ML20134N953
| ML20134N953 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crystal River  |
| Issue date: | 02/11/1997 |
| From: | Terry J FLORIDA POWER CORP. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20134N951 | List: |
| References | |
| PROC-970211, NUDOCS 9702250041 | |
| Download: ML20134N953 (84) | |
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9 FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION CRYSTAL RIVER NUCLEAR PLANT l
SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PLAN REVISION O i
Sponsor er, Nuclea Plant Technical Support Date 7fIlf9) l l
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Approval Chair $ nan,(Restart Panel
. Date 1 ff k7 9702250041 970219 PDR ADOCK 05000302 PDR ENCL')SURE 4
=s' s TABLE OF CONTENTS 1.0 PURPOSE
2.0 REFERENCES
3.0 DXF1MITIONE 4.0 BCOPE
- 5.0 DNAPONSIBILITIES 6.0 SYSTEM PRIORITIZATION 7.0 SYSTEM nennTNESS CERTIFICATION PROCESS (Level 1) 7.1 Phmaa 1 - Initial System Readiness Reviews 7.1.1 Form System Teams I 7.1.2 Team Training 7.1.3 Team Kickoff Meeting 7.1.4 Design and Licensing Basis Documentation 7.1.5 Time Lines for Key Systems
- 7.1.6 System Condition Documentation 7.1.7 Assessment of System Attributes and Topic Areas 7.1.8 Perform Multidiscipline Walkdown of System 7.1.9 Identify and Evaluate Restart Action Items I
7.1.10 Determine Restart Work' scope 7.1.11 Prepare Initial System Readiness Report and Present to the Restart Accountability Team 7.1.12 Evaluate Extent of Condition for Identified Problems 7.2 Phase 2 - Restart Activities Manitorina 7.2.1 Monitor Appropriate Work Control Documents for Restart Action Items 7.2.2 Disposition Restart Action Items for Completion 7.2.3 Monitor Restart Action Item Work Scope in Progress 1
7.2.4 Screen Emergent Issues for Inclusion in Action Item List 7.2.5 Conduct Work in Progress Walkdowns of System
- 7.2.6 Update Database With Status as Items are Closed and New Items Issued
. 7.2.7 Provide Status of Restart Item Work Progress as Required by Plant Management 7.2.8 Start Preparation of Final System Readiness Report 7.3 Phase 3 -
Final Svatam Readiness Review 7.3.1 Conduct Final System Readiness Walkdowns 7.3.2 Review Work Not to be Completed Prior to Restart for Impact on System Readiness 7.3.3 Present Final System Readiness Report to the Restart Panel Prior to Plant Restart 2
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
, (Continued) 7.4 Phama 4 - Startup and Power Ascension 7.4.1 Monitor Startup System Activities for Affect on
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System Readiness Condition i 7.4.2 Review System Test Results B.O SYSTEM MWAMINTES AREEBRMENT PROcWRE (Level 2) 8.1 Phmaa 1 -
Initial Svatam Randiness Review 8.1.1 Perform Initial System Condition Assessment 8.1.2 Assessment of System Attributes and Topic Areas j 8.1.3 Perform Multidiscipline Walkdown of System l 8.1.4 Identify and Evaluate Restart Action Items 8.1.5 Determine Restart Workscope !
8.1.6 Prepare Initial System Readiness Summary !
i 8.2 Phama 2 -
Restart Activities Manitoring i 8.2.1 Monitor Appropriate Work Control Documents for Restart Action Items 8.2.2 Disposition Restart Action Items for Completion 8.2.3 Monitor Restart Action Item Work Scope in Progress 8.2.4 Screen Emergent Issues for Inclusion in Action Item l List 8.2.5 Conduct Work in Progress Walkdowns of System 8.2.6 Update Database With Status as Items are Closed and New Items Issued 8.2.7 Provide Status of Restart Item Work Progress as Required by Plant Management 8.2.8 Start Preparation of Final System Readiness Summary 8.3 Bhmaa 3 - Final Sv_ stem Randiness Review 8.3.1 Conduct Final System Readiness Walkdowns 8.3.2 Review Work Not to be Completed Prior to Restart for Impact on System Readiness 8.3.3 Present Final System Readiness Summary 8.4 Phase 4 - Startup and Power Ascension 8.4.1 Monitor Startup System Activities for Affect on System Readiness Condition 8.4.2 Review System Test Results 3
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
, (Continued) 9.0 SYSTEM nuanTNTRS WATXnDWN PROCESS (Level 3) 9.1 Phmaa 1 -
Tnitial Syntam Randiness Review 9.1.1 Perform Initial System Condition Assessment 9.1.2 Perform System Manager Walkdown of System 9.1.3 Identify and Evaluate Restart Action Items 9.1.4 Determine Restart Workscope 9.1.5 Prepare Initial System Readiness Summary 9.2 Phmaa 2 - Restart Activity Manitoring 9.2.1 Monitor Appropriate Work Control Documents for Restart Action Items 9.2.2 Disposition Restart Action Items for Completion 9.2.3 Monitor Restart Action Item Work Scope in Progress 9.2.4 Screen Emergent Issues for Inclusion in Action Item List 9.3 Phama 3 -
Final System Randiness Review 9.3.1 Conduct Final System Readiness Walkdowns 9.3.2 Review Work Not to be Completed Prior to Restart for Impact on System Readiness 9.4 Phase 4 - Startup and Power Ascension 9.4.1 Monitor Startup System Activities for Affect on System Readiness Condition 10.0 Integrated System Readiness Report FIGURES 1 SYSTEN READINESS REVIEW ASCESSMENT MATRIX 2 SAMPLE ASSESSMENT MATRIX 3 ATTRIBUTE ASSESSMENT FORM 4 SAMPLE ASSESSMENT FORM 5 GRADED APPROACH FOR SYSTEM ASSESSMENT 6 LEVEL 2 SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW ASSESSMENT MATRIX 4
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- ATTACHMMITS
. 1 RESTART ISSUES SELECTION / SCREENING CRITERIA r
2 SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM
- (SYSTEM WALKDOWN GUIDELINES) 3 INITIAL LEVEL 1 SYSTEM READINESS REPORT FORMAT
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4 FINAL LEVEL 1 SYSTEM READINESS REPORT FORMAT 5 INITIAL LEVEL 2 SYSTEM READINESS
SUMMARY
FORMAT e
6 FINAL LEVEL 2 SYSTEM READINESS
SUMMARY
FORMAT 7 RESULTS OF SYSTEM PRIORITIZATION
- 8 INTEGRATED SYSTEM READINESS REPORT FORMAT
, 9 TRAINING REQUIREMENTS FOR SYSTEM READINESS TEAM 4
10 GUIDANCE FOR DISPOSITION OF DISCREPANCIES I
11 LEVEL 3 SYSTEMS 4
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1.0 PURPOSE ;
. l The purpose of this document is to define the System Readiness Review Program and provide guidance in evaluating and determining system readiness for CR-3. The System-Readiness Reviews are intended to assess the conformance of the plant design, testing, maintenance, operation and cenfiguration with the licensing and design requirements.
These guidelines support startup from the current Design Margin Outage.
2.O REFERENCES 2.1 Restart Plan, FPC Crystal River Unit 3 2.2 Restart Management Guideline, FPC Crystal River Unit 3 2.3 AI-256, Restart Readiness Assessment Guidelines 2.4 AI-257, Start-Up, Power Ascension and Near-Term Operation ,
Plan (under development) 2.5 AI-1700, Conduct of Nuclear Engineering and Projects 2.6 NOD-55, Control of Design Basis Information
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2.7 Management Corrective Action Program II (MCAP II) 2.8 CP-153B, Monitoring the Performance of Systems, Structures and components under the Maintenance Rule 3.O DEFINITIONS 3.1 System Readiness Review Assessment Matrix -
The matrix consists of Attributes (rows) and Topic Review Areas (columns) that when completed provide the summary basis of the conclusions of the System Readiness Review. Figure 1 l provides the Assessment Matrix Form Figure 2 provides a sample assessment matrix.
3.2 Attribute -
Key aystem parameters that will be evaluated against various Topic Review Areas. The Attributes make up the rows of the matrix and are selected by the System Readiness Review Team using inputs such as the FSAR, PSA and reviewer knowledge.
3.3 Topic Review Area -
Consists o.5 documents and sources of information in the following areas: Design, Licensing, 6
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Operations, Maintenance, Surveillance, Physical Plant, and
, Programs, Processes and Procedures. The Topic Review Areas make up the columns of the assessment matrix.
3.4 Discrepancy - A finding generated as a result of an activity performed in accordance with this plan which indicates a potential need for corrective action or process improvement.
3.5 Generic Issue - Discrepancies identified in several systems for the same topic review area that potentially identify a process or programmatic problem.
3.6 Licensing Basis - The set of NRC requirements applicable to CR-3 and FPC's written commitments for ensuring compliance with and operation within applicable NRC requirements.
3.7 Regulatory Design Basis - A subset of the design basis that is included in the current licensing basis and forms the basis for the NRC staff's safety judgment. This consists of information that identifies the specific functions to be performed by a structure, system or component and specific values or ranges of values chosen for controlling parameters as reference bounds for design. (See NOD-55 and NUREG-1397 l for further clarification).
3.8 Design Basis -
The fundamental specification for a structure, system, or component (SSC) that defines the parameters that ensure owner and regulatory requirements are met. The design basis is the entire set of design restraints that are implemented, including (1) those that are part of the current licensing basis, and (2) those that are not part of the current licensing basis, but are implemented to achieve certain economies of operation, maintenance, procurement, installation, or construction.
(See NOD-55 and NUREG-1397 for further clarification, including definitions of Design Basis Document, Design Requirements and Design Output Document).
4.0 SCOPE The System Readiness Reviews will address 105 plant systems.
Plant Systems will be prioritized for review scope in three levels:
Level 1 - System Readiness Certification Level 2 - System Readiness Assessment Level 3 - System Readiness Walkdown 7
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.The threshold for these levels are based upon the Readiness Review Significance System-Ranking and status of prior system reviews (EDSFI, SWSOPI, IPAP, Self-Assessment, Tank Calculations, Setpoint Program, SPIP Reviews, Appendix R Reviews, EOP Technical Basis Documents). These levels of review will give reasonable assurance that the systems reviewed are in conformance with the plant Design /
Licensing Basis and are in a' condition to support plant operation for the next run cycle.
These reviews will also help establish an Extent of Condition concerning 10CFR50.59 evaluations and design control.
l The three-level graded approach is summarized in Figure 5.
I Level 1 - System Readiness Certification Level 1 systems were selected based upon their impact on maintaining the fission product boundaries and as determined by prioritization criteria, defined in Section 6. The prioritization effort, as summarized in Attachment 7, has resulted in defining the following Level 1 systems:
1 Makeup - MU Decay Heat - DH Emergency Feedwater - EF and EFIC Emergency Diesel Generator - EG Engineered Safeguards - ES Core Flood - CF Reactor Coolant - RC l Level 1 systems will receive an in depth review of the i design and licensing documentation, using a methodology i based on Safety System Functional Inspections (SSFI) as well j as a multidisciplinary walkdown, as described in Section 7.1. A detailed Time Line is also constructed for each Level 1 system, as described in Section 7.1.5.
Level 2 - System Readiness Assessment Level 2 System selection was based upon the prioritization criteria. The following 18 Level 2 systems have been identified for CR-3.
AC - AC Electrical Distribution DP - DC Elec. Distribution 8
BS - Building Spray !
, AH - Air Handling for control complex, reactor building i recirculation and auxiliary building exhaust. j SW - Nuclear Services Closed Cycle Cooling RW - Nuclear Service and Decay Heat Sea Water l
DC - Decay Heat Closed Cycle Cooling DR - Rod Drive !
MS - Main Steam WD - Waste Disposal RM - Radiation Monitoring AN - Annunciator System FW - Feedwater CA - Chemical Addition SF - Spent Fuel NI - Nuclear Instrumentation RP - Reactor Protection System RA - Containment Access l
To assist in the review of two of the more important Level 2 '
. systems, Building Spray (BS) and Air Handling (AH), Time Lines, as described in section 7.1.5, will be developed for these systems.
A focused review of design and licensing basis issues will !
be conducted for Level 2 systems.
Level 2 systems will be reviewed for all open items and will be walked down by a System Manager / System Operator team.
Generic issues identified in Level 1 system reviews and evaluated as having impact to other systems are to be considered in Level 2 system reviews.
Level 3 - System Readiness Walkdown Level 3 systems include the remaining systems which do not meet the requirements for Level 1 or Level 2 but require a planned system walkdown prior to plant restart. Level 3 systems are identified in Attachment 11.
5.O RESPONSIBILITIES 5.1 The System Readiness Review Program Manager is responsible for program development, schedule and coordination, and oversight of the System Readiness Review (SRR) Program.
5.2 The Nuclear Plant Technical Support (NPTS) Manager is responsible for:
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- a. System Readiness Review Program content and
, oversight.
- b. Development of the system screening criteria parameters and threshold for determining the required level of review.
- c. Ensuring adequate training is provided to participating team members,
- d. Approving the Attribute selection and the corresponding Assessment Matrix for each Level 1 and Level 2 system.
- e. Review the results of the individual system readiness reviews and identify any generic issues, their extent of condition, and define the appropriate expansion of readiness review or programmatic corrective action.
5.3 System Managers are responsible for:
- a. Coordination of requests for system design and licensing basis documentation from the appropriate sources.
- b. Assembling Readiness Review Results and restart action l items into an appropriate database for tracking.
- c. Maintaining a status of restart action items and submit status update to plant management as I required.
- d. Leading a System Team consisting of:
System Manager Team members, as applicable to system level, with expertise in:
Maintenance Operations Design Engineering Licensing Clerical others as required
- e. Coordinating and conducting system walkdowns with appropriate team members as applicable to system level.
- f. Coordinating. preparation of System Readiness Reports as required.
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'g. Presenting Initial and Final System Readiness i Reports to the Restart accountability Team and Restart i Panel or Manager NPTS as required by system level. l I
5.4 The System Readiness Review Team will:
- a. Select Attributes and Topic Review Areas appropriate to their specific system, by reviewing the FSAR, Safety Evaluation Report, Probabilistic Safety Analysis (PSA),
other design basis documents and using the knowledge / expertise of the reviewers. The selected Attributes will form the re.s of the Assessment Matrix; selected Topic Areas for each Attribute will be marked with an "X" in the Assessment Matrix. A sample matrix is depicted in Figure 1. l
- b. Perform the system attribute checks and walkdowns and document the results, inc.uding any noted discrepancies, in the appropriate data base, l
- c. Enter the deficiencies in the CR-3 corrective action program, using Precursor Cards or REAs.
5.5 The Operations Manager will be responsible for assigning Operations Representatives for Level 1 Teams and Level 1 and Level 2 Walkdowns. l 5.6 The Nuclear Operations Engineering (NOE) Manager will be responsible for assigning Design Representatives for Level 1 Teams and Level 1 and Level 2 Walkdowns.
5.7 The Nuclear Maintenance Manager will be responsible for assigning Maintenance Representatives for Level 1 Walkdowns.
5.8 The Nuclear Licensing Manager will be responsible for assigning Licensing Representatives for Level 1 Teams.
5.9 The Work Controls Manager will be responsible for ensuring restart restraint actions are planned, scheduled and implemented to support restart readiness.
5.10 The Restart Accountability Team will be responsible for review and approval of submittals to the Restart Panel, the Initial System Review Report, and the Final System Review Report.
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5.11 The Restart Panel will be responsible for approving the
! . Initial System Review Report, the Final System Review l Report, and approving the implementation of required restart
! action items as required.
, 6.O SYSTEM PRIORITIZATION l
- 6.1 Plant systems in CMIS have been prioritized based on the i following ranking factors to provide a logical approach in l deciding which systems receive Level 1, Level 2 and Level 3 ,
reviews. The weighting or importance ranges picked for the l various factors were developed using engineering judgment l l with input from various departments.
l PSA Factor - The Probabilistic Safety Analysis (PSA) Factor was provided by the PSA Group based on a system ability to affect core damage frequency.
l l Regulatory Factor - The Regulatory Factor is applied to a l system based on regulatory sensitivity / involvement. The
! applied factor is relative between systems.
Relative Importance Factor - The Relative Importance Factor represents the product of PSA and Regulatory Factors.
Risk Significance Factor - Risk significance determinations have been established through Maintenance Rule Scoping. An expert panel determined systems to be risk significant based on safety functions (inventory control, reactivity control, l and decay heat removal), and PSA evaluations of criteria l such as core damage sequences,. risk reduction worth and risk achievement worth. This factor is 1.20 for risk significant systems and 1.00 for non-risk significant systems.
Safety /Non-Safety Factor - This factor is 1.10 for safety systems and 0.90 for non-safety systems. Safety classifications were obtained from CMIS.
System Importance Factor - The System Importance Factor represents the product of Relative Importance Factor, Risk Significance Factor and Safety /Non-Safety Factor.
Number (#) of Closed Modification Approval Records (MARS) -
The number of closed MARS against each system.
- Number (#) of OP Revisions -
The number of Operating Procedure (OP) revisions against each system.
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l l Number (#) of SP Revisions - The number of Surveillance l . Procedure (SP) revisions against each system.
l 10CFR50.59 Review Opportunities - The sum of number of closed MARS, Operating Procedure (iOP) revisions and Surveillance Procedure (SP) revisions on each system.
Readiness Review Significance -
The product of System l Importance Factor and 10CFR50.59 Review Opportunities.
l l 6.2 A Readiness Review Significance System Ranking is determined 1 for each system and used as a tool to determine which i i
systems receive Level 1, Level 2 and Level 3 reviews. The results of the system prioritization are presented in Attachment 7.
6.3 Extent of condition for generic issues identified in Level 1 system reviews will be determined by expanded evaluation of l these issues in Level 2 system reviews.
l 7.0 SYSTEM REAnINEMS CERTIFICATION PROCEES (Level 1) l l
7.1 Phman 1 - Initial System Randiness Reviews I
7.1.1 Form System Teams l l
l A System Ree.diness Review (SRR) Team consists of:
System Manager Team members with expertise in:
Maintenance Operations Design Engineering Licensing Clerical 1 -
others as required l
l l 7.1.2 Team Training once a team is established, training is to be conducted to educate team members on the System Readiness Review
! Program. Training requirements are defined in Attachment 9.
7.1.3 Team Kickoff Meeting The SRR Team Kickoff Meeting will accomplish the I
following:
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! , a. Introduction of the team to the SRR scope and l expectations.
- b. Review of SRR guidelines.
- c. Team indoctrination to the database to be utilized for documenting the attribute checks and results of system walkdowns.
7.1.4 Design and Licenmina Basis Documentation Review The SRR Team shall become familiar with the design and '
- licensing basis of the system to gain an understanding of the system functional requirements. The current revisions of the following information sources will be readily available to the SRR Team (other quality records, documents, procedures or reference information will be available as needed via Seek, DocView, FulText and other document search and retrieval systems)
l System Flow Diagrams FSAR (Current and pending)
ITS and Bases
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Design Basis Documents (Enhanced and Topical)
Training Lesson Plans and related material Operating Procedures l
Surveillance and Performance Test Procedures Emergency and Abnormal Operating Procedures Calculations The following material will be made available to provide insight into the development of the related design and licensing basis documents. These are not all kept current and use will generally require facilitation by appropriate FPC staff:
Technical Specification Bases Back-up Document Safety and Performance Improvement Program (SPIP) l Safety Function and Shutdown Logic Diagrams EOP Technical Basis, Deviation and Cross Step Documents i
During the review and evaluation of design and
- licensing information, the System Team should develop a
, list of attributes to be included in the assessment on the System Readiness Review Matrix, Attachment 1.
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l 7.1.5 Time Lines for Key systemn
" Time Lines" for Level 1 systems will be provided to the SRR Teams. The timelines will generally include a review of significant NRC interactions (TS amendments, LERs, NOVs, Generic Communications, other),
nonconformances, modifications, and Industry Operating Experiences. These are viewed as opportunities for breakdowns in the change review, commitment management or other processes.
During the review and evaluation of the timeline j information, the System Team may develop additional j attributes to be included in the assessment on the System Readiness Review Matrix, Attachment 1.
i 7.1.6 System condition Documentation Plant work controls databases should be reviewed by the SRR Team to gain a complete and consistent l understanding of the current system condition for j comparison to the system functional requirements for l readiness.
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l The following documents are to be considered for l
l review: l o OCRs I
o Open - REA, MAR, Work Requests, Problem Reports, l NOTES, NOCs, LER's, and Precursors I
l o Closed - MAR, Problem Report, NCOR, LER's , and ,
Precursors i
, o Canceled Items -
applicable system items from l l previous CRT/PMRG meetings o Operator Workarounds o Outage Required PMs that will be overdue prior to next planned outage l During the review and evaluation of these documents, the System Team may develop additional attributes to be included in the assessment on the System Readiness Review Matrix, Attachment 1.
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7.1.7 Assessment of Svstem Attributes and 'repic Areas l
The SRR Team will evaluate specific system Attributes l and Topic Review Areas in accordance with the l Assessment Matrix. The SRR Team will document positive
! and negative comments and observations on an Attribute l Assessment Form (Figure 3). An example of a completed i
Attribute Assessment Form is provided in Figure 4.
Each assessment form shall list the documentation reviewed or walkdown observations made to arrive at the
- assessment conclusions. The list of reviewed documents shall contain revision numbers and/or date if applicable. The assessment forms shall describe the assessment and indicate the number of attribute checks covered by the assessment form and the number of attribute checks which resulted in identification of discrepancies.
A summary of the evaluation for each attribute will be documented in the system readiness report.
7.1.8 Perform Multidiscipline Walkdown of System The System Manager should develop the walkdown l strategy in accordance with the System Walkdown Guidelines and brief the SRR Team (see ATTACHMENT 2).
Walkdown findings and initial corrective action items should be recorded by each team walkdown participant, and compiled for review.
l During the review and evaluation of the walkdowns, the System Team may develop additional attributes to be included in the assessment on the System Readiness Review Matrix, Attachment 1.
7.1.9 Identify and Evaluate Restart Action Items The documents and information gathered in Sections 7.1.4, 7.1.5 and 7.1.6 shall have a multidiscipline in-depth vertical slice review per sections 7.1.7 and 7.1.8 to determine the accuracy of design and licensing basis documentation, the materiel condition of the' system, and the ability of the system to perform the required design and licensed functions.
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All attribute checks performed as well as discrepancies
. found in this review are to be documented in the
_ appropriate database.
The team shall evaluate each item and determine appropriate corrective actions for resolution. Guidance for disposition of discrepancies is provided in Attachment 10.
The corrective actions shall be documented in the appropriate database.
7.1.10 Determine Restart Workscone Review open corrective action items against the Restart issues Selection / Screening Criteria (see ATTACHMENT 1). These items are to be evaluated for Restart Readiness Scope.
The SRR Team will recommend one of the following scope categories for restart action items to enable return of CR-3 in a safe, legal and efficient operation:
- a. RESTART RESTRAINT - Activities required to be completed prior to entering Startup/ Power Ascension.
- b. POST RESTART ACTIVITY - Activities which should be completed on a schedule consistent with the normal plant work controls process.
These scope categories will be used to determine and schedule the work within the appropriate restart time frame.
7.1.11 Prepare Initial System Readiness Report and Present to Egfaf. art Accountability Team The information gathered throughout the review and walkdown shall be compiled by the SRR Team. The SRR Team shall determine the extent of condition for ,
! discrepancies identified within their system. j
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! A presentation of items reviewed,- issues raised, open l l items required to be resolved for safe, legal and ,
- efficient operation of the plant, and resources l required for implementation shall be developed.
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. The report is to address the section requirements outlined in ATTACHMENT 3 and will be presented to the Restart Accountability Team for approval.
Restart Accountability Team comments shall be evaluated and incorporated into the report /re-presented (if required) and approved. l 7.1.12 Evaluate Extent of Condition for Identified Problems ;
l The Nuclear Plant Technical Support (NPTS) Manager or l his designee shall review all individual system reports to identify any recurring or generic issues. If appropriate, this information will be used to expand l the scope of the Level 2 reviews and/or recommend i corrective actions of a programmatic nature to CR-3 !
management.
7.2 #hama 2 -
Restart Activities Monitoring 7.2.1 Monitor Appropriate Work Control Documents for Restart j Action Items l i
l Ensure items on the Restart Action Item List have l appropriate Work Controls Documents (Work requests, REA's, RPA's, DCN's, etc.) initiated. Each document initiated is to specify the classification of the item (Restart Restraint, Post Restart Activity). The Approved Restart Action Item List will be transmitted to the departments requiring action.
I 7.2.2 Disposition Restart Action Items for Comnletion The departments requiring actions will work through the System Manager and Scheduling for expected completion dates. Scheduling will incorporate the required items into the Plant Integrated Schedule. If conflicts or discrepancies are discovered, these items shall be brought to the System Manager's attention in an expeditious manner. Items requiring upper management review shall be presented to the Restart Accountability Team.
f 7.2.3 Monitor Restart Action Item Work Scope in Progress 18
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The System Manager shall maintain the status of the
. Restart Action Item List. Scheduling should be used to facilitate this action and informed of work status to ensure the Plant Integrated Schedule is accurate and reviewed for possible conflicts.
l l 7.2.4 Screen Emergent Tssues for Inclusion in Restart Item List l
The System Manager will maintain an awareness of issues ,
associated with the system.and any Emergent activities l (Work Requests, OCRs, LERs, Notices / Bulletins, etc.)
l associated with the system. The System Manager shall ;
review these. items to determine if an emergent activity
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should be recommended as a Restart Activity Item or )
Post Restart Activity. The System Manager shall document recommended restart activities for Restart Accountability Team review.
! Scheduling must be kept informed of the issue and if approved include the required activity into the Plant Integrated Schedule.
l 7.2.5 Conduct Work in Progress Walkdowns of System 1
1 The System Manager shall conduct walkdowns of the system based upon the type of work activity in progress. These walkdowns should be planned and documented in accordance with the System Readiness ~
Review Program System Walkdown Guidelines (Attachment 2). The results of these walkdowns and any concerns noted shall be provided to the System Manager for review in an expeditious manner. The System Manager is to compile the walkdown results for inclusion into the Final System Readiness Report if required.
7.2.6 Update Database With Status as Items are Closed and New Items Issued The System Manager maintains the Open Items Database to ensure accuracy. This database is used to provide Open Item status to the Team Members and Plant Management as required.
] 7.2.7 Provide Status of Restart Item Work Progress as Required by Plant Management l
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l j The System Manager provides the Restart Accountability l , Team and the Restart Panel periodic status of Action Item Work. The periodicity is to be determined by Plant Management. If it is determined that information previously unavailable changes that status of a restart restraint activity to a post restart activity, this shall be documented and presented to the Restart Accountability Team. Approval to remove an activity l
from the restart required list shall be performed by the Restart Panel.
t 7.2.8 Start Preparation of Final System Readiness Report i
The System Manager should begin compiling Phase 2 data for inclusion in the Final System Readiness Report.
This information should be reviewed against the screening criteria and the Initial System Readiness Report to ensure Restart Readiness of the system.
The report is to address the section requirements l
outlined in ATTACHMENT 4.
i 7.3 Phmaa 3 - F4nal System Rand 4nams Review 7.3.1 Conduct Final System Readiness Walkdowns The System Manager should develop the walkdown strategy in accordance with the System Walkdown Guidelines and brief the SRR Team (see ATTACHMENT 2).
Walkdown findings and documentation of corrective action items completed should be recorded and compiled j for review.
7.3.2 Review Work Not to be Completed Prior to Restart for Impact on System Readiness 1
The System Team reviews the Restart Item List and applicable open Work Control Documents to ensure that deferred work is not required prior to restart.
l l 7.3.3 Present Final System Readiness Renort to the Restart Panel Prior to Plant Restart The Final System Readiness Report will be presented to the Restart Panel for approval.
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Restart Panel will comments shall be evaluated and
. incorporated into the report /re-presented (if required) and approved.
7.4 Phase 4 -
Startuo and Power Ascension 7.4.1 Monitor Startun System Activities for Affect on System Readiness Condition The System Manager will monitor startup system activities and focus on areas where corrective maintenance and enhancements were performed.
7.4.2 Review System Test Results The System Manager will review results of Work Requests (Post Maintenance Tests), SPs, pts, MAR Functional Tests for assigned system (s). Applicable departments are expected to provide data to the System Manager.
8.0 SYSTEM READTNESS ASSESSMENT PROCESS (Level 2) 8.1 Phase 1 -
Initial Syntam Readiness Review 8.1.1 Perform Initial System condition Assessment The System Manager / Engineer and System Operator will become familiar with the design and licensing basis of the system to gain an understanding of the system functional requirements. The current revisions of the following information sources will be readily available (other quality records, documents, procedures or reference information will be available as needed via Seek, DocView, FulText and other document search and retrieval systems): )
1 System Flow Diagrams FSAR (Current and pending)
ITS and Bases Design Basis Documents (Enhanced and Topical)
Plant work controls databases should be reviewed by the System Manager to gain a complete and consistent understanding of the system condition for comparison to the system functional requirements for readiness.
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1 The following documents are to be considered for ;
I , review: '
o OCRs 1
I o Open - REA, MAR, Work Requests, Problem Reports, NOTES, NOCs, NCOR's, and Precursors o Operator Workarounds o Outage Required PMs that will be overdue prior l to next pl'anned outage l Utilizing Figure 6, the System Manager and System Operator should develop a list of attributes to be included in the assessment on the System Readiness Review Matrix.
Corrective actions from SWSOPI (SW, RW, DC), EDSFI (MT and DP), and IPAP will be reviewed and evaluated to determine if additional attributes are to be added to the appropriate system assessment matrix.
Generic issues identified in Level 1 system reviews are also to be considered in Level 2 system reviews.
8.1.2 Assessment of System Attributes and Topic Areas The System Manager will evaluate specific system Attributes and Topic Review Areas in accordance with the Assessment Matrix. A sample attribute matrix and a discussion of typical attributes for a Level 2 system is provided in Figure 6. The System Manager will document positive and' negative comments and observations on an Attribute Assessment Form (Figure 3). An example of a completed Attribute Assessment Form is provided in Figure 4.
Each assessment form shall list the documentation reviewed or walkdown observations made to arrive at the assessment conclusions. The list of reviewed documents
(
shall contain revision numbers and/or date if applicable. The assessment forms shall describe the assessment and indicate the number of attribute checks covered by the assessment form and the number of attribute checks which resulted in identification of discrepancies.
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A summary of the evaluation for each attribute will be
. documented in the system readiness summary.
.1.3 Perform Multidiscipline Walkdown of System The System Manager should develop the walkdown strategy I in accordance with the System Walkdown Guidelines and brief the Walkdown Team (see ATTACHMENT 2). The walkdown team will consist of the system manager and system operator with support from maintenance and design as needed to address specific concerns.
Walkdown findings and initial corrective action items should be recorded by each team walkdown participant and compiled for review.
8.1.4 Identify and Evaluate Restart Action Items Data gathered in Sections 8.1.1 and 8.1.2 should be reviewed for design and licensing basis issues. This ;
review of information should be documented and included as part of the Initial System Readiness Review Summary.
8.1.5 Determine Restart Workscone Review open corrective action items against the Restart Issues Selection / Screening Criteria (see ATTACHMENT 1).
These items are to be evaluated for Restart Readiness scope.
The System Manager will recommend one of the following scope categories for restart action items to enable return of CR-3 in a safe, legal and efficient operation:
- a. RESTART RESTRAINT - Activities required to be completed prior to entering Startup/ Power Ascension.
- b. POST RESTART ACTIVITY - Activities which should be completed but are not required to be completed within any specified time frame. These items should be added to the normal plant work controls process.
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l These scope categories will be used to determine
. and schedule the work within the appropriate restart time frame.
1 8.1.6 Prepare Initial System Readiness Summary Information gathered throughout the review and walkdown i shall be compiled by the System Manager.
l The summary shall address the section requirements
. outlined in ATTACHMENT 5.
l l The summary is to be approved by the NPTS Manager and I
made available for Restart Accountability Team review if requested.
i 8.2 Phase 2 - Restart Activities Monitorina 8.2.1 Monitor Appropriate Work Control Documents for Restart Action Items Ensure items on the Restart Action Item List have appropriate Work Controls Documents (Work requests, REA's, RPA's, DCN's, etc.) initiated. Each document initiated is to specify the classification of the item (Restart Restraint or Post Restart Activity). The Approved Restart Action Item List will be transmitted to the departments requiring action.
8.2.2 Disposition Restart Action Items for comnletion The departments requiring actions will work through the System Manager and Scheduling for expected completion dates. .
Scheduling will incorporate the required items into the Plant Integrated Schedule. If conflicts or discrepancies are discovered, these items shall be brought to the System Manager's attention in an expeditious manner. Items requiring upper management review shall be presented to the Restart Accountability Team.
t
! 8.2.3 Monitor Restart Action Item Work Scope in Progress l
The System Manager shall maintain the status of the Restart Action Item List. Scheduling should be used to facilitate this action and informed of work status to
- ensure the Plant Integrated Schedule is accurate and ,
reviewed for possible conflicts. ;
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- L 8.2.4 Screen Emergent Issues for Inclusion in Action Item List The System Manager will maintain an awareness of issues i associated with the system and any Emergent activities ,
(Work Requests, OCRs, LERs, Notices / Bulletins, etc.) I associated with the system. The System Manager shall review these items to determine if an emergent activity should be recommended as a Restart Activity Item or Post Restart Activity. The System Manager shall j document recommended restart activities for Restart Accountability Team review.
Scheduling must be kept informed of the issue and if approved include the required activity into the Plant i Integrated Schedule.
I 8.2.5 Conduct Work in Procress Walkdowns of System The Team shall conduct walkdowns of the system based upon the type of work activity in progress. These walkdowns should be planned and documented in accordance with the System Readiness Review Program System Walkdown Guidelines (Attachment 2). The results of these walkdowns and any concerns noted shall be provided to the System Manager for review in an expeditious manner. The System Manager is to compile the walkdown results for inclusion into the Final System Readiness Report if required.
8.2.6 Update Database With Status as Items are Closed and New Items Issued The System Manager maintains the Open Items Database to ensure accuracy. This database is used to provide open Item status to the Team Members and Plant Management as required.
8.2.7 Provide Status of Restart Item Work Progress as Required by Plant Management j The System Manager provides the Restart Accountability j Team and the Restart Panel periodic status of Action Item Work. The periodicity is to be determined by-Plant Management.
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- 8.2.8 Start preparation of Final Svstem Readiness Summarv The System Manager should begin compiling Phase 2 data for inclusion in the Final System Readiness Summary.
This information should be reviewed against the screening criteria and the Initial System Readiness l Summary to ensure Restart Readiness of the system.
The summary report is to address the section requirements outlined in ATTACHMENT 6.
8.3 Phmaa 3 - Final System Randinams Review l 8.3.1 Conduct Final System Readiness Walkdowns l
The System Manager should develop the walkdown
( strategy in accordance with the System Walkdown Guidelines and brief the SRR Team (see ATTACHMENT 2) .
Walkdown findings and documentation of corrective action items completed should be recorded and compiled for review.
8.3.2 Review Work Not to be Completed Prior to Restart for Impact on System Readiness l
The System Team reviews the Action Item List and applicable open Work Control Documents to ensure that l deferred work is not required prior to restart.
l Potential cumulative impact of the deferred work will be considered.
8.3.3 Present Final System Readiness Summary l
The summary report is to be presented to the Restart i Panel for approval.
8.4 Phama 4 - Startue and Power Ascension 8.4.1 Monitor Startup System Activities for Affect on System Readiness Condition The System Manager will monitor startup system activities and focus on areas where corrective maintenance'and enhancements were performed.
8.4.2 Review System Test Results 26
The System Manager will review results of Work Requests
. (Post Maintenance Tests), SPs, pts, MAR Functional Tests for assigned system (s). Applicable departments '
are expected to provide data to the System Manager. )
9.0 SYSTEM mainINESS WATXn0WN PROCESS (Level 3) l l
l 9.1 Phase 1 - Tnitial System Readiness Review
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l 9.1.1 Perform Initial System Condition Assessment The System Manager / Engineer will review the FSAR, ITS, and DBD's if applicable to gain an understanding of the system functional requirements.
Plant work controls databases should be reviewed by the System Manager to gain a complete and consistent understanding of the system condition for comparison to the system functional requirements for readiness.
The following documents are to be considered for review:
o OCRs j
o Open - REA, MAR, Work Requests, Problem Reports, NOTES, NOCs, NCOR's, Precursors l l
1 o operator Workarounds o Outage Required PMs that will be overdue prior to next planned outage 9.1.2 Perform System Manager Walkdown of System The System Manager should develop the walkdown strategy in accordance with the System Walkdown Guidelines (see ATTACHMENT 2),
Walkdown findings and initial corrective action items
! should be recorded. l i
- 9.1.3 Identify and Evaluate Restart Action Items Data gathered in Sections 9.1.1 and 9.1.2 should be reviewed for design and licensing basis issues.
l 27 l
v This review of information should be documented and
. included as part of the Initial System Readiness Review Summary.
9.1.4 Determine Restart Workscone Review open corrective action items against the Restart Issues Selection / Screening Criteria (see ATTACHMENT 1).
These items are to be evaluated for Restart Readiness Scope.
The System Manager will recommend one of the following scope categories for Restart action items to enable return of CR-3 in a safe, legal and efficient operation:
- a. RESTART RESTRAINT - Activities required to be completed prior to entering Startup/ Power Ascension.
- b. POST RESTART ACTIVITY - Activities which should be completed but are not required to be completed within any specified time frame. These items should be added to the normal plant work controls process.
These scope categories will be used to determine and schedule the work within the appropriate restart time frame.
9.1.5 Prepare Initial System Readiness Summary Information gathered throughout the review and walkdown is to be compiled by the System Manager. l The summary is to address the section requirements outlined in ATTACHMENT 5.
The summary is to be approved by the NPTS Supervisor and made available for Manager NPTS review if requested.
9.2 Phmaa 2 - Restart Activity Monitorina 9.2.1 Monitor Appropriate Work control Documents for Restart Action Items I
28
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- Ensure items on the Restart Action Item List have appropriate Work Controls Documents (Work requests, REA's, RPA's, DCN's, etc.) initiated. Each document initiated is to specify the classification of the item (Restart Restraint or Post Restart Activity). The Restart Open Action Item List will be transmitted to the departments requiring action.
9.2.2 Disnosition Restart Action Items for comnletion The departments requiring actions will work through the System Manager and Scheduling for expected completion dates. Scheduling will incorporate the required items into the Plant Integrated Schedule. If conflicts or discrepancies are discovered, these items shall be brought to the System Manager's attention in an expeditious manner. Items requiring upper management review shall be presented to the Restart Accountability Team by the System Manager for resolution.
9.2.3 Monitor Restart Action Item Work Scope in Progresq The System Manager shall maintain the status of the Restart Action Item List. Scheduling should be used to facilitate this action and informed of work status to ensure the Plant Integrated Schedule is accurate and reviewed for possible conflicts.
9.2.4 Screen Fmergent Issues for Inclusion in Action Item List The Team Members shall keep the System Manager informed of any Emergent Issues (Work Requests, OCRs, LERs, Notices / Bulletins, etc.) associated with the system.
The System Manager shall review these items to determine if a Team review is required. If the Team review determines a Restart Restraint Activity is warranted, the System Manager shall present the activity to the Restart Accountability Team and the Restart Panel (as required) for inclusion in the Restart Action Item List.
Scheduling must be kept informed of the issue and if approved include the required activity into the Plant Integrated Schedule.
9.3 Phase 3 - Final System Readiness Review 29
V n -
9.3.1 Conduct Final System Readiness Walkdowns i
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i The System Manager should develop the walkdown strategy in accordance with the System Walkdown 4 Guidelines and brief the SRR Team (see ATTACHMENT 2).
Walkdown findings and documentation of corrective action items completed should be recorded and compiled i for review.
9.3.2 Review Work Not to be Completed Prior to Restart for Impact on System Readiness The System Team reviews the Action Item List and applicable open Work Control Documents to ensure that deferred work is not required prior to restart.
I 9.4 Phase 4 - Startup and Power Ascension
, r i
! 9.4.1 Monitor Startun System Activities for Effect on l System Readiness Condition l
The System Manager will monitor startup system l activities and focus on areas where corrective l l maintenance and enhancements were performed.
10.0 Intaarmted Svatam Readinaam Report l
The Nuclear Plant Technical Support (NPTS) Manager or l
- his designee shall prepare a report which integrates the results of the individual SRR efforts at each !
level: System Restart Certification (Level 1), System l
Restart Assessment Process (Level 2) and System Restart l Walkdown Process (Level 3). ;
! The integrated report shall describe results of extent of condition determinations and expansion of reviews if required, make recommendations if appropriate for further required programmatic evaluations or corrective actions.
The intent of this integrated report and associated i backup information is to provide assurance that the plant design, testing, maintenance, operation and
, configuration conforms to the licensing and design requirements and that the plant is in a condition to support plant operation for the next run cycle.
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The final integrated System Readiness Report will be
, ' presented to the Restart Panel for approval.
An outline of the integrated report will be provided in Attachment 8.
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1
c FIGURE 1: SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW MATRIX MAJOR T0PIC5
. - . - _g, -- --- . %; g I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 IS 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 IS 19 20 28 22 23 24 25 26 27 25 29 39 o pj;ij . , ,
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Figure 1 (continued) ,
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DESCRIPTION OF MAJOR TOPICS Design Basis
- 1. Electrical Cales/ Analysis: Calculations related to motors, electrical devices, circuits, and associated power supplies for system components shall be reviewed. The reviews should assess the appropriateness of design inputs, assumptions, and general approach. Also, calculation results should be l
verified for appropriate use in other design basis l
documents.
- 2. I&C Cales/ Analysis: Calculations.related to the performance, setpoints, and stability of I&C components and loops for
, system components shall be reviewed. The scope of the i reviews should be the same as for electrical calculations.
- 3. Mech and Struct Cales/ Analysis: Calculations related to i hydraulics, heat transfer, equipment / support loads,
- equipment / pipe stresses, and other mechanical performance
' issues related to system components shall be reviewed. The scope of the reviews should be the same as for electrical i calculations.
- 4. Accident Analyses: Analysis of FSAR Ch. 14 events shall be reviewed for assumptions regarding system performance and conditions.
l 5. Drawings: Controlled drawings documenting system design, configuration, layout, and conformance to programs (e.g., i l Appendix R, testing, and EQ) shall be reviewed for system l design basis information and system interaction / dependency information. Drawings that are excluded from this topic are l l the Safety Functional Diagrams and Safety Logic Diagrams j (covered in Topic 6), 302-series and 208-series drawings l (covered in Topic 25), and vendor drawings (covered in Topic l 20). l l
- 6. Safety Func/ Logic Diagrams: The safety functional diagrams j and safety logic diagrams shall be reviewed for system i design basis information and system interaction / dependency ;
information.
- 7. CMIS: The Configuration Management Information System data j for system components shall be verified to be consistent with other design basis documents. A sampling of cross-
~
referenced documents shall be verified to be current,
. applicable, and appropriate.
- 8. Specifications: Equipment design, procurement, and installation specifications shall be reviewed for system design basis information. General design specifications shall also be reviewed for system design basis information.
- 9. EDBDs/TBDs/ABDs: Related basis documents shall be reviewed for system design basis requirements, identification of possible cross-referenced documents, and appropriate applicability.
- 10. Change Documents /50.59 Reviews: Change documents, including MARS, DCNs, and FSAR changes, shall be assessed for package completeness, appropriate use of design basis information, appropriate consideration of interdisciplinary impact / input, and effective follow through (changes made or posted against the appropriate documents). 50.59 applicability evaluations and 50.59 reviews shall be reviewed to assess whether conclusions are defensible.
- 11. Temporary Mods: Temporary modifications shall be reviewed to verify that they were evaluated against appropriate design basis information and do not result in an unreviewed safety question. Also, the temporary modification shall be assessed to assure the duration is not excessive.
i Licensing Documents '
- 12. FSAR Review: Chapters related to the system, interfacing systems (e.g., power distribution, I&C, and support systems), accident analyses, and applicable design criteria shall be reviewed for design and licensing basis information.
- 13. ITS/ Bases: LCOs, Surveillance requirements, and their bases l for the system and its components shall be reviewed for l design and licensing requirements. Other appropriate sections (e.g., for interfacing systems, EQ-related, and '
containment isolation-related) should also be reviewed for system / component design requirements.
- 14. Licensing Commitments: NOTES items, open items from NRC l inspections, commitments in the license (and not in the FSAR l or ITS), and other commitments made to the NRC by )
correspondence shall be reviewed for additional licensing !
basis requirements. !
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- 15. Notices / Bulletins: NRC generic communications and i . evaluations and responses to them related to the system I
shall be reviewed for additional design basis requirements i i and information. i l
i
. operations 1
- 16. Procedures: Operating and emergency operating procedures l related to the system shall be reviewed for design basis information.
i
- 17. Operator Workarounds: Operator workarounds shall be reviewed for impact on system operation or performance. The impact should be assessed against the design basis information. !
l
- 18. Industry Operating Experience Reviews: Industry experience reviews related to the system shall be assessed for completeness and compared to current design basis information.
Maintenance I l 19. Maintenance Procedures: Procedures for the overhaul of or !
general repair of system components shall be reviewed for appropriate use of design basis information. Also, completed work documentation, including any applicable data sheets, should also be assessed for adequacy of the use of the procedure. This topic does no~ cover preventive maintenance activities (covered by Topic No. 21) and surveillance type procedures (covered by Topic No. 22).
- 20. Vendor Technical Information: Vendor technical manuals, vendor drawings, and design data forwarded by the vendor related to system components shall be reviewed for design basis information.
- 21. Preventive Maintenance: Regularly scheduled maintenance work items to assure proper equipment operation, including calibrations, lubrication, and filter flushing / changing, shall be reviewed for appropriate schedules, timeliness of performing the activity, and appropriate use of materials.
, Procedures, maintenance scheduling, and work documentation shall be reviewed.
Surveillances
- 22. Surveillance Tests & Inspections: Procedures for tests and inspections required to verify compliance with ITS l
l
Surveillance Requirements for system components shall be
, reviewed to assess compliance with the ITS and its Bases, appropriate methodology, and consistency with other design basis information. Results of surveillance tests shall also be reviewed for compliance with design basis information.
- 23.Section XI IST/ Performance Tests: Procedures for Inservice testing of system pumps and valves and other performance tests (e.g., heat exchanger performance tests, Mov tests, special pump / system performance tests) shall be reviewed for appropriate use of design basis information. Results of the tests shall also be reviewed for compliance with design basis information.
Physical Plant
- 24. As-Built Verifications: Walkdowns of the system to verify design basis information, system layout, system condition, component configuration, interactions with other systems, and other characteristics shall be performed based on checklists developed from the documentation reviews.
25, 302/208 Drawings: Critical drawings for operators, such as the 302-series and the 208-series drawings shall be reviewed ,
for design basis information. Also, the timeliness-of the )
incorporation of changes to these drawings should be assessed.
- 26. Surveillance Programs: Surveillances not associated with Topics 22 or 23, such as Erosion / Corrosion, Fire Protection, or HELB, shall be reviewed for. direct or indirect applicability to the system and its components. Results of the surveillances should be assessed against design basis information.
Programs, Process, & Procedures
- 27. PC/REA/PR Corrective Actions: Precursor cards, Requests for Engineering Assistance, Problem Reports, and other l corrective action program reports related to the system shall be assessed for appropriate evaluation of problem, generic considerations, appropriate resolution, timeliness of resolution, and adverse trends. l
- 28. QA Audits & Other Assessments: QA audits, EDSFIs, SSFIs, I and other similar system or program assessments related to the system shall be reviewed to assess effectiveness of the audit, appropriate resolution, timeliness of resolution, and adverse trends.
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! 29. . Training Lesson Plans: Operations and engineering training lesson plans for the system shall be reviewed for l consistency with design basis information and operating l procedures.
- 30. Open Items (Backlog) : Maintenance, engineering, and operations open items related to the system shall be ,
l assessed for quantity and duration of items' open status.
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c FIGURE 2: SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW MATRIX EFW SYSTEM EXAMPLE .
MAJOR TOPICS optaATIONE I" twsscN mAses MAINTENANCE 50RV.
I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 19 Il 12 13 14 15 16 17 IS 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
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l l"l i p hp i i fllIl l ASSESSMENT ATTRIBUTES X
P !
X X X X l
X X X X i
X X X X X X b
EFUI Waeer Supply EFUI Pumps EFP-1 and EFP-2 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X EFU3 Initiation and Control X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X EF04 EFP-2 Thrbine and Sicam Supply X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X EH)S EFW Control Valves EFV-55. 56,57. 53 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X ER16 OTSG Isolat%n X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X EFU7 EFW/EFIC overall swem X X X X X X X X X X X X X EFC2 Pipina Desian X X X X X X X ERN Containment Isolation X X X X X X X EF10 Sicion Blackout Operation X X X X X X X X EFil MF1HE Line Breaks X X X X X X X i
EFIR Enrironmental Qualification X X X X X X X X X X X X X EFl3 Appendix R X X X X X X X EFI4 Electrical Separation X X X X X X X X EFIS Seismic Oualification X X X X X X X X
V 3 .
Figure 2 (continued)
ATTRIBUTE SELECTION BASIS System Attributes EF01 Water Supply: An adequate water supply inventory is required for the EFW system to remove decay heat from the RCS following events resulting in a loss of main feedwater.
Issues related to water volume and level indication, switchover to other sources, and overpressure / vacuum pressure are to be assessed.
EF02 Pumps EFP-I and EFP-2: The pumps are critical components for d'alivery of EFW flow. Issues related to pump perfc rmance, N PS'.f , mininum flow requirements, motor and power supplies, and desagn requirements are to be assessed. l EF03 Initiation and Control: The Emergency Feedwater Initiation and Control System is required to automatically initiate the i system to assure adequate decay heat removal and to allow !
control of cooldown rates. Issees related to initiation and control setpoints, instrumentatica, flow controller design and stability, level controller design and stability, and l operator interfaces with the system are to be assessed. l EF04 EFP-2 Turbine and Stea.: Supply: The turbine driver for EFP-2 and its steam supply are critical components for the operation of EFP-2, have been involved in recent j modifications, and has had negative industry experience.
Issues related to steam line warming and draining, ASV-5 and ,
-204 design and operation, speed control, overspeed I protection, and pump alignment are to be assessed.
EF05 EFW Control Valves EFV-55, 56, 57, 58: The control valves are critical to limit flow to specified limits to achieve adequate decay heat removal and to minimize overcooling of the RCS. Issues related to valve and actuator design requirements, power supplies, and positioning capability are to be assessed.
EF06 OTSG Isolation: Protection against overfilling the steam generators is required to protect main steam piping.
Isolation of EFW flow to a depressurized steam generator is necessary to assure adequate flow delivery to the good steam generator for decay heat removal.
V l EF07,EF/EFIC Overall System: The system demands and configuration differ based on the plant conditions, such as the need for natural RCS circulation, equipment availability, and decay heat levels. Also, the system interfaces with other systems (e.g. , main steam, Class 1E power supplies). Both of these conditions impact system operability and single failure potential. Issues related system demands / operation, system configurations, single failure scenarios, and system interfaces are to be assessed.
Generic Attributes l
EF08 Piping Design: Changes in piping design criteria since original plant design typically result in confusion in piping design, installation, and inspection for existing )
l piping and new piping installations. Issues related to 1 buried pipe, classification boundaries, design temperatures and pressures, and pipe stress / support loads are to be assessed for the EFW system.
EF09 Containment Isolation: Concerns regarding the design, maintenance, and testing of containment isolation features are relatively common throughout the industry. Issues related to the applicability of EFW and FW valves in the j lines to the upper EFW nozzles on the steam generators and related Appendix J requirements are to be assessed.
l EF10 Station Blackout Operation: Significant effort has been made by the industry to address rules regarding loss of all AC power. The EFW system is an important system to cope with this event. Issues related to water supply, flow control and manual actions for the EFW system are to be assessed.
EF11 ME/HE Line Breaks: The EFW system should be protected from the effects of medium energy and high energy line breaks.
Line break issues are interdisciplinary, involving piping design, environmental qualification, flooding, barrier design, and accident analyses. Consistracy among these issues and impact on system design basis are to be assessed for a sample of system components.
EF12 Environmental Qualification: EQ is a highly regulated i
program to assure system operation during design basis accidents. Compliance with the program and impact on design basis shall be assessed for a sample of system components.
.g .
EF13 Appendix R: Appendix R is a highly regulated program that t , required significant utility effort to address. Compliance with the requirements and the impact on design basis are to be assessed for a sample of system components.
EF14 Electrical Separation: Redundant electrical trains and instrument channels are required to be separated per Reg Guide 1.75. Compliance with the requirements and the impact on design basis are to be assessed for a sample of system components.
EF15 Seismic Qualification: The Emergency Feedwater System is classified Seismic Category I in accordance with Reg Guide 1.29. Compliance with seismic requirements and impact on i design basis are'to be assessed for a sample of system i components, l
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t Figure 3 l
Readiness Review Attribute Assessment Form Reviewer l l Date l l Item Number Reviewer Number l l System l l Attribute Number i j Attribute Desenption l Attribute Attribute Checks PCs Checks PCs Electrical Cales/ Analyses ! l ll l Operating Procedures 16 j ll j I&C Cales/ Analyses 2 l ll l Operator Work Around.: 17 l ll l Mech /Struct Cales/ Analyses 3 l ll l Industry Operating Experience Reviews 18 l ll l Accident Analyses 4 l ll l MaintenanceProcedures 19 l ll l Drawings 5 l ll l Vendor /TechmcalInformation 20 l ll l Safety Func/ Logic Diagrams 6 l ll l Preventive Maintenance 21 l ll l l
CMIS 7 l ll l Surveillance Test and Inspection 22 l ll l Specifications 8 l ll l Section XIIST/ Performance 1ests 23 l l C EDBDs/TBDs/ABDs 9 l )l l As-Built Verification 24 l ll l Change Docs /50.59 Reviews 10l ll l 302208 Drswmgs 25 l ll l Temporary Mods 11l ll l Surveillance Programs 26 l ll l FSAR Review 12l ll l PC/REA/PR Corrective Action 27 l ll l ITS/ Bases 13l ll l QA Audits and Other Assessments 28 l ll l Licensing Commitments 14l ll l Traimng Lesson Plans 29 l ll l l Notices and Bulletms 15l ll l Open Items (Backlog) 30 l ll l PC Number 1
l Documents Reviewed l
Attribute Assessment
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Figure 4 1
Readiness Review Attribute Assessment Form Rewswer l Russell Dete l 2/5/97 l ltem Number Reviewer Number l ABRO1 l System l EF l Attribute Number l EF01' l l
Attnbute Desenption l EFT-2 DEDICATED VOLUME DESIGN BASIS l
Attribute Attribute Checks PCs Checks PCs Electncal Cales/ Analyses 1 l0 l l0 l Operatmg Procedures 16 l0 l l0 l I&C Cales/ Analyses 2 l0 l l0l Operator Work Arounds 17 l0l l0l Mech /Struct Cales/ Analyses 3 l0 l l0 l Industry Operating Experience Reviews 18 l0l l0 l Accxtent Analyses 4 l0 l l0 l Maintenance Procedures 19 l0 l l0 l Drawings 5 !0 ! l0 l VendorfferhnicalInformation 20 l0l l0 l Safety Func/ Logic Diagrams 6 l0 l l0 l Preventive Maintenance 21 l0 l l0 l CMIS 7 l0l l0 l Surveillance Test and Inspection 22 l0 l l0 l Specifications 8 l0 l l0 l Section XIIST/ Performance Tests 23 l0l l0 l EDBDsffBDs/ABDs 9 l1 l l1 l As-Built Venfication 24 l0 l l0l Change Docs /50.59 Reviews 10 l 1 l l0l 302/208 Drawings 25 l0 l l0 l Temporary Mods !Il 0 l l0 l Surveillance Programs 26 l0 l l0 l FSAR Review 12 l 1 l l0 l PC/REA/PR Corrective Action 27 l0 l l0 l ITS/ Bases !) l l l l0 l QA Audits and Other Assessments 28 l0 l l0l Licensiag Commitments 14 l 1 l l0 l Training Lesson Plans 29 l0 l l0 l l Notices and Bulletins 15 j 0 l l0 l Open Items (Backlog) 30 l0l l0 l PC Number IPC97 'm? to provide basis f,r the statement that 150,000 gallons is sufTscient to remove decay heat for 18 hours2.083333e-4 days <br />0.005 hours <br />2.97619e-5 weeks <br />6.849e-6 months <br />.
_I Documents Reviewed l it. EDBD 6-13, " Emergency feedwater", Sections 2.0 and 3.0, Rev. 4.
'2. FSAR 10.5.3, Rev. 23
- 3. ITS 3.7.6 and Bases, Amendment 149.
- 4. FPC Letter 3F018714 to the NRC dated 1/15/87, *Genene letter 8121 and NUREG 0737, Item II.E.1.1" l [ MAR 82-09-19 01," Install 184,000 gallon Tank" Attnbute Assessment
!!TS 3.7.6 and its Bases states that the mttumum required water volume of 150,000 gallons for EFT-2 is sufficient to remove decay heat tfor 18 hours2.083333e-4 days <br />0.005 hours <br />2.97619e-5 weeks <br />6.849e-6 months <br /> at MODE 3 (HOT STANDBY). The bases references FSAR section 10 5.3 for this statement. FSAR 10.5.3, EDBD isection 2.0, and EDBD section 3.0 are consistent with the ITS bases.
I
'The EDBD section 3.0 references Letter 3F018714 as the basis for this statement. Attachment A of the letter includes clanfications hf the existmg Technical Specification 3.7-6 which requtres a nummum of 150,000 gallons in the Condensate l tank to be operable (EFT-2 had not been installed at this time, and the CST was the pnmary water supply for the EFW pumps). The
!clanfication stated that the volume was sufficient for HOT STANDBY cooling for about 18 hours2.083333e-4 days <br />0.005 hours <br />2.97619e-5 weeks <br />6.849e-6 months <br />, assuming conservative decay heat igeneration rates However, no calculation could be found that established the volume needed to remove decay heat for 18 hours2.083333e-4 days <br />0.005 hours <br />2.97619e-5 weeks <br />6.849e-6 months <br /> at HOT STANDBY.
Page 1
l Figure 4 C:nt.
Readiness Review Attribute Assessment Form Reviewer l Russell l Date l 2/5/97 l Item Number Reviewer Number l ABRO1 l System l EF l Attribute Number l EF01 !
l Attnbute Descdption l EFT-2 DEDICATED VOLUME DESIGN BASIS l it appears from the 3F0187-14 letter that the EFT 2 was sized to provide the same required minimum volume as the condensate
, storage tank. MAR 82-09-19-01 installs EFT 2 but does not clearly indicate this as a design basis requirement. The basis for the 18 Ihour decay heat cooling capacity of EFT-2 needs to be established.
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FIGURE 5 GRADED APPROACH FOR SYSTEM ASSESSMENT l
I SyWem SyMem SyMem Readiness Readiness Readiness ss Certification Assessment Walkdown (Level 1) (Level 2) (Level 3)
Project System Engineer System App e Team System Operator Manager l
Review Design & Licensing Yes Focused Open items Documentation Review System Materiel Yes Yes Yes i Condition Documentation -
As-Found System Condition Project System Engineer System Walkdown Team System Operator Manager identification of Deficiencies Yes Yes Yes Disposition, Tracking &
Yes Yes Yes Reporting Restart Restraints As-Left System Condition Yes Yes Yes Walkdown Final System System Final l Reporting Requirements Readiness Readiness Walkdown l
Report Summary Summary l
Tumover to Operations Yes Yes Yes i
9 FIGURE 6: EXAMPLE SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW MATRIX ,
FOR LEVEL 2 SYSTEMS MAJOR TOPICS '
DESIGN DOCIMENTS OPERATIONS MAINTENANCR SUltV.
PstoctDumas ,
t 2 3- 4 5 6 7 8 9 19 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 29 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 s
[ ASSESSMENT NITRIBUTES n- .
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Overall System X X X X X X X X X X X l l
Ilydraulic Functionality X X X [
IIcat Transfer Functionality X X X !
Pir4ngStructrual X X t i
Pumps X X X Control (IAC) X X X '
Electrical Power X X X X X X X X 2110f97
w- 3 Figure 6 (continued)
. I ATTRIBUTE SELECTION BASIS l Attributes i
The following attributes shall be considered by the system l manager as examples in formulating the assessment matrix for a Level 2 system. The specific attributes will vary between specific systems, but in all cases should cover the fundamental functional requirements for the system and the critical. components that provide that functionality.
01 Overall System: The overall system requirements not covered under the individual attributes assessed below will be addressed. Issues to be considered include system demands and configuration differences based on variable plant conditions, such as equipment availability. Issues related to single failure scenarios, and system interfaces are to be i
assessed.
I l 02 Hydraulic Functionality: System flow, pressure, pressure 1 drop and temperature requirements will be identified and ,
I compared to system capability. Issues related to valve and I actuator design requirements, power supplies, and positioning capability are also to be assessed.
03 Heat Transfer Functionality: Heat transfer requirements for the system will be identified and compared to system capability. Issues to be addresses will include fouling margin for heat exchangers and monitoring of degradation of system performance.
04 Piping and Structural Design: Issues related to classification boundaries, design temperatures and pressures, and pipe stress / support loads are to be assessed for the system.
! 05 Pumps: The pumps are critical components for delivery of
. flow. Issues related to pump performance, NPSH, minimum flow requirements, motor and power supplies, and design requirements are to be assessed.
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06 Control and Instrumentation: Issues related to initiation
,and control setpoints, instrumentation, flow controller
( design and stability, level controller design and stability, l and operator interfaces with the system are to be assessed.
l 07 Electrical Power: Requirements for quality of power supply,
! and for redundant electrical trains and instrument channels
! are to be assessed.
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u ATTACMSNT 1
, (Page 1 of 1) l RESTART ISSUES l SELECTION / SCREENING CRITERIA l
l 1. Required to directly address the purpose for outage l extension (design margin improvement of selected
( safety systems) l i
- 2. ' Required to determine the " Extent of Condition" of l our design issues
- 3. Required to address organization, programmatic or i
process deficiency that led to the design margin condition t
- 4. Required to address a current operability issue
- 5. Required to address a significant equipment materiel. condition or reliability deficiency (especially repetitive failure) i l
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l ATTACHMENT 2 (Page 1 of 6)
SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM SYSTEM WALKDOWN GUIDELINES l
Purpose:
This walkdown guideline is to be used as a reference while conducting the System Readiness Review Team (or individual) l walkdowns. .
General Meehnds l 1. Define the purpose of the walkdown, areas to be l visited / observed, roles of the individual team members, and
! assistance from Health Physics or other departments to access areas.
- 2. Plan the walkdown execution and implementation.
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- 3. Brief the team on the purpose and plan.
- 4. Conduct the walkdown. Focus the team on observation of equipment. Work independently and d;ucuss concerns for clarity. Take concise and accurate notes to quantify and l
describe findings in sufficient detail to prevent having to walkdown the item twice.
! 5. Conduct a formal post walkdown briefing. Review the notes, 1
discuss issues and document the results. Identify any impact on equipment or system operation. Immediate concerns are to be identified to the engineering supervisor and SSOD.
, 6. Develop a work list for items that need to be completed for the system to meet its intended design function.
The items 1 l are to be documented for disposition and tracking.
Guidelines:
l 1. The team (led by the System Manager) is to outline the system walkdown strategy. Key system components and system l concerns are to be identified.
- 2. The team is to identify necessary operational or plant configuration drawings to accompany the team during the walkdown.
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ATTACHMENT 2 (Page 2 of 6)
SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW PROGRAM i SYSTEM WALKDOWN GUIDELINES Guidelines (cont'd)
- 3. Throughout the walkdown, the team is to function as a j cohesive unit, maintaining a team focus on individual system ;
i components or specific system areas.
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- 4. The walkdown is to focus on equipment reliability or j operability issues as well as conformance with system design l configuration and design bases. Other conditions should be l l noted during the walkdown.
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- 5. Each team member is expected to record detailed notes of issues or concerns identified during the walkdown.
- 6. Examples of team focus areas include:
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+ Condition of snubbers, pipe supports, hangers and fasteners l
+ Condition and placement of coatings and insulation
+ Evidence of corrosion
+ Evidence of boric acid or boric acid buildup especially on carbon steel components and material wastage
+ Unauthorized modifications, partial modifications or temporary modifications not in accordance with station programs
+ Surface condition of visible structural welds
+ Condition of barrier or penetration seals
+ Use of unauthorized chemicals on components '
l + Evidence of bolt torque relaxation
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+ Evidence of discoloration on relays, cable insulation or electrical components
+ Unauthorized or expired scaffolding, scaffolding in unauthorized locations or impacting equipment performance
+ Hoses or other connections from vents or drains l
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ATTACHMENT 2 (Page 3 of 6)
- 7. The following is a general list of electrical equipment physical plant inspection items:
PLPETRICAL PANRT.R EOUIPMENT
+ *:dentify missing water plugs or holes / opening in cabinets l
(water or moisture intrusion can degrade or damage equipment)
+ Identify miss'ing or loose bolts or thumb screws (if missing can violate seismic evaluation and it is not good work practice)
- Identify open doors or back panels (ensure properly closed and j latched otherwise can violate seismic evaluation or allow dirt, water, etc. to enter panel)
+ Identify dirt or debris on top of or in panels (cleanliness of circuit boards, modules, relays, cabinets; qualitative impact on heat transfer)
+ Identify mis-positioned breaker switches (anything that is different)
+ Identify proper labeling on key component breakers / switches (accurate and legible per controlled drawings; also includes modules, relays, conduit)
+ Identify dirt or debris covering cooling gratings or filters (if blocked can prevent cooling and cause heat buildup and subsequent equipment degradation)
+ Feel panels and equipment enclosures where appropriate to check for excessive heat buildup (Can be an indication of degraded equipment, initiate request for thermography check)
- Check cable trays. Cable should not be hanging outside of cable tray (can overstress cable tray)
+ check cables and conduit for degradation (cracked, brittle, chafed, bend radius, wet conduit, etc.)
+ Check MCCs overall for anything that is different
+ Note any deficiency tags, especially old tags not being worked. These may need increased priority or have had work completed but the tags have not been removed
+ Check for any abnormal sounds or smells coming from the l cabinet (may indicate degraded equipmert) l + Verify equipment grounding cable is connected and intact
+ Look at general materiel condition of cabinet (rust, dirt, consider qualitative impact on heat transfer)
! + Inspect seismic supports and trays
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- 7. FLFETRICAL PANET A EOUIPMENT (Cont'd)
+ Inspect overall condition of temninal strips and mechanical connections (lug landings)
+ Inspect conduit and junction boxes for external damage, loose conduit connections and missing parts and fasteners
+ Inspect solenoid valves and motor covers for evidence of damage or equipment degradation
+ Inspect meter or gauges for visual degradation l + Cathodic Protection (Proper configuration and operation)
- 8. The following is a general list of mechanical l equipment physical plant inspection items:
MECHANICAL COMPONENTS
+ Identify any abnormal sounds or smells coming from pump or motor operation l + Bearing housings and motors and pumps are to be inspected for signs of excessive heat or vibration l + Look at general material condition of pump or motor for steam, oil, water leaks, proper levels in oil reservoirs or sight l glasses (and properly marked), missing insulation, proper conduit installation
+ Identify pinned hangers
+ Inspect system gauges for proper operation or typical values l + Look for pump rotation or reverse rotation if part of a dual train common header system (could indicate check valve degradation or isolation valves leaking by)
- Identify dirt or debris covering cooling gratings or filters l (if blocked can prevent cooling and cause heat buildup and l subsequent equipment degradation) l + Note any deficiency tags especially old tags not being worked.
l These may need increased priority or have had work completed but the tags have not been removed
+ check equipment skid / foundation bolting. Are all bolts present and have proper thread engagement?
+ Review trends of parameters on key system equipment, visually inspect identified equipment with degraded performance
+ visually inspect for old leak repair fittings, ensure T-MARS
- exist to restore components with leak repair fittings Equipment Labeling / tags (Accurate and legible per controlled drawings) l
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ATTACHMENT 2 (Page 5 of 6) i 9. The following list contains Ematerial conditions indicating equipment operability issues:
OPERABTLTTY ISSUES
+ Leaks (water, steam, oil, air - packing, flanges, rust on components or floor) i
+ Lubrication (sight glasses, bull's eyes, grease cups, grease fittings, valve stems)
+ Handwheels/ valve operators (missing, key or pin missing, unlocked, not labeled)
+ Filters, screen or louvers (clogged, dirty, missing)
+ Instruments or gauges (out of calibration, inoperable, bent pointers)
+ Drains or drain holes (clogged, blocked, full, screens or grating missing)
+ Lines or Pipes (loose, unbracketed, vibrating, insulation missing or damaged)
+ Fasteners / bolts (loose, striped, missing)
+ Indicating lamps (missing, burned out, missing covers)
+ control room annunciators
+ Panels (covers missing, bolt missing or not tightened, dirt and debris inside)
+ Area lighting (bulbs missing or burned out, inadequate to support activities)
+ Look for consistency between similar parameters l + Packing (bottomed out, out of adjustment, dirty or rusted glands)
+ Cables or leads (unsecured, worn or frayed insulation, improper terminations)
+ Motors or generators (dirty, brush rigging pigtails broken, carbon dust, excessive noise or vibration, ground straps loose or missing)
+ Preservation (rust, corrosion, missing or damage insulation or lagging)
+ check valves (oscillating lever, banging, stuck open)
+ MOVs (lubricant leaks, missing plugs)
+ Valves (dried grease caked on stem, packing or stem leaks, bent stem) i
l ATTACHMENT 2 (Page 6 of 6)
- 10. The following is a general list of additional inspection l
items that apply to both mechanical and electrical i equipment:
MECMANICAL OR FT.FCTRICAL EQUIPMENT l
+ Identify inadequate or degraded structural components
+ Inspect system piping for evidence of water hammer, severe transients, or improper venting. Damaged supports, base plate grouting, anchors (pulled-out or deformed) are to be identified for further root cause analysis
+ Inspect for unauthorized loads supported from cable trays, conduits or piping systems l + Identify undocumented system modifications
! + Identify damaged heat trace, and damaged or missing insulation i l + Note piping exhibiting cyclical vibration for possible high cycle fatigue concerns
+ Safety Postings, Radiological Postings (Properly positioned, l
legible and understandable) l
+ Inspect for adequate separation for independent electrical trains I l
+ Identify nameplate information and compare to design basis information
- 11. The System Manager is to ensure team members record identified walkdown issues on Attribute Assessment Forms (Figure 3). The System Manager is responsible to ensure j that any discrepancies identified have appropriate follow-up 1
corrective actions initiated to resolve these issues.
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l ATTACHMENT 3 (Page 1 of 3) l l !
l INITIAL SYSTEM READINESS REPORT FORMAT I 1
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Section I l
Purpose Statement System Functions / Scope: Outline the system design function and def ne system boundaries included with the Readiness Review Scope i
1 System Readiness Review
+ Reference design basis documentation reviewed
+ License basis documentation reviewed 1
Sucaary of Findings i
+ Design Basis / License Basis Concerns
+ Summary of evaluation work scope determination, Power l Ascension, Post-Restart, Canceled Action Items l l \
+ Walkdown Results/ Report: Strategy, new open corrective action
! items
! + Aggregate impact of deferred work
! + Generic program, process <and procedural concerns l Summary of Actions to Disposition Corrective Actions I
+ Planning and Scheduling
- Performance Indicators
+ Emergent Work Items l
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INITIAL SYSTEM READINESS REPORT FORMAT l l I
I Section II l l
- Evaluation Results for Attributes, including design l basis / licensing basis Section TTI l
+ Walkdown Results l
i j h tien TV - Rafarances '
l l . Appendicas
- A. Figure showing boundaries of system review
+ B. Assessment Matrix - Record of completed evaluations supporting the System Readiness Review
+ C. Attributes, Bases for Attributes and Summary of Results
+ D. Summary of Discrepancies l
+ E. Individual Assessment Forms l
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ATTACHMENT 3 (Page 3 of 3)
INITIAL SYSTEM READINESS REPORT COVER SHEET l
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System Title l
l System Manager Signature /Date System Operator Signature /Date NPTS Manager Signature /Date l Restart Accountability Team Signature /Date Restart Panel Chairman, Signature /Date l
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ATTACHMENT 4 FINAL LEVEL 1 SYSTEM READINESS REPORT The final Level 1 System Readiness Report:
documents the status of the restart required items identified in the initial system readiness report
- provides the results of the final system walkdowns, identifies any new discre}?ncies and their status 1
- identifies how any generic issues or weaknesses identified i during the Level 1 reviews have been addressed for this system
- provides the basis for reasonable assurance that the system is within its licensing and design bases prior to startup
- discusses the cumulative impact of work that is deferred in this system until after restart.
A detailed outline that defines the format of the final system readiness report will be developed for use by System Readiness Review Team members.
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V ATTACHMENT 5 INITIAL LEVEL 2 SYSTEM READINESS
SUMMARY
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i The Initial System Readiness Summary for the Level 2 systems will follow a similar format to that of the Level 1 system report, as described in Attachment 3. The level of detail in the report will be consistent with the level of detail included in the assessment.
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l The Level 2 system reviews will assess system functional requirements and will focus on the sources of information j l identified in Figure 6 as well as any generic problem areas i identified during the Level 1 reviews. The Level 2 reviews will not focus on assessing adequacy of programs and processes, since these will already have been assessed in the Level I reviews.
i A detailed outline that defines the format of the initial Level 2 system readiness report will be developed for use by System
! Readiness Review Team members. l l
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ATTACHMENT 6
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1 FINAL LEVEL 2 SYSTEM READINESS
SUMMARY
The Final System Readiness Summary for the Level 2 systems will follow a similar format to that of the Level 1 system report, as discussed in Attachment 4. The level of detail in the report l will be consistent with the level of detail included in the assessment.
l A detailed outline that defines the format of the final Level 2 system readiness report will be developed for use by System Readiness Review Team members.
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ATTACEMENT 7 i LEVEL 1 SELECTION CRITERIA RESULTS COMPARISON
- SYSTENS CONSIDERED FOR LEVEL 1 (SYSTEN READINESS CERTIFICATION) l BASED ON MULTIPLE FISSION PRODUCT BARRIERS, WITE CONSIDYJtATION I l GIVEN TO :
l ANALYTICAL PROCESS
- ENGINEERING JUDGEMENT PREVIOUS ASSESSMENT RESULTS l
- 1. Makeup in Purification System. This system was selected as a LEVEL 1 based on several factors.
l e HPI design margin was an issue that resulted in the current extended plant shutdown.
e The Readiness Review Significance Evaluation used to support the fission product barrier methodology indicated l a high Readiness Review Significance (198.72).
o HPI is an ECCS system, o The only significant assessment activity accomplished previously is Quality Assessment Report 95-02-MAKP.
- 2. Decay Heat System. This system was selected as LEVEL 1 based l on several factors.
e LPI design margin was an issue that resulted in the current extended plant shutdown.
1 o The Readiness Review Significance Evaluation used to support the fission product barrier methodology indicated a high Readiness Review Significance (197.29).
- 3. Core Flood System. Core Flood is not risk significant based on the current PSA model, and as such, has a Readiness Review l Significance Factor of 54.80. Because however, HPI is an ECCS ;
system it was evaluated to be a Level 1 system.
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- 4. Energency Feedwater Systemt This system was selected as LEVEL 1 based on several factors. ;
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e EF design margin was an issue that resulted in the I current extended plant shutdown.
e The Readiness Review Significance Evaluation used to support the fission product barrier methodology indicated a high Readiness Review Significance (103.97).
e Based on recent SBLOCA analysis and discussions with FTI, EF is considered an ECCS system.
- 5. Emergency Feedwater Initiation & Control Systemi This system was selected based on several factors.
e The Readiness Review Significance Evaluation used to support the fission product barrier methodology indicated a high Readiness Review Significance (46.40). Because recently identified dependencies between EFP-2 and EGDG-1A may not be properly reflected in the existing PSA ;
model, EFIC was considered a Level 1 system. i e The EFIC control system has been the subject of many design reviews and control weaknesses have been identified. Operator Workaround items and the complexity of the system are other factors in the decision to consider EFIC a level 1 system.
- 6. mnergency Diesel Generator & Support Systests This system was selected based on several factors, o EGDG-1A margin was an issue that resulted in the current extended plant shutdown.
e The Readiness Review Significance Evaluation used to 4 support the fission product barrier methodology indicated a high Readiness Review Significance (101.23).
- 7. Engineered Safeguards This system was selected based on several factors.
e The Engineered Safeguards System controls the auto connected loads associated with the 4160 ES Busses following LOOP and LOCA scenarios. As such, the Emergency Diesel Generator loading is dependant on the ES system. Since design margin of EGDG-1A was an issue that resulted in the current extended plant shutdown, the ES system warrants consideration.
e The Readiness Review Significance Evaluation used to support the fission product barrier methodology indicated a high Readiness Review Significance (120.05).
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- 8. Reactor Coolant System Further review of the selection j criteria results indicates that despite the initial decision not to select this system, it should be considered as a level l 1 system. Based on this re-evaluation, RC System is now a l level 1 system. This basis is described below.
l e The RC system has undergone 682 10CFR50.59 review opportunities. Significantly more than any other safety ,
i related/ risk significant system. This aspect factored 1
- into the Readiness Review Significance factor results in !
, the highest f actor of all systems (262.10) .
- 9. Air Bandling Subsystems The Air Handling System has many l subsystems. For the purposes of level 1 reviews, only three were considered.
- Control Complex Air Handling e Auxiliary Building Exhaust i e Reactor Building Recirc e Only one of these is significant from a fission product barrier consideration, the RB recirculation system for containment integrity.
e The Control Complex Air Handling subsystem provides the necessary control room personnel protection during accident conditions.
4 o The Auxiliary Building Exhaust subsystem provides protection to the public in FSAR Chapter 14 scenarios.
e These three subsystems considered together result in a system readiness significance factor of 94.43. When considered individually, they are less significant.
Based on this, these subsystems will be considered level 2 systems. Because collectively they are significant, timelines will be completed and evaluated for these systems.
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- 10. Building Spray System. This system was originally selected as a condidate system for a timeline completion and evaluation.
This was because BS design margin was a concern that resulted in the decision to maintain the unit in mode 5. FPC has committed to complete the timeline evaluation and will do so.
The design margin concerns are at this time limited to BS pump l NPS h .
e Further consideration based on selection criteria indicates that BS is not significant in terms of the Readiness Review Significance factor (33.94). While it is integral to containment integrity during certain LOCA scenarios, it is
- not risk significant and has been subjected to minimal modification and procedure 10CFR50.59 review opportunities.
Based on this re-evaluation, BS System will be a level 2 system. A timeline will be completed and evaluated for the BS system because of it's significance in supporting containment integrity.
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- 11. DP and MT SYSTENS. Several extensive evaluations have already l been performed on ths AC and DC distribution systems in '
preparation for the EDSFI. These include the following items:
- 1. An independent. external Readiness Assessment performed by Devonrue in 1991
- 2. FPC self assessment, May 1992
- 3. NRC Electrical Distribution System Functional Inspection in July of 1993 e An upgrade of the electrical calculations was performed in the early 1990's and further electrical calculation reviews and upgrade are in progress in accordance with Restart Issue OP-6. A detailed failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) of loss of DC power is in progress in accordance with Restart Issue D-7.
e The System Manager will perform a LEVEL 2 focused review of j the MT and DP systems to confirm adequate closecut of j
previously identified issues during the Level 2 assessment.
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! 12. Reactor Protection System. Based on the low number of system
! modifications / procedure changes combined with the non-risk
! significant classification, this system is considered a level i 2 system. The readiness review significance factor is 32.82.
j_ Additional information to support this decision is as follows:
k e NRC audit feedback of RPS setpoint . calculations was ,
j positive. The audits have been ongoing since 1995.
i Typographical errors were identified, but did not change l the end result of the calculations.
! e The level of NPTS involvement in RPS setpoint calculations
- included Oversight of the Action Plan for Setpoints, j' development of the calculation template for as-found/as-
! left tolerances and test equipment to be used, calculation development, calibration procedure enhancament, revision of
' calibration data sheets and participated in NRC audits and l
4 enforcement conferences.
f a Setpoint calculations have recently been reviewed and j upgraded to correct identified deficies in instrument
- string errors. These calculations have been reviewed by j NPTS, Licensing, Operations and Maintenance. A focused
- review of these calculations will be completed. This in addition to the generic level 2 review topics.
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- 13. Nuclear Instrumentation. Based on the low number of system modifications and procedure changes combined with the non-risk significant classification, this system is considered a level 2 system.
- The readiness review significance factor is 34.19. As an additional review during the level 2 assessment, the System Manager will perform a focused review of the calculations program and the implementa. tion of the calculations into existing plant procedures.
- 14. Reactor Building Airlock.- Based on the low number of system modifications and procedure changes combined with the non-risk significant classification, this system is considered a level 2 system. The readiness review significance factor is 20.63.
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1 ATTACHMENT 8 i
l INTEGRATED SYSTEM READINESS REPORT FORMAT An integrated system readiness report will be prepared to document the key generic results of the Level 1 System Readiness Reviews.
This report will assess the generic results across the Level 1 systems and define corresponding expansion of reviews for Level 2 '
systems to further define extent of condition.
The integrated report will evaluate the significance of the
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results generated for the Level 1 systems and the use of these I results to assess the health of plant side programs and processes. The report will document the generic strengths as well as weaknesses discovered.
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TRAINING REQUIREMENTS FOR SYSTEM READINESS TEAM l
l FUTURE l
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.o o ATTACIDG3fT 10 GUIDANCE FOR DISPOSITION OF DISCREPANCIES FUTURE t
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LEVEL 3 SYSTEMS FuruxE l
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l Page 1 of 13 RESTART ISSUES Approved __* = e . ! -
Regulatory items J. S. Bapestark
- i Restart Panel Chairman ISSUE ACTION ASSIGNED TO i 15511 f DESCRIPTION IDENTIFIER (*) RAT / RIM STATUS R-1 GL 96-01 review. GL 96 01 testing J. Maseda7TDE5* ~ ~ "hook All corrective actions !
PR-96-0129 associated with PR-96-0129 Address issues identified as a result of GL PR-96-0435 and LER %-011-00 are l 96-01 reviews (SP-130). LER 96-011-00 complete. Corrective !
LER %-025-00 Action Step f2 of PR-%-
0435. Perform SP-130 prior to Mode 3' is the only open .
ttee. ,
R-2 T.S. amendment (s) for EDG load uprate: LER 96 020-00 F.(Sullivan T' J M Andrews Tech Spec change for 150 kw :
- diesel generator load ratings LER 96-025-00
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upgrade has been drafted.
- fuel storage Awaiting Engineering / Ops / t
- kw meters Licensing positions on t inhether to proceed.
Supports resolution of EDG US0s through modifications, involves changes to technical specifications and bases.
(This is related to D-6) I i
b Acronyms listed below correspond to those items listed in the Issue Identif ter coluun l W (El - Escalated inforcement Item (A - Enforcement Action IDRP - Independent oesign Review Panel IFI - Inspector Follow-tp Item t IPAP - Integrated Performance Assessment Process GL - Genertc tetter [
i LER - Licensee Event Report !
NCAP 11 - Managet Corrective Action Plan. Phase 11 N0tts - Nuclear operations Tracting and Dpediting system i oCR - operabtIity Concerns Resolution l
PC - TPC Precursor Card i PR - FPC Problem P.eport REA - Request for Engineering Assistance RFA - Request for Project Approval WAPN - FPC Workarounditst "
URI - Unresolved item '
vio - vtoisttor< February 11. 1997 Revision 3
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EHCLOSURE 5
P49e 2 of 13 0
ISSUE ACil0N ASSIGNED TO ISSUE i DESCRIPil0N IDENTIFllR (*) RAT / RIM STATUS R-3 Complete maintenance rule structural baseline N/A J. Terry / M.1Donovari R8 walkdown inspection - '
inspection of the RB. schedule will be isead by 1/10/97. Additional
- engineers w! H be on-site the week of 1/D/97 to comence the walkdowns.
R-4 ASV-204 license amendment to resolve U50. PR-96-0419 Fi Sullivan / E; Bosworth Se( Issue R-2.7 T5CRN $$
fully developed and is'~"
Supports resolution of U50(s) generated as a separate frm EDG TSCRN?
result of these modifications. Sutaittat drafted and Project Team 1:i.:corrently (This is related to D-5) reviewing:
R-5 DH 45-FI license amendment. PR-96-0444 Ji-Terry /:K. Cerbell- ' ~
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Awaiting gravity drain calculation from Inoperable flow instrument contradicts Engineering which is license conditton 2.C.(5). Resolution may currently being finalized.
require license amercent.
(This is related to D-3)
R.6 ISAR table 8-1.8-2 update (EDG load Itsting). FPC letter to NRC F.J5u11tvan/JfAndress Engineering calculations in 3Fil96 01. dated progress.
Ncw loads are being calculated to support November 18. 1996 post-modification configuration. Revised FSAR Revision 23 FSAR table will be submitted prior to restart.
(This is related to 16)
R-7 Possible short term 115 change to allow OCV PR-96-0041 J. Terry / IC Caribell. Need to discuss need for 17/19 177/178 modification. PR-96-0220
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this with Project Team.
18 Installation may simultaneously block valve control for two DH trains. Safest time to install is NODE 3 or higher. when RCPs are running and OISG cooling is available.
(This is related to D-3)
R-8 Complete and sutnit the 10CFR50.54(f) letter NRC letter to FPC B,'Gutherman,/ R. Widell DriftLout for. general response. dated 10/9/96 review 1/13/97AComents due back'no:later than' (This is related to 0-23) 1/24/97 to meet 2/5/97 submittal date:
February 11. 1997 Revision 3
Page 3 of 13 ISSUE ACTION ASSIGNED TO ISSUE f DESCRIPTION IDENTIFIER (*) RAT / RIM STATUS R9 Sutait LPI mission time test results. PR-96-0311 J,1Tertf 1 Kb 7 Campbell Awaiting Engineering review (This is related to D-3) ^
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of draf t copy.
R-10 Sutait and receive approval for T. 5. N/A B. Gutherman /1~"~ P!20fiten Tech Spec change approved amendment for ILRT Appendix J. option B. ~~
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by PRC - 1/6/9/ and NGRC -
1/15/97. i:TSQut being fine 112ed for management ggg -
R-Il Conglete review of the ASME Section XI. Code PR-96-0092 03 J? Massda / S. Roe NDE review is currently on-Class 1.2.3 NDE program and disposition any going with scheduled concerns that arise. completion date of February
- 28. 1997.
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february 11. 1997 i Revision 3
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RESTARI ISSUES Design Readinessdxtent of Condition Items f
r ISSUE ACTION ASSIGNED TD ,
ISSUE # DESCRIPTION IDENTIFIER (*) RAT / RIM STATUS ;
D-1 HPl pu m recirculation to the makeup tank. CR3 D.I.1 F.Sullivan/jJ/.lderren '
Preliminary work scope to PR-96-0440 develop MAR currently in Changes needed to eliminate or control progress.
recirculation flow to MJT post-LOCA to FPC letter to NRC prevent relief valve from lifting. 3F1096 22. dated ;
10/28/96. Item 1. i D.2 HPI system modifications to improve SBLOCA CR3 D.1.2 F. Sullivan'/ JRidarrett MAR being developed.
margins. LER %-006-00 Conceptual DRB to be LER %-006-01 scheduled.
Revise to close H N-27 on 1500 psig HPl IFl 96 003-16 initiation signal instead of 4 psig RBIC signal. FPC letter to NRC r 3F1096-22. dated I 10/28/96 Item 2.
WARN #2 D-3 LPI pum mission time. CR3 D.I.3 J. Terry If KRCambell~ ' Revlei ef misi n ties URI %-201-01 t' leted and Extend allowed low flow time using test data OCR:DH 96-DHP- ineert itensini and evaluation of results (pump teardown and 1AllB-3 .C been:3ent inspection).
PR-96 0311 b8C%"to ffR~ ^^ " ^J"e$019tl0n 3^' ' ' ' " ' '
Pusitst7ttport?fijctived
- FPC to NRC letter frts:llR; anti revleugd IW ;
3F1096-22. dated '
EngineerinsMCo~ mments havd 10/28/96. Item 3. bein tent:bacit teJIPafer ~ r tThifis related to"itees R-5rRWand R-9) resolution.F " " ^~" ~ "
D-4 Reactor building spray pug IB NPSH. CR3 D.I.4 FO$uliliia67 M.Miti%rald Mtla1*sedidispletFind f
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URI 96-201-02 tested & Engineer 1 ' trill !
Tear down pu g s, perform flow test (and OCR:BS-96-BSP 1B go back?and add: jegd modify impeller. tf required) to reduce NPSH ghtch will be testedxthe ' i required. FPC to NRC letter imelt[offi/20/97 sand ~
3F1096-22 dated reviewed by.EngineertN.
10/28/96. Item 4. ' ' ~ ' " " ' ~ ' ~
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Page 5 of 13 ISSUE ACTION ASSIGNED TO '
ISSUE i DESCRIPTION IDENTIFIER (*) RAT / RIM STATUS D-5 Emergency feedwater system upgrades and CR3 0.I.5 F. Sullivan 7 EF Bosborth Some conponent module diesel generator load impact: URI 96-12-01
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shipped off-site for
- cavitating venturis VIO 96-09-07 modification. Conceptual *
- automate cross tie valve EFV-12 DRS approved and P%R is
- EFIC corrpensating module PR-96 0419 being developed. Plan to Add ASV-204 "A" auto signal have Framatome do actual design.
Reverses previous modification which remnved FPC to NRC letter "A"-side auto-start signal from steam inlet 3F1095-22. dated ASV-204: Conceptual DRB valve to "B"-side EFW pump. These 10/28/95. Item 5. approved and MAR is teing modifications address the NPSH issue and/or developed.
reduce operator burden.
EFV-12: Conceptual DRB approved and MAR is being developed.
Cavitating venturis MAR (Thisitt related to' items R-4;'and D-17) being verified. Final DRB has been scheduled.
D6 Emergency diesel generator loading: CR3 D.I.6 F.SullivanTJ$Andres
- capacity uprate ' ^ ' " ~' Remove non-essential loads:
EEI 96-12-02 DRB to be rescheduled. MAR
- remove nonessential load (s) OCR:EG-96 EGDG- is being developed.
- kw meter accuracy improvement SIA/lB
- Calibration equipment upgrade Kw meter improvement
- extend the 30 minute rating to a 90 minute LER 96-020 00 accepted. Conceptual DRB rating LER 96-025-00 approved. MAR almost increases the continuous 2000 hr. and 200 hr. FPC to NRC letter ratings. Thirty (30) minute rating duration 3F1096-22 dated New calibration equipment may be increased. Reduces connected load. 10/28/96. Item 6.
Allows more accurate testing measurement of has been ordered EDG output.
EDG capacity update: MAR (This is related to Items R-25 R-6E D-12 and issued. Field work to
' ' ' ' " begin week of 1/13/97, 0+14)
February ll, 1997 Revision 3
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Pcge 6 of 13 ISSUE ACTION ASSIGNED TO ISSUE # DESCRIPTION IDENTIFIER (*) RAT / RIM STATt!S D-7 Failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) of CR3 0.1.7 FC Sullivan / J. Maseda The draft FPEA Basis /
loss of DC power. Methodoloay document has FPC to NRC letter beenconpleted. System Extensive review of scenario creating several 3F1096-22. dated reviews have been recent design basis problems. 10/28/96. Item 7. prioritized and all work is scheduled to be completed by 4/21/97. The schedule thange (from 3/4/97) was dee to the additional work neeied to evaluate the inpact on 120v Vital AC '
circuits.
D-8 GL 96-06 (thermal overpressure protection for CR3 0.1.8 Ff Sullivan / D.: Porter MAR for expansion chambers containment piping. penetrations and Ifl 96-08-02
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has been U18 approved and coolers). OCR: RB awaiting PRC review.
penetrations Sargent & Lundy calculation Will address overpressure issue with hardware for SW system received.
mods. Will evaluate and address FPC to NRC letter Will develop a t%R to susceptibility to other issues. 3F1096-22. dated 6ddress the other two 10/28/96. Item 8. Issues of GL 96-06 which will be based on the Sargent & Lundy recon:nendations of the calculation.
D-9 Discrepancies in HPI design basis analysis. URI 96 01-02 Vendor is to perform test F.Sellivan/~J/ Warren Re-confirm key hydraulic model inputs.
on stop-check valve to validate hydraulic model.
D-10 DCV 17/18. 177/178 positioners (Mode 3 or URI 96-201-04 JJ. Terry % C Campbell Ops waiting to work MNt on-above). ~
11ne (MODE 1) with a PR-96-0041 currently anticipated date Addresses non-safety related controllers on PR-96-0220 SR valves. of 6/26/97.
Reference:
Install T-MAR (94-04-04) and install permanent MUt (This'is related to~0-3) (94-09-02).
February 11. 1997 Revision 3
PacP 7 of 13 ISSUE ACTION ASSIGNED TO ISSUE # DESCRIPil0N IDENTIFIER (*) RAT / RIM STATUS D-Il Appendix R review: VfD 96-06-06 U Sullivan't W. Rossfeld Transformer protect 1&l
- transfoner protection devices ~
- hot short effect on remote S/D panel fuses tievicesM Resolution of PR-96-0401
- approval of NI detector TSI removal this:1ssue wl11 railluirel1 (CAP (24 and 25)~ MNt d ich:Isbeing rel Addresses design / licensing basis issues found sed~~~kill:te
^ '~ evallab e; ~9?g in Appendix R review. i'C M 62521 ~
PC,f96-5253 N6tTshort'effectiWhimbtd
$/D panel!fusesM Root ~ ~ "
(ER:96-022 00 l Cause' Analysis 11Qn ' ';
Progmss3
!5 prove 1LofNttletectot9751 remove 1 % Infonnetton "" ' ^
requested for closure of this ites has been ~
informally substtted t( the K S No:further; activities are,.p)annedj for#thisdssue; i t .
assessment N 0 raft < report (This is related to D.22) of the assessmentecurrentif in the' review cycle f ~
D-12 EDG protective trips not bypassed during IFI 96-201-04 F. Sullivan /-;J 2Andrews
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emergency mode of operation. " 50.59 had been re-done and PR-96-0263 is currertly ur. der review.
New EDG trips added by plant modification not bypassed during emergency mode of operation.
(This is re14ted to 0-6)
D-13 Develop system timelines for EF MU. DH. BS, N/A Jf; Terry / HJDonovarl EG modifications. analysis and related Work currently in progress.
ticensing correspondence.
Extent of Condition element.
(This is related to 0 23)
D-14 Re-perform the diesel loading calculation. EEI 96-12-04 F. Sullivan~ /.'J;" Andress .
Currently project is on Confirmation of existing calculation. hold. Working on 500 kw backfeed calculation.
(This'1s related to D-6)
February 11. 1997 Revision 3
Page 8 of 13
,a ISSUE ACTION ASSIGNED TO .
ISSUE f DESCRIPTION IDENTIFIER (*) RAT / RIM STATUS D-15 Review a sample (20) of past modification N/A Bl[Gutbergari / R. Knoll 50.59's. ^ Second alevel?reVlemi underway,bMeetings srt11 occur.uset of 1129/97;T Extent of Condition element.
Documentation of>rttelts e eected by 1/31/974 " ' ',
D-16 Perform an integrated safety assessment of N/A R2 Dav 4 / M.: Van Sicklen Safety assessment being current outage modifications. '
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initiated on EDG week of 1/13/97.
Back-end look at modifications made this outage to assess aggregate safety impact.
D 17 Complete NPSH review of EFP suction swapover REA 96-0788 FESullivin / EEBosiorth from EFT to CST. ^' ' '
~~'~ Final calculation received from Parsons. Third party t
Hydraulic issue. No check valves between review by N0E is in progress.
tanks.
(This is relatt<f to D-51 0-18 Resolve NPSH concern when SFP's are used to PR-%-0360 Rr Davis / G2 Becker recirc BWST. ' ' ' ~ ~ ~ Based onLtWoutW of 1/17/97'eettnes.an'Attien s .
Hydraulic issue. LOCA during SfP Plan is:being developed.fot recirculation of BWST would add to friction resolution of thit?t$sdei'"
loss in a portion of one train's ECCS suction lines.
D-19 Correct RMi-29/30 seismic mounting. PR-96-0267 F. Sullivan / DO Kargel Conceptual walkdown
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coglete. Minor MAR / calc Control bmrd mounting of high range c,ritaurnent radiation monitor instrumentation reautred to resolve. No is not seismically quallfled.
DRB L. m ed or required.
D-20 Correct RWP cyclone separator fouling. PR-96-0441 Currently developing an F Sullivan /. K@~ iudali '
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f SR seawater source of RWP bearing flush action plan to address this issue, water. Addresses repetitive plugging of fouling / corrosion.
D-21 ESCP-1 upgrade from non-safety to safety PR-96-019S F. SullivanV;D?'!.Kargel Preparing for conceptual related DRB.
LER 96-019 00 i
february 11. 1997 Revision 3 t
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' ISSUE +
ACTION A551GNED TO ISSUE # DESCRIPTION IDENTIFIER (*) ~
i RAT / RIM STATUS i D-22 Complete review of the cable ampacity issue i PR-92-0057' F. Sullivan IERostfeld Information is being l and address any operability concerns that " ' ~
arise. gathered in preparation to PC f%-3705 - develo model. ping analytical :
(This is related tc 0-11) '
D-23 Redsonable assutence of design ' " ~ ~ JJ Terryff Ml Donovin accortlance with design bestsj . earglKand:'1h
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(Coupleti Systen Headints$ Revies Plen:to tipport "Eatent;of; Condition Evaluatton )
, tThis51sTrelated^tolitems'R4.*'ind 0213)
D-74 Ter'o"we MM31HPressuriiiF(L.evel:lContr61 "I! QR'TM7,Ri Wienians Valve): response during transient:tonditions?
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RESTART ISSUES Maintenance / Materiel Condition Itees ISSUE ACTION ASSIGNED TO ISSUE f DESCRIPTION IDENTIFIER (*) RAT / RIM STATUS M-1 Toxic gas monitoring (CL, Channels) - PR-96-0382 J.Terryl/,RJWienatwa Interim actions in-place to Repetitive failures, improve reliability are effective. Long tern plan being developed (prior to start-up).
M-2 Main control board deficiencies - too many. RJ; Davis / J. Canpbell Update as of 1/2/97:
h al <10). '
Maintenance working - 9 Planning hold - 1 Resolve all that can be resolved without de- Scheduling hold - 4 fueling or having to be at power. Material hold - 1 Engineering hold - 6 '
Engineering needs to evaluate why 4 to 5 new deficiencies are being added to the Itst weekly as !
this challenges the goal to i get the nunber below 10.
M-3 MN-103 - repetitive seat leakage. PR-96-0121 R; Detris I;0 sporter Conceptual design change development in progress.
WARN #49 M-4 Resolve discrepancy with in-plact filter OCR: AH-96 NIFL-1 J. Terry l/j A.5Washburst' testing criteria for #fL-1/2. AH-96-NFL + 2A M tfon being tracked bf"'PR4 960149dStep5/ ~ "
AH 96-#f t-28 -
Ni-96-NEL-2C AH-96-NEL-20 PR-96-0149 M-5 Turbine lube oil piping failure analysis. PR-96-0350 J. Terry /- Af Washburri (in particular. ~ ' '
PR-96 0350-05: Perform a Determine cause of piping failure and component failure analysis i Corrective Action of the crack in the pipe is implement actions to prevent recurrence. Steps 5 and 7) due January 20. 1997 PR-96-0350 07: Perform formal root cause analysis ,
of the event is due
__ February 1. 1997 '
l February 11. 1997 Revision 3
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Page 11 of 13 l RESTART ISSUES 'I Organizational and Programmatic (0 & P) Itees f ISSUE ACTION ASSIGNED TO ISSUE F DESCRIPTION- IDENTIF nR (*) RAT / RIM STATUS OP-1 Improve safety culture: MCAP 11 Restart / Direction '97
- establish site wide priorities which D? Wilder / BaHitt}(
' '~ "~ '
emphastre a safety culture Standdown occurred January !
- consnunicate. advertise, coach and
- 6. 1997. Handouts given to t all personnel outlined the constantly reinforce safety culture down Restart Plan. Restart throughout the o anization Management Guideline.
- conduct a Safety Iture Index which will present status of the be evaluated at periodic intervals t Restart Issues and the l Nuclear Operations Vision.
OP-2 Upgrade the problem reporting (CP-Ill) IPAP Report program.
D.iWildet*I:050 ante 13
' ' ' " ~ ' ' ' ~ ~ ' ' CP-Ill. Revision 55. I MCAP 11 issued. Effective date -
Eliminates problem reports and replaces with
, one graded precursor approach.
OP-3 Upgrade the root cause (CP-144) program. IPAP Report pll Wilder /DyDanielis l Work currently in progress. i L
EEI %-12-03 i OP-4 Upgrade the operability /reportability (CP- VIO 94-27-02 CP-150 draf t complete. CP-150/1511 progre:n. VIO 94-27-03 Df MiderlD.i deMintf~ ort!
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151. Revision 0. Issued.
Separate and better define the two processes. Effective date - 11/22/%.
Provide better guidance for decision making.
OP-5 Upgrade the 50.59 review process. EEI %-12-03 B. Guthennan / BRKnpil'" ~~^~ New CP drafted. Expect approval of all affected -
Improve program and provide training to the procedures by 2/28/97.
people to be qualified for writing and ;
reviewing 50.59s.
OP-6 Upgrade the engineering calculation process. eel 96-12-04 DEWilder 7/^ETGschuNder
~ ~ ~ ~ ' "' ~ Current scheduled due date EA 95-126 NOV I.0.1 March 1997 Address issue of using unverified case studies ,
+ OP-7 Upgrade the design basis program to include: IDRP Report D2 Wilder /,F75ull1%rl Action complete. N00-55.
- ownership IPAP Report ' ' ' " ~ " ~ ' ~ ~ ~ ' " '
- definition Revision 0. Issued.
- documents included in scope Effective date - 12/30/%.
, (clearly define intent) i
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Page 12 of 13 ISSUE ACTION ASSIGNED TO ISSUE f DESCRIPil0N IDENTIFIER (*) RAT / RIM STATUS OP-8 Establish a high-level configuration control VIO %-05-05 Dl Wilder;7jBNTay'IW Current scheduled due date procedure (N00). VIO %-09-06 ' ""
- June 1997 Establish and document management expectations for the program.
i February ll, 1997 Revision 3
e Page 13 of 13 RESTART ISSUES Operator Readiness items ISSUE ACTION ASSIGNED TO ISSUE # DESCRIPTION IDENTIFIER (*) RAT / RIM STATUS 0-1 OP-103 A&B curves - need to be validated. UR!% %-201-03 Phase 1 - Review of curves RT Dad s /.PJ~ltKhe
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URI 96-201-05 in-progress. Scheduled Vertfy and validate A ether curves are design EA 95-126 NOV l.C.2 completion date - 3/97 basis and what that basis is. WARN f21 & #24 Phase 2 - laplementation of recomendations from Phase
- 1. Scheduled completion date - 10/97.
Phase 3 - laplementation of procedure changes.
Scheduled completion date -
1/982 02 - Verify SP's for containment integrity: SP- LER 96-018-00 R30avisT/-M.;C611 tris Project approximately 598 324, 341, 346. LER 96-018-01
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complete. To date, sixty- t four (64) penetrations have
- Develop new detailed as-built mechanical PR 4 0189 been cog letely walked-down ,
penetration drawings. PR-96-0436 by the project team and
- Address tests. vents, and drains issue. other walk-downs are in RPA W O026 various stages of progress.
0-3 Complete operator training on E0P/AP/0P changes resulting from restart issues. NOTE 5f24364 R. Davis tfJdt.inci This91s E liTBit tretted 10TES . g.Mt
.h a..
g, ,.........,.
February 11. 1997 Revision 3
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