ML20154M421

Responds to 851012 Concerns & Recommendations Re Dense Population in Proximity of Facility,Core Melt Frequency & Containment Effectiveness.Concerns Consistent W/Acrs Views on Safety Goals

ML20154M421
Person / Time
Site:	Indian Point
Issue date:	02/27/1986
From:	Palladino N NRC COMMISSION (OCM)
To:	Moeller D AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED
Shared Package
ML20154M401	List: ML20154M398 ML20154M407 ML20154M411 ML20154M421 ML20154M431
References
NUDOCS 8603140260
Download: ML20154M421 (2)

Text

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UNITED STATES

,, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION s* i WASHINGTON,0. C. 20555 e

%*****/ February 27, 1986 CHAIRMAN Dr. Dade W. Moeller 27 Wildwood Drive Bedford, Massachusetts 01730

Dear Dr. Moeller:

The Commission has reviewed your letter of October 12, 1985, which raises issues and recommendations related to the Indian Point Special Proceeding. Your specific conc' erns appear to center on three issues: the dense population in the proximity of Indian Point, core melt frequency and containment effectiveness, which we address in the enclosure.

With regard to the broader issue raised by your letter, the general safety of Indian Point, reasonable individuals can have diverse views on technically complicated issues, particularly on those considered in a proceeding that took almost five years to complete and involved highly judgmental factors. Nevertheless, we believe thit 'che Indian Point decision was, in total, consistent witn the Severe Accident Policy Statement subsequently approved by the Commission and was consistent with ACRS comments on that policy proposal. As stated in the Commission's conclusion on Question 5 of the Special Proceeding (21 NRC at 1075) we do not consider Indian Point to be a risk outlier, i.e., in a high-risk class all its own. However, we do recognize that the plant is in an area of relatively high population density and, as a consequence, warrants continuing effort to assure its safe operation.

The specific technical concerns raised in your letter appear to be consistent with ACRS views expressed on Safety Goals and we will consider them further in that context in the longer term.

Commissioner Asselstine has the following comment:

I believe this response inadequately addresses the matters raised in ycur and your colleagues letter of October 12, 1985. As indicated in my attached separate views on the Indian Point Special Proceeding, I believe the Commission was wrong in adopting the bottom-line results of probabilistic risk assessments, the Commission was wrong in ignoring the uncertainties in the risks associated with the operation of the Indian Point reactors, the Commission was wrong in rejecting the relatively straightforward safety improvements urged by the staff and the Board, and the Commission was wrong in accepting the risk posed by the

l Indian Point plants for the long-term. Other countries'are already backfitting additional safety features at their plants which appear to provide substantial improvements in safety at reasonable costs. It is' unfortunate that U.S.

citizens are not afforded similar protection. I commend you and your colleagues for attempting to bring about safety improvements at the Indian Point reactors for the long-term.

Sincerely, c ri+

f {[a ,(', ,,, -

Nunzio 7. Palladino

Enclosures:

As Stated 1

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