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Category:REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE REPORT (SEE ALSO AO LER)
MONTHYEARML20077B4731991-05-10010 May 1991 Ro:On 910507,operator Failed to Perform Surveillances & Channel Tests for All 6 Scram Channels & 2 Interlocks Prior to Reactor Operation.Caused by Personnel Error. Tailgate Meeting Held & Mods to Hardware Initiated BECO-86-173, Partially Withheld Security Event Rept:On 861107,HVAC Duct, Penetrating Vital Area,Removed by Contracted Craft Workers Before Notifying Security.Cause Not Stated.Security Oversight of Subj Contract Work Intensified1986-11-12012 November 1986 Partially Withheld Security Event Rept:On 861107,HVAC Duct, Penetrating Vital Area,Removed by Contracted Craft Workers Before Notifying Security.Cause Not Stated.Security Oversight of Subj Contract Work Intensified BECO-86-171, Partially Withheld Security Event Rept:On 861106,temporary Vital Area Barrier Insp Found Barrier Could Be Breached. Barrier Modified & Compensatory Security Measures Released1986-11-10010 November 1986 Partially Withheld Security Event Rept:On 861106,temporary Vital Area Barrier Insp Found Barrier Could Be Breached. Barrier Modified & Compensatory Security Measures Released ML20211E0731986-09-26026 September 1986 Unplanned Operating Event Rept 85-6, Manual Reactor Trip Following MSIV Closure Due to Inadvertent Emergency Feedwater Actuation,851009 BECO-86-125, Partially Withheld Security Event Rept:On 860826,bomb Threat Received.Search Initiated.No Suspicious Objects Found1986-08-29029 August 1986 Partially Withheld Security Event Rept:On 860826,bomb Threat Received.Search Initiated.No Suspicious Objects Found ML20238E4601986-08-28028 August 1986 Partially Withheld Secrity Event Rept:On 860824,bomb Threat Received for Plants.Bomb Search Initiated.No Suspicious Objects Found ML20212Q6971986-08-26026 August 1986 Ro:On 860821,during Prestartup,Source Interlock Operated But Failed to Prevent Movement of Control Rods.Caused by Temporary Loss of Electrical Contact in Logic Circuits. Movement Restored Proper Electrical Contact ML20211K8211986-06-18018 June 1986 Special Rept:On 860521,valid Failure Occurred on Div 2 Diesel Generator During Performance of Tech Spec Surveillance 4.8.1.1.2.Caused by Failure of Jacket Water Thermostatic Control Valve to Open ML20238E4591986-06-17017 June 1986 Partially Withheld Security Event Rept:On 860612,withheld Discovery Made Re 860604 Moderate Loss of Security Effectiveness.Caused by Inadequate Post Orders & Training for Assignment.Assignments Will Be Specifically Addressed 05000000/LER-1986-009, Ro:On 860312,discovered That LER 2-86-04 & LER 86-009 Not Submitted to Nrc.Caused by Misplaced Repts.Repts Telecopied to Nrc.Procedure for Distribution of Repts Revised1986-04-14014 April 1986 Ro:On 860312,discovered That LER 2-86-04 & LER 86-009 Not Submitted to Nrc.Caused by Misplaced Repts.Repts Telecopied to Nrc.Procedure for Distribution of Repts Revised BECO-86-016, Partially Withheld Security Event Rept:On 860215 Security Officer Appeared to Be Asleep at Post at Vital Area Penetration.Unathorized Entry of Vital Area Did Not Occurr. Security Officer Relieved of Duty & Suspended1986-02-20020 February 1986 Partially Withheld Security Event Rept:On 860215 Security Officer Appeared to Be Asleep at Post at Vital Area Penetration.Unathorized Entry of Vital Area Did Not Occurr. Security Officer Relieved of Duty & Suspended BECO-85-220, Partially Withheld Security Event Rept:On 851204 Vertical Pipe Chase Not Locked.Lock Removed When Surveys Indicated Radiation Level Below Requirement for Locked High Radiation Level.Pipe Chase Will Be Secured1985-12-0909 December 1985 Partially Withheld Security Event Rept:On 851204 Vertical Pipe Chase Not Locked.Lock Removed When Surveys Indicated Radiation Level Below Requirement for Locked High Radiation Level.Pipe Chase Will Be Secured ML20136H3291985-11-13013 November 1985 Ro:On 851112,wide-range Log Channel Malfunctioned During Operation of Reactor.Caused by Faulty Calibr Switch in Log Channel.Switch Adjusted & Reactor Operated at Several Power Levels Up to 95 Kw ML20114B3221985-01-14014 January 1985 Ro:On 850107,while Taking Unit to 95 Kw Power,Period Meter Indicated Period Decreasing W/Log Power Trace Levelling & Linear Power Trace Rising.Caused by wide-range Log Channel Malfunction.Manual Scram Initiated & Reactor Secured ML20101M8491984-12-10010 December 1984 Ro:On 841203,wide-range Log Channel Malfunctioned,Resulting in Manual Scram.Cause Traced to Resistor in Filter on Detector High Voltage Supply.Repairs & Testing in Progress AECM-84-0204, Special Rept 84-017/0:on 840304,Fire Doors 1A401 & OC219 Blocked Open to Support Maint Activities.Fire Watches Established Until Doors Restored1984-04-0606 April 1984 Special Rept 84-017/0:on 840304,Fire Doors 1A401 & OC219 Blocked Open to Support Maint Activities.Fire Watches Established Until Doors Restored ML20198H3691983-11-14014 November 1983 Ro:On 831003,results of as-found Tests Indicated Crosby Main Steam Relief Valves Had Lift Points Exceeding Tech Spec Limits.Valves Disassembled & Rebuilt by Mfg ML20105D2431983-06-24024 June 1983 Special Rept:Five Individuals Found to Have Received Radiation in Excess of 10CFR20.101 Limits W/O Required Documentation.Caused by computer-based Sys Feature Allowing Use of Outdated Info & Personnel Error.Procedures Revised ML20065R4001982-10-20020 October 1982 Ro:On 821006,malfunction of Eberline AMS-3 Continuous Air Monitor Pump Caused Pump to Be Inoperable for Approx 1-h.No Loss of Significant Signals Indicated.Pump Repaired.Changes to Procedures or Equipment Under Review ML20137G4501981-03-24024 March 1981 Ro:During walk-through of Operator Training Program, O-ring Seal of Filter Holder Found Not Seated Properly Causing Partial Bypass of Filter for Air Sucked Into instrument.Filter-in Lock Adjusted ML20071F0861980-09-25025 September 1980 Ro:On 800912,sample Analysis Taken from Hydrazine Addition Tank Indicated Sodium Chloride in Tank.Anonymous Telcon Indicated Salt May Have Been Added Prior to Labor Strike by Unknown Persons ML20086D5141978-01-0606 January 1978 Telecopy Ro:On 780105,discovered That One of Two Nuclear Engineering Co Model B3-1 Shipping Casks Provided w/1-inch Diameter Lid Bolts Rather than 1-1/4 Inch Size Specified in Certificate of Compliance 6058 ML20086D5201977-12-14014 December 1977 Telecopy Ro:Heating Steam Coil Leak in Reactor Bldg Ventilation Supply Unit V-AH-4A Resulted in Freezing of Condensate at Inlet to Unit & Subsequent Inoperability of Associated Secondary Containment Isolation Dampers ML20086D5371977-10-14014 October 1977 Telecopy Ro:Insp of Internal Torus Catwalk Support Structure Revealed That Catwalk Mitered Sections Not All Attached to Horizontal Catwalk Support Plates in Some Manner.Attachment Locations Will Be Upgraded ML20086D5501977-10-13013 October 1977 Telecopy Ro:On 771012,local Leak Rate Testing of MSIV AO-2-80A & Nitrogen Instrument Air Sys Isolation Valve CV-7436 Indicated That Leakage Exceeded Tech Spec Acceptance Criteria.Cause Under Investigation ML20086D5541977-10-0505 October 1977 Telecopy Ro:On 771004,local Leak Rate Testing of HPCI Sys Discharge Isolation Check Valve HPCI-9 Indicated That Leakage Exceeded Tech Spec Acceptance Criteria.Cause Under Investigation ML20086D5571977-09-29029 September 1977 Telecopy Ro:On 770929,local Leak Rate Testing of Core Spray Inboard Isolation Check Valve AO-14-13A Indicated That Leakage Exceeded Tech Spec Acceptance Criteria.Cause Under Investigation ML20086D5611977-09-14014 September 1977 Telecopy Ro:On 770913,local Leak Rate Testing of Core Spray Inboard Isolation Check Valve AO 14-13B Indicated That Leakage Exceeded Tech Spec Acceptance Criteria.Related Event on 770914 ML20086D5671977-09-12012 September 1977 Telecopy Ro:Main Steam Drain Isolation Valve MD 2373 & Main Steam Outboard Isolation Valve AO 2-86A Exceeded Tech Spec Acceptance Criteria for Local Leak Rate Tests ML20086D6421977-07-11011 July 1977 Telecopy Ro:On 770709,determined That Recombiner Sys a Offgas Flow Control Valve PCV 7489A Could Be Opened W/ Controlling Solenoid Valve Deenergized.Valve Held from Svc Pending Investigation ML20137G4461977-06-23023 June 1977 Ro:On 770621,radioactive Source Containing 200 Mci Cs-137 Recovered from Brine Well 33.Incident Described in ML20086F0801977-06-0606 June 1977 Ro:On 770506,plant Iodine & Particulate Release Rate Exceeded 4% of Facility Tech Spec Averaged Over Second Calendar Quarter of 1977.Caused by Fuel Perforations Coupled W/End of Cycle Testing & Reactor Coolant & Steam Leaks ML20086D6911977-03-0202 March 1977 Telecopy Ro:On 770301,torus Water Vol Found to Be Slightly Below Min Vol Established by Tech Specs.Water Vol Restored to Normal Operating Level ML20086D7031977-02-24024 February 1977 Telecopy Ro:On 770223,while Withdrawing in-sequence Control Rod to Bring Reactor Critical,Reactor Period of Less than 5 Obtained ML20086F4181976-12-0909 December 1976 RO Re Plant Iodine & Particulate Release Rate Exceeding 4% of Tech Spec 3.8.C.2 Averaged Over Fourth Calendar Quarter 1976.Caused by Leaks in Reactor Water Cleanup Sys.Leaks Repaired & Equipment Modified to Reduce Leakage ML20070J8681976-10-20020 October 1976 RO 76-13:on 760916,normal Boric Acid Makeup to Vol Control Tank Could Not Be Accomplished Due to Plugging of Chemical & Vol Control Sys Line 1-inch-CH-56-152.Cause Unknown.Line Will Be Inspected for Indications of Solidification ML20070J8581976-10-0101 October 1976 RO 76-12:on 760909,low Pressure Alarm Occurred on Safety Injection Accumulator C,Resulting in Pressure Reduction. Caused by Partially Open HCV 1936 & Body to Bonnet Leaks on HCV 1898 & 1549.Valves Repaired & Accumulator Repressurized ML20070J8961976-09-29029 September 1976 RO 76-05:on 760915,pressurizer Level Fell Below 45% Level Setpoint,Resulting in Decreases of Pressurizer Pressure & Vol Control Tank Level.Caused by Leaking Tube in Steam Generator A.Cause of Tube Failure Will Be Evaluated ML20070J8801976-09-24024 September 1976 RO 76-07:on 760913,monthly Average of Gaseous & Airborne Particulate Wastes for Previous 12 Months Found Greater than Tech Spec Limit.Caused by Interpretational Changes in Tech Spec Section 3.11.B.New Limit Approved ML20086D7881976-09-10010 September 1976 Telecopy Ro:On 760909,discovered That Torus Water Vol Several Hundred Cubic Ft Below 68,000 Cubic Ft Min Required by Tech Specs.Caused by Failure to Correct for Vol Vs Level Correlation ML20086D8231976-05-0505 May 1976 Telecopy Ro:On 760504,during Routine Surveillance Test, Primary Containment Oxygen Concentration Found to Be in Excess of Tech Spec Limit.Caused by Leakage from Drywell Instrument Air Sys Into Containment Nitrogen Supply Line ML20086F4701976-01-27027 January 1976 Ro:On 760117,gaseous Activity Release Rate Exceeded 4% of Tech Spec 3.8.C.1 for More than 48 H.Caused by Increase in Offgas Activity Due to Fuel Cladding Perforations ML20137H3841976-01-12012 January 1976 Ro:On 760106,operator Left Console Key in Switch So That Reactor Not Secured Per Tech Specs.Key Withdrawn from Console.Incident Discussed W/Operators & Large Red Plastic Tag Attached to Key to Make It More Visible ML20086F4731975-12-23023 December 1975 Ro:On 751123,during Insp of Upper Portions of Drywell,Two of Eight Reactor Vessel Stabilizers Appeared to Have Been Slightly Deformed.Caused by Stabilizer Bindup & Cyclic Loading During Vessel Heatup or Cooldown ML20085E9531975-07-0404 July 1975 Telecopy Message of Ro:On 750703,facility Became Inoperable Due to Governor Problems.Manual Operation Possible.Lee Gas Turbine Could Not Be Tied in Through Isolated Line to Supply & Buy Power.Investigation Continuing ML20084K7411974-09-19019 September 1974 Telecopy Ro:On 740913,plant Shut Down to Investigate Source of Unidentified Leak in Drywell.Caused by Small Crack Through Pipe Wall in 4-inch Bypass Line on B-recirculation Loop.Ge Investigation Initiated ML20084K7731974-09-13013 September 1974 Telecopy Ro:On 740913,unit Shut Down Upon Discovery of Leak on 2B Recirculation Pump Loop at Junction of Discharge Line & Recirculation Loop Between Pump & Discharge Valve. Investigation Continuing ML20084D0181974-06-11011 June 1974 Telecopy Message of Ro:On 740611,8 of 31 Bergen-Paterson Hydraulic Piping Restraints within Drywell Found Defective. Caused by Loss of Hydraulic Fluid & Vibration of Cleanup Sys Header within Drywell.Repairs Initiated ML20084D0101974-06-11011 June 1974 Telecopy Message of Ro:On 740611,8 of 31 Bergen-Paterson Hydraulic Piping Restraints within Drywell Found Defective. Caused by Loss of Hydraulic Fluid & Vibration of Cleanup Sys Header within Drywell.Repairs Initiated ML20084D0401974-02-13013 February 1974 Telecopy Message of Ro:On 740211,12 of 31 Bergen-Paterson Hydraulic Piping Restraints within Drywell Found Defective Caused by Loss of Hydraulic Fluid.Restraints to Be Overhauled 1991-05-10
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20205K3851998-12-31031 December 1998 Dow Triga Research Reactor Annual Rept for 1998. with ML20203A1031998-02-11011 February 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 8 to License R-108 ML20217P6341997-12-31031 December 1997 Dow Triga Research Reactor Annual Rept - 1997 ML20210R1221997-08-19019 August 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 7 to License R-108 ML20137C5401996-12-31031 December 1996 Dow Triga Research Reactor Annual Rept - 1996 ML20101F2761995-12-31031 December 1995 Dow Triga Research Reactor Annual Rept - 1995 ML20081F1491994-12-31031 December 1994 Dow Triga Research Reactor Annual Rept-1994 ML20063G7291993-12-31031 December 1993 Dow Triga Research Reactor Annual Rept for 1993 ML20127B4661992-12-31031 December 1992 Dow Triga Research Reactor Annual Rept 1992 ML20141M0461991-12-31031 December 1991 Dow Triga Research Reactor Annual Rept - 1991 ML20077B4731991-05-10010 May 1991 Ro:On 910507,operator Failed to Perform Surveillances & Channel Tests for All 6 Scram Channels & 2 Interlocks Prior to Reactor Operation.Caused by Personnel Error. Tailgate Meeting Held & Mods to Hardware Initiated ML20081M7561991-03-26026 March 1991 Dow Triga Research Reactor Annual Rept - 1991, Covering May - Dec 1990 Period ML20062F7491990-11-19019 November 1990 Microprocessor-Based I&C Sys for Dow Triga Research Reactor ML20081E0901990-06-30030 June 1990 Dow Triga Research Reactor Annual Rept - 1990 ML18094B3211990-02-28028 February 1990 Annual Operating Repts for 1989 for Salem & Hope Creek Generating Stations ML20012A9011990-02-27027 February 1990 Suppls 900213 10CFR21 Rept Re Chilled Water Sys Operation. Evaluation of Crystal River Determined That Postulated High Energy Line Break in Intermediate Bldg May Be Subj to Steam Loads Higher than Normal Loads,Causing Rising Water Temp ML20011F5971990-02-22022 February 1990 Part 21 Rept Re Solder Connections in Abb 27/59 Relays Deteriorated Due to Thermal Stress,Causing Bonding of Printed Wiring Pattern to Glass Epoxy Circuit Board.Interim Circuit Board W/Larger Pads & Higher Wattage Will Be Used ML20011F1941990-02-22022 February 1990 Part 21 Rept Re Abb 27/59 Relay Catalog Series 211L.Solder Connections to Printed Wiring Runs on Bottom of Circuit Board Deteriorated Due to Thermal Stress.No Actual Failure Occurred & Relays to Be Changed at Next Outage ML18153C1011990-02-0202 February 1990 Part 21 Rept Re Two of Three Pc Cards in GE Type SLV11A1 Over/Undervoltage Relays Failing to Produce Output.Short Between Leads Would Result in Damage to Component 1C5. Sketch of Threshold Detection Board Encl ML17223A7451990-01-26026 January 1990 Part 21 Rept Re Backup Rings Furnished in Spare Parts Seal Kits & in 25 Gpm 4 Way Valves as Part of Actuators Made of Incorrect Matl.Rings Should Be Viton & Have Been Identified as Buna N ML20006B6581990-01-19019 January 1990 Ro:On 900116,wide Range Log Channel Failed While Reactor Taken to Power.Caused by Poor Connection in Rotary Switch in Wide Range Log Channel.Authorization to Replace Entire Control Console Initiated in Early Jan 1990 ML20006A8231990-01-10010 January 1990 Errata to Rev 3 to BAW-1543, Master Integrated Reactor Vessel Surveillance Program Consisting of Revised Tables 3-20 & E-1 ML20005G6831990-01-0505 January 1990 Part 21 Rept Re Installation Instructions for Grommet Use Range for Patel Conduit Seal P/N 841206.Conduit Seals in Environ Qualification Applications Inspected for Proper Wire Use Range & Grommets Replaced ML17347B4621989-12-31031 December 1989 App a to USI A-46 & Generic Ltr 87-02. ML19354D5871989-12-21021 December 1989 Ro:On 891220,wide Range Log Channel Failed While Reactor Was Being Taken to Power.Caused by Poor Connection in Rotary Switch in Log Channel.Switch Repaired & Reactor Returned to Operation ML18094B1471989-10-25025 October 1989 Emergency Plan Annual Exercise 1989 for Artificial Island on 891025. W/One Oversize Drawing ML19325E0861989-10-16016 October 1989 Followup Part 21 Rept Re Class 1E Battery Chargers W/ Transformers Running at Temps Exceeding Those Used in Qualification Rept When Operating at or Near Full Load Rating of Equipment.Listed Corrective Actions Underway ML19351A2941989-10-0909 October 1989 Part 21 Rept Re Potential of Ambient Compensated Molded Case Circuit Breakers to Deviate from Published Info. Instantaneous Trip Check Will Be Instituted on All Class 1E Thermal/Magnetic Ambient Breakers Prior to Shipment ML20248G8291989-10-0202 October 1989 Rev 19 to YOQAP-I-A, Operational QA Program ML19351A4191989-09-30030 September 1989 Mark-BW Reload LOCA Analysis for Catawba & McGuire Units. ML19327C0681989-09-30030 September 1989 Nuclear Safety & Compliance Semiannual Rept Number 11,Apr- Sept 1989. W/891027 Ltr ML17347B3821989-09-30030 September 1989 Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1989 for Turkey Point Units 3 & 4 & St Lucie Units 1 & 2.W/891016 Ltr ML20248F0001989-09-29029 September 1989 Debris in Containment Recirculation Sumps, Technical Review Rept ML19325C9521989-09-29029 September 1989 Part 21 Rept Re Potential Common Failure of SMB-000 & SMB-00 Cam Type Torque Switches Supplied Prior to 1981 & 1976. Vendor Recommends That Switch W/Fiber Spacer Be Replaced ML20248D1571989-09-13013 September 1989 Rev 56 to QA Program ML20248E0121989-09-13013 September 1989 Supplemental Part 21 Rept Re Potential Problem W/Six Specific Engine Control Devices in Air Start,Lube Oil, Jacket Water & Crankcase Sys.Initially Reported on 890429. California Controls Co Will Redesign Valve Seating ML20247K2531989-09-11011 September 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 123 & 41 to Licenses DPR-61 & NPF-49,respectively ML20247E3761989-09-0707 September 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 122,34,143 & 40 to Licenses DPR-61,DPR-21,DPR-65 & NPF-49,respectively ML17347B3341989-08-31031 August 1989 Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1989 for Turkey Point Units 3 & 4 & St Lucie Units 1 & 2.W/890913 Ltr ML20246D6871989-08-14014 August 1989 Rev 1 to Criticality Analysis of Byron & Braidwood Station High Density Fuel Racks ML20248C0731989-08-0303 August 1989 Sser Accepting 880601,0909 & 890602 Changes to ATWS Mitigation Sys Actuation Circuitry for Plants ML18008A0311989-07-31031 July 1989 NTH-TR-01 Decrease in Heat Removal by Secondary Sys. ML17347B2731989-07-31031 July 1989 Monthly Operating Repts for Jul 1989 for Turkey Point Units 3 & 4 & St Lucie Units 1 & 2 ML19327B4011989-07-31031 July 1989 Safety Evaluation for Byron/Braidwood Stations Units 1 & 2 Transition to Westinghouse 17 X 17 Vantage 5 Fuel. ML20246P7111989-07-17017 July 1989 Part 21 Rept Re Quench Cracks in Bar of A-SA-193 Grade B7 Component.Quench Cracks Found in One Bar of Matl.Listed Purchasers Informed of Potential Defect.Next Rept Will Be Submitted When Addl Info Becomes Available ML20247D3011989-07-12012 July 1989 Part 21 Rept 10CFR21-0047 Re Control Wiring Insulation of Inner Jacket Used on General Motors Diesel Generator Sets Identified as 999 or MP Series.Encl List of Owners of Units Notified ML20246D6711989-06-30030 June 1989 Criticality Analysis of Byron/Braidwood Fresh Fuel Racks ML20247H0711989-06-30030 June 1989 Description & Verification Summary of Computer Program, Gappipe ML17347B2741989-06-30030 June 1989 Corrected Monthly Operating Repts for June 1989 for Turkey Point Units 3 & 4 ML17347B1851989-06-30030 June 1989 Monthly Operating Repts for June 1989 for St Lucie Units 1 & 2 & Turkey Point Units 3 & 4.W/890717 Ltr 1998-02-11
[Table view] |
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THE DOW CHEMICAL CO M PANY MIDLAND. MICHIG AN 45640 November 22, 1971 9 '
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U. S. Atomic Energy Commission Division of Reactor Licensing '
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gvW ~j ' ' .. cy' U: :l Gentlemen: bra N y{
We would like to describe an experience related to the opera-tion of our Dow Triga Reactor '(Docket 50-264, License R-108) which occurred on October 22, 1971.
This occurred during startup of the reactor af ter all safety and control channels had been checked and calibrated. The operator removed the safety rod and part of the shim and regulating rods as during normal startup. While the reactor was still. subcritical and with the linear channel indicating 0.05 watt, and while the log channel was not yet in its operating range, the operator s)vitched to the automatic mode.
The demand had been set to 95% of the range of 0.03 watts, so that the transfer to the automatic mode caused immediate with-drawal of the regulating rod by the servo system. Since the. .
log channel was not yet in its operating range no period limit-ing signal was available for the servo system which continued to raise rod and caused a rapid rise of the power as indicated by the linear channel. When the operator realized that there was no period indication and the power increased at an unusu-ally rapid rate he manually scrammed the reactor,at the 0.2 watt level. It appears from the record tha t. during this short time interval the' reactor period might have been less than the 7 sec. minimum period set point for the log N channel given in Table I of the Technical Specifications. Thus, at low power levels the safety circuit associated with the log N channel may not be effective in limiting the reactor period.
No safety problem was involved in this occurrence, since Triga reactors with our fuel have been licensed for pulsing and operate without period limita tions. Two automatic scram cir-cuits were available to terminate the run, the first, if the power had reached 0.33 watts and the second if the power had risen beyond 110 kw. Moreover, there exists a high likelihood that neither scram would have been required since the flux controller would have rapidly reinserted the regulating rod when the power had exceeded the demand set point, so that the power would have levelled out at 95% of the 0.3 watt range without reaching the 0.33 watt scram level.
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U. S. Atomic Energy Commission November 22,-1971 Page 2
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The Reactor Operations Committee has reviewed the startup procedures and specified that startup of the reactor must be done in thepower the desired manual mode level until the has been reactor is critical and reached. Only then may the operation be transferred to the automatic mode. A notice to this effect is now posted on the mode switch of the console.
Very truly yours U W F. Peter Boer Chairma n , Reactor Operations Committee 1602 Building mb 4
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THE DOW CHEMICAL COM ANY u.auana, unemenu <.. a December 30, 197]
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Mr. Donald J. Skovholt Assistant Director for
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?.4 U. S. Atomic Energy Commission Washington, D. C. 20545 M;j~.qf ~
Dear Mr. Skovholt:
This letter is in response to your letter dated October 5, 1971, requesting detailed information concerning radio-activity effluents from our reactor. The Dow TRIGA Reactor, AEC license No. R-108, Docket No. 50264, has been in operation since July 6, 1967. It is used primarily for activation analysis studies.
The radioactivity released to unrectricted areas on an annual basis results from the disposal of spent activated samples and the release of argon-41 stemming from the air contained in the " sample" rack and the pneumatic sample transfer system.
Most of the activated samples contain only short-lived isotopes. In 1970 and 1971, a minimum hold-up time of seventeen days was maintained between the time of activation and the time of disposal. From this procedure less than 0.0006 curies were released to unrestricted areas ennually.
The production of argon-41 accounted for an additional release of less than 0.0004 curies to unrestricted areas annually.
It has been the practice during this period to incinerate the radioactive waste in Dow's main incinerator. This unit is operated at approximately 1100 C with an air flow of 50,000 cubic feet per minute. The effluent temperature is approximately 200 C, and the effluent stack height is 200 feet. The incinerator is equipped with a triple spray wash system. The effluent water goes to Dow's water waste treatment facility. The amount of water effluent from this treatment facility is approximately 50 million gallons per day.
We assume that the 0.0006 curies of activated samples, when burned, were all released in the gaseous effluent from the incinerator. For this case, the concentration at the TjoW d 4 y' ( b
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.a D.-J. Skovholt December 30, 1971 L
Several monitoring systems are used to determine radiation exposures to both staff and non-staff. In the reactor room itself, are located two area monitors. One is a Nuclear Measurement Corporation continuous air monitor and which through. pumps airpaper.
a filter into a chamber (~2 liter 1/4 Approximately, capacity) inch f rom the filter paper is a thin end window Geiger-Mueller tube, shielded by about 2 inches of lead. The background of this monitor, stemming from radon daughters, is 1.7 x 10-11 p C1/cc of air. The second area m6nitor is a G-M tube located 13 feet from the top of the reactor. It is connected to a ratemeter and is sensitive to approximately 0.1 mr/hr.
Located in the water tre.atment system of the reactor is another G-M tube monitor, which continuously monitors the pool water and has a sensitivity of approximately 0.01 Ci/ml of water. All water in contact with the reactor core is cleaned up by means of demineralizers and recycled.
The demineralizer bed is periodically changed, with the old one being first monitor.ed and then incinerated. Its release of isotopes is included in the above calculations.
In addition to these area monitors, several " laboratory monitors" (mica-window G-M tubes connected to ratemeters) are continuously operated within the labcratory building housing the reactor. One of these is operated in the hood to which is connected the exhaust from the pneumatic sample transfer system of tae reactor. The others are operated in adjacent laboratories. These monitors have a background of approximately 100 counts per minute. Many other portable, standard, health physics monitoring instruments are used in the building for routine surveys. These instruments are used for alpha, beta, gamma, and neutron l:
radiation measurements. Several multi-channel analyzers, liquid scintillation, and proportional counters are also used for evaluating gaseous, liquid, and solid samples.
'. The lower detection limit of these instruments are generally 1 x 10-7 C1.
, Film badges for beta, gamma, and neutron dose measurements -
are used to evaluate radiation exposures of individuals present in the facility. The film badges are supplied by R. S. Landauer, Jr. and Company and are sensitive to 10
. milli-rems of X- and gamma radiation, 40 milli-rems of hard beta, 20 milli-rems fast neutron, or 10 milli-rems thermal
, neutron. Pocket dosimeters are also used to evaluate radia-tion exposures, and are sensitive to approximately 2 mr of X- or gamma radiation.
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m D. J. Skovholt December 30, 1971 point of release to an unrestricted area (the top of the stack) would be approximately 8 x 10-13 Ci/cc of air averaged over 1 year. Incinerations have been carried out
, only during favorable weather conditions to provide for maximum dispersion. -
If we assume, on the other hand, that all the activity were washed down and released in the water effluent from the plant, the averaged concentration would have been 9 x 10-12 Ci/cc of water at the point of discharge.
The isotopes released in this manner consisted of the following:
Isotope Amount (C1)
Br - 82 <0.000010 Na - 24 <0.000001 Cr - 51 <0.000025 Fe - 59 <0.000070 Sb -124 <0.000060 P - 32 <0.000250 Sc - 46 <0.000050 Zn - 65 <0.000005 Co - 66 <0.000003 Hg -203 <0.000010 Ag -110m <0.000020 Ba -131 <0.000005 Cd -115 <0.000025 S - 35 <0.000010 Se - 75 <0.000010 Ni - 63 <0.000001 Total Mixed <0.000555 The argon-41 is released through a vent to the outside l of the reactor building. The air flow through this vent
( is 1000 cfm. The concentration of the argon-41 at the j point of release is then less than 3 x 10-11 Ci/cc of l . air.
L
- The direct radiation levels to the unrestricted area from this facility is undetectable (less than 0.01 mr/hr and less than 10 milli-rem / month). The direct radiation level
'from the facility effluents is also undetectable f<1 x 10 -
C1/cc of air of long lived isotopes, < 2 x 10-11 Ci/cc of air of short lived isotopes, and < 1 x 10-* p Ci/ml of water for all isotopes).
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D. J. Skovholt December 30, 1971 In addition, air samples are taken on top of nearby buildings on filters which are counted by gamma spectro-
, scopy and by beta spectroscopy.
There are ten sampling locations in the reactor room, the building housing the reactor, and adjacent buildings.
The personnel film badges, changed once per month, have indicated that personnel are exposed to less than 100 milli-rem per year of X , gamma, or beta radiation at our facility, and to less than detectable amounts of neutron radiation. Area film badges have indicated less than detectable amounts of all radiation. .
. Air samples in the reactor room have indicated that airborne concentrations of radioactivity $o be at the background level of the monitor (1.7 x 10-11 p Ci/cc of air) except during periods immediately following atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons. This has been confirmed by gamma spectroscopy and other routine measurements around the reactor.
Air samples taken daily on nearby buildings indicated no releaseofactivitydirectlyattributab{gtotheoperation of the reactor. Some activity (1 x 10- p Ci/cc) of long g lived isotopes, mainly radium,, thorium, and their decay
- products, with some fission products following atmospheric
! testing of nuclear devices were, however, identified in >
! these samples.
l We hope that the above information will suffice your need.
I In case additional discussion of any of the above items appears desirable, please do not hesitate to contact us again.
Very truly yours, LuNfdlfu hairman HErold Hoyle, l Radiation Safety Committee 1701 Building HRH:dda 4