ML20153F569

Part 21 Rept Suppl Re Cracks Discovered in Crosby Valve & Gage Co Safety Valve Guide & Bearing Assemblies.Initially Reported on 870507.Audit of Crosby Design & Mfg Controls Indicated Inconclusive Results.Assemblies Being Replaced

ML20153F569
Person / Time
Site:	San Onofre
Issue date:	08/10/1988
From:	Baskin K SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON CO.
To:	Martin J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
References
REF-PT21-88, REF-PT21-88-105-000 PT21-88-105, PT21-88-105-000, NUDOCS 8809070340
Download: ML20153F569 (2)

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August 10, 1988 U. 5. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region V 1450 Maria Lane, Suite 210 Walnut Creek, CA 94596-5368 Attention: Mr. J. B. Martin, Regional Administrator

Subject:

Docket Nos. 50-361 and 50-362 10CFR21 Notification Supplement Deviatior. Involving Crosby Valve & Gage Company Safety Valve Guide and Bearing Assemblies San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station Units 2 and 3 By letter dated May 7, 1987, we advised you of a condition considered reportable in accordance with 10CFR21.21. The condition involved cracks discovered in spare safety valve guide and bearing assemblies in storage at the San Onofre warehouse.

These assemblies were supplied by Crosby Valve & Gage Company, Wrentham, Masst.chusetts (Part Number S49037) and are utilized in our San Onofre Units 2 and 3 main steam safety valves, Crosby No. 6R10 EA-75-FN.

Our May 7, 1987 letter indicated that the root cause evaluation for the cracking was continuing and would include SCE's evaluation of the circumstances in the warehouse which may have contributed to thic condition.

The SCE evaluation included a review of warehouse / receiving inspection practices and documentation, and an audit of Crosby's design and manufacturing controls for the valve guide and bearing assemblies. The evbluation of the warehouse / receiving inspection activities concluded that there were no problems in these areas which could have contributed to the cracXing condition. The audit of Crosby's design and manufacturing controls indicated inconclusive results due to the fact that:

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Mr. J. B. Martin August 10, 1988 (1) Crosby does not consider these components to be critical, (2) the assemblies are manufactured under their commercial grade program, and (3) Crosby does not retain pertinent manufacturing, procurement, and inspection records for the assemblies unless specific customer requirements for records preparation and retention are requested in the purchase order. For the assemblies procured by SCE for San Onofre Units 2 and 3 no specific records requirements were estat11shed in the purchase order beyond the requirement to sulait a Certificate of Conformance.

Corrective action has been taken by SCE to replace the nonconforming assemblies in the warehouse and installed in the plant. The following is being taken to preclude future problems:

The qualification status of Crosby has been revised to assure that future procurements of valve guide and bearing assemblies (and any other parts SCE considers safety related and essential to valve function) are controlled in

) accordance with Crosby's nuclear quality assurance program.

• Procurement ordering information has been revised to require performance of nondestructive examination of the guide and bearing assemblies as part of SCE receiving inspection at

, San Onofre to determine the absence of cracks.

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Maintenance procedures have been revised to require i performance of nondestructive examination of the guide and

! bearing assemblies when the disassembly of the valve is required for other reasons.

This report constitutes our final submittal on this matter.

Sincerely, Mno *v' cc: F. R. Huey, Senior Resident Inspector J. J. Greene, Quality Assurance Manager, Crosby Valve and Gage Company