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Insp Rept 50-373/86-10 on 860306-27.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Inservice Insp & Functional Testing of safety-related Snubbers & Licensee Actions in Response to 10CFR50.55(e) Deficiency Rept
	ML20202E973
Person / Time
Site:	LaSalle
Issue date:	04/07/1986
From:	Danielson D, Yin I; NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:	;
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ML20202E954	List: ML20202E951; ML20202E973;
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	50-373-86-10, NUDOCS 8604140082
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

r.-

Report No. 50-373/86010(DRS)

Docket No. 50-373 License No. NPF-11

Licensee: Comonwealth Edison Company

, P.O. Box 767

l' Chicago, IL 60690

Facility Narre: LaSalle County Station, Unit 1

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Inspection At: LaSalle Site, Marseilles, IL

USNRC Region III, Glen Ellyn, IL (RIII)

Sargent and Lundy Engineers (S&L)

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Inspection Conducted: March 6-7 and 11-12, 1986, at the site

March 17,1986, at RIII *

i March 26-27, 1986, at S&L

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Inspector: I. T. Yin /

Date' /

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Approved By: D. H. Danielson, Chief M/7//2

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Materials and Processes Section Date'

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Inspection Sumary

Inspection on March _6 throu.gh _27,1986_jR_ep~ ort No. 5_0_-373/pB6,010jDRP)) R

Areas Inspected: Special announced inspection of inservice inspection and

. functional testing of safety-related snubbers and licensee actions in response

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to previous inspection findings and a 50.55(e) deficiency report.

Results: No violations or daviations were identified.

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8604140082 860407

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PDR ADOCK 05000373

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DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

CommonwealthEdisonCompan,yjCECo]

T. A. Hammerich, Technical Staff, Compliance

G. J. Diederich, Station Manager

D. R. Szumski, Technical Staff, Snubber Test Coordinator

D. S. Berkman, Assistant Superintendent, Technical Services

R. D. Bishop, Services Superintendent

R. L. Scott, SNED Engineer

B. M. K. Wong, SNED Engineer

R. M. Jeisy, QA Supervisor

J. Merwin, Staff Assistant, Maintenance

J. G. Marshall, Director of QA, Operations

'C. M. Allen, Nuclear License Administrator

L. F. Gerner, Regulatory Assurance Superintendent

H. L. Massin, SNED Engineer

H. S. Turbak, Licensing Director, Operating Plants

K. L. Graesser, Division Vice President

D. L. Farrar, Nuclear Licensing Director

+J. T. Fox, R chanical Engineer

Sargent and Lundy Engineers (SEL)

+*R. h. Pollock, Project Manager

G. T. Kitz, Head, Engineering Mechanics Division

+R. B. Johnson, QA Coordinator

S. M. Kazmi, Supervising Design Engineer

+R. J. Janowiak, Structural Project Engineer

i +S. A. Gibraiel, EMD Engineer

+W. U. Choudhury, Mechanical Project Engineer

+A. Morcos, Assistant Head, QA Division

+H. G. S. McCullyh, Project QA Coordinator

US NRC

C, J. Paperiello, Director, Division of Reactor Safety, RIII

J. J. Harrison, Chief, Engineering Branch, RIII

D. H. Danielson, Chief, Materials and Processes Section, RIII

R. W. DeFayette, Project Manager, RIII

J. A. Gavula, Mechanical Engineer, RIII

I T. Yin, Senior Mechanical Engineer, RIII

R. J. Kiessel, IE-EGCB Staff

H. K. Shaw, N"R-BWREB Staff

M. J. Jordan, Senior Resident Inspector, RIII

Denotes those attending the management meeting at RIII on March 17,

1986.

+ Denotes those attending the exit meeting at S8L on March 27, 1986.

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2. Licensee Action on Previous Idt.ntified Items

a. (Closed) Unresolved Item (373/82-11-08): The S&L system analysis

criteria for separating header and branch connections was based on a

moment of inertia ratio of seven or more. Questions were raised

relative to branch connections that were close to equipment nozzles,

and possible restraint design load increases of more than 10%. The

NRC inspector reviewed the S&L Report EMD-035739, " Evaluation of the

Effects of Branch Lines on the Header Restraint System for LaSalle

County Unit 1," Revision 0, dated April 30, 1982, and considered the

matter resolved.

b. (Closed) Open Item (373/82-11-09): Potential weaknesses in pipe ;

snubber design control were identified. S&L upgraded its program

to include:

Snubber selection criteria are included in S&L EMD-TP-1 "EMD

Lesson Plan For Training Personnel in Piping Analysis," Volume 1,

Revision 6, dated April 27, 1985. ,

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The frequency of S&L engineering site visits and meetings to l

provide as-built reviews and evaluations has been increased. l

A comprehensive piping analysis hardware optimization evaluation

and snubber reduction program has been implemented.

The NRC inspector reviewed the pertinent records and considered

the issue resolved.

c. (Closed) Unresolved Item (373/82-15-01): A number of snubbers were

installed close to rigid restiaints. This could affect the operability

of these snubbers because of restricted lockup motion. To date, more

than 1000 snubbers were either deleted or replaced by rigid restraints.

The NRC inspector reviewed some of the ECNs and "Addendums to Piping

Stress Reports" generated for the snubber optimization effort and had

no adverse comments. Revised snubber selection criteria are documented

! in S&L report EMD-035454, " Snubber Lock-Up Evaluation Report for

LaSalle Units 1 and 2," Revision 0, dated April 1, 1982. The NRC

inspector also reviewed these criteria and considered them acceptable.

d. (Closed) Unresolved Item (373/82-31-01): Extra conservative system

temperatures were used in some of the piping stress analyses. The

number of snubbers could possibly be reduced if the actual design

temperatures were applied. The NRC inspector reviewed an S&L letter

to CECO " Thermal Mode Review - Snubber Reduction," dated July 25,

1983, and considered the matter resolved.

e. (Closed) Unresolved Item (373/82-31-02): The NRC inspector requested

CECO provide a copy of the energy absorbing material (EAM) design

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specification and qualification test data for his review. A followup

review was conducted at Byron Station during construction. See RIII

Inspection Report No. 50-454/84-51; 50-455/84-35 for details.

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f. (Closed) Violation (373/82-47-01): The QA pro

the installation of pipe whip restraints (WRs)were gram notmeasures

adequate. for

The NRC inspector reviewed the enclosure to the CECO response letter

to RIII, dated May 4, 1983, " Response to Inspection Report 50-373/82-47,

Item of Noncompliance, No.1," and considered it acceptable. The NRC

inspector also reviewed the following procedures and found them

acceptable:

Morrison Construction Company Standard Operating Procedure, PC-16,

" Erection of Supports - Restraints and Final Installation Verifica-

tion," Revision 10, dated October 1982.

CECO LSQP 3-2, "As-Built Data Gathering Interface Control,"

Revision 0, dated December 31, 1982.

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g. (Closed) Violation (373/82-47-02): The FCR system was used to

document and resolve WR installation nonconformances. The NRC

inspector reviewed the enclosure to the CECO response letter to RIII,

dated May 4, 1983, " Response to Inspection Report 50-373/82-47, Item

of Noncompliance, No. 2," and considered it acceptable. The NRC

inspector also reviewed the site procedure developed as a part of the

corrective action (LSQP 3-2, "As-Built Data Gathering Interface

Control," Revision 0, dated December 31,1982) and had no adverse

coments.

h. (Closed) Unresolved Itcm (373/82-47-03): Followup on the disposition

of QA audit findings in the area of WR installation. The NRC inspector

reviewed CECO Audit Report No.1-82-54, " Whip Restraint Installation,"

Revision 1, dated September 13, 1982 including "LaSalle QA Followup

Surveillance" reports. Audit findings were closed from February to

November 1983. CECO QA actions to resolve WR installation deficiencies

were considered adequate,

i. (Closed) Unresolved Item (373-82-47-04): Questionable S&L design of

WRs utilizing EAM. A generic design review for Byron, Braidwood, and i

LaSalle EAM installations was conducted by the RIII and NRC-NRR )

staff. All issues were resolved. See RIII Inspection Report No.

50-454/84-51; 50-455/84-35 for details.

j. (Closed) Violation (373/82-47-05): CECO failed to implement some of

the requirements contained in the " Hot Line Walk Inspection Procedure." -

The NRC inspector reviewed the enclosure to the Ceco response letter

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to RIII, dated May 4, 1983, " Response to Inspection Report No.

> 50-373/82-47, " Item of Noncompliance, No. 3," and considered it

acceptable. The NRC inspector also reviewed the following licensee i

corrective actinn documents. !

CECO letter to RIII, "LaSalle County Unit 1 Pipe Whip Restraints,"

dated January 18, 1983.

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S&L report EMD-039304, " Verification of Pipe Whip Restraint Hot

Gaps," Revision 1, dated March 23, 1983.

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" S&L letter to CECO, " Unit 1 Pipe Whip Restraints," dated April 6,

1983.

S&L letter to CECO, " Unit 1 Pipe Whip Restraints," dated April 12,

1983.

k. (Closed)UnresolvedItem(373/82-47-06): Due to design configura-

tion, several WRs could not be radiographed or ultrasonicly examined

in accordance with the S&L specification requirements. From a total

of 145 WRs, 33 (51 reported previously) did not satisfy the specifica-

tion requirements. A review of the records identified that of a

total of 919 full penetration welds, 804 welds passed either RT or

UT, and the remaining 115 welds passed a visual examination. This

matter is considered resolved.

3. Licensee Action on 50.55_(_ellt_ epi _s_

(Closed) 50.55(e) Item (373/82-03-EE): On February 9, 1982 the licensee

reported to RIII that due to a deficiency in design, approximately 113

snubbers in LaSalle Unit 1 might not lockup due to close proximity to

rigid restraints. Corre-tive actions were documented and a report was

sent from CECO to RIII in a letter, "LaSalle County Station Units 1 and 2

Mechanical Snubbers in Close Proximity to Rigid Restraints 10 CFR 50.55(e)

Final Report No. 82-03," dated March 10, 1982. RIII review of this item

is documented in paragraphs 2.b. 2.c and 2.d above. This item is considered

closed.

4. Snubber Visual Inspec_tjon and Functional Testing

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The NRC inspector performed followup inspections on' safety-related large

bore (L/B) and small bore (S/B) snubber visual inspections and functional

testing performed by the licensee in accordance with the plant Technical

Specification (TS). L/B snubbers are Pacific Scientific Pacific Shock

Absorber (PSA) sizes 1 to 100. S/B snubbers are PSA sizes 1/4 to 1/2.

a. Review of Procedures

The NRC inspector reviewed the following procedures and supporting

dccuments, and had no adverse comments:

LMP-H0-01, Removal and Installation of Pacific Scientific

Mechanical Snubbers," Revision 1, dated August 28, 1985.

LTS-500.14, " Mechanical Snubber Functional Testing Contractor

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Assisted," Revision 1, dated October 16, 1985.

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SNED Manager letter to LSCS Plant Manager, " Acceptance Criteria

.for Snubber Functional Test AIR-373-251-85-00053," dated

Ncvember 26, 1985.

S&L EMD Report No. 055187, "LaSalle Snubber Testing Criteria,"

Revision 00, dated November 25, 1985.

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b. Snubber Failures and Probable Cause

There are 850 L/B snubbers and 401 S/B snubbers included in the

LaSalle Unit 1 TS. As of March 11, 1986, of the 260 L/B snubbers

that have been functionally tested, 10 did not meet the test accep-

tance criteria and of 374 S/B snubbers that have been functionally

tested, 51 did not meet the test acceptance criteria. The nature

and the probable cause of the failures are as follows:

TABLE 1

L/B Snubbers

Snubber No. System Failure Probable Cause*

HP02-1507S HPCS Weld slag caused 1

(PSA-3) internal binding

RI24-1120S RCIC Defect in thrust bearing 2

(PSA-10)

RH53-15125 RHR-(C) Bent screw shaft 2, 4

(PSA-10)

HP08-1024S HPCS Scored inner tube caused 2

(PSA-10) by high vibration ,

RH13-11545 RHR-(B) Sediment and weld splatter 3

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(PSA-35) fcund in internals

LP02-1059S LPCS Cracked thrust bearing 1, 2

(PSA-3)

RH03-10475 RHR-(A) Slightly bent screw shaft; 2

(PSA-3) thrust bearing pulled apart

LP02-10545 LPCS Thrust bearing cracked; bent 2

(PSA-1) screw shaft with ball !

in'pressions l

RH40-1572S RHR-(A) Internals destroyed 2

(PSA-3)

RH40-1042S RHR-(A) Bent screw shaft; dislocated 2

(PSA-10) thrust bearing

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TABLE 2-

S/B Snubbers

Probable

Snubber No. System _ Failure Cause*

MSC6-10165 MSIV instrument Tape residue on inner 1

(PSA-1/4) tube

NB15-1002S "9ssel head vent Twisted internal 1

(PSA-1/2)

MS14-1048S MS drain Bent inner tube 1

(PSA-1/4)

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HP20-1402S HPCS pump relief Overloaded in 2

(PSA-1/4) compression

NB13-1002S Vessel head vent Bent torque carrier 1

(PSA-1/4)

FW11-1003S Reactor water Dirt and debris 1, 3

(PSA-1/2) clean up to FW

MS14-1050S MS drain Tape residue on inner 1

(PSA-1/4) tube

LP20-10285 LPCS water relief Overloaded in 2

(PSA-1/2) compressian

LP20-10305 LPCS water relief Overloaded in 2

(PSA-1/2) compression

RHB4-10085 RHR shutdown Overloaded in 2

(PSA-1/4) cooling valve compression

bypass

RHB4-10115 RHR shutdown Overload in 2, 3

(PSA-1/4) cooling valve compression;

bypass lubricant dried up

HSC6-1005S MSIV instrument Bent inner tube; 3

(PSA-1/4) external damage

NB11-1003S Vessel instrument Tape residue on inner 1

(PSA-1/4) tube

FRH-1207-H095 RHR instrument Bent inner tube 1

(PSA-1/4)

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M1302-24-103 Recirc. pump seal Lubricant dried up 3

(PSA-1/4) injection

! LC01-1005S MSIV leakage Internal spring 1

i (PSA-1/2) control dislocated

FRH-1213-H025 RHR instrument Slight bow in screw 1, 2

i (PSA-1/4) shaft

RR17-1004S Recirc. drain Overloaded in 2

i (PSA-1/4) compression

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M-1302-23-140 MSIV instrument Overloaded in 1, 2

(PSA-1/4) compression

i M-1302-24-149 Recirc. pump Lubricant dried up 3

(PSA-1/4) seal injection-

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M-1302-24-151 Recirc. pump External damage 1, 2 -

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(PSA-1/4) seal injection caused internal rubbing

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RR17-1003S Recirc. drain Dirt and debris 1

! (PSA-1/4)

, RR17-10075 Recirc. drain Tape residue on inner 1, 3

) (PSA-1/4) tube; corrosion

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i M-1302-24-148 Recirc. pump seal Overloaded in '3

l (PSA-1/4) injection compression; corrosion

i FRH-1209-H03S RHR instrument Tape residue on inner 1

) (PSA-1/4) tube

LC09-10315 MSIV leakage Dirt 1, 3

i (PSA-1/4) control

M-1302-36-154 RCIC instrument Corrosion' 3

(PSA-1/4)

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1 RR17-1005S Recirc. drain Corrosion; weld slag 1, 3

(PSA-1/2) on inner tube

RHB4-10075 RHR shutdown Overloaded in compression; 3

(PSA-1/4) cooling valve lubricant dried up

bypass . i

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4 RR17-10085 Recirc. drain Dirt 1, 3

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RH52-H09S RHR instrument Overloaded in 2

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LC01-1058S MSIV leakage Loosened. capstan spring 4

. (PSA-1/4) control

MS10-10135- MSIV instrument Corrosion 3-

(PSA-1/4)

LC01-10515 MSIV leakage Twisted internals 1

(PSA-1/4) control -

RR69-H095 Recirc. drain Corrosion 3

(PSA-1/4)

RIO9-1008S RCIC steam drain Twisted internals 1

(PSA-1/4)

RIO9-1026S RCIC steam drain Overloaded in 1

(PSA-1/4) compression; internal

spring dislocation

RIO9-1005S RCIC steam drain Twisted internals 1

(PSA-1/4)

RH23-H075 RHR instrument Dirt and debris 1, 3

(PSA-1/4)

MS50-H025 MSIV instrument Slight bend in head 2

(PSA-1/4) screw shaft

RT33-H105 Reactor water Dirt and corrosion 3

(PSA-1/4) cleanup

RH25-H04S RHR valve Corrosion; wear due to 2, 3

(PSA-1/4) leakoff vibration

RH25-H03S RHR valve Overloaded in 2, 3

(PSA-1/4) leakoff compression; corrosion

RH25-H06S RHR valve Overload in 2

(PSA-1/4) leakoff compression

M-1302-28-84 RHR instrument Twisted internal 1

(PSA-1/4)

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M-1302-22-110 RHR instrument Corrosion 3

(PSA-1/4)

M-1302-28-76 RHR instrunent Dirt 3

(PSA-1/4)

M-1302-22-102 HPCS instrument Corrosion 3

(PSA-1/4)

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M-1302-28-74 RHR instrument Ofrt and corrosion 3

(PSA-1/4)

M-1302-30-52 RHR instrument Corrosion 3

(PSA-1/4)

M-1302-21-40 RHR instrument Internals rub due to 3

(PSA-1/4) external damage

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Tables 1 and 2 - Probable Cause of F_ai_ lure

1. Improper handling or installation during construction.

. 2. Damage that could result from: (a)systemdynamic

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transient loads, (b) a high magnitude of line . vibration,

and (c) steady state line vibration.

3. Inadvertent damage such as water / chemicals spraying on

i the snubber; or placement of the snubber in an adverse 1

environment such as exposure to high temperature. !

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4. Menufacturing defect or mishandling during manufacturing,

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c. Meetin.g_with CECO at the Region III Office j

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RIII management ret with CECO representatives at RIII on March 17, {

1986 to discuss the snubber functional testing failures and CECO

alternatives and courses of action. Matters discussed included: (1)

j number of snubber test failures, (2) causes of test failures, (3)

status of system operebility evaluations, (4) future preventative

actions,and(5)impactonUnit2.

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At the conclusion of the reeeting, the RIII staff indicated that:

! (1) Consideration should be given to functional testing of all L/B

i and S/B safety-related scubbers in LaSalle Unit 1.

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(2) Priority should be given to functional testing of the RHR Loop A

l and Loop B snubbers.

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(3) A formal inspection should be performed for the RHR Loop A and-

) Loop B piping systems.

! (4) Operability evaluations and aralyses performed for the RHR

1 systems should be completed on an expeditious basis.

(5) Removal of the Unit 2 RHR system snubbers for furctional testing

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is acceptable provided no more than two snubbers are removed

at any one time.

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(6) Region III would conduct further reviews into the Ceco statement

j that some snubbers could have been damaged during maintenance

t work in the vicinity of the snubber after the IEB 81-01 required

! inspections. This is an Unresolved Item (373/86010-01).

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The CECO representative stated that RHR snubber testing and

i evaluations should be completed before the'end of April 1986.

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5. Unresolved Items

I An unresolved item is a matter about which more information is required

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in order to ascertain whether it is an acceptable item, an open item, a

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deviation, or a violation. One unresolved item disclosed during this

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inspection is discussed in Paragraph 4.c.(6).

i 6. Exit Interview

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The NRC inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)

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at the conclusion of the inspection. The inspector summarized the scope and

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findings of the inspection. The inspector also discussed the likely

informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents I

! reviewed by the inspector during he inspection. The licensee representatives I

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did not identify any such documents as proprietary. !

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