ML20133F778
| ML20133F778 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Indian Point  |
| Issue date: | 07/11/1995 |
| From: | Rathbun D NRC OFFICE OF CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS (OCA) |
| To: | Kelly S HOUSE OF REP. |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20133F757 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-96-514 NUDOCS 9701140351 | |
| Download: ML20133F778 (1) | |
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J1 UNITED STATES 1
j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. - anat j
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2 July 11,1995 The Honorable Sue Kelly a
United States House of Representatives Washington, DC 20515
Dear Congresswoman Kelly:
l This is to acknowledge receipt of your letter dated June 28, 1995, regarding the restart of the Indian Point 3 Nuclear Power i
Plant in Westchester County in New York.
Please be assured that we are working on a response and a reply will be forwarded to you as soon as possible.
Sincerely, f
1 Dennis K. Rathbun, Director Office of Congressional Affairs t
9701140351 970108 PDR FOIA WEISER96-514 PDR
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WAlHIMef oM. o.o. MeeHem July 27, 1995 l
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The Honorable Benjamin A. Climan l
United States House of Representatives i
l Washington, DC 20515-3220
Dear Congressaan Gilman:
I as responding to your request for a review of the concerns about the i
expressed by operation of Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 3 (!P3) dated June 18 your constituent. Dr. Harthe Schulwolf, in her letter to you11 requev j
1995. The princ As you know, IP3 was shut down by the New York Power Authority (N February 1993, to correct several hardware issues and to implement i
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has 4
programmatic improvements.
undertaken significant inspection and assessment efforts since the February 1993 shutdown to evaluate NYPA's progress in resolving te i
concerns and correcting the underlying root causes of the identified 19, 1995, I have enclosed a copy of the NRC's letter of June which modified the IP3 Confirmatory Action Letter and articulated the N deficiencies.
The basis for supporting the conclusion that the plant was ready to resta plant restarted on June 1995, letter addresses the majority of con 27, 1995.
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During the IP3 restart, the NRC implemented an augmented inspec In addition to the three full-time resident 1
inspectors assigned to the site, additional inspectors provided aro assess NYPA's activities.
clock coverage for the first phase of the startup and maintained a NYPA had connitted not to increase inspection effort for about three weeks.
f reactor power above 40 percent until they had performed a self-asse their overall safety perfonsance and notified the NRC staff of the res 7
On July 6,1995, NYPA notified the NRC staff of the re independent augmented inspection effort, we agreed with the findings.
assessment.
Although our augmented startup inspection effo l
d 4
of time, NRC staff will continue to oversee this facility closely.
NYPA has also committed that, after achieving full-power opera 4
conduct a self-assessment of the restart process and they will pres This finding of that self-assessment to the NRC staff in a public meeting, meeting will be held in the vicinity of the site and open for public observation to be followed by a question-and-h j
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The Honorable Gilman 1 Once we determine the details of this meeting, we will publish a notice regarding the time and location.
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Your constituent raises several other concerns that I will elaborate on.
These issues pertain to (1) emergency preparedness (i.e., the population density surrounding the plant), (2) radioactive waste, (3) site location on the Ramapo fault (i.e., seismic design), and (4) cost effectiveness.
With 3
regard to the first issue, it might be helpful to explain the role of emergency planning and preparedness in NRC's defense-in-depth approach to ensuring adequate protection of public health and safety.
Briefly stated, this safety philosophy (1) requires high quality in the design, construction, and operation of nuclear power plants to reduce the likelihood of equipment j
malfunction; (2) recognizes that equipment can fail and operators can make mistakes, therefore requiring safety systems to reduce the chances that malfunctions will lead to accidents that result in the release of fission products from the fuel; and (3) recognizes that in spite of these precautions, l
serious fuel damage accidents can happen, therefore requiring containment structures and other safety features to prevent the release of fission products off site.
The feature of emergency planning added to the defense-in-depth philosophy provides that even in the unlikely event of an offsite fission-product release, reasonable assurance exists that emergency protective actions can be taken to protect the population around nuclear power plants.
Detailed planning is in place for the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) to facilitate prompt protective actions in the event of a radiological emergency at the Indian Point site.
i Each nuclear power plant is required to conduct an annual e::ercise of its emergency plan.
This annual exercise, which is evaluated by the NRC, can involve partial participation by State and local jurisdictions. Once every 2 years, each nuclear power plant is required to conduct a full-participation exercise that is evaluated by both the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the lead Federal agency responsible for evaluating emergency plans for areas around nuclear power plants, and the NRC.
The last full-participation exercise conducted at the Indian Point site was successfully performed in June 1994.
In addition, as part of NRC's res m t readiness review process for IP3, FEMA has received periodic updates of the plant's restart readiness and both FEMA and the NRC maintain that reasonable assurance exists that the public can be protected in the event of a radiological emergency at Indian Point.
With regard to the second issue, commercial nuclear power plants were designed with the capability to safely store both high-level waste (spent fuel) and low-level waste on site.
IP3 has the capacity to store spent fuel until the year 2008. Under the Federal Nuclear Waste Policy Act, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is responsible for ultimate management of the Nation's high-level waste and is evaluating several options, including interim storage of spent fuel.
Until DOE accepts the spent fuel from licensees, the licensees are responsible for storing their spent fuel. As far as a time frame for storing waste on site, as stated in 10 CFR 51.23, the Commission has made a generic determination that, if necessary, spent fuel generated in any reactor can be I
The Honorable Gilman
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ttered safely and without significant environmental im l
a revised or renewed Itcense).
l low-level waste is located on site in an interim low-At the IP3 facility,factlf ty that has the capacity to store the volume of 4
level waste storage The waste that would be produced over the next to years of plant operation.
State of New York is an Agreement State, and as such, has the authority to j
It determine where in that State low-level waste will be
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waste.
With regard to the third issue, as part of the construction pensit and operating Itcense processes, the Indian Point site has undergone thorough geologic and setsste investigations and reviews.
tapitcation in her letter to you, ',here are no active faults at Ramapo fault was thoroughly evaluated and found to be old, inactive, and n Point site.
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- fault under Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 100 definitions.
With regard to the fourth issue, the NRC maintains regulatory oversight of In nuclear facilities for the protection of the public health an Since IP3 is owned by the State of New York, your nuclear power plant. constituent may wish to contact New York State and local with respect to any econcete concerns she may have.
I trust this information will be of assistance to you in responding to your As requested. I as also enclosing Dr. Schulwolf'-
constituent's concerns.
letter.
Sincerely, Orighalsigned by James M. Taylor
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Ja.es M. Taylor Executive 01 rector for Operations
Enclosures:
1.
NRC restart letter dated June 19, 1995 2.
Dr. Schulwolf's letter dated June 18, 1995 i
Distribution: See attached sheet
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f June 19, 1995 Mr. William J. Cahill, Jr.
Chief Nuclear Officer New York Power Authority l
123 Main Street 4
White Plains, NY 10601 i
SUBJECT:
RESTART OF THE IEIAN POIN 3 WCLEAR POWER PLAN j
(N00!FICATION OF CAL-1-93-009)
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Dear Mr. Cahill:
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i The Indian' Point 3 Nuclear Power Plant was shut down by the New York Power j
Authority (NYPA) on February 27, 1993, to correct deficiencies associated with the anticipated transient without scram mitigation system actuation circuitry j
(AMSAC).
In response to a growing list of performance deficiencies, NYPA management decided to keep the plant shut down while effecting plant-wide programmatic improvements.
By letter dated March 26, 1993, NYPA agreed not to l
restart the plant until NYPA management was satisfied with restart readiness I
and the Regional Administrator, Region I, agreed with that conclusion. On June 17, 1993, the NRC issued Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL) 1-93-009, which documented NYPA's restart commitments.
By letter dated June 12, 1995 2
(Enclosure '1), you stated that Ir.dian Point 3 was ready for restart.
j-Significant inspection and assessment efforts have been undertaken by the NRC i
since the February 1993 shutdown to evaluate NYPA's progress in resolving technical concerns and correcting the underlying root causes of the identified l
performance deficiencies. These efforts included the establishment and implementation of a NYPA Assessment Panel (NAP); the conduct of numerous individual resident and region-based inspections; the conduct of an NRC l
special team inspection to determine the root causes for the declining performance; the conduct of NRC team inspections to evaluate the adequacy of
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the fire protection and motor-operated valve programs; an NRC meeting with you on April 3,1995, to review the results of NYPA's startup readiness evaluation i
(SURE); and an NRC Readiness Assessment Team Inspection (RATI) during the i.
period of April 3-21, 1995, to independently evaluate the plant's readiness for restart.
i l-Based on the above, the NRC staff has concluded that sufficient progress has been made to support safe plant restart and power operations.
Our detailed i
assessment to support this conclusion is contained in Enclosure 2 to this j
letter.
l In preparation for restart, NYPA has developed a detailed reactor startup plan to describe the process and self-assessment efforts planned to achieve a safe restart of Indian Point 3.
The NRC has also developed an augmented inspection plan and will provide augmented inspection coverage to monitor unit startup and return to power operation.
Based on your letter dated June 12, 1995, we understand that Indian Point 3 will not exceed 40 percent reactor power until a self-essessment is performed and the NRC staff is notified of the results.
In addition, after achieving full power operation, NYPA again will conduct a
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2 self-assessident and present the results to the NRC staff in a public meeting.
Thus, this letter modifies CAL 1-93-009 to reflect your new commitments as discussed above.
In summary, based on the actions you have taken and our independent review of those actions, the NRC agrees with your assessment that the Indian Point 3 plant is ready for restart.
If you have any questions regarding our assessment, please contact Curtis Cowgill of my staff at 610-337-5233. We appreciate your cooperation.
Sincerely, ORIGINAL SIGNED BY:
Thomas T. Martin Regional Administrator Docket No. 50-286
Enclosures:
1.
NYPA letter dated June 12, 1995 (Readiness to Restart) 2.
Indian Point 3 Restart Readiness l
5
William J. Cahill, Jr.
3 cc w/ encl:
S. Freeman, President R. Schoenberger, Chief Operating Officer L. Hill, Jr., Resident Manager, New York Power Authority W. Josiger, Vice President - Nuclear Operations J. Kelly, Vice President - Regulatory Affairs and Special Projects T. Dougherty, Vice President - Nuclear Engineering R. Deasy, Vice President Appraisal and Compliance Services R. Patch, Director - Quality Assurance G. Wilverding, Manager, Nuclear Safety Evaluation G. Goldstein, Assistant General Counsel C. Faison, Director, Nuclear Licensing A. Donahue, Mayor, Village of Buchanan C. Jackson, Nuclear Safety and Licensing Manager (Con Ed)
C. Donaldson, Esquire, Assistant Attorney General, New York Department of Law Chairman, Standing Committee on Energy, NYS Assembly Chairman, Standing Committee on Environmental Conservation, NYS Assembly E. Nullet, Executive Chair, Four County Nuclear Safety Committee Chairman, Committee on Corporations, Authorities, and Commissions Robert D. Pollard, Union of Concerned Scientists The Honorable Sandra Galef, NYS Assembly Director, Energy & Water Division, Department of Public Service, State of New York A. Song, Assistant Secretary to the Governor F. Valentino, President, New York State Energy Research and Development Authority State of New York, SLO Designee 5
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ENCLOSURE.
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- > NewWrkPbwer tv Authon.ty Wilham J. Cahul, Jr.
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June 12,1995 IPN-95-065 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn:
Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555
SUBJECT:
Indian Point 3 Nuclear Power Plant Docket No. 50-286 Randina== to R= tart Indian Point 3
REFERENCES:
- 1. NYPA letter IPN-93-015, R. E. Beedle to NRC, " Action Plans Regarding the Performance improvement Outage," dated March 26, 1993.
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- 2. NRC Letter, Thomas T. Martin to R. E. Beedle, " Confirmatory Action Letter *-93-009, Restart Commitments," dated June 17,1993.
Dear Sir:
Tha New York Power Authority voluntarily shut down the Indian Point 3 Nuclear Power Pl in February 1993 in response to indications of programmatic weaknesses (Reference NRC issued a confirmatory action letter (Reference 2) which outlined the major milestones be r;: ached prior to retuming Indian Point 3 to service. The confirrr.atory action letter reflec th3 Power Authority's commitment in reference 1 to obtain the agreement of the NRC Regional Administrator prior to restart.
Tha Power Authority has implemented corrective actions and conducted a comprehensive s:lf-assessment program to verify the effectiveness of those corrective actions. Criteria used by tha Power Authority for determining the readiness of Indian Point 3 for restart are discussed in Attachment 1.
During April and May 1995 the Power Authority performed plant heatup using reactor coola pump energy, to conduct system testing. Plant cooldown was initiated on May 28 for maint: nance activities in preparation for reactor restart. The present schedule will allow reactor restart to begin approximately June 21,1995 contingent upon the agreement of the NRC Region i Regional Administrator.
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4 Dockst No. 50-286 IPN-95-065 Page 2 of 2 The startup process for Indian Point 3 includes hold points to assess plant and staff performance. The Power Authority will provide assessment results to the NRC at approximately 30% to 40% power and after reaching full power. The Power Authority will also meet with the NRC after reaching full power to discuss plant and staff performance during the power ascension evolution.
I have reviewed the readiness of Indian Point 3 with the Authority's senior management, including President and Chief Executive Officer S. David Freeman and Chief Operating Officer Robert Schoenberger. We conclude that the actions needed to support the safe restart and t
continued safe operation of the plant are complete, as further desenbed in Attachment 1. The Power Authority anticipates that the maintenance activities identified during hot functional testing will be complete and Indian Point 3 will be ready in all respects for restart.
-We request the agreement of the NRC to restart the reactor. Attachment 11 contains the commitments made by the Power Authority in this submittal. If you have any questions, please contact me.
Very truly yours, Y
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W. J. Cahill, Jr.
Chief Nuclear Officer Attachments cc:
Mr. Thomas T. Martin Regiona! Administrator / Region I U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406-1415 Mr. Curtis J. Cowgill, Chief Reactor Projects Branch No.1 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region i 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406-1415 Mr. Nicola F. Conicella, Project Manager Project Directorate I-1 Division of Reactor Projects 1/ll U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop 14 B2 Washington, DC 20555 i
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Resident inspectors' Office Indian Point 3 Nuclear Power Plant i
P.O. Box 337 Buchanan, NY 10511
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ATTACHMENT I TD IPN 05065 READINESS TO Rp8tTART IND!*N PrWT 3 NUct CAR FOWER PLmT i
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INTRODUCTION:
The New York Power Authority voluntarily shut down the Indian Point 3 Nuclear Power PlI in February 1993 in response to indications of heyammatic weaknesses (Reference i
NRC issued a confirmatory action letter (Reference 2) which outlined the major milestones t be reached prior to retuming Indian Point 3 to service following the outage. Included in the confirmatory action letter is the condition that the Power Authority obtain the agreement of t!
NRC Region i Regional Administrator prior to restart.
i The Power Authority developed the Restart and Continuous improvement Plan (RCIP, i
Reference 3) which describes the objectives, strategies and action plans designed to ad the root and contributing causes of the performance decline at Indian Point 3. The RCIP als defined criteria. in three categories, to be used by the' Power Authority for determining i
readiness to restart. The following sections discuss how these criteria for restart have been satisfied.
II. MANAGEMENT ISSUES:
i The Restart Action Plans detailed in the RCIP identified specific actions needed to correct resolve management issues 'which contributed to the decline in performance at Indian Point 3.
Implementation of the Restart Action Plans, during the second half of 1994, was fol self-assessment program (Start Up Readiness Evaluation) to verify the implementation and i
i the effectiveness of the corrective actions. The Power Authority notified the NRC of the completion of the Start Up Readiness Evaluation (Reference 4) and invited the NRC to conduct a Readiness Assessment Team Inspection. The Power Authority provided a detailed i
discussion of the results and conclusions of the Start Up Readiness Evaluation at the pub j
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entrance meeting for that inspection on April 3,1995.
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implementation of the Restart Action Plans and the performance of the self-assessment a
provide assurance that proper management controls are in place. The RCIP also contains 4
action plans which describe specific steps to be taken after restart to ensure continuous improvement at Indian Point 3.
The Power Authority has developed a procedure which govems the overall startup evolution from the beginning of heatup to the completion of testing at 100% power. The Startup and 1
2 Power Ascension Procedure (Reference 5) includes provisions for senior management involvement and establishes the methodology for ensuring the safe, controlled and deliberate i
retum to service of Indian Point 3. The startup staffing plan includes a Senior Manager on Shift to provide management representation and oversight during plant startup.
An important aspect of the Authority's performance improvement effort is the continuation of self-assessment activities. The Startup and Power Ascension Procedure includes self-assessment hold points where the effectiveness of management controls and the performance
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of plant staff and systems are evaluated. At each hold point, a decision is required by the Resident Manager and the Plant Leadership Team (PLT) to continue plant start up.
information to support decision making can include input from Department Managers, the i
j Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC) and Quality Assurance.
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e Dockst No. 50-286 IPN 95-065 Attachment i Page 2 of 4 i
lit. MATERIAL CONDITION AND EQUIPMENT READINESS:
During the outage, the Power Authority completed thousands of work activities and hundreds i
of modifications to improve the material condition of the plant. As of June 9, there are approximately 250 work requests to be completed prior to reactor restart. Work requests include corrective and preventive maintenance, modification work requests and acceptance tests, and operations surveillance tests. The prerequisite checklist from the Startup and j
Power Ascension Procedure includes a requirement to verify that applicable work requests are completed prior to criticality.
The Authority's Restart and Continuous improvement Plan included a System Certification' i
Program to provide a structured process for evaluating systems prior to retuming them to 4
service for plant operations. The Authority provided additionalinformation (Reference 6) to the NRC regarding this program in response to a meeting with the NRC on February 1,1995.
I There are 74 plant systems / subsystems that are covered by the System Certification Progr Certification of 72 systems is complete and the remaining 2 will be complete prior to reactor l
restart.
Plant heatup, using reactor coolant pump energy, commenced on April 17,1995 to perform the equipment and system testing which required plant conditions above cold shutdown.
Normal operating temperature and pressure wue achieved on May 9,1995. Plant cooldown was commenced on May 28,1995 to perform maintenance activities, including replacement of reactor vessel head 0-rings. Maintenance work is presently scheduled to be complete to support reactor restart approximately June 21.
IV. AEGULATORY ISSUES:
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The NRC Restart Action Plan (RAP, Reference 7) identifies 60 technical, programmatic and management oversight issues which must be addressed by the Authority prior to the restart of Indian Point 3. These issues are in addition to the actions specified in the confirmatory action letter. The Authority has provided information to the NRC to resolve these issues.
During the Readiness Asussment Team inspection (RATI), the NRC identified (Reference 8) six additional issues which regiired resolution prior to restart. The Authority has completed or will complete prior to reactor restart the following actions:
1.
Plant Alann Response Procedures The Power Authority reviewed alarm response procedures and identified 21 which
. required revision. The 21 procedures have been revised, approved by the Plant Operating Review Committee (PORC) and issued for use.
2.
Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Building Ventilation Additional system testing was performed which verified proper operation of the fans and temperature controllers as stated in Reference 8.
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i Dock:t No. 50 286 IPN-95-065
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Attachment I Page 3 of 4 3.
Breaker PanelLoad Schedules The Power Authority has completed the scheduled walkdowns of breaker panels in the power plant and is in the process of updating controlled drawings for use by plant i
operators. During the walkdowns, undocumented modifications were identified. A i
' review of past operability is being performed and the affected circuits are being 3
i disconnected, deenergized, or authorized as temporary modifications or design j
changes. Actions to update the breaker panel controlled documents and address the -
j undocumented modifications will be completed prior to reactor restart.
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4.
Setpoint Change Control i
Corrective actions taken are as stated in Reference 8. Setpoint change request packages were reviewed to identify plant documents c;;&W revision. Documents identified by' the review were updated and additional guidance was issued to supplement the setpoint change control procedure.
3 5.
Control Room Drawings
- t Information from 122 Document Change Requests has been incorporated into the j
control room vital drawings.
i 6.
Turnover of Design Changes to the Operations Department Corrective actions taken are as stated in Reference 8. A representative sample of 1
design changes was reviewed to ensure that plant procedures had been appropriately i
j updated.
The Power Authority uses the Action and Commitment Tracking System (ACTS) to record and track management, technical and administrative issues, including those identified as regulatory commitments. As of June 9 there are 11 ACTS items remaining to be completed prior to j
reactor restart.
A roving fire watch is in place for penetration seals until evaluation of information used in the i
fire seal analysis is complete, as committed during the NRC special inspection to review fire protection and 10 CFR 50 Appendix R restart items (Reference 9). Restart ACTS items related to fire protection and 10 CFR 50 Appendix R are csw@te and fire protection related restart work requests will be complete prior to restart, t
V.
CONCLUSION-The Authority concludes that corrective actions needed to support the safe restart and l
continued safe operation of the plant are complete. This conclusion is based on:
Successfulimplementation of the Authority's Restart and Continuous j
1mprovement Plan (RCIP) Restart Action Plans.
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Dockit No. 50 286 IPN-95-065 j
Attachment I Page 4 of 4 Completion of the Start Up Readiness Evaluation self-assessment program.
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- Resolution of regulatory issues identified as requirements for criticality.
Successful plant heatup from cold shutdown to normal operating temperature and pressure for system testing and implementation of assessment hold points.
The use of established administrative tools to track the completion of work activities and other prerequisites required prior to commencing reactor restart.
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The Power Authority anticipates that Indian Point 3 will be ready in all respects for restart approximatelp June 21,1995 pending completion of work activities summarized in Sections ll!
and IV.
1 VI. REFERENCES-1.
NYPA letter IPN-93-015, R. E. Beedle to NRC, " Action Plans Regarding the Performance improvement Outage," dated March 26,1993.
2.
NRC letter, Thomas T. Martin to R. E. Beedle, " Confirmatory Action Letter 1-93-009, 1
j Restait Commitments," dated June 17,1993.
3.
NYPA Restart and Continuous improvement Plan for Indian Point 3, Revision 1, dated November 4,1994.
4.
NYPA letter IPN 95-036, W. J. Cahill, Jr., to NRC, " Start Up Readiness Evaluation,"
dated March 16,1995.
1 4
5.
Indian Point 3 Procedure SUP-95-01, "Startup and Power Ascension Procedure."
4 6.
NYPA letter IPN-95-019, L M. Hill to NRC, " System Certification Plogram," dated February 23,1995.
7.
NRC letter, R. W. Cooper to William Cahill, Jr., " Revision and Status Update No. 4 of j
the Indian Point 3 Restart Action Plan," dated March 8,1995.
1 8.
NRC letter, R. W. Cooper to L Hill, Jr., "NRC Readiness Assessment Team Inspection (RATI) Report No. 50-286/95-80," dated May 25,1995.
9.
NRC letter, J. T. Wiggins to L. M. Hill, "Special inspection to Review Fire Protection and Appendix R Restart items, inspection Report No. 50-286/95-81," dated May 11, 1995.
ATTACHMENT ll TO IPN-95-065 COMMITMENT UST Commitment Number Commitment Description Due Date iPN-95-065-01 Provide restart self-assessment results to NRC at Prior to continuing power approximately 30% to 40% power.
ascension IPN 95 065-02 Provide restart self-assessment results to NRC Following operation at after reaching full power and meet with NRC to 100% power discuss plant and staff performance during the power ascension evolution.
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ENCLOSURE 2 INDIAN POINT 3 RESTART READINESS TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF CONTENTS............................
1
1.0 BACKGROUND
2 2.0 NYPA ASSESSMENT PANEL FORMATION..................
3 30 NRC ASSESSMENT OF RESTART READINESS................
4
3.1 INTRODUCTION
4 3.2 NRC RESTART ISSUE CLOSURE..................
4 3.3 READINESS ASSESSMENT TEAM INSPECTION RESULTS 5
3.4 RESTART READINESS ASSESSMENT CHECKLIST 7
3.4.1 ROOT CAUSE IDENTIFICATION AND CORRECTION 7
3.4.2 LICENSEE MANAGEMENT..................
10 3.4.3 PLANT AND CORPORATE STAFF...............
11 l
3.4.4 PHYSICAL READINESS OF THE PLANT............
12 3.4.5 COMPLIANCE WITH REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS........
14 3.4.6 COORDINATION WITH INTERESTED AGENC.iES/ PARTIES.....
15 4.0 RESTART COORDINATION 15 5.0 OTHER ISSUES 16 5.1 LATEST SALP.........................
16 5.2 FIRE BARRIER PENETRATION SEALS 16
6.0 CONCLUSION
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1.0 BACKGR0LAS The Indian Point 3 Nuclear Power Plant, owned and operated by the New York Power Authority (NYPA), is a Westinghouse four-loop, 965 megawatt (electric) 4 pressurized-water reactor located 24 miles north of New York City.
i The NRC's Indian Point 3 SALP report for the period ending August 1992 indicated an overall' decline in performance. Although the licensee continued to display superior performance in the radiological controls functional area, the SALP noted weaknesses in the operations, maintenance / surveillance, emergency preparedness, engineering / technical support, and safety assessment / quality verification functional areas. The most signfficant weaknesses were in the engineering / technical support functional area.
In general, the overall weak performance resulted from inadequate management oversight.
Specifically, NYPA was not effective in-implementing corrective actions for both long-standing and newly emerging 1
issues.
The weak performance was also evidenced by the escalated enforcement record of. Indian Point 3.
Between May 1992 and July 1993, Indian Point.3 received eight Severity Level III violations, with civil penalties totaling
$762,500.
In January 1993, NYPA submitted a Performance Improvement Plan (PIP) for Indian Point 3 to the NRC.
The plan addressed NYPA's self-assessment efforts and the performance issues noted in the SALP report.
On February 27, 1993, NYPA shut down Indian Point 3 to correct deficiencies associated with the anticipated transient without scram mitigation system actuation circuitry (AMSAC) system and with programatic weaknesses in the surveillance testing program.
However, the growing number of performance deficiencies identified by NRC and licensee personnel prompted NYPA to keep the plant shutdown while effecting plant-wide programmatic improvements.
By letter dated March 26, 1993, NYPA committed to make necessary programmatic improvements before resuming power operations.
In addition, NYPA officials i
committed not to restart the plant until it was satisfied with restart readiness and until the NRC agreed with this conclusion.
In May 1993, the NRC conducted a Special Inspection Team at Indian Point 3 and again confirmed that significant fundamental weaknesses in licensee programs and staff performance existed at the plant. As stated in the inspection report, "The team determined that the root causes for the declining
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performance of Indian Point Unit 3 were weak managerial processes, controls and skills." The team also identified two contributing causes.
First, NYPA failed to identify and resolve underlying root causes for problems identified 3
by_ the Quality Assurance (QA) organization.
Second, NYPA's self-assessment process was ineffective because the function was fragmented and selectively applied and the onsite and offsite oversight committees were narrowly focused.
At the Senior Management Meeting on June 15 and 16, 1993, the_ plant was added to the list of facilities which, while still authorized to operate by the NRC, warranted increased NRC headquwters and regional oversight because of declining performance (i.e., the NRC's "watchlist"). On June 17, 1993, the NRC issued Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL) 1-93-009 which documented the
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restart commitments made by NYPA.
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j Over the succeeding months, several PIP action plans were completed by NYPA.
i However, NYPA concluded that the existing programs and efforts to improve the performance of Indian' Point 3 were not sufficiently effective to justify returning the plant to service, nor were they effective in creating a 1
foundation for. long-term, sustained improvement.
Significant performance problems continued to occur even though prog ans and process improvements l
I designed to correct-those deficiencies had been implemented. On December 17, 1993, the NRC met with NYPA to discuss the progress and status of the PIP.
In a letter to NYPA dated December 22, 1993, the NRC documented its concern i
regarding the effectiveness of the PIP as at ir.t w rated plan for overall i
performance improvement at the station, in light of recurring plant events and -
procedural violations.
a l
In January 1994, NYPA senior management selected a team of plant and corporate personnel to perform a root cause analysis for the decline in performance at i
both Indian Point 3 and the NYPA corporate office, and to develop a
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comprehensive and integrated Restart and Continuous Improvement Plan (RCIP).
i The RCIP project was completed in May 1994 and by letter dated May 27, 1994, was. formally submitted to the NRC for review.
i l
In August 1994, the NRC's NYPA Assessment -Panel (NAP) completed its' initial review of the RCIP and concluded that if properly implemented, the RCIP should i
correct the fundamental issues responsible for the performance decline at Indian Point 3.
This conclusion was documented in an NRC letter dated August
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8, 1994.
It appeared that the PIP's shortcomings had been assessed by NYPA and had been corrected in the RCIP.
2.0 NYPA ASSESSNENT PANEL FORMATION i
A significant NRC effort was required to follow licensee actions to correct the growing number of deficiencies in late 1992. Therefore, in January 1993, the NRC expanded the already existing FitzPatrick Assessment Panel into the NAP.
This action would allow the NRC to continue to monitor FitzPatrick as i
well as closely follow NYPA's implementation of the Indian Point 3 improvement program and to assist in the coordination of NRC resources for overall performance monitoring and assessment.
The NAP is comprised of personnel from both Region I and NRC headquarters.
The NAP subsequently assumed the I
additional role as a restart panel.
The responsibilities of the NAP relative j
to Indian Point 3 are to:
o monitor and assess the licensee's performance e
coordinate the inspection program for the facility y
e recommend and coordinate enforcement activities
]
e assess the adequacy of the Performance Improvement Program (and subsequently the RCIP) and monitor its implementation j
e review the licensee's response to inspection findings and assess the adequacy of associated corrective actions e
identify, evaluate, and track restart issues 3
provide a plant restart recommendation and basis after NYPA completes l
its restart program i;
i i
l
4 In July 1993, the NAP developed the Indian Point 3 Restart Action Plan (RAP).
2 The RAP, which was developed from NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0350, " Staff Guidelines for Restart Approval," established guidance fcr the NRC to follow and listed specific items that the NRC must complete before concluding that Indian Point 3 was ready to restart.
The RAP consisted of three parts.
Section 1, " Restart Process Checklist," listed the steps of the NRC overall review process for Indian Point 3 restart.
Section 2, " Restart Issues Checklist," listed plant-specific restart issues and the criteria used to develop these issues. Section 3, " Restart Readiness Assessment Checklist,"
contained " Areas for Assessment" covering items associated with the performance decline at Indian Point 3, its ultimate shutdown and other matters that should be evaluated before restart because of the length of the shutdown.
Each assessment area contained a list of " Applicable Items," which was used in part as guidance for developing the inspection plan for the Readiness Assessment Team Inspection (RATI).
Enough items were selected in each area to allow a sound assessment of readiness for restart.
3.0 letc ASSESSMENT OF RESTART READINESS
3.1 INTRODUCTION
As previously stated, the NAP developed a comprehensive restart readiness evaluation process to ensure that required restart issues were thoroughly reviewed and assessed by the NRC before plant restart.
The Indian Point 3 RAP was the guiding document used to assess restart readiness.
In addition, the NRC conducted a RATI whose principal objective was to perform an in-depth evaluation of the degree of readiness of NYPA administrative controls, programs, plant equipment, and personnel to support safe restart and operation of Indian Point 3.
The RATI assessed performance in the areas of Management Programs / Independent Oversight /Self-Assessment, Operations, Maintenance and Surveillance, and Engineering and Technical Support.
The RATI also closed six Indian Point 3 RAP restart issues.
The preliminary results of the RATI were discussed at an exit meeting, open for public observation, on April 27, 1995.
During the public participation portion of this meeting, no new issues were raised that impacted the NRC's restart readiness assessment.
The RATI inspection report was issued on May 25, 1995.
The following sections address the areas that were assessed by the NRC to determine if Indian Point 3 was ready for restart. The areas assessed are consistent with the Indian Point 3 RAP and NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0350.
3.2 NRC RESTART ISSUE CLOSURE Section 2 of the Indian Point 3 RAP contained 60 technical, programmatic, and management oversight issues which required resolution prior to restart.
Fifty-four of these issues were inspected, closed, and documented in various NRC inspection reports.
Six issues were specifically assigned to and closed by the RATI.
These latter issues included operations effectiveness, maintenance effectiveness, management expectations, QA effectiveness, backlog reviews, and NYPA staff attitude with respect to performance improvement.
The Indian Point 3 RAP lists each issue, the inspection report (s) where resolution of the issues are discussed, and the NAP meeting number and date when closure
5 of each issue was confirmed. The inspection effort required for restart issue i
closure was above and beyond the normal NRC site inspection program that-1 continued during the shutdown.
Final resolution of each restart issue was confirmed by the NAP during regularly scheduled meetings.
Therefore, the NRC concludes that all restart i
issues are closed.
3.3 READINESS ASSESSMENT TEAM INSPECTION RESULTS The RATI reviewed Indian Point 3's performance in'the areas of Management Programs / Independent Oversight /Self-Assessment, Operations, Maintenance and Surveillance, and Engineering and Technical Support. The RATI consisted of 10 inspectors plus a team leader and included representatives from all four NRC regional offices and headquarters.
The majority of the onsite inspection activities took place between April 3 and 21, 1995, with certain activities occurring prior to these dates.
Inspection activities were conducted during day shifts, off shifts, and weekends, and over 1000 hours0.0116 days <br />0.278 hours <br />0.00165 weeks <br />3.805e-4 months <br />
? direct inspection-of plant activities was accumulated.
During the conduct of the inspection, the team identified six new issues that were considered appropriate for resolution by NYPA prior to restart.of the facility:
(1). Plant Alarm Response Procedures The team identified that several alarm response procedures did not reference the alarm actuating devices or alarm setpoints.
A problem was also noted regarding the failure to revise an alarm response procedure following a modification.
(2) Auxiliary Feedwater Building Ventilation Fans The team identified that the Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Building J
temperature controllers were not set in accordance with the system drawings and the temperature controllers and fans were not routinely functionally tested.
(3)
Breaker Panel Load Schedules The team noted that the load schedules located inside electrical distribution panels were not controlled documents and did not match the system drawings. The load schedules posted inside the panels did not reflect plant modifications that had added or removed loads.
(4)
Setpoint Changes The closeout process for setpoint changes was not clearly proceduralized.
The setpoint change control procedure and process did not ensure that all procedures and documents affected by a setpoint change were revised.
r
-,a
- - -. +
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(5) Drawing Changes i
The team noted that 122 Requests for Document Change (RDC) were backkgged against the " Type A" (control room vital) drawings.
The team i
concluded that the information provided in the RDCs should be available j
to the operators.
i
'(6) Design Change Closecuts 4
i The team found that a design change turnover had been completed by the responsible engineer without the adequate review or concurrence by the Operations Department as required by plant administrative procedures.
i The team concluded that a review of similar design change'closecut packages should be conducted to ensure that. plant procedures had been appropriately updated.
As discussed in NYPA's letter dated June 12, 1995, each of these issues has j
been or will be completed prior to restart. The NRC has confirmed that each of these issues has been or will be adequately addressed. Thus, there are no outstanding RATI issues affecting restart of the facility.
RATI Overall Conclusion The team determined that a comon understanding of management expectations and a favorable atmosphere for problem identification existed at Indian Point 3.
Management expectations regarding safety had been clearly communicated to the plant _ staff. The Quality Assurance organization had taken appropriate measures to implement an effective Quality Assurance program.
The offsite and onsite review committees were providing quality oversight of-important processes and programs. The problem identification process and the corrective action program were sufficiently implemented to identify and_ resolve plant deficiencies in a timely manner.
Self-assessment programs have improved over the past year.
r During the period that the team was on the_ site, the operators maintained the plant in a safe condition. Command and control of operational activities was generally good. Operators were cognizant of plant conditions and control room annunciators.
In general, operations procedures were technically adequate, administrative requirements were clearly delineated and proceduralized, and adequate processes were in place to control plant configuration.
The maintenance staff demonstrated a conservative approach to the performance and completion of maintenance activities.
Plant and system material condition was_ good.
Identified plant deficiencies were properly prioritized and scheduled to support resolution in a timely manner.
Implementation of the preventive maintenance and the surveillance testing programs was also good.
The RATI determined that the plant material condition of safety systems and components was good.
Further, the RATI concluded that planning and maintenance programs and processes were adequate to support a safe plant restart.
Based on observations of the engineering organization, the RATI concluded that it was capable of providing timely support for emergent
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{
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j technical issues; additionally, the engineering and technical support staff, procedures, orograms, and processes were in place to support a safe restart and continued plant operation.
4 The major engineering organizations were available to the plant and their support to the station was effective.
Both the Design Engineering and Technical Services organizations are taking appropriate steps to control their backlogs of work and the backlogs have been adequately screened for plant restart issues.
The permanent and temporary modification processes were adequate to ensure that plant safety margins were not reduced.
Safety i
evaluations contained adequate technical detail that supported reasonable conclusions.
j Based on the above, the NRC concludes that staffing, plant equipment, programs and processes are adequate to support safe restart and continued operation of Indian Point 3.
1 3.4 RESTART READINESS ASSESSMENT CHECKLIST As previously discussed, Section 3 of the Indian Point 3 RAP contained six
" Areas for Assessment," involving issues broader than specific restart issues, that the NRC staff needed to assess before concluding that the plant was ready to restart.
The six areas for assessment are discussed below.
The information used by the NRC staff to develop its conclusion was obtained, as applicable, from (1) resident and specialist inspections (2) inspections assessing restart issues (3) the RATI (4) NAP activities and (5) NRC
]
management visits.
3.4.1 ROOT CAUSE IDENTIFICATION AND C0RRECTION 1
In mid-1992 NYPA recognized that the performance of Indian Point 3 was declining. An assessment was conducted to identify the causes of performance problems and to develop an improvement program.
As previously discussed, the j
PIP was developed and subsequently submitted to the NRC on January 14, 1993.
However, subsequent NRC inspections and continued weak performance in some areas questioned the usefulness of the PIP as an integrated plan for overall i
performance improvement of the station.
NYPA performed a second review and
)
finalized its list of root and contributing causes in the RCIP.
NYPA found six primary root causes:
e Management did not demonstrate the ludership, interpersonal skills, or the credibility to provide a work environment that encouraged open communication, teamwork, innovation, and trust.
i e
Senior management did not establish the vision or provide the direction to drive the organization's agenda.
Issue identification, assessment, and problem resolution processes were not well managed and did not result in lasting correction of issues and problems.
Management did not establish clear performance expectations, provide i.
i effective coaching and feedback, or hold people accountable for meaningful parformance results.
4 l
8 i
e Management of change was ineffective, e
e Roles and responsibilities were not sufficiently defined to support j
' effective organizational performance.
j NYPA found six contributing causes:
j e
NYPA management did not employ industry experience to establish and
-implement effective performance standards.
4 e
Information and direction were unclear and often not communicated effectively.
e Policies and procedures were inadequate to support acceptable station performance.
They were overly complex, contained technical inaccuracies, and were ineffectively enforced.
e The quality and rate of completion of work by the maintenance function did not support plant needs.
e Information management systems did not support management needs.
e Engineering procedures and products did not effectively support plant operations and maintenance.
Based on the above findings, NYPA developed a comprehensive, long-term RCIP in May 1994.
The plan was designed to improve overall performance at the plant and corporate office by correcting the twelve root and contributing causes.
NYPA also established a Restart Management Team (RMT) to oversee the RCIP.
The RMT, which consisted of the senior managers from NYPA's Nuclear Generation Department, was chartered with directing actions necessary to restart Indian Point 3.
The RCIP was revised in November-1994; however, this revision did not change the 12 root and contributing causes as delineated in the original RCIP.
Corrective actions (i.e., action plans) to address the 12 root and contributing causes are addressed in the RCIP.
The NRC's NAP conducted a thorough review of the RCIP.
In a letter to NYPA dated August 8, 1994, the NRC concluded that the RCIP was a comprehensive plan that addressed the root causes for the previous decline in plant performance, provided appropriate corrective actions, and provided a reasonable process for assessing the effectiveness of those corrective actions.
In a management meeting open for public observation held at the Indian Point 3 site on November 17, 1994, NYPA presented the status of its improvement program, the RCIP, and the results achieved to date.
NYPA concluded that progress was being made, but further efforts were warranted.
Between December 5 and 16, 1994, NYPA performed a Startup Evaluation for Readiness Team (SERT) inspection.
The purpose of this self-assessment was to determine, through evaluation of objective evidence, the effectiveness of corrective actions and improvements relative to restart readiness of Indian Point 3.
The SERT concluded that additional work was needed to prepare Indian Point 3 for restart, but that NYPA management had made significant improvements in both plant and corporate activities during the shutdown.
These significant improvements included improved programs and processes, increased employee involvement in decision making, improved corporate support, improved 'amployee morale and confidence in management, and improved independent oversight.
However, additional effort would be required to make a number of areas fully
i i
9 effective and capable of supporting restart.
The NAP concluded that the SERT took a critical look at NYPA's programs and made appropriate recommendations for improvement.
Over the next several months, NYPA's Start Up Readiness Evaluation (SURE),
I which is described in the RCIP, continued an organized framework of I
assessments and reviews necessary to demonstrate that Indian Point 3 was ready j
for restart.
NYPA's letter dated March 16. 1995, informed the NRC that the SURE for Indian Point 3 had been completed; the letter also delineated some i
items that needed to be addressed prior to restart and requested the NRC to perform the Readiness Assessment Team Inspection.
The NRC staff reviewed the licensee's Startup Plan and the SURE program, including the associated elements of the System certification, Operational Readiness Review, Startup Evaluation for Readiness Team (SERT), and Quality Assurance Department Oversight.
This review was conducted to ensure that NYPA had adequately assessed and resolved outstanding issues and had developed a detailed plan for conducting a plant restart.
The NRC staff concluded that l
the startup plan was detailed and thorough and provided appropriate oversight for plant restart; the SURE program provided plant management an appropriate tool for identifying restart issues, and plant management had provided sound oversight in the resolution of these issues.
The NRC staff reviewed the Deviation Event Report (DER) process to determine the effectiveness of the program in identifying, prioritizing, tracking, and resolving the root causes of problems.
The NRC staff interviewed cognizant plant staff and conducted a review of open and closed DERs.
The NRC staff concluded that the DER process was being adequately implemented to identify i
and resolve plant deficiencies in an effective and timely manner.
The NRC staff assessed the effectiveness of the QA organization to give plant management feedback on overall plant performance.
The NRC staff conducted interviews, reviewed audit reports and findings, observed several QA meetings, and assessed the open QA findings to ensure that items important to support plant restart had been scheduled for completion prior to restart. The NRC staff concluded that the QA organization had taken the appropriate measures to 1
establish an effective QA program at Indian Point Unit 3, and station management's commitment to establish the QA Department as an integral oversight organization has enhanced its effectiveness.
The NRC staff reviewed recently conducted self-assessment activities in the areas of operations, maintenance, and training.
The self-assessment programs have improved over the past year.
The currently implemented program provides the basic performance data necessary to identify significant performance issues, and management is using this information appropriately to identify and i
resolve problems.
The NRC concluded that these programs have been j
- sufficiently implemented to. support safe startup.
j Overall, by implementing the RCIP, NYPA has made significant changes to promote both short-and long-term improvements in performance.
Corporate i
management has provided substantial resources and oversight.
The NRC staff will continue to monitor the implementation of this improvement program via
10 the NRC inspection program and through periodic meetings with the licensee.
The NAP will continue to be the focus for NRC oversight of the Indian Point 3 facility until NYPA demonstrates sustained performance improvement.
3.4.2 LICENSEE MANAGEMENT NYPA has demonstrated a serious commitment to improvement and has provided the management attention and resources necessary to implement its RCIP effectively. NYPA has also made major corporate and site organizational and personnel changes designed to improve performance at the facility.
Since the shutdown in early 1993, the following changes occurred within the NYPA corporate organization: new Chairman of the Board; new President and Chief Executive Officer; new Chief Nuclear Officer; new Vice President of Appraisal, Compliance and Regulatory Affairs (Quality Assurance); new Vice President Engineering; and establishment of a Chief Operating Officer position.
Establishment of the Regulatory Affairs and Special Projects corporate department occurred in October 1994 when the NYPA licensing organization was restructured.
The new licensing organization has one corporate director, and each site (Indian Point 3 and FitzPatrick) has one licensing manager reporting to the Vice President Regulatory Affairs and Special Projects.
These positions were filled with persons from outside as well as within the NYPA organization to provide site and corporate management with a broader industry perspective in operating and managing Indian Point 3.
Observations to date indicate that this organization has been effective in supporting the licensee's improvement efforts.
The following major management changes occurred at the site: new Resident Manager; new General Manager of Support Services; new General Manager of Operations; new General Manager of Maintenance; establishment of a Site Engineering Director; and elevation of the Training Manager position to a General Manager of Training.
The NRC has seen significant improvement in management oversight, direction and support. Management has provided resources for extensive plant modifications, and has increased staffing in operations, engineering, and licensing. Site and corporate management involvement in plant activities and operational concerns has clearly improved, and so has the communication of management expectations and standards of perfonnance to the plant and corporate staff.
Improvements in planning and scMduling of activities have been evident.
Managers fostaring improved accountability, responsibility, and attention to detail have been observed.
NYPA management has encouraged improved horizontal and vertical communications and teamwork at the site and between the site and the corporate office.
NYPA management has also established a work environment conducive to problem identification and has established improved programs to identify, prioritize, and resolve significant issues.
Programs for root cause an? lysis and the evaluation and utilization of operating experience have been upgraded.
f 11 Through developing and effectively implementing the RCIP, NYPA has demonstrated its ability to successfully evaluate performance and to factor the results of those evaluations into improved program and personnel performance.
The QA program at the site has been substantially improved and is being used as an effective management tool.
Satisfactory performance of the onsite Plant Operations Review Comittee (PORC) and the offsite Safety Review Committee (SRC) has been demonstrated.
As previously stated, NYPA developed a startup plan to describe the process and management review necessary to support a safe organized return to service of the plant.
The plan describes the physical and administrative requirements for startup.
The plan also describes approaches for self-assessments of the startup process. As part of the plan, recommendations will be made to the Resident Manager for the continuation of plant startup when milestones are completed and activities leading up to these milestones are assessed.
The plan also requires a senior manager to be assigned to each shift to provide continuous management presence and to supplement the shift supervisor during the startup.
The NRC found that the plan was comprehensive and contained sufficient checks and balances for decision making, feedback of information, and sound judgements for a safe plant startup.
Overall, the NRC staff concludes that NYPA management has clearly communicated its expectations to the staff, is providing appropriate direction and oversight of plant activities, and is ready to support restart of the unit.
3.4.3 PLANT AND CORPORATE STAFF The NRC staff condJcted numerous interviews of plant staff and observed meetings to ensure that plant safety issues were being communicated to the proper levels of management. The NRC assessed the licensee's effectiveness in i
communicating management expectations to the plant staff in the areas of problem identification, procedure adherence, and work safety practices.
Based on the common understanding of management expectations and the favorable atmosphere for problem identification, the staff determined that the management team adequately provided direction to the NYPA plant staff.
In addition to routine inspection observations, the NRC observed operations activities during plant heatup.
The NRC observed all shifts, including weekend and backshift activities.
The NRC assessed operator performance regarding administrative procedures and management expectations.
The staff found that operators maintained the plant in a safe condition.
The NRC staff reviewed and assessed the quality of plant operations procedures to ensure the procedures were adequate to conduct a safe plant restart.
A sample of operations procedures were found to be technically adequate.
The NRC staff assessed operator control board awareness and annunciator response on all shifts. The NRC also assessed the quality of the Shift Manager and Control Room Supervisor command and control, and operations management involvement in day-to-day plant operation.
The NRC found the quality of command and control to be generally good.
The NRC observed that teamwork in the control room was good, as evidenced by various shift members
l 12 identifying and correcting problems.
Operators were cognizant of plant conditions and control room annunciators.
Operations management was actively involved in operational activities.
The NRC staff verified that operator training and qualifications were current and that key plant changes made during the performance improvement outage were addressed in operator training. The staff concluded that operator requalification training was up to date.
Operator training had been conducted on plant modifications implemented during plant shutdown and the operators were knowledgeable of important plant changes.
The NRC staff concluded that specialized operator training to support restart activities was adequat.e.
The staff considered the plant fire brigade to be adequately trained and prepared to effectively respond to plant fires.
As a result of the NYPA engineering reorganization, Design Engineering was created and design engineering personnel and the design authority were relocated to the site from the White Plains Office. The reorganization is ongoing. Observations to date indicate that the engineering reorganization and transition are being appropriately managed.
Overall, the support provided to the plant by the major engineering organizations was effective.
Design Engineering response to emergent issues was technically sound and timely.
System Engineering response was adequate and was improving as the system engineers gained plant experience. The availability of engineering personnel to the rest of the station was good.
Both the Design Engineering and Technical Services organizations were taking appropriate steps to control their backlogs.
The transition during the engineering reorganization appeared to be appropriately controlled.
The NRC staff noted that both System Engineering and Design Engineering staff and management were involved in the plant outage meetings and the Outage Work Scope meeting, providing support to other plant organizations.
Both System Engineering and Design Engineering staff were supplying around-the-clock coverage for critical activities.
Overall, the NRC staff concludes that NYPA operations staff and support staff are ready for Indian Point 3 restart.
3.4.4 PHYSICAL READINESS OF THE PLANT During this outage, NYPA has implemented many significant hardware upgrades and programmatic improvements.
Examples of systems impacted by these improvements included the AMSAC system, the emergency diesel generators, the control room air conditioning system, the instrument air system, the safety-related motor-operated valves, the power-operated relief valves, and the service water electrical cable duct bank.
In addition, thousands of corrective maintenance work items were completed during the shutdown period.
Extensive inspection and tours by NRC indicate that overall plant material condition has substantially improved.
The overall plant material condition is satisfactory to support restart and continued operation of the facility.
13 The NRC staff reviewed licensee mechanisms in place to ensure that the status of plant safety-related equipment was being adequately controlled.
The NRC staff concluded that Operations has processes in place to control plant configuration for safe plant operation. Operators were cognizant of system status that required entry into technical specifications limiting conditions for operations. Operations control room deficiency and operator work-around programs were good initiatives that were successfully tracking and prioritizing these issues.
The protective tagging program effectively tracked the status of plant equipment.
In addition, the staff found that protective tags were installed on the correct equipment and that information on the tags was correct.
The NRC independently verified that selected systems were appropriately aligned for the current plant condition. The inspectors further verified that the licensee had completed a comprehensive system alignment verification.
The NRC staff reviewed the planning area by conducting interviews, reviewing planned maintenance work requests, and observing work.
The staff reviewed the backlogs of corrective and preventive maintenance and observed various meetings to verify that unresolved maintenance issues were assigned appropriate priorities and to ensure that items requiring resolution prior to plant restart were properly scheduled. A work plarning process has been developed and is being implemented by the licensee. Although the process is adequate, NYPA is enhancing it to make it more effective.
The NRC staff observed ongoing maintenance activities to verify that these activities were being properly controlled through the use of established procedures, approved technical manuals, drawings, and job-specific instructions.
The staff considered the conduct of maintenance activities to be adequate to support plant startup.
The NRC staff conducted several plant tours and system walkdowns to determine if hardware problems had been identified. The staff also reviewed the overall condition of several safety significant systems.
Plant material condition was acceptable to support startup.
The NRC staff reviewed the adequacy of preventive maintenance procedures, observed the performance of preventive maintenance (PM) in the field, and assessed coverage of the program with regard to incorporating vendor recommendations, scheduling and deferral, and review and trending of results.
The staff determined that NYPA's implementation of a preventive maintenance program was adequate.
A strength noted was that only a few PMs were deferred beyond their planned performance date and those that were deferred were adequately evaluated and justified.
The NRC staff reviewed surveillance scheduling and procedures, observed the performance of tests, and reviewed test results to verify that the surveillance program was being conducted in accordance with requirements.
The staff determined that the surveillance program was being conducted in an acceptable manner.
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The NRC staff reviewed the licensee's modification program and reviewerf a i
sample of permanent modifications.
The review compared the design change to the design bases, considering the potential impact of the design on other l
equipment and its compliance with appropriate procedures.
The NRC also reviewed a sample of modification acceptance tests -(MATS) to determine if they i
satisfactorily proved the proper operation of the associated modification.
The NRC staff concluded that engineering processes were adequate to ensure that plant safety margins were not reduced.
The technical bases and i
associated documentation for the modifications were adequate.
The development and performance of MATS were adequate and demonstrated the proper operation of the associated modification.
l 4
The NRC also reviewed the temporary modification (TM) process, including administrative procedures and a sample of TMs. At the end of April 1995, there were 22 installed TMs, seven of these were installed on safety-related systems; two are planned for removal prior to startup, one will be removed after completion of full power testing, and three are scheduled for replacement before July 1995. The NRC concluded that administrative procedures were in place to acceptably control the development, review and approval, installation, and removal of TMs.
Overall the NRC concluded that i
the temporary modifications were acceptable for restart.
j All pre-1990 safety-related modifications have been reassessed by NYPA to identify differences between the as-built plant conditions and the plant drawings. Additional controls were added to the modification process in 1990 to prevent undocumented deviations from the modification drawings. The licensee redlined all vital control room drawings with changes in preparation for restart. The NRC staff concluded that the plant's configuration control was acceptable.
The NRC reviewed backlogs in the Technical Services and Design Engineering organizations.
This review included those items in the backlog that would not i
be completed prior to restart and the licensee's method for determining that i
the item need not be completed prior to restart. The NRC'also evaluated the licensee's prioritization of these items.
The NRC staff determined that the-i backlogs had been appropriately screened and prioritized.
Both the Technical Services and Design Engineering organizations were taking appropriate steps to control their backlogs.
1 The NRC staff reviewed the industry operating experience program to ensure j
that lessons learned were being appropriately incorporated in plant programs and staff training and to verify that appropriate items had been resolved prior to plant restart. The staff concluded that the review process for industry experience was adequate.
The staff also noted that the backlog of
. reviews was manageable. The staff determined that the backlog had been adequately screened by the licensee for plant restart issues.
3.4.5 COMPLIANCE WITH REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS The NRC staff has issued and granted all applicable license amendments, exemptions, and reliefs.
The actions specified in Confirmatory Action Letter 1-93-009 have been satisfied. All significant enforcement issues to date have
15 been resolved.
The NAP also reviewed all open allegations and concluded that none affected restart of the facility.
There are no outstanding issues in this area relative to the restart of Indian Point 3.
3.4.6 COORDINATION WITH INTERESTED AGENCIES / PARTIES The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) was notified of the pending restart of Indian Point 3 via telephone on June 16, 19S5. and FEMA was not aware of any offsite emergency preparedness issues that could potentially affect restart of the plant.
The New York State Liaison Officer was notified of the pending restart of Indian Point 3 by the Region I State Liaison Officer via telephone on June 16, 1995, and various government and local public officials.were notified in a meeting on June 16, 1995.
Individuals from these various agencies identified no issues that would preclude restart of the plant.
The NRC has provided several opportunities, after NRC meetings with the utility, for the public to comment on the.possible restart of Indian Point 3.
Subsequent to each of these meetings, the staff has reviewed issues of concern, as well as the bases for their position; the staff has concluded that substantive issues that could delay restart do not exist.
4.0 RESTART COORDINATION In a letter to the NRC dated May 27, 1994, NYPA committed to perform a detailed SURE before restart.
The NRC recommended that NYPA complete its SURE before the NRC performed its RATI. The SURE consisted of a SERT inspection, an Operational Readiness Review, Quality Assurance Oversight, and System i
Certification.
By letter dated March 16, 1995, NYPA notified the NRC that the SURE had been completed successfully and that the facility was ready for the NRC RATI.
At the public entrance meeting for the NRC's RATI on April 3,1995, NYPA presented the results of its SURE.
In the licensee's letter dated June 12, 1995, NYPA informed the NRC that Indian Point 3 was ready to be restarted and delineated NYPA's power ascension oversight plan. The licensee plans to have its Restart Management Team (RMT) review activities at various plateaus during power ascension.
The RMT will then make recommendations to the Resident Manager regarding readiness to continue to the next plateau. NYPA intends to have a member of the Restart Management Team available 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> a day during plant startup; additionally, a senior manager is also to be assigned to each shift until reactor power reaches 100 percent.
The NRC has developed an augmented inspection plan to assess the Indian Point 3 rettart.
In addition to the resident inspectors assigned to the site, additional inspectors will provide on-shift, around-the-clock coverage, starting 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> before the planned reactor startup and continuing for several days.
During this time, among other NRC inspection activities, NRC inspectors will review NYPA's self-assessments, Quality Assurance assessments, and support to operations during emergent issues.
Following completion of
.-.~.-
e 16 around-the-clock coverage, the NRC will continue to provide augmented coverage of the power ascension process, including major evolutions as they occur, until the plant stabilizes at 100 percent power.
5.0 OTHER ISSUES 5.1 LATEST SALP The current SALP assessment period, which was originally scheduled to end on November 17, 1993, was suspended until 6 months after plant restart.
The bases for the suspension were that the NAP will continuously oversee the plant under the provisions of Manual Chapter 0350, and that plant restart will be monitored.in accordance with the NRC's approved IP3 Restart Action Plan. The latest SALP report is over 2 years old and does not reflect the current status of the facility.
j i
i 5.2 FIRE BARRIER PENETRATION SEALS In response to NRC inspection Unresolved Item 50-286/93-24-03, " FIRE SEAL
- ANALYSIS - Self Ignition Temperature of Cable Insulation as it Relates to the Design of Fire Seals," NYPA initially concluded that the self-ignition
)
temperature of the cable insulation is not less than 785'F and that this temperature is sufficiently above the 700*F maximum allowable unexposed surface temperature criteria for penetration seal designs at Indian Point 3.
This conclusion was based on generic cable flammability data published by the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI). The cables at Indian Point 3 are "similar" to the cables referenced in the EPRI reports, but NYPA could not provide reasonable assurance that the cables specified in the EPRI report are truly representative of the cables installed at Indian Point 3.
Because of the broad range in flammability data for cables of "similar" construction and I
the different test protocols for obtaining the flammability data, the NRC staff was concerned that the generic cable data 'used.in NYPA's fire seal analysis might not adequately represent the cables installed at Indian Point 3.
Therefore, this item remains unresolved.
NYPA is doing research, including actual testing if needed, to verify the applicability of the generic information used in its evaluation. NYPA has implemented fire watches in all plant areas where the penetration seals in question are located. These compensatory measures, coupled with other elements of NYPA's fire protection program, ensure an adequate level of fire safety; therefore, the NRC staff has concluded that this issue has low safety significance. Thus, the NRC staff has determined that NYPA's actions are acceptable for restart and subsequent operation until the penetration seal issue is fully resolved.
6.0 CONCLUSION
The NRC has thoroughly assessed the physical condition of the plant, the performance of NYPA's plant and corporate staffs, NYPA's corporate and plant management oversight, and the licensing status of the plant. The NRC has found all of these areas to be adequate to support restart and operation.
The NRC also found that NYPA's RCIP is a comprehensive plan that addressed the w
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17 root causes and corrective actions for the previous decline in plant performance' and provided a reasonable process for assessing the effectiveness of those corrective actions.
Furthermore, the NRC found that NYPA's startup plan provides the process and management oversight necessary for a safe organized return to power operation.
4 NYPA has completed the comitted restart actions as described in CAL 1-93-009.
In their letter dated June 12, 1995, NYPA committed that Indian Point 3 will not exceed 40 percent reactor power until a self-assessment is performed and i
the NRC is notified of the results.
In addition, NYPA committed to another self-assessment after full power operation is achieved, with the results of this latter self-assessment to be presented to the NRC in a public meeting.
The cover letter to this document adds to the comitments contained in CAL 1-
~
93-009 to reflect the above statements and transmits our agreement that Indian Point 3 is ready to restart. The NRC will provide augmented inspection 4
coverage during the startup process.
The NRC also will continue to closely monitor NYPA's performance and the implementation of the RCIP.
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Mr. Dennis K. Rathbun
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naar Mr. Pathh.ir
! have received the attached communication from my New York, Dr. Marche Schulwolf of Piermont, i
3 Nuclear Facility.
constituent, concerning the Indian Point i
which can be given to this matter will be appreciated.1 of your findings when yourrned to me with Please provide me with a report review has been.:ompleted and have the letter retu your reply.
Thank you far your kind attention.
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BENJAMIN A, GILMAN Member of Congress i
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Marthe Schulwolf, Ph.D.
109 DeVrles Court l
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June 18,1995 l
Representative Benjamin Gaman l
2185 Raybum House OfDee Budding l
Washington, D.C.20615 j
Re:
Indian Point 3 VtA FAX 2022252541 Dear Congressman Gaman-Regulatory Commission's decision to reo l
i TNs plants history of operating difnculpes and the dangers in j
location wthin the greater New York rnetropoiltan ares and on th i
tarthquake faut mapify the already extraordinary risks nvo v th t nolonger even cost emcient tech 6&qy. Itis becoming cleare t f e this l
nuclear power genera 5on is the way of the t
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tionsto this area? Why continue to generate waste l
i acciden. occurs,rather thanlater, benefit frorn this plant whatsoever and l
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cause of our County to the NRC and to do everytNng and any l
stoptre reopening ofIndian Pobt 3.
l Very truly yours, l
Dr.Marthe Schutwolf i
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_The Honorable Eliot L. Engel United States House of Representatives Washington, D.C.
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Dear Congressman Engel:
I am responding to your letter of January 2,1996, in which you expressed concern about the potential risks posed to your constituents by continued safety violations at Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 3 (IP3), which is operated by the New York Power Authority (NYPA).
At present, IP3 is on the NRC's " Watch List" of plants meriting special scrutiny, and an NRC inspection team is on-site at IP3, closely monitoring the licensee's preparation for restarting the facility.
I can assure you that if the NRC staff determines that it lacks reasonable assurance that the plant can operate safely, it will not hesitate to take appropriate action.
I NYPA shut down IP3 in February 1993 to correct several hardware deficiencies and to implement plant-wide programmatic improvements for correcting the j
underlying root causes of identified performance deficiencies. is i
a copy of NRC's letter of June 19, 1995, which provided NRC's basis for the conclusion that the plant was ready to restart from the extended outage.
The plant restarted from that outage on June 27, 1995.
During the restart, the NRC conducted inspections to assess NYPA's activities.
Additional
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inspectors assisted the three full-time resident inspectors assigned to the site Lin providing around-the-clock coverage for the first phase of the startup and conducted an inspection lasting about 3 weeks.
Safety violations similar to those that led to the extended shutdown were identified shortly after restart, and NYPA was cited for failing to follow safe operating procedures.
The staff found that from July 10 through 12, 1995, IP3 operated with reduced reactor coolant system (RCS) pressure which was outside the plant's design basis.
Some of the factors contributing to the violation were issues that the NRC had previously brought to the attention of NYPA, such as weak management oversight of the operation department's activities, problems in the procedure upgrade program, and insufficient understanding of the facility's design basis.
Consequently, NRC issued,an escalated enforcement notice (Severity Level III).
However, in accordance with our enforcement policy, NRC waived the monetary civil penalty because NYPA identified the violation itself, conducted a detailed root cause analysis, and took significant corrective action. A copy
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of the notice of violation, which was issuad on October 16, 1995, and the I
details, relating to its issuance are provided in Enclosure 2.
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2 In September 1995, IP3 entered a forced outage to correct self-identified equipment problems.
However, the new equipment problems were different from those that had been corrected during the previous shutdown.
On October 15,1995, the IP3 operations staff violated regulatory requirements by increasing the RCS temperature above 200*F with three engineered safety features pumps inoperable due to incorrect control switch positions.
A predecisional enforcement conference, which was open to the public, was held on December 13, 1995, to discuss the apparent violation, its root cause, the safety significance of the event, and subsequent corrective actions taken by NYPA. A copy of the notice of violation, which was issued on January 2, 1996, and the details relating to its issuance is provided in Enclosure 3.
The violation resulted in escalated enforcement and the imposition of a $50,000 civil penalty.
The notice indicates the factors that the staff weighed in determi*ning the amount of the civil penalty.
For example, though the operational staff performed poorly, a quality assurance staff member took quick and effective action to correct the problem, and though temperature limits for the RCS were exceeded, no actual hazard to safety resulted.
4 In light of the safety violations which occurred following initial restart the NRC, on December 22, 1995, requested that NYPA provide the current status of its performance improvement effort and delineate the corrective actions it has taken. Our purpose was to ensure that performance problems are being arrested i
and that lasting improvements are being facilitated.
The NRC's request and NYPA's response dated January 12, 1996, are included as Enclosures 4 and 5, respectively.
The Commission will continue to pay close attention to IP3 and will keep you informed of any significant further actions that we may take with respect to IP3.
Sincerely, Shirley Ann Jackson
Enclosures:
1.
NRC Letter, June 19, 1995 2.
Notice of Violation, October 16, 1995 3.
Notice of Violation, January 2,1996 4.
Request for Information, December 22, 1995 5.
NYPA Response to the December 22, 1995, Request 2 for Information, January 12, 1996 k
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June 19, 1995 Mr. Willian 4. Cahill, Jr.
Chief Nuclear Officer New York Power Authority 123 Main Street White Platns NY 10601 l
$UBJECT:
RESTART OF THE Ile!AN POINT 318JCLEAR POWER PLAl-(N00!FICAT!0N OF CAL-1-93-009)
Dear Mr. cam 11.
The Indian Point 3 Nuclear Power Plant was shut down by tho'New York Power Authority (NYPA) on February 27, 1993, to correct deficiencies associated with the anticipated transtant without scraa attigation system actuation circuitry (AMSAC).
In response to a growing Itst of performance deficiencies, NYPA management decided to keep the plant shut down while effecting plant-wide i
j programmatic improvements. By letter dated March 26, 1993, NYPA agreed not to restart the plant untti NYPA sanagement was satisfied with restart readiness and the Regional Administrator, Region I, agreed with that conclusion. On June 17, 1993, the NRC issued Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL) 1-93-00g, which documented NYPA's restart comettaents. By letter dated June 12, 1995 (Enclosure 1), you stated that Indian Point 3 was ready for restart.
Significant inspection and assessment efforts have been undertaken by the NRC since the February 1993 shutdowr to evaluate NYPA's progress in resolving technical concerns and correcting the underlying root causes of the identified performance deficiencies. These efforts included the establishment and taplementation of a NYPA Assessment Panel (NAP); the conduct of numerous individual resident and region-based inspections; the conduct of an NRC special team inspection to deterstne the root causes for the declining performance; the conduct of NRC team inspections to evaluate the adequacy of the fire protection and motor-operated valve programs; an NRC meeting with you on April 3,1995, to review the results of NYPA's startup readiness evaluation (SURE); and an NRC Readiness Assessment Taas Inspection (RATI) during the period of April 3-21, 1995, to independently evaluate the plant's readiness for restart.
Sased on the above, the NRC staff has concluded that sufficient progress has
~
been ande to support safe plant restart and power operations. Our detailed assessment to support this conclusion is contained in Enclosure 2 to this letter.
In preparatica for restart, NYPA has developed a detailed reactor startup plan to describe the process and self-assessment efforts planned to achieve a safe restart of Indian Point 3.
The NRC has also developed an augmented inspection plan and util provide augmented inspection coverage to monitor unit startup and return to power operation. Based on your letter dated June 12, 1995, we understand that Indian Point 3 will not exceed 40 percent reactor power until a self-assessment is performed and the NRC staff is notified of the results.
In addition, after achieving full power operation, NYPA again will conduct a ENCt.05URE 1 b
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William J. Cahill, Jr.
self-assessment and present the results to the hRC staff in a public meeting.
Thus, this letter modifies CAL l-93-009 to reflect your new commitments as discussed above.
In summary, based on the actions you have taken and our independent review of those actions, the NRC agrees with your assessment that the Indian Point 3 If you have any questions regarding our plant is ready for restart.
assessment, please contact Curtis Cowgill of my staff at 610-337-5233. We appreciate your cooperation.
1 Sincerely, ORIGINAL SIGNED BY:
Thomas T. Martin Regional Administrator Docket No. 50-286
Enclosures:
~
1.
NYPA letter dated June 12, 1995 (Readiness to Restart) 2.
Indian Point 3 Restart Readiness e
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Vt11taa J. Cahill, Jr.
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- 5. Freeman, President R. Schoenberger, Chief Operating Officer L. N111. Jr., Assident Manager, New York Power Authority W. Jostger, Vice President - Nuclear Operations J. Kelly, Vice President - Regulatory Affairs and Special Projects T. Dougherty, Vice President - Nuclear Engineering R. Deasy, Vice President Appraisal and Compliance Services R. Patch Director - Quality Assurance G. Wtlverding. Manager, Nuclear Safety Evaluation l
G. Goldstein, Assistant General Counsel C. Falson, Director, Nuclear Licensing t
A. Donahue, Mayor, Village of Buchanan C. Donaldson, Esquire, Assistant Attorney General (,lyC New Yor Chairman, Standing Consittee on Energy, NYS Assemb Chatraan. Standing Cosetttee on Environmental Conservation, NYS Assembly E. Nullet. Executive Chair, Four County Nucisar Safety Committee 1
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Chatraan, Cometttee on Corporations, Authorities, and Commissions j
Robert D. Pollard, Union of Concerned Scientists The Honorable Sandra Galef, NYS AssemblyDirector. Energy & W New York j
A. Song, Assistant Secretary to the Governor F. Valentino, President, New York State Energy Research and Development Authority i
State of New York, SLO Designes 4
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i Ab ewWrkPbwer Wl0 kern J. Cenen. Jr, c m m O'.:r-June 12,1995 IPN 96466 l
U. S. Nucisar Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Contml Desk WanNngton, DC 20555
SUBJECT:
Indan Point 3 Nudear Power Plant Docket No. 50-286 Randinaam to Rantart indlan Point 3
REFERENCES:
- 1. NYPA lettor IPN 93-015 R. E. Beede to NRC, ' Action Plans Regardng the Performance I.Tiinw T. eat Outage,' dated March 26, 1993.
- 2. NRC Letter, Thomas T. Martin to R. E. Beede, T,on6rmatory Action Letter 1 93409. Restart Commitments," dated June 17,1993.
Dear Sir:
The New York Power Authority voluntarty shut down the indan Point 3 Nudear Power Plant in February 1993 in response to indcations of f.vy-T.watic weaknesses (Reference 1). The NRC issued a con 6tmatory action letter (Reference 2) which oudned the major miestones to be reached prior to retuming inden Point 3 to service. The conermatory action letter reRects the Power Authority's commitment in reference 1 to obtain the agreement of the NRC Region i Regional Administrator prior to restert.
The Power Autorty has implemented correcthe actions and conducted a comprehensive saf assessment pmpam to verfy tio effseshroness of base conective actions. Criteria used by be Power Autorty fouletermining the readness of Indan Point 3 for restart are dscussed h Altschment L During Aprs and May 1996 the Power Authorty performed pient heatup using roamor coolant purg energy, to conduct system testing. Plant cooldown was initiated on May 28 for maintenance actMties in propensson for reactor restart. The present schedule wlE asow reactor restart to begin wvanstofy June 21,1995 cui.i" Wii upon the sysoment of the NRC Region i Regional Administrator.
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Docket No. 50 286 IPN 95 065 Page 2 of 2 The startup process for Indian Point 3 includes hold points tu assess plant and staff perturmance. The Power Authonty wi!! provde assossment results to the NRC at approximately 30% to 40% power and after reaching full power The Power Authority will also meet with the NRC after reaching fu!! power to discuss plant and staff performance during the power ascermon evolution.
I have reviewed the readiness of Indian Point 3 with the Authonty's senior management, includng President and Chief Executive Officer S. David Freeman and Chief Operating Officer Robert Schoenberger. We conclude that the actions needed to support the safe restart and continued safe operation of the plant are complete, as further described in Attachment f. The Power Authority anticipates that the maintenance activities identified during hot functional testing will be complete and Indian Point 3 wi!! be ready in all respects for restart.
We request the agreement of the NRC to restart the reactor. Attachment il contains the commitments made by the Power Authority in this submittal. If you have any questions, please contact me.
Very truly yours, h
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W. J. Cahill, Jr.
Chief Nuclear Officer Attachments cc:
Mr. Thomas T. Martin Regional Administrator / Region i U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 475 Mendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406-1415 Mr. Curtis J. Cowgi!!, Chief Reactor Projects Branch No.1 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region l 475 Mendale Road King of Prussia. PA 19406-1415 Mr. Nicola F. Conicella, Project Manager Project Directorate 11 Dmsion of Reactor Projects 1/11 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop,14 B2 Washmgton, DC 20555 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Resident inspectors' Office Indian Point 2 Nuc! ear Power Plant P.O. Box 337 Buchanan, NY 10511 0
ATTACHMENT I TO IPN 46066 RF AntNm TO RMTART INDIAN PotMT 3 NUC18 AA PQ'#ER PLANT 1
L INTMODUCTION-i i
l The New York Power Authortty voluntartfy shut down the incien Point 3 Nudser Power Plant in February 1993 in response to indcatons of p.wT Tiade weaknesses (Reference 1), The
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NRC issued a con 8tmatory acton letter (Reference 2) whicts outaned the makr muestones to j
be reached prior to retuming inden Point 3 to service fotowing the outage, induded in the
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conArmatory accon letter is the cond6cn that the Power Autiorty obtain the agreement of the NRC Reglon i Regional Admrustrator prior to restart, j
The Power Authorty developed the Restart and Continuous impnn Twit Plan (RCIP, Reference 3) which describes the objecthnes, strategies and acuan plans designed to address i
the root and contreuting causes of the performance decine at inden Point 3. The RCIP also denned critona. In three categories. to be used by the Power Authorty for determning l
readness to restart. The fosowmg secdons docuss how these criteria for restart have been saessed.
I 1
- 11. MANAGFMENT ISSUFM-l The Restart Action Plans detaAed in the RCIP identified specific actions needed to correct and
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resche management issues which contreuted to the docene in performance at Indan Point 3.
Implementanon of the Restart Action Plans, during the second half of 1994, was fotowed by a self assessment program (Start Up Readness Evaluadon) to verify the implementadon and I
the effectheness of the correcWye acdons. The Power Authority notified the NRC of the l
wT,Me6 of the Start Up Readness Evaluation (Reference 4) and irMted the NRC to conduct a Readness Asaessment Team inopoetion. The Power Authorty provided a cletailed ese-M of the results and condusions of the Start Up Readness Evaluation at :he p@iic arcance meeting for that bepection on Apri 3,1996.
Implementation of the Restart Action Plans and the performance of the self assessment provide assurance that proper management controis are in place. The RCIP sino contains acuan plans which describe spedne steps to to taken aner restart to ensure canonuous improvement at Indan Point 3.
The Power Autiorty has developed a procedure which govems the overaf starty evolution from the beginning of hoseg to the es. C"J. of tesdng at 100% power. The $tertup and Power Ascenelon Procedure (Reference 5) indudas provisions for senior mana0ement invofvement and estabashes the methodology for ensuring the safe, contro5ed and deEberate retum to service of incien Point 3. The startup staffing pian includes a Senior Mana0er on Shift to provide mariagement representation and oversight during plant startup.
An important aspect of the AuthorVs performance improvement oflort is tie continuadon of self assesament actMties. The Startup and Power Ascension Prococksu indudes se5 assessment hold points where the effectiveness of management controls and the performance of plant staff and systems are evaluated. At each hold point, a decision is recpired by the Resident Manager and the Plant Leadership Team (PLT) to continue plant start up.
Information to s@ port decision making can include 's1put from Department Managers, the Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC) and Quality Assurance.
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Oc'het No 50486 IPN 95 065 i
Attachment i Page 2 of 4 J
lit MATERIAt_ CONDITION AND EOUloMENT READINESS:
j Dunng the outage, the Power Authonty c.ompleted thousands of work activities and hundreds of modhcations to improve the materid conditinn of the plant. As of June 9, there are approximately 250 work requer,ts to be completed pnor to reactor restatt. Work requests include corrective and preventive maintenance, modification work requests and acceptance tests, and operations surveillance tests. The prerequisite checklist from the Startup and Power Ascension Procedure includes a requirement to venty that applicable work requests are completed prior to enticality.
The Authority's Restart and Continuous improvement Plan included a System Certification Program to provide a structured process for evaluating systems prior to retuming them to serwce for plant operations. The Authority provided additionalinformation (Reference 6) to the NRC regarding this program in response to a meeting with the NRC on February 1,1995.
There are 74 plant systerns/ subsystems that are covered by the System Certification Program.
Cortification of 72 systems is complete and the remaining 2 will be complete prior to reactor rUstart.
J Plant heatup, using reactor coolant pump energy, commenced on Apnl 17,1995 to perform the equipment and system testing which required plant conditions above cold shutdown.
Normal operating temperature and pressure were achieved on May 9,1995. Plant cooldown i
i was commenced on May 28,1995 to perform maintenance activities, including replacement of reactor vessel head 0 rings. Maintenance work is presently scheduled to be complete to support reactor restart approximately June 21.
1 IV. REGULATORY ISSUES-The NRC Restart Action Plan (RAP, Reference 7) identifies 60 technical, programmatic and management oversight issues which must be addressed by the Authority prior to the restart of l
Indian Point 3. These issues are in addition to the actions specified in the confirmatory action letter. The Authonty has provded information to the NRC to resolve these issues, t
During the Readiness Assessment Team inspection (RATI), the NRC identified (Reference 8) six additionalissues which required resolution prior to restart. The Authority has completed or will complete prior to reactor restart the fo!!owing actions:
1.
Plant Alarm Response Procedures The Power Authority reviewed alarm response procedures and identKied 21 which a'
required revision. The 21 procedu es have been revised, approved by the Plant Operatihg Review Committee (PORC) and issued for use.
2.
Auniary Feedwater Pump Building Ventilatbn i
Additional systerr. testing was performed which verified proper operation of the f ans and temperature controllers as stated in Reference 8.
i
Docket No. 50 266 IPib95 065 t
Attachment l l
Page 3 of 4 l
2.
stenku PanelLoad Scheduks The Power Authority has completed the scheduled walkdowns of breaker panels in the l
power plant and is in the process of updating controlled
- swings for use by plant oper4vs. During the walkdowns, undocumented modficadons were identified. A review of past operstdty is being performed and the affected drcuits are being i
dsconnected, doenergtred, or authortred as temporary modficadons or design j
changes. Acdons to gdste the breaker pensi controsed documents and ad@ess the l
undocumented madmcanons wE be completed prior to reactor restart.
4.
Segu*st Change Control Correcthre act;ons taken are as stated in Reference 8. Setpoint change request packages were reviewed to identify plant documents needng revision. Documents identified by the review were updated and adddonal guidance was issued to s:.'pplement the setpoint change control procedure.
5.
ConnelRoom Orserngs informa6on from 122 Document Change Requests has been incorporated into the control room vital eawings, i
6 Turnover of Design Changes so the Operations Department Co. Tem actions taken are as stated in Reference 8. A representadvs sample of design changes was reviewed to ensure that plant proceduras had been appropriately W
The Power Authorfty uses the Acdon
- 4 COT.TruTwd Tracidng System (ACTS) to record and track management, todinical and administradvs issues, incaming those identitled as regulatory commitments. As of June 9 there are 11 ACTS items remaining to be corvoleted prior to reactor restart.
A roving fire waldi is in place for penetradon seals unts evaluation of information used in the tre seal analysis is complete, as committed during the NRC special kispection to review fire ym %w6 and 10 CFR 50 Appendx R restart items (Reference 9). Restart ACTS items related to fire pmescsicn and 10 CFR 50 Appendx R are complete and fire protection rotated restart work recpest_s wE be complete prior to restart.
V. CONCLUSION:
1 5
The Authority Concludse $18t CorroCdvs actions riseded to st.45J191e safe restW1 Eld i
continued safe operadon of the plant are complete. This conc 6usion is based on:
Successful'enplernentation of the Authorit/s Restart and Continuous i
improvement Plan (RCIP) Restart Ac6on Plans.
1
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Docket No. 50 286 f
IPN 95 065 Attachment i Page 4 of 4 4
Completion of the Start Uo Readiness Evaluation self assessment program.
Resolution of regulatory issues identified as requirements for criticality.
Successful plant heatup from cold shutdown to normal operating temperature and pressure for system testing and implementation of assessment hold points.
The use of established administrative tools to track the completion of work I
activities and other prerequisites required prior to commencing reactor restart.
The Power Authority anticipates that Indian Point 3 will be ready in all respects for restart approximately June 21,1995 pending completion of work activities summarized in Sections 111 and IV.
VL AEFERENCES:
1.
NYPA letter IPN 93-015 R. E. Beedle to NRC, " Action Plans Regarding the Performance improvement Outage," dated March 26,1993.
2.
NRC letter, Thomas T. Martin to R. E. Beedle, " Confirmatory Action Letter 193 009, Restart Commitments.* dated June 17,1993.
3.
NYPA Restart and Continuous improvement Plan for Indian Point 3, Revision 1, dated November 4,1994.
l 4.
NYPA letter IPN 95 036, W. J. Cahill, Jr., to NRC, " Start Up Readiness Evaluation,"
dated March 16,1995.
5.
Irx5an Point 3 Procedure SUP 95-01,"Startup and Power Ascension Procedure."
6.
NYPA letter IPN 95-019, L M. Hill to NRC, ' System Certification Program," dated February 23,1995.
7.
NRC letter, R. W. Cooper to Wittiam Cahill, Jr., " Revision and Status Update No. 4 of the Indian Point 3 Restart Action Plan," dated March 8,1995.
8.
NRC letter, R. W. Cooper to L Hill, Jr., "NRC Readiness Assessment Team inspect >on (RATI) Report No. 50-286/95-80,* dated May 25,1995.
9.
NRC letter, J. T. Wggins to L f A. Hill, "Special Inspection to Review Fire Protection and Appendix R Restart items, inspection Report No. 50-266/95 81,* dated May 11, 1995.
l
1 ATTACHMENT 11 TO IPN 95-065 4
j COMMITMENI,,,LgiI i
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Commitment Nunter Commitment Descripdon Due Data i
IPN 95-06541 Provide restart seN assessment results to NRC at Prior to contkaing power approximately 30% to 40% power.
ascension i
IPN 95-065-02 Provide restart self assessment results to NAC Fo5owing operadon h after reaching fut power and meet with NRC to 100% power ciscuss plant and staff performance during the c.n n.vowon.
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ENCLOSURE 2 INDIAN POINT 3 RESTART READINESS TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF CONTENTS............................
I 2
1.0 BACKGROUND
2.0 NYPA ASSESSMENT PANEL FORMATION..................
3 3.0 NRC ASSESSMENT OF RESTART READINESS................
4 4
3.1 INTRODUCTION
3.2 NRC RESTART ISSUE CLOSURE..................
4 3.3 READINESS ASSESSMENT TEAM INSPECTION RESULTS 5
3.4 RESTART READINESS ASSESSMENT CHECKLIST 7
3.4.1 ROOT CAUSE IDENTIFICATION AND CORRECTION 7
3.4.2 LICENSEE MA'tAGEMENT..................
10 3.4.3 PLANT AND CORPORATE STAFF...............
11 3.4.4 PHYSICAL READINESS OF THE PLANT............
12 3.4.5 COMPLIANCE WITH REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS........
14 3.4.6 COORDINATION WITH INTERESTED AGENCIES / PARTIES.....
15 15 4.0 RESTART COORDINATION.......................
16 5.0 OTHER ISSUES...........................
5.1 LATEST SALP.........................
16 16 5.2 FIRE BARRIER PENETRATION SEALS 16 6.0 C0:tCLUSION..............,,,...........
2 1.0 BACKGROIAC The lodlan Point 3 Nuclear Power Plant, owned and operated by the New York Power Authority (NYPA), is a Westinghouse four-loop, 965 megawatt (electric) pressurtred-enter reactor located 24 miles north of New York City.
The NRC's Indian Point 3 SALP report for the period ending August 1992 indicated an overall dec1tne in performance. Although the licenses continued to display superior performan:e in the radiological controls functional area, the SALP noted weaknesses in the operations, maintenance / surveillance, emergency preparedness, engineering / technical support, and safety assessment / quality verification functional areas. The most signtficant weaknesses were in the engineering / technical support functional area.
In general, the overall weak performance resulted from inadequate management oversight. Specifically, NYPA was not effective in implementing coreactive actions for both long-standing and newly emerging issues. The wea perfomance was also evidenced by the escalated enforcement record of Indtsn Point 3.
Between May 1992 and July 1993, Indian Point 3 received eight Severity Level III violations, with civil penalties totaling 5762,500.
In January 1993, NYPA submitted a Performance Improvement Plan (PIP) for Indian Point 3 to the NRC. The plan addressed NYPA's self-1 assessment efforts and the performance issues noted in the SALP report.
On February 27, 1993, NYPA shut down Indian Point 3 to correct deficiencies associated with the anticipated transient without scram mitigation system I
actuation circuitry (AMSAC) system and with programatic weaknesses in the surveillance testing program. However, the growing number of performance deficiencies identified by NRC and Itcenses personnel prompted NYPA to keep the plant shutdown while effecting plant-wide programatic improvements. By I
letter dated March 26,1993, !?YPA comitted to make necessary programatic improvements before resuming power operations.
In addition, NYPA officials j
comitted not to restart the plant untti it was satisfied with restart readiness and until the NRC agreed with this conclusion.
In May 1993, the NRC conducted a Special Inspection Team at Indian Point 3 and again confirmed that significant fundamental weaknesses in licensee programs and staff performance existed at the plant. As stated in the inspecticn repc M, "The team determined that the root causes for the declining performance of Indian Point Unit 3 were weak managerial processes, controls and skills." The team also identified two contributing causes. First, NYPA failed to identify and resolve underlying root causes for problems identified by the Quality Assurance (QA) organization. Second, NYPA's self-assessment process was ineffective because the function was fragmented and selectively applied and the onsite and offsite oversight comittees were narrowly focused.
At the Senior Management Meeting on June 15 and 16, 1993, the plant was added to the list of fact 11 ties which, while still authorized to operate by the NRC, warranted increased NRC headquarters and regional oversight because of declining performance (i.e., the NRC's 'watchlist"). On June 17, 1993, the l
NRC issued Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL) 1-93-009 which documented the restart comitments made by NYPA.
e O
3 Over the succeeding months, several PIP action plans were completed by NYPA.
However, NYPA concluded that the existing programs and efforts to improve the performance of Indian Point 3 were not sufficiently effective to justify returning the plant to service, nor were they effective in creating a foundation for long-term, sustained improvement. Significant performance problems continued to occur even though programs and process improvements designed to correct those deficiencies had been implemented. On December 17, 1993, the NRC met with NYPA to discuss the progress and status of the PIP.
In a letter to NYPA dated December 22, 1993, the NRC documented its concern regarding the effectiveness of the PIP as an integrated plan for overall performance improvement at the station, in light of recurring plant events and procedural violations.
In January 1994, NYPA senior management selected a team of plant and corporate personnel to perform a root cause analysis for the decline in performance at both Indian Point 3 and the NYPA corporate office, and to develop a comprehensive and integrated Restart and Continuous Improvement Plan (RCIP).
The RCIP project was completed in May 1994 and by letter dated May 27, 1994, was formally submitted to the NRC for review.
In August 1994, the NRC's NYPA Assessment Panel (NAP) completed its initial review of the RCIP and concluded that if properly implemented, the RCIP should correct the fundamental issues responsible for the performance decline at Indian Point 3.
This conclusion was documented in an NRC letter dated August 8, 1994.
It appeared that the PIP's shortcomings had been assessed by NYPA and had been corrected in the RCIP.
2.0 NYPA ASSESSMDfT PANEL. FORMATION A significant NRC effort was required to follow licensee actions to correct the growing number of deficiencies in late 1992. Therefore, in January 1993, the NRC expanded the already existing FitzPatrick Assessment Panel into the MAP. This action would allow the NRC to continue to monitor FitzPatrick as well as closely follow NYPA's implementation of the Indian Point 3 improvement progras and to assist in the coordination of HRC resources for overall perfonsance monitoring and assessment. The NAP is comprised of personnel from both Region I and HRC headquarters. The NAP subsequently assumed the additional cole as a restart panel. The responsibilities of the NAP relative to Indian Paint 3 are to:
monitor and assess the licensee's performance e
coordinate the inspection program for the facility recoassend and coordinate enforcement activities assess the adequacy of the Performance Improvement Program (and e
subsequently the RCIP) and monitor its implementation U
review the licensee's response to inspection findings and assess the e
adequacy of associated corrective actions identify, evaluate, and track restart issues e
provide a plant restart recommendation and basis after NYPA completes e
its restart program
_i_______._..__...
4 t
In Jaly 1993, the NAP develcped the Indian Point 3 Restart Action Plan (RAP).
The RAP, which was developed from NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0350, ' Staff Guidelines for Restart Approval,' established guidance for the NRC to follow l
and ilsted specific items that the NRC must complete before concluding that Indian Point 3 was ready to restart. The RAP consisted of three parts.
Section 1,
- Restart Process Checklist," listed ti.e steps of the NRC overall review process for Indian Point 3 restart. Section 2. " Restart Issues Checklist,' listed plant-specific restart issues and the criteria used to i
develop these issues. Section 3, ' Restart Readiness Assessment Checklist,'
contained " Areas for Assessment" covering items associated with the performance decline at Indian Point 3, its ultimate shutdown and other matters that should be evaluated before restart because of the length of the shutdown.
Each assessment area contained a list of ' Applicable Items," which was used in part as guidance for developing the inspection plan for the Readiness Assessment Team Inspection (RATI).
Enough items were selected in each area to allow a sound assessment of readiness for restart.
3.0 Mtc ASSESSRDfT OF RESTART READIMESS
3.1 INTRODUCTION
I As previously stated, the NAP developed a comprehensive restart readiness evaluation r,rocess to ensure that required restart issues were thorcughly reviewed gr.d assessed by the NRC before plant restart. The Indian Point 3 RAP I
was the guiding document used to assess restart readiness.
In addition, the i
NRC conducted a RATI whose principal objective was to perform an in-depth evaluation of the degree of readiness of NYPA administrative controls, programs, plant equipment, and personnel to support safe restart and operation l'
cf Indian Point 3.
The RATI assessed perfomance in the areas of Management Programs / Independent Oversight /Self-Assessment, Operations Maintenance and Surveillance, and Engineering and Technical Support. The RATI also closed six Indian Point 3 RAP restart issues. The preliminary results of the RATI were l
discussed at an exit meeting, open for public observation, on April 27, 1995.
During the public participation portion of this meeting, no new issues were raised that impacted the NRC's restart readiness assessment. The RATI l
ir nection report was issued on May 25, 1995.
The fo11owing sections address the areas that were assessed by the NRC to eters..e if Indian Point 3 was ready for restart. The areas assessed are i
consistent with the Indian Point 3 RAP and NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0350.
I 3.2 NRC RESTART ISSUE CLOSURE t
l Section i o' the Indian Point 3 RAP contained 60 technical, programmatic, and managh..n:
ersight issues which required resolution prior to restart.
Fifty-fous or these issues were inspected, closed, and documented in various NRC' inspection reports. Six issues were specifically assigned to and closed by the RATI. These latter issues included operations effectiveness, maintenance effectivenesr. management expectations, QA effectiveness, backlog i
reviews, and NYPA staff attitude with respect to performance improvement. The Indian Point 3 RAP lists each issue, the inspection report (s) where resolution 4
of the issues are discussed, and the NAP meeting number and date when closure f
i of each issue was confirmed.
The inspection effort required for restart issue closure was above and beyond the normal NRC site inspection program that continuert during the shutdown.
j I
Final resolution of each restart issue was confirmed by the NAP during regularly scheduled meetings. Therefore, the NRC concludes that all restart i
issues are closed.
1 3.3 READINESS ASSESSMENT TEAM INSPECTION RESULTS 1
i The RATI reviewed Indian Fotnt 3's perfonnance in the areas of Management Programs / Independent Oversight /Self-Assessment, Operations, Maintenance and The RATI consisted of Surveillance, and Engineering and Technical Support.
lo inspectors plus a team leader and included representatives from all four NRC regional offices and headquarters. The majority of the onsite inspection activities took place between April 3 and 21,.1995, with certain activities i
occurring prior to these dates.
Inspection activities were conducted during day shifts, off shifts, and weekends, and over 1000 hours0.0116 days <br />0.278 hours <br />0.00165 weeks <br />3.805e-4 months <br /> of direct inspection of plant activities was accumulated. During the conduct of the inspection, l
the team identified six new issues that were considered appropriate for resolution by NYPA prior to restart of the facility:
(1) Plant Alarm Response Procedures The team identified that several alarm response procedures did not reference the alarm actuating devices or alarm setpoints. A problem was also noted regarding the failure to revise an alarm response procedure 1
j following a modification.
j (2) Auxiliary Feedwater Bull.ing Ventilation Fans The team identified that the Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Building temperature controllers were not set in accordance with the system i
drawings and the temperature controllers and fans were not routinely i
functionally tested.
(3) Breaker Panel Load Schedules The team noted that the load schedules located inside electrical i
distribution panels were not controlled documents and did not match the systes drawings. The load schedules posted inside the panels did not reflect plant modifications that had added or removed loads.
i (4) Setpoint Changes The closecut process for setpoint changes was not clearly proceduralized. The setpoint change control procedure and process did j
1 not ensure that all procedures and documents affected by a setpoint change were revised.
t 6
(5) Drawing Changes The team noted that 122 Requests for Document Change (ROC) were backlogged against the ' Type A" (control room vital) drawings. The team concluded that the information provided in the ROCS should be available to the operators.
(6) Design Change Closecuts The team found that a design change turnover had been completed by the,
responsible engineer without the adequate review or concurrence by the Operations Department as required by plant administrative procedures.
The team concluded that a review of similar design change closecut packages should be conducted to ensure that plant procedures had been appropriately updated.
As discussed in NYPA's letter dated June 12, 1995, each of these issues has been or will be completed prior to restart. The NRC has confimed that each of these issues has been or will be adequately addressed. Thus, there are no
)
outstanding RATI issues affecting restart of the facility.
'1 RATI Overall Conclusion The team determined that a comon understanding of management expectations and 1
a favorable atmosphere for problem identification existed at Indian Point 3.
Management expectations regarding safety had been clearly comunicated to the plant staff. The Quality Assurance organization had taken appropriate measures to implement an effective Quality Assurance program. The offsite and onsite review committees were providing quality oversight of important processes and programs. The problem identification process and the corrective action program were sufficiently implemented to identify and resolve plant deficiencies in a timely manner. Self-assessment programs have improved over the past year.
During the period that the team was on the site, the operators maintained the plant in a safe condition. Comand and control of operational activities was generally good. Operators were cognizant of plant conditions and control room annunciators. In general, operations procedures were technically adequate, administrative requirements were clearly delineated and procedura11 zed, and adequate processes were in place to control plant configuration.
The maintenance staff demonstrated a conservative approach to the performance and completion cf maintenance activities.
Plant and system material condition was good.
Identified plant deficiencies were properly prioritized and scheduled to support resolution in a timely manner.
Implementation of the preventive maintenance and the surveillance testing programs was also good.
The RATI determined that the plant material condition of safety systems and components was good. Further, the RATI concluded that planning and maintenance programs and processes were adequate to. support a safe plant restart. Based on observations of the engineering organization, the RATI concluded that it was capable of providing timely support for emergent
7 _._
l 2
i 1
=
7 technical issues; additionally, the engineering and technical su procedures, prograss, and processes were in place to suppo l
and continued plant operation.
The major engineering organfrations were available to the plant and j
Both the Design Engineering and Technical Services organizations are taking appropriate steps to c support to the station was effective.
l backlogs of work and the backlogs have been adequate l
Safety adequate to ensure that plant safety margins were not reduced.
q restart issues.
evaluations contained adequate technical detail that supported rea j
i conclusions.
l Based on the above, the NRC concludes that staffing, plant equipment, and processes are adequate to support safe restart and continued
]
l l
Indian Point 3.
8 i
RESTART READINESS ASSES $ MENT CHECKLIST f
3.4 As previously discussed, Section 3 of the Indian Point 3 RAv contain 4
' Areas for Assessmen,t," involving issues broader than specific restart is f
that the NRC staff noeded to assess before concluding that the plan l
The The six areas for assessment are discussed below.
information used by the NRC staff to develop its conclusion was obtain to restart.
applicable, from (!) resident and specialist inspections (2) inspections assessing restart issues (3) the RATI (4) NAP activities and (5) NRC management visits.
f 3.4.1 ROOT CAUst IDENTIFICATION AND CORRECTION i
In mid-1992 NYPA recognized that the performanc declining.
l problems and to develop an improvement program.
14, 1993, PIP was developed and subsequently submitted to the NRC on January However, subsequent NRC inspections and conti l
NYPA performed a second review ard i
performance improvement of the station. finalized its list of root i
l j
NYPA found six primary root causes:
l interpersonal skills, or Management did not demonstrate the leadership, hat encouraged open the credibility to provide a work environment t e
l consunication, teamwcrk, innovation, and trust. Seni to dr,1ve the organization's agenda.
e not well managed and did not result in lasting d
i e
Management did not establish clear performance expecta problems.
effective coaching and feedback, or hold people accountable fo e
]
meaningful performance results.
l I
i
~
4 s
8 Management of change was ineffective.
e Roles and responsib111tten were not sufficiently def f nsd to support e
effective organtastional performance.
NYPA found six contributing causes:
NYPA management did not employ industry experience to establish and e
implement effective performance standards.
Information and direction were unclear and often not comunicated e
effectively.
Policies and procedures were inadequate to support acceptable station performance. They were overly complex, contained technical inaccuracies, and were ineffectively enforced.
The quality and rate of completion of work by the maintenance function e
did not support plant needs.
Information management systems did not support management needs.
e Engineering procedures and products did not effectively support plant e
operations and matr a ance.
Based on the above findi..ss, NYPA developed a comprehensive, long-tem RCIP in May 1994. The plan was designed to improve overall performance at the plant and corporate office by correcting the twelve root and contributing causes.
NYPA also estabitshed a kestart Management Team (RMT) to oversee the RCIP.
The RMT, which consisted of the senior managers from NYFA's Nuclear Generation Department, was chartered with directing actions necessary to restart Indian Point 3.
The RCIP was revised in November 1994; however, this revision did not change the 12 root and contributing causes as delineated in tt.e original RCIP.
Corrective actions (i.e., action plans) to address the 12 root and contributing causes are addressed in the RCIP. The NRC's NAP conducted a thorough review of the RCIP. In a letter to NYPA dated August 8,1994, the NRC concluded that the RCIP was a comprehensive plan that addressed the root causes for the previous decline ir, plant performance, provided appropriate corrective actio.is, and provided a reasonable process for assessing the effectiveness of those corrective actions.
In a management meeting open for public observation held at the Indian Point 3 site on November 17, 1994, NYPA presented the status of its improvement program, the RCIP, and the results achieved to date. NYPA concluded that progress was being made, but further efforts were warranted. Between December 5 and 16, 1994, NYPA performed a Startup Evaluation for Readiness inspection. The purpose of this self-assessment was to determine, Team (SERT)luation of objective evidence, the effectiveness of corrective through eva The actions and improvements relative to restart readiness of Indian Point 3.
SERT concluded that additional work was needed to prepara Indian Point 3 for restart, but that NYPA management had made significant improvements in both plant and corporate activities during the shutdown. These significant improvements included improved programs and processes, increased employee involvement in decision making, improved corporate support, improved employee morale and confidence in management, and improved independent oversight.
However, additional effort would be required to make a number of areas fully
.m i
9 The NAP concluded that the SERT effective and capable of supporting restart.took a critical look for improvement.
Over the next several months, NYPA's Start Up Readiness Evaluation which is described in the RCIP, continued an organ l,
informd the NRC that the SUAtforIndianPoint3hadbeencompleted,1995thelettsfa for restart. NYPA'sletterdatedMarch16
)l ttees that needed to be addressed prior to restart and requested the NR perform the Readiness Assessment Team inspection.
l The NRC staff reviewed the licensee's Startup Plan and the SURE program, l including the associated elements of the System certification, Operationa l
Readiness Review. Startup Evaluation for Readiness Team (SER Assurance Department Oversight.had adequately assessed and resolve detailed plan for conducting a plant restart.
ht the startup plan was detailed and thorough and provided appropriate overs for plant restart; the SURE program provided plant management an ap tool for identifying restart issues, and plant management had provided oversight in the resolution of these 1: sues.
The NRC staff reviewed the Deviation Event Repo The NRC staff interviewed cognizant resolving the rcot causes of problems.
The NRC staff plant staff and conducted a review of open and closed D and resolve plant deficiencies in an effective and timely manner.
The NRC staff assessed the effectiveness of the QA organization to g The NRC staff conducted management feedback on overall plant performance.
and assessed the open QA findings to ensure tha The NRC plant restart had been scheduled for completion prior to restart.
establish an effective QA program at Indian Poin management's connitment to establish the QA Department as an inte oversight organization has enhanced its effectiveness.
The NRC staff reviewed recently conducted self-assessment activi areas of operations, maintenance, and training.The currently implemented program p have improved over the past year.
the basic performance data necessary to identify The NRC concluded that these programs have been l
resolve problems.
sufficiently implemented to support safe startup.
Overall, by implementing the RCIP, NYPA has made significant chan j
Corporate promote both short-and long-term improvements in performance.The NR management has provided substantial resources and i
i 10 the NRC inspection program and through periodic meetings with t The MAP will continue to be the focus for NRC oversight of the l
facility until NYPA demonstrates sustained performance improvement. f l
3.4.2 LICENSEE RAMAGEMENT NYPA has demonstrated a serious coemitment to improvement a management attention and resources necessary to impl personnel changes designed to improve performance at the factitty.
effectively.
i Stace the shutdown in early 1993, the following changes occurred NYPA corporate organization: new Chairman of the Board; new Pre
'hfef Nuclear Officer; new Vice President of Appraisal, Compliance and A.gulatory Affairs (Quality Assurance); n Chief Executive Of ficer; r, President Engineering; and establishment of a Chief Operating Officer I
po:ltion.
Establishment of the Regulatory Affairs and Special Projects corporate department occurred in October 1994 when the NYPA licensing organ The new Itcensing organization has one corporate director, and each site (Indian Point 3 and FitzPatrick) has one Itcensing manage restructured.
These
!! fairs and Special Projects.
positions were filled with perm from outside as to the Vice President Regulato'7 Observations to date perspective in operating and managing Indian Point 3. ind l
l licensee's taprovement efforts.
The following major management changes occurred at the site: new Manager; new General Manager of Support Services; new Gene Operations; new General Manager of Maintena General Manager of Training.
The NRC has seen significant taprovement in management overs Management has provided resources for extensive plant and j
modifications, and has increased staffing in operations, engineering,it and support.
Site and corporate management involvement in plant activ operational concerns has clearly (sproved, and so has the Ifcensing.
management expec',ations and standards of performance to the Improvements in planning and scheduling of activities ha Managers fostering improved accountability, risponsib corporate staff.
NYPA management has encouraged been evident.
attention to detail have been observed. improved horizon NYPA management has also between the site and the corporate office.
established a work environment conducive to problem identi f
t established improved programs to identify, prioritize, and res Programs for rut cause analysis and the evaluation and of operating experience have been upgraded.
issues.
i 1
f l
11 1hrough developing and effectively implementing the RCIP, NY i
ft demonstrated its ability to successfully evaluate performance a l
the results of those evaluations into improved progra Satisfactory perfomance of j
performance.ts being used as an effecttre management tool.
t the onsite Plant Operations Review Comittee (PORC) and the offs i
Review Committee (SRC) has been demonstrated.
l At previously stated. NYPA developed a startup plan to describe and management review necessary to support a s f l!
The plan also describes approaches for self-assessments of t a
of the plant.
As part of the plan, reconnendations will be made to the
- r for startup.
Resident Manager for the continuation of plant startup when mileston j
startup process.
The completed and activities leading up to these silestones are assess f
ide l
plan also requires a senfor manager to be assigned to each shift to continuous management presence and to supplement the shif t su The NRC found that the plan was comprehensive and containe sufficient checks and balances for decision making, feedback of in the startup.
and sound judgements for a safe plant startup.
Overall, the NRC staff concludes that NYPA management has its expectations to the staff, is providing appropriate direction and oversight of plant actt<ttles, and is ready to support restart of the 2.4.3 PLANT Ale CORPORATE STAFF The NRC staff conducted numerous interviews of plant staff and meetings to ensure that plant safety issues were being com communicating management expectations to the plant staff in th proper levels of management.
Based probles identification, procedure adherence, and atmosphere for problem identiffcation, the staff deterstned that the management team adequately provided direction to the NYPA la addition to routine " inspection observations, the NRC obsert The NRC observed all shtfts, including activities during plant heatup, The NRC assessed operator performanceThe staff weekend and backshift activities, regarding administrative procedures and management expectations found that operators saintained the plant in a safe condition.
The NRC staff reviewed and assessed the quality of plant o A
to ensure the procedures were adequate to conduct a safe pla sample of operations procedures were found to be t:chnically The NRC staff assessed operator control board awaren Manager and Control Roos Supcrvisor cossaand and contr response on all shifts.
The NRC found the to-day plant operation. The NRC observed that management involvement in dayl to be generally good.
f b rs quality of cousand and controteamwork in the control room wa I
i
12 Operators were cognizant of plantOpe identifying and correcting problems.
conditions and control room annunctators.
involved in operational activities.
The HRC staff verified that operator training a The staff concluded that operatorOperator tra addressed in operator training.
4 requalification training was up to date.on plant modifications were knowledgeable of laportant plant changes.
The specialized operator training to support restart a prepare d to effectively respond to plant fires.
As a result of the NYPA engineering reorganization, Design Enginee created and design engineering personnel and the design authority we relocated to the site from the White Plains Office.Obserst'. tons ongoing.and transition are being appropriately managed.
Overall, the support provided to the plant by the major engineering Design Engineering response to emergent issues Systes Engineering response was adequate organizations was effective.
was technically sound and timely.
The and was taproving as the systes engineers gained plant experience.
d availability of engineering personnel to the rest o The transition during the appropriate steps to control their backlogs, engineering re ff The NRC staff noted that both System Engineering and Design Work and sanagement were involved in the plant outage meetings and t Both System Scope meeting, providing support to other plant coverage for critical activities.
f Overall, the NRC staff concludes that NYPA operations sta are ready for Indian Point 3 restart, 3.4.4 PHYSICAL READINESS OF THE PLAXT During this outage, NYPA has implemented many significa Examples of systems impacted by these and programmatic improvements, improvements include f
control room air conditioning system, the instrument air syste d the related motor-operated valves, the power-operated relief valves, an id service water electrical cable duct bank, corrective maintenance work items were completed during the Extensive inspection and tours by HRC indicate that over condition has substantially improved. satisfactory to suppo i
13 t
The NRC staff reviewed licensee sect anisms in place to ensure t The NRC of plant safety-related equipment was being adeq j
configuration for safe plant operation.
status that required entry into technical specifications i
i i
programs were good inttfatives that were successfully trackin for operations.
priorittring these issues.
In addition, the staff found that protective i
tags were installed on the correct equipment and that information the status of plant equipment.
j l
The NRC independently vertfled that selected systems werelne inspec was correct.
appropriately aligned for the current plant condition.
l verifted that the licensee had completed a comprehensive systes alignm j
verification.
i The NRC staff reviewed the planning area by conducting interviews, r planned maintenance work requests, and observing work.
i backlogs of corrective and preventive safntenance and observed various l
meetings to verify that unresolved maintenance issues were assigned appropriate priorttles and to ensure that items requiring resolution i
A work planning process has been plant restart were properly scheduled.
Although the process is i
developed and is being implemented by the licensee.
l adequate, NYPA is enhancing it to make it more effective, l
The NRC staff observed ongoing maintenance activities to verify that th l
activities were being properly controlled through the use of established f
and job-speciffe procedures, approved technical manuals, drawings,f maintenance activities to The staff considered the conduct o j
instructions.
be adequate to support plant startup.
i The NRC staff conducted several plant tours and system walkdo if hardware problems had been identified.
Plant material condition was i
condition of several safety significant systems.
acceptable to support startup, The NRC staff reviewed the adequacy of preve f
assessed coverage of the program with regard to incorporating vend recommendations, scheduling and deferral, and review and tre l
The staff determined that NYPA's implementation of a p 4
4 program was adequate.beyond their planned performance date a adequately evaluated and justified.
The NRC staff reviewed surveillance scheduling and procedure performance of tests, and reviewed test results to verify that th The surveillance program was being conducted in accordance with l
staff determined that the surveillance program was being conduc acceptable manner.
i
)
I 1
k i
i i
i 1
o 14 The NRC staff reviewed the Ilcensee's modification progras a i
sample of permanent modifications.
the design bases, considering the potential impact of the design on o 4
f The NAC also equipment and its compliance with appropriate procedures.
l reviewed a staple of modification acceptance tests (MATS) to dete satisfactortly proved the proper operation of the associated modificatio The NRC staff concluded that engineering processes were adequate to ens i
The technical bases and that plant safety margins were not reduced.
The development associated documentation for the modifications were the associated modification.
1 The NRC also reviewed the temporary modification (TM) process, incl 1
administrative procedures and a sample of TMs.
there were 22 installed TMs, seven of these were installed on safety-l systees; two are planned for removal prior to startup, one will be rem f
after completion of full power testing, and three are scheduled forTh replacement before July 1995. procedures were in place to accept r
approval. Installation, and removal of TMs,the temporary modifica i
i All pre-1990 safety-related modifications have been reassessed by NYPA 1
identify differences between the as-built plant condition The to prevent undocumented deviations from the modtfication drawings.
drawings.
ifcensee redlined all vital control room drawings with changes in prepa The NRC staff concluded that the plant's configuration control i
for restart.
was acceptable.
The NRC reviewed backlogs in the Technical Services and Design En This review included those items in the backlog that would not l
be completed prior to restart and the licensee's method for determi organizations.
i l
the ites need not be completed prior to restart.The NRC staff determined that the licensee's prioritization of these itess.
Both the Technical backlogs had been appropriately screened and prioritiz i
l control their backlogs.
The NRC staff reviewed the industry operating ex and staff training and to verify that appropriate items had been reso The staff concluded that the review process j
prior to plant restart.
industry experience was adequate,The staff determined that the backlog had been reviews was manageable.
adequately. screened by the licenses for plant restart issues.
i 3,4,5 COMPLIANCE WITH REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS f
The NRC staff has issued and granted all applicable license amend The actions specified in Confirmatory exemptions, and reliefs.
1-93-009 have been satisfied.
t i
i y.
l e
l 15 o
l The MP also reviewed all open allegations and concluded that There are no outstanding issues in been resolved.
l none affected restart of the fact 11ty.
this area relattve to the restart of Indian Point 3.
i 3.4.8 C0 ORDINATION WITH INTERESTED AGENC!!!/PART!!5 The Federal toergency Management Agency (FEMA) was nottffed of the pe 16, 1995, and FEMA was not
)
restart of Indian Point 3 via telephone on June l
aware of any offsite energency preparedness issues that could i
of the pending restart of Indf an Pofnt 3 by the Region ! State Liaison Of affect restart of the plant.
t and various government and local pubife i
14, 1995, 16, 1995.
Individuals from these via telephone on June officials were notified in a meeting on June i
various agencies fdentified no issues that would preclude restart of the l
l P ant.
The NRC has provided several opportunttles, after N i
Subsequent to each of these meetings, the staff has l
l substantive issues that could delay restart do not exist.
t' RESTART COORDINATION i
4.0 j
27, 1994, NYPA comitted to perform a The NRC recommended that NYPA complete its SURE I
!n a letter to the NRC dated May j
detailed SURE before restart.
The SURE consisted of a SERT inspection, before the NRC performed its RATI.an Operational Readiness Revi j
Certification. By letter dated March 16, 1995,
$URE had been completed successfully and that the f 2
l NRC RATI.
i NYPA presented the results of its SURE.
12, 1995, NYPA informed the NRC that In the licensee's letter dated June Indian Point 3 was ready to be restarted and delineated NYPA's pow f
The licensee plans to have its Restart Management Team (RMT 1
The RMT will oversight plan.
review activities at varfous plateaus during power ascension.
then sake recommendations to the Resident Manager regardin J
Management Teas available 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> a day during plant startup; a continue to the next plateau.
1 a senior manager is also to be assigned to each shift until reactor power I
l reaches 100 percent.
The NRC has developed an augmented inspection plan to assess t J
In addition to the resident inspectors assigned to the site, 3
additional. inspectors will provide on-shift, around-the-clock coverage, 3 restart, starting 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> before the planned reactor startup and continuing fo i
several days. During this time, among other N i
Following completion of j
and support to operations during emergent issues.
I i
i 4
i il
- 1 18 rovide' augmented coverage
)
around-the-clock coverage, the NRC will continue to of the power ascension process, including major evol tions as they occ l
untti the plant stabilizes at 100 percent power.
l 5.0 GT) G 115UES i
5.1 LATEST SA17 f
The current SALP assessment period, which was originally scheduled The was suspended untti 6 months after plant restart.
i bases for the suspension were that the NAP will continuously oversee t slant November 17, 1993, under the provisions of Manual Chapter 0350, and that plant restart wil se l
The nonitored in accordance with the NRC's approved 193 Restart Action Plan latest SALP report is over 2 years old and does not reflect the current s l
of the facility.
FIRE BARRIER PENETRATION SEALS 5.2 50-286/93-24-03, " FIRE SEAL in response to WRC inspection Unresolved Ites MALYSIS - Self Ignition Temperature of Cable Insulation as it Relates to Design of Fire Seals,' NYPA inttf ally concluded that the self-ignition temperature of the cable insulation is not less than 785'F and that this l
temperature is sufficiently above the 700*F maximum allowable unexpose
'l surface temperature criteria for penetration seal designs at Ino~f an Poi This conclusion was based on generic cable flammability data publishe The cables at Indian Point 3 are Electric Power Research InsMtute (EPRI).
'stmilar* to the cables referenced in the EPRI reports, but NYPA could no provide reasonable assurance that the cables specified in the EPRI r Because of truly reprasentative of the cables installed at Indian Point 3.
the broad range in flassabf11ty data for cables of "similar* construct the different test protocols for obtaining the flassability data, the NRC staff was concerned that the generic cable data Therefore, this ites remains unresolved, 3.
NYPA is doing research, including actual testing if needed, to verify t NYPA has applicability of the generic information used in its evaluation.
taplemented fire watches in all plant areas where the penetration These compensatory sessures, coupled with other elements of NYPA's fire protection program, e question are located.
Thus, the NRC staff has determined that NYPA's actions are acceptable for restart and subsequent operation until the pen significance.
issue is fully resolved.
COIICt!ASICII 5.0 The NRC has thoroughly assessed the phys The NRC has sanagement oversight, and the licensing status of the plant.
The found all of these areas to be adequate to support restart and ope NRC also found that NYPA's RCIP is a comprehensive plan th
d t
N 17 a
root causes and corrective actions for the previous decifne in plant 4
performance and provided a reasonable process for assessing the a
furthermore, the NRC found that NYPA's startup of those corrective actions. plan provides the process and managemen organtaed return to power operation.
i 1-93-009.
NYPA has completed the committed restart actions as described in CAJ In their letter dated June 12, 1995, not exceed 40 percent reactor power until a self-assessment is p 1
the NRC is nottfled of the results.
with the results of self-assessment after full power operation is achieved,in a public meeting, this latter self-assessment te be presented to the NRC The cover letter to this document adds to the coani The NRC will provide augmented inspection The NRC also will continue to closely Point 3 1s ready to restart.
coverage during the startup process.
monitor FrPA's performance and the implementation of tha RCIP.
e d
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NUCttAR REQULATORY COMMISSION i
mgocesi 4
l 4M AtttNoAtl #oAo 0 of PAvls'A. PtNNsvtv ANtA 1540114tl 1
t8 l
October 16,1995 i
(A 95-178 1
Nr. W. J. Cahill Jr.
Chief Nuclear Officer i
New York Power Authority l
123 Nain Street White Platns, New York 10601
$USJECT:
NOTICE OF VIOLATION (NRC Inspection Report No. 50-286/95-12) f t
j
Dear Mr. Cahill:
11,1995, to This letter refers to the NRC inspection conducted from July I-August 7,1995, at the Indian Point 3 Nuclear Power Plant, Buchanan, New Yo During the inspection, the inspectors reviewsd the circumstances associated with a vio ation identified by your staff involving the failure to perfone a safety 1
evaluation, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59, prior to making a change to the facility j
The specific change as described in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR). involve with pressure lower than the minisue amount specified in your I
July 12, 1995, Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR).
i The violation was discussed with your staff at the inspection exit meeting on 23, 1995, August 7,1995, and also was described in the NRC letter, dated August l
transaltting the inspection report. In that letter, we indicated that it say not be necessary to conduct a predecisional enforcement conference in order to en i
the NRC to make an enforcement decision in this case. However, before making a enforcement decision, we provided you an opportun i
l You or (2) request a predecisional enforcement conference.
of that letter,ference which was held with you and seabers of your staff on i
its causes, and your requested a con 1995 to discuss the apparent violation, October 5,
~
corrective actions.
The violativ. occurred when you operated at reduced reactor coolant system l
from July 10 to July 12, 1995, pressure (below 2205 psig)fter discussions with operations man gement, operators a leaking safety valve. A invoked portions of alars response procedure (ARp)-3 to allow 6 hts to red I
pressure la an attempt to.ressat the leaking safety valve. T j
had been revised on Junereduction based on a vendor recoenendattori, al That procedure was pressure to as low as 1900 psig to stop the leakage.
l inadequate because it permitted the operation of the reactor at a pressu 2205 psig which was not in accordance with your FSAR; therefore, it pl d
reactor in a condition outside the accident analysis and design basis Prior to l
reducing the RCS pressure, neither management i
j In the change from the FSAR did not involve an unreviewed safety question.
i addition, operators maintained the reduced pressure for more than eight ho which was contrary to the procedure, without evaluating the impacts of doin i
J i
ENCLOSURE 2 1
/L/
l i
f l
New York Power Authority 2
a The NRC recognises that a safety evaluation was performed after the violation was Identified, which concluded that the safety consequences for the operating i
10-12, 1995, were minimal. Nonetheless.
condition during the period from Julythe NRC is concerned with the po j
to, during, and in tsumediate response to the event, which occurrsd less than a month after your startup from the extended shutdown.
l to ARP-3 did not appropriately consider that its implementation would be contrary j
Also, although minimum RCS pressure currently is not provided in l
your technical spec 1(fcatfons, senior sanagement should have recogn1zod, to the FSAR.
l reducing pressure, that an evaluation should have been conducted to ensure that In addition, manage-the change did not involve an unreviewed safety questfon.
ment, the operations staff, and engineering staff should have demonstrated a technically inquisitive attitude and aggressively questioned th: appropriate of this evolution before taplementing it.
and the vendor, Westinghouse, were contacted on July 12, 1995, two days after the j
evolution began, that you learned that operation at reduced RCS pressure, both long-ters and short-ters, was outside the accident analysis for the plant as stated in the FSAR.
Furthermore, Def tetency Evaluation Report (DER) classified the event at a lo regulatory significance of the failures by j
should have been.
violation was low, given the management and staff, this violation has been categoriz j
j Enforcement Actions" (Enforcement Policy).
NUREG-1600, (60 FR 34381; i
l June 30, 1995).
In accordance with the Enforcement Policy, a base civil penalty in the amount l
is considered for a Severity Level !!! violation. Because your facility has been the subject of escalated enforcement actions within the last two years,26, 199 550,000 (a Severity Level III Notice of Violation was issued to you on April EAs g3-280 and g3-305), the NRC considered wheth Credit was assessment process in Section VI.8.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
warranted because your staff fdentf fled the violation and conducted a detaile root cause analysis, and subsequently, you have taken signtf presentation at the actions, as noted in theThe corrective act1ons included (1) counselling of senior managers by the Chief Nuclear Officer regarding. conserva enforcement conference.
operation; (2) communicating the managers' seeting; (3) timely 1ssuance of a standing order regarding op within normal ranges and seeking formal review if operating outside of norsa l
ranges; (4) training of operations staff regarding lesso and accident analysis; (5)
- event, and, managers on certain transient for selected key plant parameters and engineers, incorporation into the app 1tcab$ess plant operating procedures; (6) p definition of operating ran prior to restart from the current forced outage of alars response pro plant operating procedures, and off-normal operating procedures b to assure they do not permit unanalyzed operating conditions; (7) incr oversight of plant operations by the Independ
o e
3 New York Power Authority
() Increased to assure they do not gemit unanalyzed operating conditions;in Group; and overstght of plant operations by the Independent Safety E enhanced safety screening practice.
violations. I have been authortred, af ter consultation w
- However, of Enforcement, not to propose a civil penalty in inis case.
significant violations in the future could result in a civil penalty.
You are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions spectfled in the enclosed Notice when preparing your response. In your response, you should document the spectffe actions taken and any additional actions you Your response may reference or include previous docketed correspondence, if the correspondence ade plan to prevent recurrence.
corrective actions and the results of future inspections, the NRC will determine whether further NRC enforcement action is necessary to ensure compliance with N regulatory requirements.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's ' Rules of Practice,' a copy of th letter, its enclosure, and your response will be placed in the NRC any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be Document Room (POR).
placed in the POR without redaction.
The responses directed by this letter and the anclosed the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96.511.
Sincerely, Thomas T. Nartin Regional Adainistrator 4
Docket No. 50-286 License Nos. OPR-64
Enclosure:
a e
~
i New York Power Authority 4
I cc w/ enc 1:
1 R. Schoenberger, President and Chlaf Operating Officer L. Hill, Jr., $lte Executive Officer W. Jostger. Vice President - Engineering and Project Management l
J. Kelly, Vice President - Regulatory Affairs and Special Projects T. Dougherty, Vice President - Nuclear Engineering l
R. Deasy, Vice President Appraisal and Comp 11:nce Services R. Patch Director - Quality Assurance G. Wilverding. Director - Independent Dyersight G. Goldstein, Assistant Ceneral Counsel t
C. Falson, Director, Nuclear Licensing l
A. Donahue, Mayor Village of Buchanan C. Jackson, Nuclear Safety and Licensing Manager Con Ed)
C. Donaldson, Esquire, Assistant Attorney General (, New York Department of L Chatraan. Standing Committee on Energy, NYS Assembly Chairman, Standing Committee on Environmental Conservation, NYS Assembly Chatruan and Commissions, NYS Assembly E. Nullek, Committee on Corporations, Authorttles, Safety Committee Executive Chair, four County Nuclear R. Pollard, Union of Concerned Scientists The Honorable Sandra Galef, NYS Assembly Director Energy & Water Division, Department of Pubile Service, State of New York A. Song, Assistant Secretary to the Governor 4'
F. Valentino, President, New York 5, tate Energy Research and Development Authority e
O E
d
~
I
J IELOSURE i
Docket No. 50-286 l
New York Power Authority License No. OPR 64 l
Indian Point 3 Nuclear Power Plant EA 95-176 i
During an NRC inspection conducted between July 11 and Aug In accordance with the ' General f
violation of NRC requirements was identified. Statement of Po l
l FR 34381; June 30,1995), the violation is listed below:
Changes Tests and Experiments, in part, permits licensees to make changes in the faellity as described in the safe i
analysis report without prior Consulssion approval, unless th change involves a change in the technical specifications incor i
j the Itcense or an unreviewed safety question.
10 CFR Part 50.59(b)(1) requires, in part, that the licenses sai j
records of changes in the facility that constitute changes in the fa as described in the Safety Analysis Report (SAR), and the record include a written safety evaluation which provides th i
determination that l
question.
The Final Safety Analysis Report, Chapter 14, evaluates the s l
of the plant and demonstrates that the plant can be operated that the exposures froe credible accidents do not I
coolant systes pressure shall be 2205 psig while the reactor is o i
i 1995, while the l
10, 1995 to July 12,d the facility as Contrary to the above, fros July reactor was in an operational mode, the licenses change f
described in the SAR by operating with reactor coolant system below 2205 psig, which is the minimum initial pressure ass accident analysis. This change was made without prior C h
and without pe'rforming a written safety evaluation, which pr basis for the determination that the change does not invo safety question. (IF5 Code 01013)
This is a Severity Level !!! violation (Supplement !).
b Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, New York Powe l
required to subelt a written statement or explanation to C Resident l
Regulatory Commission. ATTM:a copy to the Regional Adm f
Inspector at the facility that is the subject of this Notice, w This
)d h the date of the letter transmitting this Notice of Violation (No ld reply should be clearly marked as a " Reply to a Not have been include for each violation:the basis for disputing the violatio g}ff ?
Enclosure taken and the results achtsved. (3) the corrective steps that will be taken avoid further vioittf ons, and (4) the date when full compilance will be ac h
Your response may reference or include previous docketed correspondenc correspondence adequately addresses the required response, If an adeq is not received within the time speciffed in this Notice, an Order or a Oema for Information may be issued as to why the license should not be modified, suspended, or revoked, or why such other action as may be proper should taken. Where good cause is shown, consideration will be given to extending the response time.
Under the authority of Section 182 of the Act 42 U.S.C. 2232, this response be submitted under oath or affirmation.
locause your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Roos (PDR) the extent possible. it should not include any personal privacy, hout redaction.
safeguards information so that it can be placed in the PDR wit However, if you find it necessary to include such information, you should clea indicate the specific information that you desire not to be placed in the and provide the legal basis to support information from the pubitc.
Dated at King of Prussia, Pennsylvania this 16th day of October 1995 1
-~_ - _. - _ _ _ _, _ _ _
d' w%dge sta,tg
[
h NUCLE AR REGULATORY COMMIS$10N I
8tc4N I 3
d 47% attt%c agg mo n o aiho of 8e,1%.a pt%%svtvahiA tum tais j
- ...e January 2,1996 Mr. William J. Cahill, Jr.
Chief MtKlear Officer New York Power Authority 123 Main Street Whtte Plains, New York 10601
$UBJECT:
NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF CIVIL PENALTY l
- $50,000 (NRC Inspection Report No. 50-286/95-15)
Dear Mr. Cahill:
This letter refers to the NRC inspection conducted on September 19 through October 30, 1995, at the Indian Point 3 Nuclear Power Plant. An exit meeting was conducted on November 2,1995. During the inspection, the inspectors j
conducted an independent evaluation of the circumstances surrounding an event which occurred at the factitty on October 15, 1995, involving the p. ant exiting the cold shutdown condition with the control switches for the rectreulation and containment spray pumps in the trip pullout position. The event, as well as the rela'ed violation of the technical specification, was identified by a member of your Quality Assurance staff, and was described in the NRC inspection report transattted with our letter, dated November 30, 1995. On December 13, 1995, an open Predecisional Enforcement Conference was conducted with you and members of your staff to discuss the violations, their causes, and your corrective actions.
The violation of the technical specifications is described in the enclosed Motice of Violation. The tect.atcal specifications require that at least one recirculation pump and two containment spray pumps be operable prior to entering the hot shutdown condition. However, on October 15, 1995, the reactor was heated up above the cold shutdown condition (200*F) with both recirculation pumps and both containment spray pumps inoperable because of the In control switches in the control room being in the trip pullout position.
that position, the automatte start features of the containment spray pumps were defeated, and the normal sequence for manually starting the recirculation This condition existed for about four hours, until it was pumps was altered.
identified by a member of your Quality Assurance staff during his review of the control room conditions.
The NRC connends the Quality Assurance individual who identified this condition, which was corrected within ten sinutes of identification. However, The the performance of the operctions staff in this satter was poor.
responsible control room supervisor initialed steps in the " Plant Heatup From Cold Shutdown" procedure indicating that the recirculation pumps and the 9602280248 96o215 f
ADom o m g 6 ENCLOSURE 3
x _x_.-
I 2
i Mr. W1111as J. Cahill. Jr.
l; containment spray pumps were operable (even though he knew in the ii in the trip pullout position) because he belteved that subsequent ste to the procedure would require that the switches be placed in autom Althogh such a requirement had previously existed 3
j heatup.
initialed the procedure indicating that the pumps were operable w It had been deleted in 1993.
l shift turnover, which tr.cluded a detailed control I
- not, conducted, but failed to identf fy that the recirculation and conta iting pump sultches were in the trip pullout position and did not supp i
operators did not discover the switches in the trip pullout positio l
the cold shutdown condition.
b aware of question this discrepant position, even though they should have een These failures by the status of the equipment on the control boards.
t operations staff constitute three additional violations of NRC re which are also described in the enclosed Notice.
The NRC acknowled es that the safety signiffcance of the technical l
that spectf tcation vio ation relative to plant status was minimal, considering f
the reactor coolant system temperature was about 230*F at the tim At this temperature, a loss of coolant accident would not re f
in plant conditions that would require the automatic starting j
discovery.
the the control room, which would have been expected to be cleared w containment spray pumps, to auxiliary feedwater and safety injection pumps were made ope l
l exceeding 350*F, but would not have cleared because of the inop l
t d the recirculation and containment spray pumps, and thereby, would Nonetheless, the violation is of significant concern to the N ht because of the poor performance of the operations staff, giv i
ff had cperators.
several members of multiple organizational l l
and i
Given the regulatory sign l
i to following the heatup, but did not do so.
this performance, the violations indicate a lack of adequate at j
IIcensed responsibilltfes and have been categorized in the d
Severity Level !!! in accordance with the " General Statemen l
0 (60 Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions' (Enforcement Po j
FR 34381; June 30,1995).
t In accordance with the Enforcement Policy, a base civil p Indian Point 3 has of $50,000 is considered for a Severity Level !!! probles, two years been the subject of an escalated enforcem i il ociated with 16, 1995 for a violation assithout performing penalty was issued to you on October the operation of the reactor for two days at low pressure w Therefore, in an evaluation pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59; Re l
h redit was j
d nce with the warranted for identification and corrective actio t Policy.
e j
l.
k l
4
3 Mr. William J. Cahill, Jr.
^
e The NRC has decided that credit for identification is warra timely actions of the Quality Assurance Inspector which prev l
your corrective actions, after identification, were considere hentup of the reactor.
comprehensive.
included, but your presentation at the predecisional enforcement conference, l changes to (1) management personnel and organizationa enhance the coeveunication of expectations to operator were not Itatted to:
expectations and a satisfactory level of performance, accountability initiatives to reinforce performance standards, In view of your identification and corrective actions, a civil penaltyH normally would not be issued.
of Enforcement and the Deputy Executive Olrector for Nuclear Reactor Regulation Regional Operations, and Research, I have Imposition of Civil Penalty (Notice) in the amount of $50,000 for this Severity 1.evel !!! probles, because of the poor performance by the operation 4
The penalty is intended to emphasize (1} the importance of adherence with the technical specifications, and (2) propt identific staff.
If not for the j
comprehensive correction of violations when they exist. iden j
lager civil penalty would have been issued.
You are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructio In your specified in the enclosed Notice when preparing your res 4
Your response may reference or actions you plan to prevent recurrence.
include previous docketed correspondence, if the correspondence ad After reviewing your response to this Notice, including your proposed corrective action addresses the required response.
necessary to ensure compliance with NRC regulatery requirements.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice this letter, its enclosure, and your response will be placed in the N To the extent possible, your response should not include proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be Document Room (POR).
any personal privacy,hout redaction.
placed in the POR wit i
a
]
I 4
Mr. William J. Cahill, Jr.
l The responses directed by this letter and the enc i
l by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 Pub, L. No. 96.51),
r Sincerely,
(
i Thomas T. Nartin Regional Adminf strator Docket Mos. 50-286 1.icense Nos. OPR-64 Notice of Violation and
Enclosure:
Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty i
cc: w/ enc 1 L. M. Hill, Jr., Site Executive Officer C. Rappleyes, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer R. Schoenberger, President and Chief Operating Officer W. Jostger, Vice President - Engineering and Project Nanagement 1
J. Kelly, Of rector - Regulatory Af f airs and Special Projects T. Dougherty, Of rector - Nuclear Engineering R. Deasy, Vice President Appraisal and Compliance Services 1
l R. Patch. Olrector - Quality Assurance G. Wilverding, Director - Independent Oversight j
G. Goldstein Assistant General Counsel C. Faison, Olrector, Nuclear Licensing A. Donahue, Mayor, Village of BuchananC. Jackson, Nuclear Sa j
C. Donaldson, Esquire, Assistant Attorney General, New Yor l
Chaiman, Standing Comittee on Energy, NYS Assembl E. Mullet, Executive Chair, four County Nuclear Sa Robert D. Pollard, Union of Concerned Scientists The Honorable Sandra Galef, NYS AssemblyDirector, Energ i
New York A. Song, Assistant Secretary to the GovernorF, Valentino, P and Development Authority i
l l
4 I
l 5
i OfSTR'RUTION:
f PUBLIG SECY i
CA i
Jinylor, EDO JM11hoan, DEOR JLieberman. OE l
TMartin, RI I
JGoldberg. OCC l
RZimmersan. NRR i
Enforctment Coordinators i
i RI, RII RIII, R!v RHvey. WCfD l
W8eecher, GPA/PA l
GCaputo. Of l
DBangart, OSP l
LNorton. 0!G EJordan. AE00 WDean, OE00 l
4 OE:Chron OE:EA l
l DCS DScrenci. FAO-RI (2) l Nuclear Safety Information Center (NSIC) l NRC Resident Inspector - Indian Point 3 j
4 I
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wiew en.chw </.=*=.,. T cmenar3sm um/ e
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NAME DHolody RCoope4UM KSmt th%'/
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DATE
,12/ 6/95 12/ft/95 12/' j /9S 12/25/95 '
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ENCLOSURE J'
AND i
)
PRCPOSED IMPOSITION OF CIV!L PENALTY J
Docket No.
50 286 New York Power Authority License No. DPR 64 i
f Indian Point 3 Nuclear Power Station EA 95-251
'J As a result of an NAC inspection condt.cted between September 19 and October 30,199;. the exit meeting of which was held on November 2,1995, violations of HRC requirements were identified.
In accordance with the j
' General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actior.s,'
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission J
NUREG-1600. (60 FR 34381; June 30, 1995),
proposes to impose a civil penalty pursuant to Section 234 of the Atomic l
The Energy Act of 1954, as amended (Act), 42 U.S.C. 2282, and 10 CFR 2.205.
j particular violations and associated civil penalty are set forth below:
e 4
The Indian Point Unit 3 Technical Specifications, section 3.3.A.1.d, 1
A.
state that the reactor coolant system average temperature shall not l
exceed 200'F unless one recirculation pump, together with its associated i
piping and valves, is operable.
.j The Indian Point Unit 3 Technical Specifications, section 3.3.8.1.b.
state, in part, that the reactor shall not be brought above the cold shutdown condition unless the two containment spray pumps, with their Technical Specifications, associated valves and piping, are operable.
section 1.2.1, define the cold shutdown condition to be when the reactor is subcritical by at least 1% ak/k and average temperature is less than f
or equal to 200*F.
15, 1995, free about 11:25 a.m. to Contrary to the above, on October 3:33 p.m., the reactor coolant systes average temperature exceeded 200'F with both recirculation pumps and both containment spray pumps 7
inoperable. The pumps were inoperable in that the control switches for these pumps were in the trip pullout position, rather than the automatic position, and would have prevented the automatic start of the pumps, j
Indian Point 3 Technical Specification 6.8.1 requires that written 8.
procedures shall be established, implemented and maintained covering activities referenced in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, " Quality Appendix A of Assurance Program Requirements", November 1972.
Regulatory Guide 1.33, Section 2, requires general operating procedures for cold shutdown to hot standby.
Indian Point 3 Procedure POP-1.1, ' Plant }{eatup From Cold Shutdown i
Condition', Revision 34, requires, in Attachment 3, Sections 3.4 and 3.6.3, respectively, that the Control Room Supervisor and the Shift i
4 l
l i
)
'9602290253 960215
~
PDR ADOCK 05000286 O
_ __ 7 7 7-Enclosure 2
Manager initial the procedure to indicate that at least one rectrculattan pump and both containment spray pumps are operable.
Procedure PCP 1.1 defines operable as capable of performing the intended funtilen in the intended manner (eigii rentral teltthfl in Automatit):
Contrary to the above, between October 14 and October 15, 1995, the Control Room Supervisor and the Shift Manager initialed Indian Point 3 Procedure POP-1.1 to indicate that at least one recirculation pump and both containment spray pumps were operable. However, the pumps were inoperable in that the control switches were in the trip pullout position rather than the automatic position.
C.
Indian Point 3 Technical Specification 6.8.1 requires that written procedures shall be established, implemnted and maintained' covering activities referenced in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33,
- Quality Assurance Program Requirements *, November 1972. Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Section 1.g. requires administrative procedures for shift and relief turnover.
Indian Point 3 Procedura 00-6, Shift Relief and Turnover, Revision 8 Section 6.2.4, requires that the tasks idantified in section 3.0 of the applicable shift turnoser sheet shall be completed prior to assuming the I
watch. Shift turnover sheet OPT-2, Control Room Supervisor Turnover Sheet, Revision 6, Section 3.0, requires the control room supervisor to walkdown the control boards prior to assuming the watch. Procedure 00-6 defines walkdown as a detailed review of the status of appropriate control panels by applicable on-coming and off-going watchstanding personnel.
Contrary to the above, on October 15, 1995, the control room supervisor did not perform a detailed review of the control panels prior to assuming the watch, as indicated by the failure to identify that the control switches for the recirculation and containment spray pumps were in the trip pullout position, and would not support exceeding the cold shutdown condition.
D.
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix 8, Criteria XVI, Corrective Actions, requires that measures be established to ensure that conditions adverse to quality, such as nonconformances, are promptly identified and corrected.
Contrary to the above, after the reactor coolant system average temperature exceeded 200'F on October 15, 1995 at about 11:25 a.m. untti 3:23 p.e, measures were not established to ensure that the two reactor operators on duty identified a condition adverse to quality that existed at the time, namely, the inoperability of the recirculation pumps and n..m
j f
3 4
e J
(nclosure The pumps were inoperable in that the both containment spray pumps.
control switches for these pumps were in the trip pullout posttion, 4
rather than the automatte position, and would have prevented the automatic start of the pumps.
1 l
This is a Severity Level !!! problem (Supplement 1).
Civil Penalty - $50,000.
l Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, New York Power Authori required to submit a written statement or explanation to the Director of Enfortement f Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civ i
i This reply should be clearly marked as a
- Reply to a Notice of Violation of the Notice o i
(1) admission or denial of the should include for each alleged violation: alleged violation (2 denied, the reasons why, (3) the corrective ste violations, and (5) the date when full compliance will be achieved.
1 If an adequate reply is not received within the time specified in this an Order or a Demand for Information may be issued as to why the Itcen should not be modtfled, suspended, or revoked, or why such other acti be proper should not be taken.. Consideration may be given to e r
l response time for good cause shown.Act 42 U.S.C. 2232, this res affirmation.
Within the same time as provided for the response required above und 10 CFR 2.201, the Licensee say pay the civil penalty by letter add the Director Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Co I
a check, draft, money order, or electronic transf cumulative amount of the civil penalties if mo 1
by written answer addressed to the Director, Office of Enfo Should the specified, an order imposing the civil penalty will be issued.
Regulatory Commission.
Licensee elect to file an answer in accordanc 1
an
- Answer to a Notice of Violation
- and say: demonstrate extenuating circumstances in the Notice, in whole or in part, (2)how other reasons why the penalty (3) show error in this Notice, or (4) s l
should not be imposed. In adittion to protesting the civil penalt in part, such answer may request remission or attigation of i
i 1
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Enclosure In requesting mitigation of the proposed penalty, the factors addressed in Any written Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy should be addressed.
answer in accordance with 10 CFR 2.205 should be set forth separately from the statement or explanation in reply pursuant to 10 CFR 2.201, but may incorporate parts of the 10 CFR 2.201 reply by specific' reference (e. g.,The attention o citing page and paragraph numbers) to avoid repetition. Licensee is procedure for imposing a civil penalty.
Upon failure to pay any civil penalty due which subsequently ha satter may be referred to the Attorney General, and the penalty, unless comproatsed, remitted, or attigated, may be collected by civil action pursuant l
to Section 234c of the Act, U.S.C. 2282c.
i The response noted above (Reply to Notice of Violation, letter with payment of civil penalty, and Answer to a Notice of Violation) should be addressed to:
James Lieberman, Director Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Cost =1ssion One Ithite Flint North,11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville. MD 20852-2738, with a copy to the Regional Administrator, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory i
Commission Region I, and a copy to the NRC kesident Inspector at Indian Point 3.
Because your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (POR), to the extent possible, it should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be placed in the POR without However, if you find it necessary to include such information, you redaction.
should clearly indicate the specific information that you desire not to be j
placed in the POR, and provide the legal basis to support the request for withholding tne information from the public.
i nited at King of Prussia, Pennsylvania i
tais 24 day of January 1996
_ _ _ _. - - _ - ~ _ _ _. _ -
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1 4M ALLENoAtt AoAo KINO oF PRusstA, PtNNsVLVANIA 19400 I4fl i
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December 22,1995 1'
i Mr. William J. Cahill, Jr.
Chief Nuclear Officer Power Authority of the State of New York 123 Main Street White Plains, NY 10601 j
i REQUEST FOR INFORMATION REG p-SUSJECT:
i 1
Dear Mr. Cahill:
l NYPA and the NRC have identified a series of Indian Point 3 Operations department perfomance deficiencies since restart of the unit in June l
These perfomance deficiencies were sanifested during the operation o j
10-12, 1995; reactor coolant system at low pressure on Julywhen the plant exc
+
pumps in the pull-te 15, 1995, switches for required engineered safety features (ESF)5, in the lengthy per i
lock position; and more recently, on December 2-3,199 of time which it took to identify the component cooling 4
valve leakage.
your continuing efforts to taprove performance.
paring to restart Indian Point 3 from a forced outage l
We request that you provide in writing the NYPA is currently p l
specific corrective actions that you intend to laplement prior to that began in Septe r 1995.
address these performance weaknesses, and l
We also request that you describe the l
and facilitate lasting improvements.
criteria you are using to determine the effectiveness of these corre actions prior to and during the restart of the facility.
Continuous Improvement Plan has been.
that you describe how your ongoing,t activities to assure continued safe plant I
factored into these required restar i
operation.
We appreciate your cooperation in this matter.
Sincerely, l
Thomas T. Martin l
Regional Administrator i
I Docket No. 50-286 1
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January 12,1998 IPN 96 002 4
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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Indian Point 3 Nuclear Power Plant
Subject:
Docket No. 50 286 Response to Request for information Regarding the Status of Performance improvement and Corrective Actions Prior to Restartina fndfan Point 3 NRC letter T. Martin to W. J. Cahill, Jr., ' Request for Information Status of Performance improvement / Corrective Actions P'for to Res
Reference:
Indian Point 3.* dated December 22,1995.
Dear Sir:
We welcome the opportunity to provide the information requested in As discussed below, we have aggressively pursued critical self deficiencies in operations and operations support activities, arH h 22,1995.
action *, which address the events cited in your letter, and founo in our tot experience to form the bas!s of our dynamic continuous improvem corrective actions which we implemented are structured to tailored to ensure lastir.g improvement. activities, we are address including maintenance and engineering, as described in this letter, During 1994, NYPA developed a Restart and Continuous Imp intended to identify deficiencies and improvement potentials in associated organization and staff. Throughout t
ditions were made. Some of these could only be identifled during restart, or as p i l reveated a deficiency. During initfal operation our operations organization to ensure timety response to plant n leadership in effecting change to a more formal mode of opera associated with initial operating experience started before we re f
culminated in a new organizational structure which is specifically ary reliable operation in accordance with appropriate written procedur serves to illustrate the ways in which we have implemer.ted our po improvement at Indian Point 3.
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Docket No. 50 286 IPN 96 002 Page 2 of 7 After the extended outage, which commenced in F ational Cooldown cycles. The operating philosophy demonstrated during the subse periods was based upon implementing a entical self assessme material condition of the p' ant, but most %portantly, the performance dem operational staff and management team. Executive managemen toward ensuring delDerate, conservative plant operations, in most s was successfulin meeting those expectations. One exampfe of this w the reactor head o-ring seals based upon eviden leakage in September 1995, and the subsequent actions to take the p shutdown condition in response to indica!!ons of problems with certain cont penetrations. As a result of a critical self-assossment of perform up evolution, the recent maintenance outage was extended to com scope of corrective actions designed to ensure lasting improvement in Operational events, as referenced in your letter of December 22,1 deficiencies that were self identified and have led to the accomplisY cn l
root-cause analyses through our self assessmen demonstrated dudng these and simifar events indicated the need for a actions beyond the scope of the recently completed restart portion of the actions compliment the RCIP actiert and provide additional clarificatio l t expectations. These continuing improvement iniflative? have res fi t
organization to strengthen individual performance and tne mana d
effort was directed toward improved definition of toward enhanced understanding of conservative decision making and di operating philosophy with reduced tolerance fo f
d practical understanding of adherence to procedures.
Extensive effort has been extended to addrecs equipment deficien t
that the plant operations staff would not be challenged w improvement trend in the material condition of IP3 based up performance problems.
ti ely resuit deficiencies as illustrated in Figure 1. We are completing pr implementatk>n and compliance with the Maintenance Rufe.
identify 28 systems as risk-significant with a total of 110 system f
t stif sted by the Maintenance Rule. Acttvities in progress inclu ii for boundaries and equipment selection in support of the maintenanc 6
Compliance with the development of performance criterla and obtaining related system d the rule requirements is expected by April 1996.
A similar level of effort has been expended within the site e j
effectiveness of that organization to support plant operations. Mo reorganization has been accomplished whic ager who I
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L-m:
Docket No. 50 286 0
IPN 96 002 Page 3 of 7 o
d has extens've industry experience and a record of success. Improved co focus on pant technicalissues provides confidence in the ability of the engin organizat on to support plant operations. As provicusly noted, system e participedng in training to support the development of system pe implemanted processes based on project manage t
d long-techrscal and management skiffs, resulting in the timely resolution of both e stanJing operational issues.
As previousfy stated, we havo reorganized Indian Point 3 to suppo tf or;erations in compilance with NRC requirements. This change includes f
- rations, t'1e General Manager Operetions (GMO) position with functional responsibil d
radiation protection, chemistry, performance engineering, planning and sc f
tion at training. This provides our new GMO, a person who successfu!!y perform h the our James A. FitzPatrick plant during a critical period of performance i f the plant, resources necessary to manage operations and to f
Operations Manager, who also has extensive industry experience.
f Human performance has improved significantly, as l
t improved and responsibilities. This positive performance tren ki g i
f the Additional oversight of plant operations has als l
th i
i l prior shift supervisor experience. These mentors provide an addi d operations oversight of plant operations and real time critical nced id the shift wP the development of a plan, which included an orientation period to prov e li d ctination rr >. ors familiarity with previous operational deficiencias and a persona n o conceming enhanced IP3 performance expectations. Specific assessm
~
d the performance focus on previously identified performance deficiencie hift tumover effectiveness of managementleadership and direction, communications, s ti ig formality and effectiveness, procedural adherence, conservative d h s beenin attitude and attention to detail. Althour,h the Operations Shift Mentorin dback to effect for only about one month, the shift mentors have provided mean
- hifts, operations management attesting to the technical capabilities of the i
d increasing improvement in the effectiveness of the shift tumover p d by a self-assessments of !"at process, and rigorous procedure comptianc d d by the Shift skeptical, but healthy, questioning attitude. Co f
ce d IP3 Plant enhancements. Although subjective in nature, t i
areas, but recognized development needs in other areas.
ent A number of performance indicators at IP3 have demonstrated a co d
tative since the spring of 1995, when we first heated up the plant. The mon
---u Docket No. 50 286 i
.. e IPN46 002 Page 4 of 7 average human performance error rate, as noted above, has impro period and Is approaching the industry goal (Figure 2), The percent discovered by plant personnel compared to the i
and 4). This demonstrates that the critical self evaluation being perfor personnet over this period has improved. During this same pel:
the plant has also improved. This is demonstrate l-as noted above (Figure 1).
l Three operator training requalification cycles have been completed s!n operators required remedla5on because of weak performance in the firs operators required remediabon in the second cyc'e, and no remedi 4
last cycle. Also, the seven operators who took the NRC exam in Decem l
l We are planning to resume power op9tation of IP3 upon satisfaction which we expect to accomplish this month:
Plant Operating Procedures and related System Operating Procedu 1.
l training complete.
Requisite corrective actions associated with.ecent significant even l
j 2.
determined by the GM. Operations.
Shift Technical Advisor roles and responsibilities defined, training co qualified STAS assigned to each operating s 3.
will provide oversight of plant operations.
Plant material and equ@ ment condition estab!!shed to suoport restart b evaluation of the integrated impact of the following parameters:
4.
Outstanding Work Requests (Figure 5)
?
Control Room Deficiencies (Figure S) l Operator Work Arounds (Figure 7) i i
Temporary Modifications (Figure 8) i Catch Containments (Figure 9) in the case of operator work arounds, the long term trend of tota In other cases, such as control room deficiencies and catch co increased during periods when tne plant has been at hot shutdown char,enging period for these parameters. Ou that the plant will operate safely, effect'rvely, and in compliance with requirements.
Docket No. 60 280 IPN 96 002 Page 5 cl 7 S. Supporting determinations will be provkfed by l
plant start up. These determinat6ons will be supplemented by:
Operations Shift Managers and Control Room SupeMsors, jl l
Tac 5 cal Assessment Coordinator, and Operations Shift Mentor Team Leader.
Determina5on and endorsement that the equipment and staff a effecitvely restarting IP3. This will be based on an evaluation per 6.
Opersoons and Operanons Manager of the integrated impa$t of item 7.
Overall Approval for Restart
' Site Executive Otheer Chief Nuclear Otheer The Contnuous improvement Plan (CIP) and the Restart Plan desenbed made part of the IP3 Action item Tracking System (ACTS). Although t f
of the CIP ltems from 1995 has been extended. tnese CIP items will be the ACTS system.
In some areas such as teamwork training, significant progress has Ac5on Plan C 1.1.1.1, addressing
- core competence," is nearing com involved identifying needed management skills for the plant staff. dev program to meet these needs and implementing the training. The i
management skitts training program covering teamwork and com f
action plan. Training has been provided for approximately 800 st people scheduled to attend. in 2 3 day sessio is now bemg used to evaluate performance of Nuclear Generatio during 1995.
Each of the other CIP action plans wtfl be tracked with the AC To closure. We recognize tnat in some cases, ex b
i to manage this program.
I would also like to address some of the points from the NR 4
h iod This report, covering inspections during t e per which we recerved on January 10,1996.
October 31 to December 4, included a performance based t Corrective AcDon Program. As a result of th ither CTS, etc.).
corrected or entered into the appropriate corr These changes are scheduled for completion this month.
~
' ' ^- * * - - - - - _ _ _, _ _.
Docket No. 50 286 r
IPN g6 002 Page 6 of 7 l
As previously mentened, some parts of the CIP h ectre CIP to tm restructured trws month.
The inspect 6on report au noted that the Authenty was not affectivofy pri bactuuss. During December we implemented a new pnonfiration system sim recentry implemented at out James A. Fst2Patnck plant. Station work at IP3 is priottuted using this new method. We wdl monsfor the effectiveness of t addressing the management of work becklogs later this year.
CONCLUSION:
We have taken and are taking many acDons to address our performanc Of he key acDons are:
Clarttying improved instrueson and enforcing those expectations relat 4
1.
procedure adherence.
Extenstvety revising operatog procedures to ensure they can be forfow consistent with rtem 1 above, and provong on shift personnel to support 2.
procedure revisions.
i Reorganizing the Operat ons departr ent, including estab!!shing GM-Operabons, wei ade tlonal rescurces and authority to control oper 3.
l l
and readmess to operate.
Proveng and enforcing more spectre directions to the shift crews re c
formahty and conduct of periode warkdowns,logkoeping and shitt tumov 4.
Prov6mng addibonal training on plant awareness and conservative de i
5.
making.
Increased mormoring of operating performance by using Watch Engineets/ STAS, the Tac 0 cal Assessment Group and shift mentors.
6.
We beteve these ac5ons will sfgrWficantly impro i
i of our operstng events, such as those cited in your letter.
Based on our experience in restarting and opera conc $ude that IP3 can be restarted safety and in conformance with procedu s
We we condnue to monitor the effaceveness 4
Tf We witt revise our Continuous app.vJT.atety 30-40 percent power and at fu!! power, Imp s
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Docket No. 601286 IPN.96,002 Page 1 ci 7 We are contt$ent that the actions desctted in this le part of th6s montn.
1 If you have arv questens. please contact me Vory truly your f
$=
j William J. C lif, Jr.
Chief Nuclear omcor Attachments Mr. Thomas T. Martrn cc:
Regenal Administrator l
Regen i U S. Nuclear Regulatory Commisson 475 Amendale Road 19406 1415 King of Prussia, Pennsylvania l
Mr. Curtis J. Cowg4111, Cheef Projects Branch No. I Dmsion of Reactor Projects U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
)
475 Amendale Road King of Prusse, Pennsylvania 194061415 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Resident inspectors' Office Indian Point 3 Nuclear Power Plant f
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CHAIRMAN, ROGERS, RF 1
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DATE DUE:
Jan 19 96 SIGNATURE:
DATE SIGNED:
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O' Congregg of tije IHnitch Eptates J)ottst of Etprtsentalbeg l
IZlasfjington, DC 20315 J
January 2, 1996 Ms. Shirley A. Jackson Chairman U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555
Dear Ms. Jackson:
We are writing about the potential risks to our constituents posed by continuing safety violations at the Indian Point 3 nuclear power plant in Buchanan, New York.
As representatives cf millions of New Yorkers who live in che vicinity of the plant, we urge the U.S. Nuclear a
l Regulatory Commissi)n (NRC) to take all necessary action to ensure that these violations cease.
As you know, in February 1993 the Indian Point 3 plant was shut down after the New York Power Authority (NYPA) filed reports with the NRC admitting that the plant had not complied with its safety design criteria.
Because safety 4
problems at the plant were so acute, the plant did not resume operations until June 1995 -- almost two and a half years later.
4 We understand that as soon as the plant resumed operations this June, the NRC found safety violations of the same type that had been occurring before the shutdown.
As far as we are aware, however, the NRC has taken no enforcement action as a result of those violations, i
Moreover, on several occasions since June Indian Point 3 has l'
again been cited for failing to follow safe operating procedures.
Most recently, in mid October the temperature of the reactor's cooling system was raised while three pumps that serve backup safety systems were inoperable, in violation of the plant's operating procedures.
The continuing violations at Indian Point 3 lead us to seriously question why the NRC permitted Indian Point 3 to resume operations when the underlying causes that led to its shutdown in 1993 had not been corrected.
We want to know why these violations continue to occur and what action the i
NRC is taking with the NYPA to ensure they do not continue.
j In light of the plant's location in one of the nation's most densely populated regions, our constituents rely upon 1
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your agency to ensure their safety by holding Indian Point 3 to the very highest safety standards.
i We appreciate your prompt attention to our concerns.
Sincerely, i
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February 15, 1996 CHAIRMAN i
The Honorable Nita M. Lowey 11ffit'ed States House of Representatives Washington, D.C.
20515
Dear Congresswoman Lowey:
I'am responding to your letter of January 2, 1996, in which you expressed 3
concern about the potential risks posed to your constituents by continued safety violations at Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 3 (IP3),.which is operated by the New York Power Authority (NYPA). At present, IP3 is on the NRC's " Watch List" of plants meriting special scrutiny, and an NRC inspection team is on-site at IP3, closely monitoring the licensee's preparation for restarting the facility.
I can assure you that if the NRC staff determines that it lacks reasonable assurance that the plant can operate safely, it will not hesitate to take appropriate action.
NYPA shut down IP3 in February 1993 to correct several hardware deficiencies and to implement plant-wide programmatic improvements for correcting the underlying root causes of identified performance deficiencies. is a copy of NRC's letter of June 19, 1995, which provided NRC's basis for the conclusion that the plant was ready to restart from the extended outage.
The plant restarted from that outage on June 27, 1995.
During the restart, the NRC conducted inspections to assess NYPA's activities. Additional inspectors assisted the three full-time resident inspectors assigned to the site in providing around-the-clock coverage for the first phase of the startup and conducted an inspection lasting about 3 weeks.
Safety violations similar to those that led to the extended shutdown were identified shortly after restart, and NYPA was cited for failing to follow safe operating procedures.
The staff found that from July 10 through 12, 1995, IP3 operated with reduced reactor coolant system (RCS) pressure which was outside the plant's design basis.
Some of the factnrs contributing to the violation were issues that the NRC had previously brought to the attention of NYPA, such as weak management oversight of the operation department's activities, problems in the procedure upgrade program, and insufficient understanding of the facility's design basis.
Consequently, NRC issued an escalated enforcement notice (Severity Level III).
However, in accordance with our enforcement policy, NRC waived the monetary civil penalty because NYPA identified the violation itself, conducted a detailed root cause analysis, and took significant corrective action.
A copy of the notice of violation, which was issued on October 16, 1995, and the details relating to its issuance are provided in Enclosure 2.
1 M&GJJZ39 Yl
2 In September 1995, IP3 entered a forced outage to correct self-identified equipment problems.
However, the new equipment problems were different from those that had been corrected during the previous shutdown.
On October 15, 1995, the IP3 operations staff violated regulatory requirements by increasing the RCS temperature above 200*F with three engineered safety features pumps inoperable due to incorrect control switch positions. A predecisional enforcement conference, which was open to the public, was held on December 13, 1995, to discuss the apparent violation, its root cause, the safety significance of the event, and subsequent corrective. actions taken by NYPA. A copy of the notice of violation, which was issued on January 2, 1996, and the details relating to its issuance are provided in Enclosure 3.
The violation resulted in escalated enforcement and the imposition of a $50,000 civil penalty.
The notice indicates the factors that the staff weighed in determining the amount of the civil penalty.
For example, though the operational staff performed poorly, a quality assurance staff member took quick and effective action to correct the problem, and though temperature limits for the RCS were exceeded, no actual hazard to safety resulted.
In light of the safety violations which occurred following initial restart, the NRC, on December 22, 1995, requested that NYPA provide the current status of its performance improvement effort and delineate the corrective actions it has taken.
Our purpose was to ensure that performance problems are being arrested and that lasting improvements are being facilitated.
The NRC's request and NYPA's response dated January 12, 1996, are included as Enclosures 4 and 5, respectively.
The Commission will continue to pay close attention to IP3 and will keep you informed of any significant further actions that we may take with respect to IP3.
Sincerely, Shirley Ann Jackson
Enclosures:
$/24.(OUtfb 1.
NRC Letter, June 19, 1995 2.
Notice of Violation, October 16, 1995 3.
Notice of Violation, January 2, 1996 4.
Request for Information, December 22, 1995 5.
NYPA Response to the December 22, 1995, Request for Information, January 12, 1996
(011d1'055 Of dit UnitfD iPIa',ts D0"$0 Of 15?WC50!!illt!Urs 21.j +h:ngt c:-
"M 20313 January 2, 1996 Ms. Shirley A. Jackson Chairman U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555
Dear Ms. Jackson:
We are writing about the potential risks to our
~
constituents posed by continuing safety violations at the Indian Point 3 nuclear power plant in Buchanan, New York.
As representatives of millions of New Yorkers who live in the vicinity of the plant, we urge the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to take all necessary action to ensure that these violations cease.
As you know, in February 1993 the Indian Point 3 plant was. shut down after the New York Power Authority (NYPA) filed reports with the'NRC admitting that the plant had not complied with its safety design criteria.. Because safety e
problems at the plant were so acute, the plant did not resume' operations until June 1995 -
almost two-and a half years later.
--We understand that as soon as'che plant resumed-operations this June, the NRC found safety violations of the same type that had been occurring before the shutdown.
As far as we are aware, however, the NRC has taken no enforcement action as a result of those violations.
Moreover, on several occasions since June Indian Point 3 has again been cited for failing to follow safe' operating procedures.
Most recently, in mid-October the temperature of the reactor's cooling system was raised while three pumps that serve backup safety systems were inoperable, in violation of the plant's operating procedures.
The continuing violations at Indian Point 3 lead us to l
seriously question why the NRC permitted Indian Point 3 to resume operations when the underlying causes that led to its shutdown in 1993 had not been corrected.
We want to know why-these violations continue to occur and what action the NRC is taking with the NYPA to ensure they do not continue.
In light of the plant's location in one of the nation's most densely populated regions, our constituents rely upon l
o m
-ucav u5^ e7
your agency to ensure their safety by holding Indian Point 3 to the very highest safety standards.
We appreciate your prompt attention to our concerns.
Sincerely,
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WASHINGTON, D.C. 206664001 July 3,1996 r
/ The Honorable Benjamin A. Gilman, Chairman Committee on International Relations l
U.S. House of Representatives Washington, D.C.
20515-I
Dear Nr. Chairman,
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has sent to the Office of the Federal Register for publication the enclosed final rule which amends'the Commission's export regulations in 10 CFR Part 110.- The amendments expand the authority of U.S. companies to export nonsensitive nuclear reactor equipment i
and minor quantities of nuclear materials under NRC general licensing.
The final rule also adds uranium conversion plants and especially designed or prepared equipment thereof to the, export licensing' authority of the NRC.
The new regulations reflect the Executive Branch's nuclear non-proliferation policias and conform the export controls of the United States to the j
international export control guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group.
Sincerely, h &.)C Dennis K. Rathbun, Director Office of Congressional Affairs
Enclosure:
As stated cc:
Representative Lee Hamilton s'
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'The Honorable Lauch Faircloth, Chairsan s.
5ubcosmittee on Clean Air, Wetlands, Private Property, and Muclear safety Countttee on Environment and Public Works i
United States Senate Washington, D.C.
20510 cc: Senator Sob Grahan 4
The Honorable Jesse Helas, Chairman i
Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate Washington, D.C.
20510 cc: Senator Claiborne Pell l
The Honorable Ted Stevens, Chatrisan j
Committee on Governmental Affairs United States Senate Washingon D.C.
20510 4
cc: Senator John Glenn The Honorable Pete V. Domenici, Chatruan Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development l
Committoe on Appropriations United States Senate 4
j Washington, D.C.
20510 i
cc: Senator J. Bennett Johnston The Honorable Dan Schaefer, Chairman Subcommittee on Energy and Power Committee on Commerce U.S. House of Representatives
)
Washington, D.C.
20515 cc: Representative Frank Pallone, Jr.
The Honorable Benjamin A. Gilman, Chairman Consittee on International Relations U.S. House of Representatives Washington, D.C.
20515 cc:
Representative Dana Rohrabacher The Honorable John T. Ptyers, Chairman Subcoesittee on Energy and Water Development Committee on Appropriations U.S. House of Representatives Washington, D.C.
20515 cc: Representative Tom Bev111
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 2066EM001 4....
4 Septenber 26,,1995 lnformation in this record was deleted The H norable Benjamin A. Gilman in accordance with)he Freedom of Informa nited States House of Representatives Act e tions U Washington, DC 20515-3220 FOIA.
-59
Dear Congressman Gilman:
I am responding to your letter of August 17, 1995, in which you requested information for one of your constituents. As requested by your constituent, I am enclosing a copy of the portions of Part 73 to Title 10, Code of Federal i
Regulations, that govern security of nuclear power plants.
Your constituent also asked why the security force at the nuclear plant where j
he works is not informed when the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) receives threats regarding a nuclear power plant.
If the FBI receives a credible threat and decides prompt notification is important, the FBI may first inform the licensees and then advise the NRC of the action it has taken.
)
J The FBI field offices have contingency plans for assisting nuclear power plant licensees in the event of a credible threat.
In other instances, the FBI may send a threat advisory to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).
The NRC then decides whether it should pass the threat on to one or more licensees. The NRC staff does not report threats that are not remotely credible. The NRC passes on to licensees only credible threats and those threats that the NRC decides warrant prudent handling.
Your constituent should understand that both the FBI and the NRC take all threats to nuclear power plants (and other NRC-licensed activities) very seriously and therefore both agencies work very closely together to ensure that the public health and safety are being protected.
This letter does not contain your constituent's name because we were asked that the request be kept confidential.
I hope that this letter responds to your constituent's concerns.
Sincerely, w. 7WAL~p i
james M. Tay1or (J.xecutive Director for Operations
Enclosure:
Portions of Part 73 of the Code of Federal Regulations 4
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 1
RULES and REGULATIONS TTTLE 10, CHAPTER 1, CODE OF I EDERAL REGULAT)ONS-ENERGY I
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73.1(a) i l
l PART PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF PLANTS AND MATERIALS
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73.73 Requirement for advance nouse and
$ 73.1 Purpose end esepe.
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,'m"i,"e,18"* *7Mg (a) Purpose. This part rescribes g
Deruuuene. "*88-manesaw.
mquirements for the esta lishment and I
ts.:
73 '4 R***' maat for ad ease asume and maine== mar = of a physical protection 73.s interpreteueme.
8*euen et amont ens'emente et nucle-e7stan which will have capabilities for i
ts.4 comunmusemene.
" Ytruw N eun"u"osen U s N in' Prosection of special nuclear
,"j f,",,m"a8"*"n'aan par nea, 7,
',c,o,
Protecuan of Nuclear Matenal. utree. _ material at fbed sites and in transit and use and 2 of lants in which special nuclear
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vs.s Internasuem aaaa==sa== requiremanu-materialis used.N following design g basis threats, where referenad in ossa noorwena.
- wformann o6)eeuw sad nao vm I ensuing sections of this
, shall be g
not crimines a*-
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Ts.s1 Requiremunu for uw prosecuan g E used to design systems to esteeueres mformasuon.
73.s4 Prohtuuone.
protect against acts of radiological and to prevent the theft of en l
Purresens, Peormersos or aveczat Noctaan A'N'ess A-UwrTuo Staten, ocamaa Rase-Maransas, as Taamarr tatsar na===maron Ressomat orricus e
nuclear material. Licenesee
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ts.ss Pertw.aa-caenuttues ter m.,
TL"~*'"'
C"""" 'on secons.
subject to the provisions of 6 72.182.
i f 72.212, $ 73.20, f 73.50, and 5 73.60 proteauen et strateese e,eeing noeis 3,,,,,,, c_
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1 are exempt from 6 73.1(a)(1)(i)(E) and
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"" T'*"'*nauen passaal proteouem 4,,wssa D-Purescas. Peorearms or tana.
$ 73.1(a)(1)(li!).
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mad esavus Raaeros Pou6 is Taasser, nass.
sue Pacesass Seasser Scussess
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o,'m'" "g, (1)llodiologica/Schodepo. (i) A
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of irradiated fust trenest.
determissed ht extemal assault, Arrusess P-Natsous Tuat Aes Paarsas to l
Pervseent Pasuscesor Raeoramarre as attack by stealth, or deceptive actions, Tau Couvarrioer os rum Partescas, Pao.
yngen green i
fuertoe or Nociana Marensas, of several perseas with the following 4
"# Ph' dent preemason, oeneral reettr>
Apreurs O-Recetassa sarescases attributes, assistance and at:
i M.48 Perf empehestees or f1 sed AppsNDsx H-WaArOpee Quaup4 CARE 3d Carm-ggf dgggCGled may inchade% inside ammineam "A
Ts.46 Ptsed este phpulent protesuon eye.
l an__'
ble lodividual temne, suhayetense, mamaramaata and pre.
hAusbertsy: Secs. S3,141, es Stat. eso,948.
leforunation) an a ve TsM phpetent proteseen se aramadaal, sec.147,94 Stat. 700 (42 U.S.C to entrasace and exit, m3,2167,2mh sec. 201,as amended 204, f role hdisable slanas and communica l
W.86 Reemrements tw W m ofna==== assantase sa nuoleer power re.
j astere seatmet radaanar'aa' enhosaee.
88 Stat.1242, as amended,1248. ecc.1701, 3 partidpete la violent attack), or both.
73.56 Forsneselaceaeauthorteesion 106 Stat. 29S1,2952,2953 (42 U.S.C S441.
(C) suitable weapons,up to and for nedser posur pleens.
5444,2297f).
head-held autossatic weapons, j
r 1
13.87 Requiruseente for ertantant hiesary Sectica 73.1 also leeued under secs.135, with ellmacere and having cheeks et indeWeuale orented unesserted I *at. Pub. 1.97-425,98 Stet. 2232,2241 (42 long reage accuracy. (D) hand-
- ament faenley 3 UA.t @ ES,10181). Section 73.37(f) also carried equipment,inchadlag issued under sec. 3o1 Pub.1.96-298,94 incapacitatlag agente and vosfor g, g,g power roaster liseneses,
% 80 Manasaams per phyulent Stat. 789 (42 U.S.C 5841 note). Sectica 73.57 use as smole of entry or for a.-
et maapesar reesters le leeued under sec. 606, Pub. L 99-390,100 destroying reactor, facility,i,
. T.
Stat. 476 (42 U.S.C 2169).
1r container intepity or features of the Pterssons Paereerses er eresaL Nemana safeguertie system. and saava nas or sammeness ase Inw senase.
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ese Sesespumanes ts.et IJeanese ased este and in.treasst no.
outremente ser un phrenen seossessen (E) A four-wheel drive land vehicle et species amenent sentenas et niederate and new arensene sawa=====
used for1 - J7ng personnel and Raco m as Raroats their hand-carried equipment to the vs.19 nosords proximity of vital areas, and 13.'1 neportene et enteouarde mots-(11) An laternal threat of an insider,
"'"n"**m".E"r"$iaNuNnnes$ un E including an employee (in any 3 position),and teete no ctal nucies, matersal, specia nucient material of moderate strateetc (iii) A four-wheel drive land vehicle etentitcanee, or irradiated twtor fuel.
bomb.
73-1 September 30,1994
PART 73 o PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF PLANTS AND MATERIALS T.
pm ectiesTopecial by As provided in part 76 of thle 3
for y
(2) Theft orDiversion ofFormula nuclest ma terial as transportation by che ter,the regulations of this part I Quantities of Strategic Specio/ Nuclear any person who is licened owouset k Ih Procedurm and criteria for f Afoterial.
the regulations la part 70 and part no of physical security for the issuance of a 3
thischaptwwhoimporte exporte, f certificate of com ar= or the approval r ; % debwere to a carrier for 3 of a compliance p transport ise shipment er takes
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deliveryof a shipment free os (1) A determined. violent, extemal board (F.01) at le deBvered to e essault, attack by stealth, or deceptive carriar. formula quantities of strategic at.tions by a small group with the special nacieer material special nuclear fallowing attributes, assistance. and a aterial of modorete stretsgic equipotent:
I"'"""" or special amulear matertal (A) Well treined (lacluding military stategic signissenes.
training and oldile) and dedicated (3)This pad also apphes to h individuale:
by air of special anclear meterial is a$le 8'
vi a
w arem er(14l3gguesas of anesepts to participate in a pesolve role wsM MW h woudem I:t2.'"=:".!;r.*t.reeJ:
,,, ;se,a :,= >- o t -- = *e u-
- *e e,
$hQ bo
. p*Micipate (4) Special nuclear matedel emblest to (C) Suitable weapoos, up to and Pen mey ales yprotected pummaat I**
O
u qu p h le ani avirg agency fw he protection of classa8ed j sffective long range accuracy; and use far. any such use a la try of the diettoying reactor, facility, transporter
- "'"I A - -
with
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cr container integrity or features of tho'
- '*9"Wasato of ele pad does not esfe-guarde system:
relieve any Boonese from any (E) land vehiclee used for
'equirement er abugdien to putse trensporung personnel and bir hand.
special ancisar emeterial pursuant to escried equipment; and
- escurity,. -
-._ presselbed by the (F) the abdity to operate as two or Commission er other Govereenset m:re turne.
agency isr the protection of etmaaafled meteriale.
==
MI M pad mise opg#es to to
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IiII An individual,includi^8 en shipsenet of irradiated reactor heel la lifA e irse tw n ndividuale quanudes est in a single shipant boe 3 in any position who ma have:(A) need 15 greene la net weight of g Access to and detailed wiedge of irradiated fuel exclusive of claddlag or nuclear power plante of the facilities e&er samaurel or pedaging meterlaL a han a mealradiadon does in refIrred to in i 73.30(a), or (B) items that I ould facilitate theft of opedal m.cle ir nores d 20 rene per hour at a c
material (e.g., small tools. substitute ditterace of 3 feet from any acesseible material, false documents, etc.). or both, surface witout intervening obloiding.
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(b) Scqpa (t) N part prescribes f e) t
'nnis part presarmes requero.
- requirements for (i) the physical ptolecuon of.
'. : and utilisaties g mate tw take pitystant protestima of e f;cilities liconeed pursuant to part so of
- opent fust mased h attaner en mee.
E (pendena essas feel morese maathanan g thle chapter. (61) the physical psotemien IEpW) er a soonitored roertevelde y cf plan'ein which activities linesmed 3 storese lastaalaisen (agsta) ua pursuant to part 70 of this chapter era i under part 13 of thle chapter conducted, and L=
[for the protocelen of Befageerde (y)This par prescribee, '
a luune physicalprotectism of semiser metertalby any pasen pureenat to the regaintisme in part et er
- hdormaties is the hende of any person.
yo of this abapter, possesses er mese at
! whether er met a Mosesos of the
{ eny site or eastigesme sites suhteet to l "'a=
who receives, or lg the osalmi by the lismessa. fsemmle acquires letarenetien.
g quenuties of strategic muelser meterial ee s,selal matemalef r.
s moderate strategic =a =an===== or (s) ' nite part presermes reautre.
r ments for et unes notice of export epec.ial nuclear ansterial of low etstag and lamport ahlg-te of ggeglg[ ggglg.
,m ar matartal including trradiated rene.
tor fuel.
30, W 73-2
73'2 7 3 ~'
1%RT 73 o PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF PLANTS AND MATERIALS
~
" Continuous visual surveillance" "laolation sone" means any area IE U*A"I means unobstructed view at eu times adiacant to a physical barrier, clear of i
As used in this part-of a shipment of special puolear mate-an objects which could conceal or (a) Terms defined in Parts 80 and 10 rial, and of all neones to a temports ehleid an individusL of this chapter have the same maantnf stormee area or cargo compartment "Imek" ha the case og vawte or when used in this part.
containing the shipenent.
vault type rooms eseems a three post.
"AMiropriate Nuclear Regulatory "ControHed acosa area" sneens tion.==aspana**aa nelstant, dial type.
Commission partanal Offlee usted in any teenporarQy or peramanently estab.
buut-in -hana*8aa look or combina-appanm= A"means:
thhed area whleh is clearly desmarest.
tion padlocit and in _the case of fences.
- (1) For donnesuc shipaments--the Re-ed. acessa to which is contreued and walls, and buildings means an lategral glonal Office within whose region the which affords leolatica of the snatorial door leek or padlocs which provides licensee who is responsible for the or persons within it.
protection equivalent to a als tumbler i
physical protection arrangesments of eyunder leek. "Leelt" la the case of a the ahlpeneet is toested, "Decett" eneens methods used vault or vault type room also means (3) por esporg hs e.
ek. 30 to attempt to gain usasutl N any mamalpailastaa reistaunt, electroene-gload Offlee within winese reglen the access, introduce unanehanteed smatert-chanlaal devios whleh provides the llennese who is te for the als. or remove strategic spoeial nuclear eases funellen as a bunt-in combina-physical protestion arrmay=====*= of materials, where the attemet involves tion lock or aa-hanneaan padlock.
4 the ehlgement is loested, and the Re-falsifloatles to pneemt the appearamos which can be operated resnotely or by sional Offlee for the sessen in which of authertmed aseems.
the reading" or insertion of informa-ties,"which saa be uniquely citaracter.
the last potat of emit of the abissment
" DOE
- and "Departement og j
froma the UA is located.
Energy " ansaas the Department of teed, and widah allows operation of (3) Ftr import =he--
- = 4h-A,+
miergy esteldished by the Departemeng ties esetse. "Leeked" encens protected glemal Offlee within whose raska 0 #
of Baergy Organtantion Act (Pub. L hy an operable losit.
heemsee who is ressessihte for toe 06 41. 91 Stat. SdB. 43 UAC.1181 et
" listerial aseems area" means any phyminni protection arr=r======*= of ass.), to the estant that the Depart-naam*8== wtdeh esotains special nucle-the eldsenent is located, and the Re-
' meat, or its duly autherteed reprenant.
er amaterial, witada a vault or a build-stenal Offlee for the regles in utdeh stives, esereises functions forenerly ing, the roof, wans, and floor of which the first point of entry of the ship -
vested in the UA Atemde Energy each constitute a phyelcal barrier.
j anent into the UA is loested.
g ca==a=8a't. Its Chairumaa, mensbere.
"Stevennent control conur
4 "Arumed escort" smeans an armed 3 offlesse and aamaran==*a ami trasts" eneaan an opersticas center which is person, not ansessaarSy usuforened. -- fered to the UA Burgy Resammh and resmote frees transport activity and Dmlopment Adualuistettica and to which smaintains periodic position in-whose prianary duty it 'a manamnpany the Ad=8 alm tor thereof pursuant to forsmatten en the movement of strate-a Ishipenesta of special nuclear snatorial sections 104(b). (c) and (d) of Une sie special nuclear material, receives for the protecuen of such shap.m te Energy Reorganisation Act of 1914 reports of attempted attacina or thefta.
asainst theft or radialattant enhotage.
E provides a means for reporting these
- not
= eenne.!"-
u.a.A C.ser.ta,,.5and Aruned respones per 4 U to
d ==== m a appa-=
, u
.nor,,,u,suant to and een mouest and omdi-forsned, whose primary duty la the secuen 301(a) of the Departament of
'8 " *8'I*A* "I#'
event of attensted theft of special nu-Energy Organinsuon Act (Pub. L 06-clear matertal or radaalageaal enhotase
- 91. 91 Stat. See at STT-STS, 43 UAC.
"Need to know" ameans a deter-shdl be to respond, artmed and 11813.
% by a porosa having responsi.
bGity for protesting Safeguards Infor-equipped to prevent or delay such no-Force means violent enethods maasm that a proposed recipient's a
- tiens, med y an adunary to attempt to assem to Safegues Information is J
"Authertsed Individual" means
="a3 eu*ask asiahl auder =8e'id E menemary in the performanoe of offi-any individual, inoimung an enebyee.
or to abotase a nuclear festitty or vlo-g etal centractual or lineesse duuss of a student, a consultant. or na asent d met ah employment, a lieensee who has been deslanated la g
"Pureen" means (1) any individ-wrtuns by a un e to hm respeans-acuena.
tduty for survotuanoe of or control ual eerpersues, partaerutdp firna, as-over speesal nuclear maternal er to assistaan, trust, estate, puhue or prt-vale insutuusa. group. government
~
haw unasoorted necess to areas where special nuclear masterial is used or M'8"'I8 9"ontify means otrategic
.assocy other than the ra - d=8aa or stared.
opecial amelear material ta any the Department of Energy (DOEL a
I or more tion in a geastity of BJioO pass ceanbina (essept that the DOE shan be consid-anunet/ressouns" means preta-r-a==8 by the fannula, penas ered a genen to saw extent that its le 1
uen assinst somelete penetreuen, pas.
ease of frasunents of projeetnes, and R. (grams contained U-ass) + 2.5 (grams entales am==id=* to the u==ndnyand 8
y autberty M the spalues (fr-em--*--> of taw palm-E u-ass + Fans plutonium).nis eless of
- h'*8 "ena"p'*a"re'nant to seeseen set o ceauaiss uve matertal that could enues injury 2 material is samtimes referred to as a the assagy meere==a==da= Act of 1974 to a person standins arestly hame=d tae bunst nsestans barrter.
I Category I quantity of material and smalleas 184. 188 and ses of the L
Uremissa nam Teenass maamassa-con-trol Act of ISTB). any state er peutical "Ouard" sneens a untformed inds-subevisina of a state, or any peutkal pomiguous stems uneenslicenses vidual armed with a firearm whose prl-subdivesten of any government or controlled loostiaca, deemed by the mary duty is the protecuon of speelal neuen, or other entity and (3) any nuchar mstertal asannst theft. the lesal
. repressatative, asut, I r a===<==8a= m be la close eng
"8'"*""*'*"8"'*8' m uch other, the the special 8***'*".*e.I
- 888"'
'8*'"** '*d'*I*88" ca sabota or both.
"Physiset Smerter meeme: (1) Fences E nuclear anatorial anest be considered in
" Incendiary device" oneens any es.o ted of ne.st Americes wire 2
agregate for the purpose of physical self contained devios intended t*
gases, er beevter wise s,a, bete,, toppe cre.t.. n- - -
or m.re e ar od w or L
- nossaur flaawnsktant or ntardant similar saateriel en breakate engled
"*88*'**
toward er outward between so* and es'
]
"Intruenon alass" means a keus the vertical with an overen height E taanper indicauns electrkal, destro-of not less them a feet,lealuding the nechankat electroopuent electronic 2 or esauar device wtdoh wul detect in, barbed topping (2) buudlag walls,
~
trusion by an individual into a buud-ceGings and floore constructed of stone.
j Ins, proucud area, vital area, or mate.
brick, cinder block. concrete, steel or rtal access area, and alert guards or comparable materials (openings in watchmen by manna of actuated vtal-which are secured by grotes, doors, or
~
ble and audible signals.
73-3 MMN
i 73.2 73*2 PART 73 o PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF PLANTS AfG MATERIALS i
covere cf construction and fist:ning of
>SpecialawJearmoderioloflow "Ctealth" means methods used sufficient strength such that the inte stmassic a'
- conce means, to attempt to sala unauthorised l
of tha wallis not la===aad by any ytty (1) lass an enount of special access, introduce unauthorised materi-opening). or wells of stadler nuclear material of moderate strategic e61s, or remow strateste special nuclear construction, not part of a beilding,
""== as d=Anad in parepaph (1) material, whom the fact of such at-j provided with a barbed topping of the definition of strategic anclear lempt As 8* 8 g conosal i
described in paragraph (1) of this material of moderate stratesk ma ione==aa la this section, but more 8tsstesic l
definition of a height of not less than a r
,g,g.,,,,,, rui ne tained 3
feet:or than is grams of ureatum-ass (oostained urnium enriched to 30 passent or (3) Any other physical obstruction in ureatum enriched to 30 percent or atore in the U NS lootope), uranium-constructed in a ramaner and of mate-more in U.235 isotope) oris pasas of MS or plutonium.
rials euttable for the purpose for urealuss-238 or 15 of pantomhee or which the obstruction is ineaadad the aa==hiandon a pasos when
. Tectical Response Team. means the
. -8,etected ares - area ca.,.ted b, & e e,s. on, sam-r
- -ar-ama i
encompassed by phreical barriere and contained U-ass) 1. (pens whissi can be idendfled by a diednedre j
to which access is controlled.
).t. (pens U-ass) or item of unifonn, armed with specined l
" Radiological embotase" unanna (2) lass then 1&0D0 yens but more we8 pone.W h h h penah any deliberate act directed against a than 1. cod grams of armahun-ass immediate mponse.
j plant or transport in widah an activity (contained in uranism earkdmed to to "Treaspost" ananas my lami, ina====d pursuant to the regulations in' peesset or esore but less han 3 passet sea, or air aanveyanos or enachdas for this chapter is aaaduatad or against a in the U-238 lootope) or these oseveyanees such as reR oars or aa'arwinaar of such a plant or trans.
=taad*8silmed eargo amnemana s.
Port whleh could directly or indirecuy E
-- s-pub c h-=, - estet, 2
,,o,e na,,isest perform ndergoing proceedng" Insens "U
ta
.gasuveopa.uo. son al.-
by esposure to radiatian a
,al i,e,,e,, &as 10 pareent in rial auch as ehemalent transf6
" Safeguards Informauon" means the U-ass lootope).
phyelent transformation, or transit be-informauon not otherwise claestfled as
- lids class of materialis sometimes tween euett operaMons, to be differen.
Nauonal Security Informauen or Re.
reformd to es a Category M quantity of tinted freen storage or paebaging for stricted Data which specifically idead-materlat ahl==aat t
flee a licensee's or appilcant's detailed.
" Vault" means a wtadowlses on.
(1) escurity measures for the physical Specle/ nucleor moderfol of modorode olosure with walls, floor, roof and protection of special nuclear material.
siroespic '- *- = monas:
I doeste) destyned and constructed to y
[ cr (2) escurity measures for the physt*
(1) lass than a foreneda quand of g delay peestration freen forced entry.
y cal protocuen and locauen of certain strategic special onclear una but "Vasalt type reces" means a rosen
[ with one or anere doore, aH espable of g plant equipenent vital to the safety of amore han 1.000 yams d 6 2 eing loeked, protested by an intru.
production or utlHamtian faculties, b
g g,,,g g,
" Security managesnant" sneans egen alarum wtiania arentes an h percent or more in the'U-ass isotope) or persons responsible for escurity at the policy and seneral managesment level.
mas &an 800 pans of hm or upon the entry of a pereen anywhere into the room and uposa exit froma the rossa or u en ovement of an istivid-
" Security Storage Container" enere een when computal uni within the roosa, includes any of the fonowtas repost.
tories: (1) For storage in a building lo-by he '9"' den,8""' " I8'*"'
" Vital area" oneens any area cated within a protected or controlled contained U-235) + 2 (pens U-238 +
whleh aaataisia vital equipament.
acones area, a eteel fDing cabinet passe plutonium) or
" Vital egna anant" means any r
equipped with a steel locking har and
( )10,000 yams or enore of arealum-equipament, system. devloe, or anatorial, a three postuon. chanseable combina.
238 (contained in uranium enriched to 10 the faSure, destrucuen, or release of Lion. OSA approved Padia** (2) A so-
' percent or more but less then 30 percent wtdeh could directly or indirectly on.
curity filing cabinet that bears a Test in the U-Ess tootope),
danser the pubus bes'th and safety by Ceruficauon Iabel on the side of the
.Ilds class of matmialis somedmes exposure to redlauen. Equipment or locking drawer, or interior plate, and systems wtitch would be neuted to referred to 88 8 CategorF E quandty of tuneuen to protest puhuc health and is marked. " General Servlees adeninna-
"8 tration Approved Security Container" emfety fouowing maatt faSure, destrus>
on the exterior of the top drawer or tion, or relenes are also considered to door: (3) A bank enfo<leposit boa: and be vital.
(4) Other repositories wtdch la the "Watehsnaa" aneans an individ-judgement of the NRC, would provide ual, not necessarny uniformed or commparable physical protecuen.
armed with a firearna, who provides 5ecurity supervision" nneans' protecuca for a plant and the special persons, not necessarny uniformed o,.
nuclear amaterial therein in the course armed, whose primary duties are au-of perforndne other duties, pervielon and direction of escurity at the day to<tay operaung level.
July 31,1992 73-4
l 73.21(b) 73.3 PART 73 o PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF PLANTS AND MATERIALS gFas sesammmenesamesa (4) lacludes a and maintenance s vs.s -
""""*"*"'8'"
proyam answe trol over all f
ausses as esseammar emnestsee my (a)Ho Nedser Ragslaterf activities
=N=retag the
- men====a- *= an wrtehe, as seenwo-Comadssien has==h-masme essed roue
~,and s taansa et the et ass neessesses
^
avausbili ofthe
~prote: tion informatiesoutseelse deOSeeof i
a la the part by ear eromsesseset e--
-- tion that ommeninedin Ibis part to
'FM'"' cts such acd des"and
- me easier them a wresten an-any defe 1
. tarpreenesem ny the osmarat oseman wm
, u==ag====8 and Mist
" he ressemasse as taseans apes me Omme-3 appmelasseguimd toreserweek devices wGl prompdy and
- Iledeselon Act of tage UAC. sept et correceed for total of time j
- n. seq 4 M has appmod to they are as a part the i
g ya,e,-
I l
Except where eterwise =p=a868 all camenhedis made j
comumanications and reports concoming sesehersisege.
f as resensuses in this put anmeld be NThe appseeed hemmestem (e} geek subject the of and h the past appeaMr f
he rs.ss, fem
,,g,,
safety and E irtstor of Nuclear Reector Reguistion.
73.38,75.3r.Psar.FRAL FE455 75Ak ggg -
D es appropriate. L'.S huclear Regulatory ra.g& F5AE. 75M.FRJ4, FEFL FEFE, ead pigslealpseteellem
)
ICommission. Washington. DC 20655. or Appemeens B and C.
contingsmay,piene the ho the I
may be delive:vd in person at the licensee wlE comply the i
Commission's offices et 2130 L Street.
8"""'""**0""
regubenbeelsof r
, (a) and (b) l NW. Washingten. DC. or at 11558 of tidssection.
Recksille Pike. Rockville. Wryland.
(a) adados mag req to of Jds part, each fir=====
.who is au to operate a fuel
$ 7&4 Spamme amamenses.
'r plant pursuant to Part 50 of I
Ttis a===8='===
mar seen esell'a-che possesses or uses forsaule q tities trategic specialmeclear 3Y er atT 4
ma et alte or contiguous sites
}
= grass me reseresammes et the ruominetsas su to con by the liceases:is s la this part as is esessmenes ese ember.
,1 a, tems my law see um met emeanour Mfe er au to or deliver to a j
- presorty er the emmmen essnes and gar i,,
gg, p.,,,,,, go
=
{'",,,",,"'
and an othewme m me panes part of this fannula quantities n
i of stre ce.
nuclear material:
takse very of ala questities of stra special material free on l Fast Insgesemeses ter sie peessmen et
$71.8 Esempelene ter estehe tusenddes and Idnds of speelmi niseiner ansterial, bosni(
b.) the i at whidiit is sesammesmesmesu6 (elCememf, ' -. - ~ regaMement.
d to a for transportation:
aman teamses"who(tlpassesses a E eli c.
or or e tormels geanuties 3 A llan-is exempt Imma the emaiser.getseessels spesial Isnuale a._,'_1 c(10 CPELpart 26 and I of stre specal matarisi.
er talis a=&srhed to E ll 73.20. 73.25. 73.26,73.27. 73.45.
E aba!!esta and tain or make R 73.46,73.70 and 73.72 with suspect to 3 e" to for a y.ical,_
speem a
- poww mener,er(s) ep a
w tc t t tins aisnmels stetsgic the foHowing special nuclear meterial.
i.vavo, mat.rw are sp
.ed r m.t d
notlat-ae=
um d=8==== and les of kroested seestarlust,an
- escartty, not tute as panes tshe sessieue,er (as cr==ai==-ses emmenamed in we.
" risk to puhuchedda asestes bumeneuseshmE ahms eartamos esiam tems se resuma e" and afMy.
ph
- ensure e m nedemaelseis
^ ~ - -
systema shall Eprotect 3 putsahd egdest smesterimd ch spessoa mustmar saaesstat vedsk tu assinst the threatsof theft
- assiassa.To meet ein gesamt
,, ass summer susare.nas seus seer same.: me.e mamma n s nse ass a esas ar e,ws
.f usic moeiser pssenesses messenssi.uaamsem and esserena remnessa ene seen an emme saaterial and r ' C sabotags as pessoas suhtssa to his section shoe eseshtsk and maintain an infasensues
, et se seen sur haar es a ethese er s rtated in i rs.1(a I 'N'"a'ns"sa"n"ne""end
[b) To acideve ymesselse system hetindedse to tr@ Wof his seedes
. M m spessaa mmsesar senesotatin aaan-ve of
(*)
maassesspeedEndis,hierinstise sier est emessene We seems er eresses>
of this secties a establish 8ss.==an=-en. saammasa, er a an-and mainiaan, or
, e physical posednes employedby andhad petse $sess ese dessbad
- "== therest. pasamnet la say ematr6
- " syske t
_MYesseer"es'es s' ens *s'e"e*m"ry' ""
"[d pro.vides the p: -- --
to meet tess seguim.ments,.s e,,s s m s
~
capa a es-i.e i
*"'" 8'**8o. or i serased i,,se of mammessa,
( (4)special.
ads
- shd' 68 a bem.e.s,s,.edeer si.esriniih tisos,er,es.t e.a wy e e.s,est.,ses pse.e.w-mg*,l, d* -
sunnedsmem e*- a *r e,.-
m ess,
falpepedesi Asesalias of Ftiesf Adles.
3 bdsimamosamaterwise eiessasd a w Deen er NeesaalBeastly E te> aimenal nuewar maarw at no (2)le designed wi==fmdame power reactore.
himmellensoledesto to patenden of IJeerssees subject to I73.se are not
- ' y and
-ty to ensure Inalens het peamm amuds emendum exempted freni il vs.7o and 73.7s. and maintamanceof tim-:
- Nx licensees sub)oct to I73.87(ei are not dee.ibed in il 73.25
'I'"'Ud**F.Id""l'"
The power seestem coonagency e;.(,3)lacia.les a
. exempted from I 73.72 of this part.
- abet,
.t.n
.e.it.
i E appendix C to this part eensee
" and l Sefermards Con August 31,1994(reset) 73-5
73.21(d) 73.11(b)
PART 73 o PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF PLANTS AND MATERIALS
)
socieer facility or elle.
(2) Phys /colprotection la lawne#.
es esfeguards , - t and reports.
(u) Site spectSc dre
- diayone, Informatica not otherwim cleastned as SpecdScesy:
sheedes, er maps that tiaDy itestricted Data er National Security (Q portions of enfepardsinspesume represamt the Real design features of the Information relative to ther _ -."- af reports, evalmettens,amets, er j
physicalpreescelse eyeese.
ehlpewats of formale quasesties of investigations that emmenin deemde of a (uq Deemas of stare sysemmisyeste strategic special nuclear material and besmese's or appuoners
/
ehewtug leasties of letrusies detecties apent fuel SpectScaDy:(1)The security sysens er that devions, alarm equipes t.
compaiw transporation physsent enoomoted defects, wessassess, er alarm syness wirtue, emergsacy power security plan, vennerebnisine h he sysese.
seeress, and durses alarmas.
(60 th1== and itinereries Ier Informouse regenting doisses.
(iv) Wettssa physical escurity ordere epocinc obpments.(Iteutes and weaknesses er volandeGleise may he l
and. " i for membere of the quemoties ur toof heel rolessed after correction have been enometty organisation, derees codes, and are not withheld y made. Itaports ofinvestigstee may be 1
5 Scheduleefor shipmemes may
- n. reisesed eher to L N hese i
pomel.,a a.a (v) Dotads of the es>eite and of-elle g he misesed to eher tolast E sempleted,unisse wishbald paw s e
f shipmat of a carnet mies.)
E ether anchargues, to headme of i
a=== systems that are eseg (180 Dotade of vehicle h g leformeeles AstjB
- gag, ser esserity purposes, I I*"'oe, letrusion alana devises, and
- 4) c..
-- penises et l **('8'8"d* I'I'"*#"
(v0 fad esehinedoes and
- """"*'**#**'F"*-
'espondamse esses = es aseiana l
--h.=sa : hay deesp.
- **0 l
(vE)Documsees and other matter that r.'c*.e. a.dise!".e'.'!:Ps"e "s :,'*."o.
(ilnd,*t,"re*,e,'t" *"*
-- r -
j
- 'a i!a,,p'$"'8 *"
s t
a =ampi-es2lllll* ".w' re.v) Dotade regarding Endtetless of (e) Aesses as'
(
j w~h,,he W tw
- imp e -
-e h,elca, as 3
v0 Procedurm In a g e m W setake, me penas may 2 esteinedis physiceGecurity plans.
h* *enses to hiermansa n
i
" comunpacy piem. pleet I3
- ~ ~ ~ ~ '"'I anaf unless the perses anesenhushed "hI^6*"" 3***88* "' **"wim "had W know"ist the himmatism and j
$ e,,gge n~fepards aulyses for i
m-T-= or utsmuon recastin.
.ja:
elecolSed as Metlesal Seemrtty %
- r i
Wmmah Dete P ac the er site.
(i) An employee, asset, or contractor l
(talThose portions of the facility of as applicant, a licenese, tlw 2
J guard qualincetico and trelaing pies g r'a=='a=8a= or the Unied Suta j
whis disclose fuhares of the physical R Government. However, an individual to j
security system or response procedures.
- be authorised access to Safeguards j
(m)Itseponse plans to specinc threets f Infonnation by a nuclear power reactor detalaag mise, C Z"-
response 3 applicent orliosmees meet undergo e Federal Bemes of Inveengstles crisnimal j
times, and armament of responang ehed to the entsat required by forces.
(zi) Sire, armaawat, and disposities of
,JO FB.5F; on ette reserve forme.
(10 A member of a dely soebertsed (xil) Sise. identity, armament, and
""I h
~
~
'"#1A s.',=.~
.reo
=
heternatiesel Atomic Energ Assag (IAEA) eagneed la eselvtees associated g(xill) Infortnation required by the toU has by 3
g Commission pursuant to 10 CFR 73.55 (v) A asehne of a statewloestlaur gi(c) (8) and (9).
^ asedstW Get is 3
mapenstleler restMag to sagessh Je gar assistesse desse selapsses L
g sees pmeios er vi Asineveduales whom assisesse E s(enhad pursenet to $ 1.Peeleief his i
1 amesps as the commissies may enteries,as pesan may doeless SelspardsInfaseouse to est eherpersen amanyt as setsurela A legt)er tes essass.
? ) Amesselse adde As eseereieries IdWhAs k use, master ereeshdse D)sspsses basenessensheshe under se to esseselaf as estaresadinevidenL IIIWhAs unsmmedad,Sassgemads hiermeelen shsE he sensedin aleshed seemely sewegs easseiner. Itaswiedy ofled esmhimmeses pseessass Sasspeeds nessemetion shes he hadeed to a =a a=== smuber et paressoal der operetles perpeens who have a "used to August 31,1994 73-6
PART 73 o PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF PLANTS Ale MATERIALS I
(1) Mini =1=e the vulnerability of the l
know"and are eterwise emeedsed strategic special nuclear material by assessis safenmoelesin using ghe following subfunctions and easedemos the ymisiems of his
,,,=
3____' * -itineraries for the i
essgen.
(i).
l gephpe,oges and mom t of strategic special nuclear h End desmanssaer matest that easteins Sehemasde meterk tsformeelen as deemedin M
I 78 84 N (11) y ac=1ty updating knowledge in this sesales ehesbe (a) Except as specifically approved by of route tiene for the movessent of hfummelen* In a the Nuclear Regulatory t'a==i==lan no strategic nuclear material:
j
= !="t d special nue. lear ma (IH) " ' ' '- knowledge d the of shall be made in passenger aircraft in states and tie's of the strategic
%ge gene,
,,e p g,,e, speg set as,e h excess (1) 20 yams or ao auries.
epecial saaterial en route: and g Fa.stibieherhas le less, of plutonium or (iv) rt __
- and aa==aale= ting a
and naimbspiens uranium-or (2) 350 yens of alternatin i en route se essespondemas to sad tuun to Bet 3 (aa=*=4==nl in uranium acaditione i
Desumanes andehermaster g enriched to percent or snare in the U.
(2) Detect and y any unauthorized 8'I' peds hemenen h es heads 3 238 lootope).
a to gala orlatroduce
""*"'*" e"8 '*"" d #""" "
8'"'
E (b) Unless _
2_. approved by the unes as by stealth or 3,M g",'g"g gg,*E" g uclearRegula r%==a== lam as force lato the of transports and N
ased.st.e merha mism.e,me
-y a pmen d e,e u s=
s,e u
-ormi usag a
remesed hem stesses ennemimaseist nuclear materialla ladividual the and
=hir== ate are lose a fannula subfunctions:
use.
If) Aspredssaise anddssesselse(
quantity, but the to mantity in (i) Controlled mar===
to isolate ms8er 8sdgemuk shipments in transit at saane time strategic special nuclear terial and Miurneden (11 ima-==a==
could equal or exceed a annula to aneure that uthorised may be sepaded a the utdes quantity, unless either following shall not have sonese to.
- E#mt ammary amisenM ased unautberland materiale not be wiesus permissism f sheedgheemr.
_ *^ are met:
=
in lato the vicialty the IDesumenteerschermesent (I
and strategic nuclear
=a a==safspadshimsessaanmay (1) licensas shall andlos nas and T4,,e W by **I,n,,eed ase b
the al at the final nt==h of detection ',.
and e-E sas,ep,ards ter essesta, each vidual shipament and the E ;.c(ii) g,
,,g,,,g g, to desset, ames.
~
(glaremrnateenesdasfera log for yeare froen the de of the 3-L -to any unastbartmed
- h endasesries (1) f last in the log.'lles shall penetretka(or such stensepts) of j
la =he===*= to that con:. -
area by persons.
er eher ansteer sentalske Sassenesde g aise r
hiennellen, when tressailead seasids
,g the total tity for two or vehicI== or teriale so that the as semertmed plass of ess er shipseente tranett at the same response entisfy the general a
or exceed the fans veand -- nts she.E be packaged to pendsde does n,,ot
- r.,
(as d. -.f
, n y. or
= =ds--de - m w m oetect.
to g
~
giaces alum
(
in - -
f-wi.2) Physical saa vicini e,m,z, e.,,,,es,es,,e r,m,,e e
--te d ii7 =
d -,,
t using.e and7sJsle by the liosmoe for following and sobranctions.
gsg such shipments appropriate so that (gj A.,,,,,,' r tion controle and (slanespeender er the totalquantity spedalsnelser to marrant es geis,
inf e.es
.et, s
e,i,
-=wi w me m m-=a*
or e a.d -
preensted telecommmmissesas steams so, M and in t at the same for persons, and p=ne m=g a==a-ame approved by to thus, does not equal
====8 a fannula y
ang Mac. physiset seemiqr seemes segubed quantity.
( Acesse controle 1.. to O'
N "I*
- Speelal Ph.ye. leal Proeseu.ena l
he w
tr i e ee, u.ser es me.
current setbortsa adsedules O I'"""'8I'd'I' I f 73.38 Porton.unne.s ter and criteria before tting
'a"y,'pa=5 8d'*a=*'g,,,=, mis s,n,mem,reme.
ecos a waam
- ---d e,,,,m,,eJr e -sion - = -.=
n
.ne.
-tries.
esN.eastained ultis to asuneenne er 4 (a)To meet the general (c) Q or,elay ens d
hissammesser's and seguisse to objective and requirusmente d 9
.30 en entry er -
_'_ r'-
of unau in-trement protection materials and====8hained essess to. semed use af as endo removal of, spedal== eta =
emed shall tact
, r --
imammellen.
ayeeses Nsepmedhr sema,by he capabilities describedini
-7 (b) unatorial transports.To acideve this 88's**@e" through (d) of this section unless ce the protection es4p"F otherwise authorised by the systems Commiselon.
(1) Detect a to gain
[
g, segepe,d,tege,magen (b) Restrict secess to and activity in unauthertsed entry or introduce whomover to tuformatism as the vicinity of transports and strategic unauthorised materials into transports meets to cruesta emetelmedla this special nuclear material.To achieve this l y deceit using the following esselse.
capability the physical protection subeystems and subfunctions:
(1) Access authorization controle and system shall:
73-7 August 31,19H (rese0
PART 73 o PHYSICAL PROTECllON OF PLANTS AND M ATERIALS procedures to provide current communicate any attempts at
) F1.28 Transportation physical protection authorization schedules and entry unauthorized removal of strategic systems, subsystems, componente, and citeria for access into transports for special nuclear material so that 88esedwen.
' both persons and materials: and response to the attempt can be such as (a) A transportation physical (ii) Entry controls and procedures to to satisfy the general performance protection system established pursuant verify the identity of persons and objective and requirements of i 73.20(a).
to the general performance objectives materials and to permit transport entry (d) Respond to safeguards and requirements of I n.20 and only to those persons and materials contingencies and emergencies to assure performance capability requirements of specified by the current authorization that the two capabilities in paragraphs I 73.25 shallinclude, but are not schedules and entry criteria.
(b) and (c) of this section are achieved, necessarily limited to, the measures (2) Detect attempts to gain and to engage and impede adversary specified in paragraphs (b) through (1) of unauthorized entry or introduce forces untillocallaw enforcement forces this section.h Commission may unauthorised material into transports by arrive. To achieve this capability. the require, depending on the individual stealth or force us the following physical protection system shall:
transportation conditions or subsystems and sub tions:
(1) Respond rapidly and effectively to circumstances, alternate or additional (i) Transport features to delay access safeguards contingencies and measures deemed necessary to meet the to strategic special nuclear material emergencies using the following general performance objectives and sufficient to permit the detection and subsystems and subfunctions:
requirements of 173.20. W Commission response systems to function so as to (i) A security organisation -.. ;uI also may authorise protection measures satisfy the general performance of trained and qualifed personnel, other tlun those required by this section objective and requirements of i 73.20(a);
including armed escorts, one of whom is if la its pinion, the overalllevel of (ii)Inspecion and detection designated as escort ca===nder, with performance meets the general subsystems and procedures to detect procedures for command and control, to performance objectives and unauthorised tempering with transports execute response functions.
requirements of I 73.20 and the and cargo containers; and (ii) Assessment procedures to assess performance capability requirements of (iii) Surveillance subsystems and the nature and extent of security related i 73.25.
procedures to detect, assess and incidents.
(b) Planning and Scheduling.
communicate any unauthorized (iii) A predetermined plan to respond (1) Shipments shall be scheduled to presence of persons or materials and to safeguards contingency events.
avoid regular patterns and preplanne.1 eny unauthorized attempt to penetrate (iv) Equipment and procedures to
- to avoid areas of natural disaster or 4:ivil the transport so that the response will enable responses to security trlated 3 disorders, such as strikes or riots. S Jch
- satisfy the generd performance j incidents sufficiently rapid smi effective E shipments shall be planned in ordu to j objective and requirements of 9 73.20(a). a to achieve the predetermined objective i avoid storage times in excess of 24 S of each action.
- hours and to assure that deliveries occur (3) Prevent unauthorized removal of m' strategic special nuclear material from (v) Equipment, vehicle design features, at a time when the receiver at the final
- transports by deceit using the following and procedures to protect security delivery point is present to accept the subsystems and subfunctions:
organi== tion personnel, including those shipment.
(i) Authorization controls and at the movement control center, in their (2) Arrangements shall be made with procedures to provide current schedules performance of assessment and law enforcement authorities along the for authorized removal of strategic response related functions.
route of shipments for their response to special nuclear material which specify (2) Transmit detection. assessment an emergency or a call for assistance.
the persons authorised to remove and and other response related information (3) Security arrangements for each receive the material, the authorised using the following subsystems and shipment shall be approved by the times for such removal and receipt and subfunctions:
Nuclear Regulatory Commission prior to cuthorised places for such removal and (i) Communications aguipment and the time for the seven. day notice receipt.
procedures to rapidly and accurately required by 6 73.72. Information to be (11) Removal controls and procedures transmit security inforenation among supplied to the Commission in addition to establish activities for transferring armed escorts to the general security plan information cargo in emergency situations; and (ii) Equipment and procedures for is as follows:
(iii) Removal controla and procedures two-way communications between the (i) Shipper. -P n carriers, to permit removal of strategic special escort c " and the movement transfer points, modes of shipment.
nuclear material only after veriAcetion control center to rapidly and accurately (ii) Point where escorts will relinquish of the identity of,psysons or transmit assessment information and responsibility or will accept receiving the strategic special a requests for assistance by locallaw responsibility for the shipment.
material, and after verification of the enforcement forces, and to coordinate (iii) Arrangements made for transfer identity and integrity of the strategic such assistance, of shipment security, and special nuclear material being removed (iii) Communications equipamnt and (iv) Security arrangements at point from transports.
procedures for the armed escorts and where escorts accept responsibility for (4) Detect attempts to remove -
the movement control center,,& - - '
an t.
strategic special nuclear material from to notify locallaw enforcement forces of (4) receipts shall be traner arts by stealth or force using the the need for assistance.
-- a' ^-f at origin and destination and folloning subsystems and subfunctions.
(3) Establish liaisons with locallaw at all points enroute where there is a (i) Transport features to delay enforcement authorities to arrange for transfer of custody.
unauttorized strategic special nuclear assistance en route.
(c)
/ Import Shipments.
material mal attempts sufficient to (4) Assure that a single adversary (1) A kaa=== who imports a formula assist detection and permit a response action cannot destroy the capability of quantity of strategic special nuclest to satisfy the general performance armed escorts to noHy the locallaw material shall make arrangements to objective and requiremente of I 73.20(a);
enforcement forces of the need for assure that the material will be j
and assistance.
protected in transit as follows:
(ii) Detection subsystems and procedures to detect, assess and April 30,1992 73-8
___.~.__._.________________..__-.._..__.____..m..______.
J 73A5(0 j
73A0 MRT 73 o PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF PLANTS AND MMERIALS l
i 4
PhrelselPeteC3estitequiremente (2) Detect attempts to gain material and comununicate them so that I
4 at Phad h unauthhsed access orintroduce response ces be such as to return the unauthd rised materiale into material strategic special nuclear material tu l
acceseareas or vital areas by deceit authorised plecoment or control (e) Peredt reseoval of only authorised h
using thy following subsystems and and ceanremed forms and amounts of I
w eu -
Escit h shallprovide physical (i) authorisation controle and strategic special nuclear material from f
Protection at a Azad alta, or contiguous to provide current s anatorial aaosse areas. To acideve thie
{
sites where ll===ani activities are authoriassion schedules and entry pebty the physical protection l
conducted, against radiological criteria both persons and materiale:
2 abat ti" Detectattesepts at unauthorised j
esbotage,or spelast then of special and l
nuclear material, or agelast both, in (ii) En controle and procedures to tr aoval of strategic nuclear E almanlance with the applicable sections verify the i tity of persons and a4terial from mg acesse areas by matwiele assoas such ideouty stasith or fotos using the following j
g of this Part forsech spedSeclose of
~ inet I authorisation schedules and-
^
the Hm==== abell establish maintain entry before permitting (i Barrimato p monsand facility er meteria!!icense. If licable.
ans exillas a serial access ares and to tiete ri==pa== anesaures k exit conhd poh$ and k dday any physical security la acusedenas with to yunau enWise.
unas pere special nuclear security plans approved by the Nuclear
( pWredt authorised activities me russeyel aufBcient to Regulatory (*a===a8==ta.
and "" witida protected weaa.
assist and
- and ma I
arose, and vital aroes.
To ethis pability the physical penmit respe4se,thatprevent the I
au sed., r-a l
e
,,at J &.,; w s,;i- -
- dhei
- llP""
n l
.-g
,ws e
am.
e
@)
e and d"
material'eccess a as and vital areas 8"i
- - - W and (a)To seest the general-' of 8 73.aB a b' - ---
using the folio subsystones and f
"8
'***U*"*l[e reemva task site subfunctions:
unau 3
Phye6 calc _ _ -' system shalllecteds (i) Contr9 e and uros that 1
special M so t
i the capahdities described establish i
edules of gresponse sympt can auch as ha (b) tiu@ (g) of his authorised ti and conditions.in E Prmat m e eyal W h
r l
esction otherwise authoriend by 5 defined area' ;
[ generals.o
-- objecd and g (ii) es to areas within (b
enestberteed ausses of e which the eut activities and 4 empuirmnee d I @e).
the Q) i (3) Coa 8rm and ventify j
med mehrials hm I Mum me ad
- I '**8I*
I 1
areas and vital asses.
(till Detecti and presentador ba twisi l
copsbGity the physical subsystems a to discover enempts t acomes area d
shaB:
and assess una activities and unseeorted al own togata conditions and
- = theen so speciainuclear fran
}
(1 erletradmee that response be as to stop the scesa arm by iW &e l
3 E-t a mainialacreesseenial acuvity or the tions k
- h,ad f
3 acasesier vital area boundaries by satisfy the geners -
~-'
objective and reg of 9 73.ao(a).
,4,,,,
,g,,
l c stealthbr force using the feuewhts (d) Persait only a p3-t pggQ,,
and '
y (1) and snowment of e special
,,,,g,3,,,g,,,,,
to poresse and nuclear material wi W access the authertsed ties material meterial and vleel 8' ens.To achim buhy se of oosterial to be ithe f
area oneersi and te deley phyelcal patecdon
, shat sothertend to the material, f
any c ties attosupte
--_i DJ Detect enamW,
the authorised time i
by pareceder me to
__u and newest of ggg) g,,,,,g
,,g j
assist and arosynnes
- I**' "*'*I "I
. '*I toidesely and the
&at will the'-
"- and O!u
,and quantities of me being j
(ii) Acesimo and
- 8'** ",g'*8 g
removed and verify the of 1
" u to aseese g
i, of Persome maldag the communicate
,g,g,,,,,,y - -
tand removal and asemos the peestretles by er
"""*I
- '*8
- curvest autheateed schedule I
materials at the er se
""u) ude ud."~ -~ -
^
beters ttlag reseova naa==
tems and j
that the reopease provost
(
(ig) h*"g,,,
Procedens to provide for ation ' f i
eneatherised er peastrothr.,
n $- -t-i i wi*i -
".lalltlfrem.vd a Li f
u can be ausk as to provost reseovalj
"'***h,,g,,g--
~g objective and teleIl 73ha).
1 tain knowledge dse
- ==auty. p'"""l nuclear m pmvide tw meshed)come and t,
all strategic specia amne hd ad emW i
within material access areas; ad muewhdpmedadhe j
(iv) Detection and monit protected area to satisfy the general j
eubeystems and procedures to scover performance objective and requiremente and assess unauthortmed pla tand of i 73.20(e). To achieve this capability movement of strategic special nucwar Asaruret St 1993 f teset)
_~
7.M M U PART 73 o PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF PLANTS AND MATERIALS the physical protection system shall:
(3) Provv equipment fer the security earlitions whzther such reports and (t) Detect attempts to gain organizatn. and facility design features documents are kept by the licensee or ee contractor. (iii) the requirement. in unauthorised access or introduce to:
unauthorised persons, vehicles or (i) Provide for rapid assessment of I 73.4e(b)(4) of this section that the licensee demonstrate the ability of materials into the proheted area by safeguards contingencies:
stealth or force using th'atfollowing (ii) Provide for response by assigned physical secunty personnel to perform subsystems and subfunctleps:
security organization personnel which is their assigned duties and responsibilities, include demonstration (1) Barriers to channel persons.
sufficiently rapid and effective to i
vahicles. and materials to prbtected area achieve the' predetermined objective ' f of the ability of the contractor's physical e
entry control points; and to delay any the response: and
\\
security personnel to perform their unauthorized penetration attempts or (iii) Provide protection for the
\\
assigned duties and responsibilities in the introduction of unauthorized \\
assessment and response personnel so \\
carrying out the provisions of the vthicles or materials sufficient to assist that they can complete their assigned \\
Security Plan and these regulations, and d:tection and asaessment and permit a duties.
(iv) the contractor will not assign any
$ personnel to the site who have not firs response that will prevent $e (4) Provide communications networks been made aware of these penetration or prevent such penetrati to:
ibilities, objective and requirements of I 73.20(s)\\
end satisfy the general performance se(i) Transmit rapid and accurate
- \\
curity information among onsite
)De licensee shall have onsite at and forces for routine security operation.
all at least one full time member of (ii) Accese detection subsystems and
'\\ assessment of a contingency, and the ty organisation with authority procedures to(detect. aseees and bsponse to a contingsacy; and to the physical protection communicate any unauthorised access
\\(ii) Transmit rapid and accurate activt of the security organisation.
de ection and assessment information to (3) h shan have a or penetre or such attempts off(site assistance forces, r
c- - system to provide for the persons. y or materials at time of the act er the ettempt so that the (5) use that a single adversary development.
sion. implementation.
response can be such as to prevent the action noot destroy the capability of and enf t of security procedures.
unauthorised access or penetration. and the sec 'ty organization to notify offsite The system include:
satisfy the genesul performance response rces of the need for cblective and requirements of I n.20(a).
assistance.
(i) written securi procedures which NF W N*
sad wh de a I th es or,ganismo.erecticai ream. guards.
a n
uce c -.u wa.d em w is
% materials into the tected assa by and erosedwen.
h, watchmen, and o&er
- deceit using the wing subsystems (a) A 12censee p sical protection emie f urt.
ucenme cad subfunctions:
system establish uant to the gg,,3,,,,,,,g
[1] Access autho tion controls and 3 generalperf objective and m-m a record until e g F,,'i,,iaa terminates the li procedures to provi current E roquaranents of I n a) and the for cuthorisation schedul s and entry g perfonnance capabili requirements of which these procedures were veloped criteria for persons, v and I n.45 shallinclude, are not and,if any portion of these ures necessarily limited to.
measures bg
retain se su 5
materials: and (11) Entry controle ank procedures to specified in par 63raiphs ( through (h) material for three years after each verify the identity of pespons materials of this section.na Co may change; and cnd vehicles and assess
- identit, require, depending on indi ual facility age current au schedules and sits conditions, alternat before tting entry to laitiate additional measures deemed ry
[
,\\
3 ii) provision for written approval of to meet the general perf h su(ch procedwes and any revisions measures to dbjective and requirements of I JD.
unsaan
==st access.
(g) an _- Each pb protection Thera--i aan also marsu e thereto by the individual with overall Protection measures other than
,on.
4
- "ty for the secwity function.
u.
propas '
provide a
==
required by this section if. In its capabih assure that we
[
capabili described in pbs (b) the overalllevel of perf-h through (f) this section achieved the general performance objective end that ry forces be requirements of I nJD and the engaged and until to performanas capability requisements assistance f arrive.To this t 73.45.
capabluty a shalt:
(b) Seewity Organisation.
(1) Establieb secwity tion (1) ne licensee shall establish a security oryanization including guards.
to:
(i) Provide tre and if a contract guard force is utihned for pessonnel to out assisted site secunty, the licensee's written and rampaaaahale and assement with the contractor wGl (ii) Provide for time securi,
cfearly show that(1) the licensee is operations and and
( '=
responsible to the t'a==l=laa for r
to _ --
maintaining safeguards in accordance daa with n'a==i==taa tions and the and safeguards con (2) Establish a
_. _ _ ' pla to licensee's security
- n. (ii) the NRC respond to saf contingency may inspect. copy, and take away events.
copies of all reports and documents required to be kept by Commission regulations, orders, or applicable license i
\\
\\
bMEM N f
PART 73 o PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF PLANTS AND MATERIALS l
(g) Response regulisment. (1) b (h) Each11 shall establish.
~
to the requirements of this section. In heanaam shall establish, maintain, and maintain, and w an NRC-approved accordance with i $ 50.54 (x) and (y) of j
follow an NRC approved safeguards training and q cations plan outlining part 50. the licensee may suspend any by
- guards, safeguards measures pursuant to I 73.55 contingency plan lgsseponding to g
armed persons, and in an eme when tMs action is we i
threats, thefts, and
"-7 ' embotage gother of secwhF immediate needed to protect the related to the material l
and anclear ties to the f orWenisa willbe trained.
- public health and safety and no action j
provleibes of this 0; og and anHAnd to ensure
- consistent with license conditions and that t the
" technical specification that can provide oo8tf81psacy plans must j
=9 ~ T = with the cri appendix requirements o
)(4)of this E adequate or equivalent protection is i
g C to thid part. " Licensee
_section.
- immediately apparent.His suspension must be approved as a minimum by a
~ Con Plans." h shall f Ts.ss megenunuerp%elsel licensed senior operator prior to taking
- retain careent safegeards
,g,,,, m numew the action.& suspension of safeguards l
contingssyy plan as a reoned the measures must be reported in tenninetes the and.
satsenge.
accordance with the provisions of j
ifany of tbs planis 1 By Dec. 2. toes each licensw. as t 73.71. Reports made under i 50.72 l
retain
- ' partionlar 3 need a t be duplicated under j 73.71.
l
_after the ve date of tbs a
to y
wWch i
(2) h shall establish define how the amandad requirements (b)Physico/Securr
' ti ~
l dar==aat lia' with law enforcem t of Paragraphs (a), (d)(7), (d)(g).
N heensee shallochbhs cu i
{
authorities.The consee shall retain and (e)(1) will be amt. Each submittal organisation, including guards, to g documenta6on the current liaison as must include a proposed implementation protect his facility against radiol 8' cal
-- ""on schedule for Commission appmval. &
If I
g a rec 6td until the amended safeguards requirements of "dboy,,," ***
l
,. terminates each b for which the y
g
- u. hanson was devel and.if any these paragraphs must be implemented written agreement with the contractor 2.Sortion of the liai documentation is by the hcensee within tan days after that must be retainad by the licensee as superseded, retain superseded Canminain approval of the proposed a ruard for the deden of ee conM material for three ye after each security I ccordance with the wulclearly show k ible to th
( Generalperfbrmance objective f Safegu g
m ondrogwoments. b licensee shall m accordance with Commasion
~' (3iUpon detection i abnormal pres.
ence;or activity of reons or vehicles establish and maintain an onsite regulations and the hcensee's security P ysical protection system and security h
withip an isolation ne, a protected a
area. material area, or a vital organization which will have as its Z p4an.
(illh NRC may mspect. cop 3. and area; r upon evide or indication of objective to provide high assurance that
. take away copies of ah reports and int n into a pro area, rnate activities involving special nuclear a documents required to be kept by a
rial a area, or vi area, the 11-3 material are not inimical to the conunon Commission regulations. orders, o' censee urity o on shall:
% defense and security and do not applicable bcense conditions whether (D
rmine whe er or not a e constitute an unreasonable risk to the tne reports sad documents are kept by f the threat.*, public health and safety.b physical threat e the bcensee or the contractor.
protection system shall be designed to (iii) The requirement in paragraph (11) the extent II ""Y' ""
protect against the design basis threat of (bl(4) of this section that the licensee
- (HD T e isnan conement radiological sabotage as stated in demonstrate the ability of physical
- measures neutralise t threat, by
I 73.1(a).To achieve this general security personnel to perform their E
fvesbet performance objective, the onsite assigned duties and responsibilities.
' inte physical protection system and security includes demonstration of the ability of access areas vital and any mganisation must include, but not the contractor a physical security E adversary at mpting en for the necessarily be limited to, the terial or radle and to capabilities to meet the specific personnel to perform their assigned purpose of the t of special ear ms.
intercept any esiting with spe.
requirements contained in pa pbs duties and responsibilities in carrymg out the provisions of the Security Plan cial nuclear
- and, (b) through (b) of this section.
and these regulations, and (B) Informing law enforcensent Commission may authorise an applicant agencies of the and requesting or licensee to provide measures for
[iv)"Ilie contractor will not assign any.
assistance.
protection against radiol I sabotage rsonnel to the site who have not first
]
made aware of these (4) The licensee shall instruct every other than those requiregl y this section guard to prevent impede atteenpted if the applice it or licensee demanatrates responsibilities.
acts of theft or logical sabotage that the measures have the same high by using force icient to counter assurance objective as sparinad in this (2) Atleast one full time member of the force directed him including paragraph and that the overalllevel of the security tion who has the pmtecdon seemuy to
&e physical nabie be efit]
system
~
asaht mdiological htage equivalent pmtecdon advides & secwW
$nse or in the dele o
of oth'
to that which would be provided by
". organisation shall be onsite et all times.
paragraphs (b) through (h) of this section (3)blicensee shallhave a and meets the general performance a managammat system to provide for the requirements of this section.
I development, revision, implementation.
Specifically, in the special cases of
- and enforcement of security procedures. :
licensed operating reactors with b system shallinclude:
adjacent reactor power plants under construction. the licensee shall provide and maintain a level of physical protection of the operating reactor against radiological sabotage equivalent
i j
73.55(b) 73.55(c)
PART 73 o PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF PLANTS AND MATERIAU3 i
J l
"' II) Wntten security y.-_-
that
- (c) Phaetest barriers. (1) The licens.
- 11) Confirm to the Commission that l
docement the structure of the security se shan locate vital equir====t only the vehicle control measures meet the organization and detail the deties of within a vital area, which in turn-desi is and criteria s fled: or (UfProPoes alternative measume,in guards, watchmen, and other individsale shan be located within a protected responsible for eecerity. ne tw====a area such that acases to vital equip.
addition to the measures established in shrli maintain a copy of the current sment reeutres poemase through at least e
procedures as a record until the two phyelcal barrters of suffistent accordanm with 10 CFR 73.55 (c)(7),
communico termissies each heense for strength to meet the performance re-describe the level of pmtection that which the procedurm were developed outrements of paresresh (a) of this these measures would provide against a section. neon than one vital ama anF land vehicle bomb, and compare the j
snd,if any portion of the procedum is superseded. retain the esperseded M*****d
I"" *
"8 8""****d costs of the alternative measures with
]
material for three yeam after each (si The phye6 cal barrks at the pe.
the costs of measures necessary to fully chase" rinneter of the proe===a area annu be meet the design goals and criteria. 'llie (ii) Provielse for written approval of esperated frona any other barrter das.
Commission will approve the proposed thm pescedems and any misions e isnated as a physscal barrier for a ottal alternative measures if they provide the _
by the individual with area within the protected area.
'"botandal ecd"
- land s
everall rospanalbGityJer the esserity (3) leolataan mones shan he sonin-vehicle and it is by l
functions. Hs N===== aban retals each tained in outdoor areas adpaamaa to 2
writtes appsoval as a record for three the phrenmal barrier at the perimeter an analysis, using the essential elements years frees the date of the approval of the protected area and aban he of of 10 CPR 50.109, that the costs of fully i
(4)(i)De boommes may met penmit an sufficient aims to permit observataan of meeting the goals and criteria am ladividual to act as a geenL wetthseas the activities of posede en eether side not justifled by added protection escartty tien
)
11 authorized to unless the ladivideal has been hemed, f he F=
tai t teolation eene operate a nuclame power reactor shall:
,l
- ipped, Naiped y and extertar to the protected ares her-l c-(1) By February 2 s, osteco n o,,anet,,oon o, at.
i-i = = = = - r d a cri u - of with a,,s.dm
-cseeraiCriter for P
the proposed vehicle control measures Securtty Peroammel/* 'o this part. Upon tesnoted penetrassen of the protected c the request of an metha toed area or the isolaties none adtma==w to u. as required by 10 CFR 73.55 (c)(7) and e
1 representative of the Coomission, the the protected aren harrter shan assum 3 the rwults of the vehicle bomb li-a-shaR demnametrate the abGity of that adeounte response by the security comparison as required by 10 CFR 73.55 the physial escurity pesammel to carry orsanimataan can be initiated. AD exte-(c)(8). For limasses who choose to a
'}
S out their assiped duties and rior areas within the protectos ama S responsibuttles.Each gaanL watchman, shan be periodsomuy had to deseeg Pto alternative measures as c armed ra'Pa"" pensa and other the pr===aa= of unauthortmed permann, Pro ded for in 10 CFR 73.55 (c)(8), the vebirlan, or matertals.
Pf0Poeal must be submitted in h
(8) 1=a1=Ha= sones and an estarter acx:ordance with 10 CPR 50.90 and th App =md6v B to this past at laaet every u 7 than the rea include the anal and justification for with i=
the proposed ves.
months.'I1ds sequaktir.atles meet be esent for the menttertas and cheerva-documented.no licenses shat retain tson requimenents of parnsraphs (ii) By February 29,1996 fully the documentaban of each (ex3). (ex4), and thx4) of this soeuan.
Implement the requimd vehicle control roquahrembon as a reconi far three but not less than 0.3 faa*=adn= mens-measures, including site-speciGc yerre eher the requalification.
ured hortmentaur at sround level alternative measures as approved by the (s) The wmun, doors, eenans floor.
Canmissim.
and any wtadows in the vous and in (ii) Each lican=== shall establish, th* 88888 *f th* ***888r 8888831 roa.
QH) W as MInfonnadon, anau be mmessuns.
Information required by the i
maintain, and follow an NRC.epproved
}
training and qualinaations plan outlining
,, 7 * "
c 08 processes by which guards' (iv) Retain,in accordance with 10 watchmen, artned response persons, and k7) Vehicle control mesures, CF1t73.70 allcosaparisonsand cther members of the escurity including vehicle barrier systems, must anal pared ant to 10 CFR crganisation will be selected, trained, be established to protect against use of 73.5
)
and (4 equipped, tested, and quallAad to ensure a land vehicle, as specified by the (10) Each a licant for a license to i
.that these ladividuals anoot the Commission, as a means of o
to a n reactor g requirements of this persymph.'liis transportation to gain unauthmized pursuant to 10 1(b) or 10 CFR g licensee shall maintain the current proximity to vital areas.
50.22, whose application was submitted training and qualiAn=tions plan as a 3 (8) Each licensee shall compare the Prior to August 31 1994,shall 4
g g record until the t'a==i==ia= terminates g vehicle control measures established in g
aa the license for which the plan was of the plan E a cordanen with 10 CFR 73.55 (c)(7) to P[end impI====nt it by the date of lato the site Physical Security the Commission's design goals (i.e., to developed and,if any is superseded, retain t :-; rn M E
material,quipment, systems, devias, or receipt of the operating license.
protect e portion for 3 years after the effective the failure of which could
~
date of the change.h training and disectly or indirectly endanger pubile qualificatione plan suust include a health and safety by exposure to schedule to show how all escurity radiation) and criteria for protection 3'
personnel will be qualiA=d 2 years after against a land vehicle bomb. Each the submitted plan is approved.b licensee shall either:
training and qualifications plan meet be i
f:llowed by the lican-e0 days after the submitted plan is approved by the NRC.
August 31,1994 73-26
_ _ _ _ _ ___._ _ __ _ _ _____.__.__.. _ _ _ _ _. _ _ ~ _. _ _ _ _ _ _
i PART M o PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF PLANTS AND MATERIALS 4
l (d) Access Jteguiranssis (1) The !!.
(2) At the potat of personnel and ve.
(8) Individuals not authorised by the oemene shall control all potate of per.
hicle access inte a protected area, all licenses to enter protect &d areas without sonnel and vehicle access into a pro.
hand 4arried packages shall be socort abau be socorted by a watchman i
teoted area. Identification and search searched for devices such as firearms, or other individual designated by the l
of all ladividuals peless otherwise pro.
esploalves, and incendiary devlees, or hcenses while in a protected area and
}
vided hereta must be made and author.
other items which could be used for re-shall be badged to indicate that an diological embotage.
(3) All packages and material for de I escort is la additica, the lastion must be checked at these potete. De search function for detec.
checked for proper identificauon and [individualreg,rmleiro that(a livery into the protected area shall be hcensesshaH
+
tion of firearms, esplosives, and incen.
ata as or her name, date, diary devices must be accompIls.l.ad such as firearms, esplosives and inces S me.parpore of visit. amployme authorteauon and searched for devices ti through the une of both firearms and emploelve detection equipment capable oY detecting thces devices. De licensee diary devices or other items which individdel to be visitsd. The hconsee must subject all persons escept bona could ho used for rediological embotage, shaB retain the register af information j
Sde Federsi. State, and local law on-prior to admittamos late the protected for three yens after the last entry in the forcement personnel on official duty to area, escept those twa=a==la=.
ap-a 1
these equipment searches upon entry geoved delivery and inspectica activi- _N' late a protected area. When the 11-ues specifloally designated by the 11 ceases has cause to suspect that sa in-osasse to be carried out withia vital or (7)%e liconase shall:
j dividual is atterapting to introduce protected areas for reasons of safetF-(1) Establish an access authorisation l
Brearms, esplosives, or imaadiary de-security or operational neoensity.
system to lisait unescorted access to 4
vices late protected areas, the llosasse (4) All vehicles, escept under emer-vital areas during nonemergency coadmot a physical patalown gency condiuono, shan be searched for i
E shall
?
search of that ladividual. Whenever items which could be used for esbotage conditions to individuals wbo require E firearms or esploelves detecuos equip-purposee prior to entry into the pro-access in order to perform their duties.
l meet at a portal is out of service or not tected area. Vehicle areas to be To achieve this, the licensee shall:
j operating esusfactorily, the licensee searched shall include the cab. engin*
(A) Establish current authorisation shall conduct a physical pataiown compartment, undercarriage. and cargo access lists for each vital area.The anarch of all persons who would other*
area. All vehicles, escept designated 11-
"CC liste "ust be updated and wise have been subject to equipment consee vehicles. requiring entry into mapproved by the cognizant bnsee the last access control fuscuon (con. e the protected area shall be escorted by anarches. The individual responsible for i
E a member of the security organisation manager or supervisor at least once j
trolling admission to the protected % while within the protected area sad, to every 31 days. De licensee shall include i
assa) must be lactated withis a bullet-the estent practicable shall be off on the access list only individuals j
resisting structure as described in loaded in the protected ares at a spe-whose specific duties require access to l
paragraph (c)(6) of this section to as-cific designated materials receivtag vital asses during monomergency sure his or her ability to respond or to area that is not ad)ncent to a vital condWons*
summon assistance. By Dec. 2. ISOS area. Designated liooneen vehicles shall each licensee shall submit revisions to be limited in their use to onsite plant (B) Positively control. in accordance its escurity plan which define how the functions and shall remain la the pro-with the access list established pursuant final nearch requirements of this pars-tected ares escept for operational. c: to paragraph (d)(7)(il of this section, all maintenance, repair escurity and erner*
graph will be met. The flaal search re-rency purposes. The licensee shall es g points of personnel and vehicle access quirements of this package must be implemented by the liceasse within 80 ercies postuvo control over all such [ to vitalareas.
(C) Revoke'in the case of an designated vehicles to assure that they a indhidual,a involuntary termination for days after Commension approval of the are used only by authorised pessons '
proposed security plan reytalons.
and for authorised purpeans.
cause, the individual a unescorted (6) A numbered picture badge identi.
facility access and retrieve his or her ficatloa system shall be used for all in-identification badge and other entry dividuals who are authorised access to devices, se applicable, prior to or amtected areas without escort. Aa la*
simultaneously with notifying this dividual not employed by the licensee individual of his or her termination.
but who requires frequent and estended access to protected and vital areas may (D) Lock and protect by an activated be authorised access to such areas intrusion alarm system all unoccupied without escort provided that he re-vital areas.
ceives a picture badge upon entramos (11) Design the access authorization into the protected area which must be system to accommodate the potential returned upon esit fross the protected need for rapid ingress or egress of area and which indicates: (1) Non-em-individuals during e conditions PI""* **** '"I" ' and (iii) the or situations that could ead to whlok access is authorised period for which access has bees an.
emergency conditions. To help assure thortead. Badges shall be displayed by this, the licensee shall:
all individuals while laside the pro-(A) Ensure prompt access to vital tested ares, equipment.
(B) Periodically review physical security plans and contingency plans and procedures to evaluate their potentialimpact on plant and personnel safety.
am
l i
73.55(d) 73.55(h)
PART 73 o PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF PLANTS AND MATERIALS i
(81 Access to the reactor containment (2) All alarm devices including trans-(2) Each intrusion alarm shall be i
shall be through doors or hatches which mission lines to annunciators shall be tested for performance at the beginning shan be alarmed and have locks of sub-tamper indica 61ng and self-checking es.
and end of any period that it is used for i
stantial construction to offer penetra-an automatic indication is provkied when security. If the period of continuous use a tion resistance and impede both surrept!-
failure of the alarm system or a com-is longer than seven days, the intrusion j
g tious and forced entry. Any time fre-ponent occurs, or when the system is on alarm shall also be tested at least once j
- quent access is permitted to containment standby' power. The annunciation of an every seven (7) days.
f such as during refueling or major main-alarm a6 the alarm stations shall indi-(3) Communications equipment re-a p tenance. positive access control to assure cate the type of alarm (e.g., intrusion quired for communications onsite shall i
that only authorised personnel and ma-alarm, emergency exit alarm, etc.) and E be tested for performance not less fre-terials are permitted into the contain-locauon.
All emergency exita in each pro y quently than once at the beginninqr of i
ment shall be exercised by the licensee, (3) each security personnel work shift. Com.
1 with a guard or watchman tected area and each vital area shall be municauons equipment required for alarmed.
communications offsite shall be tasted (f) Commandestion requirements. (1) for performanem not less than once a (9) All keys, locks. combinations, and Each guard, watchman or armed re-day.
related access control devices used to sponse individual on duty shall be cap.
control access to protected areas and able of maintaining continuous com-vital areas must be controlled to reduce munication with an individual in each (4) b security propam must be the probability of compromise. All such conunuously manned alarm staden n-reviewed at least every 12 months by i
ksys, locks, combinations, and related quired by paragraph (e)(1) d this asc*
individuals independent of both security access control devices must be changed payan manapt Wermaanal rom o wa or rotated at least every 12 months.
men, and armed response perecemal and who ben direct responsibuity for
)
t: Whenever there is evidence or suspicion from local law enforcement authorities.
'"P amamention of the security propam.
l i
g that any key lock, combination. or (2) The alarm stations required by b security prepas review must j
N related access control devices may have paragraph (e)(1) of this section shall eclude an audit of escurity
- " e
]
+ been compromised. It must be changed have conventional telephone service for and precdoes, an evalundan of the si or rotated. The licensee shall issue keys, communicauon with the law enforce-offecoveness of the physical protection l
locks. combinations, and other access 8 ment authorttles as described in para-system, an audit of the physical i
control devices to protected areas and gfrah ud
)(1 this sect vital areas only to persons granted E tinuous communication, radio or micro.
maintenance peepam, and an audit of unescorted facility access. Whenever an mdividual e unescorted access is g wave tranamitted two-way voice com-commitments es*=Mahad for reopense 2
munication, either directly or through by local law enicecoment authorities.
i revoked due to his or her lack of a blemdiary, shd! be whbikhd, m l & results and r=an==aadadoes o
{
trustworthiness, reliability, or addition to conventional telephone serv-security pseyens review, management's inadequate work performance, keys, ice, between local law enforcement au M findings on whether the security d vices toIh ch th thorities and the facility and shall termi-E propas is currently effective, and any cont per n had nate in each continuously manned alarm 0; actions taken as a result of access must be changed or rotated, i
station required by paragraph (e)(1) of r=aa====dations fresa prior propam this sec;;on.
reviews enest be dae== anted in a report to he lionsee's plant =any and W l
(e) Detec!!ca aids. (1) Ali alarms (4) Non-portable communications corporate management adcast me leul l
required pursuant to this part must equipment controlled by the licensee and bigbar than that having responsibility cnner.ciste in a continuously manned required by thh secuon shau renam
]
central alarm etat on located within the fw es dayhy plant opendon.
operable from independent power sources p c:ected area and m ot leart o te :ther hee reports must be maintained in an
""""P'
auditable form, available for inspection, I
r.cntinuousiv manaed station not as and mam" ten for a period of 3 years.
i necessarily onsite so that a single act gg, ahau cannot remove the capabillry of call ng sion alarms, emergency alarms, com.
(b) Aasponse seguisement (1) h for assistance or otherwise respondmg municauons equipment, physical bar.
licenses shall establish, maintain, and to an alarm. The onsite central alarm riers, and other security related devlees follow an NItC-approved safeguards g station must be considered a vital area or esinirwnant utuised pursuant to this contingency planb.::7 * ; to a and its walls. doars. cei! ng floor, and section as follows:
threats, thefts, and radiological sabotage Ic ant windows ir the walls and in the (1) An alarms, communicadon equip-related to the nuclear facilities subject
- diots m'ust be bullet resisting.W ment, physical barriers, and other secu.
k es
" of &issecdon.
E ces o equi s e hau l
casite centra! alarm station must be
$related Safehm contingency plans must be in gg p
e di loca'.ed wIthin a buildme in such a ucenses shau develop and employ com.
accordance with the criteria in appendix manr.et that tne intenor of the central pensatory measures including equip.
C to this part, "fleanaae Safeguards 4
a.rm stat.cr. is not tisible from the ment, addtuoral security permannai and Condagency Plans."
i Fer. meter c,f the pretected erra. This spaetae procedures to assure that the station rnust not contain any operational efectiveness of the security system is not activities that would interfere with the reduced by failure or other continsencies execution of the alktm response afecung the operation of the security f.metion. Onsite secondary power related equipment or structures.
I j
supply systems for alarm ancunciator equipment and non-portable
]
communications equipment as required i
m paragraph (f) of this section must be t
located v ithin vital areas.
Aup9st 31,1994 (reset) 73-28
i e
73.55(h) 73.56(c)
PART 73 o PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF PLANTS AND MATERIALS i
~
(2)'I1se haaname shau establish and l7a.es pereenr:elaseoasausserteesen (b) Genero/ performance objective docussent liaison with locallow regutennenes ser aussear power pienen, and requirements. (1) The licensee shall
~,
establish and maintain an access enfornamant anthorities.The hosnese (a) Generol. (1) Each licensee who is J eleau stain rea==matation of the authorised on April 28. test, to operate authorisadon proyam penung individuals unescorkd access b 2 current lialeon es a record untG tbs a nuclear power reactor pursuant to 4
Co-minaion termnews edi boense for ll 50.21(b) or 50.22 of % chapter shall protected and vitalareas with the objecove of providing high assurance a which the listeos was developed and. if I comply with the requirements of this that individuals granted unescorted l
2 any portson of the liaison dociansotation section. By April 27, told, the required access are trustworthy and reliable, and le
_ _ '- t retain the :- ; z!4 E access authorisation program must be do not consutuu an - r-able risk material for three years after each
- u. incorporated into the site Physical to the health and safety of the public
_ change 3 Security Plan as provided for by to CFR 2 commit 50.54(p)(2) and implemented. By April gudhg a poun l
(3) The total number of guards, and 27,1m. each h==a= shah cordfy to
~
armed, trained personnel immediately the NRC that it has implemented an (2)Exospt as prov ded for h available at the faculty to fulfill these I
(
I response requirements shall nominally access authorisation program that moote v
~ be ten (10), unless specifically required the roquarements of this part.
pngram must inclyh foHW
~
8 ot.herwise on a case by case basis by (1) A -_
- inmugadon I the Commisalon; however, thle number (2) Each applicant for a license to desissed to identify past actions which may not be reduced to less than fin operate a nuclear power reactor I are indicative of an ladividuars future (5) guards.
(j pursuant to ll 80.21(b) or 50.22 of this 5 milabuity within a protected or vital chapter, whoes appucadon was f area of a nuclear power reactor As a
~
(4) Upon detection of abnormal pres-g submined prim to Aprd 28,im ebaH
_- '_ investigation I.i.a=== the ' duare true identity, ence or activity of persons or vehicles a.: either by April 27,1982 or the date of must verdy an indivi u
within an leolation sone, a protected area, material numma area, or a vital 3 receipt of the operetinglicense whichevw and develop informadon me.2.g an area; or upon evidence or indication of is later, incorporate the required access individuare employment history, 3 intrualon into a protected area, a ma.
authorisation proyam into the site education history, credit history, 3 terial access area, or a vital area, the
,,, Physical Security Plan and implement it.
criminal history, military service, and
- licensee security organisation shal'.:
vady an individuare character and (1) Determine whether or not a (3) Each a t for a license to reputaden.
s (ii
-- " =1 mammas =ent (11) Aasses the extent of the threat, pursuant to il 50.21(b) or 5tL22 of this desid) A ' e'va*hiate the possible im
- threat exista, operate a n power reactor to
.ma have a
- 8 e ures to neu rail e
8 Pum 52 of on u s -
and (A) Requiring responding guards or
[hapur ow re other armed response personnel to E Mtud & Apru 28,1991* ebaH Interpose themselves between vital (111) Behavioral observation.
g g
authorisation propam as part ofits conduchd by 4 :-h and amas and material access amas W any adversary attempting entry for Phys cal Security Plea.Th appucent.
=aang====*,
'. designed to dehet individual behavioral changes the purpose of radiological sabotage or theft of special nuclear material and upon mceipt of an operating hcom or widch. If left unattended, could lead to to intercept any person eslung with upon receipt of operating authorisation, g
P special nuclear material, and, shallimplement the requimd access (B) Informing local law enforcerapnt authorisation proyam as part ofits site
- safety, (5) The licensee shall base its decision agencies of the threat and requesting Physical Security Plan.
to pont, deny, revoke, or continue an g,
5)
' licensee shan instruct every au tion guard and all armed response person-contractore or vendore for their isif naation developed.
nel to prevent or impede attempted emplo provided i "**" die
- 4) Faume by an individual to report acts of theft or radiological sabotage
- 9
,,g gg,
'Ik any previous
. - _ n myocation, or by using force sufficient to counter may W parW as amen denial of unescorted access to nuclear the force directed at him including the sadnortsadma progran med byit power reactore is considered sufficient use of deadly force when the guard or contractore, vendme, w odier M cause for denial of unescorted access other armed response person has a reasonable belief it is r=== mary in self.
meanizadone and subeututa, authortsetion.
- t. or dupucate any perdon d (c) Esistrg, minsioted, tmnsferred, defense or in the defense 6f others.
'b* PNF** ** ********1 '* **' 0'*
ond temporary acosas authorisation. (1)
(a> To facilitate initial response to
' -te of this section. In any case.
Individuals who have had an detection of penetration of the pro-the licensee is responsible for penting, udsterrupted nama-hd access tected area and assessment of the ex-denying, or revoidag unam-ted access methorisation for at least 180 days on 2 latence of a threat, a capsbuity of ob-authorisation to any contractor, vendor
- Apru 25,1991 nomt mot be it'dtw 8 serving the isolation sones and the or other affected organimados employes.
A hd M N shah b physical barrier at the perimeter of sew to the behavioral oboenadon E the protected area shall be provided, squirement of dde secdon.
a preferably by means of closed circuit
' television or by other suitable means which limit exposure of responding personnel to possible attack.
73.56(c) 73.57(bI PART 73 o PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF PLANTS AND MATERIALS l
I l
(f) Protection ofinformation. (1) Each l authorizztion and for a five. year period licensee. contractor, or vendor who I following its termination. Each licensee a
l collects personalinformation on an 5 who denies an individual unescorted employee for the purpose of complying LB access shall retain the records on which with this section shall establish and e the denialis based for 5 years.
I maintain a system of files and (2) Each licensee shall retain records E of results of audits, resolution of the I
l procedures for the protection of the (2) He access authorization program Persaalinformatim.
audit findings and corrective actions for may specify conditions for reinstatm' g (2) Licenases, contractors, and thrw yews.
I j
en interrupted access authorization for vendors small make available such i
~
trcnsferdag an access authorization Personalinformation to another "W
from another licensee, and for licensee, contractor, or vendor provided permitting temporary unescorted access that the request is accompanied by a assoas W a musisw pew hsAly w asma auth:rization.
signed release from the individual a gegegneres informousn by paw i
(3) He licensee shall grant unescorted (3) Licensus, contractas, and messer esensees.
1 tecess authorization to allindividuals vendors may not disclose the pomnal (a) Ceneml. (1) Each licensee who is information collected and maintained to authorized to opwate a nuclear power who have been certined by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission as suitable for Persons other than:
reactor under Part 50 shall comply with such access.
(0 Othw licensees, contractors, or the requirements of this section.
i f
vendors, or their authorized (2) Each applicant for a license to (d) Requirements during cold i
shutdown. (1) De licensee may great representatives, legitimately seeking the operate a nuclear power reactor j
information as required by this section pursuant to Part 50 of this chapter shr'11 unescorted accese during cold shutdown fw una==ted access decisions and submit fingerprint cards for those j
to an individual who does not possess i
en eccess authorization granted in who han obtained a signed miease individuals who have or will have i
from the individual access to Safeguards Information.
j tccordance with paragraph (b) of this I
(11) NRC representatives:
(3) Each applicant for a license to g
section provided the licensee develops Od) APPmpdak law enfacement operate a nuclear power reactor and incorporates into its Physica]
officials under court order:
pursuant to Part 50 of this chapter may Security Plan measures to be taken to (iv)%e subject individual w his a submit fingerprint cards prior to
)
ensure that the functional capability of NPN8e 8 mceiving its operating license for those j
squipment in areas for which the access (v) se 11 en8ee representatives individuals who will require utiescorted i
euthorization requirement has been who han a need to han access to the access to the nuclear power facility.
i rzland has not been impaired by Infamatim in perfaming assigned (b) Generolperformance objective r:Elaution of that requirement.
- duties, including audits oflicensa s-and requirements. (1) Excefthis section.
t those
$ me(2) Prior to incorporating such g ntractor's, and vendor's programs, listed in paragraph (b)(2) o l
rsures into its Physical Security Plan l
""8 N8
- N R
each licensee subject to the provisions
! s the licensee shall submit those plan E review rapPeel;at 2 of this section shall Angerprint each
- chinges to the NRC for review and the nuclear power [cill y o p
i m d es t a
(3 yp a
- nun, yjdence o c5Naa conduct E Nd I
security plans that allow for relaxation wg is w e
ed acceu cccess authwisatim mquirements fromlaw enforcement officials.
authorisation on April 1.1987 will retain
}urms Id shutdown are superseded by (3) Audits. (1) Each licensee shall such accese e criminal history cht of ding licensee recei i
. Provisims in licensees audit its access authorization program the results o eck Physical Security Plans on April 25,1991 within 12 months of the effective date of on the individual's Angerprints, so long that provide for devitalization (that is, a implementation of this program and at as the cards were submitted by change from vital to protected area least every 24 months thereafter to September 23.1937, %e licensee will e tus) during cold shutdown are not ensum that the requirements of this then review and use the information a
kd section are satistled.
received from the Federal Bureau of (a)Re modum. Each Econsw (2) Each licensee who accepts the Investigation (FBQ.and basal e the impl:menting an uneecorted access access authorisation program of a pmisions contained in this rule, authorisation program under the contractor or vendor as provided for by determine either to continue to grant or Provisions of this sectiop shallinclude a (s)(4) of this section shall to deny further unescorted access to the procedure fbr the review, at the request access to records and shall audit facility or Safeguards Information for of tha affected employw, of a denial or contractor w vendw programs evwy 12 that individual. Individuals who do not revocation by the licensee of namaa=ted he w
cccess authorization of an employee of s
inf be p(11, e ensum &a the to d
ag i
may accept audits of contractors and 1937 shall be Angerprinted b the h
a eni a
nelrole u
and y actions. Each consee retains fyc w ccess to Safeguards provide an opportunity for an objective responsibility for the effectivenen of gg revizw of the information on which the any contractor and vendor program it gg
,g d:,ni:1 or revocation was based.ne accepts and the implementation of this section for the following categories:
procedure may be an impartial'and appropriate corrective action.
- 0) For un ed a w h ind: pendent internal management (b) Recon /s. (1) Each licensee who nuclear power facility or for access to rzvisw. Unescorted access may not be issues an individual unescorted access Safeguards Information (but must gr:nted to the individual during the authorisation shall retain ths records on adhere to provisions contained in review process.
which the authorization is based for the i 73.21): NRC employees and NRC duration of the unescorted access contractors on official agency business; July 29,1994(reest) 7g
PART 73 o PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF PLANTS AND MATERIALS 1
l 6dividuals responding to a si.
(6) All fing:rprints obtained by ths (2)ne Commission will review 1
emergency in accordance with the licensee under this section must be applications for criminal history checks j
i Provisions of I 73.55(a); a representative submitted to the Attomey General of the for completeness. Any Form FD-258 of the international Atomic Energy United States through the -miania i, containing omissions or evident error.
)
e i
Agency (IAEA) engaged in activities (7)De licensee shallreview b will be returned to the licensee for j
j associated with the U.S./IAEA information received from the Attorney corrections. De fee for processing i
Safeguards Agreement at designated General and consideritin making a fingerprint checks includes one free facilities who has been certined by the determination for granting unescorted resubmission if the laitial submission is NRC: law enforcement personnel acting access to the individual or access to returned by the FBI becoun the 3
in an official capacity: State or local Safeguards information.
fingerprint hepressions cannot be i
government employees who have had (8) A licensee shall use the f class 18ed.He one free resubm equivalent reviews of FBI criminal information obtained as part of a must have the initial (rejected) i history data: and individuals employed enminal history records check solely for E Angerprint cards attached. If additional i
at a facility who possess "Q" or "L" the purpose of detennining an Gi submissions are meessaary, they will be y
i
- clearances or poseoas another active individual's suitability for an== carted treated as en initial submittal and j
- government granted security clearance.
access to the nuclear power facility or require a second payment of the
]
f Le Top Secret. Secret, or ConSdential:
access to Safeguards Infonnation.
processing fee.The payment of a new g
(ii) For access to Safeguards o
(c) Prohibit /ons. (1) A licensee may processing fee entitles the submitter to j
Information only but must adhere to g not base a final detennination to deny an additional fue resubmittel. If 1
provisions contained in i 73.21:
Employees of obr agencies of the g an ladividual unescorted access to the necessary. pmvlously miected submiselons may not be included with United States Government: a member of E nuci, pow,r cggsy ar maa the third suh-i=ta= because the Safeguards Infonnation sol]el on the
,'. duly authorised committee of the basis ofinfonnation malv from b submittal will be rejected automaticaHy.
k the Governor of a State or l
hisk designated upmeentaum FBlin ol%
(i) An arrest more than 1 year old for individuals to whom disclosure is which there is no information of the a
i 8'demd pursuant to i 2.744(e):
dispainon of b case -
(3) Fees for the processing of (iii) Any licensee currently processing (ii) An arrest that resulted in diami=.i Angerprint checks are due upon
{
criminal history requests through the FBI of b charge or an acquittal.
application. f Iraa-shall submit Pursuant to Executive Order 10480 (2) A licensee may not use Peyment with the appucation for the j
need not also submit such requests to informados received from a criminal iz
' of Sagerprints through j
_the NRC under this section; and history check obtained under this
' check, certi8ed check.
section in a mannar that would infringe e check, or money order made gr= fiv) Upon further notice to licensees upon the rights of any ladividual under payable to "U.S. NRC."The amount of i
g and without further rulemaking, the the First A==ad===t to the Constitudon the feeis the user fee for processing Heensee use the infonnation in any way EN
_ t cqds subenitted]on on se Commission may waive certain of the United States. nor shall the g
i _=
{ requirements of this section on a temporary basis.
to II P
charged (3) ne ucensee shan nouf, e.ch nanomai-w. se. - age.
g='*g=,>*ay.enya affected individual that the fingerprints b user fu by se FBI i j
will be used to secure a review of his/
}(d)Proceduresfbrprocessing of
$ub eralRegister the fee '
es Fed.Ib r==laalan wtB dinctly her criminal history record, and infonn t checks. (1) For the purpose of j-the individual of proper procedures for with this section. lleensees nod Mcensen who are sub>ct to sh revising the record or including submit one -. f dlegible on of any ise changes.
i 1
explanation in the record.
standard fingerprint card (Form FD-ass,
'i j
(4) Fingerprinting is not required if the ORIMDNRCOOOZ. NRC Division of utility is reinstating the unescorted Security, Rockville.MD) which may j
access to the nuclear power facility or be obtained from the NRC for each (4)ne -=taalan will forward to l
access to Safeguards infonnation individual requiring unescotted access r
granted an individualif:
to se nuclear power facility or access to the submitting licensee all data received j nu(clear power utility that granted access g Division of Security. U.S. NuclearI Safegu from the FEE as a result of the licensee's i) De individual returns to the same i
a tion (s) for cdminal history i
e and such access has not been E Regulatory e-=i=ian Washington.
laciuding the individual's
[ interrupted for a continuous period of g DC 20885. Attention: Criminal History tcard.
)
i to correct andcomplete
. more than ass days; and Check Section. Copies of these fanns (ii)ne previous acones was n.ay be obtained by writing to:
l tion. (1) Prior to any final 4
terminated under favorable conditions.
Ingormation and Records Management detenmination, the licensee j
(5) Fingerprints need not be taken, in Branch.U.S NuclearRegulatory E shall make available to the individual j
the discretion of the licensee,if an camadanian Washington.DC 20655.%e H the contents of records obtained from Individualwhois an emploF" licenses shall establish procedures to the FBI for the purpme of assuring i
of a licensee, contractor, manufacturer, enstre that the quality of the Angerprints correct and complete infonnadon.
j or supplier has been granted uneocorted take moults in minimizing b m>ction Confinnation of receipt by the individual of this notiBeation must be 4
accom to a nuclear power facility or to rate of angNPrint cards due to illegible or maintained by the licensee for a period Safeguards Information by another 8
lac mp ete cards.
of 1 year from the date of the g
}
licensee, based in part on a criminal history records check under this section.
notification.
j ne criminal history check file may be transferred to the gaining licenom in i
3 accordance with the provisions of paragraph (f)(3) of this section.
73 31 May 31,1995
PART 73 o PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF PLANTS AND MATERIALS (2)If after reviewing the record, an applicable physical characteristics for equipped r/tth an int in alarm or in individual believes th6t it is incorrect or identification.
a vault-type room, and e h such vault incomplete in any respect and wishes (4) Da licensee shall make criminal or vault-type room shall controlled changis, corrections, or updating (of the history records obtained under this as a separate material acc area.
(4) Enriched uranium ser in the alleged deficiency), or to explain any section available for examination by an smil pi uttin, chi mitter in the record, the individual may authorised representative of the NRC to n
initi ta challenge procedures.These determine compliance with the result imm a manufacturing p ss, procedures include direct application by 3 mgulations and, laws.
contained 1130-gallon or larger con.
(5) The licensee shall retain all tainers. with a uranium.235 conte f
the individual challenging the record to e
th2 agency,i.e., law enforcement
% fingerprint cards and criminal history less than O. 5 grams per liter, may e ag:ncy, that contributed the questioned
- records received from the EI, or a copy tored withi a locked and separately information or direct challenge as to the if the individual's file has been enced area hich is within a larger Eccurity or completeness of any entry transferred, on an individual (including protected ar provided that the stor.'
on the criminal history record to the data indicating no record) for 1 year age area is n closer than 25 feet to Assistant Director. Federal Bureau of after termination or denial of unescorted t
perimeter of the protected area.
Invzstigation Identification Division, access to the nuclear power facility or e storage en when unoccupied sh be prot ed by a guard or Washington. DC 20537-0700 as set forth
,, access to Safeguards Information.
wa hman who hall patrol at inter-in 28 CFR 18.30 through 16.34. In the latt;r case, the FBI then forwards the t
on al chillinge to the agency that submitted (5 Admittance o a maternal necess the dsta requesting that agency to verify 3 area hall be und the control of au.
thor individu and limited to in-or correct the challenged entry. Upon 6 M N mquhnts W divid is who rec re such access to rec;ipt of an official communication g, pWcal prohcdon at nonposer macsps.
perfo their duti directly from the agency that w
contributed the original information, the $
(6) rior to entr Into a matertal access res. packas shall be searched FBI Idantification Division makes any L
for de tces such as firearms, explo-chang:s necessary in accordance with thn information supplied by that agency.
sives, t eendiary de ces. or counter.
felt su titute items which could be Licensees must provid,e at ieast to days Each nonpo r reactor licensee who, used to theft or div rsion of special 4
for en individual to initiate action to pursuant to the ufrements of part 70 nuclear terial.
, cht!!enge the results of an FBI criminal of this chapter, ssesses at any site or (7) M thods to o e individuals
- history records check after the record contiguous sites a bject to control by the within terial access cas to assure that s al nuclear ma rial is not di-b2ing made available for his/her review.
licensa uranium-(contabd b verted sh I be provided used on a Th2 licensee may make a final adverse
~
detIrmination based upon the criminal uranium enriched t 20 percent or more continu basis.
history record, if applicable, only upon in the U-235 isotope uranium-233, or (b) Eri requirement.
h individ-P utonium, alone or any comb' nation e ual. pack and vehl le shall be l
rzecipt of the RI's confirmation or corrtction of the record.
in a quantity of 5000 or more
?, searched r concealed a nuclear
- material fore exiting i m a materi-(f) Protection of information. (1) Each computed by the form e al access es unless exit into a con-lic:nsee who obtains a criminal history gra (grams con U-235)+ 2.5 r2 cord on an individual under this
(
U-233+ grams pl tonium), shall 3"Mh ma h t Ya ph c
i srction shall establish and maintain a g prot the special nucle material from ca! search r by use of eq ipment ca-syst:m of files and procedures for 2 theft o diversion pursus to the pable of de.
thep of con-ta of paragrep 73.87 (a), (b),
cealed spect nuclear rnate al protection of the record and the H
@ require is section, (c) Detect a cid requir
- t. Each personalinformation from unauthortred E (c), and d),in addition to except t a licensee is ex t from unoccupied rial amess a shall disclosure.
be locked protected b an intru.
(2) The licensee may not dise'ose the e mq ants of paragn (a), M, sion s.larm o active status. All emer-rzcord or personal information collected (c).(d),
(e) of this section o the sency exita be co unuously end maintained to persons other than extent tha it possesses or use speciel alarmed.
th2 subject individual. his/her nuclear terial that is not rea y (d) Testing maintena
- e. Each representative, or to those who have a need to have access to the information separable m other radioactiv 11censee shall and main intru-s alarms, p ysical in performing assigned duties in the material an that has a total ex p
proc:ss of granting or denying radiation d rate in excess of1 rems requirements of is secdon M foHows-unescorted access to the nuclear power per hour at distance of 3 feet from y (1) Intrusion al physical bar.
facility or access to Safeguards accessible ace without interveni riers, and other used for mate-Information. No individual authorized to' shielding, rial protecuon shal be mainiained in 5:v2 cccess to the information may re-opersbie corxhtion.
(2) Each intrusion shall be in-dissiminate the information to any other spected and tested for perab(11ty and individual who does not have a need to (a) Access trementA (1) Special required funct!onal formance at kn:w.
nuclear ma shall be stored or the beginning and end o h interval (3) The personal infortnation obtained processed o in a material==='
, during which it is used or material on an individual from a criminal history area. W acts ues other than those protection, but not less frequently record check may be transferred to whleh require "" to 8PeCial DUCIC&f han once every seven (7) days.
cnother ticensee.
material or pment employed in (i) Upon the individual's written the process, or storage of special rsquest to the licensee holding the data nuclear mate shall be permitted to rFdisseminate the information
$ within a mater a m e= area.
z contrined in his/her file: and j (2) Material areas shall be lo-(ii) The gaining licensee verifles
- a. cated only within protected area to informstion such as name.date of birth, ' which access is con tied.
soci:1 security number, sex, and other I
(3) Special nuclear material not in l process shall be stored in a vault
.luhr 74 1994 franat) 73 32
PART 73 o PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF PLANTS AND MATERIALS i
i k.
~
- (i) Make aR shir==ats of the material-
- (1) The shipper shan provide to the t
either(A)la dedicated with Cornminaion, upon request. such addi.
(f) fixedsite wnments for special nuclearmaterial low simtegic i
aolaterusadiate stops to oranload tional informatJon regarding a
planned shipment as the Commisalon significance. Each consee who
,, other carp and with asicerrier or considers pertinent to the decision on 8 possesses, stores. ok uses special l
- ,ebicle treasfere or temporary storage whether to delay such shipment-d nuclear material oflipw strategic
- la treasit.or(B) under 7-(11) The receiver of each shipsnent. a significance at a site or contiguous s % the oestody of the M sites, except those w are licensed to
""I *E N ce shall y
oPerste a nuclear powW mactw ter of the appropriate Nuclear Regula.
2
~
(11) Malatein the saaterial under M tory Commiamson Restonal Office pursuant to part 80. s 4
er under the con %z _.of an inlividual_ _ acceptance of later than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after arrival of listed in Appendix A by telephone. no who bse = - -'
_oestody of the aseterial by signature.
such shipment at its final destinat,lon.
I or after such shipenent has left the
- 15) Each hcensee wnu exports, specis!. United States as dexport, to confirm 4
nuciear matenal of mooerste strategic
- the integrity of th4 shipment at the significance shah comply with thy 2 time of receipt or exit froen the United a
recuiremr.nts specificd e paragraphs (c) s States.
1 I
and (t)(1).131. and (4 of ttus sects I (111) The Commiamian notify the V The bcensee shali tetam esch recc
" affected shippers no than two 2 required by tr.ese sections for three days before the ached shipenent date that a given shipmen is to be de-years after the close of period for w
~
layed.
g the hcensee possesses the special S
tiv) Shipants of nuclear 1.
2 nuclear material under each heense t
Insterial of moderate aisnift-authonzes the lic.erisee to export this cance which are protected in material. Copies of sunerseded material anm with the provisions of I 73.20
]
must be retained for three years af ter 73.25. and 73.26 shall not be sub to each cnanFS
(
orders to delay shipment nor ered to consutute a portion of an -
a-i stesste formula quantity of i
3 (S) Each Hesmaea who imports special special nuclear material for the pur-I
- anclear santerial ofmoderate stretegic of determining whether any magainamaa= sbaE..
S i,
a pments must delayed.
(i) dmply with the requirements j
speedied m paragraphs (c) and (e)(2).
(3) and (4i of tius secbon,ne hcensee s
S shall retam each recoy required by
- these sections for threq years after the
- close of penod for which the hcensee pos6 esses the special n$ clear material j
m i
under each hcense that huthonnes the i
licenses to import this material. Copies of supeaseded material aiust be retained s
j for throsyears after each\\ change.
I
\\
(11)
$e exporter deligened a
the me to a carrier of the arrival ma%
m u. afte, iving nou e pursuant to 73.72 a Itaaname 4
j p)anning to in transport.
, deliver to a for in a 4
single ahlpment, deli,gry at 2 Che point where it to a car-e aler.specialnuclear of saader-4 1 s.te strategic signif taintas in
" 8.ny part strateste uclear una-tartal, it appears to 4
i that two or more shi of special nuclear material of stratesic signif6cance consututing aggre-sale an amount equal to greater i
2 than a forinula quanuty o strategic special nuclear material, be en route at the same time, the mia-saon may order one or mo i the shippers to delay shipment to the following provisions.
4 w/
s 4
73-35 July 29,1994(reset) j
PART 73 o PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF PLANTS AND MATERIALS i
cordance with the requirement.s of I thre3 yerre after the close of period for i 4J.67(g)(3) of this part, unless the ? which the lacensee pa======= the special shipper is a licensee and has agreed in a nocinarmaterialiedereachlicense that writing tip arrange for the in transit l authorisas the linma=== toimport this physical Ihrotection.
material. Copies of asperseded seaterial S
g (3) Each licensee, either shipper or 2 must be retained for three years after i
g, receiver, who arranges for the physical each change.
1
$ protection of special fluclear material (1) Store or use the material only, of low strategic significance while in o~
cit.hin a controlled access area.
- transit or who takes delivery of such $ (ii) notify the person who delivered material free on board (f.o.b.) the the material to a carrier for transport of point at which it is delivered to a carri* ; the arrival of such material.
g (2) Monitor with an intrusion alarrn 4 or other device or procedures the con-
- trolled aaeas areas t.o detect unau-er for transport shair
{
- u. thorized penetrations or activities.
Racosas Asra RaronTs
~
4 (3) Assure that a watchman or off-(i) Establish and maintam tesponse g73.7o necores, jl site response 1orce will respond to all procedures for dealmg with threats or Ead record required by this part must u
rized 4 penetrations or activi-thefts of this material. The hansee shall be kgible L-W_-t the retention 1
y retain a copy of the current response period spacmadby each r'ammission y
2 pr$tedures as a record for three years regulation.'!be record may be the l
(4) Establish an'd maintain response after the close of period for which the Mginal or a 3
j procedures for dealing with threats of E licensee possesses the special seclear alcrofor that copy or j
th2fts or thefts of this material. The material under each license for whid microform is authsaucated by a
y licensee shall retam a copy of the of superseded m$ere established. Copies authorised personnel and that the 1
the procedures g current response procedures as a record aterial must be retamed microform is capable of producing a
]
g
- for three years af ter the close of penod for three years a er each change.
clear copy throughout the required for which the licensee possesses the Man'pwiod. Tb moord may also be l
t
{ fled immediatelt of tne arrival of the
- special nuclear matenal under each 1
(tD Make arrtngements to be nott' stored in electronic media with the hcense for which the procedures were g
capabihty for psodeciglegible, established. Copies of superseded
- shipment at its klestination, or of any accurata, and complete records dunng l
mtterial must be retained for three e such shipment hat is lost or unac.
the required rotentios period. Records j
yzersafter each change. s
% coubted for af the estimated time such as letters, drawings, specifications,
, \\
val at its instion, n.nd In transtt requirements for spe.{of must include all pertinent information j
such as stamps, initials, and signatures.
4 (g)
]
cid nuclear material of lono struttate (ii Conductlaupediately a trace The licensee shall mamtsin adequate 7tgMficance. (1) Each licensee who investigation of a shipment that is lost safeguards against tampering with and transports or who delivers a camer, or ur4ccounted fo after the estimated loss of records. Each bcensee subject to 4
u for transport special nucle material 8 arriva time and no ify the NRC i
s (i
vi e van otif a n to r
v ry I of "p
e owing s.
j the receiver f any planned s ipmenta $ shipment and within one hour after la) Names and addresses of all a
specifying L mode of trar.s rt. esti.
m rec m o wa ling w ost
- individuals who have been designated 4
mated time o arrival, locatto of the shipmen in accordang:e with the as authorised individuals:'Ihe hcensee ruaclear materi transfer point name of carrier and t port identifi tion, ~provisio of I 73.71 this part.
shall retain this record of currently (1D Receive co irmation fro the designated authortsed individosis for receiver prior to co encement the
'(4) Each ensee wh exports special the pened during which the licensee planned shipment hat the ree ver nuclear ma crialoflow trategic possesses the appropriate type and
{ will be ready to acc t the ship nt significanc shall compl with the quantity of special nuclear material appropriate uirement specified in requiring this record under each license
- et the planned time d location d
acknowledges the s filed mode f paragraphs ) and (g)(1) nd (3) of this that authorises the activity that is g
w transport, g
tion Th 'censee shal tetain each subject to the recordkeeping recad req h th a chns fw mqht ad b h pan r
ca ing ed er
.tiv) Check the intettrity f the con.
three years afipr the close f penod for thereafter. Copies of superseded i
tainrrs and seals prior to ahlpment,, which the he see possess the special material must be retained for three uclear mate ' 1 under each' ' cense that years after each change.
and (v) Arrange ior the in.
t pinys).
uthonses the see to ex this (b) Names. addresses, and badge i
cal protection of the mate in ac.
terial. Co ' of supersed matedel numbers of all individuals authonsed to cordance with the require nts of m et be retamed[or three yea site.
hm accaos to vital equipment w special nuclear matanal. and the vital i 73.67(g)(3) of this part, unl the re*
es chann.
ceivsr is a licensee and has in areas and material access areas to writing to arrange for the in t 55-which authorization is granted The physical protection.
2 Each licensee bho imports s al licensee shall retain the record of (2) Each incensee who receives e an. O nu(cl er materialoflow strategic individuale currently authonzed this tities and types of special nuclear E signi cance shall:
access for the period during which the terial of low strategic significan 4
licensee posessass the appropriate type and quanW d W nWear maw
(
Check the integrity of the con. r-tainers and seals upon receipt of the (i) Comply with the requirements regelring this record under each license shipment.
- specified in paragraphs (c) and (g) (2) that authonses the activity that is (11) Notify the shipper of receipt of a and (3) of this asction and retain each subject to the recordkaeping the material as required in i 70.54 of t; record required by these paragraphs for requirement and, for three years thereafter. Copies of superseded Part 70 of this chapter, and a
(11D Arrange ior the in. transit physi. I material must be retained for three
,g years after each chauss.
cal protection of the material in ac-o,
,c %,n
.e.
July 29,1994 (reset) 73 36
PART 73 o PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF PLANTS AND MATERIALS l
4
~
l (b)(1) Each licensee subject to the f
I shallretam a copy of the current (c) A register of visitors, vendors, and S procedures as a record until tne provisions of 39 73.20,73.37. 73 50. 73.55' 1
i other individuals not employed by the
$ Commmion tersunates each hcense for 73.80, or 73.67 shall notify the NRC which the procedures were developed Operations Center within one hour of
. licensee purenant to il 73.4e(d)(13).
z" and.if any portion of b procedure is discovery of the safeguards events l
73.58(d)(6), or 73.80. De licensee shall E superseded. retain the superseded described in paragraph 1(a)(1) of retain this register as a record, avellable R or 8 T -E-:. for 3 years after the last resterial for three years after each change.
Appendix C to this part. Licensees s f subject to the provisions of Il 73.20.
)
j m entry is made in the register.
73.37,73.30,73.55. 73.00 or each licensee
[,,
1 73.71 Meportmg of esfeguards events.
Possess strategic special nuclear material (
and subject to (s)(t) Each licensee subject to the l
(d) A log indicating name, badge provisions of Il 73.25, 73.28, 73.27(c).
I 73.87(d) shall notify the NRC
. Operations Center within one hour after i
g j
number. tune of entry, and time of exit 73.37. 73.87(e) or 73.87(g) shall notify the t
of aU individsals prented access to a g NRC Operations Center 8 within one a discovery of the safeguards events
}
vital aree except those indmduals g hour after discovery of the loss of any g describedin graphs 1(a)(2), (a)(3),
i I
entenne or exiting the reactor control shipment of SNM or spent fuel, and g (b) and(c) Appendix C to this part.
room. The licenses shall retain this lag within one hour efter recovery of or IJcensees subject to the provisions of as a record for three years aDer the last accounting for such lost shipment.
Il 73.3lL 73.37. 73.30. 73.55 or 73.00 shall notify the NRC Operatione Center O
entry le made in the log.
(2)his notification must be made to within one bour after discovery of the (e)Deaunentationof allroutine the NRC Operations Center via the safeguards events described in i
security toers and inspecnons, and of all j
tests. inspections, and maintenance Ernergency Notification Systeet. if the paragraph 1(d) of Appendix G to this 1
performed as pirysical barners, licensee is party to that system. lf the part.
intrusion alarms.mmanunications Emergency Notification System is (2)his notification must be made in equipeneet and other secannty related inoperative or unavailable. the licensee accordance with the requirements of j
shall make the required notification via paragraphs (a) (2), (3). (4). and (5) of this l
equipment used pursuant to the commercial telephonic service or other secthm.
t requirements of this part.ne licenses shall retain the documentation for them dedicated telephonic system or any events for three years from the date of other methods that will ensure that a (c) Each license subject to the report is received by the NRC pmvisions of $173.20,73.37,73.50,73.55, i
documenting each event (f) A remrd at each onsite alarm Operations Center within one hour.%e 73.60, or each licensee possessing SSNM annunciation location of each alarm.
exemption of 9 73.21(g)(3) appNes to all and subject to the i 73.87(d) shall false alana, alarm check, and tamper telephonic reports required b" this maintain a current los and record the a
indication that identifies the type of section.
safeguards events described in (3) The licensee shall, upo request to paragrapheII(s)and(b)of Appendix C
$ alarm. location, alarm circuit. date, and tisse. In addition, detalla of response by the NRC. maintain an open a 'id to this part within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of discovery 4
j continuous communication channel with by a licensee employee or member of facility guards and watchmen to each the NRC Operations Center.
the licensee's contract security i
s alarm. intrusion. or other secusity (4) ne initial telephonic notification organisation. De licensee shall retain
' incidset shaB be recorded.ne license must be followed within a period of 30 the los of events recorded under this j
= ahau rotein each record for three years deys by a written report submitted to section as a record for three years after after the record is made.
the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory e l e last entry is made in each log.
j (3) Shipments of special nuclear t
aseterial to the requirements of
- Commission. Document Control Desk.
g this part, names of carriers.
- Washington. DC 20555. He licensee g
a shall also submit one copy to the (d) Each licensee shall submit to the u.
seejar roads to be used, flight numiboss' l appropnate NRC Regional Office listed S in the case of air shipments. dates and Commission the 30-deY written reImrts expected times of departure and arrival a in Appendix A to this part.%e report required under the provisions of this
- must include sufficient information for section that are of a quality which will of shipmenta vertification af NRC analysis and evaluation.
Permit 185ible reproduction and aa==== helen equipasent on board the (5) Significant supplemental processing. lf the facility is subject to trenefer vehicle names of ladividasis information which becomes available
$ 50.73 of this chapter,the licensee shall 4
who are to aa====nents with the after the initial telephonic notification to ileecrtptions and idemaltenties, and say the NRC Operations Center or after the PNPare the written report on NRC Form transport velplate.eamanimar seal subminion of the written report must be 366. lf the facility is not subject to utilised to osseply with Il 73.35. 73.3s, telephonically reported to the NRC
$ 50.73 of this chapter, the licensee shall j
other 6=8=mumatian to esmera the means and F1.IF.hisinformation meet be Operations Center and also submitted in not use this form but shall prepare the recorded priortoaha===a inforumados a revised written report (with the written report in letter format.The obtained destag the seurse of the revisions indicated) to the Regional report must include sufficient r
ehlpasseteash asengisses of au Office and the Document Control Desk.
information for NRC analysis and
% edienceafshippisig Errors discovered in a written report evaluation.
must be corrected in a revised report plan. imalading usentter adinages, trece 1
i====a8 =an=== end othere nuest slee be with revisions indicated. %e revised i
3 seconled.he licenses shall retain each report must replace the previous report:
(e) Duplicate reports are not required i
senerd aheat a sugidred by this the update must be a complete ecuty
$ for events that are also reportable in persymphIs)ler yeare alter the and not cantein only supplementary or accordance with il 50.72 and 50.73 of a
revised information. Each licensee shall E this chapter.
record is saada, maintain a copy of the written report of (b) Precedures for.controlhng access an event submitted under this section as E to protected stees and for controlhng access to keys for locks used to protect record for a period of three years from e
j special nuclear material. ne hcensee the date of the report.
iCommercial telephone number ofIbe NRC Opereuens Centeris (301) ens.sma March 31,1995 73-37
PART 73 o PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF PUWTS AND.WUERIALS 1
1
] 73.73 Requirement for advance notice of M(4) Notify the Division of Industnal und
- 12) Assure tha 'he notification will be shipment of termule quangeles of stretsgie Medical Nuclear Safety by telephone as received atless 1 days before special nuelser meterial, spectal nuoteer 301) 4t5-7197 at least 10 days before thw transport of the empment commences at
~
m8t*'888 88 ****'*#d'*tegie signineanos, y (facility that an advance notice has bee shipment commences at the shippina the shipper's facility:
'"*d'*d '**#*' "
(3) include the following information g
I (a) A licensee, other than one e sent;and in the notiScation:
specified in paragraph (b) of this y (5) Notify,the Division ofIndustrial and (i) N name(s), address (es), and j
. esction, who in a single shipment, plans '
Medical Nuclear Safety by telephone at telephone number (s) of the shipper, j t3 d liver to a carrier for transport, to (30t) 415 7197 of any changes to the receiver, and carrier (s);
j
,, taks delivery at the point where a shipmentitinerary.
(ii) A physicaldescription of the g abipment is delivered to e carrier for shipment (the elements isotopes, form.
~
tr'nsport. to import, to export, otr to transport a forreule quantity of strategic a **C4 (iii) Alistingof themode(s)of special nuclear material, special nuclear l shipment, trenefer pointe, and route to i
materialof moderste strategic (b) Alicensee who makes a road s
i significance, or irradiated reactor fuel shipment or transfer with one-way
$ be um4 required to be protected in accordance transit times of one hour orless in (iv)h estimated time and date that with I 73.37, sball'.
duretion between installations of the shipsnent will-=- and that each
. licensee is exempt from the country along the route is scheduled to be entered;and g requirements of this section for that g shipment or transfer.
(v)'!he settmated time and date of
' 8 7s.7s neguirement ser advenee neues arrivalof the shipment at the j
> (1) Notify in writing the Division of 3 and pressenen of esport eMpments of dwtination:
y Industrial and Medical Nuclear Safety, spessai nusisar meterial of low stromsts (4) Assure that during transport g U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
eignineenee.
outside the United States, the shipment l
E Washington. DC 20555; (a) A licensee authorized to export will be protected in accordance with 3
special nuclear material oflow stretesic Annex I to the Convention on the L
significance shall:
Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (see Appendix E of this part).
1
- > (1) Notify in writing the Division of
[-
I (b) Alicensee who needs to amend a
- > written advance notlacation required by g Industrial and Medical Nuclear Safety.
(2) Assure that the notification will be g U.Ss Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
y, 2
received atleast 10 days before e Washington.DC 20555; g paragraph-(e)ofthissectionmaydosoby transport of the shipment commences at h a telephoning the Division ofIndustrial and y MedicalNuclearSafetyat(301)415-7197.
the shi facility:
i (3) lac!
the followinginfonnation L in the notification:
L (1) h name(s), address (es). and l
telephone number (s) of the shipper.
I receiver, and carrier (s);
l (ii) A physicaldescription of the shipment:
(A) For a shipment other than 3 Irradiated fuel, the elements. Isotopes.
$ carichment, arid cuantity:
E (B) For a stupment of irradiated fuel.
2.the physical forin, quantit{. type of reactor, and original w.f--
t:
(iii) Alisting of the mode (s)of shipment, transfer point (s) and roote(s) to be used; (iv) N eettmated time and date that shipment willcommence and the each country along the route is scheduled to be entered; and (v)W estimated time and date of errival of the shipment si the destination:
4 1
i
73.N(a) 73.81(b)
PART 73 o PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF PLANTS AND MATERIALS
)
l 1
Euroacuaterr*
f
+
l 73.74 Requirement ter advanes nettee M(b) licensee who needs to amend a
~
and protecteen et import shipments of writte advance notification required by j
nusosar motorteh sounertes Nt am not jparagr (a) of this section may do so by l73A0 Vietsmens.
4 2 teleph ng the Division ofIndustrial and
, (a) W Commission may obtain an j
g Medi Nuclear Safety at (301) 415-7197.
injunction or other court order to l (a) A licensee authorized to import Prevent a violation of the provisions g
of-E special nuclasr material oflow strategic
$ significance ffem a country not a party j
(1)The Atomic Energy Act of1954, as l
amended.
l j
to the Convention on the Physical (2) Title II of the Ensisy I
i i
Protection of Neclear Material (i.e not Reorganisation Act of 1974. as amended:
listed in Appendix F of this part) shall:
c) A licensee authorized to import j
a country not a party to the (3) A regulation or order issued
\\
ention ap the Physical Protection of j
\\
N Meterial(i.e notlistedla Pursuant to thoos Acts.
(b)De Comuniesion may obtain a (1) Notify in writidy the Division of y
p.,gjagarm,l.
court order for the payment of a civil j
j ladustrialand Medi Nuclear Safety.
quas of a nuclear material, penalty imposed under section 234 of the l
g U4NuclearRegulato Commission.
,,, special eclear tarial of moderate g
ington, DC 20555 lstret ignificakce, special nscleE
(
or ti of-S E material flow str s W cance,or (1) Sections 53, 57, 62. 63. 81. 82.101.
irradiated actor shaII assure that 103.104.107,or100 of the Atomic i
g duringtra out the United Energy Act of1964, as amended:
States the ipment be protected in (ii) Secuan mf b Egy
?
accordance Anne Ito the R
n A
ConvenHon the Phys 1 Protection of j
I (2) Asgure that the notifi tion will be
(*** A pendix E of
. issued pursuant to the sections specified u 38 M8*,
P j
received'st least 10 days before thto part).
E in peregraph(b)(1)(i)of this section:
transporty the shipment cobences at (iv) Any term, condition, or limitation 4
the shippe 's facility: and
\\
~
l (3)Inclu the following ini ation of any license issued under the sections i
specified in paragraph (b)(1)(1) of this in the noti tion:
section.
(i)The na e(s), address (es)
(2) For any violation for which a i
j telephone n ber(s)of the thip license may be revoked under Section
, receiver. and trier (s);
186 of the Atomic Energy Act of1954. as l
ii) A physi I description of the amended.
g (ipment(thei topes, enrichment.
g sh j
quantity, etc.):
E (iii) A listing o e(s) of shipment.
f 73A1 Cetminal peneluse, j
transfer points, a routes to be used:
(a) Section 223 of the Atomic Energy j
(iv) h estimat time and date that Act of 1964, as amended. provides for l
shipment will corn and that each criminal sanctions for willful violation i
country along the rout is scheduled to of. attempted violation of, or conspiracy be entered; and to violate, any regulation issued under l
(v) b estimated time date of sections 161b.1611. or 161o of the Act.
For purposes of section 223. all the i
arrival of the shipment at regulations in part 73 are issued under i
destination.
one or more of sections 161b 1611. or 1
1610. except for the sections listed in
{
paragraph (b) of this section.
I (b)%e regulations in part 73 that are 1
not issued under sections 161b 1611. or i
1eto for the purposes of section 223 are j
se follows: ll 73.1. 73.2. 73.3. 73.4.73.5 i
73.6. 73.8. 73.25. 73.45. 73.80, and 73.81.
4
~
f n
i i;
4 4
May 31,1995 73-39
+
4pp.A
- -App. A PART 73 o *HYSICAL F90TECTION OF PLANTS AND MATERIALS Amnois A To PAnf 73-U.S. Nucwut REowtomy h RecoeAL Ornces _ _
t
C 08"'*"" C"*' W mc opnem
.. m om,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, w p m,,,
usman as assuesne oma, m
_610) 337 _5000
"'mL W of
(
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ammessen M m ammum m #888 fe.130twege
,E ~
.aumen %
a-=
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- w Upg a.=e.
goe>w oo "r. : -e:,_e.,: _,,,,;
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M es s.,f4 esemaan eng pumumuse an sie m RegmallP.Mascame
- llllF *l':: " %.-.
i:::
a====
l e
o May 31,iets 1
l App, B App, g i
PART 73 o PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF PLANTS AND MATERIALS Nv
- s. Educauonal development-Possess a Appendix B-Ceneral Criteria h high school diploems or pass an equivalent Security Personnel perfortnance examinatico deslaned to meas.
(2) Headag: (e) Individuals shall have Toble of Comad.
ure boele job-related mathematical, lan.
no heerloslessin the h ear suase, and reasoning aktum ability, and g gg g gg Introduction.
knowledge, required to perform escurity job Dehnnions.
duties.
1,000 Hs and W Hs with no level Criteria.
- b. Felony conylcuens-lieve no felony tbsHO desdbolsatany ces L Employment suitabihty and quahfication.
convieuens involvtas the use W a wagon
$@ 300 '*8tendssd A. Sutability.
and w felony convie*1ana that aflect on h M be h of B. Physical and mental quahtications.
the individual's reliabutty
$3&1900E1973) J19 5)or, ANSI Mene
{
C. Medical esamination and physical
- 2. Prior to empiopuneet or mama n==ne to s
for fitness qualifications.
the security ersaan==tiaa in an armed casse E Audienstase). W 380 and ANSI S3.8-fty, the individual, in addition to (a) and (b)
D. Contreet security personnel.
1980 havs been appsowed for above, must be 31 years of ase or older.
E. Physical and medical requmhfication.
B. Phyeleal and mental qualifkations.1. g'!=_
_ _" - by sefusence by the F. Documentation.
PhF'ima qualsikstions DisocieroftheFedesel
. A copy i
II. Trainins and oualtf6=ena
- a. Individuals whose security tasks and job of escit sisadeld is Ier l
A. Training requirementa, duuss an dinetly easedated with the effee, iaspection at the NRC Librery 11545 w
i--==a of the leasasse phreient
- a. Quauficauon requirements.
uve r
Rockville Pike, Rockville. Maryland
- c. contrem personnet, escurity and =*W pleas aban have i
D. securtty knowlease, skms, and abe-no phreisal w==a==== or abeermanues 20ss2 273a.
ties.
that would adversely affect their perforus-j E. Reguallflaatsen, anos of assigned security job dunes,
~
j.
HI. Weapons trainins and quauficatism.
- b. la adellen do a. above, suards, araned IV. Weapone qualification and requaltflan-response pemensel, armed esserts, and een-j tion presresa, tral alarm stattom operators shaR suesessful.
V. Guard, aruned response personnet, and 17 pass a phyelent==maner.maann na. anima r.g aramed ensart eentp=,at.
by a u a phyv da= 'fhe e===inaues n
l A. Fined site.
shan be designed to maneum the inevid-i
- s. Transportauen.
unre phrateal abnity to perforan assisned me.
I curity job duties as idanufted in the licenese
~
I8'T5080Cvio8 physical amourity and contingency plame.
Aruned personnel shau meet the foDowins (b) A heartas aid is accepable provided additlemal phyeleal requiremments suitable testins preesdures h ste au-l Security peroommel who em reWble for (D V1 sten: (a) For each individual, distaat ditary easily equivalent to the abow stated i
the protesties of spedal suelear mastenst en visual neulty in each eye shall be correctab6e g,
g g
ette er la trement and for the protesties of es t* 3e/sej
,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,g,,,,
w
) in fadiky a wheele against
$,,,,,,3,,,,,,,,,,,,,g3,,,,,,g,,,,,,,,,,,,
viduars sansned ascurMy job duum duttas l
f*'halag8*= ambotage should,like other 88'"*I 8'""88"8F 888'*U8'8'have no es-a estanes vision is met at least as/44 km the x
(s) Dessasse-Individuale shaU elements of the phys 6 cal escurity eyotsu, he E better eye, the ine,vleual aban carry ane.hn.h.amoment hhtery or neeecal diasno-i requimd to sneet minimum artterie to ensure g,,g,,,,g, og,,,,,,,, 3,,,,,, pg,,,,g,,,g als of epGeper er embetes, or, where such a that wiB eSectively perform their aculty, carrected er uneerrected, shad be og j
enomrhy-mieted job duties. la enter least 30/4e in the better eye. Field of vistem constaan esista, the individual shaU provide j
to ensure that those ladividuals responsihie must be at least Te* hortmental anerleaa to medical evidense that the mammtica en be for esaurity are properly equipped and each eye. 'the abGety la estinsulate red, contreDed with proper medMa& dom oc that a
the inevidual wGI met lapse hde a coma or i
geallSed to emeoute the job duties presethod steen, and yeDow colors is requind. Imes of state whde perfeMos==si aad
=
f j
sur them, the feC has developed generei vtalen in one eye is disqueufyins. Olaueanna senerNy job dutim.
meteria that speelfy escurity peresumet shah be esqueufytes, unless controlled by (4) Adeletion-Imeviduals shaB laave no es-p g,,,
acceptable sneemt er surskal means, pro, tabusW meemt er menaal ensno-I Dese gameref eriteria estabbah vided such modemuons as unay be used for ses of aanbetaal er druft admeuen, contretMag fama-de met comme undesir-er wtnen such a conetton has unisted, the f requissements for the a.,es able side effects which adversely affect the equipping testep and WallSeatles ineviduare abGity to perfens amisned soeu-Individual shad provide certilled documan-i n
e tauen of hartas counpleted a ruhabnstauon e ladividuals who wtB be responshis for spedal ameiner materials, madear rny job duten, and provided the vWua,,l prosrem which would stee s. reasonable
,,,ggy
,,g gg,gg g,g,s,
,,,,g,,,,,,
and nedser ekspeames.
,,,,,g
,,,,,,,,, o, in,_3,,, evaluause desree of eennesses that tyn individual would be empable of perferuni:ss assigned so-j When regubed to have passammel shad be used for knewbluals who sahebet a curity job deuse.
that have been trained, and sand eener visese detest, to perform esetty Wh (b) where correeuve eyesiasses are re-(s) ouner physsent noustements-Am ine-
'$ dust vtm has been inenpaanated due to a i
in eensedness the metasta in this quared, they shnu be of the safety staes serious ulnama, injury, disease, or operauen, i-appensa, he hemmene must estakkeh, type-which ecund interfen WMk the effeedve per-(cl'fbe use of earreeuve ey(slasses or eas>
j meentein. and Supeer a plan het shoue hour test lamaa shan met interfere with an ing., formance of nanignad escurity job duties the setterna wtEhe mot. He plus must be viduare abGity to effectively perform as. g shall, prior to r=====**== of such duties, i
8 submittad h the )RC lar end sumet dened escurity job duuss durtas aermal er,, provide scenal widenes of recovery W l
beI'mya.m s.awggts 23 e4mr
""8'"'
f a
s ndivid als i
approval by the P,RC u.nisse otherwise ween securtt,euant spo ned my as 5C w w.
te.be andJ.b uum a,e e.
j recuy===a**atad wkh the effecuve imple-mentause of the licensee physseal securtty 4
and meetinsemey plans shaB demonstate mental alertness and the capabuRy la eser-else seed J.h ampiamane instrueuona, Derswrness andmeate assisnod escurity emmaa. and pos-som the asulty of senses and abGety of es-N Terms deflaed in Parte 90, St. and T3 et pressten suffielent to permit accurate cosa-t this chapter have the sasse amenains when suuniention by written, spoken, audible, visi-used in this appenea.
ble. er other signans required by assisned 4
g job duties.
ca:Tessa n
)
f L Employment euttabelty and qualification.
j g
A. Sultablitty-1. Prter to employment. er 4
assignment to the securtty organimauen, an j
individual stiaD meet the followins euttabO-t My criteria:
i i
73-41 assy 31,1995(feest) i
w~
PART 73 o PHYSICAL MYLEM Ut aml Warm nw uum. s I
E.gushn:;stions as a record for three years afta
- b. Armed indivtduals. and central alarm E. Physacal s- ;- ""At least sver) o he amp 12yee ends employment la the stauon operators. In addluon to rueeting the 12 months. central alarm station opere tore requirement stated in parearaph m. above.
eball be regmuod to meet the physscal 2 sociesty related capacity and for three years shall have no e couonal instabluty that mquusements of 11.b of thee secuan, and
[ after 8e close of pened for which the 1
m== mat possesses the epocial acclear tround laterfere w. h the offocuve perform-guards erend roepense peroammel and I
meknalimidw each hrmana and ance of assigned escurity job duties. "the de-armed soone shaR be regeired to meet the WM b M far h p h and M.
& tenntnauon shau be saade by a lleensed pay-ph #, h,,of M,,,.I b h R chtlogist or psychiatrtet or physiclah. or g gg g gg
*,# 8*
h ebeBdeamenteed.tedMdear.aphysical I D. Sec.urtty knowledge. akilla, and ablu-8
- -- e.d
- e., eta
.e ues-r.
indmduai nomigne.
pefo.
W My misted task idenW in the Ib
[ documetote of sogeahScotion as a M W
N a for thme yearsime the deu of each g
o t
and or appropriate corrective measures by respon sible supervisors for indications of encouon-regaals$ cation skul, and abuity in acewdance with tho' al instabuity of individuals in the course of F. fiaa====tetson-1he seemits of specifhd mandards fw each het u etsud performing aselsned accurity job duties.
esitobDity, pbysscal, and enantal in 2e N3tC approwd th training and IdentiftanHan of esmouonal instabGity by s*
gush 6catnese data and test residte asset be guauftentless plan. The areas of knowledge, eponalble eusservisore shall be subject to ver*
asaa=====a==l by the hcomese er the boomose's amine, and abGities that shau be aan=sse,g Jficcuen by a ueensed, trained pemen.
seent The lsceness or the agent shall retana mi the tar====='s training and qualifkstione uus 86===atalaan as a record for three plan are as fouowet
- 1. Protecuan of nuclear facnities, trans-C. Medical exere6netsene end physical yeare from the dem of obtaaning and port vehicles, and special nuclear material
~
fhnese goalificanons-Geerde. armed recording taese resulta
- 3. N3tC requirements and guhlance for response personnel armed socorts and otner physical escurtt.y at nuclear faciuties and trmed escursn force seembers sheg be run E
O. Nothing herein authortees or requirse a for transportauen.
a medical enounenon hicledme e Z liennese to inveaugate into or judge the
- 3. 'the private escurity guard's role in pro-reading habits, peutical or relistous beliefa.
viding phyehnt protaeuen for the nuclear determmetsen and wntion certification by e a
hcomeed physioen that there em no medical
{ or atutudes on social. =aaaamse or poHusal
- industry, 4."the authority of private guards.
contraindscoteus as diodoesd by the medical
,,, issues of any persen.
S."Ihe use of nonlethat weapons.
sxisoination to perbespotion by the 3.The use of deadly fores.
S individualis phyoual Stness tests.
t Power of arrent and su2ority 2 detain g E _'_ _ _ _ " to thus medical exemmat on-11.Trainmg and quehincahons 4
A. Treirung requiremente-Each individual uthority to search individuale and
',8"
," one d
fy rc who requuss treuung to perforen seeigned sense property.
- g. Adversary group operadone.
members shall demonstrete physica! $mes*
secunty-related job taske or iob dataea m
- 10. 3douvadon and objecuves of adversary a
for assigned ascenty lob duties by performmg identaned in the hcensee physical escun'F or e prochcal phyelcal esercise program within aba pna a t.
,, yp*-Tacues and force that snight be used i
a specHic tune penod. The exercise program E by adverary groups to achlew Geir objec-perfonnance obtecttves shall be desenbod in ance with the hcenese or the in accord.e egenre h=anud training and
- 13. Recognition of entsotage relatad de.
)
- " uves.
the hcense trainmg and qualificatione piso heensee and eben consider job-related functione such qualificatione plan.The hcensee or the agent
- u. Hese and sculpesent that udsht be used i
es strenuoue actrvtty, physical exertson. levels eball maintain dae== ntabos of the current O again=e the beenese's faciuty or shipement of stress.and exposere to the elements as plan and retain this da====itation of the vehicle.
they pwtem to eed indMduare emagned plan as a remni for three years after the
- 13. Factuty aseurity C-""
and op.
securey job duties fw isoth normal and close of pened for widch the hoensee eraden.
fhe physicut ihnus pa======= the special maclear anotarial ender
- 14. Types of phyelcal barriers.
4
- 16. Weapons, lock and her control system
'qEnhentioQ one uasd. weed response eed lic=ese for which the plan was s
ermed ascesetM o&w secenty fwce 4
any of plan m
,m on M sprad and/or Mtal areas member sher be documented and ansetad to h empemedad for dwee yeem she each chassa.
"7 Qres security and vulnerabil.
1 ehet tius on es e 36 QuahScaban mgersmam-4ach ig,,
record for three years fross the date of each
. pones who pe.rfome senerny-related job is. T,ypes of alarm systeme,n used.
a
,iade or id d esregoedoi-pi ise is. es,,orm and.
m ala,m a,,.
quahficanon.
bcmasse physical escartty er connagency nunciauena and other indienuone of intru.
D. Contract escurity _
,. "act plas shaB. pnet h bang sempnad to these e6ca.
~
__m "curity tmreennel namn be mouimd t* ""*
tede w densa. be eenhaed si accordemos a raminertonuen with types of special
- the suitabuity, physical, and smental re-wts se hcensee's hyproval W nuchar material W St. General conoasta of itsed este security a
and gealias.atione plan. The qual Scotname of f
with
.ed svi % be - ted d e-1u
- 33. Vulnerabutues and conesquences of aT uen,o,2ta..,._.
ettested by a benese sacerity supervisar theft of special nuclear maternal or radiolas-the bcamese shaR reta due decamentebes k"3'***"*8' 'I *I*'88"
of and indevidmare geallScotaams as e record "8
- a for three years eher the employee ende una.'
emplevnent in the escortsy-reisted capechT
- 34. Personal eeutpasent use and &"
and for thme years aher the close of pastes for nonmal and continoamey operapons, for which the h posseeems the spendal
- 35. SurveGlanse and am systeam socleer material under sech Iscenes, and and tachaleusa,
- ? maternaller three years aber 38.
r'a-====4amuaa=
syenessa operaden.
ee'ch daags.
ftsedsete.
St. Assam oseteel erstems and opwauen
- c. connect pw cnn.L-canmci pusonnel 8", 7,,,,,,8,",basmA w,hid,a,,,,,,,
shan be tremed egapped. and q shsed =
appropnete to their semaned security-reldled job tasks or job dunen, is monardance erith St. Barrters and other delay systema secuene B. 5L IV, and V of this appendia.
around matertal aseems er vital areas.
1he geahfications of each ladividual mest be dar-tod and attested by a heensee security empervisor.1he 1-==a== shad retain this documentatico of each individuare i
73-42 usy 31, toes (fisset)
Ap'p.B App.B PART 73 o PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF PLANTS AND MATERIALS i
i i
(
- 30. Exterior and interior alarm systems
- 70. Security briefing piecedures.
III. Weapons training j
cperation.
- 71. Response force taetkal movement.
A. Guards, armed r=aranaa personnel and
- 31. Duress alarm operauon.
- 73. Response force withdrawal anned escorts requiring weapons training to
- 33. Alarm stauona opersuon.
- 13. Reponse force use of support fire, perfonn assigned sacudty related job tasks i
- 33. Response force organteauon.
- 14. Response to bosab and attack thresta, or job duties chau be trained in accordance j
- 34. Response force minatan TS. Response to 1998 disturhannes (eg with the th* documented weapons
- 38. Response force opersuon.
strikes, desneastratorsk training progressa. Each individual shall be
- 34. Response force engesesment.
- 18. Response to confirmned attempted proncient la the use of his assigned
- 37. Security cammami and control system theft'of special nuclear manertal and/or ts.
weepen(s) and shall meet prescribed stand-during normal operauon.
diolosteal aabetage of feeGitsen, g ords la the following areas
- 38. Security comrnand and control systems TT. Response to hostase attuataeas.
1.
Mehaa'a=1 aansembly. diamaaa=bly.
during contingency operation.
- 78. Site poetfic anned tacusal precedures S range penetrauen capabGity of weapon. and j
- 39. Transportauon systems security orga.
and opersuom.
s buHseye firing.
L
- 3. Weapons maaantas and storage.
niandon and opersuon.
- 79. Seeurity response to emnergency attua.
- 40. Types of 87GE transport vehicles.
tiens other them soeurity insidamet U
- 3. thahmi firtns, day and alsht.
- 41. Types of SNM escort vehicles.
St. Beale transportaties defensive re.
- 4. Safe weepens handHag.
- 43. Modes of transportation for SNM.
"Panas testiet S. Cleartig loading, aa'aadtat and re,
- 43. Road transport security systema coen.
St. Aramed eseert deplopensaL loadas.
mand and control structure.
sa. Araned essert adsermary a-rw-==*
s.When to draw and point a weapon.
- 44. Use of weapons.
- 83. Arated essert fenmatises.
- 1. Rapid fire techniques.
- 48. Communicauons ersteens operation for
- 84. Anmed emoort use of weepean Ike (tee.
- 8. Close guarter firing.
transportauon. shipenent to control center -
44ealand cosaba&L
- 3. Stress instas.
and intraconvoy.
- 88. Aramed escort and ablpenset movesment
- 10. 3ereing assigned weapontsL'
- 48. VulnerabGiues and maan=== et under fire.
[
theft of aponial nuclear amaterial or radiolos
- 88. Tactical convoytas techniques and er IV.%espone qualincataan and requahLcahun leal embotage of a transport vehicle, ersteenL proyest
- 41. Prosecuan of transport system aoeurt, s. Armed essert tastient emeralses Qualification finns for the bandgun and tne ty informauen.
as. Arened escort response to bomb and rifle must be for daylight finns. and eact 4g. Control of area around transport whl.
acted thresta.
o 4.le.
as. Verificauen of shipunant documenta.. Ie ladhidual chaH perioru napht fang for
. leenhansehon with assigned weaWsme
- 49. Normal convoy techniques and oper.
taan and contents.
resuha of weapons quahfacetion and suorm
- 30. Continuous survamamma of ship a-e g g ^ bon must he documented by b Se. FamiliartsatJon with types of special
- vehicle, m.
heemsee or the lammese's asset.Each a
r.aclear materials shipped.
- 91. Nonnal and contensency opersalon for
$1. Flaed post stauon opertuona.
shipment anode transfer, ladividual shaR be requalilled at least every St. Access control system opersuca.
- 93. Araned personnel procedures and oper.
12 months. He boomase shall rotein tius
- 83. Search techniques and systems for in.
stoon shirtus tesnoorary starsee between documentatiam of each geahdication and dividuals, packages and vehicles.
umode transfers of shipments.
requahncetsen as a record for three yeart Sa. Escort and patrol responsibilities ang ;
- 93. Aramed escort threat manaammaat and fruen the deto of the gushnestion er g operation.
g response.
ma taan, as appropriate.
- 94. System for and opersuon of shipsnamt
- 58. Contensency response to confirmed in. g a
trusloe or attemapted intrusion.
u vehicle lock and key control.
- 84. Security systema operation after cua,
- 98. Techniques and procedures for leois, a
ponent failure.
tion of shipsnent veluc8e durtas a contingen.
a ST. F1 sed site security infonnauon protec.
cy situation.
A. Har.dsun Ouards. armed escorts and
- don, SS. Transportance coordinsuon with local anned response permannat shaU qualMy with
- 88. Security coordinadon with local law law entforcement asencist a revolver or senalaut1snatic pistol firtne the enforcement agencies.
- 91. Procedures for verificause of shl8" nauonal poues couren. or an equivalent na.
St. Security and situauon reporting. docu.
ment locks and sealk MonaHy raaarnt=ad course. Qualifying score sacntandon and report wHtins.
St. Transportatien security and situatica shad be an eseumulated total of 70 percent
- 80. Continsency duuse.
reporting. docussentation and report writ
- of the smastetun otrtalnable acore.
81.Self defense.
Ing.
B. Segalautosmatte Rifle-Ouards, armed st. Use of and defenese assinet incapacg.
- 30. Procedures for ahlpment delivery and sooerts and anmed response personnel, as.
pickup.
signed to use the samlautoamaue rifle by the tattas asenta.
- 83. Secur'ty equipament tasuns 100. Tranara tataan escurtty system for g laconses troistas and qualificauens plan.
- 84. Contansener procedures.
- ' cort by road, rmIL att and sea.
,, shall qualify with a pa=6 automatic rifle by es. Night vision devices and erstesma, g firing the ISS. yard couras of fire specified in E Machannan of detentiesL E.Requah8 cat -
- 4 paresonal i asetien 1920 of the Nasianal Rifle Associa.
abau be r=
taen. Rish Power Rifle Rules book uffecun st. maale anned and unaruned defensive g,,,,ga,,1,=alAAad at least eve.ry t2 months
,,gy,g Man.h 18.1974L' or a aa tanah raaafni*ad S and doNes Ier both aermalQ ""*'$ tasks equivalet eoewes of fire.' Targets used ahan
- tacues,
^'
- 80. Response force deployenes1 8"'I be es maname in seetten 17.8 for the 100-yard
- 80. Security alert procedures.
g opersums Woom shaB he la
,,,,,,,.tisme llantes for individuals shall be accordamos with the NRC.epproved hennese as specified to aersion 8.3 of the NRA rule a
a Waining and y=ahAaans===
The renehs book resarqSeas of the sourse fired. Ottalify-
"; elregenh8ention must be and ins somre shaB be an secussulated total of 90 attested by a kommens esculty esparviser-porosot of the mantenusa otnainable score.
e The Ecosses abaB retain this -
of each ladividuare regsehsentlen se e roosed for times years drum the date af eash regenbacanon.
- Copese of the "NRA Righ Power Rifle Rules" may be a===taad at, or obtained fresa, the Natlanal Rifle Associatloa 1000 Rhode Island Avenue NW., Washirgton, D.C.20088.
73 43 May 31,1996(foseQ
y_ __ __ _ ___ _ _ _ _X)N OF PLANTS AMOMATHRIALS
~~~~
PART 73 o PHYSICAL PROTECT I
j C. Khotgun-Ouards. armed escorta, and
- 4. AnununJtion; l
anned response per=aaaal assigned to use (a) For each assigned weapon as approgrv l
the 13 stuse ahetsun by the larmamma train-ate to the individuars aestsnad centingener ins and qualifientiana plan shah quanfy security job duties and as readGy ama11aMr 7
with a full choke or improved modified as the weapon.
choke 13 sauce shotgun firing the fonowins (1) la rounds per handsun.
(3) 100 pounds per sendau'==nene rifle.
opures" j
(3) 13 rounds each per shotgun (as snuse and alugh es,
""9" newe s fassn*
(b) Amununition availablo on site-two (3) j tlanes the amount stated in (a) above for is yes Mp are some-4 5-37 each weapon.
A r5 yes.
Dedew 4
EL tr
- 8. Personal equipment to be readDF avail.
6 able for ladividuals whose easigned contin-sency security job duties, as desertbed in the i
g ine 4 mmm sus as aus e a ausses myss muni e sessnes 8
- ""* **"""8'"*#
.Y..sysummesan TsemN Esm7 sum *e asssesaman. osmanns issa n,s plans, warrant such ognir=ama*
nea enamme nau
-n g*
emm amesmassme eessammen,.assensiere anummen (a) Melaaet. combat, eus"'a (b) Ons mask, fell fase.
f g"y"" 'f,",",*g*g*'"aamen4m (c) Body annor (buHet.rusistant vesti 4
(d) Flashlights and betterten, j
(e) antaa i
To qualify the inevadual shan be required IU to place to percent of au penets (38 penets)
(s) Amanunition/equipement belt.
wnhin the black eShouetta.
- 8. Binoculare.
- 1. Night vision alds, i.e., hand fired luumi.
nation flares or oculvalent.
- 8. Tsar ses or other nonlethal gas.
- 9. Durses alarins.
- 10. Two.way portable radios thandi. talkie)
D. Requaufleauen-Ineweduals shad be 3 channels minimaum.1 operating and 1 weapons regualified at neest every 13 months in menordener with the NRC ap.
emergency.
B. Transportauen-Armed escorts ahan proved licensee training and quauflandons plan, and in accontanes with the require.
h be equipped with or have reaely available the foDowins escurity equipment ments stated in A. B. and C of this assuon. 2 appropriate to the individual's assigned een-V. Guard, armed response pessonnel, and 1 Linsency security related tasks or job duttaa.
armaed emeert equipement.
A. FLzed Site-Flaad ette guards and a as described in the Ucensee phystad ascurity armed response pereennel shan either be [ and continsency plans;
- 1. A*=iautama' Ae riflee with the foDowtag equipped with or have avaDahle t.he follour. a no=taal aninirnum specifkstions' e
ins security egulpement appropriate to the (a).333 caHber.
individual's assigned conungency security (b) Musste velocity.1.980 ft/ase.
related tasks or job dulles as described in (c) Musale energy. 988 foot pounds.
the licenses physical accurity and contba-(d) Masasine or clip of 10 rounds.
sency plans:
(e) Reload capabGity. 10a da
- 1. Seralautamatie rifles with foDowins (D Operable in any envircrunent in whleh na=inal mirdsnuss specificapons:
k w1B be used.
g (al.333 caliber.
3.13 gauge shoteurm
'89'-
(b) Musale velocity. Itse ft/sec.
(a) 4 round punap or ma=Ininteena44c.
(c) Musale N. 968 fut M E
(d) Magasine or clip load of 10 rounda k
Q (e) Magasine reload. < 10 ancanda (c) Puu er 6 choke.
(f) OperaMe in any enetreammaa in whleh
- 3. Sendautomatic pistols or revolvers with 3 3 sa shotguns with the foBowing
- a c-u-( a,.,,,n,,,,,
(a) e round pump or===tanteenatie-(b) Musale energy,388 foot-poundL (b) Operable in any enetraa==as in which (c) FuD saasmaine er artinder reland capa, it wtB be used, bGita 8 sesenes.
(c) Full or anodified choke.
(d) Musule veleedty. See ft/see.
- 3. Se=taneamats, pesteis or revolvers with (e) Full cylinder or sansmalne capeetty. 8 the foDowing pondnal =lal= muss spectflan-
- runnes, tions:
(f) Operable in any onettenement in wideh (a),864 esuber. -
g wgl be used.
(b) Mummie energy,300 footgeunds.
- 4. Assamunition for each shipmemL (c) FuD masastne or cyttador reload caps.
(a) hr eneh assigned weepen as apsreprl-bulty < e aa - ada age to the inevidears assigned===*easmaaF (d) Musale vetoesty. 000 ft/ses, soeurity job duties and as reader eveDahle (e) Full cylinder or masmanna espaneew. e as the weepen:
rounda.
(1) 30 rounds per handgun.
(f) Operable in any enetraammae. In whleh (3) 130 rounds per samalautomatie rtile.
it wtB be usesL (3) 13 rounds each per shotsus (90 saanes and shagL S.
Benart veldeten, buDet resisting, agulpped with ensamuntenuens systems, red flares, first aid kit, amersoney teet kat, tire changing egulament, battery chassers for remes (where appropetata, for recharslag portable rame battertest May 31,1996 (reest) 73-44
l PART 73 o PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF PLANTS AND MATERIALS App. C i
i
- s. Personal equipment to be mador avan.
Ayrsuptx C-Licawass 8ArmeUARDS U0'IAI Conten f the i
able for individuals whose assianut ennun.
Courtuosuc1r Ptaas pi,,,
j eeney securtty job duties. as desertbed in the L asetyround. Under the following g,,,,,,ggies, j
licensee phyalcal security and continsency leales, this category of Inforination shall plans, warrant such equipsment.
identify and denne the percetved dangere a
j (a) Mehmet. -ha*
and insidents with which the plan wiu deal 0 (b) One enask, full fase.
Aliosasse enfsguards contissemey le a and the esmeral way it will handle these:
a g (c) Body arener (buDet reelstaat vest).
documented ples to Wye guldenes to
- a. Foreelved Danser-A statessent of the (d) Pimahlights and batteries, persesmal h sedw to M perceived danger to the security of special j
g.
t a.
(e) anten.
amanad objectives in the event of is, nuenear matertal, licenses pereennel, and 11 l
3 (f) Anusunition/ equipment belt.
thane, or:=dhalagaanaesbotage reladag to eensee property, including covert diversion ts) Paser / duress alareas.
audear motsetal er mealeer factedse of special noiser material, radiologient sab.
1 T. Sinoculara.
otase, and overt attacks. The stateenent of
- s. Night vision sids, i.e., hand. fired nausal.
llosased under the Alomic Act of peresived danser should conform with that nauen flares or eeutvalent 1M4. se amended. An esinguards presaulsated ley the Nuclear Resulatory
- s. Tear ses or other nonlethal eas.
condagsasy pies must osatalse(1) e Osmasmission. (The statement annaniaad in
~
prodotermined est of desdalene and antismo to is CPR 78.es(a) or subsequent ca==*'a's l
estisfy edeted objectives. (2) an idend$ cation statemente stu mirnan 3 t
of the data, artteria, procedures, and
- b. Purpose of the Plam-A discussion of 1
mechanisses meesseery to mamminney the semeral alene and opersuonal concepte Implemsat abs desdalene, sed (3) e stipulaties smeertylag h%tation of the plan.
i of the individeal, m er a=g==a==*8==ai
- c. asase of the ytan-A delineauon of the
'F". 'Dennations-A list of terme and
'"""" ***d 1* 'h* plart 4
andty responsible for seek decisina and d
i
{
dennettees used in deserthing operational h goals ofllosasse salugaards and technical aspects of the piart 4
condagemey piene for respealbag to threats.
- 3. Generie Plesnina ases. Under the fol-embohge em:
shnu define the ert uo (1) to orgamine the respemes eSert et the terminataan of responses to safeguards con.
licenses level, tingencies tagether with the epocific deci-i g:
86.
i etmctured eions. actions, and supporting informauon
$ ram (3)to provide i i
paaman by th to safeguarde needed to bring about such responses.
conteng nes
- a. Identificadon of those evente that wt!!,
}
(3) to ensure time lategrades of the licensee be used for magnaikw the beginning or as.
4 wie the "ePosses by other enddes, artenues of a safeguards ennungency ac.
eerding to how they are pereelved initially
)
by licensee's pereennel. Such evente may in.
(4) to addeve a measurable
,--- - = la,,, elude alarme er other indicatione signanns 1
response capability.
E ****"'** *' " "'"*"****,'T,' "'**','fm' I
h safeguark contingency pleaning g
j ehould result in organistap the llamese's emissing er uneesounted for: or threat indi.
j resources la euch a way met the partidpante catisme-either vertal, such as telephoned i will be identt8ed, their several threate, or implied. auch as esenlaung civil l reopensibikties apaasmad and the responses disturbasses.
1 coordaneted.m responses sheeld be thmely.
- b. Denantes of the specific objecov, to be u
r mmad reanuve to each idenuried 4
Itis t to note that a ha====='s event. The objecuve may be to obtain a saf contingency plan is intended les el of awareness about the nature and ee.
ity of the safeguards conungency in l to be --
'-tary to any emergency order to prepare for further responses: to 4
plans developed pursuant to appendix E estabush a leven d respaan preparednam:
1 j
to part 80 or to l 70.22(l) of this chapter.
er to sucesssfuur munify or reduos any ad-verse en.feguare eenseeuemens arisine from 4
she aa. a
- 3. K4eement 7tenadna mass This estesory et laternation aban taehade the factors af-costrarre or Tim ytaar feethe eaat==ar ptannlag that are ape-l Each 11a===== enfeguards aaantat==ay plea eine for eneh feedisty or oneans of transpor eben toelude five ensegernes of informaties.
taties.14 the extent that the topice are
- 1. Backgroung treated in adesunto detan in the u ma o
- 1. Generte Pleasdas Esse approved phyelest security plan, they may
- 3. IJeansee Planning Base be asteorporated by emas mierence to that
- 4. Responsibility Matets plan. 'me foDarts topies should be ad-5.Procedums IJeemsee's Orfan8==naaaai Structum for Although the t==pta-anHay preesdures rwneangman, pa=raaaaa-A delineauon of (the ftfth eategory of Plan information) am the
8=at==Ma
of the planales process.
the erv.aa8=mina='s chala of an=asmand an 4.n.y.es. et authority as these apply to and therefan are an lategret and hacertant safeguards constagsmas==
E part of the enfeguards===**af'a=F pha,
- b. Phyeleal layout-41) Ptsed Sites-A de-they estaa operating estano enhjeet to fro.
eartpuon of the physical structures and S quant changes. 'mer need act be submitted their locauen on the site, and a description to the - for approval. but wiu he of the ette in relause to nearby town, roads, mesessed by NBC staff as a pertedte basie-and other enviremamental features important 11me unseems is ressemente for ensurtas that to the effective esordinause of response op-the '=f'""ma=**=y procedores reseat tame in-eretices. Particular empuaade should be forsmados an the mW Matrts. ap.
placed on ensin and alternate entry routes propetetela ousamartmed and suitably pm" for low enforcement ma=Aasanaa forces and eented for effective use by the resseness the locauen of control pointe for marshal.
enuties.
11ng and coordinaung response activiues.
(!!) Transportation-A description of the vehicles, shipptng routes, preplanned alter-nate route, and stated futura.
73 45 May 31,1995 (foset)
PART 73 o PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF PLAMTS AND MATERIALS
]
- ~
'Arrasstx D-PavstCAL Paotscriost or
~
i
- e. safeguards aretems unidware-A de-88"anarrn.
scriptaon of the physsent security and no.
ImaADIATED Reagos PUEL tm TaAN.
I counung ersteen hardware that innuence At latervals mot ic enceed u maatha the s
TRAINEWe PaosaAM SUSIBCT how the mana== wiu respond to an event,
====p1== of systeens to be discussed an ha===== shall provide for a review of the cosamunianuone, alarms, locks, seals, ares safeguards contingsacy plan by individuals Peruhaat to the preetsien of I73.3T of to aseems, arma=anta, and survetuanos.
is,tapmaama, of boten enourity CpR linrt T3. each useosse who transports
- d. Iaw Enfortement Assistanee-A lisung
- a"I' " "'and W &
h or delitore to a carrier for transport Irradi.
l af rvausbie local law enforesment agonales yfor toticeofthe sted reteter fuel is required to assure that
)
and a descripuon of their response capabin semity pregraan.h revlegr amst ineleds en inevidels used as mMyaant eenerte how eudit of -. t contiegency proosderes connplet4d a tamaning progrant 1he subjects ties and their critetta fo* v' and a that am Ao be instuded la this Isaaatag pro.
discussion of wortLing at..eements or ar.
renseenents for coeur"ana=8 tag with these and pesotices, and an endit of commeltaments sresa are' fousee:
i 4
establiebed for response by local law I
1 agencies-J
- e. Poucy Constraints and ?_-E " - A enforesument methorities.
8""#$8' $"'$"4#
discusaton of State laws, locea ordiamaaan shall h b d
- d j
Nern ucensee responseYtnesden sj and the raaa==amadations of the seingsands l _,,,,,g,T,,,,g,,,
i E contingsacy plan revleur===ga-=*
pies that may be asseussed include:
-h um M aim rouus i
Use of deadly force:
ll; Sadings on whether the enfeguards j
Use of employee property; contingency plan le corrently h and g
madeettogs j
Use of off<luty employees; any actions taham as a result of as j
Site amourity Jurtsdictional bounderles.
'8=== hess prior reviews la a I - Equipsment y
- f. Ad=lasausuve and ragemasama Consider, f* Port to the liceness's plant anamager and to
-status auens-Desertpuans of naa====
praetenes corporate managessent at least one level
-contests Inw enforcemet units h"al""88"" "'r""*
I that may have an infhasees on the response bidst than that havlag rampamandhty der the
-Procedures f reporting IM4=ata to safeguards eenesapaaw ereats. The oss, l
aldersuces ahau include a desertpues of the day-to day plant operatism. N report usest procedures that wiu be used for ensuring be malatalamel is an seditable forus, avellable
- y\\
a --
i that all ee"treamas needed to offeet a sue-for lamp = asia = for a period of a years,
-Desertause of the radioecuve
}
cessful r*Taaaa to a safeguards aaaaaamma,w
-Fumauen and the ship-j wul be ensur aconesible. In good working ping ensks 1
order. and in sufficient supply to provide to.
-Nadiaties dundancy in case of equipment fauure.
-Federal. State local ordi rela-
- 4. Jtesponettuity Matrts. This category of uve to the si t of
~ vesnate-inforetation consists of detaued identitles.
rials 4
a tion of the or ~--" enuuse roepensi-
- =raaadhna 3 ble for each daae=taa and acuan====ad=*ad O with spectfle responses to safeguards ennua-Jtaspense to saaen== Por each Intuating event, a tabula.
-Aeddents aL tion shall be anade for each response entity 3 depleting the masiva===tt of r=TaaadhiHties
_ Severe weather ys % g,,,gg,,,
for all decisions and actions to be taken la response to the intunting event. (Not an en-
-Commausdent.l.ess
,,gg,
titles will have assigned responsitdlities for
_g,, og,,,, gag g gg any given intusung eventa 1he *=Ma*8aaa
,, m,g3 in the Responsibuity Matris eau preetde an oversu picture of the reuse neuer:a 1
and their interntaucaships. Safeguare re-A8'poner to rests aran =ibuities aban be ammigaad in a maname
= Report 4Rg that precludes aaafHee la duties or reagengt.
-Challas for nama,amaan buitsee that would prevent the esecution of
-Use of tamanshausaeang f j
trne plea in any safeguart conungeoey.
-Bestage antanadens a
- 8. Procedures In order to aid execution of
-Avelding===ridaaa si the dataned pies as developed in tu Re-j aponstbuity Matrts, this estagory of infor-mission ahau detaa the acuses to be taken
'the Heemsse is also required assure that i
and dada'a== to be sands by seeh eassaber or armed toeveduals sentes as t es-law en-unit of the organtunues as planned in the 3 earts, other than ensenbers of
<r forenesset aseneiss, have -pa=*ad a weap-Wy Matris.
N een training and quannemanaan progreat J
'=
g equivalent to that required of guards, as de-i
'ss1 bed to m and IV of aaramm 3 of this
$ part, to assure that each eueti Individual is j
{fuDr queufled to uns weapons assigned him.
~
I f
1 I'
i 1
h May 31,1996(reset) 73-48
PART 73 o PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF PLANTS AND MATERIALS I
i i
Appends E-4,usle of phyeumi Prehsame APPEN0ex F-Nations THAT Amt pan-
"Appenes G-Reportable Safeguards Eurite
~
j To Be Applied is Isossestenal Transpese of yiss To THE CONVENTION ON THE 1
Nedeer Meessimi
- Pmuent to the provisions of to Cnt 73.71 PHysacAl. PascTions or M (b) and let licensees subject to the provision.
4 Meheum from Annen I w es Conmuss MATEstiAl. I of to CFR 73J0. 73J7,73.50. 73.58,73 00. and j
j en the physacal pmescem of Nucles' 73.87 shell report er record, as appropriate.
- I F****e*** let ancieer og E
no repened w a one hourof i
"ei43 de'i's seeress to hoewnent d***ery.fo#ewedbya written upon laterne6enal secteer indenst Noten of wi n M ders.
(1) ForColognry IN me seerage seskadam (a) Any event in which there is renon to i
within em\\eres to orbich -
is centround; esih sie beheve that a person has commitsd or IAEA caused. er ettempted to commit or ceuw, or (2) For Colegory E meteri le. enorage withis hee made e credible threat to commit or es oree under caneteet surv9tBeace by
{
seerds er devicec-
' ' by a Brass Ost 17, co m physical wie ahad e of
'881-(1) A theft er unlawful diversion of special k
Mar 2.
neden meterish or i
peines edseerp under ommeral er gulgerte
\\
1g34.
(2) Sipincent physical damese eo e power
- f*** % 8mpduime dphysisel Canade
\\
Mar. 21, seectar er ear facility possessang SSNM or ite Paesehe" \\
\\
test egelpment er carrter egepment transportmg (8)Per I meemplet.
wHhim t'
Apr.
modner fuel er spent medest fuel, or to the e pmeseted deemed for hosry 5. to : :
tees.
g nuclear fuel er spent nuclear fuel a facihty or
\\ -- flepuesc j
g wheek,la sensus is to p g,,,, r-Fett E, e center & ar
~
N (E. Gesmengl. \\
j g pareses whose -_
_ ^ -
home (s)Interrupties of aermal operehon of a 1801.
" liesmeed ancieer power reactor through the i
e deessumined,and le inder %. --
2
\\
1985.
t emeathertsed use of er tempering with its at 8 Gimse<asim Apr. at, e by peere's who ese aimes I wtsh r.cytese gasess.
I
,, esapenenas or controle including emessus hees
\\
Ma,y 4 6e seemity symen.
i ge(
meerm.ekenin[debeenad i
Nov. E, (b) An edeel entry of en unauthorized es eser %
I j
Pmmusa dmay h -- "lof k
iget Ps'een late e protected eres, metenel accese a
piegidige og Agr. y, stem. eentrolled eccese eree, vital eres, or acceae er,
_ remova 3
\\
- igeg, tr===past.
(b)Isvele of physicq'prosecess for g
\\
Nov. 25, (c) Any failwe. degredetion, or the 2
meterial during ' -
- ' tressport i
\\
qggg discoveed vulnereb6bty in a enfeguard system Ind= der
\\
\\
\\
gay g that could allow unauthorised or undetected (1) For Category B ad15 metadale,
\\
\\
ines.
ecosas to e protected eree. material access
~"
I treesperation shop take ender no,we, \\
\\
Aug is, eree. mmerotied eccese arm. vital me. or 1985.
transport for which componeetory snessures
{
f precautions techsdhg errengsmosas Fen. a.
how nea hem employed.
i emens sender. ressever, corner sad Perspar 1
18 (d)'llie actual or atiempted introduction of i
sen'~ set ;'se~
e ma.""i r~= ~ \\
k
=g,8E.
-':=d%'t,~e:' : d::;;,t~'
" botesem W
o,g,n,
\\
\\
e.,ess es m,-*. - in,-
a.m
- me, piece and ps memen 1 g
3,,g
)
% c,,,,, %
\\-
\\
\\sweemn As s.1 II. Ewrits so be recorded win 24 hour:
'88K lR cfdiscoiwry in dar sA(Aruards ewns log.
3 l
eheE take pimen inder %
I lesselted der transponesism of g
\\
- issy, F
2F.
E and IB matectals, and to under esassent sweesianos by assure under
\\
test g
esaasem which essee admee _
Y Mar 14, i
test L
wth appropr6ees suspesos fasons:
i of Soulet Me-temy E (3) For asserelisenha seer than the
'"E farms of are er esosesiden.1 (e) Any feilise, dayedstion, or discovered I""' 'L.
preescalen largeassume M sk.
't valmarehWey in e ". --i system that kgayesms U sheE lesende edeemos
\\
emeld have ellowed essetherteed or omenused senes to e proteced area.
h of shipment ispedhing made of An undese gas of party um espear meurtel seeme ama, emmened accou ama.
transport. expeceed due of arveral and lebet r
tur Senne'speams.
ensmany si sie gen Tsusene en Fesen. Appenes F us h,e - whalama,oramespenhadcomp yeeside go,g
- g,sesey g masadas se oned = mesaan as eu m 3emmumembeenmiehiidwd.
o shi,siimme.
(b Amy asher thsesesmed, ettesepted, or E se==)=iaed ae' an' ev ydeltaedta g Appends G wtth possettel for reducing the sHocttveness of the oefeguarde system below that osemitted esin a hcensed phyeleal security or contingency plan or the octual asedettee of such reduction in 8 See Asymeda C se Due 11e of ets hem eSectiveness.
the physeest dummeyam et lhe asementes d sustser meement es ese sue es Ammen t as she comummesa, yer the ymposes et ele past. the 8 steams amongelse af uselser esamtal ese ayammymans conessry Iis e insmuis quasar af sausagts sysslet musemer esement consowy a h syssess aedser meewoniet
==duees e emens siswamemme er nr esend het sad Cseessry siis syssec museums asesetalafleur t
s**meis -y"*---
73 4T May 31,1995(foset)
PART 73 o PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF Pt NfS AdMATERIALS Appeedix H-Weapons Quah6 cation Crikria
, The B-27 'Iarget or a target of equivalent diHiculty will be used for all weapon qualification testing.
TABLE H-1 MNMUM DAY FIRING CRITERIA 1
[see l'oomotes at and of{atdo H-1) g 8'
Weapon Stage t Stdn0 s Distanos Timing s Poenlon Scodng g
Hendgun 1
\\1 3 yenis..
6 9 seconds
\\ Drew and tre 2 namde (supeal 2 tenimum spassy.
'S
\\ times) 3 eanonde seeh setng.
hg = 70E
\\
2 1
' yenis.
e to seconds Drug and are 2 rounds at center 2
rg and I sowuf at sie head
(
' ance) s esconds each sadne.
3 1
7 e
12 seconds (4 using hand only, tem the 2
seconde sedi tour seedy em 2 nanute 3
setng).
(repost 4
1 10 yards 2
4 seconds Drew and to 2 come to h*'
lowready 2
to yenis 2
3 seconds.
Fire 2 rounds from seedy pool-San and rehotsesr.
\\
3 10 yards 4
12 seconds (m.
Drew and tre 2 munds, tre volver) 10 sec.
2 rounds and mheister onds (esm6 E
eucomenc).
4 to yenes.
2 4
Dew and tre 2 sounds. come low ready poeulon.
g' 5
10 yenis 2
3 Fire 2 rounds tem low ready po6 3
ton and rehoisesr.
5 1
15 yenis.
2 5
Sewusng, absur weapon, move to imesang posson, tien tre 2 rounds and renalsser 2
15 yenis 2
5 seconds.
Staruhig, theur usepen, enovo to ineske poeman, then Om 2 sounds and rehotsler.
5 3
15 yenis 4
14 seconds (m-ches mespan, tre 2 henimurn woher) 12 eso.
- nove e ineseng posk in0 "
ands (semk
. and to 2 sounds, seload automasc).
and
,15 yenis 2
5 seconde Drew and tre 2 sounds oome to ice ready po-sinon 5
15 2
3 esconde Fire 2 tow seedy.
4 1
25 2
5 seconde Dour and are pouruss, sannigne, left olde of 2
25 yenis 2
5 seconds Drew and tro 2 dpd side of hentoede 3
25 yenis 4
15 seconds (so-Drew insepan move tem vener> 12 eso.
sesumig m :_ n
, em ende (eere 2 rourues, ist side
- bentoads, automage).
reload, and hem inesing poenlon, to 2 munds, side or manioede.
4 25 yards 2
1 seconds Drder weapon and move mandhg a m, em 2 rowide.
5 25 yens 2
to one weseen and an e som avanng a pens, no 2 nanum.
7 1
50 yents 2
0 Dreur weapon and are 2 munds ham a steruhg bentende pook son (nght or tem ekte, shooew's opton).
Muy 31,1995(reset) 7344
Notica of Viol: tion Because your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR), to the extent possible, it should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be placed in the PDR without redaction. However, if you find it necessary to include such information, you should clearly indicate the specific information that you desire not to be placed in the PDR, and provide the legal basis to support your request for withholding the information frorn the public.
l OFFICIAL RECORD COPY j
.i Notica of Viol: tion.
B.
Condition 13 of License No. 29-04236-01 requires, in part, that sealed sources stored for a period of more than 10 years be tested for leakage and/or l
contamination.
1 i
Contrary to the above, as of December 11,1996, several sealed sources containing between 370 microcuries and 1.96 curies of byproduct material had not been tested for leakage and/or contamination within the past 10 years.
1 Specifically, the licensee's sealed sources numbered B1, B3, G1-GS, G7-G9, G11, G16, and G29 had not been tested for leakage in the past ten years.
t This is a Severity Level IV violation. (Supplement VI)
C.
Condition 20 of License No. 29-04236-01 requires, in part, that licensed material be possessed and used in accordance with statements, representations and procedures contained in a letter dated December 26,1990.
Item 3 of the letter requires that coruamination surveys, survey meter readings, and wipe test data of the sealed gamma and beta sources in use be performed every six months.
Contrary to the above, as of December 11,1996, survey meter readings around sealed gamma sources in use were not performed every six months.
Specifically, surveys around the cesium 137 sealed sources in use were last conducted on February 3,1996, and surveys around the cobalt-60 sealed source in use were last conducted on February 20,1993. The cesium-137 i
4 sources were last used on November 27,1996 and the cobalt-60 source was last used on May 7,1996.
i This is a Severity Level IV violation. (Supplement VI)
Pursuant to the provisions o' 10 CFR 2.201, Nuclear Research Corporation is hereby f
j required to submit a written statement or explanation to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory j
Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555, with a copy to the Regional Administrator, Region I, within 30 days of the date of the letter transmitting this Notice of Violation (Notice). This reply should be clearly marked as a l
" Reply to a Notice of Violation" and should include for each violation: (1) the reason for the violation, or, if contested, the basis for disputing the violation, (2) the l
corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved, (3) the corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further violations, and (4) the date when full i
compliance will be achieved. Your response may reference or include previous docketed correspondence, if the correspondence adequately addresses the required response. If an adequate reply is not received within the time specified in this Notice, 5
an order or a Demand for Information may be issued as to why the license should not 4
be modified, suspended, or revoked, or why such other action as may be proper j
should not be taken. Where good cause is shown, consideration will be given to l
extending the response time.
l OFFICIAL RECORD COPY 4
i
)
J
NOTICE OF VIOLATION Nuclear Research Corporation Docket No. 030-05302 Dover, New Jersey License No. 29-04236-01 During an NRC inspection conducted on December 10 and 11,1996, violations of NRC requirements were identified. In accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," (Enforcement Policy),
NUREG 1600, the violations are listed below:
A.
Conditions 8 and 12 of License No. 29-04236-01 limit, in part, the amount of byproduct material with half lives greater than 120 days that may be possessed at any one time to a total of 10' times the quantity specified in Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 30.
Contrary to the above, as of December 11,1996, the licensee possessed radioactive material with half lives greater than 120 days in excess of 10' times the quantity specified in Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 30. (The limit for cobalt-60 is 1 millicurie [ mci] and for cesium-137 is 10 mci). Specifically, while sealed sources are specifically listed on the license, the following sealed sources were not specifically listed or. the license and were in excess of the limit described above:
Licensee's #
isotope Activity (mci)
G1 Cobalt-60 6.87
{
G2 Cobalt-60 0.43
~
G3 Cobalt-60 0.37 G4 Cobalt-60 0.43 G5 Cobalt-60 1.32 G6 Cobalt-60 0.001 G7 Cobalt-60 0.93 G8 Cobalt-60 0.43 G9 Cobalt-60 1.27 G11 Cobalt-60 325.70 G12 Cobalt-60 0.07 G13 Cobalt-60 0.15 G14 Cesium-137 82.49 G15 Cesium-137 0.47 G20 Cesium-137 0.46 G29 Cesium-137 1965.23 This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement VI).
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY 9701170239 970113 PDR ADOCK 03005302 C
Robert K. Shumway North American inspection, Inc.
Distribution:
PUBLIC Nuclear Safety information Center (NSIC)
Region i Docket Room (w/ concurrences)
DOCUMENT NAME: R:\\WPS\\MLDL\\L3723370.01 To receive a copy of this document, Indicate in the boa:
"C" = Copy w/o attach /enci "E" = Copy w/ attach /enci "N" = No copy OFFICE DNMS/RI lN DNMS/RI l
l l
n NAME Arredondo (#
Johansen $ /
DATE 01/10/97
/)
01/p /97/'/ 7 01/ /97 01/ /97 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
l
)
- l l;
North American Inspection, Inc.
i l
Docket No.:
030-20982/96-001
)
License No.:
'37-23370-01 Date:
December 30, 1996 j
l l
APPENDIX A
RESPONSE
I I
Page #1 l
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