ML20137G586

Forwards Description of 780110 Breach of Physical Security Sys as Possible AO for Review.Significantly Weakened Protection Against Sabotage Cited

ML20137G586
Person / Time
Site:	Dow Chemical Company, 05000000
Issue date:	03/29/1978
From:	James Keppler NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:	Haller N NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE)
Shared Package
ML20136D183	List: IA-85-256, Requests That Encl Form Be Completed & Submitted by 760915 & Facility Emergency Plan & Implementing Procedures by 761007 in Order for NRC to Prepare Info Packets for Use in Responding to Incidents or Emergencies IA-85-258, Amend 3 Renewing License R-108 & Incorporating Security Plan as License Condition IA-85-261, Documents That Appropriate Corrective Actions Taken by Dow Chemical Co in Response to 780113 Immediate Action Ltr,Per 780207 Enforcement Conference at Facility IR 05000264/1973001 IR 05000264/1975001 IR 05000264/1977002 IR 05000264/1979003 ML20137G383 ML20137G390 ML20137G402 ML20137G410 ML20137G417 ML20137G432 ML20137G437 ML20137G446 ML20137G450 ML20137G460 ML20137G467 ML20137G472 ML20137G478 ML20137G487 ML20137G507 ML20137G524 ML20137G586 ML20137G600 ML20137G614 ML20137G637 ML20137G653 ML20137G750 ML20137G793 ML20137G816 ML20137G854 ML20137G875 ML20137G888 ML20137G896 ML20137G903 ML20137G908 ML20137G916 ML20137G921 ML20137G926 ML20137G931 ML20137G940 ML20137G951 ML20137G972 ML20137G976 ML20137G983 ML20137G990 ML20137G997 ML20137H003 ML20137H022 ... further results
References
FOIA-85-256, FOIA-85-258, FOIA-85-259, FOIA-85-261 NUDOCS 8508270343
Download: ML20137G586 (3)

Text

T March 29, 1978 BOCKET NO. 50-264 MMORANDUH FOR: Norman M. Baller, Director, Division of Safeguards Inspection, IE FROM: James G. Kappler, Director

SUBJECT:

POTENTIAL ABNORMAL OCCURRENCE - DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY In accordance with Manual Chapter 1110, enclosed for your review and handling is the subject potential abnormal occurrence. We view this incident as indicative of a substantial breakdown of physical security that significantly weakened the protection against embotage as outlined in Appendix A of MC 1110, I.C.4.

James G. Kappler Director

, Enclosure As stated ec w/ attachments:

E. Jordan, MOOS 8508270343 850712 PDR FOIA KOHN05-256 PDR

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r POTENTIAL ABNORMAL OCCURRENCE BREACH OF PHYSICAL SECURITY SYSTEM Date and Place On January 10, 1978 at the Dow Chemical Company TRIGA Research Reactor Facility, Midland, Michigan, two NRC inspectors gained entry into the reactor building and had access to the reactor undetected and unchallenged by the site security system.

Nature and Probable Consequences At approximately 1:40 p.m. on January 10, 1978, two Region III (Chicago) inspectors gained entry into the reactor building and had access to the reactor without apparent detection or security challenge contrary to the facility's existing security program. The inspectors passed through a receptionist-manned control point in a building on the site perimeter and then into the limited access area undetected and unchallenged, proceeded across the interior of the limited access area to the reactor building, and then accomplished access to the reactor and reactor controls through an unlocked and unattended door of the reactor building.

The potential consequences could have been an act of sabotage by a malevolent

.truder who could have similarly gained entry to the reactor building and ad access to the TRIGA research reactor.

Cause of Causes The principal cause of the breach of the site security system was the failure of a receptionist on duty at an access checkpoint to comply with site security procedures for the control of entry into the limited access area. Once entry to the limited access area was gained, ingress into the reactor building could be achieved through the unlocked and unattended door of the facility.

Action Taken to Prevent Recurrence Licensee -

Procedure revisions and physical modifications to ensure positive access control to the site limited area, to the reactor building, and to the reactor were promptly instituted. Additionally, steps were taken to ensure that various building receptionists monitoring entry to the limited access area through those buildings are familiar with site procedures.

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NRC - NRC expressed its concern about the serious nature of this type of security breakdown and identified the actions deemed necessary to correct the situation in an Immediate Action Letter dated January 13, 1978, as well as at a special management meeting held on February 7,1978 in Midland, Michigan. Verification of adequate corrective action taken by the licensee was also accomplished during the February 7, 1978 meeting. Escalated enforcement action is under consideration.

(Closed)

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