IR 05000295/1988006

Insp Repts 50-295/88-06 & 50-304/88-07 on 880208-11.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Emergency Preparedness Program,Including Licensee Action on Previously Identified Areas & Emergency Plan Activations

ML20149N006
Person / Time
Site:	Zion  File:ZionSolutions icon.png
Issue date:	02/23/1988
From:	Ploski T, Matthew Smith, Snell W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20149M999	List: IR 05000295/1988006 ML20149M998
References
50-295-88-06, 50-295-88-6, 50-304-88-07, 50-304-88-7, NUDOCS 8802290376
Download: ML20149N006 (13)

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COWiISSION

REGION III

Reports' No.' 50-295/88006(DRSS); 50-304/88007(DRSS)

Docket Nos. 50-295; 50-304 Licenses No. DPR-39; DPR-48 Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company Post Office Box 767-Chicago, IL 60690 Facility Name: Zion Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At: Zion Site, Zion, Illinois Inspection Conducted: February 8-11, 1988 Inspectors:

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T. Ploski

[  ;; Date h >M H. Smith ?lU/ST Date Approved By: W a$ hief 2M2/sm '

Emergency Preparedness Section Date '

-Inspection Summary Inspection on Febri!sry 8-11, 1988 (Reports No. 50-295/88006(DRSS);

, No. 50-304/88007(DRSS))

i Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of the following areas of the emergency preparedness program: licensee action on previously identified items; emergency plan activations; operational status of the emergency

! preparedness program; emergency detection and classification; protective i action decision making; shift staffing and augmentation; training; and l licensee audits. The inspection involved two NRC inspectors.

l Results: No violations of NRC requirements were identified.

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DETAILS 1. Persons Contacted

• G. Plim1,. Station Manager

• P.-LeBlond, Rad Chem Supervisor

• W. Stone, Regulatory Assurance Supervisor

• A. Nykiel, GSEP Coordinator

• W. Cramer, Support Training-Group Leader

• G. Olson, QA Engineer W. Otterson, GSEP Training Instructor L. Lanes, Support Training Group Instructor T. Cox, Support Training Group Instructor K. Bennett, Shift' Engineer (SE)

S. Kaplan,' Station Control Room Engineer (SCRE)

W. Brenner, Emergency Planning Supervisor W. Beecher, Technical Staff Projects Group D. Dumbacher, Technical Staff Projects Group H. Zimmerman, Corporate Emergency Planning Staff R. Palatine, Technical Staff

• Indicates those who attended the February 11, 1988 exit intervie . Licensee Action on Previously-Identified Item

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(Closed) f, pen Item No. 295/85008-04 and 304/85009-04: There was inadequate procedural guidance regarding how environmental monitoring teams would accomplish personal and vehicle decontamination tasks. An appropriate procedure (EG-10), comman to all of the licensee's nuclear generating stations, has been revised to include adequately detailed instructions for monitoring teams and their controllers regarding the accomplishment of personal and vehicle decontamination task This item i is close (Closed) Unresolved Item No. 304/87002-01: Due to a records misplacement ,

problem, evaluation of the adequacy of initial offsite notifications following a February 1987 emergency plan activation could not be complete The licensee obtained copies of the missing notification forms from the States of Illinois and Wisconsin. '.he situation was correctly classified as an Unusual Even Initial notifications to State agencies were adequately completed. This item is close (Closed) Open Item No. 295/87002-01 and 304/87002-02: The licensee must revise appropriate Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIPs) so that guidance for the OSC, Technical and Operations Directors reflects all their duties and responsibilities as summarized in the GSEP. The relevant procedures had been revised and adequately reflected all position responsibilitie This item is close . ._ _ -

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(0 pen) Open Item No. 295/87002-02 and 304/87002-03: .To better ensure adequate 24-hour staffing capability in the TSC, the licensee should identify at least three qualified persons for each Station Group Director a'

position. Also, for.the consolidated Maintenance /0SC Director position, more than four persons must be identifie Based on a review of the curient onsite emergency organization callout procedure (EPIP 320-1) and training records, at least three qualified individuals were available for all Station Group director-level positions, with the exception of the Security Director positio A third Security: Director candidate had been identified, but was scheduled for training later in the first quarter of 198 Also, four persons were identified as Maintenance Directors, while three other persons were listed as Operational Support Center (OSC) Directors. This item will .

remain open, pending addition of a third qualified Security Director to the callout procedur (Closed) Open Item No. 295/87002-03 and 304/87002-04: The onsite emergency organization callout procedure (EPIP 320-1) must list additional TSC communicators and support staff to the Station Grou Based on a review of EPIP 320-1 and training records, six persons had been-qualified as staff-level communicators assigned to the Station Director's Communicator. The GSEP Coordinator indicated that the e communicators, who were Training Department staff, were also ex, .ted to

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fulfill such support functions as messengers. This item is close (Closed) Open Item No. 295/87007-04 and 304/87009-04: During the 1987 exercise, approved procedures were not utilized by persons operating counting equipment in the "PARAPS Room". Procedure ZCP 711-5 has been approve It contained guidance on the uso of equipment in the PARAPS Roo This item is close ,

(0 pen) Open Items No. 295/87007-01, 02, 03, 05 and 304/87009-01, 02, L 03, 05: These items relate to the performance of certain inplant teams  ;

and offsite monitoring teams during the June 1987 exercis The i licensee's planned corrective actions on these concerns involved additional training during the annual requalification training given to Radiation Chemistry Technicians (RCTs). This training had been scheduled

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to take place following a 10-week outage beginning in late February 198 These items remain open pending evaluation of these training effort . Followup on NRC Information Notice No. 87-58

. (Closed) Item No. 295/87900-01 and 304/87900-01: This notice is addressed to all nuclear power reactor facilities having an operating license, and emphasizes the regulatory requirement that the licensee must maintain adequate personnel on shift to permit continuous communications with the NRC following an emergency declaration without diminishing the e capability to place the reactor in a safe shutdown conditio ,

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Based on records review and discussions with cognizant licensee staff, it was determined that an on-shift, non-licensed operator (Radwaste Foreman)

has been assigned responsibility for assisting Control Room personnel by functioning as a communicator to the NRC following an emergency declaratio In the Technical Support Center (TSC), the licensee has procedurally identified and trained personnel to fill the Station Director's Communicator and staff level communicator positions. These persons can be utilized to continuously maintain' communications with the NRC or other offsite agencies from that facilit In the Emergency Operations Facility, the licensee has procedurally identified and trained personnel for the Emergency Notification System (ENS) Communicator positio This item is close . Emergency Plan Activations NRC and licensee records associated with all emergency plan activations between February 1, 1987 and January 15, 1988 were reviewed. These ;

records included: Licensee Event Reports (LERs); records generated b "

NRC Duty Officers; Control Room logs; Nuclear Accident Reporting System (NARS) forms completed following each emergency declaration; and evaluations of each activation that were performed by the Generating Stations Emergency Plan (GSEP) Coordinato During this time period, on-shif t personnel correctly classified four Unusual Events. Based on the LER review, there were no other classifiable events through mid-January 1988. Initial notifications to Illinois, Wisconsin, and NRC officials were completed within the regulatory time limits following each declaratio Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program was <

acceptabl . Operational Status of the Emergency Preparedness Program (82701) Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedures (Also 82204)

By letter dated June 19, 1987, the NRC approved Revision 6 to the Zion Annex to the generic GSEP, with one exception. That exception

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was the revised evacuation time estimates that were incorporated into the Zion Annex. The revised estimates were much more reasonable compared to those previously available; however, the methodology used to compute these revised estimates was outdate Interim use of the revised estimates was permitted, with the understanding that their reasonableness would be verified by completing an evacuation time estimate study for the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) based on current methodologie On February 3,1988, the licensee submitted such a revised study in preliminary form. State and local government officials had not yet

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completely reviewed and approved the study. NRC evaluation of the study will commence once it has been approved by the appropriate'

offsite official A random review of changes to the Zion Station's EPIPs was conducted. All changes had been reviewed, approved and distributed in accordance with licensee procedures. Copies of changes to the plan and its implementing procedures were sent to appropriate individuals and organizations in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(q)

requirements. The random review of changes to the procedures included EPIPs changes suggested as improvement items in the 1987 routine inspectio The licensee reviewed these improvement items and adopted them into their procedures during 198 A review of the EPIPs indicated that none summarized the undelegatable responsibilities of the Station Director (SD) and Acting Station Directo During an interview with a Shift Engineer (SE) and Station Control Engineer (SCRE), both exhibited some uncertainty whether these responsibilities included authorizing emergency worker exposures for life-saving or vital equipment saving tasks. While these exposure limits were listed in EPIP 370-1,

"Rescue and Recovery," no mention was made that authorizing such exposures was an undelegatable responsibility of the Station Director or Acting Station Directo Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program was acceptable; however, the following item should be considered for improvement:

• The three undelegatable responsibilities of the Station Director and Acting Station Director should be summarized in one or more appropriate EPIPs.

I b. Emergency Facilities, Equipment, Instrumentation and Supplies (Also 82203, 82204)

l l A review of Rad Chem inventory records for 1987 revealed that all required monthly and quarterly inventories of onsite and offsite emergency kits were completed per licensee procedures and NRC

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requirements. The GSEP Coordinator indicated that his approval j signature was being added to the inventory forms to give him better awareness of this aspect of the emergency preparedness progra Licensee communication test records were reviewed and evaluated as follows:

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• The annual test of all communication equipment was conducted on February 10, 1987, and was successful.

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• Quarterly tests of GSEP communication equipment were conducted in February, May, August, and November of 1987, and were successfu * Monthly tests of the ENS, HPN, NARS, and NAWAS telephones were successfully conducted during 198 All tests were conducted according to licensee procedures and met

'NRC requirement Any equipment malfunctions were reported and promptly repaire The onsite and offsite Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs) were as demonstrated during the June 1987 exercise. By letter dated December 1, 1987, the Commission approved the licensee's request to designate the Corporate Command Center in downtown Chicago as the Zion Station's Backup Emergency Operations Facility (E0F), in lieu of a smaller, lesser equipped facility in Libertyville, Illinoi The licensee's request had been found acceptable by the States of Illinois and Wisconsin, and NRC Region II An inspector toured the Control Room, TSC, and EOF. Emergency communications equipment was in place at the Control Room's center desk, along with adequate copies of the Nuclear Accident Reporting System (NARS) form utilized to document initial messages to the States, and a reference copy of the NRC's Event Notification Workshee The layout of the TSC was unchanged from that used during the 1987 exercise, including workstations and telephones i available for the NRC's Expanded Site Team. The internal layout of-the EOF was unchanged from that used in the last exercise. While EOF provisions for additional telephone lines for NRC were in place, the extra telephones were not installe The toured ERFs were being adequately maintained in an operational state of readiness, with the exception of the E0 Subsequent to the mid-1987 exercise, the licensee determined that the operability

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of the E0F's emergency ventilation system and Particulate, Iodine, and Noble Gas (PING) radiation detector were both highly suspec Corrective actions were well underway before and during this inspection. A vendor had recently verified that the operability of the ventilation system's recirculation mode was adequate. A purchase order had been written for improved inspection and maintenance of the E0F building's ventilation system, including its recirculation mod The licensee planned to add periodic evaluation of the E0F's ventilation system to the Station's surveillance progra The inspector observed a meeting between Station and Corporate staffs and vendor representatives regarding the status of the PIN The device was out of calibration and essentially unable to perform its intended function. The preliminary evaluation also led to the conclusions that: a number of the PING's components should

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be examined in greater detail and replaced or upgraded, as needed, to better ensure long-term operability; the sample line from the ventilation system's ductwork to the PING's detectors should probably be reconfigured due to its having three, 90-degree bends; and, an upgrade should be made so that the ventilation system would automatically switch to the recirculation mode should sufficiently high radiation levels be detected in the ambient air being drawn into the ventilation system. The vendor agreed to promptly provide the-licensee with time and cost estimates for the various repair and upgrace options that were discusse The licentee must periodically test the operation of the E0F's emergency ventilation system and associated radiation detection equipmen Such tests should be documented, with provisions that any corrective actions be initiated in a timely manne This is an Open Item (295/88006-01). Until the adequate operability of the E0F's PING can be demonstrated, the licensee must develop interim measures for continually assessing the habitability of the E0F and must implement these measures whenever this ERF has been activate This is an Open Item (295/88006-02).

The licensee was proceeding with plans to construct a new TSC, with a current completion date of June 1989 that was considered somewhat optimisti The new TSC will be located at ground level at the northeast corner of the Turbine Building. An alternate location to the north of the gatehouse had been dropped for space limitation reasons. The TSC will be about 60 feet by 112 feet in size, and will be similar in layout to the 435 foot elevation of the TSCs at the Byron and Braidwood Stations. However, the new TSC will not have a computer roo The "monitor room," where the Station Group directors' workstations will be located, will be sufficiently large for 28 full-time occupants, each having 75 square feet of spac These occupants were considered to be 20 licensee staff, five NRC Site Team personnel, and three State of Illinois staf Separate offices were also identified for NRC and State of Illinois staffs in i the preliminary layout drawing. The licensee had not yet made a final decision regarding a "reliable br.ckup" versus "uninterruptible" redundant power supply to the TS Based on the above findings, two Open Items were identifie c. Organization and Management Control (Also 82204)

Since the last routine inspection, the GSEP Coordinator's reporting chain to the Station Manager was changed by the substitution of the

! Rad Chem Supervisor fo. che Regulatory Assurance Superviso This ( revised reporting chain was consistent with that found at the i licensee's other nuclear stations. The coordinator was no longer assigned as the Station Goals Coordinator or the Human Performance Evaluation System Coordinator. Instead, the coordinator had

! recently been appointed as a liaison, for corporate environmental affairs staff and local government planning committees, regarding

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information on the onsite storage of hazardous chemicals in accordance with Title III of the Superfund Reauthorization Act This additional duty was not anticipated to be very time-consuming, and appeared relevant to the coordinator's role as the primary onsite source of emergency planning expertis During parts of 1986 and 1987, various members of the corporate emergency planning staff conducted quarterly reviews of the GSEP Coordinators' routine activities at all six nuclear station Such announced visits were discontinued during 1987 in favor of having the coordinators functionally report to corporate emergency planning supervision through a "Corporate GSEP Coordinator," a position that was not yet fille This corporate coordinator would also have liaison responsibilities with Production Training Center staff involved in developing generic emergency preparedness training materials and in conducting much of the training of the licensee's offsite emergency organization. The licensee has continued the practice of conducting GSEP Coordinator counterpart meeting ,

Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program was acceptabl d. Emergency Preparedness Training (Also 82206)

Based on a review of Training Department records and discussions with the GSEP Training Instructor, it was determined that all members of the onsite emergency organization had successfully completed their 1987 training requirement With the exception of persons added to the emergency organization since the mid-1987 exercise, the bulk of the annual training had taken place prior to that exercise. The training had been conducted in a manner analogous to that which occurred in 1986. Training was a mixture of classroom seasons on relevant modules, as determined by Training Department and Production Training Center (PTC) staffs; required readings; and examinations. Personnel were allowed the option of completing the readings and passing an examination without attending training sessions, in accordance with a current corporate directiv During early 1987, representatives from all of the licensee's nuclear stations and the PTC had agreed that onsite emergency organization personnel would receive future training based on: an approved set of modules; an approved matrix defining the modules relevant to each position; and approved examinations. These modules had been initially developed by PTC staff and later refined by Braidwood Station staff. Training Department staff from each Station were to modify the standardized modules, as necessary, to incorporate site-specific detail Due, in part, to the mid-1987 exercise date, site-specific modification of the standardized modules was in progress at Zion during early 1988. The GSEP Coordinator and Training Instructor were both involved in reviewing the modules and identifying where to add site-specific details. At the time of this inspection, the 1988 training program for Zion

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Station was planned to consist of a combination of required readings; training sessions utilizing the site-specific versions of the standardized modules; and examinations. A firm training schedule was not available. However, the vast majority of the annual training would take place sometime after a 10-week outage scheduled to begin in late February 1988. The 1988 onsite. emergency organization training program must be conducted utilizing a matrix of positicn specific training requirements, modules, and examinations -

all of which aust have the requisite prior approvals. -This is an Open Item (295/88006-03).

During January and February 1987, the licensee's medical contractor had provided additional training to about 36 Radiation Chemistry Technicians (RCTs) and 15 supervisory personnel on the onsite and offsite handling of a contaminated, injured individua The training addressed interfacing with hospital staff and prioritizing medical versus contamination control concerns onsite. The annual Medical Drill was conducted in August 1987. Based on the nature and number of drill critique comments, the onsite radiological control performence was considered to be unsatisfactory by the inspector A Quality Assurance (QA) surveillance of this drill correctly identified one problem due to a temporary communications breakdown between personnel at the accident scene and the Control Roo However, the performance of drill participants with respect to onsite radiological controls was not adequately addressed in the surveillance repor The internal critique report, dated August 31, 1987, correctly stated that, had the drill been real, no actions had been taken which would have endangered the victim's life, r However, the report also included a statement that the sorts of problems identified during the drill were acceptable in a training exercise. Since a drill is a learning experience, identified problems should be acted upon to avoid recurrence-in a real situation or in a future drill, rather than being dismissed as

"acceptable." The licensee must ensure that corrective actions are completed on the onsite radiological control problems evident in the 1987 Medical Drill critiqu This is an Open Item (295/88006-04). i Records review fr.dicated that the annual environmental monitoring drill, two post-accident sample collection drills, and an inplant Health Physics drill had been conducted, adequately critiqued, and documented during 198 In addition to the Open Items, the following items should be considered for improvement:

• The licensee should include, as an exercise objective, a demonstration of oroper contamination control provisions for an onsite accident victim during the 1988 utility-only exercis ,

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• A scenario involving a contaminated / injured onsite victim requiring offiste medical treatment should be added to several 1988 and 1989 exercises involving offsite support agency participatio Independent Reviews and Audits (Also 82210)

The annual independent review of the emergency preparedness program was adequately performed for 1987. The independent review consisted of an audit of the program by Quality Assurance (QA) staff based at the Zion Station, an audit of portions of the program by QA staff based at other licensee locations, and a number of QA surveillances of the program. The two audits satisfied the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(t), with the exception of evaluating the adequacy of offsite interfac The need to evaluate the adequacy of the Station's interface with offsite support groups was already a line item in the 1988 Zion Station audit schedule. Following discussions with the GSEP Coordinator and the QA Supervisor, a special surveillance of the offsite interface was adequately conducted and documented prior to the exit meeting. This special surveillance was accepted as part of the 1987 QA review of the emergency preparedness program for Zion Station, and was determined to fulfill the 1987 requirement to evaluate the adequacy of offsite agency interfac The onsite QA staff performed six surveillances during 198 These surveillances includr.d observation of an Environs Drill, a Medical Orill, Shift Augmentation Drill, use of Emergency Response Facilities during the Federal Full Field Exercise (FFE), and the performance of a field monitoring team during the FF The inspector discussed the corrective action program with the GSEP Coordinator and reviewed tracking system records. The coordinator had the responsibility for deciding which items identified during drills, exercises, audits, and NRC inspections should be placed on the Station's tracking syste This tracking of corrective actions on identified items was also monitored by the Office Superviso Evidence of improved responsiveness to NRC concerns is demonstrated by the closure of a number of open items in this report, and the responsiveness to leprovement items identified in 1987 inspection report Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's rogram was acceptabl . Emergency Detection and Classification (82201)

In October 1986, the licensee submitted a major revision to the Zion Station's Emergency Action Levels (EALs) and a supporting "PWR EAL Philosophy" document. Following a period of review, discussion, and resolution of the staff's concerns on these EALs, the NRC approved the revised EALs by correspondence dated March 31, 198 The new EALs were

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proceduralized in April 198 Records review indicated that appropriate members of the licensee's'onsite emergency organization had been trained on the new EALs prior to the June 1987 exercis A-SE and a SCRE were interviewed regarding their emergency preparedness responsibilitie Both persons' exhibited adequate familiarity with the proceduralized EALs and correctly classified several abnormal plant situations described by the inspector. Both individuals were also adequately familiar with the requirements for initially notifying State and NRC officials following any emergency declaratio Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program was acceptabl . Protective Action Decisionmaking (82202)

Procedural guidance related to onsite and offsite protective action decisionmaking was consisted with that contained in the approved GSEP and Zion Annex. The SE and SCRE interviewed during this inspection were adequately familiar with onsite assembly and accountability requirements and emergency worker exposure limits. They knew that an offsite protective action recommendation was required following any General Emergency declaration. They were able to use procedural guidance to formulate correct offsite protective action recommendations when given several different release rate or containment status situation Based on the aoose findings, this portion of the licensee's program was acceptabl . Siiitt Staffing and Augmentation (82205)

The licensee's provisions for the minimum shift staff and for augmenting this staff were found to meet the goals of Table B-1 of NUREG-0654, Revision 1. Provisions for onsite staff augmentation for each emergency-lass were adequately described in the GSEP and its implementing nrocedure The Station's callout procedure, EPIP 320-1, has been updated at a quarterly frequency by the GSEP Coordinator. Procedure revisions have been issued in mid quarter. Administrative mechanisms were used so that the GSEP Coordinator was kept adequately informed of the training status of onsite emergency organization candidates and members. As indicated in Section 2 of the report, the licensee has generally been responsive to several staffing concerns raised during the 1987 routine inspection, as evidenced by the addition of more director-level personnel and six staff-level communicators to the callout procedur Only one candidate had not yet completed all training requirements for the Security Director position. That individual was scheduled to be added to the next revision of the callout procedure, which would then list at least three qualified persons for each director position, to better ensure adequate 24-hour staffing capability.

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The licensee conducted semi-annual, off-hours drills during 1987, which successfully demonstrated the capability to augment onshift personnel with TSC director-level personnel. The OSC Director position, TSC communicators and other technical support staff were not included in these augmentation drill Based on the above findings, this position of the licensee's program was acceptable; however, the following item should be considered for improvement:

• .The licensee should include the OSC Director position, several staff-level TSC communicators, and other TSC technical support staff in future off-hours augmentation drill . Preliminary Assessment of ERF Provisions for the NRC Expanded Site Team Requirements for workspace and communications equipment for NRC emergency responders located in licensee ERFs predate the Expanded Site Team concept, as described in IE Information Notice No. 86-18, "NRC-On-Scene Response During a Major Emergency." Thus, an Expanded Site Team may find it difficult to fulfill its statutory responsibilities from licensee ERFs due to workspace and communications equipment limitations, although the licensee's provisions for an initial on-scene NRC presence would be in compliance with current space and equipment requirements. Therefore, Region III staff are assessing the adequacy of ERFs for an Expanded Site Team's needs. Should an ERF be considered adequate with respect to requirements for an initially small Site Team, but lack sufficient workspace and/or communications equipment for an Expanded Site Team, regional management may elect to negotiate for additional provisions on a case-by-case basis. Assessment of the Zion Station's ERFs for an Expanded Site Team's needs is somewhat unique, as such an !!RC contingent operated from these facilities during the 1987 Federal Full Field Exercise (FFE-2). '

Provisions for the Expanded Site Team within the TSC were unchanged from those available during FFE-2. The Shift Engineer's (SE's) office would serve as a meeting room for the team's TSC contingent. The room was ~

equipped with an operable Health Physics Network (HPN) telephone, and two touch-tone telephones which had three plant extensions and two commercial lines reserved for NRC use. The second HPN telephone was located near the licensee's dose assessment workspace in the TS The majority of the key TSC staff would work from a number of small desks arranged to form a large rectangular wurkspace. Desk space for the NRC's counterparts to the licensee's Station and Rad Chem Directors was

provided adjacent to these directors' locations. The touch-tone telephone provided for the Station Director's counterpart was linked to the same plant and commercial lines as the telephones in the SE's office. A fourth plant extension was provided for the Rad Chem Director's NRC counterpart, while a fifth extension was available for the Resident Inspector's use in the TSC. As design and construction of the new TSC progresses, the licensee was willing to accommodate NRC counterpart seating and NRC telephone desires analogous to those provided in the present TS '

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Space and telephone line: provisions for NRC use in the E0F were unchanged from FFE-2, with the exception that most of the telephones for NRC use were not installed in the facility's large meeting roo HPN telephones were located near the licensee's dose assessment staff's workspace and in the large meeting room. Five commercial telephone lines and one plant extension for NRC use were available and operable in the E0F's meeting room. The telephones were the touch-tone variet The Joint Public Information Center was not visited during this inspectio . Exit Interview On February 11, 1988, the inspectors met with those licensee representatives identified in Section 1 to present and discuss their preliminary findings. The licensee agreed to consider the items discussed and indicated that none were proprietary in natur .

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