ML20217D318

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Summary of 970722 Plant Restart 0350 Panel Meeting W/Listed Attendees at Facility Re Status of Open Items from Insps, Restart Issues & Restart Tasks
ML20217D318
Person / Time
Site: Crystal River Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 07/29/1997
From: Jaudon J
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML20217D186 List:
References
FOIA-97-252 NUDOCS 9710030118
Download: ML20217D318 (33)


Text

_ __

  • s d*(ich UNITED STATES

=g 'g NUCLE AR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGloN il j- ATLANTA FEDERAL CENTER

  • 61 FORsYTH STREET. sW. sVITE 23T85 g ATL ANTA. GEORGIA 30303 July 29,1997 MEMORANDUM TO: Fil FROM: s ca a on, Director k

Division of actor Safety.

SUBJECT:

MINUTES OF RESTART (0350) PANEL- MEETING FOR" CRYSTAL RIVER The Crystal River Restart Panel met in Headquarters on July 22,1997. The following Panel l members were in attendance: -

." Johns P. Jaudon, Chairman Frederick J. Hebdon, Vice Chairman ,

Kerry D. Landis Harold O. Christensen Stephen J. Cahill Lakshminaras Raghaven Additionally, the following staff members attended the meeting:

Luis A. Reyes Caudie A. Julian The panel reviewed the status of open items from inspections (Attachment A), the status of ,

restart issues (Attachment B), and the status of restart tasks [ Attachment C). These three attachments are included for information.- Some preliminary review of these checklists had been done during a tele-conference held July 16. It should be noted that the category of license Amendments has been removed from Attachment A. All of the items were moved to Attachment D (see below) or to the "Other" category in Attachment A.

The panel discussed the results of the licensee's detailed technical briefing of the staff conducted July 21,1997.

  • The panel determined that, licensee efforts notwithstanding, there was a potential problem in NRR being able to complete all the reviews of license amendments in a manner timely enough to suppod projected restart dates. The panel determined that the licensee shou ld be reminded of this and an attachment delineating our understanding of licensee amendments be appended to these minutes (Attachment D].

Action:

Hebdon provide Attachment D.

9710030118 970929 i

PDR FOIA O'MEALI97-252 PDR O

. 2 The panel discussed the planned Safety System Functional inspection. Specifically, the panel determined that the inspection plan should be drafted by the next meeting and that the expertise of the assigned SRA should be solicited prior to making the final selection of systems. The pros and cons of several potential systems were discussed.

Action:

Christensen present draft inspection plan for next panel meeting Jaudon contact.SRA concerning candidate systems for selection as inspection targets.

~

The panel discussed the status of the core inspection program, since the SALP process had been held in abeyance until six months after startup. K. Landis, the assigned DRP Branch Chief stated that he believed it was not a problem, as the core inspections were being performed.

Action:

  • Landis provide core inspection status at next panel meeting. .

The panel discussed the next meeting date, which will be August 20 and 21 onsite. The panel also discussed the next meeting at which senior NRC staff would attend. Subsequent to the meeting, this was determined to be October 30 and 31, onsite.

Docket: 50-302 Attachments: as stated.

cc/w/att:

L. Reyes, ORA /Ril S. Collins, NRR-J. Johnson, DRP/Ril B. Boger, NRR

. F. Hebdon, NRR L. Raghavem,- NRR H. Christensen, Rll K. Landis, Ril

  • C. Julian, Ril N. Dudley, OEDO

' R. Schin, Rll

. S. Cahill, SRl/Ril

1 Attachment A * .

CRYSTAL RIVER 3 ISSUES CHECKLIST R' ITEMS (TO BE INSPECTED BY THE NRC BEFORE RESTART)

Status as of July 22, 1997 The original Crystal River Restart Panel meeting on November 13, 1996 developed seven general areas under which the restart issues will be grouped. Those seven areas are:

1. Knowledge of design and licensing bases and adequacy of design margin
2. Regulatory knowledge and persp'ective
3. Operator performance and knowledge
4. Marginally effective engineering organization
5. Management oversight; including quality assurance, self assessment, and corrective action
6. Corrective actions for NRC violations
7. Other Total Restart (R) Items: 147
  1. Open 97
  1. Closed 50

! wrces fcr issues include: !FS. $1MS. NUREC 1435 (Status of Safety Issues at Licensed Power Plants), Resident's CIL. PM's OIL NOTE: Open a!!egations. O! investigations. and emerging / draft issues are ncrt contained in this list.

NOTE: 7a Asterisk (*) in far right column denotes a change from previously issued report.

A n ISSUE DESCRIPTIOtt AREA NRC LEAD IR/SER LICENSEE CCD9 TENTS NRC CLOSURE STATUS STAttFS LICENSEE

  • S RESTART LIST OF DESIGst-RELATED ISSUES (D.I.s)fper 10/20/96 Itr from FPC)

CR3 D.I. 1 HP! pump recirculation to the makeup tank 1 RI Cahill D-1 LER 97-08 R See URI 96-01-02. IF1 96-17-02 IR 96-17 PR3 D.I. 2 HPI system modifications to improve SBLDCA margins 1 Schin/NRR ,

D-2 See URI 96-01-02. LER R 96-06, IR 96-17. TS

  • Change Request 210

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d ISSUE DESCRIPTICit AREA NRC LEAD 1R/SER LICBfSEE CCBSEDFFS NRC :

c.oSust mwS mwS CR3 D.I. 3~ LFI pump mission Liste - (stRR for boron precip. reviet 1 RI Cooper / D+3 See tJRt 96-201-91. IR R NRR R-9 96-17 -

." l CR3 D.1. 4 Ecsetor building spray pump 18 NPSM 1 R1 Sanchen D-4 See 15tt 96-201-62 IR R 96-17

' CR3 D.I. 5 Ewergency feedicater system upgrades and diesel generator load 1 Schin D-5 Series See tatt 94-12-01: EEI R

  • impact 96-12-02. TR 96-17  !

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CR3 D.I. 6 Emergency diesel generator loading 1 Fillion/ D-6 Series See EEr 96-12-52 IR R

  • I Schin 96-17. LER 96-20 LER I 96-2$ I CR3 D.I. 7 rallure modes and ef f ects of loss of DC pc ser i M. Miller D-7 See URI 96-32-01. LER R 96-97, TR 96-17  !

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Containment piptwg. penetrat ions and coolernt RI Cahill/ See IR 96-12. LER 97- R Crowley 04

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I LICENSET* S OTHER RESTART ITEMS RPG 29/33 Seismic econting of HR Rad #4anitor 1 tenahan/RI D-19 R i

' P swST NPSH NPS11 concern with ECCS pumps when SFP pumps are running in 1 Thounas D-19 Review SP-63C test R I

r BWS an* Rectre results following MUT '

1 event I wJv.27 Section XI leakage testing 1 R-21 PC 97-1954 m *  ;

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FIVE ARFJLS OF CONTINUINC CONCEkN WITR IPAP RECwwvw TNSPELTICEt AND RII RiC - s w AITITICEIS i

Management - NRC inspect Problee Identification: focusing on c4 audits 5 R1 Cahill/ IR 97-07 OP-2 88ew CA systeen

  • Overssght - and the problem r mrt iwt sYTt**. R

- Increased inspectaon of CA Thomas CP-3 inspected in IR 97-07 IPAP Problem Analysis and Evaluation focusing on root ca.ase Recommended 1 vlo (97-07 013 needs 2 evaluatinns. follow up- CA audits Inspection og good - discussed in 4

various repo-tm in
  • 97 l PLrginally - NRC inspect Engineering Problem Identification and 4 Schin OP-4 50.59 R Effective Resolution: with eephasis on licens** evaluations for OP-6 Engineering plei f ictmt isss** and work backlogs.

Organization - Also anspect Quality of Enganeerang; with eephasis on 19

- IPAP Cf7 59.59 screentws and safety evaluat ions, accuracy of the ,

i Recommewled F5AR and eenaqament overstqht.

5 Inspect the lacensee's FSAR l Inspection EeWew Project and a:.sess the ident ified FSAlt errors.  !

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ISSVE frSCRIPT20st ARIA MFC 1.EAD IR/SER 1.ICENSTE CCBWG5rTS Kat .

c:.esume m Tes rTa-es' ta , of - finC inspwt Engineering Safety Focus focusing on prtvar 1 Schin D-13 Pdequate id-nt i f icat ton of di sereran ties with th- plan + + s d-sic tesi s a

  • D-15 Enowleeye of an the cor r ect ive an ion system. D-16 -
  • the Dess9n - Also anspect Enganeerang Problee Identification and OP-?

Basis - IPAP Resolutions f ocusing on prortrae-s for id-et if yim desig.1 basis OP-8 Fe_ ..Ad ipsvas and capturing them in t he correct a we act ten Prmrom. D-23 Inspection - Also anspect Quainty of Enganeeranga focusang on sa -si t ivity/underst anding by t he *mtneericat/licaesim staf f of t he pl ant 's de= > en basi s .

- Also assess the deste margin. including the licensee *s aew+ nr nf evedieinn- reviews 1.ack of - NRC inspect 50,5's, ove r abil i t y, report abi l it y 2 Schin OP-4 a Regulatory 0P-5 F.nowledge and Ctepliance With

Regulations -

IPAP -

Recommended inspect ion Operator - NRC inspect Saf ety Focus; focusing on ce**i-an. cat ion within 3 RI Cahill 0-6 Will evaluate OPS R

  • Performance - onerat f 2n_?. emseticat ion with etbar site groups, and 1+-- ..a Plan med IPAf ev*a r t n ae success of recent Recommended changes in CPS Ynsp-etson organiratton IftSPECTOR POf.1.OWUP SYSTFJE URf 95-02-02 Control room habitability envelope leakage. Encessive 1 Schin/NRR R-12 See TIA 95003: FPC TS R
  • 1eakage paths through doors, dampers, and drains due to Change Request so. 20s 4 design errors and lack of surveillances/ preven *ive of S/28/M; 12Rs J6-a maintennnee 04, 94-10, 95-01. 95-04-01, 95-09: las 95
92. 95-09 95-11. 95-16 95-21, 97-c5. 97 07: FPC ltrs. of 5/26/95 and 10/23/95.

VfD 94-2%-01 CPI $6 01 , Discrepancies in the high press.sse injection design basis. 1 Schim. TIE 97+C7 D-9.'D-1 See C13 D.I. 1; - R C*

analysis .

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CP 3 D I . 2 '

Utt! 95-04-01 Discrepancieslin the tied and the TSAR regardirry the 1" Crowley 'IR 94-19' ~

See EFI 94-19 07. R. , C prevention of post-tacA boren preelpitation -

tmI 96 05 07 Design concerns with saain steam line hangars used in seismic-' is RI. x IR 97 01 T D-51. See VIO 94-05-01;. R. C and other dyr.asic load appiteations? Reghaven .; g . Coordinate wfth L.

s. naq% avan CRI 96 06-03 Non-safety related transfer switch used IC ES status 1 Fillion. 1E 91 04 - D Indicatirwy light circuitry See LER 95 19 ' 3; c '*

U:11 3 G 01 Emergerrey Feedwater lew kPS11 to th-th pumps hub'to pcstulated 1 Nchtra1 -

IR 94-19 S 17- see CN3 D.!s Se single fallure ' -

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,. CR3 D.g; 7; EE;.94 19 f' , . , ,

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, 1.rF ts-24 CRI 96-17-03 railure to cond: set re1dized Technical specification ' 4 _- M.iMiller* .12 97-02. CP See setA SL601 ' (CL 94c-surveillance testiney on safety related circuitry t";L 96-C11 R. C 01). $*e IR 97-01' 3

J 4

ISSUE DESCRIPTION AREA NRC t.EAD TR/SEE LICEftSEE CCFWerTS NRC -

C14St"RE STATUS ET&Tes tfRI 96-201 01 Long term plant cooldown following a seudl break LOCA 1 21 Cooper / D-3 See CR3 D.I. 3- See IR R assuming a single f ailure in the decay hesi erop line NRR , SG-11. par taking *.

. responsibility for this item.

URI 96-201 02 NPSM for building spray puep has very little margin, and some 1 RI Sancher D-4 See Ot 3 D. t 4 a calculation f act ors wre nonconservat t we +

tml 94-231-03 Operating curves 16 17 and 19 in OP-103B are not validated 4 Hopper 0-1 R by licens**

tfRI 96-201-09 Nonsaf ety-related posit ioners on safety-related valves 1 Thomas D-10 See IR 96-00 IR 97-e1 R R-7 URI 96-201-05 Servhee water systein heat leads did net censider maaiem ' 1~ Crowley' IR SC-N 0-1 See Eri 96-19.C8 R. C in;*st heat (or-le39, Curve 15) - '

t'R 1 96 - 2 01 - 0 7 EDG not protected against water spray from f ailure of firs 1 Fillion/ D-52 R protection deluge system in EDG room M. Miller /

i u. Miller

.y 171 91 01-06 ftP1 systee. design, licensing basis.' and T3 concerns -

1 ' 'Schin IR 97-05 ' he It ' 99-06. EA ST- R. C.

147 fC10139

~

URI 97-01-09' . Adegaacy ef procedures to take the plant from bot standby to 2' Theems:- IP 97-02' R. C cold shutdown f rte otstside the centrol room - (Appendie R) t;s t 97- 02-02 Deletion of water quality regtirements f rom the FSAR 2 Thomas /NRR OF-5-8 R

' URI 97-05-02 50.59 safety evaluation does not address operation of the 1 Thomas / OF-CSD See IIR 97-10 R .

atmosrherie dump valves f rom remote shutdown panel during an Raghavan CP-SC Apperviin R fire event

, URI 97-05-D4 LER and VIO not supplemented by date stated in licensee 2 Thomas CP-32 Review comunstment R

  • j rer vanse t rack lear sys+ee tml 97-07-0) Reactor building liner plate degradation 7 Blake R .

(JR1 97-07-04 TJnanalyzed combustible burden in reactor b1dg fr/AC ductwork 7 Blake R .

1tR 95-13-01 Design deficiency may cause eaA*vp tani t wortexing resulting 1 Mellen -IF 97-05 D-4 9 ' 12R 95-13-03 tjesed in R. C in f ailure to met Aeoendia R ratJ!rements ' -

IR 94-es tEp 96-18-co. Failure to verify RB penetrations closed per TS 1 at Cooper 0-2 See EA 94-365 m LER 96-18-01 v10 9 te20135

[ER 96-21-00 Delayed ent ry into technical specification required act ion 3 RI Cahill 0-15 m .

involving an inoperable Reactor Protectiot System channel LER 96-22-00 Design error regarding hot shorts results in op* ration 1 M. Miller D-11D R .

LER 96-22-01 outside Appendia R desist basis LER 97-05-00 t?nanalyzed condition re small break LOCA & EFW 1 Schin/NRR , CP-OSA See D.I.2 m

  • LEE 97-09-00. Inadevaate design resulted in RCP lubricating oil collection 1 W. Miller / D-57 See VIO 96-15-02 R
  • LER 97-09-01 systam bairry outside to CFR 50 : equi r ement s Rag % avan LER 97-13-00 Functional testieg of EDG-1A room te*perature may exeeed 1 M. Miller D-06A R =

120*F 4

IS 3tTE ITESCRIPTICN AREA NFC LEAD IR/SER LICENSEE COpWGNTS CLost'RE STattr$ ysc sTmT,yg-LER 97-14-00 RH penetrations do not meet code require ==nts - c.stside 4 11 Cahill See D.I.G. LER 97-12 2

  • desaqq teasts LER 97-15-00 M?t-4 0. 41 SOS incapatde of per forming safety function post- 4 RI Sancher D-67 m
  • IJDCA LER 97-16-00 99 Coatings ret included in sump calculation 4 m
  • EE! 96-10-01 Four emaerles of f ailure to follow refuelityg procedure FP-203 3 Hopper 0-4 See EA PG-31E tC101s) R. C EE! 9C-10-02 railure;to essure root ca.ase snelysia'and corrective actions' $. Dopper - C-5 See EA 96-316 (020141 R, C taken to precidde repatition were adetsate af ter refuel; f inc.ident (no PR f ovve31 -

- l EtG loading tJSQs due to inadequate 10 CFR 50.59 evalcationst EEI 96-12-t'2 ,4' Schint R-2. D-6. D- 3ee EA 95-365,94-465,- R. C *

. three examples tone podification & two procedure changes) .

. Fillion - .14.. . D-15. 74 $27. VIO A (01012 CP-S 01022. 010321; see CR3 D.I 5: CR3 D.I. 5 1.E2 *6-2c Ett 96-12-03 ' inadequate correttive actions for 10 Cn 50.59 evaluation . S'- Schin . - CP-145 See EA 96-36$ et al. R. C errorst two esaeples v10 C (03013)

EEI.96-12-04 Use of urtverifled calculations to support modifications. -4 Schin CP-6. D 14 See EA 96-365 et al. R. C .

trdt i tspect licensee *s extent af conditicm reviews. VIO 9 (C2011f t.EI ?6-19-O' nree inadequate procedures l for containment penetration 4' F1 CP-15 See EA 96-365 et.el f R, C -

survelliances -

YIO B (020115 EEI %-19-C2 Inadegoate corrective actions for inadequate centainment; 1 RI- CF-16 ; See EA 96-365 et al. R. C tv.atration surv*llinnees VTO C 4030199 EE1 95-13-C3 ' Etw tePSIf t!EG due to inadequate 10 CFR 50.59 safety evolustion '

l' l $ chir. . D-38 See EA.96-365 et s!. .. R. C for a saadification- VIO A 101047) See IR 97-04' EEt 94-19-04 l' allure to update- appilcable c4 sign documents to incorporate 'l .Themas D-19' See EA $6-345 et eli R, C 14W design information (EFF-2 'suned operating e EFf-1 YIO B (02013) t rips at $000 Rr'"7 pre 9*-tre)

EEI 96-19-05 Failure to include appliNetle deslen !cformation in the " l' %ceas D-4 0 - See EA 95-165 et al. R. C design ,irput. requirements for an I" fit tedificatiort (EFP VIO 8 402013) contmuing to operate af ter EFP-1 trips at 500# RCS pressure f +,

and hydraulie req =st re**nt s)

I EEI 94k19-06 EW 03Q ese to removing the automatie open ' signal from 'AS7- il . T? xmas: R-4 See EA 96-364 et al. - R. (*

204. redocity the reliability cf EFP-2 , VIC A 1010525-

-EEI 96-11-07 Inadequate SC.59 evaluation for post-LOCA boron precipatetion . 1' btpeley ^ OP-17 See EA M-365 et s!. R.-c control '

VIO A 401CE21J verify f=tocedures and,..

'l ' .

doeveentativ .'egwate prior to r*o .e- e

, . .2 Error in design calculations for SW system hast loads .

EEI 96-11-09 '

1. . 'Crowler D-26.*'.- See EA 95-165 et al. R. C VIO 8 802013p EEI 97-06 01 -

Inadequate safety evaluations for added operator actions for - 1 See EA 97-162.' FIO - R. C

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CLostram STA7US gTATus EEI 97-09-01 Unreviewed safety question involving added EDG protective 4 Schin See EA 97-330 R

  • trips EA 95-16 Use of non-conservative trip setpoints for safett-related 6, 1 Mellen '

CF-13 See IR 95-16 IR 95- 9

  • twas EEI 95- equipment (SLI!!). Additional examples identified in IR 95- 21 IR 97-01 IR 97-02 02-04? 16. LER 94-06 EA 95-125, .*ine' inst $nees 'where operators vio!.ted procederes for MCT * ^ 6. 3 L .Schin - IR 97-07. R.13 See IR 36-04. : LEst ?4- R. C
  • V!O !. A . pressurir/leve! (St.III) . , 03, (Dio!!) (was-CEI 95-22-011 ' ' '

EA 95-176; Conduct of .unauthorired tests of MITylthout 15 ETR 50.59; '41 3 I $cttin$' IR 37-01 CP-10-' See'IR 36-04' ' R, c VIO I' B < .

. 2 evaluation (SLIII) . - Additional exagles ' (four tests) . -

f02011) (was EEI 95+22 02)

'. identified in 1/18/96 letter titled EA ?$-126 and EA 94-1951.

(See 'JRI 96-04-01) 1 e

, .. . . .  ?

EA 75-126 . Failure to take adequate coerective actions for cperator? .6 c 5 .- -schirt. In 97 07- Op-13 ': Rc.

VIO I.C.1 .. concerns regarding OP-10334 . Curve 8.' for MJT pressure / level (030131 twas limits-(5LIII)J EE! s5-22-039-EA 95-126 Corrective actions for an inadequate Curve 9 ftwo STI s and a 6. 5 BI Cooper / O-I a VIO 1.C.2 revised Curve SA E 891 were also incorrect (SLIII) Schin (04013) twas EEI 95-22-03)

EA 95-126, Design controls failed to ensure adequate safety margin for 6 1 RI Cooper / OP-6 R VIO I.D,1 HPI pumps for certain IJDCA scenarios (SLIII) Schin (05013) twas EEI 95-22-04)

CA 95-12t., Swarover of CCCS pumps' suction fran BwsT tat five feet) to- 6 11 FI Cbeper/~ tRI2*-07~

D- ht . . R ' C*

VIO 1.D.2 reactor tn11 ding sump was inadequate (SLIII)i Settin .. -

(06013) (was:

EEI 95-22 04) -

EA 95-126 EOPs allowed single Lt'I pump to supply two EPI pumps, with . GD 1 RI Cocterf.; IR 97-07" D-36i R. c.-

VIO II.A .

insuff!clent.22FSH for I.PI pump:tSLIII).'

Schin (07013) twas FET 95-32-04)

EA 95-126 Failure to take adequate cdrrective actions for tank 6 5 RI Cooper OP-12 R v!O II.B volumes / level /section point .SLIV)

(09014} twas Eri 95-22-03)

EA 95-126, railure*to ensure fire water stosage tank contained adequate 6 1 R1 Cooper D-37 a VIO II.C volume of water (St.IV)

(09914) twas EEI 95-22-01)

LA 96-316 ~ Four'eramples of fat'.ure to follow refueling procedure FP-203 . 3l Norpe r, . IR'37- C-4 ' Rc c*-

(01014).

~

300

^

twas EEI 96- '

10-01) ~ .I k ,

Failure to assure root cause analhis arvi corrective actions ;

EA 96 316 5 flopper [ 'iR 97 J C R C, t020147.

.. ' taken to preclude repetition were adequate af ter refuel > a -i 300 ;

(was EEI 96- '1ricident Ino PR issued).10-02t ^ +

6

ISSttE DESCRIPTION AREA NRC LEAD IR/SEE LICENSEE COBsEENTS genc .

CIDSURE STATUS STRTUS EA 96-365. EDG loadievy USQs due to inadequate to CTR 50.59 evaluations: 4 Schin/ D-6 See CR3 D.I. 5: CR2 R

  • 96-465. 96- three examples tone modification & two procedure changest Fillion D-14 , D.I. 6 527 VIO A D-15 . See 1ER 94-24 and 94- **

k 101012 CP-5 20 4 01022 and R-2 01032). twas EE! 96-12-02 EA 96-365 et ETW NPSf4 USQ due to inadequate 10 CTR 50.59 safety evaluation 1 Schin D-38 See LER 97-01 R

  • al. VIO A for a modification (01092).

(was EE! 96-19-035 EA 96-365 et ETW 1J50 due to removing the automatic open signal frois ASV- 1 Thomas R-4-A See IR 97-07 3

  • al. VIO A 204, reducing the reliability of EFP-2 (01052).

twas EEI 96-19-06)

EA 96-365 et Inadecsate 50.59 evaluation for post-toCA boron precipitation 1 RI Cooper CP-17 verify procedures and R al, VIO A control dotweentation adequate (01062). prior to restart.

twas EE1 96-19-07)

EA 96-365 et Use of unverified calculations to support modifications. 4 Schin D-14 a al VIO B NRC inspect licensee's entent of condition reviews. CP-6 102013),

twas EEI 96-12-04)

EA 96-365 et Three inadequate procedures for containment penetration 4 RI CDoper 0P-15 m al. VIO 8 surveillances (020131.

twas EE! 96-19-01)

EA 96-365 et railure to wpdate applicable desigen documents to incorporate 1 Thomas D-39 See IR 97-07 R

  • al. VIO B Etw design information (EFP-2 assumed operating when EFP-1 102013). trips at 5005 RCS pressurel (was EE! 96-19-04)

EA 96-365 et railure to include app 11pble design information in the 1 Thomas D-40 See IR 97-07 a

  • al, VIO B design input requirements fbr an EfM modification (EFP-2 102013). continuing to operate af ter ETP-1 trips at 5003 RCE pressure
was EEI 96- and h} L M ic requirements)
  • 19-05)

EA 96-365 et Error *kdesigncalculationsforSW system heat loads 1 Crowley/ D-29 R al. VIO B Mellen 102013).

twas EE~ 96-19-06)

EA 96-365 et Inadequate corrective actions for 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation 5 Schin OP-2 R

  • al. VIO C errors; two examples
  • 12-01) 7

ISSUE DESCRIPTIJtr ARIA NRC LEAD IR/SER LICENSER CCDOMNTS 3rRC ,

CLOSURE STATUS S mT"'S EA 96-365 et Inadequate corrective actie rs for inadequate containment 1 RI Cooper CP-16 R al. VIo C penetration surveillances ,

103013). .

twas EEI 96-19-021 EA 97-094 Failure to report an unanalyzed condition that significantly 2 Schin/ D-5 See EER 97 001, ga 97- R =

V!O A2101023) co mromised plant safety. Inadequate NPSH for EDF pusep Et Cahill 04 E:A 97-it2, Inadequate safety evaluations for added operator actions for 1 Schin OP-5-C R VIO 01013 design basis SB14CA mitigation twas EEI 97-06 011 VIO 93-16-07 InadeTaste LOP and AP pre essurev : 6. 3- Mcyper s IR 97- C-3 See IR 96-04. IFI 96- R, C

  • 300 CP.19 067 03. IR 96-04 IFI 95-99-09 V!O 95-16-03 inadequate procedure for operation of the makeup purp 1A 4. 1 RI Cahill 0-s-R See 12R 96-10 LER ?s- # =

cooling water 10 VIO 95-21-03 Failure to isolate the clase IE from the non-class 1E 6 1 Thomas / D-30 See 1ER 95-25 LER 96- R electrical circuitry for the RB purge and mini-purge valves RI 02 IR 97-01 IR 97 c2, TR 97-05 VIO 96-01-C1 Inadequate corrective action for NPI flow indication problem 6 5 RI Cooper D-59 See 12R 94-es R VIO 96-01-06 Failure to correctly translate design basis of SW system into 6 1 R1 Sanchez D-54 See IER 95-17 R =

procedures, drawi wes, and instructions VIO 96-04 Failure to ta'Ae prompt corrective actiert.in revising 6. 5?~ ' Hopper s tR 97-. 9 . R) c a procedure VP.580 Pla.nt Cafety Verification (for STAS)'. VP. " 300' 530 contained outdated and incorrect'Information; VIO 96-05-01 Failure to create a PR 'and OCR for.desnaged poln Steam line -

hangara W,'5: RI$

Rachavan

.. IR 97-01 IR 97-02 0 '

See Citt. 96-05-02; See R. ' C IR 97-02 V10 96-05-05 Failure to follow procederes for updatirg design basle 6. 4 ; Crowler IR 97-01: CP-0. D-55 < R. c do":uments'-

VIO *G-05-07 ' Inedequate receiving inspections for battery chargers tvender .

~

6.' 4 - Schin ~1R 97-01 UP-25: R,' c testsi VIO 96-0$ . Failtar'e to, follow pu-chad procedures !cr Israerters ' ^6. 4 $ chin' IR 97-01 ~CP-21* R, c VIO 96-06 02' 'No procedure for deelnerellted = rater flush performed by- 6, 3, RI

  • IR Sy.02' CP.22 - Rf c voarators on intje ocid addition If nes VIO 96-06-n4 No evaluation on non-FSAR vital battery charger configuration 6 4 RI Cooper R-19 R

. . s

. rR not' initiated to resolve CREVS test failure ~.

VIO 96-04 6 f.5 -

tenah.an/ 'IR,97-02. OP-2 F . gc-Cromley -

v!O 96-08-01 Ccrrective action not taken on make-trp system audit findings 6. 5 R2 Cahill OF-24 R

& excessive vibration on spent fuel pool pung cooling f an mot or

  • VIO 96-09-03' Failtire to perfers a 10 CFR $0.59 sJiety evaluation for- . 6. 37 Thomas IR9702: CP.25, ' ' R. C changes to procedures deveribed in the PSAR for coctrolling

'd!ssolved hydresen concentration in the aCs '

6. 6 .

~

VIO 96-09 04 Failure to update operating curves to reflect 1981 power .

Thorias 'IR 97 021 CP-26 R. c upret e S

I ISSVE DESCRIPTION ARLA NRC 1 RAD IR/EER LZCI3fSEE COB 9G3rTS Wyc --

C1457RR STATUS ST17vs VIO 96-09-05 Failure to incorporate design change of MUV-64 int o 6, 4 Thomas / OP-27 R cperations procedJres Crowley VIO 96 09-06 Three examples of design control errors terroneous 6. 4 RI Cooper CP-8 R calculation inputs and ISI foundaryl v!O 96-09-07 Untimely corrective actions for the EFIC system concterns and 6 5 19eonnes -

0P-29 See tR 97-01 R problems -

VIO 96-11-04 Reactor building sump not constructed in accordance with 6 1 R1 Cooper D-56 See IR 97-02 1 approved const ruction drawinrrs VIO 96-15-02 Failure of reactor coolant pump oil collection system to 6 7 tr. Miller D-57 See 1R 97-02. LER 97- R ret ain oil leaking from reactor coolant pump 099 PC 97-3387 VIO 96-20-01 Failure to adhere to reactor coolant system cooldown limit ^ 3 R1 Cooper 07-29 R VIO 96-20-02 Failure to follow procedure AI-400C for review and 7 R1 Cooper OP-30 R development of Maintenance Procedure PM-191 Main Turbine / Generator, Fee p g ar Turbine 1.myup VIO 97-01-01 Inadequate clearance tagyang requirements 3 RI Cahill 0-12 R 1

V!O 97-01-02 Failure to follow procedures. resulting in inadvertent EDG 3 RI Cooper C-13 More g M lems R

  • start discut wo ia IM 97-09 VIO 97-01-04 Failure to perfore TS surveillance for spent fuel pool level 3 RI Ceeper M-9 See t.En 97 02 R
  • V!O 97-01-07 Instrument loop uncertainty setpoint calculation assuoptions 4 Mellen D-26 See IR 97-c2, LER 91- R
  • not translated into procedures 07 VIO 97-01-09 Inadequate corrective actions for cable empacity 4 Fillion/ D-22 R M. Miller VIO 97-02-01 Failure to follow equipment status control procedural 3 R1 Cahil' O-13-A R
  • require **nts VIO 97-02-03 Adequate procedures not in effect to take the plant from het 1 Thomas OP-19-A R standby to cold shutdown f rom outside the centrof rcom VIO 97-02 04 Failure to conduct TS logic testing 1 M. Miller R-1-A See C2. 96-01 LER 97- R
  • a el VIO 97-05-01 Failure to follow equipment t agging control procedural 3 RI Cahill C-13A See IR 97-97. VIO 96 R
  • requirements .

11-03 v!D 97-05-03 Incorrect information in annunciator response procedure for 3 Thomas 0-16 R

  • invae t eris V!O 97-07-01 Failure to follow proc *+Jre CP-111 for precursor card 5 Thomas R =

, processing l'

-1FI.95h5-01? tws!gn requ$ resents for. nitrogen overpressure iservice waterly 1? I,. Mellen- '1RSY-eI~ C-41 6

. , - jseed to review R, C

, N'*', licensee *s calculation 2m & cooc!weion .See IR' 95 21 - -

IFI 95-15402 Design requirements for dynamic LOCA ef fects per surge line 1 RI Sanchez D-Se See IR 95-21 and TIA R ef f ect s96-013 9

ISSUE DESCRIPT20ft AREA NRC 1.EAD 1R/SER LICE 3stR CC39earts WRC CLOSUPE STATUS sta7TS 1FI 95-15-03 19 sign requirements for reactor, coolar,t puep cooler failure

~ '

1 Thcmass / IR 97-05 D-59 ' See IR 91-21 and TIA R, C 9-014~

IFI 95-15-01 Code re?Jirement for thermal relief valves on decay heat 1 RI Sancher D-60 See IR 95-21 and TIA R

  • removal heat exchangers96-014 - see In 97-ce

- FPC a*9 dines reliefs IFt 95-15-05 Relief valves removed from heat enchangers 1 R1 Sanchez D-61 See IR 95-21 and TIA R 94-014 IFT 96-03-15 Evaluate the licensee's revised TS Pases and related 10 CFR 2 RI Cahill R-14 See IIR 94-07 A

  • 50.59 analysis for HPI flow indicators IFI *6-17-02 Potential f or HFI/LP! recirculat ion resulting in mare-up tank 1 RI Cahill D-1 See CW) D,1. 1, 1ER R overflow 9 7- 0+>e IF1 96-17-04 Adequacy of to CFR 50 Appendix a fire study ..=1 documentation 1 W. Miller D-43 R IFK 96-:'01-11 Design t asis for decay heat / core flood / reactor coolant piping i 1 Crewleyc 11 97-G2' D-44 . Identi led in IFAP R, C '

te*perature - report as IF 94 201-01 IFI 96-201-12 Conduit string criteria - jamreing ratio not considered 1 Fillion/ D-45 Identified in ISAF R M. Miller report as IF-94-2tt-02 IF1 76-201-13 Ceble espacities '- several esbles exceed rating. Including' 1 ' .. Fillion- IR 97-91' D-22 Identified in IPAF R. C tM A 1 ' '

repeat es IF-96-201-C1

^

IF1 96-201-14 ' SDC protectide trips not 1*ypassed a10rirgemergency mode of 1 M. Miber .IR.97-09 D=12 - Identified in 1FAP Rf C *

. operat. foe ,.

report as 17-96-201-04 See IR 97-Os-IFI 16-201-15 Verificat ion of motor starting data 1 Fillion/ D-46 Identified in IFAF a M. Miller report og IF-94-2?1-05 IFI 14-201-16' Coordinatf or of Second level undervoltage rela'y. isL::P) . . 1 Fillion/- IR 97-05) D Identified in IPAP Rc c setting vs. Inverter operation "'

M. Miller report as IF-16-201-c4 IFI 96-201-17 Coordination of St,UR and fuse protection 1 Fillion/  !*-31 Identified in IPAF R M. Miller report as IF 94-201-01 2F2 97 02-05 Outstanding issues associated witt the emergency diesel 1 RI Cooper D-6-C Assoc with room teep R

  • generator power terrate modificat ion rise irt 97 Reaknesses in plaht-specifie emergency operating procedures- 3 .. 1scpper/ 11:37-07 0 14' inspect licensee'a R. , C

' for refillirr3 the secondary' aide of dry once-through steam t

~ '

.RI Ccoper-~ _

E7Ps - in FPC planned oenerators- uporade m!.TI.rt.Arrr acTrotts MPA SL507; Pressure locking and thermal binding of safety-related gate 2 NRR D-49 See 1ER 97-11 New PC R CL 35-07 valves. Currently in staff review. An RAI is outstanding. 97-1517 identifies Espected completion? that ETIC valves open/close was not

. taken into s Con 91M N. ion -

1e

.. .- .- , . . . . . - ~ ~ - . . . _ . . . . . . . - - - - . . . -. ~. . . . . _ . . ~. .- _ _ _ . - - , = .

k l

j f

i issum DEscalFT1098 AREA grec LEAD 1R/SEE LZCRpr$tt Ctes*R3rrs grRC ,

CEDsest STATUS staTt's v p*b ' eL601: Testang of safety-related logie cirevits - 2 M. Miller R-1 See 12R 96-25. 122 97- R * -

CL 01 Licensee response in staff review. 03, 1R 97-02. 11/96 -

. the licensee has -

identified testing deficiencies that must be f amed prior to I rest art tv!O 97-02+0e1 t

Cirtua.ferential cracking of SG tube flaws.-

MtX #L',03 'r -

Blake/fatg l-2 R.1? " .see stRF letter $/21/9?. R. ' C CL95 03 11censee response in staff review; I

l orwEm r$surs j

i <

LTOP Current TS does not a1 dress LTOP prevention or mitigation. 2 ffRR/RI R-16 SIRC ltr. 2/4/97 m a On the basis of CL 88-11 the licensee submitted information requested licensee to l'

to de==onstrate that LTOP in But plants have less than 1 i =s submit a TS w al ,.a.

[

[

100 reactor years probability of occurrence and as a result On 4/T/97 FPC l

., per CL 99-11 non-appendia C methodology can be used for PT subsmittee an esempt. ion l j curves. Such a PT curve would provide for higher LT*.s? enable request tc use Code ,

pressure and temperature and would provide operational case feste. Esemption t

., flexibility. Staff denied the request in 1995 and requested granted 7/97. TS ,

7 a revised response. The licensee expects to respe sd late .. a ,., request 1997. reflecting the approved eseeption i subseitted on July 19. ,

Short term action to change PORY setroint/ limit RCS P to 1008.

)- Appendix R AppeMix R design basis issues review by FPC consultant. NRC 1 18 Miller / D-11 R review open Appendix R issues to assure that there are no Fillion/ t f restart or operability issues imbedded in them. te. Miller / l 9ssR t

operator NRC review operator woretarounds list to assure that there are 3 RI cahill 0* See vio 96-0?-07 m workarounds no restart or operability issues contained in them 50.54f Letter NPC review -licensee's $0,5t f letter response Mue 2/9/971 ort FrRA - R - 3 .. F1.ase 2 review R. C .

4 d* sign bases ' '

.4 eM1ete

{

, License verify license conditions are met 2 RI Cahill R-15 See FPC ltr 5/20/97 R Conditions f j

  • Several license conditions were not g met.

{

RC Loop in a survey inspection, the staf f noted that certain branch 2 trRR D-62 See NRC Itr 4/7/97 R

  • i Piping pipes of f the primary coolant loop were not analyred as Code RA1. sesR reviewing t Analyses Class 1 pipe ti.e., no fatigue analysis) as required by the FPC's response.  !

Code. Need NRR technical branch's opinion en this t 4

j CCur Control complex habitability envelope - Incloding TS-20r and 2 Schin/NRR R-12 TS-200 withdrawn per R i TIA 95-03 need to be addressed. Licensee submittal does not . FPC ltr. 4/18/97 See i previos adequate TS action.

  • also FPC ltr. 5/15/97

, i f or commi t ment e . l I

I I

.( 11 [

I

f' i i

i CRYSTAL RIVER 3 ISSUES CHECKLIST - i N ITEMS l

[

, (OPEN ITEMS FOR WHICH INSPECTION PRIOR TO RESTART-I.S NOT NEEDED).- ,

! I i status as of July 22. 1997 i

Total Non-Restart (N) ' Items: 114 L

# Open 98  ;
  1. Closed 16 .

i i

4 t 4

9

~

1 IssUt DESCRIPTItat AREA Inte LaAs IR/ssR 1.ICENSat CasseNTS Nec i

CtOSURE STATUS STATUS .

I j LICENSEE *S OTNER RESTART ITEMS

~

i  !

CTSG Tubes Adequacy of OTSG tube stress-relieved rolled joints is 7 See licensee Precursor N (C)  !

questioned. BuoG analysis of a Davis-Besse pulled OTSG tube, Card PC 96-5077 of t current test data. and limited field emperience conflict with 11/6/96. (No TIAl i j- test data from 1972 which

  • qualified
  • a stress-relieved  !

j rolled joint.

I l

g INS #ECTOR FOLLOWUP SYSTFJE x pe

. , ..  : ;*a** , w+~..

{ ....n, ,+u a, ~ q.. ...~. >

A cm3 diz [1.,J ' ~

~, ,

-..:tmt:95-21-oef Excessive cooldown rate 1.

~ '

sit _q 94 ;20' g.[a se f ^ ,

4 r

d. 2 3..L.;

~. ,. ., ...

f.

~ f~ a ,

M 96 ^

  • sC C+ .

I Unt 96-03-04 Measuring of percent through-wall indications with an 7 See IR 96-06. Generic N (C) unqualified procedure issue be*ng addressed '

by NRR. (no T1Al 5 tml 96-03 05 Eody current sample espansion based on degraded tube 7 See IR 96-06. N (33

percentages i l d t URI 96-06-10 Justification for removal of Thermo-Lag protection from the 1 N (SI I j source range instrumentation J ,
7. ~,, c  :.,., . w : .. ,c w.. . . .+ . <L  :

.. -. ~."&'-.: x & ,. 5 , . . ~ -r e tml 96.-07-03' 13ncertect infornation pr..ovided.,by contr,actorsi V 'i# ~ f7 9 _

r LIR. 77 .03 :

@< Lu:  %. 4_ . , s g,

' **e # >

  • y . . i

.g. ,,s,..g 3 - -

URI 96-20-06 Failure to adhere to 10 CFR 50.54(p)(1) - Phys. Se writy Plan see IR 96-18 I* ts) sutmitted decreased plan ef fectiveness a y

tml 96-201-06 Preferred of f site electrical power ocurce with plant shut 1 N ts) l down (500 kw switchyard) is not qualified. Noter- t>ttil this 6 j issue is resolved. licensee is not using 500 KY switchyard as l

an electrical power source. .-

t

. i l URI 96-201-09 Testing to qualify relays beyond manufacturers' ratings was 1

  • N ts) [

j inadequate  ;

4 1

4 i k

, 12

AREA NRC LEAD IR/SRR LICENSEE Cts 9ENTS NRC ISSUE DESCRIPTION ETATtrS..

CLOSURE STATUS LER 93 02-02, Switchyard cable failure caused degraded voltage of Class 1E 7 LER 91-02-01 closed in N (1)

IR 95-09.

LER 91-02-01 electrical buses and actuation of EDG IIR 94 06-01, Deficiency in understanding of technical requirements leads 2 LER 94-04-00 closed in N (D)

  • to nonconservative RPS setpoint and potential violation of TS IR 95-16. See EA 95-LER 94-06-03, 16.

LER 94-06-04, LER 94-06-05. ,

1ER 94-06-06 Unauthorized tests involving makeup tank level and pressure See EA 95 126 VIO N (D)

LER 94-09-02 I.A.

7 See 3R 95 11, se gt) tra 95-09-03 Minimal release during sulfur dioxide delivery causes actuation of toxic gas monitor resulting in control room emer9ency vent f lat ion actuat ion Inadequate procedure causes low cooling water flow to makeup 1 12R 95-10-00 closed in W (1) 1ER 95-10-01 2R 95-26. See also pump resulting in operation outside the design basis URI 95-11-02. VIO 95-16-03.

SW flow to control room coolers controlled by air operated 1 See IR 95-16, VfD 96- N (Da IIR 95-17-00 01-06 valves which could fail open 2 See NCY 95-18-05.- N (1)

LER 95-18-00, Inadequate TS note allowed delayed entry into TS 140 IIR 95-18-01 LER 95-18-C2 See IR 95-13. N (3)

LER 95-19-00 Leak instrumentation f or Su flow to FBCUs incapable of 1 measuring 90 9pm Inconsistent design asseptions cause building spray flow 1 LER 95-23-00 closed in N 83) 11R 95-21-01. r* 96-04.

LER 95-23-02 rates to be outside design basis See VIO 95-21-03. See N (D)

LER 95-25-00, Inadequate isolation of safety /non-safety related circuits 1 1R 97-02. IR 97-05.

LER 95-25-01, LER 95-25-01 closed in LER 95-25-02 1R 97-05.

1 See IR 95-21. N (1)

LER 95-28-00 DWST vacuum breaker has inadequate relief capacity LER 95-29-01 EFIC control circuits oisrouted; Appendia R concern 1 LER 96-01-00 closed in N tt)

LER 96-01-01, 1R 96-04: See also LEn 96-01-02 NCY 96-01-01.

  • 9 ,

Mlnipurp valve has safety /E+saf ety itI4ted. circuits - l'- IK'91-05i See VIO 95-21-OL M (!)

LJIP, 95-02-00 ' , . "

c wit hout isolatiott' See URI 95 21-04 N (1i IER 96-03-00. RCS cooldown rate exceeded during cooldown 3 LER 96-03-01 See UR1 95-02-02, IR W 4D3 LER 96-04-00 CCliE control dampers found damaged 6 leaking 1 95-21.

1 LER 94-05-00 closed in N fD) 1.ER 96-05-01, SW flow to RBCUs could exceed iesign la 96-04. See also LER 96-05-02 , YTO 96-01-01.

~- - - <

. IR 97 +06 ', . - See IR-SS-20, IR 96 ; W (D), ,

.Mellee'

.liPI instruent erTcr could result'In MPI puep runout. 1.,, , ,

LER 96-06 00, '

04 CR3 0.1. 2J

~

d' ' -

tER 96-06-01 13

ISSUE CESCRIPTICW AREA NRC LEAD IR/SEE LICENttE CDFWWFTs pac CLosess srmres statt-s

  • LER 96-07-03 HPI line SBLOCA/100P/ loss of de bus cotsid have inadequate HP1 1 RI Cahill See IR 96-01. CR) N (D)

LER 96-07-01 flow instrumentation

  • D 1.2..

LER 96-08-00 Ambigunus TS note results in net performing RCS leak 2 RI Cahill n 153 surveillance prior to Mode 2 LER 96-09-00 Failure to reattach instrument tubing to seismic supports 1 See tat! 94-03-06 IR n 133 after moodification leads to operat ion outsida devien basis 96-OS.

IJ:R 96-10-00 tow flow in Set system cooled components causes operation 1 See v10 95-16-03. W (Dt out s ide des ign ba s i s LER 96-11-00 Personnel error causes testing deficiency resulting in 1 See pFA gL601 (CL 96- W (D) condit ion prohibited by improved TS fCL 96-01 tesuest 01).

't.tR Sk 12-00, geration outside deNign' basis caused by battery'ctbrgers . (J J ; IRT 9bc1',

' ' ' Gee YIO 94-0$-h7f~ '

M TD),

having AnadeTtate test results accepted in error :

LER 96 12 01. '

c7

~

t,EP #6-12 '

LER 96-13-00 Operator error resulted in the inadvert'ent actuation of DCP- 3 See 1eCY 96-03-02. W tt) 1A 1.ER 96-15-00 Personnel errors cause cable separation / isolation concerns 1 Sea IR 94-04. w II) resulting in operation outside the design basis stoxic gas monitoret LER 96-16*00 CREYS filter testing did not meet TS specs 2 RI w (S3 LER 96-19-00 Non-safety related switch used in safety related wiring for 1 See tnt 1 96-06-03. See W (Dt LER 96-19-01 ES status lights IR 97-04 LER 96-20+00 tJnreviewed safety questions concerning EDG overloading caused 4 R-2, D-6. D- See EE! 96-12 W (D) by interptetation of regulatory requirements 14 D-15.

OP4 LER 96-23-0C Personnel error leads to missed surveillances resulting in 2 See VIO 96-15-81. N (D) violation of Technical Specifications (missed remote shutdown panel Eild pump pressure inst rument channel check)

IER 96-24-00 Plant modification causes unanalyzed condition regarding 1 See EA 96-365. VIO A N (D)

LER 94-24-01 emergency feedwater 1ER 96 25 00 Parsonnel error causes tds+ging deficiency resulting in 1 See PPA SL601 (CL 96- W (D) condition prohibited by Tecnnacal Specifications (12 contacts 01).

in ES logie were not being tested)

LER 97-01-00 Ineffective change management results in unrecognized NP$N See EA 96-345. v10 A y tpj issue

  • af feet ing ETW availability (010423 =

See EA 97-094 VIO A2 tele 21)

LER 97-501-00 9*aintenance activities in circulating water system result in See EA 97-012. Y10 N (S)

(See EA 97- protected area breach Att) (01043) 012)

LER 97-502-00 S*curity zon- out of service .

N 157 LER 97-02-00 Out of calibration fuel storage pool water level transmitters See vro 97-01-Og w (p3 a

ISee VIO 97-ci-04)

LER 97 02-01 14

r j

i ISSUE DESCRIFTION EBEA NRC LEAD 1R/STR LICENSER COpeGNTS pRC et.osers srmres svares

~

l IER 97-03-00 Personnel error causes testing deficienei.es *C1, 96-01) See VIO 97 02-04 W (D)

LCR 97-03-01, '

LER 97-03-02, ,

- i 11R 97-01-03.

IER 97-03-04 IIR 97-04-00 Ther.ac1 relief valves inside the containment do not meet . GL 94-06 W (D)

LFR 97-04-01 retstrements f or design basis accidents s** D.T.e L

, LER 97-06-00 surveillance testing results in reduction of EDG rating lioit See D.I.6 w (D3 d

due to inad*Tsate acceptanee  ;

1 LER 97-07-00, suilding teenperature variations larger than assumed, see V10 97-g1 07 N (D)

. tEW 97-07-01 result iswr in unknomeet instrument uncert a int ies 1 ,

IER 97-08-00 Potential of NF1 pump recirculation capability resulting in R1 Cahill See CR3 D.I.1 g gD3 l possible M 3 overflow or oossible pump failure -

LER 97-10-00 NVAC was not considered for manual operation of safe-shutdown see URI 97-05-02 N (D) i equipment in post-fire conditions result ing in non-compliance  !

of AFP R l IIR 97-11-00 Fressure locking of EFV-32/33 (CL 95-07) See MFAsL507 m (Dt j CL 95 07 j

4 12R 97-12-00 C1 system containemt penetrations not designed for C1,96-04 W (D1 I containeent isolatton See D 1.9 ,

I v!O 94-25-01 Failure to properly control the Control Comples Mabitability 6 7 See URI 95-02-02. N (D) i' Fnvelope fdoor blockei open for maiatenance work 1 VIO $4 27-02 Failtate to make two 10 Crit $0.13, reports to the !?RC withift t 8, 2 - 1R'97*04 CF-4 ^

See IR 95-02,11t 95 N'(1),

the reestred tim 09. C-VIO 91-27 Failure to stake one required '1D CFR 50.72 report

~' '

to the fHtC ' 62- IR 97-04 OP-4. Se* IF 95-08. N (11; within the teysired time e Vro 96-01-05 Two ena*ples of failure to update FSAR as required by 10 CFR 6, 4 m (33 50.71te)

VIO 96-02-01 Failure to snaintain 0.2 footeandles in the protected area 6, 7 See IR 94-07 W ts)

Y10 96-02-04 Failure to smaintain secondary alarm station operable and 6, 2 y gs,

  • inadetaate contensatory afaasures VIO 96-03-1; Failuso to follow radiation work permit requirements 6, 7 . y g33 v!O 96-03-12 Failure to report the tr ensport of a radioactively 6, 2 y qsp
  • contaminated individual of f site VIO 96-03-13 Unescorted visitor personnel within the protected area 6, 7 y (3) i L

VIO 96-05-04 Licensee approved eddy current acceptance criteria different 6, 2 J. Blake M ts) f rose TS requirements

^

VIO $6-06 . Failure to timely notify the NRC of' a condition outside the $;. 2 l 1R 9'7-04' N (3), i tappandix R 1,1 censing design basis- '

  • -g c VIO 96-07-01 Failure to protect safeguards info N tion 6, 7 g (33 l i

a I

?

15  !

ISSUE DEST?IPTION AREA WRC LEAD IR/SER I.1CENSEE CtssW5Fr$ WRC cresust sTm*US sTaws

v!O 56-O'-02 Failuse to complete screening elements for Fitness for Duty 6 7 i a gs3 rersonnel

^

v10 96-09-01 Failure to follow a saintenavr e procedure resulting in the 6. 7 W (51 inadvertent initiation cf the control room emergency veneilation system VIO ?s-09-02 Unescorted visitor personnel within the protected area 6. 7 -

3 (33 Y10 96-11-01 Inadegaate work instructions to present the inadvertent start 6. 7 m g33 of t he A EDC v10 94-11-03 Personnel performing worst on the reactor building sump 6. 7 RI Cahill See VIO 97-85-01 W T33 wit hout loogirvy onto a clearance. as required by approved WW v!O 96-15 01 Failtrre to perform a required TS surveillance for the remote 6, 2 See 1st 96-23 m ($3 shutdown panel Y10 97-03-01 Failure to Nintain control of badge / key card y ($3 VIO 97-07-02 Inadequate planning and controlling of hydrostatic testing 3 RI Cahill y (33 v!O 77-07-06 Inad**ruate corrective action for woe of UPS unit in security e R1 Sanches y asy central alarm station

  • 1r1 94-19-09 Review periodic verification plans - MOV (GL 89-10 ite=1 2 See IR *5-11. IR 95- w (Il 21: see CL 89-10 IF1 95-02-05 Resonance poise in vicinity of MUV-25 7 w (3) 1r1 95-09-03 Emergency Operating Procedure update program 3 See IR 95-16, v10 93- p (31 16-97 1r1 95-11-01 SCBA requirements f or personnel during a tosic gas release 2 y g33 IF1 95-21-02 Modification to the standby feedwater pump recirculation line I w (s)

Ir! 96-03-16 Review of MAR 96-02-09-Of d!P1 flow indicators. Installation 1 y gs3 packa<re and functional test ing results fri 96-04-03 Effect of setpoint calculations on ECP revisions 1 See TIO 91-1. 07 W (Dt Irl 9G-05-06 Large break loss of coolant analysis generie concerns 1 # ($1 IFI 96-06 09' ' Deficiencies in Mecaties fire' barrier progran procederes aod 4>

' IR 94 A15 ; # 3] , y g51; doewmant at ion e c 1T1 96-08-02 Re9ctor building cavity cooling piping thermal relief 1 See D.1. S. CL 96-oS w stn protection .

IF1 96-15-03 Actions taken to rescIve post-accident recriticality concerns 1 WR14 reviewing. generie W tC1 due to localtred boron dilution saw lesse 171 96-18-08 Ade7sacy of licensee s corrective actions for security audit 5 g (33 fandangs 16

Isstrt etSCRitT2cw ARza ymC trAn Ia/sta treswSrs cm yee

^

CLost*mr sTaTtrs sta-- s *

  • ^

231 9P03,02 Continued failure to protect. Safervards infotwiation ' 2 'Stratton: see EA 97-151, VIO' -. W' Al01013)r VfD B401023) (F3 . C* -

, . . , 7 - . . .- .. . . - ,

EEI 97 04 01.-: . Falltri } to sake an Trergency thone Report within the time

~ ,

+" See EA $7-094, VIo ; tr :

r*Talm.t e of to CT7 73.71' Ste1033r tSt.co EKi 97-04-C2 ~ Fa!!ure to 1:and carty a svaracted receg-tinte:israe to the See EA 97-09e. v10' '

3e shift manager for reportability teeiew - Cf01047) (s f ., C+ '

tEI 97-04-03 . Repeat failure to report outside desigts basis conditions See EA 97-094. V10 ' II -

A !O10131 (51,C*

EEI 97-09-02 Failure to update the FSAR to include added EDG trips Schin See EA 97-330 II (3)

EA 97-006 loss of control of a security badge E subsequent f ailure to 2 Stratton See IR 97-03 w (3) immediately report loss & rewwe badw f rom security computer EA 97-012, Failure to have adequate sect.rity procedures reflecting 2 Stratton See ta 94-10 r ($3 VIO Allt security upgrades 01013 (was EEI 96-la-01)

EA 97-012 Fa!!ure to respond to a protected area alare 2 Stratton See IR 94-1s n (S3 VIO At21 01023 (was EE! 94-19-02)

E1.97-012, Failure to assess more than one protected area alare 2 Stratton See TR 94-18 W (3)

VIO At3) 01031 twas EEI 96-18-03)

EA 97-012, Failure to maintain protected area barrier at Circulating 2 St rat ten See IR 94-18 LER 97- N ($3 VIO Att) Water Systee 301. IR 97-01

  • 01043 twas EE! 96-14-04)

, EA 97-012. Inadequate arms repository 2 Stratton See IR 96-18 m (3)

VIO AtS) 831053 twas Ett 96-18 05) a EA i s - 012. Failure to report chaseles to Physical Security Plan per 10 2 Stratten See IR 96-18 W (F)

, VIO D 01063 CFR 50.54 requirements * -

twas EE! 16-10-07)

EA 97-094, Failure to make an emergency phone report within the time 7 RI Cahill w (3)

V!9 Bt01033) requirements of 10 CFR 73.71 (was EEI 97-04-01)

EA *7-094 Failure to hand carry a suspected reportable issue to the 2 R1 Cahill *

. y ($3 VIO C(01C431 shift e.anager for reportability review

  • twas EEI 97-04-02) 17

ll c ISSt/E DESCRIPTION AREA NRC 1.EAD 1R/ STR LICENSEE CCBGESrTS Wet CLCTORE STAPJS STATJS -

EA 97 094 Repeat f ailure to report outside design basis conditions 1, 2 Schin a ts VIO A1401013) twas *EI 97- ,

04-03{

EA >7-161, Continued f ailure to protect Safeguards information 2 Stratton See IR 97-03 W ISI v!O A 01013 ,

VIO B 010' . 3 twas EE1 97-01-02)

MULTI-PLANT ACTIONE MFA #8105: Seismic qualification of equipment. License :'s criteria and 2 FPC walkdown id*d W ($1 CL 87-02 procedures approved. Some issues are pendirig N would be appron. 100 outfiers.

resolved thru audit (scheduled for Mar 973. Licenece's field Staf f had telesvo.e walkdowr results are currently in staff review. discussions on S/16.

Phone surunary doewmented in NRC ltr S/27. FPC comunitted to characterise the outliers for safety significance by JULY.

FPC also comunitted to resolve the outliers or provide a prior to reetart .

MPA 39111 IPE and IPEEE - These are in staf f review. Not a restart 2 m (S)

(IPE): item.

MPANB118 (IPEEE)

Movement of heavy loads over spent fuel pool 2 g gs3 MPA SX602:

tmCB 96-02 - Licensee response in staff review. This would not be a rest a rt isswe.

MPA SL208; Thermolag - Licensee plans to use Mecatiss 2 See In 96-01: IR 96-06 N iS CL 92-06: BU fan alternate material), some reanalysis of APPENDIX R, and 92-01 stwee exemption. Fire barrier tests of Mecaties includir g Ampacity tests are in staf f review. This also may not be rest art issva.

Peactor vessel structural integrity. RAI to 1teensee on 2 y (st MPA# L201:

CL 92-01 Rev 7/22/96. Only a data base issue, not a restart item.

1, Supp 1 4 d

~- -

..r. t . , . , . ,

' N is),

MPA SL604; Boraflear degradation; sLicensee response is just:in. ' Staff ~ , 2} -

.).a -

NRC ltri .- Closed by NR" to FfC 0 letter dated $/1/97 revleu to comumence. This may have to be addrested prior to of -: t- C, CL 96-04' restart because of'sensitleity to soent fuel pool issues.

  • S/1/974 e MOV testing & surveillance. This item is closed with the 2 See Irr 94-18-09 w (g)

MPA  :

CL Si~IO exception of IFI 94-18-09 on periodie verification, which is to be followed up after a new generic conwnunication is issued.

n LICEN'E AMENDMENT /PELIEF REQUESTS RC 1.97 instrumentation - Subcool monitors ete - estegory 2 y (, 3 R.G. 1.97 Instruments chang.. License am-rwtaent may be approved by December.

18

amma mac tuno rs/ssa . 3.rcimisse m e-zsses essentrTrow suns-ctosame sTaras

. ~. .. n w ~ .- .n. , , - -

^

-kilometric ehepptica tb skkow'tsetirry securit[bedges 'cif site? :V .2- futR/WIE - IR .37 11s f . 'e Sammyttehlsoued . N b Ia '

DiometrkesET j ?. ;g;- 7 . ' ' . ', :[.iq.1 ,

5/7/97.-;Implemenced $ gSI. c - 1.

. A urity ' Sta f fj revlew

, a e

i s espected . tou . be complete

- - -  : acon; G. " ~ ~ , Egej (;;, Qa- .

Eh "' +--x  ;-

m w p >. + .~ g g .. . 3 y. p  : 3. y__

.m 9,

- j g .. :n. F O% y . . .

s. s , ..p w 7 0 +" 7 ,

,,<-4 ,.,#, z.

Feliefiregnest:WBC core fleed nossle$ SteffIneeds mc, ore;! mom _ ;2[ N w.- C , [ 93 ^ NAlp~-.i "

s

~

., .aelie b imoued-ca 5 "a .

Core Flood # m ~'- u< ~eM*4 r :a

~

'5/5/97. ' * ' ss),c .

,1eortle - ' Pet will keep aff informada .

OTSG tube testing - Licensee proposed a revised CTSG tube 2 see irIO 96-05-94 y (s3 OT!G Tubes acceptance criteria.

orna rssers n.

..a . -i,,:.~.

. . !. - -- e .y _.;, m s n

  • rv~ + + ~ n n .,

. met 'suut 1tr off , lsh %.j ;

JE Udk ' Refuel-9 e .aub-surface flaw uso;d!doovered! 4Tese A ::w % g.y 'g' ~[1L .c @'..,-TS

((), % 4;, .~tf;j

Pressorizer , ,2 f

-Itcensee' performed better lospection during R19 and'fotund the *  % - <; M& "s ""

7/24/97. tac h M + ' (S),Cf .

Nestle'FlawJ ~..s

-- flew to be;ecceptablei M be new inspection resultsiin reduced' 6; le,._g f sgp m c4 sqpete9 : ' ,

,- ,. 'f*

criam site and consequent 1r acceptanee criteria Jwhleh is1 ,s 2_,_ g# sg . M 4'4' m 43 based on tatio ofifisw to thickneed cipenges.'T stoff review a ~ ~

9-- '% C' " - -

4-

~

- , 1' ,[- . L

' +

/ >

-9

' - '. n* ' - e w r ;- ^ v9 4-M n progre_es.

The licensee did not carry a previously approved exemption 2 y gg3 criticality Monitor from part 70 (79.247) reesirements to Part Se license. Need leoal interpretation of the status of the emenytion.

Sources for issues include: IFS, SIMS, NUREG 1435 (Status of Safety Issues at Licensed Power Plants), Resident's OIL,'PM's OIL '

LIST OF ACRONYMS USED AP Abriormal Oper.e . ig Procedure BWST Borated Water . " age Tank C Closed CA Corrective Action CCHE , Control Complex){abitability Envelope CFR Code of Federal- Rttgulations CR3 D.I. Crystal River 3 Design Item ,

CREVS Control Room Emergency Ventilation System-EA NRC Escalated Enforcement Action EDBD ' Engineering Design Basis Document ECCS Emergency Core Cooling System EEG Emergency Diesel Generator EEI NRC Escalated Enforcement Item

EOP Emergency Operating Procedure -

FSAR Final Safety Analysis Report GL NRC Generic Letter 19

IFI WRC Inspector Followup Item IFS Inspector Followup System .,

ILRT Integrated Leak Rate Test (of the Reactor Building)

IR NRC Inspection Report ~

JCO Justification for Continued Operation - .

LER Licensee Event Report LOCA Loss'of Coolant Accident '

LPI Low Pressure Injection -

LTOP Low Temperature Overpressure Protection MPA NRC Multi-Plant Action MUV Makeup Valve N (D) Not an NRC Restart Item (because the issue is duplicated by a restart item)

N (G) Not an NRC Restart Item (because it is a generic issue affecting multiple operating plants and is being addressed by NRR)

N (I) Not an NRC Restart Item (because previous inspection of the issue is adequate for restart)

N (S) Not an NRC Restart Item (because resolution of the issue is not needed for safe restart)

NOV NRC Notice of Violation NPSH Net Positive Suction Head OCR Operability Condition Report OIL Open Iten. List OP Operating Procedure PM Plant Manager PORV Power Operated Relief Valve PR Problem Report QA Quality Assurance R NRC Restart Item RB Reactor Building RCS Reactor Coolant System RMG Radiation Monitor SBLOCA Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident SFP Spent Fuel Pool d 4 SIMS Safety Issues Management System .

TIA NRC Task Interface Agreement (between NRC offices)'

TS Technical Specifications URI NRC Unresolved Item USQ Unreviewed Safety Question VIO NRC Violation OFFICIAL RECORD COPY DOCUMENT NAME: S:\DRS\ RESTART.CR3\RESTARTN.797 20

CRYSTAL RIVER RESTART TASK CHECKLIST 5tatus at of 7/15/91 TASK MC 0350 RESP. REFERENCE STATUS REF APP A Issue preliminary: notification- B.2 b. RII:

Congressional Notification B.2 g.

Establish Restart F.1nel

8.3 al , RII.LNRR) (11/1'/96? IC ' ,

50681tra t

'Assesstavailable in'formati6n " T B:3 b.~ Panel l7/22/97!3 #

C:.T Develop Case 1Specif1'c Checklisti iB13i f.- .RII NRR4 11/13/960 t Devsl6p Restart Action-Plan' Bl3g: Rll'.INRR; M lCi Regionall dministrato~ridhproves 1 iB.3 Ji. .Rll-T ICU*

W

Restart *Attion: Plan? -

.~ '

'NRRAssociate'DirectoCApproves! B.3)1. lNRR. i9 1 -b 'C[:;/

RestartcAction: Plani Implement Restart Action Plan

e r B.3 j.

(

Ril

~

~

Evaluate'findinds'ofWPP- *

Inspection- LBT471"aL ,PdNEL[" '2/ 5/97k'
  • iCh n

Licensee performs. root cause:S  : B;41 b. . Licensee: 1.a

' analysis t and ' develops 5 corrective -

action plan' ,

l NRCevilUateslicenseefsroot B;4.1 c: Panel' >

C-cause determination'and:-

corrective action ~ plan 1 Review ikensea generated B.4.3 a. Panel 0 restart issues

' Independent 1NRCidentification; 'B A.3 b. Panel. Ci

.ofirestartDitems2(consider'

~

external 4 sources) -

NRC/ Licensee agreement on B.4.3 c. Panel s restart issues Evaluate Licensee's restart B.4.3 d. Ril issues implementation process Evaluate Licensee's B.4.3 e. Ril 0 implementation of verification nrotess Evaluate Licensee's restart B.4.5 a. Rll readiness self-assessment

~

)7

YASK MC 0350 RESP. REFERENCE STATUS REF APP A NRC evaluation of applicable B.4.5 b. Panel items frcai ISSUES section below complete

, Restart .ssues closed B.4.5 c. Panel Conduct NRC csstart readiness B.4.5 c. Ril team inspection Issue augmented restart coverage B.4.5 e. Rll -

inspection plan ,

Comments from other parties B.4.5 f. Panel i considered Re review of Generic Restart B.4.5 h. NRR .'

Checklist complete l Prepare restart authorization B.5 a. Ril & ,

document and basis for restart NRR NRC Restart Panel approves B.5 b. PANEL Restart Authorization No restart objections from other B.5 c NRR. Rll applicable H0 offices PANEL No restart objections from B.5 d Ril &

applicable Federal Agencies NRR Regional Administrator concurs B.5 e. Ril in Restart Authorization NRR Associate Director concurs B.5 f. NRR in Restart Authorization EDO concurs in Restart B=.5 g. NRR Authorization when required Conduct ACRS briefing when B.5 h. NRR requested _

Conduct Commission briefing when B.5 1. Ril & '

requested NRR Commission concurs in Restart B.5 j.

Authorization when required Regional Administrator B.5 k. RII .

authorizes restart ATTACHMENT C I

U

0 TASX MC 0350 RESP. REFERENCE STATUS REF APP A Notify Comission of restart B.6 a. NRR authorization (if Comission did not concur in Restart Authorization)

Notify EDO of restart B.6 b. NRR authorization (if EDO did not c'oncur in Restart Authorization)

Notify Congressional Affairs of B.6 c. NRR ,

restart authorization Notify ACRS of restart B.6 d. NRR i

authorization (a briefing may be substituted)

  • Notify , Applicable Federal B.6 e, agencies of restart authorization -

Notify Public Affairs of restart B.6 f. RIl authorization Notify State and Local officials B.6 9 Ri!

of restart authorization Notify citizens or groups that B.6 h. Ril expressed interest during the restart approval procy s T

T ATTACHMENT C

CRYSTAL RIVER RESTART ISSUES CHECKLIST

$tatut at of 7/ B/97 ISSUE MC 0350 RESP. REFERENCE STATUS REF APP A ASSESSMENT OF ROOT CAUSE IDENTIFICATION AND CORRECTION Conditions requiring shutdown icil.11a n

Panel:, *
C{

gre clearly understood"

~

Rootichuses:of.Oie conditions' !C]1!1b. ' Panel iC:

recuiring' shutdown clearly; D'i ,

.:unt erstood-

Root'causes ofloihsr sigiiifiltanti ElfE c$ SPanell' s  :!C2 problems-clearly /understoodL i :e - L' ' '

EffdctivenesstofJroot cause ' Cr111%

~

Panel :C?

'arialysis prooram E + ~

C '~ >

Thoroughness <of.'correctie iC.1'.3 a,,,

! Panel ,.

JC4 action plan- w

~

~

'Completenessofcorreciive  ;

m- lC'.1.3%; Paneli ;C' saction=plann

~

YontF611offcorfestive action? '

lC.E3lci Panel [ Ci 21 tem.: tracking Effective corrective actions for C.1.3 d. Panel 0 the condition requiring shutdown implemented Effective corrective actions for C.1.3 e. Panel 0 other significant problems implemented Plan Control of long term corrective C.1.3 f. Panel 0 actions Effectiveness of corrective C.1.3 g. Panel 0 action verification process

~

^

iEffec't1venessiof 0A Program 1  :'Cd E4Lai lPanep[ 'Ci tEffectilveness ofLindustry;

' experience review program C.lf6s Panel . :Ct Effectiveness of Licensee's C.I.4 c. Ril 0 independent review groups Effectiveness of deficiency C.1.4 d. Panel 0 reporting system ATTACHMENT B

ISSUE MC 0350 RESP. REFERENCE STATUS REF APP A Staff willingness!to raise; '

C.1' 4 Le'. Panel C-concerns- '

Effectiveness of commitment C.1.4 g. Panel 0 tracking program ExteritaVAuditl(KeplNP0T' s

C.I.4ch! ,

+ "

C

' capability ~

^ ^

ASSESSHENT OF LICENSEE MANAGEMENT EFFECTIVENESS .

Goals / expectation's 'communi cated/

~'Ci2ilfa; LRIl

  • N Cl
tofstatis

' ^

- L '

n . . ,

Demonstrated expectation of C.2.1 b. RII adherence to procedures ,'

Management involvement in self- C.2.1 c. RIl & 0 assessment and independent self- NRR assessment capability

  • l Effectiveness of management C.2.1 d. Ril 0 review committees

^

Managementis@cmo'nstrAtedI ICl2ibe: RIIL -

/d4 l l awarenessiof day-to day': -

operational concerns - -

Management's ability to identify C.2.1 f. Ril & 0 i

and prioritize significant NRR issues Management's ability to C.2.1 g. Ril & 0 coordinate resolution of NRR significant issues Management's ability to C.2.1 h, Ril 0 implement effective corrective actions Impact of any Management C.2.2 a. Rll & , 0 reorganization NRR ,

EffectivenessLand timelyi _ .

.Ci2;2 b. 'Ril l-IR 96 05L ;C:

resolution:ofzemployee concernsi ilR 96 09-: ,

Adequate engineering support as C.2.2 c. Panel demonstrated by timely resolution of issues -

ATTACHMENT B

ISSUE MC 0350 RESP. REFERENCE STATUS REF APP A Adequate plant administrative C.2.2 d. R!l 0 procedures -

Engineer'ing/ Licensing Effective information: exchange C.2.2 e: Ril ,

C with other: utilities ASSESSHENT OF PLANT AND CORPORATE STAFF EFFECTIVENESS LDemonstrated!comitmentJto> ' C . 3 '.1 X a . -

. RII . & . CJ C*

achieving improved performance: .NRR1 "

DemonstrateUsifety'i ~'

.C.3.1 b. . Panel- C; m consciousness-~ i l Understanding of management's C.3.1 c. Panel O'

/xpectations and goals Understanding of plant issues C.3.1 d. Panel .

O and corrective actions Qualifications and training of C.3.1 e. Ril 0 staff Attentiveness to duty C.3.1 g. Ril 0 Level of attention to detail C.3.1 h. Ril & 0

NRR Staff overtime usage C.3.1 j. RIl 0 Procedure usage / adherence C.3.1 k. Ril 0 Awareness of plant security C.3.1 1. Ril 0 Licensed operator staffing meets C.3.3 a. RII O requirements and licensee goals Level of formality in control C.3.3 b. Ril 0 room Effectiveness of control room C.3.3 c. Ril v. O simulator training
  • Control room / plant operator C 3.3 d. Ril 0 awareness of equipment status Adequacy of plant operating C.3.3 e. R!l 0 procedures Procedure usage / adherence C.3.3 f. Ril 0 Log keeping practices C.3.3 g. RIl 0 ATTACHMENT B

ISSUE MC 0350 RESP. REFERENCE STATUS REF APP A

_ ASSESSMENT OF PHYSICAL READINESS OF PLANT Operability of technical C4a. Ril specification systems Operability of required C.4 b. Rll

. secondary and support systems Results of pre startup testing C.4 c. R11 .'

Adequacy of system lineups C.4 d. Ril Adequacy of Surveillance C.4 e. Ril tests / test program '

Significant hardware issues C.4 f. Ril l resolve ~d (i.e. damaged equipment, equipment ageing,

  • modifications)

Effectiveness of the plant C.4 h. Ril maintenance program Maintenance backlog managed and C41. Ril impact on operation assessed Adequacy of plant housekeeping C.4j. RIl and equipment storage ASSESSHENT OF COMPLIANCE WITH REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS Applicable license amendments C.5 a. NRR have been issued Applicable exemptions have been C.5 b. NRR granted Applicable reliefs have been C.5 c. NRR granted Significant enforcement issues C.5 f. RIl & [

have been resolved NRR Allegations have been C.5 g. Ril appropriately addressed 10 ? C fR ! 21206fpetitiop.s ihajs])_een Cs h NRR NAlJull appropriately < addressed 15097 COORDINATION WITH INTERESTED AGENCIES AND PARTIES ATTACHMENT B w

4 ISSUE MC 0350 RESP. REFERENCE STATUS '

REf APP A Federal emergency Management C.6 a. Ril &

Agency NRR Appropriate Sate and local C.6 e. Ril officials Appropriate public interest C.6 f. RIl &

groups NRR Local news media C.6 g. Ril y 4

e I

i i

t f

4 s

f 4

'1 ATTACHMENT B e ,ye-y-

- - ,g-y---v - w - y- y ^ +N=*

CRYSTAL RIVER REST?.RT TASK CHECKLIST synner msm TASK MC 0350 RESP. REFERENCE STATUS REF APP A dssue'preliminaryinotifibation BI2?b :RII?

  • C Congressional Notification B.2 g.

.!EstablistiiResi;artiPaneN lBiais 3yy IRIE: NRR$ i11/1/962

- IC %

k

, 4 SDEclts

, s . . . . . . - .

_ m .

' Assess 0dvhilablelinformationt lBd!dl

  • iPanel! ?7/22/973 ~ ?CS fDevelbpf Case Specificichicklists iBi3@

E RIIONRRi lid 13/96b :Cs .

00eselople5tahCAcdon . . Plant: ~

iBT3bb !RI$fNRO s !CW,~

'Dd i

RegionihAdsinisOht0r[ppfoVesh BN@d.)
! RIM .,'

' Restart? Action Plani m + " ' ~ '

'Mm

$ NRRfAss6 cine!Di rector @p" roves!  :.B23ii;

- ~ [NRf@ ' .' ,

ICY

' Restart = Action' Plan, '

Implement Restart Action Plan B.3 j. RII

n. n . .. .. . r... .. -. ~ -

lEValuatetfilidingsRot?IPAMO , ~

N4INai ;PANEG. ,

!2/12/974 iC{

?Inspectioni C

~

~

~ ' " u - ~<'~~ .

v ~~ ., . w ~ .. n .~ w n iLicensee; performs"irooty isc4use n 1 "4 m b!< ~ iLicehseel

' /C4 analisis.r and idsvel Qsicorrecti ve? .

  1. actiontplan? ' ~ "

W

~

~

NRCsevaNatesMicense'efsiro0EI fBN1st /Pandf iCI stauseidetermination and ' '

o TcorrectiveractionJplan. e '

Review licensee generated B.4.3 a. Panel 0 restart issues ~~

~

. . s :.

...f... e1 -.....t <

. . . ......v .,

91ndependen tsNRC: identi fi cati on t :B 4!3 Fbi (Pane 6 x , 10!

5ofMestart) items :(considerf + .

N; Te'xternaldsources)' >

NRC/ Licensee agreement on B.4.3 c. Panel [

restart issues Evaluate Licensee's re; tart B.4.3 d. RII issues implementition process Evaluate Licensee's B.4.3 e. RII O impiementation of verification process Evaluate Licensee's restart B.4.5 a. Rll readiness self-assessment .

ATTACHMENT C

TASK MC 0350 RESP. REFERENCE STATUS REF APP A NRC evaluation of applicable B.4.5 b. Panel items from ISSUES section below complete .

Restart issues closed B.4.5 c. Panel

. Conduct NRC restart readiness B.4.5 d. RII team inspection issueaugmentedrestartcoverage B.4.5 e. RII .

inspection plan -

Conrnents from other parties B.4.5 f. Panel considered

. Re-review of Generic Restart B.4.5 h. NRR ,' I l Checklist complete _

Prepare restart authorization B 5 a. RII &

  • document and basis for restart NRR NRC Restart Panel approves B.5 b. PANEL Restart Authorization No restart objections from other B.5 c NRR. RII applicable HQ offices PANEL No restart objections from B.5 d RII &

applicable Federal Agencies NRR Regional Administrator concurs B.5 e. RII in Restart Authorization NRR Associate Director concurs B.5 f. NRR in Restart Authorization EDO concurs in Restart B.5 g. NRR Authorization when required Conduct ACRS briefing when B.5 h. NRR requested

Conduct Commission briefing when 8.5 i . RII & E requested NRR

$ Commission concurs in Restart B5j.

Authorization when reouired I B .5 k. RII Regionai Administrator authorizes restart ATTACHMENT C 1 i

u.

TASK MC 0350 RESP. REFERENCE STATUS REF APP A Notify Commission of restart B.6 a. NRR authorization (if Commission did  !

not c';ncur in Restart i Aut'.arization) j k .<otify ED0 of restart

~

B.6 b. NRR l authorization (if ED0 did not l c6ncur in Restart Authorization)

Notify Congressional Affairs of B.6 c. NRR "

restart authorization Notify ACRS of restart B.6 d. NRR authorization (a briefing may be substituted) -

Notify Applicable Federal B.6 e.

agencies of restart authorization -

Notify Public Affairs of restart B.6 f. RII authorizaticn Notify State and Local of ficials B.6 g. RII cf restart authorization Notify citizens or groups that B.6 h. RII 1

expressed interest during the restart approval process t

t 4

j t

4 ATTACHMENT C 4

4