ML20202E973
| ML20202E973 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | LaSalle  |
| Issue date: | 04/07/1986 |
| From: | Danielson D, Yin I NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20202E954 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-373-86-10, NUDOCS 8604140082 | |
| Download: ML20202E973 (11) | |
See also: IR 05000373/1986010
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
r.-
Report No. 50-373/86010(DRS)
Docket No. 50-373
License No. NPF-11
Licensee: Comonwealth Edison Company
P.O. Box 767
,
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Chicago, IL 60690
Facility Narre: LaSalle County Station, Unit 1
2
Inspection At: LaSalle Site, Marseilles, IL
USNRC Region III, Glen Ellyn, IL (RIII)
Sargent and Lundy Engineers (S&L)
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Inspection Conducted: March 6-7 and 11-12, 1986, at the site
March 17,1986, at RIII
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March 26-27, 1986, at S&L
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Inspector:
I. T. Yin
Date' /
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Approved By:
D. H. Danielson, Chief
M/7//2
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Materials and Processes Section
Date'
1
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Inspection Sumary
Inspection on March _6 throu.gh _27,1986_jR_ep~ ort No. 5_0_-373/pB6,010jDRP))
R
Areas Inspected: Special announced inspection of inservice inspection and
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functional testing of safety-related snubbers and licensee actions in response
to previous inspection findings and a 50.55(e) deficiency report.
Results: No violations or daviations were identified.
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8604140082 860407
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ADOCK 05000373
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DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
CommonwealthEdisonCompan,yjCECo]
T. A. Hammerich, Technical Staff, Compliance
G. J. Diederich, Station Manager
- D. R. Szumski, Technical Staff, Snubber Test Coordinator
D. S. Berkman, Assistant Superintendent, Technical Services
- R. D. Bishop, Services Superintendent
R. L. Scott, SNED Engineer
B. M. K. Wong, SNED Engineer
- R. M. Jeisy, QA Supervisor
- J. Merwin, Staff Assistant, Maintenance
- J. G. Marshall, Director of QA, Operations
'C. M. Allen, Nuclear License Administrator
- L. F. Gerner, Regulatory Assurance Superintendent
- H. L. Massin, SNED Engineer
- H. S. Turbak, Licensing Director, Operating Plants
- K. L. Graesser, Division Vice President
- D. L. Farrar, Nuclear Licensing Director
+J. T. Fox, R chanical Engineer
Sargent and Lundy Engineers (SEL)
+*R. h. Pollock, Project Manager
- G. T. Kitz, Head, Engineering Mechanics Division
+R. B. Johnson, QA Coordinator
S. M. Kazmi, Supervising Design Engineer
+R. J. Janowiak, Structural Project Engineer
+S. A. Gibraiel, EMD Engineer
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+W. U. Choudhury, Mechanical Project Engineer
+A. Morcos, Assistant Head, QA Division
+H. G. S. McCullyh, Project QA Coordinator
US NRC
- C, J. Paperiello, Director, Division of Reactor Safety, RIII
- J. J. Harrison, Chief, Engineering Branch, RIII
- D. H. Danielson, Chief, Materials and Processes Section, RIII
- R. W. DeFayette, Project Manager, RIII
- J. A. Gavula, Mechanical Engineer, RIII
- I
T. Yin, Senior Mechanical Engineer, RIII
- R. J. Kiessel, IE-EGCB Staff
- H. K. Shaw, N"R-BWREB Staff
M. J. Jordan, Senior Resident Inspector, RIII
- Denotes those attending the management meeting at RIII on March 17,
1986.
+ Denotes those attending the exit meeting at S8L on March 27, 1986.
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2.
Licensee Action on Previous Idt.ntified Items
(Closed) Unresolved Item (373/82-11-08): The S&L system analysis
a.
criteria for separating header and branch connections was based on a
moment of inertia ratio of seven or more. Questions were raised
relative to branch connections that were close to equipment nozzles,
and possible restraint design load increases of more than 10%. The
NRC inspector reviewed the S&L Report EMD-035739, " Evaluation of the
Effects of Branch Lines on the Header Restraint System for LaSalle
County Unit 1," Revision 0, dated April 30, 1982, and considered the
matter resolved.
b.
(Closed) Open Item (373/82-11-09): Potential weaknesses in pipe
snubber design control were identified. S&L upgraded its program
to include:
Snubber selection criteria are included in S&L EMD-TP-1 "EMD
Lesson Plan For Training Personnel in Piping Analysis," Volume 1,
Revision 6, dated April 27, 1985.
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The frequency of S&L engineering site visits and meetings to
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provide as-built reviews and evaluations has been increased.
A comprehensive piping analysis hardware optimization evaluation
and snubber reduction program has been implemented.
The NRC inspector reviewed the pertinent records and considered
the issue resolved.
c.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (373/82-15-01): A number of snubbers were
installed close to rigid restiaints. This could affect the operability
of these snubbers because of restricted lockup motion. To date, more
than 1000 snubbers were either deleted or replaced by rigid restraints.
The NRC inspector reviewed some of the ECNs and "Addendums to Piping
Stress Reports" generated for the snubber optimization effort and had
no adverse comments. Revised snubber selection criteria are documented
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in S&L report EMD-035454, " Snubber Lock-Up Evaluation Report for
LaSalle Units 1 and 2," Revision 0, dated April 1, 1982. The NRC
inspector also reviewed these criteria and considered them acceptable.
d.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (373/82-31-01): Extra conservative system
temperatures were used in some of the piping stress analyses. The
number of snubbers could possibly be reduced if the actual design
temperatures were applied. The NRC inspector reviewed an S&L letter
to CECO " Thermal Mode Review - Snubber Reduction," dated July 25,
1983, and considered the matter resolved.
e.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (373/82-31-02): The NRC inspector requested
CECO provide a copy of the energy absorbing material (EAM) design
specification and qualification test data for his review. A followup
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review was conducted at Byron Station during construction. See RIII
Inspection Report No. 50-454/84-51; 50-455/84-35 for details.
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(Closed) Violation (373/82-47-01): The QA pro
the installation of pipe whip restraints (WRs) gram measures for
f.
were not adequate.
The NRC inspector reviewed the enclosure to the CECO response letter
to RIII, dated May 4, 1983, " Response to Inspection Report 50-373/82-47,
Item of Noncompliance, No.1," and considered it acceptable. The NRC
inspector also reviewed the following procedures and found them
acceptable:
Morrison Construction Company Standard Operating Procedure, PC-16,
" Erection of Supports - Restraints and Final Installation Verifica-
tion," Revision 10, dated October 1982.
CECO LSQP 3-2, "As-Built Data Gathering Interface Control,"
Revision 0, dated December 31, 1982.
g.
(Closed) Violation (373/82-47-02): The FCR system was used to
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document and resolve WR installation nonconformances.
The NRC
inspector reviewed the enclosure to the CECO response letter to RIII,
dated May 4, 1983, " Response to Inspection Report 50-373/82-47, Item
of Noncompliance, No.
2," and considered it acceptable. The NRC
inspector also reviewed the site procedure developed as a part of the
corrective action (LSQP 3-2, "As-Built Data Gathering Interface
Control," Revision 0, dated December 31,1982) and had no adverse
coments.
h.
(Closed) Unresolved Itcm (373/82-47-03): Followup on the disposition
of QA audit findings in the area of WR installation. The NRC inspector
reviewed CECO Audit Report No.1-82-54, " Whip Restraint Installation,"
Revision 1, dated September 13, 1982 including "LaSalle QA Followup
Surveillance" reports. Audit findings were closed from February to
November 1983.
CECO QA actions to resolve WR installation deficiencies
were considered adequate,
i.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (373-82-47-04): Questionable S&L design of
WRs utilizing EAM. A generic design review for Byron, Braidwood, and
LaSalle EAM installations was conducted by the RIII and NRC-NRR
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staff. All issues were resolved. See RIII Inspection Report No.
50-454/84-51; 50-455/84-35 for details.
j.
(Closed) Violation (373/82-47-05): CECO failed to implement some of
the requirements contained in the " Hot Line Walk Inspection Procedure."
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The NRC inspector reviewed the enclosure to the Ceco response letter
to RIII, dated May 4, 1983, " Response to Inspection Report No.
,
50-373/82-47, " Item of Noncompliance, No. 3," and considered it
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acceptable. The NRC inspector also reviewed the following licensee
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corrective actinn documents.
CECO letter to RIII, "LaSalle County Unit 1 Pipe Whip Restraints,"
dated January 18, 1983.
S&L report EMD-039304, " Verification of Pipe Whip Restraint Hot
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Gaps," Revision 1, dated March 23, 1983.
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S&L letter to CECO, " Unit 1 Pipe Whip Restraints," dated April 6,
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1983.
S&L letter to CECO, " Unit 1 Pipe Whip Restraints," dated April 12,
1983.
k.
(Closed)UnresolvedItem(373/82-47-06): Due to design configura-
tion, several WRs could not be radiographed or ultrasonicly examined
in accordance with the S&L specification requirements. From a total
of 145 WRs, 33 (51 reported previously) did not satisfy the specifica-
tion requirements. A review of the records identified that of a
total of 919 full penetration welds, 804 welds passed either RT or
UT, and the remaining 115 welds passed a visual examination. This
matter is considered resolved.
3.
Licensee Action on 50.55_(_ellt_ epi _s_
(Closed) 50.55(e) Item (373/82-03-EE):
On February 9, 1982 the licensee
reported to RIII that due to a deficiency in design, approximately 113
snubbers in LaSalle Unit 1 might not lockup due to close proximity to
rigid restraints. Corre-tive actions were documented and a report was
sent from CECO to RIII in a letter, "LaSalle County Station Units 1 and 2
Mechanical Snubbers in Close Proximity to Rigid Restraints 10 CFR 50.55(e)
Final Report No. 82-03," dated March 10, 1982. RIII review of this item
is documented in paragraphs 2.b. 2.c and 2.d above. This item is considered
closed.
4.
Snubber Visual Inspec_tjon and Functional Testing
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The NRC inspector performed followup inspections on' safety-related large
bore (L/B) and small bore (S/B) snubber visual inspections and functional
testing performed by the licensee in accordance with the plant Technical
Specification (TS). L/B snubbers are Pacific Scientific Pacific Shock
Absorber (PSA) sizes 1 to 100. S/B snubbers are PSA sizes 1/4 to 1/2.
a.
Review of Procedures
The NRC inspector reviewed the following procedures and supporting
dccuments, and had no adverse comments:
LMP-H0-01, Removal and Installation of Pacific Scientific
Mechanical Snubbers," Revision 1, dated August 28, 1985.
LTS-500.14, " Mechanical Snubber Functional Testing Contractor
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Assisted," Revision 1, dated October 16, 1985.
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SNED Manager letter to LSCS Plant Manager, " Acceptance Criteria
.for Snubber Functional Test AIR-373-251-85-00053," dated
Ncvember 26, 1985.
S&L EMD Report No. 055187, "LaSalle Snubber Testing Criteria,"
Revision 00, dated November 25, 1985.
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b.
Snubber Failures and Probable Cause
There are 850 L/B snubbers and 401 S/B snubbers included in the
LaSalle Unit 1 TS. As of March 11, 1986, of the 260 L/B snubbers
that have been functionally tested, 10 did not meet the test accep-
tance criteria and of 374 S/B snubbers that have been functionally
tested, 51 did not meet the test acceptance criteria. The nature
and the probable cause of the failures are as follows:
TABLE 1
L/B Snubbers
Snubber No.
System
Failure
Probable Cause*
HP02-1507S
Weld slag caused
1
(PSA-3)
internal binding
RI24-1120S
Defect in thrust bearing
2
(PSA-10)
RH53-15125
RHR-(C)
Bent screw shaft
2, 4
(PSA-10)
HP08-1024S
Scored inner tube caused
2
(PSA-10)
by high vibration
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RH13-11545
RHR-(B)
Sediment and weld splatter
3
(PSA-35)
fcund in internals
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LP02-1059S
Cracked thrust bearing
1, 2
(PSA-3)
RH03-10475
RHR-(A)
Slightly bent screw shaft;
2
(PSA-3)
thrust bearing pulled apart
LP02-10545
Thrust bearing cracked; bent
2
(PSA-1)
screw shaft with ball
in'pressions
RH40-1572S
RHR-(A)
Internals destroyed
2
(PSA-3)
RH40-1042S
RHR-(A)
Bent screw shaft; dislocated
2
(PSA-10)
thrust bearing
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TABLE 2-
S/B Snubbers
Probable
Snubber No.
System
_ Failure
Cause*
MSC6-10165
MSIV instrument
Tape residue on inner
1
(PSA-1/4)
tube
NB15-1002S
"9ssel head vent
Twisted internal
1
(PSA-1/2)
MS14-1048S
MS drain
Bent inner tube
1
(PSA-1/4)
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HP20-1402S
HPCS pump relief
Overloaded in
2
(PSA-1/4)
compression
NB13-1002S
Vessel head vent
Bent torque carrier
1
(PSA-1/4)
FW11-1003S
Reactor water
Dirt and debris
1, 3
(PSA-1/2)
clean up to FW
MS14-1050S
MS drain
Tape residue on inner
1
(PSA-1/4)
tube
LP20-10285
LPCS water relief Overloaded in
2
(PSA-1/2)
compressian
LP20-10305
LPCS water relief Overloaded in
2
(PSA-1/2)
compression
RHB4-10085
RHR shutdown
Overloaded in
2
(PSA-1/4)
cooling valve
compression
bypass
RHB4-10115
RHR shutdown
Overload in
2, 3
(PSA-1/4)
cooling valve
compression;
bypass
lubricant dried up
HSC6-1005S
MSIV instrument
Bent inner tube;
3
(PSA-1/4)
external damage
NB11-1003S
Vessel instrument Tape residue on inner
1
(PSA-1/4)
tube
FRH-1207-H095
RHR instrument
Bent inner tube
1
(PSA-1/4)
1
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3
M1302-24-103
Recirc. pump seal
Lubricant dried up
3
(PSA-1/4)
injection
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LC01-1005S
MSIV leakage
Internal spring
1
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(PSA-1/2)
control
dislocated
FRH-1213-H025
RHR instrument
Slight bow in screw
1, 2
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(PSA-1/4)
shaft
RR17-1004S
Recirc. drain
Overloaded in
2
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(PSA-1/4)
compression
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M-1302-23-140
MSIV instrument
Overloaded in
1, 2
(PSA-1/4)
compression
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M-1302-24-149
Recirc. pump
Lubricant dried up
3
(PSA-1/4)
seal injection-
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M-1302-24-151
Recirc. pump
External damage
1, 2 -
(PSA-1/4)
seal injection
caused internal rubbing
RR17-1003S
Recirc. drain
Dirt and debris
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(PSA-1/4)
RR17-10075
Recirc. drain
Tape residue on inner
1, 3
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(PSA-1/4)
tube; corrosion
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M-1302-24-148
Recirc. pump seal Overloaded in
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(PSA-1/4)
injection
compression; corrosion
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FRH-1209-H03S
RHR instrument
Tape residue on inner
1
)
(PSA-1/4)
tube
LC09-10315
MSIV leakage
Dirt
1, 3
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(PSA-1/4)
control
M-1302-36-154
RCIC instrument
Corrosion'
3
(PSA-1/4)
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1
RR17-1005S
Recirc. drain
Corrosion; weld slag
1, 3
(PSA-1/2)
on inner tube
RHB4-10075
RHR shutdown
Overloaded in compression; 3
(PSA-1/4)
cooling valve
lubricant dried up
bypass
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RR17-10085
Recirc. drain
Dirt
1, 3
4
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(PSA-1/4)
RH52-H09S
RHR instrument
Overloaded in
2
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(PSA-1/4)
compression
1
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1
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LC01-1058S
MSIV leakage
Loosened. capstan spring
4
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(PSA-1/4)
control
MS10-10135-
MSIV instrument
Corrosion
3-
(PSA-1/4)
LC01-10515
MSIV leakage
Twisted internals
1
(PSA-1/4)
control
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RR69-H095
Recirc. drain
Corrosion
3
(PSA-1/4)
RIO9-1008S
RCIC steam drain
Twisted internals
1
(PSA-1/4)
RIO9-1026S
RCIC steam drain
Overloaded in
1
(PSA-1/4)
compression; internal
spring dislocation
RIO9-1005S
RCIC steam drain
Twisted internals
1
(PSA-1/4)
RH23-H075
RHR instrument
Dirt and debris
1, 3
(PSA-1/4)
MS50-H025
MSIV instrument
Slight bend in head
2
(PSA-1/4)
screw shaft
RT33-H105
Reactor water
Dirt and corrosion
3
(PSA-1/4)
cleanup
RH25-H04S
RHR valve
Corrosion; wear due to
2, 3
(PSA-1/4)
leakoff
vibration
RH25-H03S
RHR valve
Overloaded in
2, 3
(PSA-1/4)
leakoff
compression; corrosion
RH25-H06S
RHR valve
Overload in
2
(PSA-1/4)
leakoff
compression
M-1302-28-84
RHR instrument
Twisted internal
1
(PSA-1/4)
M-1302-22-110
RHR instrument
Corrosion
3
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(PSA-1/4)
M-1302-28-76
RHR instrunent
Dirt
3
(PSA-1/4)
M-1302-22-102
HPCS instrument
Corrosion
3
(PSA-1/4)
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M-1302-28-74
RHR instrument
Ofrt and corrosion
3
(PSA-1/4)
M-1302-30-52
RHR instrument
Corrosion
3
(PSA-1/4)
M-1302-21-40
RHR instrument
Internals rub due to
3
(PSA-1/4)
external damage
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Tables 1 and 2 - Probable Cause of F_ai_ lure
1.
Improper handling or installation during construction.
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2.
Damage that could result from:
(a)systemdynamic
transient loads, (b) a high magnitude of line . vibration,
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and (c) steady state line vibration.
3.
Inadvertent damage such as water / chemicals spraying on
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the snubber; or placement of the snubber in an adverse
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environment such as exposure to high temperature.
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4.
Menufacturing defect or mishandling during manufacturing,
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c.
Meetin.g_with CECO at the Region III Office
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RIII management ret with CECO representatives at RIII on March 17,
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1986 to discuss the snubber functional testing failures and CECO
alternatives and courses of action. Matters discussed included: (1)
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number of snubber test failures, (2) causes of test failures, (3)
status of system operebility evaluations, (4) future preventative
actions,and(5)impactonUnit2.
At the conclusion of the reeeting, the RIII staff indicated that:
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(1) Consideration should be given to functional testing of all L/B
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and S/B safety-related scubbers in LaSalle Unit 1.
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(2) Priority should be given to functional testing of the RHR Loop A
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and Loop B snubbers.
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(3) A formal inspection should be performed for the RHR Loop A and-
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Loop B piping systems.
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(4) Operability evaluations and aralyses performed for the RHR
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systems should be completed on an expeditious basis.
(5) Removal of the Unit 2 RHR system snubbers for furctional testing
is acceptable provided no more than two snubbers are removed
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at any one time.
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(6) Region III would conduct further reviews into the Ceco statement
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that some snubbers could have been damaged during maintenance
work in the vicinity of the snubber after the IEB 81-01 required
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inspections. This is an Unresolved Item (373/86010-01).
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The CECO representative stated that RHR snubber testing and
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evaluations should be completed before the'end of April 1986.
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5.
Unresolved Items
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An unresolved item is a matter about which more information is required
in order to ascertain whether it is an acceptable item, an open item, a
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deviation, or a violation. One unresolved item disclosed during this
inspection is discussed in Paragraph 4.c.(6).
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6.
Exit Interview
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The NRC inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)
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at the conclusion of the inspection. The inspector summarized the scope and
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findings of the inspection. The inspector also discussed the likely
informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents
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reviewed by the inspector during he inspection. The licensee representatives
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did not identify any such documents as proprietary.
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