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Category:CORRESPONDENCE-LETTERS
MONTHYEARL-99-035, Forwards non-proprietary & Proprietary Versions of Farley Units 1 & 2 LBB Calculation Results Due to SG Replacement & SG Snubber Elimination Programs, Used to Support SG Replacement Project.Proprietary Encl Withheld1999-10-18018 October 1999 Forwards non-proprietary & Proprietary Versions of Farley Units 1 & 2 LBB Calculation Results Due to SG Replacement & SG Snubber Elimination Programs, Used to Support SG Replacement Project.Proprietary Encl Withheld ML20217G0801999-10-0707 October 1999 Informs That on 990930,staff Conducted mid-cycle PPR of Farley & Did Not Identify Any Areas in Which Performance Warranted More than Core Insp Program.Nrc Will Conduct Regional Insps Associated with SG Removal & Installation ML20217P0661999-10-0606 October 1999 Requests Withholding of Proprietary Rept NSD-SAE-ESI-99-389, Farley Units 1 & 2 LBB Calculation Results Due to SG Replacement & SG Snubber Elimination Programs ML20217B1891999-10-0404 October 1999 Submits Clarification Re Development of Basis for Determining Limiting Internal Pressure Loads Re Review of NRC SE for Cycle 16 Extension Request.Util Intends to Use Guidelines When Evaluating SG Tube Structural Integrity ML20212J8391999-09-30030 September 1999 Forwards RAI Re Request for Amends to Ts.Addl Info Needed to Complete Review to Verify That Proposed TS Are Consistent with & Validate Design Basis Analysis.Request Discussed with H Mahan on 990930.Info Needed within 10 Days of This Ltr ML20212J8801999-09-30030 September 1999 Discusses GL 98-01,suppl 1, Y2K Readiness of Computer Sys at Npps. Util 980731,990607 & 03 Ltrs Provided Requested Info in Subj Gl.Nrc Considers Subj GL to Be Closed for Unit 1 L-99-032, Responds to NRC Re Adequacy of Kaowool Fire Retardant Fire Barriers in Use at Jfnp,Units 1 & 21999-09-23023 September 1999 Responds to NRC Re Adequacy of Kaowool Fire Retardant Fire Barriers in Use at Jfnp,Units 1 & 2 L-99-034, Forwards Comments on Draft Current Tech Specs Discussion of Change Tables for Jm Farley Nuclear Plant.Units 1 & 21999-09-23023 September 1999 Forwards Comments on Draft Current Tech Specs Discussion of Change Tables for Jm Farley Nuclear Plant.Units 1 & 2 ML20212F8861999-09-23023 September 1999 Forwards Revised Relief Request Number 32 for NRC Approval. Approval Requested by 991231 to Support Activities to Be Performed During Unit 1 Refueling Outage Scheduled for Spring of 2000 ML20212E7031999-09-23023 September 1999 Responds to GL 98-01, Year 2000 Readiness of Computer Sys at Npps. Util Requested to Submit Plans & Schedules for Resolving Y2K-related Issues ML20212F1111999-09-21021 September 1999 Discusses Closeout of GL 97-06, Degradation of Steam Generator Internals ML20212C2351999-09-16016 September 1999 Submits Corrected Info Concerning Snoc Response to NRC GL 99-02, Lab Testing of Nuclear-Grade Activated Charcoal ML20212D0101999-09-15015 September 1999 Informs That Submittal of clean-typed Copy of ITS & ITS Bases Will Be Delayed.Delay Due to Need for Resolution of Two Issues Raised by NRC staff.Clean-typed Copy of ITS Will Be Submitted within 4 Wks Following Resolution of Issues ML20212C4641999-09-13013 September 1999 Forwards Info Requested in Administrative Ltr 99-03, Preparation & Scheduling of Operator Licensing Exams L-99-031, Informs NRC That Review of MOV Testing Frequency & Changes Made to Frequency of MOV Testing Has Been Completed1999-09-13013 September 1999 Informs NRC That Review of MOV Testing Frequency & Changes Made to Frequency of MOV Testing Has Been Completed ML20212C8041999-09-10010 September 1999 Responds to to D Rathbun Requesting Review of J Sherman Re Y2K Compliance.Latest NRC Status Rept on Y2K Activities Encl ML20212D4581999-09-10010 September 1999 Responds to to D Rathbun,Requesting Review of J Sherman Expressing Concerns That Plant & Other Nuclear Plants Not Yet Y2K Compliant ML20212A6951999-09-0909 September 1999 Requests That Licensees Affected by Kaowool Fire Barriers Take Issue on Voluntary Initiative & Propose Approach for Resolving Subj Issues.Staff Plans to Meet with Licensees to Discuss Listed Topics ML20212A8341999-09-0909 September 1999 Requests That Licensees Affected by Kaowool Fire Barriers Take Issue on Voluntary Initiative & Propose Approach for Resolving Subj Issues.Staff Plans to Meet with Licensees to Discuss Listed Topics ML20211N8041999-09-0808 September 1999 Informs That on 990930 NRC Issued GL 96-06, Assurance of Equipment Operability & Containment Integrity During Design-Basis Accident Condition, to Holders of Nuclear Plant Operating Licenses ML20211N4301999-09-0808 September 1999 Discusses Proposed Meeting to Discuss Kaowool Fire Barriers. Staff Requesting That Affected Licensees Take Issue on Voluntary Initative & Propose Approach for Resolving Issues ML20212C0071999-09-0202 September 1999 Forwards Insp Repts 50-348/99-05 & 50-364/99-05 on 990627- 0807.No Violations Noted.Licensee Conduct of Activities at Farley Plant Facilities Generally Characterized by safety-conscious Operations & Sound Engineering ML20211Q4801999-09-0101 September 1999 Informs That on 990812-13,Region II Hosted Training Managers Conference on Recent Changes to Operator Licensing Program. List of Attendees,Copy of Slide Presentations & List of Questions Received from Participants Encl ML20211K2131999-08-31031 August 1999 Informs That Snoc Has Conducted Review of Reactor Vessel Integrity Database,Version 2 (RVID2) & Conclude That Latest Data Submitted for Farley Units Has Not Been Incorporated Into RVID2 ML20211K4101999-08-31031 August 1999 Resubmits Relief Requests Q1P16-RR-V-5 & Q2P16-RR-V-5 That Seek to Group V661 Valves from Each Unit Into Sample Disassembly & Insp Group,Per 990525 Telcon with NRC L-99-030, Forwards SNC Review Comments on Draft SE & marked-up Copy of Draft SE Incorporating SNC Comments Re Proposed Conversion to ITS1999-08-30030 August 1999 Forwards SNC Review Comments on Draft SE & marked-up Copy of Draft SE Incorporating SNC Comments Re Proposed Conversion to ITS ML20211G6851999-08-26026 August 1999 Informs That During Insp,Technical Issues Associated with Design,Installation & fire-resistive Performance of Kaowool Raceway fire-barriers Installed at Farley Nuclear Plant Were Identified L-99-029, Forwards Revised Response to Chapter 3.1 RAI Requested in 990726 Conference Call,Rai Response Related to Beyond Scope Issue for Chapter 3.5 Requested by Conference Call on 990805 & RAI Response to Chapter 3.8 Requested on 990615 & 07271999-08-19019 August 1999 Forwards Revised Response to Chapter 3.1 RAI Requested in 990726 Conference Call,Rai Response Related to Beyond Scope Issue for Chapter 3.5 Requested by Conference Call on 990805 & RAI Response to Chapter 3.8 Requested on 990615 & 0727 ML20211B9431999-08-17017 August 1999 Forwards Fitness for Duty Performance Data for six-month Reporting Period 990101-990630,IAW 10CFR26.71(d).Rept Covers Employees at Jm Farley Nuclear Plant & Southern Nuclear Corporate Headquarters ML20211B9211999-08-17017 August 1999 Responds to NRC Re Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-348/99-09 & 50-364/99-09.Corrective Actions:Security Response Plan Was Revised to Address Vulnerabilities Identified During NRC Insp ML20210R5101999-08-12012 August 1999 Forwards Revised Page 6 to 990430 LAR to Operate Farley Nuclear Plant,Unit 1,for Cycle 16 Only,Based on risk- Informed Approach for Evaluation of SG Tube Structural Integrity,As Result of Staff Comments ML20212C8141999-08-0909 August 1999 Forwards Correspondence Received from Jm Sherman.Requests Review of Info Re Established Policies & Procedures ML20210T2021999-08-0606 August 1999 Forwards Draft SE Accepting Licensee Proposed Conversion of Plant,Units 1 & 2 Current TSs to Its.Its Based on Listed Documents ML20210Q4641999-08-0505 August 1999 Informs That NRC Plans to Administer Gfes of Written Operator Licensing Exam on 991006.Authorized Representative of Facility Must Submit Ltr to La Reyes,As Listed,With List of Individuals to Take exam,30 Days Before Exam Date ML20210J8341999-07-30030 July 1999 Forwards Second Request for Addl Info Re Util 990430 Amend Request to Allow Util to Operate Unit 1,for Cycle 16 Based on risk-informed Probability of SG Tube Rupture & Nominal accident-induced primary-to-second Leakage ML20210G4901999-07-30030 July 1999 Responds to GL 99-02, Laboratory Testing of Nuclear-Grade Activated Charcoal, Issued 990603.Ltr Contains NRC License Commitment to Utilize ASTM D3803-1989 with Efficiency Acceptance Criteria Utilizing Safety Factor of 2 L-99-028, Responds to NRC 990730 RAI Re 990423 OL Change Request to Allow for Risk Informed Approach for Evaluation of SG Tube Structural Integrity as Described by NEI 97-06, SG Program Guidelines1999-07-30030 July 1999 Responds to NRC 990730 RAI Re 990423 OL Change Request to Allow for Risk Informed Approach for Evaluation of SG Tube Structural Integrity as Described by NEI 97-06, SG Program Guidelines L-99-027, Addresses Clarifications to Selected Responses to Chapter 3.8 RAI Requested in NRC Conference Call on 990624, Resolution of Open Issue Related to Containment Purge in Chapter 3.6 & Response Related to Chapter 3.51999-07-27027 July 1999 Addresses Clarifications to Selected Responses to Chapter 3.8 RAI Requested in NRC Conference Call on 990624, Resolution of Open Issue Related to Containment Purge in Chapter 3.6 & Response Related to Chapter 3.5 ML20210G8181999-07-26026 July 1999 Forwards Insp Repts 50-348/99-04 & 50-364/99-04 on 990516- 0626.One Violation Identified & Being Treated as Noncited Violation IR 05000348/19990091999-07-23023 July 1999 Discusses Insp Repts 50-348/99-09 & 50-364/99-09 on 990308- 10 & Forwards Notice of Violation Re Failure to Intercept Adversary During Drills,Contrary to 10CFR73 & Physical Security Plan Requirements ML20210E4071999-07-22022 July 1999 Responds to NRC 990702 RAI Re Change Request to Allow for Risk Informed Approach for Evaluation of SG Tube Structural Integrity as Described in NEI 97-06, SG Program Guidelines L-99-026, Forwards Response to NRC 990702 RAI Re SG Replacement Related TS Change Request Submitted 981201.Ltr Contains No New Commitments1999-07-19019 July 1999 Forwards Response to NRC 990702 RAI Re SG Replacement Related TS Change Request Submitted 981201.Ltr Contains No New Commitments L-99-264, Responds to NRC 990603 Administrative Ltr 99-02, Operating Licensing Action Estimates, for Fy 2000 & 20011999-07-13013 July 1999 Responds to NRC 990603 Administrative Ltr 99-02, Operating Licensing Action Estimates, for Fy 2000 & 2001 ML20209H4721999-07-13013 July 1999 Responds to NRC 990603 Administrative Ltr 99-02, Operating Licensing Action Estimates, for Fy 2000 & 2001 ML20196J6191999-07-0202 July 1999 Forwards Final Dam Audit Rept of 981008 of Category 1 Cooling Water Storage Pond Dam.Requests Response within 120 Days of Date of Ltr 05000364/LER-1999-001, Forwards LER 99-001-00 Re Reactor Trip Due to Loss of Condenser Vacuum Steam Dump Drain Line Failure.Commitments Made by Licensee,Listed1999-07-0202 July 1999 Forwards LER 99-001-00 Re Reactor Trip Due to Loss of Condenser Vacuum Steam Dump Drain Line Failure.Commitments Made by Licensee,Listed ML20196J7471999-07-0202 July 1999 Forwards RAI Re Cycle 16 Extension Request.Response Requested within 30 Days of Date of Ltr ML20196J5781999-07-0202 July 1999 Forwards RAI Re 981201 & s Requesting Amend to TS Associated with Replacing Existing Westinghouse Model 51 SG with Westinghouse Model 54F Generators.Respond within 30 Days of Ltr Date ML20196J6571999-07-0202 July 1999 Discusses Closure to TAC MA0543 & MA0544 Re GL 92-01 Rev 1, Suppl 1,RV Structural Integrity.Nrc Has Revised Rvid & Releasing It as Rvid,Version 2 as Result of Review of Responses ML20196J3591999-06-30030 June 1999 Forwards SE of TR WCAP-14750, RCS Flow Verification Using Elbow Taps at Westinghouse 3-Loop Pwrs 1999-09-09
[Table view] Category:INCOMING CORRESPONDENCE
MONTHYEARL-99-035, Forwards non-proprietary & Proprietary Versions of Farley Units 1 & 2 LBB Calculation Results Due to SG Replacement & SG Snubber Elimination Programs, Used to Support SG Replacement Project.Proprietary Encl Withheld1999-10-18018 October 1999 Forwards non-proprietary & Proprietary Versions of Farley Units 1 & 2 LBB Calculation Results Due to SG Replacement & SG Snubber Elimination Programs, Used to Support SG Replacement Project.Proprietary Encl Withheld ML20217P0661999-10-0606 October 1999 Requests Withholding of Proprietary Rept NSD-SAE-ESI-99-389, Farley Units 1 & 2 LBB Calculation Results Due to SG Replacement & SG Snubber Elimination Programs ML20217B1891999-10-0404 October 1999 Submits Clarification Re Development of Basis for Determining Limiting Internal Pressure Loads Re Review of NRC SE for Cycle 16 Extension Request.Util Intends to Use Guidelines When Evaluating SG Tube Structural Integrity L-99-034, Forwards Comments on Draft Current Tech Specs Discussion of Change Tables for Jm Farley Nuclear Plant.Units 1 & 21999-09-23023 September 1999 Forwards Comments on Draft Current Tech Specs Discussion of Change Tables for Jm Farley Nuclear Plant.Units 1 & 2 L-99-032, Responds to NRC Re Adequacy of Kaowool Fire Retardant Fire Barriers in Use at Jfnp,Units 1 & 21999-09-23023 September 1999 Responds to NRC Re Adequacy of Kaowool Fire Retardant Fire Barriers in Use at Jfnp,Units 1 & 2 ML20212F8861999-09-23023 September 1999 Forwards Revised Relief Request Number 32 for NRC Approval. Approval Requested by 991231 to Support Activities to Be Performed During Unit 1 Refueling Outage Scheduled for Spring of 2000 ML20212C2351999-09-16016 September 1999 Submits Corrected Info Concerning Snoc Response to NRC GL 99-02, Lab Testing of Nuclear-Grade Activated Charcoal ML20212D0101999-09-15015 September 1999 Informs That Submittal of clean-typed Copy of ITS & ITS Bases Will Be Delayed.Delay Due to Need for Resolution of Two Issues Raised by NRC staff.Clean-typed Copy of ITS Will Be Submitted within 4 Wks Following Resolution of Issues L-99-031, Informs NRC That Review of MOV Testing Frequency & Changes Made to Frequency of MOV Testing Has Been Completed1999-09-13013 September 1999 Informs NRC That Review of MOV Testing Frequency & Changes Made to Frequency of MOV Testing Has Been Completed ML20212C4641999-09-13013 September 1999 Forwards Info Requested in Administrative Ltr 99-03, Preparation & Scheduling of Operator Licensing Exams ML20211K2131999-08-31031 August 1999 Informs That Snoc Has Conducted Review of Reactor Vessel Integrity Database,Version 2 (RVID2) & Conclude That Latest Data Submitted for Farley Units Has Not Been Incorporated Into RVID2 ML20211K4101999-08-31031 August 1999 Resubmits Relief Requests Q1P16-RR-V-5 & Q2P16-RR-V-5 That Seek to Group V661 Valves from Each Unit Into Sample Disassembly & Insp Group,Per 990525 Telcon with NRC L-99-030, Forwards SNC Review Comments on Draft SE & marked-up Copy of Draft SE Incorporating SNC Comments Re Proposed Conversion to ITS1999-08-30030 August 1999 Forwards SNC Review Comments on Draft SE & marked-up Copy of Draft SE Incorporating SNC Comments Re Proposed Conversion to ITS L-99-029, Forwards Revised Response to Chapter 3.1 RAI Requested in 990726 Conference Call,Rai Response Related to Beyond Scope Issue for Chapter 3.5 Requested by Conference Call on 990805 & RAI Response to Chapter 3.8 Requested on 990615 & 07271999-08-19019 August 1999 Forwards Revised Response to Chapter 3.1 RAI Requested in 990726 Conference Call,Rai Response Related to Beyond Scope Issue for Chapter 3.5 Requested by Conference Call on 990805 & RAI Response to Chapter 3.8 Requested on 990615 & 0727 ML20211B9431999-08-17017 August 1999 Forwards Fitness for Duty Performance Data for six-month Reporting Period 990101-990630,IAW 10CFR26.71(d).Rept Covers Employees at Jm Farley Nuclear Plant & Southern Nuclear Corporate Headquarters ML20211B9211999-08-17017 August 1999 Responds to NRC Re Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-348/99-09 & 50-364/99-09.Corrective Actions:Security Response Plan Was Revised to Address Vulnerabilities Identified During NRC Insp ML20210R5101999-08-12012 August 1999 Forwards Revised Page 6 to 990430 LAR to Operate Farley Nuclear Plant,Unit 1,for Cycle 16 Only,Based on risk- Informed Approach for Evaluation of SG Tube Structural Integrity,As Result of Staff Comments ML20212C8141999-08-0909 August 1999 Forwards Correspondence Received from Jm Sherman.Requests Review of Info Re Established Policies & Procedures ML20210G4901999-07-30030 July 1999 Responds to GL 99-02, Laboratory Testing of Nuclear-Grade Activated Charcoal, Issued 990603.Ltr Contains NRC License Commitment to Utilize ASTM D3803-1989 with Efficiency Acceptance Criteria Utilizing Safety Factor of 2 L-99-028, Responds to NRC 990730 RAI Re 990423 OL Change Request to Allow for Risk Informed Approach for Evaluation of SG Tube Structural Integrity as Described by NEI 97-06, SG Program Guidelines1999-07-30030 July 1999 Responds to NRC 990730 RAI Re 990423 OL Change Request to Allow for Risk Informed Approach for Evaluation of SG Tube Structural Integrity as Described by NEI 97-06, SG Program Guidelines L-99-027, Addresses Clarifications to Selected Responses to Chapter 3.8 RAI Requested in NRC Conference Call on 990624, Resolution of Open Issue Related to Containment Purge in Chapter 3.6 & Response Related to Chapter 3.51999-07-27027 July 1999 Addresses Clarifications to Selected Responses to Chapter 3.8 RAI Requested in NRC Conference Call on 990624, Resolution of Open Issue Related to Containment Purge in Chapter 3.6 & Response Related to Chapter 3.5 ML20210E4071999-07-22022 July 1999 Responds to NRC 990702 RAI Re Change Request to Allow for Risk Informed Approach for Evaluation of SG Tube Structural Integrity as Described in NEI 97-06, SG Program Guidelines L-99-026, Forwards Response to NRC 990702 RAI Re SG Replacement Related TS Change Request Submitted 981201.Ltr Contains No New Commitments1999-07-19019 July 1999 Forwards Response to NRC 990702 RAI Re SG Replacement Related TS Change Request Submitted 981201.Ltr Contains No New Commitments L-99-264, Responds to NRC 990603 Administrative Ltr 99-02, Operating Licensing Action Estimates, for Fy 2000 & 20011999-07-13013 July 1999 Responds to NRC 990603 Administrative Ltr 99-02, Operating Licensing Action Estimates, for Fy 2000 & 2001 ML20209H4721999-07-13013 July 1999 Responds to NRC 990603 Administrative Ltr 99-02, Operating Licensing Action Estimates, for Fy 2000 & 2001 05000364/LER-1999-001, Forwards LER 99-001-00 Re Reactor Trip Due to Loss of Condenser Vacuum Steam Dump Drain Line Failure.Commitments Made by Licensee,Listed1999-07-0202 July 1999 Forwards LER 99-001-00 Re Reactor Trip Due to Loss of Condenser Vacuum Steam Dump Drain Line Failure.Commitments Made by Licensee,Listed L-99-024, Responds to NRC RAI Re Conversion to ITS for Chapters 3.4, 3.5,3.6,3.7,3.9 & 5.0,per 990419-20 Meetings with NRC1999-06-30030 June 1999 Responds to NRC RAI Re Conversion to ITS for Chapters 3.4, 3.5,3.6,3.7,3.9 & 5.0,per 990419-20 Meetings with NRC L-99-025, Forwards Rev 2 to Jfnp Security plan,FNP-0-M-99,IAW 10CFR50.4(b)(4).Attachment 1 Contains Summary of Changes & Amended Security Plan Pages.Encl Withheld from Public Disclosure Per 10CFR73.211999-06-30030 June 1999 Forwards Rev 2 to Jfnp Security plan,FNP-0-M-99,IAW 10CFR50.4(b)(4).Attachment 1 Contains Summary of Changes & Amended Security Plan Pages.Encl Withheld from Public Disclosure Per 10CFR73.21 ML20196J8631999-06-30030 June 1999 Submits Correction to Errors Contained in to NRC Re TS Changes Re Control Room,Penetration Room & Containment Purge Filtration Systems & Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation.Errors Do Not Require Rev of SA L-99-249, Submits Correction to Errors Contained in to NRC Re TS Changes Re Control Room,Penetration Room & Containment Purge Filtration Systems & Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation.Errors Do Not Require Rev of SA1999-06-30030 June 1999 Submits Correction to Errors Contained in to NRC Re TS Changes Re Control Room,Penetration Room & Containment Purge Filtration Systems & Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation.Errors Do Not Require Rev of SA L-99-224, Submits Rev to Unit 2 SG Tube voltage-based Repair Criteria Data Rept.Ltr Contains No Commitments1999-06-0707 June 1999 Submits Rev to Unit 2 SG Tube voltage-based Repair Criteria Data Rept.Ltr Contains No Commitments ML20195F1731999-06-0707 June 1999 Forwards Proprietary & non-proprietary Responses to NRC RAIs Re W TR WCAP-14750, RCS Flow Verification Using Elbow Taps at W 3-Loop Pwrs. W Proprietary Notice,Affidavit & Copyright Notice,Encl.Proprietary Info Withheld L-99-217, Forwards Proprietary & non-proprietary Responses to NRC RAIs Re W TR WCAP-14750, RCS Flow Verification Using Elbow Taps at W 3-Loop Pwrs. W Proprietary Notice,Affidavit & Copyright Notice,Encl.Proprietary Info Withheld1999-06-0707 June 1999 Forwards Proprietary & non-proprietary Responses to NRC RAIs Re W TR WCAP-14750, RCS Flow Verification Using Elbow Taps at W 3-Loop Pwrs. W Proprietary Notice,Affidavit & Copyright Notice,Encl.Proprietary Info Withheld L-99-225, Responds to GL 98-01, Yr 2000 Readiness of Computer Sys at Nuclear Power Plants1999-06-0707 June 1999 Responds to GL 98-01, Yr 2000 Readiness of Computer Sys at Nuclear Power Plants ML20195F0621999-06-0707 June 1999 Submits Rev to Unit 2 SG Tube voltage-based Repair Criteria Data Rept.Ltr Contains No Commitments ML20195E9581999-06-0707 June 1999 Responds to GL 98-01, Yr 2000 Readiness of Computer Sys at Nuclear Power Plants ML20195C6941999-05-28028 May 1999 Forwards Response to NRC RAI Re GL 96-05 for Farley Nuclear Plant.Farley Is Committing to Implement Phase 3 of JOG Program L-99-021, Forwards Response to RAI Re Conversion to ITSs for Chapter 3.3.Attachment II Includes Proposed Revs to Previously Submitted LAR Re Rais,Grouped by RAI number.Clean-typed Copies of Affected ITS Pages Not Included1999-05-28028 May 1999 Forwards Response to RAI Re Conversion to ITSs for Chapter 3.3.Attachment II Includes Proposed Revs to Previously Submitted LAR Re Rais,Grouped by RAI number.Clean-typed Copies of Affected ITS Pages Not Included L-99-203, Forwards Response to NRC RAI Re GL 96-05 for Farley Nuclear Plant.Farley Is Committing to Implement Phase 3 of JOG Program1999-05-28028 May 1999 Forwards Response to NRC RAI Re GL 96-05 for Farley Nuclear Plant.Farley Is Committing to Implement Phase 3 of JOG Program ML20195F2101999-05-24024 May 1999 Requests That Farley Nuclear Plant Proprietary Responses to NRC RAI Re W WCAP-14750, RCS Flow Verification Using Elbow Taps at W 3-Loop Pwrs, Be Withheld from Public Disclosure Per 10CFR2.790 L-99-180, Forwards Responses to NRC RAI Questions for Chapter 3.8 of Ts.Proposed Revs to TS Previously Submitted with LAR Related to RAI1999-04-30030 April 1999 Forwards Responses to NRC RAI Questions for Chapter 3.8 of Ts.Proposed Revs to TS Previously Submitted with LAR Related to RAI ML20206F4321999-04-30030 April 1999 Forwards Responses to NRC RAI Questions for Chapter 3.8 of Ts.Proposed Revs to TS Previously Submitted with LAR Related to RAI L-99-017, Forwards Responses to NRC RAI Questions for Chapters 3.1, 3.2,3.5,3.7 & 3.9 of Ts.Attached Pages Include Proposed Revs Previously Submitted LAR to Rais,Grouped by Chapters & RAI Numbers1999-04-30030 April 1999 Forwards Responses to NRC RAI Questions for Chapters 3.1, 3.2,3.5,3.7 & 3.9 of Ts.Attached Pages Include Proposed Revs Previously Submitted LAR to Rais,Grouped by Chapters & RAI Numbers ML20206C8021999-04-26026 April 1999 Forwards 1998 Annual Rept, for Alabama Power Co.Encls Contain Financial Statements for 1998,unaudited Financial Statements for Quarter Ending 990331 & Cash Flow Projections for 990101-991231 05000348/LER-1998-007, Forwards SG-99-04-001, Farley-1:Final Cycle 16 Freespan ODSCC Operational Assessment, as Committed to in Licensee & LER 98-007-00.Util Is Revising Plant Administrative SG Operating Leakage Requirements as Listed1999-04-23023 April 1999 Forwards SG-99-04-001, Farley-1:Final Cycle 16 Freespan ODSCC Operational Assessment, as Committed to in Licensee & LER 98-007-00.Util Is Revising Plant Administrative SG Operating Leakage Requirements as Listed L-99-015, Forwards Rev 1 to Jfnp Security plan,FNP-O-M-99,resulting from Implementation of Biometrics Sys.Changes Incorporate Changes Previously Submitted to NRC as Rev 28 by Licensee .Encl Withheld,Per 10CFR73.211999-04-21021 April 1999 Forwards Rev 1 to Jfnp Security plan,FNP-O-M-99,resulting from Implementation of Biometrics Sys.Changes Incorporate Changes Previously Submitted to NRC as Rev 28 by Licensee .Encl Withheld,Per 10CFR73.21 ML20206B4391999-04-21021 April 1999 Forwards Corrected ITS Markup Pages to Replace Pages in 981201 License Amend Requests for SG Replacement L-99-172, Forwards FNP Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Rept for 1998, IAW TSs Sections 6.9.1.8 & 6.9.1.9.Changes to ODCM Revs 16,17 & 18 Are Encl,Iaw TS Section 6.14.21999-04-21021 April 1999 Forwards FNP Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Rept for 1998, IAW TSs Sections 6.9.1.8 & 6.9.1.9.Changes to ODCM Revs 16,17 & 18 Are Encl,Iaw TS Section 6.14.2 ML20205S9501999-04-21021 April 1999 Forwards FNP Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Rept for 1998, IAW TSs Sections 6.9.1.8 & 6.9.1.9.Changes to ODCM Revs 16,17 & 18 Are Encl,Iaw TS Section 6.14.2 ML20205R0431999-04-13013 April 1999 Forwards Correction to 960212 GL 95-07 180 Day Response. Level 3 Evaluation for Pressure Locking Utilized Analytical Models.Encl Page Has Been Amended to Correct Error 1999-09-23
[Table view] Category:UTILITY TO NRC
MONTHYEARML20064A7131990-09-17017 September 1990 Advises That Due to Reassignment,Jj Clark No Longer Needs to Maintain Senior Reactor Operator Licenses ML20059J2811990-09-14014 September 1990 Forwards List of Key Radiation Monitors Which Will Be Used as Inputs to Top Level Radioactivity Status Bar Re Spds.List Identifies Monitors Which Would Provide Concise & Meaningful Info About Radioactivity During Accidents ML20065D5961990-09-13013 September 1990 Responds to Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-348/90-19 & 50-364/90-19.Response Withheld ML20059J1661990-09-13013 September 1990 Forwards Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1990 for Jm Farley Nuclear Plant & Rev 10 to ODCM ML20059L0751990-09-12012 September 1990 Forwards Revised Pages to Rev 3 to, Second 10-Yr Interval Inservice Insp Program for ASME Code Class 1,2 & 3 Components ML20059J2911990-09-12012 September 1990 Forwards Operator Licensing Natl Exam Schedules for FY91 Through FY94,per Generic Ltr 90-07.Requalification Schedules & Estimated Number of Candidates Expected to Participate in Generic Fundamental Exam,Also Encl ML20064A7111990-09-12012 September 1990 Forwards Rev 1 to Relief Request RR-1, Second 10-Yr Interval Inservice Insp Program for ASME Code Class 1,2 & 3 Components ML20059J2891990-09-12012 September 1990 Confirms Rescheduling of Response to Fitness for Duty Program Notice of Violation 90-18-02,per 900907 Telcon ML20065D6621990-09-12012 September 1990 Forwards NPDES Permit AL0024619 Effective 900901.Limits for Temp & Residual Chlorine Appealed & Stayed ML20064A3431990-08-28028 August 1990 Forwards Corrected Insertion Instructions to Rev 8 to Updated FSAR for Jm Farley Nuclear Plant ML20059D4711990-08-22022 August 1990 Forwards Fitness for Duty Performance Data for Jan-June 1990 ML20059B5101990-08-22022 August 1990 Forwards Semiannual Radioactive Effluent Release Rept for Jan-June 1990.No Changes to Process Control Program for First Semiannual Period of 1990 Exists ML20056B2751990-08-20020 August 1990 Forwards Relief Requests from Second 10-yr Interval Inservice Testing Program for Class 1,2 & 3 Pumps & Valves. Request Incorporates Commitments in 891222 Response to Notice of Violation ML20056B2741990-08-20020 August 1990 Forwards Rev 2 to Unit Inservice Testing Program,For Review & Approval.Rev Incorporates Commitments Addressed in Util 891222 Response to Notice of Violation & Other Editorial & Technical Changes ML20058Q1481990-08-15015 August 1990 Forwards Rev 3 to FNP-1-M-043, Jm Farley Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Second 10-Yr Inservice Insp Program,Asme Code Class 1,2 & 3 Components ML20058P6201990-08-15015 August 1990 Forwards Rev 1 to FNP-2-M-068, Ten-Yr Inservice Insp Program for ASME Code Class 1,2 & 3 Components, Per 891207 & 900412 Responses to NRC Request for Addl Info ML20055G7701990-07-18018 July 1990 Updates 900713 Response to NRC Bulletin 90-001, Loss of Fill-Oil in Transmitters Mfg by Rosemount ML20055F7411990-07-11011 July 1990 Forwards Monthly Operating Rept for June 1990 & Corrected Monthly Operating Repts for Nov 1989 Through May 1990.Repts Revised to Correct Typo on Value of Cumulative Number of Hours Reactor Critical ML20055F3781990-07-10010 July 1990 Submits Final Response to Generic Ltr 83-28,Items 4.2.3 & 4.2.4.Util Position That Procedures Currently Utilized by Plant Constitute Acceptable Ongoing Life Testing Program for Reactor Trip Breakers & Components ML20055D4861990-07-0202 July 1990 Requests Authorization to Use Encl ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code Case N-395 Re Laser Welding for Sleeving Process Described by Oct 1990,per 10CFR50.55a,footnote 6 ML20055D1001990-06-26026 June 1990 Responds to Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-348/90-12 & 50-364/90-12 on 900411-0510.Corrective Actions:Electrolyte Level Raised in Lights Identified by Inspector to Have Low Electrolyte Level ML20044A6191990-06-26026 June 1990 Suppls 900530 Ltr Containing Results of SPDS Audit,Per Suppl 1 to NUREG-0737.One SPDS Console,Located in Control Room,Will Be Modified So That Only SPDS Info Can Be Displayed by Monitor.Console Will Be Reconfigured ML20043G4741990-06-11011 June 1990 Submits Addl Info Re 900219 Worker Respiratory Protection Apparatus Exemption Rev Request.Proposed Exemption Rev Involves Features Located Entirely within Restricted Area as Defined in 10CFR20 ML20043C1851990-05-29029 May 1990 Forwards Proposed Schedules for Submission & Requested Approval of Licensing Items ML20043B5941990-05-25025 May 1990 Provides Rept of Unsatisfactory Performance Testing,Per 10CFR26,App A.Error Caused by Olympus Analyzer Which Allowed Same Barcode to Be Assigned to Two Different Samples. Smithkline Taken Action to Prevent Recurrence of Scan Error ML20042G7461990-05-10010 May 1990 Certifies That Plant Licensed Operator Requalification Program Accredited & Based Upon Sys Approach to Training,Per Generic Ltr 87-07.Program in Effect Since 890109 ML20042F0831990-05-0101 May 1990 Forwards Rev 18 to Security Plan.Rev Withheld ML20042G3081990-04-25025 April 1990 Forwards Alabama Power Co Annual Rept 1989, Unaudited Financial Statements for Quarter Ending 900331 & Cash Flow Projections for 1990 ML20042E4121990-04-12012 April 1990 Provides Addl Info Re Review of Second 10-yr Inservice Insp Program,Per NRC 890803 Request.Relief Request RR-30 Requested Reduced Holding Time for Hydrostatically Testing Steam Generator Secondary Side ML20012E9571990-03-27027 March 1990 Forwards Annual Diesel Generator Reliability Data Rept,Per Tech Spec 6.9.1.12.Rept Provides Number of Tests (Valid or Invalid),Number of Failures for Each Diesel Generator at Plant for 1989 & Info Identified in Reg Guide 1.108 ML20012D9661990-03-22022 March 1990 Forwards Annual ECCS Evaluation Model Changes Rept,Per Revised 10CFR50.46.Info Includes Effect of ECCS Evaluation Model Mods on Peak Cladding Temp Results & Summary of Plant Change Safety Evaluations ML20012D8901990-03-20020 March 1990 Clarifies 891130 Response to Generic Ltr 83-28,Item 2.2.1 Re Use of Q-List at Plant,Per NRC Request.Fnpims Data Base Utilized as Aid for Procurement,Maint,Operations & Daily Planning ML20012C4701990-03-15015 March 1990 Responds to NRC 900201 Ltr Re Emergency Planning Weaknesses Identified in Insp Repts 50-348/89-32 & 50-364/89-21. Corrective Actions:Cited Procedures Revised.Direct Line Network Notification to State Agencies Being Implemented ML20012C6241990-03-14014 March 1990 Informs of Resolution of USI A-47,per Generic Ltr 89-19 ML20012C4651990-03-13013 March 1990 Provides Verification of Nuclear Insurance Reporting Requirements Specified in 10CFR50.54 w(2) ML20012C2051990-03-0505 March 1990 Forwards SPDS Critical Function Status Trees,Per G West Request During 900206 SPDS Audit at Plant.W/O Encl ML20012A1621990-03-0202 March 1990 Forwards Addl Info Inadvertently Omitted from Jul-Dec 1989 Semiannual Radioactive Effluent Release Rept,Including Changes to Process Control Program ML20012A1301990-03-0101 March 1990 Responds to Generic Ltr 90-01 Re Request for Voluntary Participation in NRC Regulatory Impact Survey.Completed Questionnaire Encl ML20043A7481990-02-0202 February 1990 Forwards Util Exam Rept for Licensed Operator Requalification Written Exams on 900131 ML20006D2311990-01-31031 January 1990 Responds to NRC Bulletin 89-003 Re Potential Loss of Required Shutdown Margin During Refueling Operations. Refueling Procedures Will Be Revised to Incorporate Guidance That Will Preclude Inadvertent Loss of Shutdown ML20006A9091990-01-23023 January 1990 Forwards Response to Generic Ltr 89-13 Re Svc Water Sys Problems Affecting safety-related Equipment.Util Has Program to Perform Visual Insps & Cleanings of Plant Svc Water Intake Structure by Means of Scuba Divers ML20005E4931989-12-28028 December 1989 Provides Certification That fitness-for-duty Program Meets 10CFR26 Requirements.Testing Panel & cut-off Levels in Program Listed in Encl ML20005E3681989-12-28028 December 1989 Responds to Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-348/89-28 & 50-364/89-28 on 891002-06.Corrective Actions:All Piping Preparation for Inservice Insp Work in Containment Stopped & All Participants Assembled to Gather Facts on Incident ML20005E1971989-12-27027 December 1989 Responds to Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-348/89-22 & 50-364/89-22 on 890911-1010.Corrective Actions:Steam Generator Atmospheric Relief Valve Closed & Core Operations Suspended.Shift Supervisor Involved in Event Counseled ML20011D5041989-12-22022 December 1989 Responds to Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-348/89-26 & 50-364/89-26.Corrective Actions:Personnel Involved in Preparation of Inservice Test Procedures Counseled. Violation B Re Opening of Pressurizer PORV Denied ML19332F2111989-12-0707 December 1989 Forwards Final Response to NRC 890803 Request for Addl Info Re Review of Updated Inservice Insp Program,Summarizing Results of Addl Reviews & Providing Exam Listing Info ML19332F0791989-12-0707 December 1989 Responds to Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-348/89-22 & 50-364/89-22.Corrective Actions:All Managers Retrained on Intent of Overtime Procedures & Sys Established to Provide Independent Check of All Time Sheets Each Pay Period ML19332F1141989-12-0707 December 1989 Forwards Description of Instrumentation Sys Selected in Response to Generic Ltr 88-17, Loss of DHR, Per Licensee 890127 Commitment.Hardware Changes Will Be Implemented During Unit 1 Tenth & Unit 2 Seventh Refueling Outages ML19332F1241989-12-0707 December 1989 Forwards Response to NRC 890803 Request for Addl Info Re Review of Second 10-yr Inservice Insp Program,Per 891005 Ltr ML19353B0071989-12-0606 December 1989 Forwards Rev 1 to Safeguards Security Contingency Plan.Rev Withheld 1990-09-17
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- Mailing Address Al ttrnI Pow:r Comp ny 600 North 18th Streit Post Offict Box 2641 Birmingham, Alabama 35291 Telepaone 205 783-6090 R. P. Mcdonald Senior Vice President Fhntndge Building / Ob3lllaPower
March 31, 1986 Docket Nos. 50-348 50-364 Director, Nuclear Reactor Regulation ,
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Attention: Mr. L. S. Rubenstein Gentlemen:
Response to NRC Evaluation of Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) for Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant - Units 1 and 2 By letter dated June 12, 1985, the NRC Staff transmitted the Safety Evaluation (SE) for SPDS, Item I.D.2 of NUREG-0737, Supplement 1. This transmittal requested additional information pertaining to Sections III.B and III.E of th: SE. The requested information is attached for your use.
If you have any questions, please advise.
Respect fully bmi,tt ed .
f l l k b(}, 20 b' R. P. Mcdonald RPH/JLO:ddb-D36 Attachment cc: Mr. L. B. Long Dr. J. N. Grace Mr. E. A. Reeves Mr. W. H. Bradford /
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remW e
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m-Attachment Response to NRC Evaluation of SPDS for Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant - Units 1 and 2 l
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r-NRC Request In its evaluation of the SPDS variables, the staff has considered the Westinghouse Owner's Group's " Westinghouse Emergency Response Guidelines (ERGS)
Program," which was reviewed and approved by the Staff, as a principal technical source of variables important to safety. The SPDS variables selected by the licensee and their coordination with guideline safety functions are summarized in Table 1 grouping made by the licensee. While the Staff finds that the variables selected comprise a general comprehensive list, it is noted that the status of
- the following variables .is not discussed in the licensee's submittal:
- 1. Containment Hydrogen Concentration Containment hydrogen concentration is a key parameter used in the emergency guidelines to monitor combustible gas control and to indicate a compromise of the " Containment Conditions" safety function.
- 2. RCS Level The SPDS status of RCS level is not discussed per se in the licensee's submittals; however, an inventory critical scfety function (with supporting variables) is discussed. The SPDS status of RCS level at Farley should be clarified to demonstrate that eithcr RCS level or its functional equivalent is available.
- 3. Source Range Neutron Flux
- 4. Intermediate Range Neutron Flux
- 5. RHR Flow
- 6. Steam Generator (or Steamline) Radiation
- 7. Stack Radiation
- 8. Containment Isolation The above variables do, for given scenarios, provide unique inputs to determinations of status for their respective CSFs, which have not been discussed by the applicant as being satisfied by other variables in the proposed Farley SPDS list. The Staff recommends that the licensee address these variables and and their function by : (1) adding these variables to the Farley SPDS, (2) providing alternate added variables along with justifications that these alternates accomplish the same safety functions for all scenarios, (3) providing justification that variables currently on the Farley SPDS do in fact accomplish the same safety functions for all scenarios, or (4) identifying that these variables are in fact available from the SPDS console.
Additionally, for a rapid assessment of Radioactivity Control, the licensee has not demonstrated how radiation in the secondary system (steam generators and steamlines) is monitored by SPDS when the steam generators and/or their steamlines are isolated. The licensee should discuss this capability.
Page 2 APCo Response
- 1. Containment Hydrogen Concentration Containment hydrogen concentration was not selected as a variable for the SPDS in order to ensure consistency with the emergency operating procedures.
A flammable hydrogen concentration exists only following the metal-water reaction during an inadequate core cooling condition. To arrive at an inadequate core cooling condition a significant quantity of reactor coolant inventory must be released to the containment, most likely a reactor coolant system rupture.
A high containment pressure, rather than a high hydrogen concentration was selected as the indication of the potential for breach of the containment since high pressure will always exist when a high hydrogen concentration exists. However, the reverse is not true (e.g., following a secondary system rupture inside of the containment). Containment pressure is, therefore, a better indication of the potential for containment breach.
In development of the Westinghouse Owners Group Emergency Response Guidelines (ERGS), containment hydrogen was addressed in those areas in which it is potentially present and where containment integrity is challenged.
These areas include plant conditions associated with loss of reactor coolent transients, inadequate core cooling trar.; tents ano transients with in associated containment pressure ir. crease above the value- (hf ah-2 pressure) at which hydrogen ignition poses a containment integrity concern. The hydrogen generation associated with a loss of reactor coolant is addressed in Farley Nuclear Plant (FNP) Emergency Event Procedure (EEP), EEP-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, through sampling and operation of hydrogen recombiners, if appropriate. This treatment serves to initiate early actions to address hydrogen, if required. The Status Trees are used to diagnose inadequate core cooling conditions (the precursor of significant hydrogen-generation and high containment hydrogen concentrations) and containment high pressure conditions (which in combination with high hydrogen concentrations pose a potential integrity concern). Associated Functional Restoration Procedures (FRPs)
FRP-C.1 and FRP-Z.1, respectively, then di rect the operator to sample containment hydrogen concentration and initiate appropriate actions based on hydrogen concentration. This treatment of the_ hydrogen concern is considered an acceptable alternative to including hydrogen concentration in the Containment Status Tree.
In summary, because a hign containment pressure is the most accurate indication of a potential containment integrity challenge, its use has been specified in the Containment Tree, and, therefore, the SPDS. Hydrogen concentration indications are available elsewhere for those actions requiring this indication.
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- 2. RCS Level Reactor vessel level indication is being installed at FNP and will be addert to the SPDS during the Unit 2 Fifth and Unit 1 Eighth Refueling Outages.
The critical safety function status trees are being modified to incorporate the reactor vessel instrumentation.
As an interim solution, the WOG status trees developed for implementation without vessel level indication will be used. When used in conjunction with pressurizer l' vel, adequate indications are available to address the range of possible RCS levels from a normal hot shutdown condition to the generation of a void in the reactor vessal above the top of the core.
- 3. Source Range Neutron Flux Source range startup rate was selected instead of source range neutron flux for display on the SPDS. Post-reactor trip neutron flux decreases into the source range and remains there. While the source range count rate fluctuates, no sustained trending is expected under normal post-trip conditions. The absolute value of the flux in the source range provides little useful information on which to base critical operator actions for reactivity control. A positive startup rate, however, indicates an eventual loss of subcriticality and is the most rapid and reliatle indication of plant safety status potentially requiring an operator response.
Source range flux can be used in situations other than challenges to the fission product barrier (fuel clad) when time (before loss of subcriticality) is not a concern. Source range flux located on nuclear instrumentation panels in the control room can be used as a backup to the SPDS startup rate indication. This, however, requires continuous data manipulation by the operator during a potential challenge to a fission product barrier.
- 4. Intermediate Range Neutron Flux Intermediate range startup rate has been chosen for presentation on the SPDS instead of intermediate range neutron flux for the same reasons as discussed above for source range startup rate and flux. In addition, a positive startup rate in the intermediate range is a more severe challenge to the critical safety function of reactivity control than is a positive startup rate in the source range since less time is allowed for the operating staff to determine that a potential challenge exists and to take corrective action before power is generated.
As was true for the source range, intencediate range neutron flux level is presented elsewhere in the control room and can be used by the operating staff in situations not related to challenges to the fission product barrier or as a backup to SPDS startup rate.
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- 5. RHR Flow RHR Flow is an indirect indication of reactor core cooling and heat removal from the primary system under very limited situations (i.e., it is .;
precursor to the potential loss of core cooling and not a symptom). Core exit temperature and core subcooling margin, both included in the core cooling tree, are the direct means for determining if adequate core cooling exists.
A sustained loss of core cooling does not result in any operator actions requiring use of RHR flow. The high pressure and low pressure safety injection subsystems are used to ensure reactor core cooling. This includes the backup method of feed and bleed cooling as specified in FRP-C.1,
" Response to Inadequate Cora Cooling."
The primary and preferred means of post-reactor trip heat removal from the primary system is through the steam generators. The parameters to monitor heat removal from this path are included in the heat sink tree. Neither the '
tree nor procedures to restore a secondary heat sink require RHR flow for their use. Following a sustained loss of steam generator heat sink the backup neans to remove core heat is with feed and bleed actions.
In summary, based on the Farley emergency operating procedures and critical safety function status trees, the safety function identified in Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737 as " Reactor Core Cooling and Heat Removal from the Primary System" does not necessitate presentation of RHR flow on the Farley SPDS.
RHR flow is readily available to the operating staff, however, in the control room.
- 6. Steam Generator (or Steamline) Radiation The principal use of steam generator or steamline radiation is for the i diagr.osis and control of radiation following a steam generator tube rupture.
! Without a tube rupture the secondary system radioactivity is expected to be
! well within the limits specified in the Farley Technical Specifications. To
, diagnose a tube rupture in a particular steam generator, narrow range water l
level indications ar2 available in each steam generator to detect an uncontrolled level increase. If the level is uncontrollable, a tube rupture has ou,urred. Appropriate actions are then taken to isolate this steam generator and minimize any primary-to-secondary leakage through the break.
These actions, specified in EEP-3, " Steam Generator Tube Rupture," and related procedures, are intended to minimize and terminate l primary-to-secondary leakage. In following these, concerns such as steam l
generator overfill and the concurrent transfer of contaminated primary water are optimally addressed. Control of radioactivity is an inherent requirement in the tube rupture-related procedures. Providing a specific radiation l monitor for each loop is, therefore, not essential for the operating staff to '
control radioactivity and would not provide any information (in additio'1 to i
l steam generator water level) that results in different operator actions or better control of radioactivity, l
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Page 5 Determination of the magnitude of an offsite dose rate is included in the FNP Emergency Implementing Procedures. The FNP Analytical Data Management System (ADMS) is utilized for emergency dose rate calculations. As a result, the radioactivity concentration has not been included in the SPDS.
- 7. Stack Radiation i'
Control of radioactivity, including that exhausted from the stack, is an inherent requirement of the emergency operating procedures. As such, a specific status tree has not been identified, but is implicit in the actions performed by the operating staff.
Specific equipment and actions are available if radioactivity is released within the containment. For example containment filters and spray can be used to control the amount of radioactivity released from containment. In the case of stack radiation releases, little or no control is available once radioactivity travels to the plant ventilation system. Presenting this information to the operating staff will not significantly change any actions that might otherwise be taken.
FNP utilizes a Vent Stack Ra'fiation Monitoring System which interfaces with the ADMS to quantify the magnitude of the release. Actions taken as a result of stack radiation are defined in the FNP Emergency Plan. This information is therefore not presented on the SPDS.
- 8. Containment Isolation Containment isolation was not included in the Farley SPDS since (1) '
containment isolation is verified by the operating staff very shortly after the post-accident response begins and (2) the emergency procedures and status trees are written to protect the fission product barriers thereby minimizing any radioactivity release.
Transients resulting in the potential for increase of radioactivity above the normal Technical Specification allowable limit will result in a safety
, injection signal. Phase A containment isolation occurs automatically on a safety injection signal. Shortly after the operating staff implements EEP-0, i " Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," phase A containment isolation is verified
! if plant conditions require phase A isoletion. If isolation has not occurred it is performed manually. Similarly, if the high containment pressure phase B isolation setpoint is exceeded, isolation occurs automatically and is verified by the opt'ator. Again, it will be performed manually if it has not occurred automatically.
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Page 6 The emergency operating procedures, including the critical safety function status trees, are written and prioritized on the basis of protecting the integrity of the fission product barriers. For example, to protect the primary barrier, the fuel clad and matrix,'the first status tree, "Subcriticality," and related procedures prevent and/or minimize the generation of power. Use of the second status tree " Core Cooling," ensures adequate decay heat remaval . The third status tree, " Heat Sink," provides for the removal of the decay heat generated. The use of these three status trees protect the integrity of the fuel clad / matrix to prevent or minimize the release of radioactivity.
The second fission product barrier, the Reactor Coolant System, is protected by the first three status trees discussed above by minimizing the challenges from inadequate decay heat removal and the fourth status tree, " Reactor Coolant System Integrity."
The third barrier, the containment, is then addressed with the fifth status tree, " Containment."
Containment isolation, and similarly containment ventilation isolation, are verified to have occurred with use of symptom-based " containment" status trees and related procedures. Specifically, high containment pressure is indicative of an accident leading to the potential for release of radioactivty. Therefore, in the containment integrity function restoration procedure addressing high containment pressure, containment phase A isolation is verified and manually performed if necessary. Likewise, for indications of high radioactivity in the containment environment, the appropriate function restoration procedure ensures that the containment ventilation system is isolated and that the plant engineering staff is notified to obtain additional recommendations on operator actions. Even though the status tree does not specifically address containment isolation, the function is performed based on related symptoms in the existing ' r . e.
In summary, upon entering the emergency procedures, following a safety injection signal, containment isolation is verified by the operating staff.
While monitoring the status trees, symptoms indicative of situations where
! containment isolation may be beneficial are used to verify or initiate the containment isolation function and, therefore, are not presented on the
- status tree.
i NRC Request l For the isolation devices between tne core exit temperature monitoring system
, and the SPDS, the licensee shall submit the test results for confirmatory review to support the requir5ments -(Item 3 a through f) identified in the NRC l letter to the licensee dated April 4,1984.
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C Page 7-APCo Response By lett'er dated May 11, 1984 Alabama Power Company informed the NRC that SPDS would be connected to qualified isolators for each thermocouple loop. Subsequent to this letter, Alabama Power Lompany has revised its design for the SPDS/ Thermocouple interface. Thermocouple inputs for SPDS are now planned to be obtained via a fiber-optic data link between SPDS and a qualified inadequate Core Cooling System (ICCS) processor. The physical characteristics of fiber-optics are such that no credible fault can be pastulated for SPDS that will adversely
. affect the ICCS processor. Test results should therefore no longer be applicable.
JLO;eso-D1