ML20203L950
| ML20203L950 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Mcguire, McGuire  |
| Issue date: | 02/19/1998 |
| From: | Rinaldi F NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| To: | NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| References | |
| TAC-M97753, TAC-M97754, NUDOCS 9803060323 | |
| Download: ML20203L950 (15) | |
Text
- . --_ _ _ - - -- - -, ._
,Y . LICENSEE: Duk3 En:rgy Corporction U '
FACILITIES: McGuiro Nucl:ar Station, Un'ts 1 cnd 2
SUBJECT:
MEETING
SUMMARY
MEETING OF FEBRUARY 4,1998, REGARDING SNUBBER DESIGN TIA 97-02 (TAC NOS. M97753 AND M97754)
REFERENCES:
(1) Meeting Notice by F. Rinaldi, dated January 22,1998.
(2) Letters, V. Nerses to H. B. Barron, Request for Additional Information (RAI), dated June 16 and October 30,1997.
On February 4,1998, the staff met with Duke Energy Corporation (DEC) personnel to discuss information related to the design, operability, and qualifications of the Grinnell snubbers at the McGuire Nuclear Station. The meeting was scheduled to resolve issues related to the staff's requests for additional information, and to establish an updated review schedule.
The meeting was instrumentalin clarifying the basis for many of the licensee's assumptions and resulted in the agreement that DEC is to answer the staff's RAI of October 30,1997, and provide additional information within 30 to 45 days, as follows:
o Qualification package from Grinnell that supports the Ceriificate of Compliance issued with the lexan snubbers delivered following the identification of the qualification issue.
- Details summarizing the similarity and differences between the tested snubbers and the currently installed snubbers. Also, characterize why the differences do not invalidate the testing results for the installed snubbers.
- Description of the heat transfer calculations (thermallag) performed for the snubbers to calculate the effects of the main steam line break on the snubber components.
, Enclosure i lists the meeting participants. Enclosure 2 is the handout provided by DEC.
ORIGINAL SIGNED BY:
Frank Rinaldi, Project Manager Project Directorate ll 2 Division of Reactor Projects 1/ll o- Offico of Nuclear Reactor Regulation oME .
Docket Nos. 50-369 and 50 370 g fG l o0
Enclosures:
- 1. Meeting Attendees
- 2. DEC Handout Oc o cc w/encls: See next page 8
og Distribution w/encI 1 only (e mail) COgle, Rll Distribution w encls 1 & 2
$aa SCollins/FMiraglia LBerry HWalker tDocketFi6e FRinaldi BBoger TMartin VOrdaz PUBLIC JZwolinski RWessman YCLi PD 112 Rdg. ' '
ui -
HBerkow KManoly
, j GHubbard RGoel MTschiltz, EDO LPlisco, Ril OGC ACRS i
liikf To receive a copy of this document, Indicate in the box: "C" = Copy without attachment / enclosure "E" o Copy with attac'.iment/ enclosure "N" = No c_opy. _
OFFICE PMftht 2v __ LA:PDilh # D:PDifiV /
NAME FRina14l:cnM - LBerry W HBerkSt '
DATE %^/98 Os/li98 i f!/tN98 / /98 / /98 / /97 DOCUMENT NAME: G:\MCGulRE\MTG. SUM OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
fi t gW
,t UNITED STATES
.t j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION O WASHINGTON. D.C. 9021W001
% february 19, 1998 LICENSEE: Duke Energy Corporation FACILITIES: McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2
SUBJECT:
MEETING
SUMMARY
MEETING OF FEBRUARY 4,1998. REGARDING SNUBBER DESIGN TIA 97-02 (TAC NOS. M97753 AND M97754)
REFERENCES:
(1) Meeting Notice by F. Rinaldi, dated January 27.,1998.
(2) Letters, V. Nerses to H. B. Barron, Request for Additional Information (RAI), dated June 16 and October 30,1997.
On February 4,1998, the staff met with Duke Energy Corporation (DEC) personnel to discuss information related to the design, operability, and qualifications of the Grinnell snubbers at the McGuire Nuclear Station. The meeting was scheduled to resolve issues related to the staffs requests for additionalinformation, and to establish an updated review schedule.
The meeting was instrumentalin clarifying the basis for many of the licensee's assumptions and l
resulted in the agreement that DEC is to answer the staffs RAI of October 30,1997, and provide additional information within 30 to 45 days, as follows:
e Qualificatlon package from Grinnell that supports the Certificate of Compliance issued with the lexan snubbers delivered following the identification of the
{ qualification issue, e Details summarizing the similarity and differences between the tested snubbers and the currently installed snubbers. Also, characterize why the differences do not invalidate the testing results for the installed snubbers.
Description of the heat transfer calculations (thermallag) performed for the snubbers to calculate the effects of the main steam line break on the snubber components.
Enclosure 1 lists the meeting participants. Enclosure 2 is the handout provided by DEC.
fc!<l S S Frank Rinaldi, Project Manager Project Directorate ll 2 Division of Reactor Projects - t/Il Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Decket Nos. 50-369 and 50-370
Enclosures:
- 1. Meeting Attendees
- 2. DEC Handout ec w/encis: See next page j
McGuire Nuclear Station cc:
Mr. Paul R. Newton Mr. Richard M. Fry, Director Legal Department, PBOSE Department of Environmental, 422 South Church Street Health and Natural Resources Charlotte, North Carolina 28242 Division of Radiation Protection 3825 Barrett Drive County Manager of Raleigh, North Carolina 2760g 7721 Mecklenberg County ins East Fourth Street Ms. Karen E. Long Charlotte, North Carolina 28202 Assistant Attorney General North Carolina Department of Mr. Michael T. Cash Justice Regulatory Compliance Manager P. O. Box 62g McGuire Nuclear Station Raleigh, North Carolina 27602 Duke Energy Corporation 12700 Hagers Ferry Road L A. Keller Huntersville, North Carolina 28078 8985 Manager - Nuclear Regulat 'y Licensing J. Michael McGarry, Ill, Esquire Duke Energy Corporation Winston and Strawn 526 South Church Street 1400 L Street, NW. Charlotte, North Carolina 28242 0001 Washington, DC 20005 Regional Administrator, Region 11 Senior Resident inspector U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission clo U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Atlanta Federal Center Commission 61 Forsyth Street, S.W., Suite 23T85 12700 Hagers Ferry Road Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Huntersville, North Carolina 28078 Elaine Wathen, Lead REP Planner Mr. T. Richard Puryear Division of Emergency Management Owner's Group (NCEMC) 116 West Jones Street Duke Energy Corporation Raleigh, North Carolina 276031335 4800 Concord Road York, South Carolina 2g745 Mr. H. B. Barron Vice President, McGuire Site Dr. John M. Barry Duke Energy Corporation Mecklenberg County 12700 Hagers Ferry Road Department of Environmental Huntersville, North Carolina 28078 Protection 700 N. Tryon Street Charlotte, North Carolina 28202
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS MEETING WITH DUKE ENERGY CORPORATION FEBRUARY 4.1998 NAME AFFILLATION Frank Rinaldi NRC/NRR/ Project Directorate ll 2 Mike Cash Duke Energy Corporation, Regulatory Compliance Phil Stiles Duke Energy Corporation, Engineering Tom Harrison McGraw Hill, Newsletters Dick Wessman NRC/NRR/EMEB George Hubbard NRC/NRR/SPLB Kamal Manoly NRC/NRR/EMEB Harold Walker NRC/NRR/SPLB Vonna Ordaz NRC/NRR/SPLB Y C. Li NRC/NRRIEMEB Raj Goel NRC/NRR/SCSB Enclosure 1
a Hydraulle Snubbers
. Dixovery of Qualineation leave August 2.1996 Duke notified by Grinnell regarding 350 le in Duke Spec August 23,1996 Orinnell letter to Duke concerning lexan deformation above 2$0 le e
Corrective Actions Taken at Tiene of Discovery August 26,1996 Corrective Action Problem Report (PIP) initiated by McGuire staff l
3 September 17,1996 Operability Evaluation Complete for snubbers in the plant at the time Operable based on engineering judgement within Duke and Grinnell:
Dynamic locking requires seal integrity
. Dynamic locking occurs within hundredths of seconds Dynarric locking occurs at normal operating temperatu.e Slow thermal growth will occur at 350 !*
Structural integrity adequate to 350 f*
Not reportable under 50.72,50.73 or Part 21 based on operability March 10,1997 Procurement Specification Revised for new snubbers to reflect Operability Evaluation i
Enclosure 2
4 Y
Snubber Operation During MSLB Snubber locks within 0.02 seconds of dynamic event Snubbers on feedwater line will
- hydraulically lock" seconds into MSLB in reponse to FWI his lockup occurs at essentially containment ambient temperature 135 f*
%e snubber must allow slow growth as containment atmosphere heats up l'emperature Tronalent During MSLB MSLB temperature response calculated using RETRAN and GOTHIC Calculation of Record does not have results displayed in current UFSAR The calculation of record shown on attachment The new results are in process of UFS AR markup as part of normal process MSLB Leading Transient on Snubber Break is at terminal end at top of steam generator Break loads restrained for most part by steam generator support structure Some of the snubbers absorb load due to translational movement of steam generator The stress analysis of the snubbers conservatively combine pipe rupture and earthquake loads Slow Movement to accommodate thermal growth Engineering judgement and operational experience in the initial evaluation Grinnell testing after subjecting snubber to 350 F0 temperature for ten minutes
- Grinnell similiarity Analysis for similar snubbers
- ' GDC 2 for Natural Phenomena Not required to assume simultaneous or sequential er.rthquake and MSLB Design analysis conservatively combine pipe rupture and carthquake loads 2
- r. .
Current Qualifiestion Cdteria All Grinnell snubbers at McGuire meet the following 350 F MSLB 250 f LUCA e Conclusion Duke's initial response to Grinnell was timely and comprehensive "Itc snubbers are fully qulified O
m :
1 3
Hydraulic Snubbers
- Discovery of Qualification Issue An order for hydraulic snubbers for McGuire steam generator replacement outages was the starting point of discussions with Grinnell on environmental functional conditions. On August 2,1996, Grinnells' QA Manager sent Duke a letter stating that the snubbers had not been qualified to 350 F"a. called mt in our procurement specification MCS-1206.00-GMX)03, " Specification for the Procurement of Component Support Products". Grinnell asked for the temperature profile for the McGuire Main Steam Line Break (MSLB) analysis for lower Containment. This was sent and Grinnell subsequently wrote Duke on August 23,1996 with a concern that the polyca-bonate reservoir tube on their hydraulic snubbers would experience significant distortion at temperatures above 250F, The procurement specification stated 350 F as an envelop environmental temperature. This was applied generically to cover all design basis conditions, including MSLB and LOCA. The MSLB temperature profile being the highest, governed.
Following discussions with Grinnell, Duke determined there was a need to separate the requirements for MSLB and LOCA for hydraulic snubbers. All other Grinnell components were not affected. We made revision 3, dated March 5,1997, to the procurement specification to clarify the environmental conditions for the MSLB to be 350F with a statement exempting the polycarbonate reservoirs and requiring the snubbers allow thermal movement post accident. Gri mell then supplied the snubbers to the revised specification.
- Corrective Actions Time of Discovery A corrective action program problem investigation report was initiated on August 26,1996 to document the issue of Grinnell snubbers not meeting the specified environmental conditions. This is the normal process l
Duke uses, the Problem Investigation Process (PIP), to identify and track issues.
The issue was determined to potentially effect the operability of existing Grianell hydraulic snubbers. '
Engineering performed an operability evaluation and determined the snubbers to be operable. The basis for
- operability was the snubbers would perform their design function (s). De first f>metion is to restrain the piping during a dynamic event and the second to allow for thermal movement before and after the event.
Clarification of functional requirements for the MSLB and LOCA events resulted in the conclusion of operability for their separate environmental conditions. We revised the procurement specification to show the requi.6ments separately. Grinnell concurred they could meet the specification, and supplied the requested snubbers.
Broughout this time period, Grinned commur.icated their confidence in the snubbers allowing thermal movement after the MSLB. Our operating experience agreed with their conclusion Discussion with Grinnell confirmed tacir agreement with the basis for our concluding operable status for existing snubbers.
I i
Snubber Operation During MSLB Compatibility with the temperature environment fol!owing a steam line break event. A hydraulic snubbers is designed to " hydraulically lock" instantaneousy when rapidly subjected to high dynamic loads. Loads associated with a steam line break are greatly attenuated with respect to the hydraube snubbers which are located in lower containment. However, there are hydraulic snubbers located in on the main feedwater system that will " hydraulically lock" seconds into a MSLB transient. During this time period the snubber's hydraulic fluid, lexan reservoir and seal integrity b important for proper operation. The hydraulic fluid can only travel through the flow ports at a limiting velocity, this limiting velocity causes the snubber to " lock" into position. This occurs with the snubber materials at essentially the pre accident temperature conditions of 135 F, in triat adequate time has not passed to heat the snubber above pre-ac64nt ambient.
Following the " lock up" the hydraulic snubber allows slow movement of the piping systems by allowing, a slow flow of fluid through the flow ports. During this time period the temperature of the snubber materials are increasing in temperature in response to the MSLB. During this time period the s*ructural integrity of snubber is what is important, the snubber can continue this function if seals fail and the hydraulic fluid were to escape. Grinnell Load Capacity Data Sheets (LCDS) demonstrate that the sriubbers structural integrity is adequate to 350 P. Grinnell analytically determines the acceptable temperature for structural integrity.
11owever, testing recently performed demonstrates thi,t the seals do not leak when subjected to a temperature transient which bounds the McGuire MSLB profile Temperature Transient During MSLB l
The steam line break transient is described in detail in the UFSAR section 6.2.1.4.1 " Pipe Break Blowr.down Spectra and Assumptions". This section describes a series of steam line breaks that were analyzed to determine the most severe break condition for containment temperature and pressure response.
in addition UFSAR section 6.2.1.4.2
- Break Flow Calculations" describes some on the original l Westinghouse temperature and pressure transient modeling assumptions used in generating the currently displayed figures in the UFSAR.
The review of the qualification requirements and operability of the Grinnell snubbers used updated analytical techniques. This methodology is described in detail in the Duke Energy Corporation Topical Report DPC NE-3004 " Mass and Energy Release and Containment Response Methodology". This uses three dimensional modeling of lower containment using the GOTHIC computer code. The thermal-hydraulic methodology is described in detail in the Duke Energy Corporation Topica' Report DPC-NE.
3000. This methodology uses the RETRAN computer code for a detailed modeling of the reactor coolant system in response to a steam line break. These methodologies are currently the licensing basis for McGuire Nuclear Station each method has been approved by the NRC as detailed in Safety Evaluation Reports.
The evaluation of a main steam line break temperature profile in lower containment is presented in the Attached Figure. This figure represents the current design basis calculation for McGuire as documented in Duke Calculations. The initial condition oflower containment temperature for the transient is 135 F. This temperature bounds the McGuire Technical Specification 3.6.1.5 " Containment Systems Air Terrperature" which currently specifies a maximum constant temperature of 125 f.
Derefore, th- snubbers in lower containmerit are operating at a continuous temperature of 135 9.
Following a steam line break the lower containment temperature begins to rapidly increase to approximately 300 F for the limiting break size. The peak temperature occurs approximately 10 seconds following the k
mitiation of the accident. The cooling effect of the ice condenser rapidly reverses the temperature transient returning the temperature to below 260 9 within approximately 25 seconds. De cooling effects of steam 2
l l
1
! jet mixing also enhance this effect. The lower containn. nt temperature approaches a near constant temperature of approximately 240 F" approximately 100 seconds after the initiation of the accident.
De time dependent temperature behavior described above represents a limiting qualification envelope for MSLB for the Grinnell snubbers. The description of the new methodology and the behavior of post steam line break behavior is described in a UFSAR tr.arkup package planned for the next UFSAR update, i
MSLB Loading Transient on Snabber The MSLB containment response ana!ysis is documented in calcuiation DPC 1552.08-00-0166, "FSAR Section 6.2.1.4 Steam Line Break Containment Response". De methodology is described in approved Topical DPC-NE 3004 PA, Mass and Energy Release and Containment Response Methodology. The break dynamic event occurs in less than two- hundredths of a second and the snubbers activate. The Mainsteam and Feedwater isolation valves receive signals to close and do so in less than ten seconds (reference valve testing and acceptance criteria on drawings MCIC-1593-SM.V00101 and MCTC 1591-CF.V002-01).
The break location is at the terminal end of the Main Steam piping at the top of the Steam Generator. The break loads are for the most part, restrained by the Steam Generator support structures. His is documented in calculation MCC 1117.03-00-0025, " Steam Generator Upper Lateral Support Rings for B&W Generators".
There are three Grinnell hydraulic snubbers in each of Unit l's Steam Gererator compartments (there are none in Unit 2); one cach on the 16" Feedwater , 2" Steam Generator Blowdown, and 4" Auxiliary Feedwater piping.. De stress analysis calculations detail the load combinations which match the FSAR Tables 3 49 and 3-50, this is a conservative simultaneous combination of pipe rupture with SSE earthquake loads for snubbers.
As clarification, the MSLB snubber loadr are a result of the translational movement of the steam generator and the attached piping which occurs , hen the Mainsteam pipe breaks. There a*e massive structural rupture restraints which are designed to take the very large rupture loads o' the Mainsteam pipe. Snubbers do not take any of this loading.
Slow Movement to accommodate thermal growth Through all the conversations with Grinnell, there was not a concern expressed for any thermal locking mechanism that would restrict the snubbers ability to allow for termal movement of the piping. The statement added to the procurement specification stating that post MSLB snubber thermal movement was a requirement was accepted and agreed upon by Grinnell as part the standard procurement process. Our operating experience substantiated Grinnell's position.
Duke also made revision 8 to MCS-1144.30-00 0001, Design Specifier &,a for Pipe Supports and Restraints, dated March 26.1997. This controlling requirement document for pipe support design states the consistent message with the procurement specification that snubbers are required to allow thermal movemeat during post accident conditions.
A test was conducted by Grinnell at Duke's request to heat to 350F and stroke two representative snubbers supplied from McGuire inventory. The Grinnell report PE-9778-1, "Grinnell Hydraulic Snubber Freedom of Motion Test Under McGuire Nuclear Station MSLB Accident Temperature Condition", dated August 25, 1997, confirmed thermal movement by hand stroking after heating to 350F for ten minutes. No hydraulic fluid leaks occurred. Grinnell also performed a similarity analysis for other snubber bore sizes from 11/2 to 6 inches with the conclusion that thermal movement with no interference would be allowed up to 350F.
Thus, the entire population of McGuire Grinnell hydraulic snubbers was addressed.
3
- GDC 2 for Natural Phenomena
%c general design criteria requires conside:ation of the most severe of the natural phenomena that have been historically reported for the site and surrounding area, with sufficient margin for the limited accuracy, quantity, and period of time in which the historical data have been accumulated and appropriate combinations of the effects of normal and accident conditions with the effects of the natural phenomena.
With respect to snubbers the natural phenomena of interest are the loads imposed by a seismic event.
Therefore, the snubber design must accommodate the simultaneous loads of an earthquake and the dynamic loads of a design basis accidents. For McGuire the limiting Basis Earthquake for the design of Category I structures systems and components is 0.08 g acting horizontally and 0.0533 g acting vertically, The Safe Shutdown Earthquake is 0.15 g acting horizontally and 0.10 g acting vertically. This is described in section 3.1 of the UFSAR Conformance with General Design Criteria.
The occurrence of an Operating, basis earthquake simultaneous with the post accident containment temperatures of a main steam line break accident or LOCA is beyond the licensiro basis of McGuire, ne OBE is a design basis accident and McGuire is not required to assume simultaneous accidents or sequential design basis accidents. A letter from the NRC staff ' Technical Specification Operability Requirements".
(Dennis M. Crutchfield, Assistant Director for Safety Assessment) USNRC July 1985), A design basis carthquake does not initiate a high energy line break in that these containment SSC's are seismically qualified in design.
There are three Grinnell hydraulic snubbers in each of Unit l's Steam Generator compartments (there are none in Unit 2); one each on the 16" Feedwater , 2" Steam Generator Blowdown, and 4" Auxiliary Feedwater piping., The stress analysis calculations detail the load combinations which match the FSAR Tables 3-49 and 3-50, this is a conservative simultaneous combination of pipe rupture with SSE carthquake loads for snubbers.
As clarification, the MSLB .nubber loads are a result of the translational movement of the steam generator and the attached piping which eccurs when the Mainsteam pipe breaks. There are massive structural rupture restraints which are designed to take the very large rupture loads of the Mainsteam pipe. Snubbers do not take any of this loading.
Current Qualification Criteria All of the hydraulic scubbers at McGuire are the Grinnell hydraulic lexan meet criteria specified in procurement specification MCS-1206.00-04 003. This criteria specifies that these snubbers meet the following criteria relative to temperature:
350F MSLB 250 F LOCA The MSLB specification is consistent with a temperature profile that goes from ambient to 350 9, maintains 350 F for ten minutes. The LOCA specification represents a long term operation temperature.
Grinnell has supplied Duke with Certificates of Compliance for snubbers consistent with these requirements.
4 f
- Conclusion Duke has established through approved methodologies the MSLB post accident temperature environment in lower containment. An original operability evaluation using engineering judgment determined that the snubbers would operate properly in that post accident environment. This is based on experience at the manufacturer and at Duke with snubbers subjected to high temperatures for short time duration. In addition, the long term structural integrity of the snubbers was already analytically shown to be satisfactory to temperatures of 350 F".
Since the original evaluation the snubbers were tested t y the vendor using a bounding post accident temperature transient. The snubbers seals did not fail and w structural problems wert noted in the snubber.
The testing and analysis that exists to demonstrate the snubbers conformance with GDC 2 and GDC4 are comprehensive and thorough.
Previous regulatory research by Duke revealed is no specific method of testing or analysis that must be used for such qualification of hydraulic snubbers.
5 I
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hydraulic shock and sway suppressor flg. 200 hydraulic shock and sway suppressor assembly flg. 201 a corrosion resistant: flg. 0-200 4 corrosion resistant: flg. C-201 Patented SIZE RANGE: Seven sizes with cylinder bores of 1%
to a Inches and with normal load ratings from 3,000 pounds to 110,000 pounds. All are made with integral reservoirs in 5,10,15 of 20 inch strokes except the 1%
inch size which is offered with 5 to 10 inch strokes only -
Snubbers are available with remote reservoirs.
flg. 200 RECOMMENDED SERVICE: For use on piping sys-tems or equipment when unrestrained thermst move-ment must be allowed, but which must be restrained during impulsNe or cyclic disturbance. The unit is not effective against lo.>. amplitude, high frequency move-ment. Use with standard settings to prevent destructive response to earthquakes, flow transients or wind load.
L{p p4 - ,
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thrust resulting from safety valve blow-off or pipe rup-j' - ture.
muerrewd e phewe reservc*; -
avadaMe sko & metalreservtk.
4 flg. 201 RESERV0lR OT MN SNUBBER VALVE
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