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Category:CORRESPONDENCE-LETTERS
MONTHYEARML20217M4461999-10-20020 October 1999 Forwards Rev 8 to Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Physical Security/ Contingency Plan, IAW 10CFR50.54(p).Encl Withheld,Per 10CFR73.21 ML20217J4151999-10-15015 October 1999 Forwards Request for Addl Info Re Util 990624 Application for Amend of TSs That Would Revise TS for Weighing of Ice Condenser Ice Baskets 05000327/LER-1999-002, Forwards LER 99-002-00 Re Start of Units 1 & 2 EDGs as Result of Cable Being Damaged During Installation of Thermo- Lag for Kaowool Upgrade Project1999-10-15015 October 1999 Forwards LER 99-002-00 Re Start of Units 1 & 2 EDGs as Result of Cable Being Damaged During Installation of Thermo- Lag for Kaowool Upgrade Project ML20217G1141999-10-0707 October 1999 Responds to from P Salas,Providing Response to NRC Risk Determination Associated with 990630 Flooding Event at Sequoyah Facility.Meeting to Discuss Risk Determination Issues Scheduled for 991021 in Atlanta,Ga ML20217B2981999-10-0606 October 1999 Discusses Closeout of GL 92-01,rev 1,suppl 1, Reactor Vessel Integrity, for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2. NRC Also Hereby Solicits Any Written Comments That TVA May Have on Current Rvid Data by 991101 ML20217B8431999-10-0505 October 1999 Requests NRC Review & Approval of ASME Code Relief Requests That Were Identified in Plant Second 10-yr ISI Interval for Both Units.Encl 3 Provides Util Procedure for Calculation of ASME Code Coverage for Section XI Nondestructive Exams IR 05000327/19990041999-10-0101 October 1999 Ack Receipt of Providing Comments on Insp Repts 50-327/99-04 & 50-328/99-04.NRC Considered Comments for Apparent Violation Involving 10CFR50.59 Issue ML20217C7101999-10-0101 October 1999 Forwards Response to NRC 990910 RAI Re Sequoyah Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2 URI 50-327/98-04-02 & 50-328/98-04-02 Re Ice Weight Representative Sample ML20212J5981999-10-0101 October 1999 Forwards SE Accepting Request for Relief from ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code,Section Xi,Requirements for Certain Inservice Insp at Plnat,Unit 1 ML20212M1081999-09-29029 September 1999 Confirms Intent to Meet with Utils on 991025 in Atlanta,Ga to Discuss Pilot Plants,Shearon Harris & Sequoyah Any Observations & Lessons Learned & Recommendations Re Implementation of Pilot Program ML20217A9451999-09-27027 September 1999 Forwards Insp Repts 50-327/99-05 & 50-328/99-05 on 990718- 0828.One Violation Identified & Being Treated as Non-Cited Violation ML20216J9351999-09-27027 September 1999 Responds to NRC Re Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-327/99-04 & 50-328/99-04.Corrective Actions:Risk Determination Evaluation Was Performed & Licensee Concluded That Event Is in Green Regulatory Response Band ML20212F0751999-09-23023 September 1999 Forwards SER Granting Util 981021 Request for Relief from ASME Code,Section XI Requirements from Certain Inservice Insp at Sequoyah Nuclear Power Plant,Units 1 & 2 Pursuant to 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(ii) ML20212F4501999-09-23023 September 1999 Forwards Amends 246 & 237 to Licenses DPR-77 & DPR-79, Respectively & Ser.Amends Approve Request to Revise TSs to Allow Use of Fully Qualified & Tested Spare Inverter in Place of Any of Eight Required Inverters ML20212M1911999-09-21021 September 1999 Discusses Exercise of Enforcement Discretion Re Apparent Violation Noted in Insp Repts 50-327/99-04 & 50-328/99-04 Associated with Implementation of Procedural Changes Which Resulted in Three Containment Penetrations Being Left Open ML20211Q0311999-09-10010 September 1999 Requests Written Documentation from TVA to Provide Technical Assistance to Region II Re TS Compliance & Ice Condenser Maint Practices at Plant ML20216F5441999-09-0707 September 1999 Provides Results of Risk Evaluation of 990630,flooding Event at Sequoyah 1 & 2 Reactor Facilities.Event Was Documented in Insp Rept 50-327/99-04 & 50-328/99-04 & Transmitted in Ltr, ML20211N5681999-09-0101 September 1999 Submits Clarification of Two Issues Raised in Insp Repts 50-327/99-04 & 50-328/99-04,dtd 990813,which Was First Insp Rept Issued for Plant Under NRC Power Reactor Oversight Process Pilot Plant Study ML20211G5881999-08-27027 August 1999 Submits Summary of 990820 Management Meeting Re Plant Performance.List of Attendees & Matl Used in Presentation Enclosed ML20211F8891999-08-25025 August 1999 Forwards Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Cycle 9 Refueling Outage, Re Completed SG Activities,Per TSs 4.4.5.5.b & 4.4.5.5.c ML20211A1851999-08-16016 August 1999 Forwards Proprietary TR WCAP-15128 & non-proprietary Rept WCAP-15129 for NRC Review.Repts Are Provided in Advance of TS Change That Is Being Prepared to Support Cycle 10 Rfo. Proprietary TR Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790 ML20210V1471999-08-13013 August 1999 Forwards Insp Repts 50-327/99-04 & 50-328/99-04 on 990601- 0717.One Potentially Safety Significant Issue Identified.On 990630,inadequate Performance of Storm Drain Sys Caused Water from Heavy Rainfall to Backup & Flood Turbine Bldg ML20211A1921999-08-12012 August 1999 Requests Proprietary TR WCAP-15128, Depth-Based SG Tube Repair Criteria for Axial PWSCC at Dented TSP Intersections, Be Withheld from Public Disclosure Per 10CFR2.790 ML20210Q5011999-08-0505 August 1999 Informs That NRC Plans to Administer Gfes of Written Operator Licensing Exam on 991006 at Sequoyah Nuclear Plant. Sample Registration Ltr Encl ML20210L4291999-08-0202 August 1999 Forwards Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Unit 2 Cycle 9 12-Month SG Insp Rept & SG-99-07-009, Sequoyah Unit-2 Cycle 10 Voltage-Based Repair Criteria 90-Day Rept. Repts Submitted IAW TS 4.4.5.5.b & TS 4.4.5.5.c ML20210L1611999-07-30030 July 1999 Forwards Request for Relief RV-4 Re ASME Class 1,2 & 3 Prvs, Per First ten-year Inservice Test Time Interval.Review & Approval of RV-4 Is Requested to Support Unit 1 Cycle 10 Refueling Outage,Scheduled to Start 000213 ML20210G5301999-07-28028 July 1999 Forwards Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Unit 2 ISI Summary Rept That Contains Historical Record of Repairs,Replacement & ISI & Augmented Examinations That Were Performed on ASME Code Class 1 & 2 Components from 971104-990511 ML20211B9661999-07-26026 July 1999 Informs That Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Sewage Treatment Plant, NPDES 0026450 Outfall 112,is in Standby Status.Flow Has Been Diverted from Sys Since Jan 1998 ML20210B2521999-07-14014 July 1999 Confirms 990712 Telcon Between J Smith of Licensee Staff & M Shannon of NRC Re semi-annual Mgt Meeting Schedule for 990820 in Atlanta,Ga to Discuss Recent Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Performance ML20210J1091999-07-10010 July 1999 Submits Suggestions & Concerns Re Y2K & Nuclear Power Plants ML20196K0381999-06-30030 June 1999 Provides Written Confirmation of Completed Commitment for Final Implementation of Thermo-Lag 330-1 Fire Barrier Corrective Actions at Snp,Per GL 92-08 ML20209E4071999-06-30030 June 1999 Forwards Insp Repts 50-327/99-03 & 50-328/99-03 on 990328- 0531.Violations Being Treated as Noncited Violations ML20196J8261999-06-28028 June 1999 Forwards Safety Evaluation Authorizing Request for Relief from ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code,Section XI Requirements for Certain Inservice Inspections at Sequoyah Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2 ML20196G7881999-06-22022 June 1999 Informs NRC of Changes That Util Incorporated Into TS Bases Sections & Trm.Encl Provides Revised TS Bases Pages & TRM Affected by Listed Revs ML20196G1801999-06-21021 June 1999 Requests Termination of SRO License SOP-20751-1,for Lf Hardin,Effective 990611.Subject Individual Resigned from Position at TVA ML20195G1821999-06-0808 June 1999 Requests NRC Review & Approval of ASME Code Relief for ISI Program.Encl 1 Provides Relief Request 1-ISI-14 That Includes Two Attachments.Encl 2 Provides Copy of Related ASME Code Page ML20195E9521999-06-0707 June 1999 Requests Relief from Specific Requirements of ASME Section Xi,Subsection IWE of 1992 Edition,1992 Addenda.Util Has Determined That Proposed Alternatives Would Provide Acceptable Level of Quality & Safety ML20195E9311999-05-28028 May 1999 Informs of Planned Insp Activities for Licensee to Have Opportunity to Prepare for Insps & Provide NRC with Feedback on Any Planned Insps Which May Conflict with Plant Activities ML20195B3631999-05-21021 May 1999 Requests Termination of SRO License for Tj Van Huis,Per 10CFR50.74(a).TJ Van Huis Retired from Util,Effective 990514 ML20207A5721999-05-20020 May 1999 Forwards Correction to Previously Issued Amend 163 to License DPR-79 Re SR 4.1.1.1.1.d Inadvertently Omitted from Pp 3/4 1-1 of Unit 2 TS ML20206Q8791999-05-13013 May 1999 Forwards L36 9990415 802, COLR for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Unit 2,Cycle 10, IAW Plant TS 6.9.1.14.c 05000327/LER-1999-001, Forwards LER 99-001-00 Re Condition That Resulted in Granting of Enforcement Discretion,Per Failure of Centrifugal Charging Pump.Condition Being Reported IAW 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) & (a)(2)(iv)1999-05-11011 May 1999 Forwards LER 99-001-00 Re Condition That Resulted in Granting of Enforcement Discretion,Per Failure of Centrifugal Charging Pump.Condition Being Reported IAW 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) & (a)(2)(iv) ML20206M9341999-05-10010 May 1999 Forwards Rept of SG Tube Plugging During Unit 2 Cycle 9 Refueling Outage,As Required by TS 4.4.5.5.a.ISI of Unit 2 SG Tubes Was Completed on 990503 ML20206K6271999-05-0606 May 1999 Requests Termination of SRO License for MR Taggart,License SOP-21336 Due to Resignation on 990430 ML20206J2061999-05-0404 May 1999 Requests Relief from Specified ISI Requirements in Section XI of ASME B&PV Code.Tva Requests Approval to Use Wire Type Penetrameters in Lieu of Plaque Type Penetrameters for Performing Radiographic Insps.Specific Relief Request,Encl ML20209J0391999-04-27027 April 1999 Forwards Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Rept, Radiological Impact Assessment Rept & Rev 41 to ODCM, for Period of Jan-Dec 1998 ML20206C6541999-04-23023 April 1999 Forwards Response to NRC 990127 RAI Re GL 96-05 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2 ML20206C0841999-04-23023 April 1999 Forwards Insp Repts 50-327/99-02 & 50-328/99-02 on 990214-0327.No Violations Noted ML20206B9591999-04-20020 April 1999 Responds to 990417 Request That NRC Exercise Discretion Not to Enforce Compliance with Actions Required in Unit 1 TS 3.1.2.2,3.1.2.4 & 3.5.2 & Documents 990417 Telephone Conversation When NRC Orally Issued NOED ML20205S5891999-04-17017 April 1999 Documents Request for Discretionary Enforcement for Unit 1 TS LCOs 3.1.2.2,3.1.2.4 & 3.5.2 to Support Completion of Repairs & Testing for 1B-B Centrifugal Charging Pump (CCP) 1999-09-07
[Table view] Category:INCOMING CORRESPONDENCE
MONTHYEARML20217M4461999-10-20020 October 1999 Forwards Rev 8 to Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Physical Security/ Contingency Plan, IAW 10CFR50.54(p).Encl Withheld,Per 10CFR73.21 05000327/LER-1999-002, Forwards LER 99-002-00 Re Start of Units 1 & 2 EDGs as Result of Cable Being Damaged During Installation of Thermo- Lag for Kaowool Upgrade Project1999-10-15015 October 1999 Forwards LER 99-002-00 Re Start of Units 1 & 2 EDGs as Result of Cable Being Damaged During Installation of Thermo- Lag for Kaowool Upgrade Project ML20217B8431999-10-0505 October 1999 Requests NRC Review & Approval of ASME Code Relief Requests That Were Identified in Plant Second 10-yr ISI Interval for Both Units.Encl 3 Provides Util Procedure for Calculation of ASME Code Coverage for Section XI Nondestructive Exams ML20217C7101999-10-0101 October 1999 Forwards Response to NRC 990910 RAI Re Sequoyah Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2 URI 50-327/98-04-02 & 50-328/98-04-02 Re Ice Weight Representative Sample ML20216J9351999-09-27027 September 1999 Responds to NRC Re Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-327/99-04 & 50-328/99-04.Corrective Actions:Risk Determination Evaluation Was Performed & Licensee Concluded That Event Is in Green Regulatory Response Band ML20211N5681999-09-0101 September 1999 Submits Clarification of Two Issues Raised in Insp Repts 50-327/99-04 & 50-328/99-04,dtd 990813,which Was First Insp Rept Issued for Plant Under NRC Power Reactor Oversight Process Pilot Plant Study ML20211F8891999-08-25025 August 1999 Forwards Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Cycle 9 Refueling Outage, Re Completed SG Activities,Per TSs 4.4.5.5.b & 4.4.5.5.c ML20211A1851999-08-16016 August 1999 Forwards Proprietary TR WCAP-15128 & non-proprietary Rept WCAP-15129 for NRC Review.Repts Are Provided in Advance of TS Change That Is Being Prepared to Support Cycle 10 Rfo. Proprietary TR Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790 ML20211A1921999-08-12012 August 1999 Requests Proprietary TR WCAP-15128, Depth-Based SG Tube Repair Criteria for Axial PWSCC at Dented TSP Intersections, Be Withheld from Public Disclosure Per 10CFR2.790 ML20210L4291999-08-0202 August 1999 Forwards Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Unit 2 Cycle 9 12-Month SG Insp Rept & SG-99-07-009, Sequoyah Unit-2 Cycle 10 Voltage-Based Repair Criteria 90-Day Rept. Repts Submitted IAW TS 4.4.5.5.b & TS 4.4.5.5.c ML20210L1611999-07-30030 July 1999 Forwards Request for Relief RV-4 Re ASME Class 1,2 & 3 Prvs, Per First ten-year Inservice Test Time Interval.Review & Approval of RV-4 Is Requested to Support Unit 1 Cycle 10 Refueling Outage,Scheduled to Start 000213 ML20210G5301999-07-28028 July 1999 Forwards Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Unit 2 ISI Summary Rept That Contains Historical Record of Repairs,Replacement & ISI & Augmented Examinations That Were Performed on ASME Code Class 1 & 2 Components from 971104-990511 ML20210J1091999-07-10010 July 1999 Submits Suggestions & Concerns Re Y2K & Nuclear Power Plants ML20196K0381999-06-30030 June 1999 Provides Written Confirmation of Completed Commitment for Final Implementation of Thermo-Lag 330-1 Fire Barrier Corrective Actions at Snp,Per GL 92-08 ML20196G7881999-06-22022 June 1999 Informs NRC of Changes That Util Incorporated Into TS Bases Sections & Trm.Encl Provides Revised TS Bases Pages & TRM Affected by Listed Revs ML20196G1801999-06-21021 June 1999 Requests Termination of SRO License SOP-20751-1,for Lf Hardin,Effective 990611.Subject Individual Resigned from Position at TVA ML20195G1821999-06-0808 June 1999 Requests NRC Review & Approval of ASME Code Relief for ISI Program.Encl 1 Provides Relief Request 1-ISI-14 That Includes Two Attachments.Encl 2 Provides Copy of Related ASME Code Page ML20195E9521999-06-0707 June 1999 Requests Relief from Specific Requirements of ASME Section Xi,Subsection IWE of 1992 Edition,1992 Addenda.Util Has Determined That Proposed Alternatives Would Provide Acceptable Level of Quality & Safety ML20195B3631999-05-21021 May 1999 Requests Termination of SRO License for Tj Van Huis,Per 10CFR50.74(a).TJ Van Huis Retired from Util,Effective 990514 ML20206Q8791999-05-13013 May 1999 Forwards L36 9990415 802, COLR for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Unit 2,Cycle 10, IAW Plant TS 6.9.1.14.c 05000327/LER-1999-001, Forwards LER 99-001-00 Re Condition That Resulted in Granting of Enforcement Discretion,Per Failure of Centrifugal Charging Pump.Condition Being Reported IAW 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) & (a)(2)(iv)1999-05-11011 May 1999 Forwards LER 99-001-00 Re Condition That Resulted in Granting of Enforcement Discretion,Per Failure of Centrifugal Charging Pump.Condition Being Reported IAW 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) & (a)(2)(iv) ML20206M9341999-05-10010 May 1999 Forwards Rept of SG Tube Plugging During Unit 2 Cycle 9 Refueling Outage,As Required by TS 4.4.5.5.a.ISI of Unit 2 SG Tubes Was Completed on 990503 ML20206K6271999-05-0606 May 1999 Requests Termination of SRO License for MR Taggart,License SOP-21336 Due to Resignation on 990430 ML20206J2061999-05-0404 May 1999 Requests Relief from Specified ISI Requirements in Section XI of ASME B&PV Code.Tva Requests Approval to Use Wire Type Penetrameters in Lieu of Plaque Type Penetrameters for Performing Radiographic Insps.Specific Relief Request,Encl ML20209J0391999-04-27027 April 1999 Forwards Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Rept, Radiological Impact Assessment Rept & Rev 41 to ODCM, for Period of Jan-Dec 1998 ML20206C6541999-04-23023 April 1999 Forwards Response to NRC 990127 RAI Re GL 96-05 for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2 ML20205S5891999-04-17017 April 1999 Documents Request for Discretionary Enforcement for Unit 1 TS LCOs 3.1.2.2,3.1.2.4 & 3.5.2 to Support Completion of Repairs & Testing for 1B-B Centrifugal Charging Pump (CCP) ML20205B1091999-03-19019 March 1999 Submits Response to NRC Questions Concerning Lead Test Assembly Matl History,Per Request ML20204H0161999-03-19019 March 1999 Resubmits Util 990302 Response to Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-327/98-11 & 50-328/98-11.Corrective Actions:Lessons Learned from Event Have Been Provided to Operating Crews ML20204E8251999-03-0505 March 1999 Forwards Sequoyah Nuclear Plant,Four Yr Simulator Test Rept for Period Ending 990321, in Accordance with Requirements of 10CFR55.45 ML20207E6851999-03-0202 March 1999 Responds to NRC Re Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-327/98-11 & 50-328/98-11.Corrective Actions:Lessons Learned from Event Have Been Provided to Operating Crews ML20207J1171999-01-29029 January 1999 Forwards Copy of Final Exercise Rept for Full Participation Ingestion Pathway Exercise of Offsite Radiological Emergency Response Plans site-specific to Sequoyah NPP ML20202A7141999-01-20020 January 1999 Provides Request for Relief for Delaying Repair on Section of ASME Code Class 3 Piping within Essential Raw Cooling Water Sys ML20198S7141998-12-29029 December 1998 Forwards Cycle 10 Voltage-Based Repair Criteria 90-Day Rept, Per GL 95-05.Rept Is Submitted IAW License Condition 2.C.(9)(d) 05000327/LER-1998-004, Forwards LER 98-004-00,providing Details Concerning Inability to Complete Surveillance within Required Time Interval1998-12-21021 December 1998 Forwards LER 98-004-00,providing Details Concerning Inability to Complete Surveillance within Required Time Interval ML20198D5471998-12-14014 December 1998 Requests That License OP-20313-2 for Je Wright,Be Terminated IAW 10CFR50.74(a).Individual Retiring ML20197J5541998-12-10010 December 1998 Forwards Unit 1 Cycle 9 90-Day ISI Summary Rept IAW IWA-6220 & IWA-6230 of ASME Code,Section Xi.Request for Relief Will Be Submitted to NRC Timeframe to Support Second 10-year Insp Interval,Per 10CFR50.55a 05000327/LER-1998-003, Forwards LER 98-003-00 Re Automatic Reactor Trip with FW Isolation & Auxiliary FW Start as Result of Failure of Vital Inverter & Second Inverter Failure.Event Is Being Reported IAW 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)1998-12-0909 December 1998 Forwards LER 98-003-00 Re Automatic Reactor Trip with FW Isolation & Auxiliary FW Start as Result of Failure of Vital Inverter & Second Inverter Failure.Event Is Being Reported IAW 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv) ML20196F9841998-11-25025 November 1998 Provides Changes to Calculated Peak Fuel Cladding Temp, Resulting from Recent Changes to Plant ECCS Evaluation Model ML20195H7891998-11-17017 November 1998 Requests NRC Review & Approval of Five ASME Code Relief Requests Identified in Snp Second ten-year ISI Interval for Units 1 & 2 ML20195E4991998-11-12012 November 1998 Forwards Rev 7 to Physical Security/Contingency Plan.Rev Adds Requirement That Security Personnel Will Assess Search Equipment Alarms & Add Definition of Major Maint.Rev Withheld (Ref 10CFR2.790(d)(1)) 05000328/LER-1998-002, Forwards LER 98-002-00 Re Automatic Turbine & Reactor Trip, Resulting from Failure of Sudden Pressure Relay on 'B' Phase Main Transformer1998-11-10010 November 1998 Forwards LER 98-002-00 Re Automatic Turbine & Reactor Trip, Resulting from Failure of Sudden Pressure Relay on 'B' Phase Main Transformer ML20195G5701998-11-10010 November 1998 Documents Util Basis for 981110 Telcon Request for Discretionary Enforcement for Plant TS 3.8.2.1,Action B,For 120-VAC Vital Instrument Power Board 1-IV.Licensee Determined That Inverter Failed Due to Component Failure ML20155J4031998-11-0505 November 1998 Provides Clarification of Topical Rept Associated with Insertion of Limited Number of Lead Test Assemblies Beginning with Unit 2 Operating Cycle 10 Core ML20154R9581998-10-21021 October 1998 Requests Approval of Encl Request for Relief ISI-3 from ASME Code Requirements Re Integrally Welded Attachments of Supports & Restraints for AFW Piping ML20155B1481998-10-21021 October 1998 Informs That as Result of Discussion of Issues Re Recent Events in Ice Condenser Industry,Ice Condenser Mini-Group (Icmg),Decided to Focus Efforts on Review & Potential Rev of Ice condenser-related TS in Order to Clarify Issues ML20154K1581998-10-13013 October 1998 Forwards Rept Re SG Tube Plugging Which Occurred During Unit 1 Cycle 9 Refueling Outage,Per TS 4.4.5.5.a.ISI of Unit 1 SG Was Completed on 980930 ML20154H6191998-10-0808 October 1998 Forwards Rev 0 to Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Cycle 10 COLR, IAW TS 6.9.1.14.c 05000328/LER-1998-001, Forwards LER 98-001-00 Providing Details Re Automatic Turbine & Reactor Trip Due to Failure of Sudden Pressure Relay on 'B' Phase Main Transformer1998-09-28028 September 1998 Forwards LER 98-001-00 Providing Details Re Automatic Turbine & Reactor Trip Due to Failure of Sudden Pressure Relay on 'B' Phase Main Transformer ML20151W4901998-09-0303 September 1998 Responds to NRC Re Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-327/98-07 & 50-328/98-07.Corrective Actions:Revised Per SQ971279PER to Address Hardware Issues of Hysteresis, Pressure Shift & Abnormal Popping Noise 1999-09-27
[Table view] Category:UTILITY TO NRC
MONTHYEARML20059K6661990-09-17017 September 1990 Forwards Evaluation That Provides Details of Plug Cracks & Justification for Continued Operation Until 1993 ML20059H4031990-09-10010 September 1990 Discusses Plant Design Baseline & Verification Program Deficiency D.4.3-3 Noted in Insp Repts 50-327/86-27 & 50-328/86-27.Evaluation Concluded That pre-restart Walkdown Data,Loops 1 & 2 Yielded Adequate Design Input ML20059E1851990-08-31031 August 1990 Responds to NRC Re Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-327/90-22 & 50-328/90-22.Corrective Actions:Extensive Mgt Focus Being Applied to Improve Overtime Use Controls ML20059E2881990-08-31031 August 1990 Forwards Addl Info Re Alternate Testing of Reactor Vessel Head & Internals Lifting Rigs,Per NUREG-0612.Based on Listed Hardships,Util Did Not Choose 150% Load Test Option ML20059H1831990-08-31031 August 1990 Forwards Nonproprietary PFE-F26NP & Proprietary PFE-F26, Sequoyah Nuclear Plan Unit 1,Cycle 5 Restart Physics Test Summary, Re Testing Following Vantage 5H Fuel Assembly installation.PFE-F26 Withheld (Ref 10CFR2.790(b)(4)) ML18033B5031990-08-31031 August 1990 Forwards Financial Info Required to Assure Retrospective Premiums,Per 10CFR140 & 771209 Ltr ML20028G8341990-08-28028 August 1990 Forwards Calculation SCG1S361, Foundation Investigation of ERCW Pumping Station Foundation Cells. ML20063Q2471990-08-20020 August 1990 Submits Implementation Schedule for Cable Tray Support Program.Util Proposes Deferral of Portion of Remaining Activities Until After Current Unit 2 Cycle 4 Refueling Outage,Per 900817 Meeting.Tva Presentation Matl Encl ML20056B5181990-08-20020 August 1990 Responds to NRC Re Order Imposing Civil Monetary Penalty & Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-327/90-01 & 50-328/90-01.Corrective Actions:Organizational Capabilities Reviewed.Payment of Civil Penalty Wired to NRC ML20063Q2461990-08-17017 August 1990 Forwards Cable Test Program Resolution Plan to Resolve Issues Re Pullbys,Jamming & Vertical Supported Cable & TVA- Identified Cable Damage.Tva Commits to Take Actions Prior to Startup to Verify Integrity of safety-related Cables ML20059A5121990-08-15015 August 1990 Provides Clarification of Implementation of Replacement Items Project at Plant for Previously Procured Warehouse Inventory.Util Committed to 100% Dedication of Commercial Grade,Qa,Level Ii,Previous Procurement Warehouse Spare ML20058M2321990-08-0707 August 1990 Forwards Rept of 900709 Fishkill,Per Requirements in App B, Environ Tech Spec,Subsections 4.1.1 & 5.4.2.Sudden Water Temp Increase Killed Approximately 150 Fish in Plant Diffuser Pond ML20058N2361990-08-0707 August 1990 Confirms That Requalification Program Evaluation Ref Matl Delivered to Rd Mcwhorter on 900801.Ref Matl Needed to Support NRC Preparation for Administering Licensed Operator Requalification Exams in Sept 1990 ML20058M4471990-07-27027 July 1990 Responds to Unresolved Items Which Remain Open from Insp Repts 50-327/90-18 & 50-328/90-18.TVA in Agreement W/Nrc on Scope of Work Required to Address Concerns W/Exception of Design Basis Accident & Zero Period Accelaration Effects ML20058M0111990-07-27027 July 1990 Forwards Addl Info Re Plant Condition Adverse to Quality Rept Concerning Operability Determination.Probability of Cable Damage During Installation Low.No Programmatic Cable Installation Problems Exist ML20055J3531990-07-27027 July 1990 Forwards Revised Commitment to Resolve EOP Step Deviation Document Review Comments ML20055J0771990-07-26026 July 1990 Requests Termination of Senior Reactor Operator License SOP-20830 for Jh Sullivan Due to Resignation from Util ML20055G6611990-07-17017 July 1990 Forwards Justification for Continued Operation for safety- Related Cables Installed at Plant,Per 900717 Telcon.No Operability Concern Exists at Plant & No Programmatic Problems Have Been Identified.Summary of Commitments Encl ML20058L7001990-07-16016 July 1990 Forwards Response to SALP Repts 50-327/90-09 & 50-328/90-09 for 890204 - 900305,including Corrective Actions & Improvements Being Implemented ML20055F6151990-07-13013 July 1990 Provides Addl Bases for Util 900320 Proposal to Discontinue Review to Identify Maint Direct Charge molded-case Circuit Breakers Procured Between Aug 1983 & Dec 1984,per NRC Bulletin 88-010.No Significant Assurance Would Be Expected ML20044B2211990-07-12012 July 1990 Forwards Addl Info Clarifying Certain Conclusions & Recommendation in SER Re First 10-yr Interval Inservice Insp Program ML20055D2531990-07-0202 July 1990 Provides Status of Q-list Development at Plant & Revises Completion Date for Effort.Implementation of Q-list Would Cause Unnecessary & Costly Delays in Replanning Maint,Mod, outage-related Activities & Associated Procedure Revs ML20043H9061990-06-21021 June 1990 Responds to Generic Ltr 90-04, Request for Info on Status of Licensee Implementaion of Generic Safety Issues Resolved W/Imposition or Requirements or Corrective Actions. No Commitments Contained in Submittal ML20043H2281990-06-18018 June 1990 Informs of Issue Recently Identified During Startup of Facility from Cycle 4 Refueling Outage & How Issue Addressed to Support Continued Escalation to 100% Power,Per 900613 & 14 Telcons ML20043G4901990-06-14014 June 1990 Forwards Tabs for Apps a & B to Be Inserted Into Util Consolidated Nuclear Power Radiological Emergency Plan ML20043F9261990-06-13013 June 1990 Responds to NRC Bulletin 89-002, Stress Corrosion Cracking of High-Hardness Type 410 Stainless Steel Internal Preloaded Bolting in Anchor/Darling Model S3502 Swing Check Valves or Valves of Similar Design. ML20043F9301990-06-13013 June 1990 Responds to NRC 900516 Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-327/90-17 & 50-328/90-17.Corrective Action:Test Director & Supervisor Involved Given Appropriate Level of Disciplinary Action ML20043H0361990-06-11011 June 1990 Forwards Supplemental Info Re Unresolved Item 88-12-04 Addressing Concern W/Double Differentiation Technique Used to Generate Containment Design Basis Accident Spectra,Per 900412 Request ML20043D9921990-06-0505 June 1990 Responds to NRC 900507 Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-327/90-14 & 50-328/90-14.Corrective Actions:Util Reviewed Issue & Determined That Trains a & B Demonstrated Operable in Jan & Apr,Respectively of 1989 ML20043C2821990-05-29029 May 1990 Requests Relief from ASME Section XI Re Hydrostatic Pressure Test Requirements Involving RCS & Small Section of Connected ECCS Piping for Plant.Replacement & Testing of Check Valve 1-VLV-63-551 Presently Scheduled for Completion on 900530 ML20043C0581990-05-29029 May 1990 Forwards Response to NRC 900426 Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-327/90-15 & 50-328/90-15.Response Withheld (Ref 10CFR73.21) ML20043B3051990-05-22022 May 1990 Forwards Detailed Scenario for 900711 Radiological Emergency Plan Exercise.W/O Encl ML20043B1201990-05-18018 May 1990 Forwards, Diesel Generator Voltage Response Improvement Rept. Combined Effect of Resetting Exciter Current Transformers to Achieve flat-compounding & Installing Electronic Load Sequence Timers Produced Acceptable Voltage ML20043A6101990-05-15015 May 1990 Forwards Rev 16 to Security Personnel Training & Qualification Plan.Rev Withheld (Ref 10CFR2.790) ML20043A2391990-05-15015 May 1990 Forwards Revised Tech Spec Pages to Support Tech Spec Change 89-27 Re Steam Generator Water Level Adverse Trip Setpoints for Reactor Trip Sys Instrumentation & Esfas. Encl Reflects Ref Leg Heatup Environ Allowance ML20043A0581990-05-11011 May 1990 Forwards Cycle 5 Redesign Peaking Factor Limit Rept for Facility.Unit Redesigned During Refueling Outage Due to Removal & Replacement of Several Fuel Assemblies Found to Contain Leaking Fuel Rods ML20043A0571990-05-10010 May 1990 Forwards List of Commitments to Support NRC Review of Eagle 21 Reactor Protection Sys Function Upgrade,Per 900510 Telcon ML20042G9771990-05-0909 May 1990 Responds to NRC 900412 Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-327/90-01 & 50-328/90-01 & Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty.Corrective Actions:Rhr Pump 1B-B Handswitch in pull- to-lock Position to Ensure One Train of ECCS Operable ML20042G4651990-05-0909 May 1990 Provides Addl Info Re Plant Steam Generator Low Water Level Trip Time Delay & Function of P-8 Reactor Trip Interlock,Per 900430 Telcon.Trip Time Delay Does Not Utilize P-8 Interlock in Any Manner ML20042G4541990-05-0909 May 1990 Provides Notification of Steam Generator Tube Plugging During Unit 1 Cycle 4 Refueling Outage,Per Tech Specs 4.4.5.5.a.Rept of Results of Inservice Insp to Be Submitted by 910427.Summary of Tubes Plugged in Unit 1 Encl ML20042G0441990-05-0808 May 1990 Forwards Nonproprietary WCAP-11896 & WCAP-8587,Suppl 1 & Proprietary WCAP-8687,Suppls 2-E69A & 2-E69B & WCAP-11733 Re Westinghouse Eagle 21 Process Protection Sys Components Equipment Qualification Test Rept.Proprietary Rept Withheld ML20042G1431990-05-0808 May 1990 Forwards WCAP-12588, Sequoyah Eagle 21 Process Protection Sys Replacement Hardware Verification & Validation Final Rept. Info Submitted in Support of Tech Spec Change 89-27 Dtd 900124 ML20042G1001990-05-0808 May 1990 Forwards Proprietary WCAP 12504 & Nonproprietary WCAP 12548, Summary Rept Process Protection Sys Eagle 21 Upgrade,Rtd Bypass Elimination,New Steam Line Break Sys,Medical Signal Selector .... Proprietary Rept Withheld (Ref 10CFR2.790) ML20042G1701990-05-0808 May 1990 Provides Addl Info Re Eagle 21 Upgrade to Plant Reactor Protection Sys,Per 900418-20 Audit Meeting.Partial Trip Output Board Design & Operation Proven by Noise,Fault,Surge & Radio Frequency Interference Testing Noted in WCAP-11733 ML20042G1231990-05-0707 May 1990 Forwards Detailed Discussion of Util Program & Methodology Used at Plant to Satisfy Intent of Reg Guide 1.97,Rev 2 Re Licensing Position on post-accident Monitoring ML20042F7741990-05-0404 May 1990 Informs of Completion of Eagle 21 Verification & Validation Activities Re Plant Process Protection Sys Upgrade.No Significant Disturbances Noted from NRC Completion Date of 900420 ML20042F1691990-05-0303 May 1990 Responds to NRC Bulletin 88-009, Thimble Tube Thinning in Westinghouse Electric Corporation Reactors. Wear Acceptance Criteria Established & Appropriate Corrective Actions Noted. Criteria & Corresponding Disposition Listed ML20042G1381990-04-26026 April 1990 Forwards Westinghouse 900426 Ltr to Util Providing Supplemental Info to Address Questions Raised by NRC Re Eagle-21 Process Protection Channels Required for Mode 5 Operation at Facilities ML20042E9641990-04-26026 April 1990 Forwards Rev 24 to Physical Security/Contingency Plan.Rev Withheld (Ref 10CFR73.21) ML20012E6181990-03-28028 March 1990 Discusses Reevaluation of Cable Pullby Issue at Plant in Light of Damage Discovered at Watts Bar Nuclear Plant. Previous Conclusions Drawn Re Integrity of Class 1E Cable Sys Continue to Be Valid.Details of Reevaluation Encl 1990-09-17
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- ... - - _ . _ _ - _ _ - - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - _ _ _ _ - - - - - _ - _ _ - - - - - - - - - _ _ - _ - - - _ _ _ - - - _ - - - - _ - - - - - - - - - . _ - _ _ _ - - - _ _ _ - _ _ . _- _
[ TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY CHATTANOOGA. TENNESSEE 374ol 400 Chestnut Street Tower II 50-3M June 6, 1985 Mr. James M. Taylor, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555
Dear Mr. Taylor:
Enclosed is our response to J. Nelson Grace's May 7,1985 letter to H. G. Parris which transmitted the Proposed Civil Penalty Action: EA 84-119, Unit 1 Seal Table Leak and Thimble Tube Ejection Event (Reference IE Inspection Report No. 50-327/84-24 dated March 7, 1985) for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SQE) unit 1 (enclosure). Please note that in responding to the violations, we have made numerous references to the September 18, 1984 Office of Nuclear Power response on this matter that is Attachment III of the March 7 inspection report. For convenience, we have attached the pertinent pages of our September 18, 1984 report in enclosure 1 as attachment 1. I discusssed this with R. D. Walker of Region II on June 6, 1985.
Fees in response to the civil penalty of $112,500 are being wired to NRC, Attention: Office of Inspection and Enforcement.
If you have any questions, please call R. E. Alsup at FTS 858-2725.
To the best of my knowledge, I declare the statements contained herein are complete and true.
Very truly yours, TENNESSEE ALLEY AUTHORITY
. A. Domer, Chief Nuclear Licensing Branch Enclosure cc: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Enclosure)
Region II ATTN: Dr. J. Nelson Grace, Regional Administrator 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323 8506110245 850606 PDR ADOCK 05000327 i G PDR
\\A f
\
l' An Equal Opportunity Employer I- _ - _ _ - _ - _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _
ENCLOSURE RESPONSE TO NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF CIVIL PENALTIES: EA-119, UNIT 1 SEAL TABLE LEAK AND THIMBLE TUBE EJECTION EVENT
(
REFERENCE:
INSPECTION REPORT 50-327/84-24)
Violation 50-327/84-24-01 _
- 1. Technical. Specification 6.8.1 requires the licensee to establish, implement, and maintain procedures recommended in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, February 1978. Items 1.c 1.e., 1.1.,
7.e(1) and 9 of Regulatory Guide 1.33 specify that procedures are
. required for equipment control, procedure review and approval, access to containment, access control to radiation areas including a radiation work permit system, and performing maintenance, respectively.
Contrary to the above, the licensee failed to establish and implement adequate procedures for the conduct of equipment control, procedure review and approval, performance of maintenance, radiation work permit access control, and access to containment. Examples of these failures are cited below: ~
- a. On April 19, 1984, maintenance procedure SMI-0-94-1 for instrument thimble tube cleaning and flushing was not implemented in that Step 1.1 of the procedure forbids use of the thimble cleaning system at power and cleaning activities were performed with unit 1 at 30 percent power. The procedure established at that time was inappropriate for use at elevated reactor coolant system pressures and temperatures.
- b. Maintenance procedure SMI-0-94-1 was inadequately established when issued on July 10, 1981, in that it contained no initial conditions and no post-maintenance inspection or quality assurance requirements for the thimble tube high pressure seals which constitute a reactor coolant pressure boundary,
- c. Maintenance request implementing procedures for control and review of maintenance activities associated with Maintenance Request (MR)
A-238084 dated April 18, 1984, was not implemented in that:
(1) MR A-238084 did not delineate the applicable sections of SMI-0-94-1 to be performed and thus provided inadequate work instructions, (2) MR A-238084 did not delineate requirements associated with the job safety analysis as required by procedure SQM2, Maintenance Management System, s
+
k ENCLOSURE 1 RESPONSE TO NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND
, PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF CIVIL PENALTIES: EA-119,
{
- UNIT 1 SEAL TABLE LEAK AND THIMBLE TUBE EJECTION EVENT '
(
REFERENCE:
INSPECTION REPORT 50-327/84-24)
I Violation 50-327/84-24-01 ~
- l
- 1. Technical Specification 6.8.1 requires the licensee to establish, implement, and maintain procedures recommended in Appendix A of 4 -
i Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, February 1978. Items 1.c, i.e., 1.1.,
7.e(1) and 9 of Regulatory Guide 1.33 specify that procedures are required for equipment control, procedure review and approval, access to
[ containment, access control to radiation areas including a radiation work permit system, and performing maintenance, respectively.
' Contrary to the above, the licensee failed to establish and implement
' adequate procedures for the conduct of equipment control, procedure review and approval, performance of maintenance, radiation work permit access control, and access to containment. Examples of these failures
+
are cited below:
1 a. On April 19, 1984, maintenance peccedure SMI-0-94-1 for instrument thimble tube cleaning and flushing was not implemented in that Step
! 1.1 of the procedure forbids use of the thimble cleaning system at
! power and cleaning activities were performed with unit 1 at 30 percent power. The procedure established at that time was i' inappropriate for use at elevated reactor coolant system pressures and temperatures.
! b. Maintenance procedure SMI-0-94-1 was inadequately established when issued on July 10, 1981, in that it contained no initial conditions
' and no post-maintenance inspection or quality assurance requirements for the thimble tube high pressure seals which constitute a reactor coolant pressure boundary.
- c. Maintenance request implementing procedures for control and review of maintenance activities associated with Maintenance Request (MR) j A-238084 dated April 18, 1984, was not implemented in that:
(1) MR A-238084 did not delineate the applicable sections of SMI-0-94-1 to be performed and thus provided inadequate work instructions, a
(2) MR A-238084 did not delineate requirements associated with the job safety analysis as required by procedure SQM2, Maintenance Management System, l
? - -,vg w -e-w s.-w-w,, ,yum,-ve.,e e -e e.-.-e..3,,--yw-y_.. w..-,,p, mew %---e-=-e-----,-%.e-m,er-,4. .,,,e.r,...-----,-yy w,,,,yr_
o (3) NR A-238084 did not reference the incore instrument disassembly / reassembly instructions of Maintenance Instruction 1.9, and (4) as of April 19, 1984, the Field Quality Engineering review of MR A-238084 did not identify the deficiency of (a) above and did not identify that the post-maintenance testing and quality assurance requirements referenced in MR A-238084 did not exist. -
- d. Administrative Instruction -8, Access to Containment, was not adequately established as of April 19, 1984, in that:
(1) no guidance or positive controls are delineated in the procedure to ensure that airlocks remain accessible for egress during activities in containment in Modes 1 through 4 or to ensure that workers are kept informed of changes in available egress routes and (2) paragraph 2.4 did not clearly delineate those maintenance activities on the incore flux monitoring system for which the clearance on the incore flux drive motors could be removed; this resulted in incore detector system disassembly activities being performed without the appropriate clearance in effect,
- e. Administrative Instruction -3, Clearance procedure, paragraph S.1.4, requires that no work begin on equipment under clearance until the clearance is issued to the person responsible for the work. This requirement was not properly implemented in that as of April 19, 1984 the clearance for the incore detector drive motors covering thimble tube cleaning activities was issued to a member of the operations staff and not to a field services supervisor responsible for the cleaning activity.
-f. Radiation Work permit 02-1-00102 issued January 1, 1984, for seal table area inspection and maintenance required workers to verify the presence of a clearance on the incore insrument probes prior to entering the containment lower compartments and annulus. This requirement was not implemented on April 18 and 19, 1984, by workers entering the seal table area in that the clearance was not in effect on the problems during work activities.
This is a Severity Level III violation (Supplement I). (Civil penalty -
$37,500) i i
i TVA RESPONSE
- 1. Admission or Denial of the Violation TVA admits the violation occurred as stated.
- 2. Reasons for the Violation if Admitted Item 1.(a)
Please refer to the attached discussion and/or conclusion for item 1-84-12-SQM-5 in the TVA Office of Nuclear Power (NUC PR) response to NSRS Report 1-84-12-SQN.
Item 1.(b)
Please refer to the attached discussion for item 1-84-12-SQN-7 of the NUC PR response identified in item 1.a.
Item 1.(c)
Please refer to the attached discussion for item 1-84-12-SQN-11 of the NUC PR response identified in item 1.a.
Item 1.(d)
Please refer to the attached discussion for item 1-84-12-SQN-12 of the NUC PR response identified in item 1.a.
Item 1.(e)
Please refer to the attached discussion for item 1-84-12-SQN-9 of the NUC PR response identified in item 1.a.
Item 1.(f)
Please refer to the attached discussion for item 1-84-12-SQN-8 of the NUC PR response identified in item 1.a.
3&4. Corrective Steps Which Have Been Taken and Results Achieved and Corrective Steps Taken to Avoid Further Violations Items 1.(a). 1.(b). 1.(c)
Picase refer to the attached NUC PR response to items 1-84-12-SQN-5, 7, and 11.
F Item 1.(d)
Please refer to the attached NUC PR response to item 1-84-12-SQN-12.
Item 1.(e)
Please refer to the attached NUC PR response to item 1-84-12-SQN-9.
Item 1.(f)
Please refer to the attached NUC PR response to item 1-84-12-SQN-8.
S. Date When Full Compliance Will Be Achieved Full compliance has been achieved.
Violation 50-327/84-24-02
- 2. Technical Specification 6.5.1.6 requires that the Plant Operations Review Committee review unit operations to detect potential nuclear safety hazards and review all procedures required by Technical Specification 6.8.1.
Contrary to the above, these requirements were not implemented in that -
the Plant Operations Review Committee:
- 1. did not meet and review the operational hazards associated with thimble tube cleaning activities to be conducted in containment with the unit at power on April 19, 1984, and
- 2. did not adequately review maintenance procedure SMI-0-94-1 for thimble tube cleaning and flushing on July 10, 1981, as evidenced by the deficiencies identified in violation 1.(b) above.
This is a Severity Level III violation (Supplement I). (Civil Penalty -
$37,500)
TVA RESPONSE
- 1. Admission or Denial of the Violation TVA admits the violation occurred as stated.
2,3
&4. Reasons for Violation If Admitted. Corrective Steps Which Have Been Taken and Results Achieved, and Corrective Steps Taken to Avoid Further Violations Please refer to the attached conclusions and responses for items 1-84-12-SQN-17 and -22 provided in the NUC PR response to the NSRS Reprot 1-84-12-SQN.
- 5. Date When Full Compliance Will Be Achieved Full compliance has been achieved, t
Violation 50-327/84-24-03
- 3. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion II requires that activities affecting quality shall be accomplished under suitably controlled conditions which includes the use of appropriate equipment. In addition, Criterion III requires that appropriate measures be established for the selection and review for suitability for the application of equipment.
Contrary to the above, as of April 19, 1984, the modified incore flux monitoring system thimble cleaning tool used for thimble cleaning activities at power was not appropriate equipment for use on the reactor coolant pressure boundary in that excessive stresses were transferred to the high pressure seal on incore thimble D-12. This requested in a breach of the reactor coolant pressure boundary. In addition, management controls for and reviews of modifications to the original vendor-supplied cleaning tool were inadequate to prevent inappropriate modification of the tool and subsequent use.
This is a Severity Level III violation (Supplement I). (Civil Penalty -
$37,500)
- 1. Admission or Denial of the Violation TVA admits the violation occurred as stated.
2,3,
&4 Reasons for the Violation If Admitted. Corrective Steps Which Have Been Taken and Results Achieved, and Corrective Stcos Taken to Avoid Further Violations Please refer to the attached conclusions and response for item 1-84-12-SQN-10 provided in the NUC PR response to the NSRS Report 1-84-12-SQN.
- 5. Date When Full Compliance Will Be Achieved Full compliance has been achieved.
I
. ATTAClutENT 1 I-84-12-SQN-5, Selection of an Inappropriate Instruction for the Control of the Work Activity i
Conclusion Special Maintenance Instruction SMI-0-94-1 was a poor quality instruction and inappropriate for the activity to be controlled.
However, the instruction was selected during the planning process ;r as the primary procedural control for the cleaning activity apparently because those performing the planning and coordination function were not aware of what quality elements an instruction should contain, the change process for inadequate instructions, or -
had a careless attitude toward procedural compliance.
I-84-12-SQN-7, Inadequate Field Quality Engineering (FQE) Review of Maintenance Request (MR) and Referenced Work Instruction Conclusion SMI-0-94-1 waspoor for review. The referenced and attached to the MR when sent to FQE quality of the instruction wei not identified nor was the fact that the instruction could not be used'to perform the cleaning activity with the reactor at power. The FQE review process had not been effective in initiating quality' improvement of the instruction since its original issuance in July 1981.
I-84-12-SQN-11, Violation of Work Instruction Conclusion EMI-0-94-1 clearly stated that the Teleflex-supplied equipment and '
the instruction were not to be used at power. Using the equipment and instruction for that operation was a violation of work ,
instruction ~and the unit 1 SQNP Technical Specifications. If the .
responsible engineers.had written an adequate procedure appropriate -
for the activity and that procedure had been Plant Operation Review Committee '(PORC) reviewed, the result of the cleaning operation majt have been different (see section IV.D.2a for details).
. I-84-12-SQN-17, Poor Quality Cleaning Procedures and Inadequate PORC Review t Conclusion
. l As noted in section 1II.C.2, SMI-0-94-1 was not adequate for its intended use. SMI-0-94-2 was written af ter the accident to clean the tubes via the NUS method.
i It too was a poor quality instruction i and could promote accidents of a similar nature in the future.
This conclusion is based upon the facts that SMI-0-94-2 had no cautions or warnings to prevent damage to the mechanical seals, no administrative barriers to prevent cleaning the tubes at pressure,
- no instructions for disassembly and reassembly of the detector drive system, no postmaintenance inspections after cleaning and before pressurizing the reactor, and postmaintenance testing to ensure operability was optional. '
1
2
- I-84-12-SQN-17, (Continued)
Despite the poor quality of the instructions, both were recommended for approval by PORC.
In these instances, PORC failed to adequately fulfill its responsibilities to the Plant Manager on these matters _
relating to nuclear safety.
I-84-12-SQN-22, Significant Breakdown in the SON Procedure Process for Maintenance Activities Conclusion There is an apparent breakdown in the procedure process at SQN for maintenance activities as PORC reviewed end recommended approval of two poor quality instructions used for cleaning thimble tubes (one after the accident); the biennial review did not correct poor quality in one instruction; instructions being used were inappro-priate for the activities being performed; an instruction was violated; and some engineers and managers interviewed did not seem to understand what quality elements should be in a maintenance instruction, were not aware of the procedure change process, or expressed a careless attitude toward procedure compliance.
Response (ForItemsI-E4-12-SQN-5,I-84-12-SQN-7,I-84-12-SkN-11, I-84-12-SQN-17, and I-84-12-SQN-22)
To adequately respor.d to the referenced findings one must consider the sequence of events leading up to and including initiation of this maintenance activity.
(1) Prior to the unit 1 cycle 2 outage, the Reactor Engineering Unit identified the need for thimble tube cleaning and prepared maintenance requests (hrs) to accomplish the cleaning. The hrs were included in the unit I cycle 2 refueling outage activity schedule and work was started to accomplish the cleaning but was terminated without adequate feedback fo the Reactor Engineering Unit.
(2) During subsequeat low power physics testing, it became apparent there was an inadequate number of unblocked thimb.t tubes to accom'plish a full flux map.
'(3) Hanagement evalu.ted the performance of this main-tenance activity by requiring a survey of other utilities, vendors, and Westinghouse to ascertain the acceptability of at power performance.
(4) Management recognized the unique aspects of the job and provided for full-time health physics and engineer.
coverage.
5 -+ w g *4 *
~ . .
3 I-84-12-SQN-5, -7,
-11, -17, and -22 (Continued)
(5)
Management made the decision to clean the blocked thimbles tubes while at the 30 percent power level and specified adequate guidelines and precautions to conduct this work activity.
(MR and Special Maintenance Instruction SMI-0-94-1)Howeve .._
were not revised to reflect these directions.
(6) Tha MR was reviewed by FQE as part of their responsibility to ensure an adequate procedure exists for the performance of the work.
(7) A job safety analysis was performed by the maintenance foreman as required by the MR process. Discussions were held between the cognizant engineer and foreman concerning the high pressure connections and their proximity to the 10 path breakdown connections. No work engineerswas to be done at the nor was it done without the lead seal table.
(8) for Hold this orders and activity.
maintenance Radiation Work Permits (RWPs) were v (9) The 10-path transfer devices were disconnected and rolled back prior to beginning the cleaning process without a KR or procedural guidance, but the engineers involved were aware of the unit conditions at the time of the work, the system design, mechanical makeup of the comppgents, and potential hazards.
Employee awareness of the unit, conditions and absolute requirements was demonstrated by informal planning and cursory attempts at satisfying requireeents.
(10) The at power cleaning process began using the MR and SMI-0-94-1 as procedural guidance.
After thoroughly analyzing this event and the NSRS conclusions, SQNP acknowledges the following (1) The work package (SMI-0-94-1 and MR) provided poor quality instructions in that they were not revised to reflect at power cicaning and did not meet technical procedure has requirements specification been cancelled.for this maintchance activity. , This (2) SMI-0-94-2 did not contain and it is being. revised to reference Maintenance Instructi MI-1.9 " Bottom Mounted Instrument Thimble Tube Retraction and Reinsertion" transfer devices.for the disassembly and assembly of the 10 path added to prevent damage to the mechanical seals. Appropriate caution Postmaintenance inspections and testing requirements will be added to SMI-0-94-2; however, it should be noted that this procedure previously contained a double signoff that precluded its use at power. (3) The MR and l'QE's review of the 101 did not meet the requirements of Fequoyah's Standard Practice Maintenance Instruction, SQtt-2.
SQNP will review
4
- j. 4 e
I-84-12-SQN-5, -7, -11. -17, and -22 (Continued) '
l the HR system and QA review process by October 31, 1984, to ensure '
no programmatic deficiencies exist. (4) Adequate feedback did not exist to the Reactor Engineering Unit regarding the failure to satisfactorily clean blocked thimble tubes during the outage. In ,
the future, a detailed scheduling process for incere thimble tube maintenance will be incorporated into the outage schedule and any -.
deviations from scheduled work will be justified to plant management.
(5) A problem existed in the coordination of the hold order and RWP associated with this maintenance activity. To alleviate this problem, Administrative Instruction AI-8 will be revised to clarify what moveable detector system maintenance requires a hold order and hold order requirements for RWPs will be modified to indicate AI-8 will be followed. ,
SQNP does not believe generic program weaknesses have been indicated $
by this event. However, SQNP management understands their detailed involvement in how the job was to be implemented during the evaluation to determine its feasibility may have unintentionally ,
sent a message to key implementing employees creating the impression they had authority to proceed without adhere'nce to cormal plant r
practices.
+
F 1
l , . . . _ _ . _ . -
{ . _ . _ _ _ _ _
4
I-84-12-SQN-b, Noncompliance With Requirements of RWP No. 01-1-00102
RWP No. 01-1-00102 specified the following requirement: " Verify hold order is in effect on incore probes prior to entering Reactor Building lower compartments and the Annulus." On April 18 and 19, FSG evening and day shift employees and an HP s technician entered the reactor building lower compartment while 1
the hold order was not in effect.
Response
For this particular job at least two (2) PORC-approved procedures were being followed, Radiological Control Instruction RCI-14 and Administrative Instruction AI-8. The intent of special instruction 11 of RWP 02-1-00102; " Verify hold order is in effect on incore probes prior to entering reactor building lower compartments and the annulus," is a reminder to comply with AI-8. AI-8 section 2.4 contains the following statement: "The removal of the hold order clearance for maintenance purposes may be accomplished af ter proper coordination with the following; operations, health phystes, applicabic maintenance sections." This coordination is allowed to provide for troubleshooting of the incore detector system. In order to troubleshoot the system,'It must be operable while personnel are in the seal tabic area and, therefore, the hold order cannot remain in place. Due to the confusing nature of this allowance, some nontroubleshooting work was performed without verification of the hold order, but the work was performed with the coordination required by AI-8. For additional clarification, special instructions for hold order requirements for RWPs will be modified to indicate Al-8 requirements will be followed and AI-8 will be revised by October 31, 1984, to clarify that the conditional allowance is for troubleshooting only.
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AI-3, " Clearance Procedures [1-84-12-SQN-9, Noncomplianc . .
Conclusion Hold Order No. I was issued only to the Assistant Shift Engtneer (ASE) and not as required by AI-3 to the persons responsibic r
' fo work17 April being performed and 0400 on May in
- 1. the instrument roons between 0220 on of section 5.1.4 of AI-3. This is contrary to the requirements
Response
not included in the clearance while the work was The orderASE on titewas aware incore of the work being performed and was on the hold probes.
making all personnel aware of the requirement for the personAdd responsible for work to be on the clearance.
This will be accomplished training classes,inand precutage the briefings, existing clearance procedure are attended by managers, periodic management safety meetings which foremen, and engineering personnei, n
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I-84-12-SQN-10, Modification of Cleaning Tool Base Supports Without !
Performing a Technical Evaluation or Testine Conclusion '
The cleaning tool base support was modified,and a temporary base was constructed and used without a technical evaluation of the effect on the mechanical seals. No testing was performed before --
use. Use of the tool and its support was determined during post-accident testing to impose forces of considerable magnitude on the ;
mechanical seals and those forces were found to cause strain sufficient that the thimble tube separated from the mechanical seal.
Response
A review of the final support fixture in use at the time of the '
event indicates that resultant forces were applied to the fitting '
by the fixture, but would apply approximately 50 percent less resultant force multiplication to the fitting than the originally fabricated support base which had been scrapped. These forces were not fully considered in any preevent analysis and, therefore, the NSRS conclusion is substantially correct. However, the actual error occarred in that the original tool supplied by Telefles was modified by the addition of a base and not by fabricating a new base. '
SQNP will review "special tools" and evaluate the need for modification controls for these types of tools.
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j I-84-12-SQN-12, Lack of Control of Egress capability from containment Conclusion_
For approximately 30 minutes during the morning of April 19 the inner door of the personnel airlock was made inoperable without the knowledge of some of the workers cleaning the thimble tubes. -
This would have hindered egress from the room if the mechanical seal had failed at this time. The FSG workers were unaware of the Technical Specification requirements for maintaining contain-ment integrity and that leaving the inner door of the airlock open would enter the unit into a limiting condition for operation.
Leaving needed. the inner door open would have hampered rescue efforts if
Response
It is evident from the supporting details of the NSRS repurt that the shift engineer made an evaluation of the work in progress and in his judgement the time necessary to clear the airlock provided adequate protection for the employees inside. It is ic:portant to note that the workers involved knew alternate egress routes from the incore instrument room. In particular the submarine hatch was nearby and available as an unhindered egress route.
SQNP certainly agrees that reactor building egress should not be impaired when maintenance or other activities within containment are necessary while the unit is at power conditions. The establish-ment of good communications is essential particularly in situations where one maintenance activity has the potential for affecting egress routes associated with another maintenance activity. Present policies regarding such communication are being reviewed to ensure their effectiveness. However, it must be noted that piant policies must retain the flexibility for the shif t engineer to evaluate such -
situations on notification an individual basis and determine the extent of required.
SQNP acknowledges the FSG personnel were not adeiuately t aware of the technical specification requirements associated with the containment airlocks. Future emphasis will be placed on ensuring responsible maintenance personnel are made aware of the technical specifications associated with the airlock,s on a job by-job basis.
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