifying desten basis P-8 Recoemended issues and capturing them in the correct ive action program.
Inspection
- Also inspect Quality of Engineering; focusing on sensit ivity/underst anding by the engineerinq / licensing staff of the plant's destyn basis.
- Also assess the design margin, including the licensee's
- weent of <nnditinn-reviews Lack of
- NRC inspect S0.59s, operability, recort ability 2
Schin P-4' R
Regulatory P-5 Knowledge and Compliance With Regulations -
IPAP Recommended Inspection 2
3 S
Tt t
CA RT fIS R
4 C
EESS NU ET CA 6
/O RL IC l
D l
A i
E h
L aC C
R I
rB R
AERA 3
n i
h t
i w
nd o n i
a tac s, i
p n u oe rg ce t
ni os yr t e ih st uo coh fti
- w sun co oi Ft a yc tien Sm fa tec N
e, O
ps I
sn T
no e P
ii m
I ti R
Ca t
C Rr r
S Ne e
E o v D
co e d c en n do ra ni om et mc t r E
ao e
U rfPop S
erAcs S
pePen I
oPIRI
~.. _
ISSU" DESCRIPTION AREA MRC LEAD IR/SER LICENSEE CtsSENTS NRC CLosrRa states start's INGPECTOR FOLLCWUP SYSTEM URI 95-02-02 Control room habitability envelope leakage. Excessive 1
Schin R-12 See TIA 95001: FPC TS R
1eakage paths through doors, dampers, and drains date to Change Request No. 200 design errors and lack of surveillances/ preventive of 9/28/96: LERs 96-masntenance 04, 94-10, 95-01, 95-04-01, 95-09; irs 95-02, 95-09 95-11, 95-16, 95-21, 97-05; FPC Itrs. of 5/24/95 and 10/23/95 URI 96-01-02 Discrepancies in the high pressure injection design basis 1
Schin D-9, D-1 See CR) D.I. 1:
R analysis CR3 0.1. 2 lDiscrepancied in the EDBD 'nd the FEAR rergarding-the-31 ?-
Crowley IR 96*19 See EEI 96-19-07.
R. C (CI.96-04-011 a
prevention of post-thCA boron precipitation URI 96-05-02 Design concerns with main steam-line hangers used in seismic?
1.[
RI;
- IR 97-01L D-51' See VIO 96-05-01
R, C and other, dynamic icad applications "
Raghavan:
Coordinate with L.
Rachavan URI 96-06-0)
Non-safety teleted trangier ewitch used in'ES stRtus:
11
.Fillion.
IR 97-06L D-21 R. C,
indicating light circuitry-DI 7 :
Se* CR3 D.I.'5; R. C s
'URI'96+12-01 Emergericy Feedwater-1cw ifPSH to teth pumps due to postulated m 1
Schini 1R 96-19' 1
eingle.f ailure :
- CR3 D.1, 7 s - E21 96 ~
03,
-04, 05, 06 URI 96-lb O3 '
Failure to conJuct' required Technical: Specification'. ~..
4l M...M111er IR.97 CP-le
'See MPA SL601 (CL 96-?
R, C surveillance testing on safety related circuitry'(GL 96-0110 Oll; See IR 97-01' URI 96-201-01 Long term plant cooldown following a small break IDCA 1
RI Cooper /
D-3 See CR3 D.I. 32 See IR R
assuming a single f ailure in the decay heat drop line NRR 96-11.
NRR taking responsibility for this it em.
URI %-201-02 NPSH for building spray pump has very little margin, and some 1
R1 Sanchez D-4 See CR3 D.I. 4 R
calculation factors were nonconservative URI 96-201-03 Operating curves 16, 17, and 18 in OP-103B are not validated 4
Hopper 0-1 R
by licensee URI 96-201-04 Nonsafety-related positioners on safety-related valves 1
Thomas D-10 See IR 96-00, IR 97-01 R
R-7 URI 96-201-05' Service water systeen heat loads did not consider maximum.
1 Crowley7
'IR 96-19 0-1 !.~
See Et!.96-19 R. C.
input heat -(Ofs101B,- Curve 15)
URI 96-201-07 EDG not protected against water spray from failure of fire 1
Fillion/
D-52 R
a protection deluge system in EDG room M. Miller /
W. Miller tml 97 01-06.
IIP!' system design, licensing basis. and 73 concerns u
- 1 Schin;
' 1R 9h05 Sea IR 9b 06 R; C
- tRI 37-01-09
/dequacy of procedures to take the plant:from hotistandby to 2:
. Thomas-
.IR 97-02.
R, C -
cold shutdown from outside the control reor'{ Appendix R)
URI 97-02-02 Deletion of water quality requirements f rom the FSAR 2
Thomas /NRR F-5-E R
URI 97-05-02 50.59 safety evaluation does not address operation of the 1
homas/
A atmospheric dump valves from remote shutdown panel during an Raghaven Appendix R fire event 4
ISSUE DESCRIPTION ARIA 3rtC LEAD IO/SER LICENSEE CopeGDrrS WRC CLOSURE STATUS STATt'S URI 97-05-04 LER and VIO not supplemented by date stated in licensee 2
Thomas Review coennitment R
tracking system response LER 95-13-01.
Design deficiency asy cause sakeup tank vortering resulting-
.1 :
Hellen IR 97 D-4 8 '-
LER 95-13 00 closed in R.C.*'
in failure to meet Appendin 3 requirements -
IR 96 LER 96-18-00, Failure to verify RB penetrations closed per TS 1
RI Cooper 0-2 See EA 96-365 R
VIO 9 (02013)
LER 96-18 01 LER 96-21-00 Delayed entry into technical specification required action 3
RI Cahill R
involving an inoperable Reactor Prete< tion System channel LER 96-22-03 Design error regarding hot shorts results in operation 1
R LER 96-22-01 outside Appendix R design basis LER 97-05-C0 Unanalyzed condition re small break LOCA & EFW 1
Schin/NRR See D.I.2 R
LER 97-09-00, inadequate design resulted in PCp lubricating oil collection 1
W. Miller /
R LER 97-09-01 system being out side 10 CFR 50 requirement s
.taghaven LER 97-11-00 Functional testing of EDG-1A room temperature may exceed 1
M. Miller R
120*F EEI 96-10 01 Four examples..of... failure to follow refueling procedure FP-203 '
3s
. Hopper-0 See EA 96*316.{01014L R. C
~Hepper 0-5' See EA 96-316 (02014)
R. C EE1 96-10-02 Failure to assure root cause analysis and corrective-actionsf 5l
'taken to preclude repetition were adequate after; refuel 1 incident (no t'R issued)- ' ^
EE! 96-12;02 ECC loading tfSQs due to inadequate 10 CFR-50;$9 evaluationsi'
- 4; Schinf,-
. R-2. ' D-4. : D-See EA 96-365,c.96-465.
R. C '
three examples tone modification & two procedure changes)
Fillion'
- 14. D-15,:
96-577, VIO A (01012,'
CP-5.
.01022. 010321. 'see CR) D,I. 5# CP) D.I. 6 Inadequate corrective actions l for.10-CFR 50.59' evalustion S[
Schin.
OP N '.
See EA 96-365 et al.
R. C REI 96-12-03 VIO C (030131 errorsi tino examples '
EEI 96 12 04 Use of unverified calculations'to support ~siodifications.
'4-Schin CP-6. D-14' See EA 96-365 et al.
R. C.
NPC inspect licensee's extent of' condition reviews.
VIO 3 102013)'
EE! 96-19 Three inadequate procedures for contmirunent perbtration
[4 y FI
'OP-15.
SeeEA96-365et.al[
P, C surve111ances: ' '
VIO B (020135' EEI 96-19-02 Inadequate ' corrective actions for inadequate containment]
1:
RI.
.CP*16 See EA 26-365 et a12 R. C -
penetration surveillances:
~
-VIO C 4030133 EEI 96-19-03:
EFW frPSH t'SQ due to. inadequatd.10 CPR.. SO.59 saf ety evaluation -
- 1. -
Schin-D-38 '.
See EA 96-366 et al.
R. C.-
for a modification -
VIO A (01042b-See IR 97-04:
. ~...,..,..,
w..,:,...,.. +,,......
- 1 -"
~
EEI 96-19404:
Failure to update applicable design documents to ' incorporate':
.Thoma s.:-_
-D-39' See EA 96-365 et al,~
R, C 4
.EFW design information-(EFP.2 assumed operaging when EPP-1;.
VIO B ;1020137 trips at 5008 RCS pressurel' ETI 96-19-OSf Failure to includ+ applicable design information in the ~.
1?
ThomasL
'D-40i See EA 96-365 et al.
R.
C.
design it:put Yequirements for an EFw modificatiort (EFP-2 VIO B (02013) continuing:to operate after EPP-1: trips.at 5008 RCS pressure and hydraulle requiremental' 5
l 18702 DESCRIPTION AREA NRC LEAD IR/SER LICEEISEE CCesENTS EfRC ClosuRs sTmTus stares EE! 96-19-06.
' EFW USQ due to refnoving the' automatic.open sign 11;f rosi ASV '
>1[
Thoma8I R-4; See EA $s-365 et'al,i It, ' C.
204. reducing the reliability'of E5P-2' VIO A (010521-EE! 96-19-077 JInadequate '50.59 evaluation;for post-LOCA boron precipitationj
- 1
- -
Crowicy).
'CP+17 See EA 96-365 et al,
'st; C i control
' ~
VIO A (01062), verify','
procedures and.
documentation adequate
' prior to restart.
EE! 96-19-00' Error in design' calculations for Sw system heat idadel 11
- Crowley~
. D-24 {
See EA 96 465 et al.1 R Ci
~
VIO B (020131 EA 95-16 Use of non-conservative trip setpoints for safety-related 6,
1 Mellen F-13 See IR 95-16. IR 95-R (was EEI 95-equipment (SLIII).
Additional examples identified in IR 95-21 IR 97-01, IR 97-02 02-04) 16.
V10 I.A tuas 1 pressure / level lt$LIIt};
~~ '
6b 3 i SchinJ
.k4074
.R$1s f See_IR.96-04 R[ C 4 Nine'inittances where operators Niolated proceduresIfor f*JT[
EA ;5-126(.
EE! 95-72-01)'
..-......... 7.
s
+.<
EA 95-126; Conduct'of' unauthorized tests of f*JT without?10 CFA S0.59?
6N3 ^
-Schinh-97 CP-10.
See IR 56 R, C f VIO Ie8 (wasc evaluation.(SLIII). / Additional: examples'(four tests)a..,..
m
'REI 95-22-02)t
. identified in 1/18/96. letter titled EA 95-126 and'EA 96-185).
-(See URI 96-04e08)J' EA 95-126, Failure to take adequate corrective actions for operator 6, 5 Schin P-11 R
VIO I.C.1 concerns regarding CP-103B, Curve 8 for MUT pressure / level (was EEI 95-limits (SLIII) 22-03)
FA 95-126.
Corrective actions for an inadequate Curve 8 (two STI's and a 6 5 RI Cooper /
O-1 R
VIO I.C.2 revised Curve SA 8 8B) were also incorrect (SLIII)
Schin (was EE! 95-22-03)
EA 95-126 Design controls failed to ensure adequate safety margin for 6,
1 RI Cooper /
P-6 R
VIO I.D.1 HPI pumps for certain LOCA scenarios (SLIII:
Schin (was EE! 95-22-04)
EA 95-126, Swapover of ECCS pumps' suction from BWST (at five feet) to 6, 1 RI Looper /
D-35 a
a VIO I.D.2 reactor building wump was inadequate (SLIII)
Schin (was EE! 95-22-04)
EA 95-126.
E0Ps allcwed single LFI pump to supply two HPI pumps, with 6,
1 RI Cooper /
OP-13 R
VIO II A (was insufficient NPSH for LPI pump (SLIII)
Schin EEI 95-22-04)
EA 95-126 Failure to take adequate corrective actions for tank 6, 5 RI Cooper P-12 R
VIO II.B twas volumes / level /suctior point (SLIV)
EEI 95-22-03)
EA 95-126 Failure to ensure fire water storage tank contained adequate 6,
1 RI Cooper D-37 R
VIO II.C (was volume of water (SLIV)
EEI 95-22-03)
EA 96-316 Four examples of failure to follow refueling procedure FP-203 3
Hopper 0-4 R
(01014).
(was EE! 96-10-01) 6
ISSUE DESCRIPTICH AREA NRC LEAD IR/SER LICENSEE COpsGrFS 3rRC CLO$t2RE STATUS STATUS EA 96-316 Failure to assure root cause analysis and corrective actions 5
Hopper 0-5 R
(02014).
taken to preclude repetition were adequate after refuel (was EEZ 96-incident (no PR issued) 10-02)
EA 96-365.
EDG loading USQs due to inadequate 10 CFR 50.59 evaluations; 4
Schin/
D-6 See CH3 D.I. 5: CR3 R
96-465, 96-three examples (one u)dification E two procedure changes)
Fillion D-14 D.I. 6 527 VIO A D-15 (01012, P-5 01022, and R-2 01032).
(was EEI 96-12-02 EA 96-365 et EFW NPSH USO due to inadequate 10 CFR 50.55 safety evaluation 1
Schin D-30 R
al, VIO A f or a podification (01042).
(wos EEI 96-19-03)
EA 96-365 et EFW USO due to removing the automatic cpen signal from ASV-1 Thomas R-4-A R
al, VIO A 204, reducing the reliability of EFP-2 (01052).
(was EEI 96-19-06)
EA 96-365 et Inadequate 50.59 evaluation for post-LOCA loron precipitation 1
RI Cooper P-17 Verify procedures and R
al, VIO A control doeur entation adequate (01062).
prior to restart.
(was EE! 96-19-07)
EA 96-365 et Use of unverified calculations to support modifications.
4 Schin D-14 R
=
al, VIO B NRC inspect licensee's extent of condition reviews.
P-6 (02013).
(was EE! 96-12-04)
EA 96-365 et Three inadequate procedures for containment penetration 4
R1 Cooper P-15 R
al, VIO B aurveillances l
(02013).
(was EE! 96-19-01)
EA 96-365 et Failure to update applicable design documents to incorporate 1
Thomas D-39 R
al, VIO B EFW design information (EFP-2 assumed operating when EFP-1 (02C13).
trips at 5000 RCS pressure)
(was EE! 9C-19-04)
EA 96-365 et Failure to include applicable design information in the 1
- Ihomas D-40 R
al, VIO B design input requirements for an Efw modification (EFP-2 (02013).
continuing to operate after EFP-1 trips at 500f RCS pressere (was EE! 96-and hydraulic requirements) 19-05)
EA 96-165 et Frror in design calculations for SW system heat loads 1
Crowley/
D-20 R
al, VIO B Mellen (02013i.
l (was EE! 96-j 19-08) g 7
ISSUE DESCRIPTIOff AREA NRC LEAD IR/SER LICENSER COISEIFTS NRC CIDSURE STATUS STATUS.
EA 96-365 et Inadequate corrective actions for 10 FR 50.59 evaluation 5
Schin P-14 R-al, VIO C errors: two exarples -
(03013).
(was EE! 96-12-03)
EA 96-365 et Inadequate corrective actions for inadequate containment 1
RI Cooper P-16 R
al, VIO C penetration surveillances (03013).
(was EE! 96-19-02)
EA 97-094 Failure to report an unanalyzed condition that significantly 2
Schin/
See LER 97-001, IR 97-R VIO A2(01023) ecwnpromised plant safety. Inadequate NTSH for EFW pump RI Cahill 04 EA 97-162, Inadequate safety evaluations for added operator actions for 1
Schin P-5-C R
VIO 01013 design basis SBLOCA mitigation (was EE1 97-06-01)
VIO 93-16-07 Inadequate EOP and AP procedures 6,
3 Hopper 0-3 See 1R 96-04, IFI 96-R P-19 04-03, IR 96-00 VIO 95-16-03 Inadequate procedure for operation of the makeup pump 1A 6,
1 RI Cahill O-8-A See LER 96-10 R
- cooling water VIO 95-21-03 Failure to isolate the class 1E from the non-class 1E 6,
1 Thomas /
D-30 See LER 95-25, LER 96-R electrical circuitry for the RB purge and mini-purge valves RI 02, IR 97-01, IR 97 02, IR 97-05 VIO 96-01-01 Inadequate corrective action for HPI flow indication problee 6, 5 R1 Cooper D-53 See LER 96-05 R
v!O 96-01-06 Failure to correctly translate design basis of SW system into 6, 1 RI D-54 a
procedures, drawings, and instructions VIO 96-04-02 Failure to take prompt corrective action in revising 6, S Hopper 0-9 R
procedure VP-500. Plant Safety Verification (for STAS).
VP-580 contained outdated and incorrect information.
k-ec -.
.s t
. v v..:.
x,-..v,,,.4s
,g ar ;.,,
,-v.:-
+-
^;y
..y.
R.- C.,,.
VIO $4-05-01:.
6 Failure ' to create a PR and'. OCR : for. damaged ma.iri steam line ?
- 6,'s 5 R i k.......,
- IR 97-02:
^ '
- IR 97-02" '
.IR 97 01j 0-10f see URI-96-05 02:'See?-
ha v s2
' @m '
.s.:
1 e.- - 1 s :...
..3.,.
"f!D 96-05-05 '
Failure to' follow pr..ocedores ' for upds.. ting des,ign be.81s.
- 6 4.,4,%
N2h. wiey"
.IR N O1J.
OP.8.[D.55.
R, ' C I
S
.g t
2, v.
<.. z.. - '
.s.s
,....,.. -.^:,
y 7e-
... u.4 c.,...
e4 s
laadequate receiving inspections l for battery'* ' chargers jvendor ;
- 6 E4
- '
- schini.,
e e12R'97 01/
OPJ20 6
+
. R. C-;
V!O-96-05-01E 7
tests)
VIC 94405-08...,,
- Fa!!ureitolfollow' purchasing procedures for.inveiters g K4[
3 chin [33-j!kIS701]
Ior-21 z,
[.
s.*.
~ <
pe r...
k. + = ~..
.m...,
,e-:,,,
R]M
~
m.
,m.....
.m.,.-
.s.
,m VIO 96'06 No procedure for 'deminerailred ' water ' flush performed 'try 4
- $ 5 '< 3 )
- RII xIR 97-02)
,OP-22 i-R; C -
cperators nn boric -acid addition' lines
~
VIO 96-06-04 No evaluation on non-FSAR vital battery charger configuration 6, 4 RI Cooper R-18 R
.... - - ~,.....,..:<.<.~. ~
u..
nn.,
- +
y..
VIO 96-06-07i
'PR not?1nitlated to resolve'CREVS test.failuret 6,} 5;j'
..Lenahan/f likT9NO2 CP1 3 J Ri ' C: -
i 2
wy,y..:
- o VIO 96-08-01 Corrective action not taken on make-up system audit findings 6, 5 RI cahill P-24 R
& excessive vibration on spent fuel pool pump cooling fan motor 8
Isses casCRIPTION AREA NRC 1.EAD
-IR/SER -
1.ICENSEE COBSEDFTS NPC Cx.Osvaa sta7vs states -
m-7
,. ny _
Vic 6-05-03; Failure to perform a?10 CFR'$0;59 safety'eveluation for; R
- 6,' 3 ;-
'Thoses.i c
~1R 97-020 "OF+251; Rf ci
! changes to procedures described'1:1 the FSAR-for controlling:
~
~.^
~
dia volved hydrogen concentration in the RCE'-
'" - ^ ' ' '
...-..,...~vc...,
.wv~.
.... ~,..........,,.
V!d'9N0 bob
.' Failure to updatr operating curves to'reflectl1991' powerl'
. 6; 4..t Thoess IR)91-02(.Ch2&f R'; c. :- "
uprate :-
VIO 96-09 05 Failure to incorporate design change of MUV-64 into 6, 4 Thomas /
P-27 R
operations procedures Crowley VIO 96-09-06 Three examples of design control errors terroneous 6, e RI Cooper P-8 a
e calculation inputs and ISI boundary)
VIO 96-09-07 tJntimely corrective actions for the EFIC system concerns and 6, 5 1homas P-29 See IR 97-01 R
problems VIO 96-11-04 Reactor building sump not constructed in accordance with 6, 1 RI Cooper D-54 See IR 97-02 R
approved construction drawings VIO 96 *5-02 Failure of reactor coolant pump oil collection system to 6, 7 W. Miller D-57 See In 97-02,12R 97-R retain ot1 leaking from reactor coolant pump' 009, PC 97-3387 VIO 96-20-01 Failure to adhere to reactor culant system cooldown limits 3
RI Cooper P-29 R
VIO 96-20-02 Failure to follow procedure AI-400C for review and 7
RI Cooper P-30 g
development of Mair,tenance Procedure PM-191, Main 7brbine/ Generator, Feedwater Turbine Layup VIO 97-01-01 Inadequate clearance tagging requirements 3
RI Cahill 0-12 R
VIO 97-01-02 Failure to follow procedures, resulting in inadvertent EDG 3
RI Cooper O +3 R
=
start VIO 97-01-04 Failure to perform TS surveillance for spent fuel pool level 3
RI Cooper M-9 R
=
VIO 97-01 -0.'
Instrument loop uncertainty setpoint calculation assumptions 4
Mellen D-26 fee IR 97-02 R
not translated into procedures VIO 97-01-09 Inadequate corrective actions for cable ampacity 4
Fillion/
D-22 R
M. Miller VIO 97 02-01 Failure to follow equipment status control procedural 3
RI O-13-A R
requirements VIO 97-02-03 Adequate procedures not in effect to take the plant from hot 1
1homas P-19-A R
standby to cold shutdown f rom outside the control room VIO 97-02-04 Failure to conduct TS logic testing 1
M. Miller R-1-A See CL 94-01 R
VIO 97-05-01 Failure to follow equipment tagging control procedural 3
RI Cahill R
requirements VIO 97-05-03 Incorrect information in annunciator response procedure for 3
Thomas R
inverters LIFI 95-15-011 Design requirements.for nitto.. gen overpressdtej (service waterli
-1b 1.P Mellen?
11R.9N0b Dh4N 38hedtoheviewI..
Rh,c I
...,..., +.
,y y.:.......... ~,.
.ggc,,,,,,,,,3c 1,tg,n
' s s-Y...
a conclusion? i See -IR-.
M'
^
N4-95-21' 4
9
l ISSU" DESCRIPTION AREA ERC LEAD IR/SER LICENSEE COD 9ENTS NRC CLOSURE STATt?S STATUS IFI 95-15-02 Design requtrements for dynamic IDCA ef fects per surge line 1
RI Sanchez D-58 See IR 95-21 and TIA R
96-013 e f f ect s IF1 95-15-03 Design requirements Isr reacter ecolant pump cooler-failure, 1-Thomas -
- 1R' 9%05.
D 59 See IR 95+21 and TIA' R. C 9-014 IFI 95-15-04 Code requirement for thermal relief valves on decay heat 1
RI Sanchez D-60 See IR 95-21 and TIA R
96-014 - issued rewival heat exchangers 1
IFI 95-15-05 Relief valves removed from heat exchangers 1
RI Sanchez D-61 See IR 95-21 and TIA R
l 96-014 j
IFI 96-03-15 Evaluate the licensee's revised TS Bases and related 10 CFR 2
RI Cahill R-14 R
50.59 analysis for HPI flow indicators IFI 96-17-02 Potential for HP!/LPI recirculation resulting in make-up tank 1
RI Cahill D-1 See Ot 3 D. I.
1, LER R
97-008 overflow IFI 96-17-04 Adequacy of 10 CFR 50 Appendix R fire study and documentation 1
W. Miller D-4 3 R
9esign basis for decay heat / core flood /reactdr'coclant piping
- 1 Crowley;'
reper"_as IF 96-201-01,
R, C
.!R 37-02 i D-44.'
identified in IFAP IFI 96-201-11' temperature IFI 96-201-12 Conduit siring criteria - jamming ratio not considered 1
Fillion/
D-45 Identified in IPAP R
M. Miller report as IF-96-201-02 IR'97-01' D-22 Identified in IPAP..
R. - C i
IFI 16-201-13 Cable ampacities - seversi cables exceed radng, including -
1-l'illion report as IF *6-201 03' DHP-1' IFI 96-201-14 EDG protective trips not typassed during emergency mode of 1
M. Miller D-12 Identified in IPAP R
report as IF-96-201-04 operation IFI 96-201-15 Verification of motor starting data 1
Fillion/
D-46 Identified in IPAP R
M. Miller report as IF-96-201-05 IF1 96-201-16
. Coordination.of Second level undezvoltage relay.(SLUR) :
'1' Fillion/;.
IR 97 05-DJ47 Identified in IPAF-R. C
- setting vs? inverter operatiert M_ Miller' repert as IF-16-201-06 IFI 96-201-l' Coordinat %n of SLUR and fuse protection 1
Fillion/
D-31 Identified in IPAP R
M. Miller report as IF-96-201-07 IFI 97-02-05 Outstanding issues associated with the emergency diesel 1
RI Cooper D-6-C R
generator power uprate modification IN 97 Weaknesses 'ln plant-specillo emergency operating procedurts l-t) '
Hopper //.
r!R 97-07 O-14 Inspect' licensee's R. C
- for refilling the secondary side of dry once-through stese RI: Cooperi' J ' "
EDPs - In FPC planned-generators upgrade' MtrLTI-PLANT ACTIONS MFA #L507; Pressure locking and thermal binding of safety-related gate 2
NRR D-4 9 New PC 97-1517 R
GL 95-07 valves. Currently in staff review.
An RAI is outstanding.
identifies that EFIC valves open/close was Expected completion?
not taken into consideration MPA # L6 01 ;
Testing of safety-related logic circuits -
2 M. Miller R-1 11/96 - the licensee R
CL 96-01 Licensee response in starf review. More details are has id*ntified testing deficiencies that muar required. This issue requires attention.
lie fixed prior to rest a rt (VIO 97-02-04) 10
~ - -
i l
l 25$UE DESCRIPTION ARIA NRC LEAD IR/SER LICENSEE CCDsGNTS NRC C145 URB STATUS STATUS.
t-Circumferential'crackkng of EQ t b ilawsc d 21-
- Blakd/NRR.
5-17 See NRC letteT'$/19/97 RJ C
- MPA WL503)
CILS'03 Licensee response-in staff revi;w!
LICENSE AMENDMENT /ftELIEF REQUESTS CCHE Control complex habitability envelope - Including TS-208 and 2
Schin/NRR R-12 Nithdrawn FPC ltr.
R TIA 95-03 need to be addressed. Licensee submittal does not 4/18/97 See also FPC provide adequate TS action.
1tr. 5/15/97 for comit ment o.
USCs Licensee request and NRC review and issue license amendments NRR R-2, R-4 a
for all Unreviewed safety Questions (Usos)
R-2 See EEI 96-12-02, CR3 R
NPR D.I.
6 USO ASV 204 Thores/
R-4 See EEI 96-19-04, CR3 R
NRR D.I. 5 USO DH-45-F1 (post-LOCA boron precipitation issue)
Crowley/
NRR 96-04-c1 USQ EDG toad List Update Fillion/
R-6 See EEI 96-12-02, CR3 R
NRR D.I.
6 USQ ITS 3.0.3 relief for LPI/DH to allow modification of air Thomas /
R-7 See URI 96-201-04 R
operators for DCV 17, 18, 177, 170 NRR ILRT Conduct an 11JtT or seek an Amendment to utilise Method B of NRR R-10 R
Appendtx J to 10 CFR 50 CTEER ISSUES LTOP Current TS does not address LTOP prevention or mitigation.
2 NRR/RI R-16 NRC ltr. 2/4/97 R
O the basis of GL 88-11, the licensee submitted information requested licensee to to demonstrate that LTOP in B&N plants have less than 1 in submit a TS amendment.
100 reactor years probability of occurrence and as a result On 4/7/97 FPC per CL 89-11 non-appendix G methodology can be used for PT submitted an exception curves. Such a PT curve would provide for higher LTOP enable request to use Code pressure and temperature and would provide operational case N514.
Exemption flexibility. Staff denied the request in 1995 and requested is in review process.
a revised response. %e licensee expects to respond late TS amendment reflecting the 199?.
approved exception will be submitted by July.
Short term action to change PORY setpoint/ limit RCS P to 100s.
Appendix R Appendix R design basis issues review by FPC consultant. NRC 1
W. Miller /
D-11 R
review open Appendix R issues to assure that there are no Fillion/
restart or operability iWes imbedded in them.
M. Miller /
NRR s
11 1
l
282US DESCRIFT100f ARSA NRC LEAD 1R/SER LZcep533 N
NRC-CLOSURS status status-Operator NRC review operator workarounds list to assure that there are 3
RI Cahill 0-7 See VIO 96-09-07 R
Worbarounds no restart or e arability issues contained in them
,.......w..._my
......,.>q_,.
.7 c.., n.
.:~....g y
..v
.50;54f Let,ter7 BRC review'lleensee*e,J50 54fe,. letter, response f(dtne 2/9/97)iesta:
'WE(,,
J/J.gp3.:
/ Res {. sg,_.
Shamel2 rewE' e a r Rf.C i "'
.n :-
3, n.
B+
" ~ ' ' '
e'%
' ' +
-/
~ *?
e 5
couplete--
.. ~. - -
. design bases >?
, ct % -' N :
License Verify license conditior.s are met 2
RI Cahill R-15 See FPC ltr $/20/97.
R Conditions Several license conditions were not met.
RC 140p In a survey inspection, the staff ssoted that certain branch 2
NRR D-62 See NRC ltr 4/7/97 R
Piping pipes off the primary coolant loop were not analyzed as Code RAI. FPC has 60 days Analyses Class 1 pipe (i.e., no fatigue analysis) as required by the to respond.
Code.
Need NRR technical branch's opinion on this Sources for issues include: IFS, SIMS,.NUREG 1435 (Status of Safety Issues at Licensed Power Plants), Resident's OIL, PM's OIL NOTE:
Open allegations, OI investigations, and emerging / draft issues are listed separately.
i 12
CRYSTAL RIVER 3 ISSUES CHECKLIST N ITEMS (INSPECTION-PRIOR TO RESTART IS NOT NEEDED)
Total Non-Restart (N) Items: 108
- Open 97
- Closed 11
!$5t1 DESCRIPTION AREA NRC LEAD IR/SER LICENSEE STATUS ComENTS NRC ttostmE
~ATus LICENSEE *S RESTART t!ST OF DESIGN RELATED ISSUES (D.I.s)(per 10/28/96 ltr from FPC)
LICENSEE *S OTHER RESTART ITEMS OT5G Tubes Adequacy of OT5G ttbe stress-relieved rolled joints is questioned. BWOG 7
See licensee Precursor N (G) analysts of a Davis-Besse pulled OT5G ttee, current test data and limited Card PC % 5077 of field experience conflict with test data from 1972 thich quallf ted a 11/6/%. (No TIA) stress retteved rolled joint.
FIVE AREAS OF CONTINUING CONCERN. WITH IPAP RECOMMENDED INSPECTION AM) RI! RECOMMENDED ADDITIONS INSPECTOR F0tt0WUP $YSTEM tRI 95-21-04 5
-Encess4 M oolde d rAtEl.
di
~
IRS 20}
N CR3 0,7.11[
k ($),' C URI 96 0.1-04 Measuring of percent through-wall indications with an unqualified 7
See IR E 06. Generic N (G) procedure issue being addressed by NRR.
(no TIA)
URI %-03-05 Eddy current sanple expansion based on degraded ttee percenteges 7
See IR W C6.
N (5)
URI 96-06-10 Justification for removal of Thermo-Lag protection fron the source range 1
N (5) instrm entation URI960kO3u
- Incorrect, information, provyded by contractorsj-
!?i:
(IR97[03i
- f n (5).C*l LR1 E 18-06 Failure to aanere to 10 CER 50.54(p)(1) - Phys. Security Plan stemitted See IR % 18 decreased plan effectiveness 13
ISSUE 0($CRIPTION ARIA NRC LEAD IR/5ER t!CENSEE STATUS C3eCTS INRC CLOSURE STATUS tRI %-201-%
Preferred offsite electrical pcmer source with piar.t shut down (500 kw 1
N (5) switchyard) is not qualified. Note: Until this issue is re'olved.
licensee is not tising 500 KV switchyard as an electrical power source URI 96 201-09 Testing to qualify relays beyond manufacturers' ratings was inadequate 1
N (5)
EA 97 012 Failure to maintain protected area barriers 7
see IR 97 01 N (5)
((R 93-02-02.
Switchyard cable failure caused degradad volta 9e of Class IE electrical 7
LIR 93-02-01 closed in IR N (I) tER 93-02-03 buses and actuation of EDG 95-09 tfR 94-05-01.
Def tciency in understanding of technical requirements leads to 2
LER 94-06-00 closed in IR N (D)
- LfR 94 06-03.
nonconservative RPS setpoint and potential violation of 15 95-16. See EA 95-16
((R 94 06-04 LER 94-06-05.
LER 94 06-06 LER 94-09-02 tkiauthorized tests involving maketo tank level and pressure N (D)
- LER 95-09-00 Minimal release during selfur dioxide delivery causes actstion of toxic 7
See IR 95-11.
N (1) gas monitor resultino it, control corn emergancy ventilation actuation LER 95 10-01 Inadequate procedure causes low cooling water flow to makety pump I
ttR %-10-00 closed in !R N (1) resulting in operation outside the design basis 95-16. See also URI 95-11-02 VIO 95-16-03 LER 95-17-00 SW flow to cyitrol room coolers controlled by air operated valves which 1
See IR 95-16. V D 94 Gi-N (D) could f ai t open 06 LER 95 18-00.
Inadequate T5 note allowed delayed entry into T5 LCD 2
See NCV 95-18-05.
N (!)
LER 95-18-01.
tfR 95-18 0?
LIR 95 19-00 teak instrtmentation for SW flow to RBCUs encapable of measuring 90 grn 1
See IR 95-18 N (l)
LER 95-23-ul Inconsistent design as>inptions cause building spray flow rates to be 1
LER 95-23-00 closed in IR N (I) tfR 95-23-0?
outside design basts
%-04
((R 95 25-00.
Inadequate isolation of safety /non-safety related circuits 1
See bl0 95-21-C3. See IR N (D)
- LER 95-25-01.
97-02. IR 97-05. LER 95-25 01 closed in IR 97-05 ifR 95 25 02 LER 95-26-00.
BWST vacute breaker has inadequate relief capacity 1
See IR 95 21.
N (!)
LER 95 28-01 LER 96 01-01.
[rIC control circuits misrouted. Appendix R concern 1
LER %-01-00 closed in IR N (!) *
%-04 ; See also NLY %.
t[R 96-01 02 01 03 tER.TD2-00 Minipurge valve has sa4ty/non-safety jelatad circuits'inithout isolation ;
1 1R 97-05 See'VIO'95-21-C3.
5 (!);
7 C*
((R 96 03-00.
RCS cooldowi rate enceeded during cooldowi 3
See URt 95-21-04 N (I) t tR %-03-01 LER 90 04-00 CCHE control d.wpers found damaged 1 leaking 1
See URI 05-02-02. IR 95-N (D) 21 tlR 96 05 t,1.
SW flow to RBCUs could exceed design 1
LER 96 05-00 closed in IR N (D)
- 90 04. See also VD %-
LlR 96 05-02 01-01 14
\\
IS5UE DESCRIPTION NtEA NRC tEAD IR/STR LICENSEE STATUS CDPmENTS estC CLCStRE STATUS -
LER 96-06 00.,:
hP1 instrynent errce could result in 1f1 kftsleutf
- ) -
Nellen (
- 1R 97-56 l
'$ee (R 95-20;32 %04,[
pt (D),?C LER 96 06-01
~'
'~
CR3 D.I: 2.
LER 96 07-00.
WI linc SBLOCA/ LOOP / loss of dc bus could have inadequate HP! ficw 1
See IR % 01. CR3 D.I. 2.
N (D)
LER 9407 01 instromentation LER E 08-00 Ambiguous TS note results in not performing RCS leak surveillance prior to 2
N (S)
Mrx$e 2 d
LER W O9-00 Failure to reattach instrtsnent tubing to seismic supports af ter 1
See (Jt! E03-06. IR %-
N (I) avxitfication leads tc, operation outside design basts 05 LER 96-10 00 tow flow in SW system cooled comonents causes operation outside des 1 1 1
See VIO 95-16-03.
N (D) 9 basis LER E ll 00 Personnel error causes testing deficiency resulting in condition 1
See PFA ft601 (GL 96 01),
N (D) prohibited by i g roved TS (GL 96-01 issues)
LER E12 00 Opershon outside design t>asn caused by battery chargers hidng?
4E L IR 97-01 See VIG 96-0$-07:
N (D)/ C
^
LER 96 12-01, iedequate test results accepted in errory "
LER %12 0S LER W 13-00 Operator error resulted in the ir. advertent actuation of DCP-1A 3
See hCV %-03 02.
N (I)
LER E 15-00 Personnel errors cause cable separation /isolatim concerns resulting in 1
See IR %-04 N (!)
m eration outside the desion basts (toxic gas monitors)
LER %-16-00 CREYS filter testing did not meet TS specs 2
R1 N (S)
LER E 19-00.
Nun-safety related switch used in safety related wiring for ES status 1
See URI 96-06-03. See IR N (D)
LER % 19-01 Itghts 97-04 LER E 20-00 Unreviewed safety questions concerntng EDG overloading caused by 4
R-2. D-6. D-14 See EEI 96-12 02.
N (D) interpretation of regulatory requirements D-15. OP-5 LER %-23-00 Personrel error leads to missed surveillances resulting in violation of 2
See VfD E 15-01.
N (D)
Technical Specifications (missed remote shutdown panel ErW ptsnp pressure instrtrent (t.annel (teck )
LER 96 24 00.
Plant modification causes unanalyzed condition regarding emergency 1
See (*! %22 01.
N (D)
- LER 9024-01 feedwater LER 96-25-00 Personnel error causes testing deficiency resulting in condition 1
See P5'A fL601 (CL %01),
N (D) prohibited by Technical Specifications (12 contacts in ES logic were not being tested)
LER 97-01 00 Inef fective thange managment results in mrecognized NPSH issue affecting N (D)
- Etu availability LER 97 501 00 Maintenance activt'.tes in circulating water systm result in protected N (S) *
(See EA 97 012) area tireach LER 97-502-00 Security zcrie out of service N (S)
- LER 97-02 00 Out of calibration fuel storage pool water level tra smitters N (D) *
(See VIO 97 04)
LER 97-02-01 15
}
,j ISSIK DESCRIPTION AREA NRC LEAD 1R/SEE t!CENSEE STATUS COMMENTS NRC Ct05URE STATUS LER 97 03 00.
Personnel error causes testing def tetencies (GL 96 01)
See VIO 97-02-04 N (D)
- LER 97 03-01.
LER 97-03 02.
LER 97-03-03.
tfR 97 03-04 LER 97-04 00.
Thermal relie* valves instde the contalment do not meet requirements for GL % 06 N (D)
- ttR 97-04-01 design basis accidents See D I 8 LER 97-06-00 Surveillance testing results in reduction of ECG rating limit due to See 0.I.6 N (D)
- inadequate acceptance LER 97-07 00 Building temerature variations larger than assmed. resulting in wanan See VIO 97-01 07 N (D)
- LfR 97-07 01 instr e nnt uncertainties LER 97 08-00 Potential of HP1 ptop recirculation capability resutting in possible MUT R! Cahill See CU D.I.I N (D)
- overflow or possible pire failure
((R 97-10-00 HVAC was not considered for manual operation of safe-shutdown equipment in See (fl! 97-05-02 N (D)
- post-ff re condsttons resulting in non-empliame of APP R t[R 97-11-00 Pressure locking of Efy 32/33 (GL 95-07)
See NPAfL507
/ (D)
- GL 95-07 LfR 97 12-00 CI system contalment penetrations not designed fer containmant isolation GL%-X N (D)
- See D 1.
VIO 94-25-01 f ailure to pre erly control the Control Conclen Habttability Envelope
- 6. 7 See URI 95-02-02.
N (D)
(door blocked open for maintenance wrk)
VIO 94-27-02 ratlure to mate tie 10 CFR % 73 Feports to the bRC withth the required ;
6?kJ 97 04; OP 4 f See IR 9542c12 9008.!
N U). C
)
time' BIO 94 27-03 Failure to make 'one rewired 10 CTR 50.72 repto tNe NEwNhin the
'6b2?
Jt 97-04 r CP-4; see IR 95-06.L N (1). C required time -
v!O 96 01-05 Two examles of failure to update FSAR as required by 10 CFR 50.71(e)
- 6. 4 N (5)
VIO 96-02-01 Failure to maintain 0.2 footcandles in the protected area
- 6. 7 See IR E 07.
N (5)
VIO E 02-04 failure to maintain secondary alarm station operable and inadequate
- 6. 2 N (5) comensatory measures v!O 96 03 11 Fatlure to follow radiation work permit remieements
- 6. 7 N (5)
VIO E 03-12 fatture to report the transport of a radioactively contamir.ated individual
- 6. 2 N (5) offstte VIO 96 03 13 Unescorted visitor personnal within the protected area
- 6. 7 N (5)
VIO 5 05-04 Licensee approved eddy current acceptance criteria different from TS
- 6. 2 N (5) reautrements BIO 96-06-06 fatture to timely nettfy the NRC of a' condition outsidh the A@ektfa R?
6h2t
- IR 97-041 N ($).. C i
~ticens eg design basis - '
v!0 W O7-01 Failure to protect safeguards Inforeation
- 6. 7 N (5) lV10960702 Failure to comlete screening elements for Fitness for Duty Personnel
- 6. 7 N (5) 16
~
ISSPT DESCRIPTION ARIA NRC LEAD IR/5tR LICENSEE STATUS COMP (NTS
- C CLOSURE STATUS -
wie t=LG9 41 failure ta follow a maintenance procedure resulting in the inadvertent
- 6. 7 N (5)
- nitiation of tha control room energency wentilatton system VIO 96 09-02 thescorted visitor personnel within the protected area
- 6. 7 N (5)
V10 % 110]
Inadequate et instructions to prevent the inadvertent start of the A EtlG
- 6. 7 N (5) hY!096-1103 Personnel performing work on the reactor building sum without logging
- 6. 7 N (5) 13 orto a clearance as required by approved WR v10 E 15-01 f ailure to perform a required T5 survettlance for the remote shutdwn
- 6. 2 See LER 96-23 N (5) panel VID 97 03 01 Failure to maintain control of badge /tey card N 15)
- IFl St IS 09 Review periodic verification plans - M)V (GL 6910 item) 2 See IR E ll. IR E 21; N (!)
% GL 89-10 If! 95-02 05 Pesonance noise in vicinity of MN 25 7
N (5)
IFI 95-08-03 Emergency Operating Procedure update program 3
See IR W 16. VIO 93-16-07 N (5)
If! 95-11-01 SCBA requirements for personnel during a toxic 9as release 2
N (5)
If1 E 21 02 Modification to the standby feedwater ptanp recirculation line 1
N (5)
If! E 03-16 Review of WA E 02 09-01. HP! fitw indicators. installation package and 1
N (5) functional testing results Ifl E 04-03 Effect of setpoint calculations on EDP revisions 1
See V10 93 16-07 N (D)
Ifl % 05-%
Large break loss of coolant analysts generic concerns 1
N (5)
[lFI E06-09 Deficiencies t$ 18ecatist. fin barrier prosras procedhes a$d doctrentation! [
':IR 96-15:
N ts).EC If! 96-08-02 Reactor building cavity cooling piping thermal relief protection 1
See D.I. 8. G. E 06 N (D)
Ifl E IS 03 Actions taken to resolve post accident recriticality concerns due to I
NRR reviewing. gerwic B&W N (G) localized torcn dilution issur
!f! 96-18 08 Adequacy of licensee's corrective actions for security audit findings 5
N (5)
- EA 97 008 loss of control of a security badge & subsequent failure to inmediately 2
Stratton See IR 97-03 N (5)
- report loss & remove badge frow security computer EA 97-012. VIO Fallure to have adequate securtty procedures reflecting security upgrades 2
Stratton See IR E18 N (5)
Stratton See IR E18 N ($)
- A(2) 01923 (was (El % 18-021 17
ISSUE DESCRIPTION AREA MtC LEAD IR/5ER LICENSEE STATUS CDe(NTS NRC CLO W E STATUS-E A 97 3'7. Y!O Failure to assess more than one protected area alare 2
Stratton See IR %-18 N (5) *
- A(3) 01033 (was EFI 901003)
EA 97-012. v10 Fatture to mair.tain protected area barrier at Circulating wter System 2
Stratton See IR %-18 m (5)
- A(4) 01043 (was EE! 9018 04)
[A 97 012. VIO Inadequate arms repository 2
Strattcri See !R 9618 m (5)
- A(5) 01053 (was eel % 18 05)
EA 97-012. Y10 B Failure to report chan9es to Physical Security ',per 10 CFR 50.54 2
Stratton See IR %-18 N (5)
- 01063 (was EE!
requirements
%-18-07)
EA 97-094 Failure to make an emergency phone report within the time requirements of 7
M Cahill See EA 97-094 N (5)
- VIO B(01033) 10 CFR 73.71 (was EEI 97 01)
EA 97 094 Failure to hand carry a suspected reportable issue to the shift manager 2
RI Cahill See EA 97-094 W (5)
VIO C(01043) for reportability review (was EE! 97 02)
[A 97-094 Repeat failure to report outside design basis condittens
- 1. 2 Schin See EA 97-094 N (5) v10 Al(01013)
(was EE! 97 03)
EA 97-161.
Continued failure to protect Safe 9uards information 2
Stratton See IR 97-03 N (5)
- v!O A 01013 VIO 8 01023 (was EE! 97-03-0?)
NULTI-PLANT ACTIONS MPA fB105.
Seismic qualification of equipment. Licensee ~s criteria and procedures 2
FPC walkdown id'd apgna.
N (5)
- GL 87-02 approved. Sone issues are pendir9 and sould be resolved thru audit 100 outliert. Staff had (scheduled for Mar 97). Licensee s field walkdowi results are currently telephene discussions on in staff review.
5/16. Phone streary
&xtmmted in NRC ltr 5/27. FPC ctymitted to character 1re the outliers for safety 519nificance by JtLY. FPC also conettted to resolve the outliers or provide JC0 prior to restart MPA #8111 (IPE):
IPE and IPEEE - These are in staff review. Not a restart item.
2 N (5)
WAFB118 (IPEEE)
MPA fx602: NRCB Movement cf heavy loads ever spent fuel pool 2
m (5) 96 02
- ticensee response in staff review This wmld not be a restart issue W A ft208.
Thermolag - Licensee plans to use Mecatiss 2
See IR 96-01: IR 96-06 N (5)
GL 92-08. 80 92-(aa alternate material). sone reanalysis of APPENDIX R. and scme 01 exegtion. fire barrier tests of Mecattss including Agacity tests are in staff review This also may not be restart issue.
I 18
15511 DESCRIPTION AREA NRC LEAD IR/STR LICENSEE STATUS CDe(KTS utt CLOSURE SuruS.
PF 4 L201:
Reactor vessel structural integrity. RAI to licensee on 7/22/96 Coly a 2
m (S) a 92-01 Rev 1.
data base issue not a restart item.
Supo 1
. G1. 9b04 -
comence. :.- ints may have to be ad:Iressed prior to restart tecause of ;
~ '.
NRCltr0
' ~
hohed by"lGC to FPC N (S); C ffA ftC04:-
.Boraflex degradationH ticensee response N'Just in! Staff reetew ' o.:-
.2 ;
^
t of 5/1/97-letter cated S/In7 -
sensittrity to spent fuel pool issues t - ~
~
us.
MPA NOV testing & surveillance. This item is closed with the exception of If!
2 See IFI 94-18-09 m (t)
E BTIO 94-18-09 on periodic verification. 4tch is to be followed w after a new generic comunicatton is issued CIC[NSE A*(NOMENT/Rft!fF REGESTS R G. 1.97 RG 1.97 instrtmentation - Stbcool nonitors etc - category change. License 2
m (S)
Instrtrents amenhnt may be approved by Decentier.
Security is expected to be cmplete soon.
2 Derption issued S/7/97.
N (5)
- B1 metrics &
Bimetric exemption to allow taki,g security badges offsite - Staff review FPC nas 90 days to ieplement
..Re,l,ief r$or,,,REiCore Y15od fezdh.i5taff needs more[1nfo[ fH Mll -
[A -
~ '
Peder issued en 5/5/97.
It ($1,Ct 3,
air o,s 2?
t Coreit w,ie,ood i st
. e, z.
OTSG Tubes OTSG ttbe testing - Licensee pr@osed a revised OTSG tube acceptance 2
See viO 96-05-04 m (S) criteria OTI(R ISSUES Pressurizer During Refuel 9 a stb-surface flaw was discovered. The Itcensee performed 2
N (5)
Ncz21e flaw better inspection during RIO and found the flaw to be acceptable. The new inspection results in reduced flaw site and consequently acceptance criteria Shich is based on ratio of flaw to thickness) changes. Staff review in progress.
Criticality The Itcensee did not carry a previously approved exenotion from part 70 2
m cs)
Monitor (70.24?) requirements to Part 50 license. Need legal interpretation of the status cf the exenption.
Sources for 1ssues include: IFS. SIM5. NUREG 1435 (Status of Safety Issues at Licensed Power Plants). Resident's OIL.
PW s OIL NOTE: Open allegations. 01 investigations. and emerging / draft issues are listed separately.
NOTE: An Asterisk (*) in far right column denotes a change from previously issued report.
LIST OF ACRONYMS USED AP Abnormal Operating Procedure BWST Borated Water Storage Tank C
Closed 19
. -. - -.. ~.._
LCCHE
. Control Complex Habitability Envelope?
CFR~.
Code of. Federal Regulations.
CR3 D.I.
Crystal. River.3 Design Item CREVS Control Room Emergency Ventilation System' EA-NRC: Escalated Enforcement Action.
~ - -
EDBD' Engineering Design' Basis Document
'ECCS Emergency. Core Cooling System EDG Emergency Diesel' Generator EEI NRC Escalated Enforcement Item E0P' Emergency Operating Procedure FSAR Final Safety Analysis' Report-GL.
NRC Generic Letter.
ILRT Integrated Leak Rate. Test (of the' Reactor Building)
IFI NRC Inspector Followup Item LER Licensee Event Report.
LOCA Loss of Coolant Accident LPI Low' Pressure Injection LTOP Low Temperature Overpressure Protection MPA NRC Multi-Plant Action MUV Makeup Valve N (D)
Not an NRC Restart Item (because the issue is duplicated by a restart item)
N (G)
Not an NRC Restart Item.(because it is a generic issue affecting multiple operating plants and is being.
addressed by NRR)
N (I)
Not 'an NRC Restart Item (because previous inspection of the issue is adequate. for. restart)
N'(S)
Not an NRC Restart Item (because resolution of the issue is not ne:ded for safe restart)-
NOV NRC Notice of Violation NPSd Net Positive Suction Head
.0CR Operability Condition Report OP Operating Procedure PORV Power Operated Relief Valve PR Problem Report R
NRC Restart Item RB Reactor Building RCS Reactor Coolant. System RMG.
Radiation Monitor SBLOCA Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident' SFP Spent Fuel Pool
~
TIA NRC Task Interface Agreement (between NRC offices)
TS Technical Specifications URI NRC Unresolved Item' US0 Unreviewed Safety Question VIO NRC Violation 20
_