ML20137R028
| ML20137R028 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crystal River  |
| Issue date: | 04/07/1997 |
| From: | Raghavan L NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| To: | NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9704140010 | |
| Download: ML20137R028 (35) | |
Text
April 7, 1997
-LICEN'SEE:
Florida Power Corporation FACILITY: Crystal River Unit 3
SUBJECT:
SUMMARY
OF MEETING ON MARCH 18, 1997, REGARDING SOLUTION SET FOR EMERGENCY FEEDWATER AND EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR LOADING PROBLEMS On March 18, 1997, representatives of the Florida Power Corporation, licensee for Crystal River Nuclear Plant, Unit 3 (CR3) met with members of the staff at NRC Headquarters in Rockville, Maryland to present their potential success path for emergency feedwater (EFW) flow and emergency diesel generator (EDG) loading concerns during a small break loss of coolant accident (SBLOCA) design basis scenario. is a list of attendees. contains copies of handouts distributed at the meeting.
The licensee discussed the composition of the team that is involved in resolving the design concern. The licensee stated that the limiting scenario affecting the EFW and EDG operation is the SBLOCA, loss of offsite power (LOOP) and three limiting single failures. The licensee indicated that its established success objective is to maintain one high pressure injection (HPI) pump and EFW flow. The licensee presented details about various modifications and analyses that would be necessary to meet its established objective.
The licensee also discussed its other long-term solutions including a diesel EFW pump or increased EDG capacity.
The staff questioned whether the licensee had considered the impact of other initiatives and corrective actions on the EFW/EDG resolution strategy. The licensee indicated that its team is generally aware of the other issues and does not expect them to affect the options discussed in the meeting.
The meeting was informational in nature and did not represent the licensee's final solution to the EFW/EDG concerns. The licensee did not request, and the staff did not make a determination on the acceptability of the information presented in the meeting. The licensee expects to finalize its position and raake appropriate submittals to the staff soon.
1 Original signed by L. Raghavan, Project Manager Project Directorate II-3 Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
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Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation O
Docket No. 50-302
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Enclosures:
1.
Attendance List s
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Meeting Handout cc w/
Enclosures:
See next page Document Name: G:\\ CRYSTAL \\970318. SUM OFFICE Poll 3/PM l
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04/ 7 /97 OfflCIAL RECORD COPY 9704140010 970407 ADOCK0500g2 PDR
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StM1ARY OF-MEETING ON MARCH 18, 1997, REGARDING SOLUTION SET FOR EMERGENCY FEEDWATER AND EMERGENCY. DIESEL GENERATOR LOADING PROBLEMS Distribution:
HARD COPY w/ Enclosures 1 and I
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ACRS E-Mail w/ Enclosure 1 S. Collins /F Miraglia (SJC1,FJM)
R. Zimmerman (RPZ)
S. Varga (SAV,RCN)
J. Zwolinski (JAZ)
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F. Hebdon (FJH)
L. Raghavan (LXRI)
- 8. Clayton (BAC2)
R. Shin (RPS)
D. Ross (SAM)
J. Jaudon (JPJ)
H. Cristensen (H0C)
W. Rogers (WGRI)
F. Orr (FR0)
B. LeFave (WTLI)
- 0. Chopra (OPC)
M. Pratt (MPP)
S. Sanchez (SPS)
D. Thatcher (DFT)
S. Saba (SNS1)
J. Lyons (JEL)
G. Tracy (GMT)
S. Cahill (SJC2) (URU)
J. Johnson, RII L'
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CRYSTAL RIVER 3 MEETING MARCH 18, 1997 NAME ORGANIZATION TELEPHONE L. RAAHMAN
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Licensing Perspective Brian Gutherman Operations Management Ron Davis Perspective Summary John Holden
MEETING PLRPOSE l
Communicate Technical Information On 1
CR-3 EFW and EDG Loading During Small Break LOCA Mitigation Discuss the CR-3 Startup Team Mission Discuss the Solution Sets Supporting a Safe Startup Provide a Summary of The Regulatory l
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Mark Van Sicklen Team Members:
Bill Marshall Paul Fleming Chris Doyel Garrett Hebb Al Friend Mark Liebmann Earnie Gallion Jeff Seals (FTI)
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STARTUP TEAM First Team Identified EDG Margin Concerns On December 18th Recommended 3 Options Second Team Identified Concerns with Startup 1
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Design EOP Success Paths No Unreviewed Safety Questions Accurate Design and Licensing Basis No Exemptions from the Regulations Defense In Depth Integrated Safety Assessment
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THE LIMITING TRANSIENTS AFFECTING THE EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR LOADING AND
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LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT SIZES 36" Inside Diameter (7.07 ft2)
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DOES NOT REQUIRE HPI DOES NOT REQUIRE EFW 9.6" inside Diameter (0.5 ft2)
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