ML20092K972
| ML20092K972 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Limerick  |
| Issue date: | 04/06/1982 |
| From: | Bunker R, Mullee G, Ross K GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20092K924 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8406290198 | |
| Download: ML20092K972 (109) | |
Text
e h BWR OWNERS GROUP CONTROL ROOM IMPROVEMENTS COMMITTEE HUMAN FACTORS DESIGN REVIEW OF THE LIMERICK 1 & 2 CONTROL ROOM
SUMMARY
REPORT
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Prepared By /N W Date # #
Ronald S. Bunker General Electric Company
/b u ,, u ) d E A Date Kenneth C. Ross General Electric Company Reviewed B Date MN d G. R. Mullee General Electric Company Approved By "h*!
- Date 48!8s L
Warren Babcock, Team Leader Boston Edison Company 8406290198 840625 PDR ADOCK 05000352 F pon
IMPORTANT NOTICE REGARDING CONTENTS OF THIS REPORT (O'
b/ Please Read Carefully This report contains information regarding the Control Room Survey performed under the direction of the BWR Owners' Group with the assistance of General Electric Company. The only undertakings of General Electric Company respecting information in this document are contained in the contract between Philadelphia Electric Company and General Electric Company (Work Authorization AE12, Limerick NSS Contract), and nothing contained in this document shall be construed as changing the contract. The use of this information by anyone other than Philadelphia Electric Company or for any purpose other than that for which it is intended, is not authorized. With respect to any unauthorized use, neither General Electric Company nor the BWR Owners' Group make any representation or warranty, and assume no liability as to the completeness, accuracy, or usefulness of the information contained in this document.
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4 TABLE OF CONTENTS O %
1.0
SUMMARY
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2.0 INTRODUCTION
4 l t
3.0 PANEL LAYOUT AND DESIGN 9 3.1 Anthropometrics 10 3.2 Demarcation Lines and Mimics 11 3.3 Control / Display Grouping 19 3.4 Color Usage 23 ,
3.5 Labeling 24 4.0 INSTRUMENTATION AND HARDWARE 28 l 4.1 Controllers 29 4.2 Indicating Devices 30 4.3 Recorders 42 4.4 Indicating Lights 44 4.5 Switches 46 .
51 5.0 ANNUNCIATORS ,
i 60
, 6.0 OPERATOR INTERVIEW
SUMMARY
62 7.0 EMERGENCY PROCEDURE TASK ANALYSIS APPENDICES l
A-1 A CHECKLIST ITEMS FOR LATER REVIEW OPERATOR INTERVIEW COMMENTS B-1 B
C-1 C PHOTOCRAPHS 11
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I LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS ;
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s Control Room Arrangement 8 !
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- LIST OF TABLES i 4, t t
Table Title Page, j i .. <
t Survey Team Members 6 l I
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II- Control Room Panels Reviewed !
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1.0
SUMMARY
f% In response to recently formulated regulatory requirements for design
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reviews of nuclear power plant control rooms (NUREG-0660, NUREG-0700),
Philadelphia Electric Company has undertaken a human factors evalua-tion of the Limerick control panels. This one week review was performed by operations and engineering personnel f rom four utilities, two human factors consultants, and representatives from General Electric Company. General conclusions of the survey team are as follows:
1.1 Favorable Aspects of Control Room Design 1 Most instrumentation and hardware is located on panels within anthropometric guidelines. >
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- 2. Panels define main system operating areas. -
- 3. Controls are generally functionally grouped.
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(,, 4. Component labels are generally very explicit and consistently positioned.
- 5. Annunciators are generally grouped by system within panels and are placed above related controls and displays.
- 6. Panels are all identified by both number and system label.
l 7. Use has been made of both demarcation lines and mimic arrangements to I
organize system layouts.
1.2 General Recommendations for Enhancement Panel Layout and Design L
- 1. Vertical panels have controls and displays mounted above and below recommended heights. Relocation of components, where feasible, should (m,,) be considered.
1
- 2. In many instances, functional groupings of controls and displays is could be enhanced with dentreation lines and summary labels.
- 3. Some aspects of mimic laycuts could be improved. Flowpaths should be readily apparent and crowding avoided.
- 4. A hierarchical labeling system should be instituted.
- 5. Large arrays of closely spaced components should be separated through the uce of demarcation lines, hierarchical labeling, and spacing techniques.
Instrumentation and Hardware
- 1. Control room indicators and recorders should be reviewed to determine which would benefit from the addition of markings or color coding to indicate normal and abnormal ranges.
gge- 2. Non-standard indicator scales should be avoided.
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- 3. Relocation of some instrumentation and hardware should be considered to avoid potential problems associated with glare, parallax, hand support, and general readability.
- 4. Multi point recorders should be used only where such a format is applicable. Where used, consideration should be given to more widespread application of point select capability.
- 5. A lamp test feature should be considered.
- 6. Emergency switches should be clearly marked for position. l Annunciators
- 1. The use of a separate silence button is recommended.
2
L 2. Alarm panels should be identified by coded label.
- 3. Annunciator window legends should be reviewed to determine which would benefit from the use of more succinct wording.
1 Emergency Procedure Instrumentation 1 Indicators and recorders should be provided with range markings identifying action levels addressed in emergency procedures.
- 2. Certain modifications of display methods and formats could enhance the effectiveness of the control room as an operator aid during transient conditions.
- 3. Some information potentially useful to the operator is not available in the main operating area of the control room.
- 4. Some modification of instrumentation may be necessary to enable r the operator to evaluate the state of the plant in accordance with certain considerations addressed in the guidelines.
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2.0 IIrTEGIUCTION h
km ,) This report summarizes findings of a one week preliminary human factors review of the Limerick control panels using methodology developed by the Control Room Improvements Committee of the BVR Owners' Group. A review team comprised of operations and engineering personnel from four utilities performed the evaluation, with the assistance of two human factors specialists and representatives from General Electric Company (see Table I).
The scope of this preliminary review was defined so as to be commensurtte with the current status of the control room. Mecause Limerick is not yet operational, it was not possible to evaluate some sections of the BWR Owners' Group Control Room Survey checklists.
These have been listed in Appendix A and should be reviewed at a later phase in plant construction.
Table II lists the panels evaluated by the survey team during the review. Each panel was compared to a set of design criteria in
\ checklist form developed from recognized human factors standards.
These checklists provided detailed guidelines for panel layout, panel design, instrumentation, hardware, and annunciators.
While the control room evaluation concentrated primarily on Unit 1, both Units are essentially identical. Therefore , all conclusions discussed in this report should be considered applicable to hath units.
Sections 3.0 through 5.0 provide complete lists, grouped by subiect, of all checklist items for which control room modification should be considered. After each entry, the applicable checklist cross-reference has been placed in parentheses. A prioritization of potential enhancements is also included in the form of Evaluation Products. These products have been derived # rom two numerical rating factors, one indicating the degree to which the panel under O
4
consideration complies with the checklist criterion, the second representing the relative likelihood that non-compliance with that O(_/ -
item could cause or contribute to operator error. The products of the two factors are then categorized as follows:
9 Modification is reconmended 8 - Modification should be strongly considered r 6 - Modification should be considered ;
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4 - Modification may be beneficial in some cases Final recommendations for backfits should be determined by the utility in an item-by-item review of these concerns as part of an integrated approach to control room upgrades. This should include an analysis of the safety significance and frequency of use of the components and systems involved, the consequences of operator retraining required by the change, and the' engineering practicalities i of instituting the change . Inputs should be obtained from operations, engineering, training, and human factors specialists.
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(_- This report identifies areas of control room design for which modifications should be considered, stated as general suggestions with the understanding that corrective action should be considered on i
- a control room wide basis. While specific examples have been provided wherever possible, this document is not designed to serve as an all inclusive list of every piece of hardware for which modification may be beneficial . Nor is it intended to recommend specific improvements for the concerns discussed. Topics such as I control panel layout should be given very careful review prior to instituting a change as these concerns involve many interrelated factors which must be considered in parallel.
f O 5 I
TABLE I SURVEY TEAM MEMBERS Warren Babcock, Boston Edison Company (Team Leader)
Gerald Rainey, Philadelphia Electric Company Wallace Colvin, Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company .
Byron Thibodeaux, Gulf States Utilities Dr. Thomas Sheridan, Human Factors Consultant l Michael Danchak, Human Factors Consultant Ronald Bunker, General Electric Company Kenneth Ross, General Electric Company l
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r TABLE II l CONTit0L ROOM PANELS REVIEWED E
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00C-656 $
t i 10C-614 10C-668 00C-624 10C-669 i i
10C-626 10C-670 10C-647 00C-671 -
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10C-648 00C-681 10C-649 10C-631 00C-650 00C-693 ;
10C-651 10C-696 l 10C-652 Emergency Shutdown f
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8? 5' 8* $
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C4 Y A R R 02 K OE - R 06 SL C0 A S
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-3.0 CONTROL PANEL LAYOUT AND DESIGN Control panels were evaluated against checklist standards covering anthropometrics, panel arrangements, mimic and demarcation lines, control / display-grouping, color codes, and labeling systems.
Several positive aspects of panel design were evident, suggesting that considerable attention has already been paid to human factors engineering in the Limerick control room. Overall panel dimensions generally conform to recommended standards, controls and displays are.
functionally grouped, demarcation lines are used to define system operating areas and mimic lines have been added to some system layouts. However, several areas were noted in which control room design could be further enhanced, resulting in a still more ef fective man-machine interface.
While overall panel dimensions are in close compliance with checklist standards,' controls and indicators were of ten found mounted above and below recommended heights on most vertical panels. Indicators were found as high as 92" and as low as 22", and controls were found as high as 80" and as low as 20". (The recommended range for vertical panel indicators is 48" to 68"; for controls, 42" to 60".) Also, all annunciators in the primary operating area exceed the max'imum recommended height of 88" (top row is 118" high).
Controls and displays have generally been functionally grouped by system on each panel. However, these groupings could be made more discernible through the use of spacing techniques, der.arcation lines, mimics and a hierarchical labeling system. On many panels controls and displays have been spaced to define system operating areas, but this technique could be extended to arrays of components such as the many switches on panel 10C-668. Demarcation lines have been used to define system areas. Demarcation lines could also be used to enhance some subsystems of components, to further separate systems on some vertical panels, and to clearly offset components such as trip, O
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abode ' isolation, mV! ant.nnciator response buttons. Mimic layouts
.x y n , ,n have been used to orgs.tif te the FCCS x syst'em and electrical system o x - ., ,
components'.' The309S mialca could be further organized to eliminate Q
" congestion and simplifyjld. paths.' The use of mimics could also be s . ..
extended to,,ot.her systems 1.n the, control room such as the ESW
,. s system. . Gyutem-upamary Jabels have been provided in many locations, however,theexist[cceofrepetitivelabelsisstillapparent.
Incorporating a hierarchical iabeliud system would eliminate much of i
thie= redundancy, , res,ulti n more succinct: labels, and enhance fune.tional g'roupf agj3 of controis t.u3t dLaplays.
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Two panels, 00C .t81'and 00C-667, were noted which, besides the use of enhancement tech'ique,s n prhviously men'tiuoed, could benefit from the rearrangement of components into functional and easily recognizable ,
systems. The Heating and. Ventilating Console, 00C-681, is rather disorganized and, fcCthe x most part, mirror-imaged. The ESW control panel, 00C-667, was notad'by .
a oper,ators interviewed to be very confusing to operite~. . --
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The mimics use60n the ECCS, pmiels c9uld be improved with respect to s ., s. , ,,
both materlAlt and fnatA11ation, -
Coloring of aimic bars could be
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brighty, anty,are,nteafsplified 0,and simic lines made straight. '
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- 1. ' The detign of benchb'oard pangs genera 11ys 5% [ s s .
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the tor rov* at a. height of 118,".( p cept panels 675 s ( ,I 1, and 696)U \(f.1.1) .) ' ' ,
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Product O 2. The Generator and Auxiliary Power panels, 8 10C-654 and 20C-654, are mirror imaged.
(A1.2)
- 3. The path to and view of vertical panels 9 located behind the benchboards is ob- .
L structed by the benchboards. This is especially of concern for the ECCS panels. ;
In addition, the view of the ESW panel is somewhat obstructed. (A7.1, A7.2)
- 4. Annunciator windows for the meteorological 6 alarms, panel 00C-675, and for the post LOCA hydrogen recombiner panels, 696, are not visible from the primary control area. (A7.3)
() 3.2 Demarcation Lines and Mimics
- 1. The Heating and Ventilating Common 8 Console 00C-681 is not distinguished from panel 20C-681 by demarcation lines or other graphic display (Photo #1). (A2.1)
- 2. Part of the demarcation line which 4 distinguishes the common panel 00C-656 fismissing. (A2.1)
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' ' 3. 1: sten.n,iee. use has been made of demarcation . 7, 6' linca>on.beachboards and some vertical panels.
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In~ conjunction with mimics such as those
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, spacing techniques, controls and displays [
havc'been generally grouped per system ,
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between systems. Areas where
.the use of, demarcation lines (and hierarchi-s
. cal labeling) could' provide further dis i
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tJnction of systen. operating areas Tnclude:
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Enciese actn of related indicators, psnel SS2', -
,o Enclose related turbine and main steam displsy's and selector switches, panel 653 "
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' . Separate RFPT controls and IRM/APRM range
- switches and indicating lights, panel 603 .
. Separate and highlight reactor manual scram f
l- buttons, panel 603 (Photo #2)
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l Continue demarcation lines to vertical portion of panel 655 -
f Highlight annunciator response buttons on ,
applicable panels ,
Enclose related displays and controls, panel 00C-681 (Photos # 1, 3) i l
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i Evaluation Product Enclose related displays, panels 647 and 6 648 Enclose related electrical meter displays and synchroscopes, panels 654 and 00C-660 ,
L Enclose fire pump displays and controls, panel 00C-650 ;
i Separate and enclose related sets of small indicators, pushbuttons, and switches on panel 670 -
t Separate MSIV inboard division 1 and out- ,
board division 2 and ADS division 1 and 3, .
rs panel 626 (Photo #4)
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- 4. Graphical aids and/or hierarchical labeling 12
- e. '4 techniques have generally not been used to i separate similar subgroups of components with-in system groupings on all benchboards.
These techniques could also be used on vertical 6 ,
panels such as: (A2.3) i l
Distinguish main steam line inboard and outboard isolation switches, panel 601 ,
Separate meters for safeguard trans- 1 formers, auxiliary switchgear, and start-up buses, panel 00C-660 M v 13
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r'"% i Divide motor and diesel driven remote start switches and indicators for fire pumps, ,
panel 00C-650 I
Within switch arrays of panel 668 (Photo #5)
Separate systems within divisions of MSIV inboard and outboard leakage control, panel 626 (Photo #4)
- 5. Mimics used in the LPCS, RHR, and con- 4 tainment control systems, panel 601, use two different widths of bars. In most instances the wide mimic bars refer ,
to the primary flow path while the narrow mimic bars refer to secondary flow i Ig paths. A few places exist where primary I
2 width bars have been utilized for secondary (A2.4) flow paths. These include:
i Flow paths f rom the core spray pumps to the minimum flow bypass valve (Photo #6)
Main steam drain lines from the main ,
steam lines to the equalizer valve Bypass line through the RHR pump minimum flow valve O 14
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Evaluation ,
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Also, the flow paths through the steam line warmup bypass valves in the RCIC and HPCI mimics of panels 648 and 647, are shown as primary rather than secondary.
4
- 6. Red, dark green and dark blue mimics are 4 used on panel 601. Each of these mimics is visually distinctive against the panel background. However, the contrast between dark green, dark blue and black demarcation lines is of a lower quality. The correspond-ing mimics used on the simulator are much brighter and provide good visual contrast. i (A2.5)
- 7. Mimics used on panels 601, 647, and 648 8 O
(,j appear to be of low quality and to have ,
been installed without the proper care.
(A2.6) r
- 8. Pieces of mimics or demarcation lines are 4 missing in the following cases: (A2.6) f From the HPC1 pump discharge valve, panel 647 Steam trap to the steam line drain ,
inboard isolation valve, panel 647 Discharge of the barometric condenser vacuum pump, panel 647 l
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Evaluation Product s
Demarcation line between RHR A and B systems, panel 00C-667 Extension of demarcation line on panel 00C-656 A piece of the 13.2 KV bus mimic, panel 10C-654
- 9. Flow paths and arrangements on panel 601 12 are not orderly nor easily recognized.
In core spray system A, the mimic bar from pump IC to the minimum flow bypass valve r,hould not connect with the pump 1A line. Likewise, the mimic bar from the pump 1A line to the bypass valve should f)
_ ( ,j connect.
RHR 1A mimic lines for minimum flow bypass and suppression pool sparger flow appear to connect, but should not.
Some flow arrows are misplaced such as that L
to the A containment hydrogen recombiner L cooling water inlet valve.
l l-Main steam drain lines appear to flow into the main steam lines rather than bridging them.
l' RHR service water crosstle mimic flow arrow is pointing to an end point labeled "from RHR switch system." (Photo #7)
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Cere spray B suppression pool return lines for test and minimum flow bypass are very close and congested with the main turbine r stop valve and a demarcation line. Conges- l tion is also evident in the mimic lines from the pumps to the bypass valve. (A2.7)
L
I t fusing. The steam traps on the steam drain lines appear to be bypasses and I the drain pot bypass valves ap} . sr to be the main flow path. Also, the steam trap symbol is missing af ter the turbine drain pot in the HPCI mimic. (A2.7) *
() 11. In safeguard system B, panel 661, safeguard switchgear feeder breaker synchronizing 6
switch 101-D12 appears to connect'with the \
201 safeguard bus. This mimic line should connect with the 101 bus (Photo #8). (A2.7) o I 1
.12. The control rod display of panel 649 6 i l presents a large array of small lights. ;
It is very difficult to locate a specified I position in this array, even with the aid ,
of position labels along the sides. The use
' of small lines from position numbers to ,
the edge of,the array may aleviate some of, l
this difficulty (Photo #9). (A2.7) l l
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- 13. A line of demarcation between the reactor 6 water sample line isolation valve switches and the recirculation flow loop A system would clearly show recirculation systems A and B to te identical in layout, panel 602.
(A2.8)
- 14. Flow arrows used in mimics on panels 601, 4 647, and 648 are generally located at the end of a mimic bar between components. Some use of intermediate Llow arrows may clarify flow paths, especially where the paths are complex (not straight lines). (A2.9) i
- 15. The end point from the barometric vacuum 4 pump in the HPC1 mimic panel 647, is not O
( ,j identified. (A2.10)
- 16. The destinations for the 220 KV plant out- 4 put lines are not identified. (A2.10) ,
- 17. The mimics of panels 647 and 648 do not 4
- integrate manual valves. (A2.11)
- 18. The use of mimics may be advantageous 8 to integrate components on the post LOCA hydrogen recombiners, panel 696, and to integrate remote start switches for fire pumps on panel 00C-650. (A2.11) i O 18 i
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() 3.3 control Display Grouping i
- 1. The following displays and controls are 9 I mirror-imaged and as such do not provide ;
c identical lay-outs for repetitive groups j nor consistent component ordering: ;
l (A3.1, A3.2) l L i Controls on panel 00C-681 (Photo #1) 'l I
! L Circular meter displays of panel 00C-660 l
l (Photo #10)
Displays and controls between panels 10C-654 and 20C-654 (Photo #10) ;
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- 2. The turbine bearing lif t pump inlet pressure 6 test buttons, inlet pressure reset buttons, and pump control arrays are not laidout j i
identically, panel 670. (A3.1) i The feedwater drain to feedwater heater 6
- 3. l switches and the feedwater heater dump and drain indicating lights are not all
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grouped together, panel 668. The feedwater l
heater dump to condenser switches and the l moisture separator dump and drain lights separate these groupings (Photo #11). (A3.1) h l
The RFPT turning gear switches of panel 603 6 I 4. ;
are ordered from top-to-bottom (Photo #12),
i but the associated RFPT controllers are ordered from left-to-right (Photo #13). (A3.2)
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- 5. The following components are ordered in a 6 manner other than the expected orientations of top-to-bottom and left-to-right: (A3.2)
Heat flux detector bypa.s lights are
- top-to-bottom as D-C-B-A, panel 603 SJAE discharge recycle valve, supply valve, second stage i
driving steam valve, and first stage valve selector switches are top-to-bottom as IB-1A, panel _652 Drywell unit cooling fan switches are ordered A-E-B-F-C-G.-D-H, panel 681; groups l
l 1 and 2 are right-to-lef t (Photo #14) :
Indicators and controls of panel 00C-681 ,
are mixed in ordering (Photos #1, 3) i Generator load adjust switches are increase-decrease from left-to-right,
{ panel 654 (Photo #15) j 6. Controls and displays are not arranged in 9 functional or sequential relationships in the following cases: (A3.3)
Controls and displays do not follow any functional relation on panel 00C-681
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(Photos #1,3)
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Evaluation f Product Mimic flow paths are not : nooth nor (
easily followed on panels 601, 647, i and 648 l I
Some component relationships are dif- ;
ficult to readily comprehend, panel 654 l
- 7. Lines of demarcation, hierarchical labeling, 9 l color contrast, spacing, or other aid could t be utilized in some cases where strings or matrices of components of similar function -
are installed. Examples of this include:
(A3.4)
J The array of switches on panel 00C-681 ,
(Photo #1) l The matrices of switches on panel 652 ,
~(Photo #16)
The. strings of labels under the indicator ;
banks on panel 681 (Photo #17)
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The array of switches for turbine auxiliaries and main . steam valves, t r
panel 653 .;
t The arrays of test lights above RHR (
and core spray indicators, panel 6G1 ,
Circular meter arrays, panels 654 and ,
660 O- 21
Evaluation Product
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Switch arrays of the ESW system, panel 9 00C-667 Large arrays of switches, panel 668 (Photo #5)
String of switches for ADS division 1 and for MSIV-LCS inboard division 2, panel 626 (Photo #4)
Rod status display, panel 649 (Photo #9)
- 8. Coding methods such as the use of demarcation 9 lines, spacing and switch shape which are used across panels 651 and 652 are not consis-tently applied. For example, the spacing among the feedwater control valves, panel 651, varies the vertical position of columns of switches (Photo #18); this is not seen elsewhere.- (A3.5)
- 9. The majority of vertical panels contain 9 controls and/or displays outside of the recommended ranges. Controls are located as low as 20" and as high as 80"; there are also some lamp test switches as high as 91".
Indicators are located as low as 22" and as high as 92". (Recommended ranges are 42" to 60" for controls and 48" to 68" for displays.)
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Evaluation l Product i
Panels which have both controls and displays
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-located high and/or low are:
601 (Photo #19) 668 647 669 ,
648 607 ,
670 00C-667 654 (Phote; #10) 00C-671 661 00C-650
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626 00C-693 i 600 Remote Shutdown l
In addition, displays are located high on panel 00C-660. Some controls, such as the RBM bypass, are located high on benchboard 603 for a seated operator..
l l (A3.6) l:
- . 10 The hydrogen indicator range selector 6 i
switch on panel 601 is not located within an arms reach of the indicator. >
(A3.7) k 3.4 Color Usage L
- 1. Status indicating lights are generally white. 6 The status light for. power supply generator lock out bus, panel 602, is green. (A4.2) i.
- 2. Labels which identify panels are not consistent 6 L
[
in color, some are white others are yellow. }
(A4.2)
I i 23 c
Evaluation i
Product i
(s_-
- 3. Across the electrical system panels, yellow is 6 used for the 4 KV bus mimic on panel 661 but is also used for the 220 KV bus mimic on panel 654.
(A4.2) ,
- 3. 5 Labeling
- 1. The generator ammeter range switch on panel 654 6 has an indicating light located above it. The function of this light is unknown and unidenti-fled by label. (AS.1) 2 Labels have been switched for the trend recorder 6 and the reactor pressure and main turbine steam flow recorder on panel 603 (Photo #20). (A5.1)
' w)
(, '3. The following devices on panel 601 are not 6 identified: (A5.1)
Some H and 02 system devices 2
Mimicked devices for containment isolation f
ocated at the top of the panel (Photo #21)
RHR loop A Leeds & Northup Speedomax recorder
- 4. Labels are not used at all to identify system 8 designation on the. following panels: (A5.3) f 00C-681 652 00C-650 t
O 24 i
Evaluation Product
/. ~ Some systems are not identified by label on
+
the following panels:
-: 651 668 653 670
- 5. The following inconsistencies in label nomen- 4 clature, abbreviations, etc., were noted:
(A5.5)
"Reacter feed pump turbine" is sometimes l~ shown as RFPT and sometimes as RPT, panel 651 The word "volumn" is mis-spelled on the.
river broadcast speaker volume monitor, CI panel 00C-650 Multiple abbreviations for " valve" and
" pump" are used on panel 652 The nameplate next to PD106-120 is blank, panel 603 The recirculation pump motor air cooling switch labels use different nomenclature, panel 681 Recirculation system legends inconsis-tently use 1A or 1B or no system descriptor, panel 602 1
25
f Evaluation Product
() :
_v' Level control selector switch label should l read "1 or 2 Element", panel 603 Heat exchanger condensate discharge 4 pressure to RCIC, panel 601, has RCIC ,
spelled "RICI" on label l The device, such as " valve" is some-times included, sometimes not, on device labels, panels 601, 647 and 648 Some inconsistency in abbreviations, panels 601, 647, and 648 i
Components of similar function are labeled differently on panel 668.
-g l Some switches are labeled feedwater heater drain to feedwater heater, others are feedwater drain to feedwater heater.
The process radiation recorder for the .
H -0 recombiner, panel 600, is labeled 2 2 ,
" Recommended"
- 6. A hierarchical system of size coded labels 8 has not been used. (A5.7)
I 26 7
e -r -- - ~~ -- _ - - _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ -__ _-- - - . - --= , .- - -- -r,- -
I' Evaluation s Product
- 7. Labels are not easily read in cases where 9 -
components are located very low and where l; projecting device hcusings obstruct vision on the following panels: (A5.9) 647 00C-656 648 00C-671 661 (Photo #22) 00C-660 668 .
669 l
670 (Photo #23)
.8. The recirculation run-back reset pushbuttons 6 on panel 602 are for different levels, but t
-these levels are not specified. (AS.10) l !
"s .
s -
9.- Switches for the low pressure condensate 6 i
off-gas to mechanical vacuum pump valves ;
are only differentiated by device numbers l HV 07-133 through 136, panel 652. (A5 10)
- l i
l 10 Labels are located between panel inserts on 6 L- panel 607. This requires the operator to 1
view the complete panel to determine whether the label applies to the insert above or the one below. Locating the labels on the inserts ,
l l- would eliminate this condition. (A5.11) :
I- ,
i-
[
l
! :([3) !
27 l
4.0 INSTRUMENTATION AND HARDWARE Control room instrumentation and hardware were evaluated against
)
checklist criteria addressing controllers, indicators, recorders, indicating lights and switches. Most hardware was found to be in general compliance with recommended standards, although several specific areas may merit further attention.
To date there has been little attempt at color coding indicator and ,
recorder scales to indicate normal and abnormal ranges. Such coding techniques can be a valuable operator aid, permitting a rapid, qualitative reading of system parameters. Control room instrument-ation should be reviewed to determine which would benefit from this technique. ,
Human factors standards based upon laboratory research specify that for optimum readability, the number of intermediate marks between numbered scale divisions should not exceed nine, and that scale numbers should progress in decimal multiples of one, two, or five.
. () Many exceptions to these criteria were found, and have been identified below. In addition, many indicators were identified which use non-linear scales. Such scales should be avoided except where applicable (i.e. , logarithmic radiation monitors).
l.
Labels for some indicating devices do not specify the units of measurement. Others specify units which do not directly relate to system operation. Particular caution should be observed in using
" percent" for the unit of measurement on indicator scales. In few cases, other than valve travel, is this appropriate.
Both pen and multipoint recorders have been used on the control panels. Multipoint recorders on other plants typically suffer from crowded, unreadable printouts. Where this format has been used, the incorporation of point select capability should be considered. Many instances are noted where chart paper scales do not correspond to the l
recorder scales.
rN
'%sA ;
28
Several instances were identified in which extinguished indicating
{ ,,
lights are used to indicate " normal" system status. In these cases,
\
(N,,/ if the bulb f ailed, an abnormal condition might not be detected.
Because no lamp test feature has been provided, the operator might be :
unable to ascertain if these bulbs were indeed defective of if they l .w ere providing accurate information.
i i
Human factors standards specify height and depth ranges for the placement of instrumentation and hardware (see Section 3). Due to the placement of many controls and displays outside of these ranges, i
potential problems were noted with glare, parallax, hand support, and general readability. Also, several instances were noted where ;
switches are spaced extremely closely. Consideration should be given to providing more hand space in these cases.
t Several emergency pushbuttons have been utilized which have armed and disarmed detent positions. Clear position markings should be added i to these buttons to readily show their status.
O Evaluation
' k )-
Product 4.1 Controllers
- 1. Controllers which require manual operation 3 are all-located such that they are easily reached. However, the following cases were noted in which more hand space coul,d be provided for hand support: (Bl.5) i RFP speed controllers lA, 1B, and 1C, panel 603 L
Main steam to 1A air ejector, panel 652 Pump discharge flow, panels 647 and 648 O
29
Evaluation Product
( 4.2 indicating Devices
- 1. With the exceptions of turbine speed, oil tank 12 ,
level, and generator hydrogen purity indicators
-on panel 653, indicating devices have not been r marked to show normal or abnormal, safe or un-safe, or expected or unexpected range of opera-tion. (B2.1)
[ 2. Most indicating recorders on the following panels 9 l have no process units specified: (B2.3) 601 00C-624 ;
603 00C-667 600
- 3. The following indicating devices are not 6
( )- scaled in process units which relate to system operation: (B2.3)
Pump suction pressure indicators on panels 647 and 648 have a lower scale
! for vacuum, but the units of inches Hg have not been specified Main generator rotor temperature is in C rather than the expected "F, panel 670 Heat flux indicators have no specified ;
units, panel 603 30
- ~ . _ - . _ .
t Evaluation Product Recirculation pump speed and demand 6 speed are in %, panel 602 Recirculation flow recorder has no 1
units specified, paael 602 Turbine oil reservoir has no units specified, panel 653 (Photo #24) ,
P Low pressure turbine A,B,C stage 11 .
exit pressure indicators do not ,
specify the units of inches Hg for :
vacuum, panel 653 (Photo #25)
! Turbine speed is in %, panel 653 '
y Reactor chamber temperature control
- i indicator is in %, panel 696 ,
- 4. Graduation marks are obscured by pointers 6 on most Bailey recorders (Photo #20). .(B2.5) i
- 5. Pointers were found to obscure graduation 4 i
marks, numerals or process units in the ,
_following cases: (B2.5) i-i !
l- 1
~
Generator watts recorder (red pointer) r l-on panel 670 ,
I Turbine vibration recorder, panel 647 ,
i SJAE discharge recorder (lower scale),
panel 600 ,
~ '
31
_. , _. . , - - ~ . -- _
Evaluation Product [
O V Turbine speed / control valve and bypass valve position recorder, panel 653 Cleanup filter demineralizer inlet pH recorder (lower scale), panel 602 !
IRM/APRM recorders (lower scale), panel 603 i
- 6. Pointers partially obscure numerals on the 4 ,
circular meters of panels 654, 661, and l
00C-660. (B2.5)
- 7. The generator load adjust pushbuttons on 4 panel 654 are not positioned in the expected ;
manner; increase is on the left and decrease is on the right (Photo #15). This is the
,m opposite of control movement as well as the opposite of like pushbuttons located on panel 653. (B2.7)
- 8. The SJAE discharge recorders on panel 600 are 4 !
I not provided with identical scales, nor scales r of the same class (one is linear, the other is I logarithmic). As such, comparative reading is difficult. (B2.8, B2.10) i C. The heating and ventilating indicators of panel 6 i
l 00C-681 are not visually aligned to aid in com-parative reading (Photo #3). (B2.10) t 32
Evaluation Product
() 4
- 10. The following indicating devices are not visually aligned or are not provided with identical scales to facilitate comparative reading: (B2.10)
Generator cooling system temperature, :
metal temperature, and thrust bearing temperature recorders are not aligned, panel 670 ,
Drain cooler drain flow and third stage heaters drain flow indicators have different scales, panel 668 CE/MAC's are not in alignment, panel 669 V/102-2 has a different scale than V/101-2 n_/
s and V/107, panel 654 11 and 12 unit auxiliary bus circular meters are not aligned, panel 654 (separated by one !
row)
RWCU 1A and 1B filter flow scales are not aligned, panel 602 l
t l' RWCU dump flow and inlet flow have different scales, panel 602 (Photo #26)
Cooling tower makeup and blowdown flow recorder has one differing scale, panel 655 ;
I L
33 i
l i
Evaluation l
Product !
);
- i In addition, the lA condensate pump ammeter on panel-652 has units of AC kiloamperes whereas the IB and IC ammeters have units l of'AC' amperes. ;
r
- 11. .The cleanup filter demineralizer inlet pH 4 recorder on panel 602 has two scales (one variable) and no-apparent scale selector switch. It is not clear which scale is to f be used by the operator. (B2.11) ,
- 12. 'The following indicating devices have 6 l greater than nine intermediate gradu-ations between numbered markings: (B2,.12 ) !
Panel 670:
Millivolt meter .
Main steam temperature r
z Generator cooling system temperature j Metal temperature 4
Thrust bearing temperature Panel 668: ,
t I
RFP turbine lube oil temperature 2
Thrust bearing temperature O
34
P i
Evaluation ;;
Product ,
O.
Panel 669: 6 ,
t Condenser shells and hotwells con- i f
ductivity f
Panel 601:
I
' RHR loop flows Panel 600: ;
i i Area radiation monitor (Westronics) ;
Panel 607:
Flux probing monitor % power scale Panel 614: t All temperature recorders l
l Panels 647 and 648:
Pump. discharge pressure i
i !
! Turbine supply pressure ,
l I Suppression pool level l I
L I Panel 00C-624:
Area radiation monitor recorder t
35 ,
l ~-
l-l
Evaluation Product O 6 Panel 602: ,
RWCU heater initt pressure RWCU 1A and IB filter flow l Panel 655:
4 Instrument air pressure i
Service air pressure i
Turbine building cooling water ,
pressure and temperature Reactor building cooling water remperature Panel 652: ;
SJAE indicators Penel 653:
l l
A,B,C low pressure turbine stage 8 exit pressure t
A,B EHC fluid pump amperes (Photo #27)
Panel 000-660:
Safeguard transformer megavars
?
36
Evaluation Product '
u
/
Station auxiliary switchgear 6 l megawatt s ,
i Startup bus megawatts Panel 654:
All transformer ammeters within mimic i
~
W/G101, A/X102, V/102-2 ,
Emergency Shutdown Panel:
i Suppression pool level, both units ,
i ESW discharge pressure, unit 1 (
) t
. i
- 13. The following indicating devices are scaled 3 with subdivisions in decimal multiples other than 1, 2., or 5: (B2.13) ;
Panel 670:
t Generator cooling system temperature f
Metal temperature Thrust ~ bearing temperature i
. Thrust bearing wear 37
Y$ , Q ^\ ^ Q q w <
^' - ' -
V, . %,
t
? \ ,<. 1, .
.y -
s j
g ,
\ s ,
i Evaluation N s- !
Product j 7- .
(j - x
- J q 'N
Panel 600: f 3 l x -
SJAE discharge recordex RR26-1R602
- t 7
Panels 647 and 648:
s ;
\ .
< r t
\ i Pump discharge pressure
[
Pump suction pressure
~ f
\
Turbine supply pressure s
Suppression pool level i
Panel 603: ,
D U IRM/APRM recorders t
P 1RM-APRM/RBM recorders i
Heat flux indicators f
I Standby liquid control discharge pressure i
Panel 00C-681r j SGTS heater and filter temperatures A,B control room temperature l i
SGTS carbon filter air temperature <
> Outside air temperature 38
L Evaluation Product g
\_~h -
3 l Panel 681:
Nearly all indicators Panel 653:
i l
A, B, C, D main steam line flow (Photo #28) i Steam chest pressure Pressure setpoints A, B i
A, B, C low pressure turbine stage 8 f exit pressure l l
A, B EHC fluid pump amperes (Photo #27)
Panel 00C-667:
l i A, B, C, D RHRSW pump ammeters i Panel 654:
V/101-2, V/102-2, v/107 Panel 00C-693:
DC voltmeters ,
In addition, the indicating devices noted for item B2.12 for panels 602, 607, 655,-00C-660, and the Remote Shutdown Panel (both units) ,
are all scaled in decimal multiples other than (s
s 1, 2, ~ o r 5.
t 39
,- , - - - , ,, - - - - - , , , , -- -,-r-- n-.,-
Evaluation Product ,
!([f 6
-14.1The following indicating devices contain non-
, linear scales (other than logarithmic) over ,
their entire range or part of that range:
(B2.11. 32.13). l i
r Panel 670:
L i
Vibration phase angle l
-Panel 601: i t.
All ammeters i' ;
Panel 614:
t i !
l) empe atu es Recirculation' pump temperature ,
-i RHR water temperature '
t, r i HPCI turbine and pump temperatures i ADS safety / relief valve temperatures I Panel 603: >
CRD water pump motor ammeters 1A and IB I
CRD system, cooling water, and drive flova ;
i RFPT. turning gear ammeters lA, 1B, 1C i
40 m
)
, - - , ., . . - . . - - _ . _ . _ . , , . - ~ _ - - . , _ - _ . . _ _ . , , - _ _ . - . . . - . . . . . - - . _ . - . _ . . . - . - . - _ - . . _ -
--. )
l t
5 Evaluation :
Product ,
) l 6
Panel 00C-681: ,
A, B control room temperature Outside air temperature l
1 Ammeters l !
Panel 681: ;
5 i
A through H drywell cooling inlet and discharge l air temperatures (Photo #29) 1 Recirculation pump cooling inlet and outlet flow ,
r Recirculation filter temperatures .
~
Drywell chiller ammeters I
f L Panel 653: ;
Generator hydrogen purity Ammeters i
l' Panel 00C-667: .
A,B.C,D RHRSW pump ammeters L
I i i,
RHR heat exchanger cooling water flows ;
([3) i 41 i
Evaluation Product (s
\.-] r Panel 654: 6 Ammeters and kilovolt meters Emergency Shutdown Panel:
RCIC pump discharge flow, both units
- 15. Numerals are not criented in an upright 4 position on the percent power and volts scales of the flux probing monitor, panel 607. (B2.15) ,
- 16. The 2A condensate pump ammeter on panel 20C-652, 4 has units and numerals oriented sideways (Photo #30). (B2.15) s.
4
- 17. There is no clear differentiation between the psi and vacuum scales on the pump suction pres-sure indicators of panels 647 and 648. (B2.18) 4.3 Recorders
- 1. Multipoint recorders on the following panels 8 do not have point select capability: (33.6) l 614 669 ,
670 00C-624 668 :
i 7
- 2. Incorrectly scaled chart paper was noticed 4 in the following recorders: (B3.7) ;
L 42 I
t i
l.
s Evaluation '
Product i O ,
L Panel 600: 4 L
Service water Radwaste cryogenic Reactor building closed cooling water j H 2-02 recombiner ventilation l Panel 00C-624: y 6
Bailey recorders are scaled 10 to 10 ,
but the chart paper is scaled 100 tc 400 i Panel 603:
RFP turbine control valve pcsition l
l Steam and feedwater ' flow I
Panel 00C-667:
6 All recorders i
- 3. All four recorders on panel 00C-667 are 4 f labeled "RHR HTX RADIATION" and apply j to RHR loops A and B. The pen colors ,
for the loops are. reversed on the top _;
two reccrders and black is used for both ,
A and B loops on the bottom recorders.
(B3.10) ,
43
Evaluation Product Leeds and Northrup recorders on panel 603 4 5.
have green-blue-red pointers from top to j bottom, but the labels identify red-black-green. (B3.10)
- 6. Recorders have not been marked to show 12 normal or abnormal, safe or unsafe, or expected or unexpected range of operation.
(B3.15) i 4 I 4.4 Indicatina Lights
- 1. For:the following indicating lights, a failed 6 t t
bulb cannot be distinguished from a normal condition: (B4.2) t 1 -
'- RFPT zero speed lights, panel 603 RFPT emergency governor trip lights and RFPT main bearing oil pump test lights, panel 668 t ADS solenoid pilot valve B lights, panel 626 Generator ammeter raage select switch ,
t indicating light, panel 654 j t
Startup and trickle heat power on light, i panel 696 ,
Yellow alarm lights, panel 00C-693 [
I 44 I
L
. _ . . _ _ _ . . - - . . , _ - . . _ . . _ _ _ . . _ ~ .
I i
Evaluation i
Product l
(
- 2. On the Remote Shutdown Panel (both units), 6 a failed-bulb cannot be distinguished from f
a normal condition for the following lights:
(B4.2) f r RCIC turbine trip RCIC turbine bearing oil pressure low [
e I
r RCIC high and lou pressure bearing oil :
temperature high
~
RHR heat exchanger outlet radiation high ,
i RHR service water loop return radiation high i
- i. 3. No lamp test feature is available to diagnose 8 failed indicating lights. (B4.4) y I 4'. Indicating light bulb repacement is not easily 4 i-performed on the Response Spectrum Analyzer of
- panel 00C-693.- The panel instrument insert must j.
be pulled out and the bulb replaced from behind. j l (B4.5) j i -.
l l 5. Sets of lights are not in alignment on panel 6 ,
! 00C-681 so as to facilitate comparison between L related system elements. Components are mixed ;
and the panel is partially mirror-imaged 4 l (Photos #1,3). (B4.6) f
\'
l
- 6. Indicating lights are reversed for switch 4 i
HV02-ll3C on panel 668.
I 45 t
-- . _ . - .~ .,-. - . - . , - . - ., . - . . - . . - - . . . , - - - , . , - , . - , , . . - - - - , - - , , - - , . .- - - - - . -
I.- .
Evaluation Product
- 7. Sets of lights are not in alignment between 4 related system elements in the following cases:
(B4.6) 1A and IB level out of service lights are not located over their respective selector switches, panel 603 RHR loop shutdown cooling suction valves 2A and 2B lights are not aligned, Remote Shutdown Panel (both units) 4.5 Switches f 1. The following switches do not move in the 6 expected direction (i.e., right for start or 4 open, left for stop.or close, etc.): (B5.1)
Reactor feed pump recirculation valve switches have auto to the left, panel 651 Main steam line safety / relief valve switches are open-close from lef t to right, Emergency Shutdown Panel (both units)
Manual valve control switch has closed to the right, panel 607 Exciter voltage regulator transfer switch is manual-auto from left to right, panel 654 1
Condensate filter demineralizer switches have standl ' and service positions right to lef t,
). panel 651 46
in Evaluation
~
. Product
]
'v Also, position labels are generally placed consistently relative to each other, but not always consistently relative to the switch (e.g. "open" may be above the switch or to the right).
- 2. Switch positions are not clearly marked in the 6
.following cases: (B5.2) i Pushbuttons for inboard and outboard valve i
control logic and testable check valve have two position rotary escutcheons, panel 601 (Photo #31)
Generator ammeter range switch'has a position
~~g unlabeled, panel 654 O
220 KV breaker synchroscope check relay selector switch has an unmarked position, panel 654 Normal position is not marked on the steam seal evaporator extract steam test switch, panel 653 Condensate filter demineralizer control switches appear to be three position switches but have only two labeled positions, panel 651 The siren tone generator tone selector switch is not' synchronized with the posit-ion indications, panel 00C-650 (Photo #32) 47
Evaluation m Product N. .] ^
t
- 3. Several emergency switches are present which 9 are pushbuttons with disarmed / armed positions.
A small red line is painted on the side of the pushbutton collars to indicate the position.
This marking is not apparent. (B5 2)
- 4. Switches were noted to be below a normal reach- 6 ing/ operating distance on the following panels:
(B5.3) 600 647 670 668 648 601 (Photo #33) 607 000-693 I 661 000-667 i _
Also, the transfer switches are low on the Emergency
~
Shutdown Panel (both units) and the RHR head spray inboard isolation valve switch is high.
- 5. The 1A auxiliary lube oil pump control of panel 12 602 and the IC RFPT turning gear motor switch of panel 603 are located near the edges of these panels, but are not protected from inadvertent l
operation. (B5.4) l l 6. The Westinghouse switches on panel 652 are 9 extremely difficult to " pull to stop".
(B5.5)
- 7. Some small rotary switches such as those used 6 on panel 00C-681, do not effectively detent
! in each position. (B5.7) o 48
n Evaluation Product
- 8. Switches are spaced very tightly in the follow- 6 ing cases: (B5.9)
Loop A and B service wacer and fuel pool pump switches, panel 655 Reactor and turbine building cooling water switches, panel 655 Arrays of switches, panel 668 (Photo #5)
Adjacent J-handle keylock switches, penel 00C-667 (Photo #34)
- 9. No physical distinction is provided 8 between switches for pump, valves, O' etc., on panels 601 and 655. (B5.10)
- 10. Inconsistencies were noted in switch 4 shape in the following: (B5.10)
Pump switches are usually
/
J-handles, but not on panel 653
,I i
No. 3 and 4 control valve below I (6 ', ~
\s seat drain switches types are 3\ (
different, pane) 653 (_,'. ,
r-1 Pump switche era span-close valve W' -
(_, >,'
switches are of the same type, ,-
panel 651
-6 49
Evaluation Product 1A and IB SJAE Itrat stage valve selector switer.:s are different, panel 652 (Photo #35)
- 11. Switch knobs may obstruct position labels 4 on the following switches: (B5.ll)
RFPT control signal failure reset, panel 603 (Photo #36) l A, B reactor building recirculation fan and filter, panel 681 (Photo #37)
- 12. Rotary switches for lA and 1B scoop tube 4 brake are raised such that position indications are obscured. (35.11)
I i
O- (
50 ,
Evaluation !
Product LJ 5.0 AIMUNCIATOES i-
- 1. Annunciators are generally grouped 4 [
within alarm panels by specific system. [
Not all annunciators, however, are above [
related controls and displays. The following are examples of this: (Cl.2)
Relating to panel 661, the Dil alarms are above the D13 controls, the D13 ,
alarms are above the D12 controls, and the D12 and D14 alarms are above panel 00C-656 $
The location of ADS and MSIV leakage control alarms in alarm panel 10C826 is ;
the reverse of the location of related '
controls on panel 626 r
The reactor isolation system alarms of alarm panel 1AC802 are above the ADS panel Excess flow check valve and fuel pool alarms of alarm panel IBC802 are located ,
with the recirculation and RWCU alarms related to panel 602 Radiation monitoring alarms in alarm panel 00C824 are above panel 668 i
Feedwater alarm panel 13C868 is located above panel 669 f
51
gum A cf ,J 5743 6r T' :o 6pj;gQgd2 NECO Evaluation Product Fire protection a.'. arm panel OBC 850 is located above the control room entrance, to the left of fire protection panel 00C-650.
- 2. Warning and diagnostic alarms are generally 4 segregated from informational and advisory displays. A few instances were noted in which this is not entirely the case. These are: (cl.3)
Trip alarms are usually located in the top row of annunciator windows within an alarm panel, but this is not the case for the condensate pump trips and the circula-
~
/ )
tion water pump trips
' _J Scram input alarms are not all grouped toget he r The RHR auto start alarm window is not directly above the permissive to start alarm window.
- 3. T6e following inconsistent abbreviations 4 were noted: (C2.1)
HTX/HX FEACTOR LO LEVEL / REACTOR LEVEL 3 D/G versus D-G s (3 i !
L_ _.J 52
Evaluation Product
- 4. The abbreviation CONT is used for two 4 different applications. On alarm panel 00C881, CONT refers to " containment,"
but on alarm panel 1AC854 this refers to " control". (C2.1)
- 5. The following inconsistencies in type 4 size and style were noted: (C2.2)
In the common alarm panel over panel 00C-624, window 1 has a smaller, darker type Window 19 of alarm panel OBC 850 has a smaller than standard type size O
N' Window 17 of alarm panel 1AC870 has
- smaller, darker type
- 6. Annunciator alarm panels are located at such 9 an angle and' height that is difficult to view windows when standing between the vertical panels and the benchboards. (C2.3)
- 7. Many annunciator legends were found to be 6 insuccinctly worded. The following are some examples of this: (C2.5)
GENERATOR HYDROGEN COOLERS H 2 OUTLET HI/LO TEMP, panel 1BC870, window 34 O
53
-.-~v.- . , . r - -,*- ,- ~
Evaluation :
Product
() 6 EHC EMERGENCY TRIP PRESE LO ;
PRESS TRIP, panel 1AC870, I window 46 j t
CONT ENCL ST FLDNG DMPR ,
i
-FNL 00C729 TROUBLE, panel 00C881, window 20 ;
A REFUELING FLOOR ISOLATION ,
I
'IGNAL INITIATED, panel 10C881, window 23 1A CRD WATER PUMP TRIP, panel 1BC803, window 31 UNIT 1 REAC BLDG EL 352 .
t O NORTdWEST AIRLOCK SEAL BROKEN, i panel 10C889, window 1 f
i CIRC WATER PUMP COOLING WATER BASKET STRAINER FAILURE, panel -
10C855, window 43 1 1 GEN BKRS 452-535/635 :
r i
POSITION MONITOR CKT CONTROL .
c PWR FAILURE, panel 1BC854, window 5 I
r i
V 54
- , _ - -_ , _ . ,,._m... __ __.. . ,_ .. .-_,._,.,__-_.,._m__.....-_,____,_.,
. . . - .,--.m ,
Evaluation Product e A U'
D11 D-G DIESEL OIL STORAGE 6 TANK HI/LO LEVEL, panel 1AC861, window 19 DIV 1 ADS MANUAL INITIATION e
~
1 SW ARMED / RELAYS SEALED IN,
{
panel 10C826, window 2 ,
e h- DIV 2 LO REACTOR PRESSURE RHR PERMISSIVE TO START, panel
{ 1CC801, window 25 t
CONTROL RM EMER FRESH AIR SUPPLY CHARC0AL FILTER A FIRE, panel OBC 850, window 26
!' N '
(~'/
\_ EMER COOLING SUPPLY FROM CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK y
MOV OVLD LOSS OF PWR, panel 10C847, window 21
- 8. A few windows were noted in which the 6 system referred to is not fully identified. .
These include: (C2.5) ,
? !
SUPPRESSION ATMOSPHERIC ANALYZER TROUBLE, panel 10C800, window 28 ,
t TRAIN "A" PIPING FILL PMP ,
I AP256 LO PMP DISCH, panel 1BC801, window 14 t
O-55
Evaluation Product
- 9. No process variable is specified in the 6 following window legends: (C2.5)
EHC HYD FLUID FILTER HI DIFF, panel 1AC370, window 43 EHC HYD FLUID COOLER STRAINER HI DIFF, panel 1AC870, window 50
- 10. The annunciator legend, DIV 1 SHUTDOWN 6 COOLING & MIN FLOW VALVES OPEN, on alarm panel 1AC801 would more accuractely be worded xHR A rather than DIV 1. (C2.5)
- 11. The annunciator legend, CORE SPRAY LINE 6 73 k-) INTERNAL BREAK, on alarm panel 1AC801 is not literally correct. (C2.5)
- 12. Several alarm windows use terminology 4 which refers to varying setpoints for parameters with multiple trip levels.
These levels could be made more clear.
Examples of this are: (C2 6)
REACTOR LO LEVEL TRIP versus REACTOR HI/LO LEVEL and
. REACTOR HI LEVEL TURBINE /RFPT TRIP 1
RECIRC PUMP HI PRESS /LO LEVEL TRIP (NJ4S)
- ( ])
56
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Evaluation c
Product O
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CONDENSER LO VACUUM versus CONDENSER LO VACUUM TRIP MAIN CONDENSER LO VACUUM ,
versus STEAM BYPASS LO VAC b
DRYWELL HI PRESS versus DRYWELL HI PRESS TRIP ;
- 13. Many annunciator legends were noted to 6
- have multiple choice indications. Some examples include: (C2.7) ,
TRIP RELAY LOW VOLTAGE OR 386 PROT RELAY TRIP, panel 1BC870, window 6 HPCI VAC PUMP /COND PUMP / MOTOR ,
OVLD/ LOSS OF'PWR, panel 10C847, window 16 COMMON AREA RAD MONITORS DOWNSCALE,
+
_ panel 00C824, window 35 CONDENSATE STORAGE IANK HI/LO LEVEL, panel 1BC869, window 1 SGTS VENT HI-LO/INOP RADIATION, panel 00C881, window 26 O i 57
+
I L
Evaluation Product I,h N. s lA RFPT MAIN BRG OIL PU1P 6 1 OR 2 OVLD TRIP /INOP, panel LAC 868, window 1 MSIV LC VALVE / HEATER / BLOWER OVLD/ POWER FAILURE, panel 10C826, window 25 1A/lB/lc RFPT BRG METAL P
HI TEMP, panel LAC 868, window 26 !
NORTH STACK / SOUTH STACK ISO KINETIC SAMPLE HI/LO FLOW, panel 00C824, window 30
- 14. Various alarms have been prioritized 3 q\/ by the use of amber or red bulbs.
However, based upon observations made at the simulator, the color contrast between amber and white annunciator lights is low. (C2.8, C3)
- 15. A numeric code has been provided for 8 i
each alarm panel. The numerals printed on the windows though are very small and difficult to read from the benchboards.
No means has been provided to identify each alarm panel. (C2.9) 4
- 16. No silence button has been provided 12 for alarm response. (CS.1)
S) '
58 L
i Evaluation -
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- 17. Alarm windows do not all automatically 4 j
I blink at a slower rate when the alarm i
input clears. This is dependent on the ;
internal alarm switch setup. (C6.4) ,
o-The same is true for clearing of slaras only by operator action. (C6 5) .t I
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6.0 OPERATolt INTERVIEW SUISUULY b(/ Eight operators were interviewed by the survey team, representing a wide range of experience levels. A complete list of all comments from these interviews is included as Appendix B to this report.
In this section, an attempt has been made to identify common areas of operator concerns. Based on this review, the following items were found to be mentioned most frequently (one-half or more of operators interviewed), and as such should be given particular attention:
o Seven operators commented on the need for more simulator training. Specifically mentioned was time for normal operations training, systems and theory training, and team building.
-o The ESW panel was noted by seven operators as being difficult and confusing to operate. Color coding, switch spacing, and system layout improvements were all discussed.
o Multi point recorders were felt to be difficult and confusing to read by seven operators.
o Five operators expressed the need for color coding of switches. This was felt to be especially useful in locating group isolation controls and synchroscope switches.
o Half of the operators interviewed felt that the location of the ECCS panel is non-optimal. Much of this panel is not within the operators view from the normal operating position.
O 60
o Four operators expressed concern over the annunciator system. Specifically, all alarm panels must be scanned i before acknowledging an alt.cm, since all alarms are {
acknowledged at once. This may cause the loss of an -
incoming alarm if all alarms are not scanned prior to ,
s acknowledgement.
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7.0 EpmmuCY FROCEDURE TASK ANALYSIS
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\s / The Emergency Procedure Guidelines developed by the BWR Owners Group will form the foundation upon which Limerick's emergency procedures will be developed. Using these Guidelines, a task analysis was prepared which identified instrumentation required to evaluata plant conditions within the framework of the procedural steps. This instrument list was then compared to the actusi control room inventory to verify that the specified parameters are in fact available to the operator.
As the first step in analyzing control room design with respect to the Guidelines, all parameter limits defined as entry conditions were L identified. Since exceeding any one of these limits transfers the operator f rom normal to emergency procedures, he must be immediately aware of the existance of such a condition. This line of reasoning leads to the conclusion that the presence of any condition requiring entry into the guidelines should be indicated by actuation of an annunciator, or otherwise called to the operator's attention. A
[
n-x- review of Limerick's annunciator panels revealed that no alarms are currently provided for drywell temperature, suppression pool temperature, suppression chamber pressure, suppression pool level, or on open relief valve. In addition, as discussed in Section 5.0, certain modifications to the annunciator system could enhance its effectiveness as an operator aid.
In several cases, redundant annunciators have been provided in multiple locations for the same action level. These annunciatort are used to signify actuation of various points within logic trains, and initiation signals for various systems. For instance, two alarms are provided for a 54" reactor water level, three for 12-1/2", and four for -149". Eight alarms are provided for 2 psig drywell pressure.
Two alarms are provided for 23 in-Hg condenser vacuum.
62
While repetition of key annunciators in individual system operating areas may be desirable in some instances, it also increases the total b~.)
x/s number of windows and compounds the amount of information the operator must assimilate during transients.
l The terminology used in annunciator legends does not always clearly define the corresponding action level. For instance, annunciator LAC 801-24, "DIV 1 DRYWELL HI PRESS" and 1AC803-26, "DRYWELL HI PRESS TRIP," both signify 2 psig drywell pressure. Annunciator 1BC869-25, ,
"lA CONDENSER LO VACUUM" alarms at 25 in-Hg vac while 1BC870-17,
" CONDENSER LO VACUUM" alarms at 24.5 in-Hg vac and 1BC801-7, " MAIN CONDENSER LO VACUUM" alarms at 23 in-Hg vac. In all cases, the purpose of an alarm should be made clear through explicit nomenclature or inclusion of setpoints.
r The Emergency Procedure Guidelines written by the BWR Owners' Group may be considered in one respect as a series of action levels associated with various plant parameters, guiding the operator through increasingly degraded conditions. Displays of these critical -
7-(_/ parameters must be immediately available in the control room and easily readable, with corresponding limits readily discernible. Task analyses and walkthroughs of the Guidelines disclosed that no
-7 ,
indications are currently provided for'RHR' pump amps, RHR pump ,
~~ '
discharge pressure, or primary containment water level. !-- 3 The control room arrangement and the method of organizing controls I and displays within panels can directly impact operator efficiency ,
during transient response. Frequently required trips to backpanels detract from the operability of the control room and may affect shift manning levels, whereas conveniently located instruments promote rapid evaluation of plant status. Logically arranged, well thought-out panel layouts enable the operator to locate correct controls end
-- indicators and minimize the chance of error. Several areas were noted in which modifications may prove beneficial:
D C
63
- . -. -~. -
i o The division of the control room into wall-mounted vertical
-s panels and free-standing consoles sometimes obstructs
(/ visual and walking paths. The location of the ECCS panel, particularly, seems inconvenient. Many indications of importance to the operator are obscured by panels 602, 655, and 681. For example, in order to verify MSIV isolations and ECCS operation, the operator must walk around panel 602 to view the necessary indicating lights, many of which are mounted low on panel 601, close to the floor.
The present floor plan suggests that it nsy be necessary to assign one operator to panel 601 exclusively during major plant transients. Even those indicators which are visible from in front of panel 602 cannot be read accurately from this position; the operator must walk around panel 602 and read the indicators from directly in front of panel 601.
Fuel zone reactor water level, drywell pressure, suppres-sion pool temperature, suppression chamber pressure, and
- suppression pool level are all available only on panel 601
%- and 648. These parameters become particularly important within the context at the Emergen:y Procedure Guidelines.
o No indication of reactor pressure is available in the relief valve operating area. L o No indication of reactor water level is available in HPCI and RCIC operating areas.
o Controls and indications associated with the turbine ,
3 control system are divided between panels 670 and 653.
o ESW system controls and indications are located on panel 667, some distance from RHR controls on panel 601.
64
f f
Certain modifications or enhancements to existing design should be ;
c considered to more effectively support the operator in important i L s- decision, evaluation, or action steps identified in the Guidelines: }
e o The full core display consists of a large matrix of many-colored lights. Among other functions, this display {
+
is used by operators to verify insertion of all control ,
rods into the core following a scram. Since all rod bottom lights are not aligned, but are interspersed between many
> other multi-colored lights according to tha physical core layout, it is conceivable that one or more rods not fully
-inserted might not be noticed in a time-critical, stressful situation. This suggests that reliance will be placed upon -
> CRT displays to obtain rod position information. [
r o There currently exists no concise display of group l isolation valve position. Consequently, when verifying -
group isolations, the operator must monitor valve status in individual system operating areas.
. O.
o No direct indication of safety-relief valve position is ,
provided. Available indicating lights sense only the condition of the' actuating solenoids. ,
~
+
o Drywell and suppression chamber pressure indications on r panel 601 are scaled in 0-100 psig. This, range of indication does not allow the operator to accurately [
monitor these parameters under normal conditions, when l pressures will be maintained at < 2 psig. ;
f-o Suppression pool. level indication on panel 648 is scaled [
0-75 inches. The reference level for this instrument .{
should be clearly stated and easily correlated with r operating limits.
i i
. r 65 !
-o As presently designed, HPCI and RCIC manual isolation l-
' buttons do not work once an initiation signal has been
' sealed in.
o Main condenser vacuum may be monitored on indicators on panel 653 and recorders on psnel 652. However, both indications span a range of only 25-30 in-Hg vac. This does not allow for monitoring this parameter during plant startup.
o Two different zero references have been used for water level indications. This may complicate direct comparison of multiple channels of instrumentation. Another source of confusion may arise from the choice of scale ranges; both upset and fuel zone indications are scaled +60, -150", even though different zero references are used.
o No capability presently exists for manually overriding an ADS initiation signal. If the operator must prevent depressurization, he must press a reset button every two minutes.
Because the Emergency Procedure Guidelines represent a new concept in methods of transient response, some aspects of plant design will require careful consideration when the plant specific procedures are written. The following concerns related to the Guidelines were noted:
o Certain steps within the Guidelines address limits which may require instrument ranges in excess of those currently used. Because the actual limits are based on calculations yet to be performed, this consideration could not be actually evaluated at the time of the survey. However, it is possible that an extended range for suppression pool level will be necessary.
O 66
o The guidelines require the use of bulk suppression pool :
water temperature and average drywell atmosphere l 2 temperature. No provision has yet been made to obtain !
these " average" temperatures.
o To evaluate the validity of level indications, the operator i
must have available drywell temperature adjacent to reference leg vertical runs. While drywell temperature indication is presently available from two locations, it is not known if either of these correspond to the locations of the reference legs.
o Some limits discussed in the guidelines are "two dimensional" i.e. , the operator must correlate two different parameters and plot the resulting operating point on a graph defining the permissible operating regions. In one case he must relate three different parameters, utilizing two separate graphs. In a time critical
> situation this severely compounds the operator's workload >
r.
d and requires careful design of both control room layout and procedures. The parameters involved should at least be j situs:ed in close proximity to each other with the ;
associated graph provided nearby. However, a more i innovative approach may prove more satisfactory, perhaps involving two dimensional CRT plots or X-Y recorders. This
[
l area of the guidelines must be given extremely close I
' attention as actual plant specific procedures are f
prepared. Limits involving correlation of multiple parameters include suppression pool heat capacity, RPV saturation, suppression pool spray, pressure suppression, i
suppression pool load, and heat cr.pacity level limits.
j Potentially of most concern in this respect are limits involving suppression pool temperature and level, as these 67
parameters cre located on a backpanel. Specific recommendations for display formatting are contingent upon
() the final form of the plant specific procedures and the philosophy utilized in development of emergency response systems addressed by NUREG-0696.
o A given parameter covered by the Guidelines may possess several action levels. Limits or action levels of immediate concern to the operator should be marked in some f ashion on the indicator or recorder. This may include such points as the top of active fuel for reactor water level, normal operating limits and vacuum breaker elevation for suppression pool level, and low pressure injection system shutof f head for reactor pressure.
o Entry conditions into the Guidelines may involve action levels not currently addressed by procedures or alarmed in the annunciator system. As plant-specific limits are I
defined, the available annunciators should be evaluated to
() determine if entry conditions are adequately alarmed.
Resolutions of the above concerns will be largely dependent upon the form and content of the final written procedures. In addition, many of these aspects of control room design are intimately related to development of emergency response f acilities, as discussed in NUREG-0696. It is suggested that work in these areas must be a closely coordinated, integrated process if optimum results are to be obtained.
i n
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APPENDIX A i
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1 CHECKLIST ITEMS FOR LATER REVIEW <
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Because Limerick was still under construction at the time of the review, a complete evaluation of the control room could not be performed. Some items cannot be evaluated until a realistic control room environment is observable.
Others must await development of plant administrative procedures and definition of operating practices. A complete list of all of these items has been provided below.
All panels were not installed at the time of the review and some of those which were installed were missing some components. Panels 10C-673, 00C-674, and 00C-675, should be evaluated when fully installed.
t .
While task analyses of the Emergency Procedure Guidelines were developed and [
compared to control room design, additional work should be performed at a later state in plant construction, concurrent with development of plant specific procedures. A complete analysis requires knowledge of all panels and should involve operating personnel.
The following items (listed by checklist number) could not be evaluated at the time of the survey:
(o Panel Layout and Design A1.3 When panel components are permanently removed, are spaces covered to prevent debris or dust f rom entering panel internals and repainted to avoid visual distinctiveness?
A5.2 Are labels, legend plates and escutcheons used to identify operational limits or warnings?
A6 Use and application of tempcrary panel changes could not be evaluated.
Instrumentation and Hardware Bl.2 Are controllers that require manual operation designed to facilitate precise control where fine adjustments are required?
O A-2
B2.2 Are indicating devices free from glare and parallax?
) B2.16 Are indicating devices maintained, calibrated and surveillance tested on a regular basis?
B3.1 Are printed values easily read and distinguishable on recorder charts?
B3.2 Are recorder printing devices properly aligned such that printed values correspond to scale values?
B3.3 Are alarm points identified on recorders?
B3.4 Is there adequate distinction for markings on multi pen recorders?
B3.5 Where f ast tracking rates or trends are periodically required, do recorders have high speed capability?
B3.11 Do recorder chart papers not bind?
B3.12 Are recorder charts periodically marked with date, time, and initials?
B3.13 Has an administrative procedure been established for recorder chart marking and retention?
B3.14 Are recorders free from glare and parallax?
B4.1 Is there adequate distinction between lit and extinguished indicating lights?
l B4.3 Is the size and intensity of alarm lights adequate to command attention?
B6.4 Are switches for emergency use controlled by specific procedural instructions?
A-3
B7 Use of key-lock switches could not be evaluated.
Annunciators C2.4 Are alarm windows in accordance with checklist criteria for changes or modifications?
C4 Does the audible alarm meet checklist criteria f or audib10 displays?
C7 Annunciator procedures were not available.
C8 Annunciator maintenance could not be evaluated.
C9 Alarms actuated during normal operating conditions were not known.
In addition, no evaluation could be performed of computers, procedures, control room environment, maintenance and surveillance procedures, training, or manning. LER analysis is not applicable at this time.
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OPERATOR INTERVIEli COMMENTS ,
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The following is a complete list of all operator comments (see Section 6.0 for discussion of common operator concerns). Where duplicate responses were received, the frequency has been indicated in parentheses. While responses (n) have been abbreviated where possible and as cuch are not verbatim, the intent of the reply has been adhered to as closely as possible. Refere to actual comment sheets for detailed responses.
No attempt has been made in this section to judge the validity of the operators' criticisms or to make any suggestions for improvement. All comments are repected here as a means of transmitting operator concerns to plant management for further review and should not be interpreted as survey team recommendations. In addition, operator concerns generally apply only to the Simulator and as such may not be entirely applicable to the Limerick control room.
Panel Layout and Design The condensate and feedwater controls need rearrangement. The addition of large system labels may improve recognition.
O The feedwater pump valve controls are too far f rom the RFPT controls.
The MSIV panel is difficult to see f rom the reactor control console.
Color coding is needed on group isolations to help locate some of the infrequently used devices. (4)
Color coding needed for normal valves on ESW board (service water outlet valves and backup valves).
Synchroscope switch should be color coded. (2)
Much of the ECCS system (panel 601) cannot be seen from the central operating location. (2)
B-2
Benchboard recorders on panel 603 are too high for shorter persons to read properly.
ts
,/ RFP controls are scattered across panels. (2)
Power range monitoring equipment status lights are out of view.
+
Labels on group isolation status indicators are too small to be read well. l This display should be identified as well.
i Mimics on panels such as the RWCU would be helpful.
i No APRM instrument drawer's are provided in the control room. f Panels having more than one system should be divided by grouping related equipment with lines of demarcation. (2) l Schematic flow paths would be helpful.
Controls and Instrumentation Needed in the CR O
V A drywell pressure recorder is needed on panel 603.
Suppression pool water temperature. (2) '
SRV leak detection for each SRV.
Turbine vibration trip bypass control.
i i Drywell chiller isolation bypass control.
t ,
i APRM gain adjust controls. ,
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HPCI/RCIC/MSL temperature monitors (trip units and individual indicators).
fs
. ( ,) Recirculation pump vibration.
j Narrow range suppression pool water level.
1 SRV open indications.
Controls Difficult to Operate i
The reactor mode switch is hard to move f rom one mode to another. There is a fear of overshooting.
ESW keylock switches do not have encugh hand space between them.
Hard to get the feel of fast / slow speed on controller pushbuttons.
Control rod buttons are tiresome on the fingers.
() Some pistol grips switches are flimsy.
Control switches of the oblong clover leaf design have n non positive feel.
S Controls Prone to Inadvertent Operation The relativa positioning of the A and B SJAE controls on panel 652 is inconsistent.
The recirculation pump start switch is too close to the edge <. the console.
l t
i The turbine load set buttons are opposite positions on the vertical board and the turbine console.
i A number of nameplates are confusing or misnamed.
l O B-4
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Controls Which Could Be Improved A
( ,) There is difficulty in associating RFPT speed controls with the appropriate RFPT. "ome syster " = vices are ordered f rom top to bottom while others are left to right.
Recirculation pump discharge valve switch shape could be changed to indicate that the function differs from the normal pull to stop.
RPS static inverter alarms could be located next to the associated RPS channel trips to help recognize a half scram.
Panels Confusing or Difficult to Operate ESW panel is very confusing. (7)
Computer console lacks operator instructional aids.
Heating and ventilating panel is confusing.
(-
\
Location of switches and meters on the Main Turbine and EHC console.
Indicating Devices Difficult or Confusing to Read Multi point temperature recorders. (6)
Drywell atmosphere hydrogen and oxygen.
ECCS panel " Christmas tree". (2)
Drywell pressure, panel 601 ESW to RHR service water return header flow, panel 667.
l Turbine expansion recorder is too high.
l B-5
Temperature meters on HVAC bench board have odd increments.
j Drywell temperature indicators are not graduated evenly.
Eccentricity, bypass valve position, and control valve position recorder (labeling problem).
Important Indicators Difficult to See During Normal or Emergency Operation Drywell pressure and suppression pool temperature on CRT.
Suppression pool temperature on multi point rec orde r. (3)
Drywell pressure and temperature, suppression pool pressure and level.
MSIV position.
ECCS systems.
g Full core display.
Annunciators Windows should be color coded rather than using colored bulbs.
Yellow annunciator light s should be more pronounced. These are hard to distinguish from the white lights. (2)
Cannot acknowledge annunciators until all the alarm panels have been scanned so that incoming alarms are not lost.
A different tone alarm for each panel would be useful.
All scram input alarms should be located on one panel (e.g., move neutron monitoring system trip f rom panel 600 to 607).
3 d
LJ B-6
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Annunciator bells are too loud, cauces difficulty in operator verbal
{
i communications.
Annunef ator windows should continue to blink until locally acknowledged. l 4
. Operator Responsibilities I
The RO-SRO interface was not clearly understood during cold license J
certification on the simulator. ;
.Was not claar at the simulator what the RO could do af ter a scram (i.e., could ;
he leave the reactor console). 1 4
Training t More time on the simulator should be given towards the RO and SRO becoming a ,
i
' team.
i Simulator training should be extended by four weeks. One week more on r systems, one week on reactor theory and fluid flow / thermodynamics, and two j 7
i I weeks on the machine. (2)
' More simulator time should go towards normal operating conditions such as l heat-ups, start-ups, and shutdowns. (4) i 4 Information Flow j i
i i
Would like to see more load dispatcher knowledge as to nuclear terms and ;
- i
- problems. t
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Miscellaneous Operations people should be involved early in the design phase and throughout modifications of panels to review equipment changes. l Operators need extensive instrumentation inputs from offgas and recombiner
() systems, not enough information was available on the simulator. l B-7 j r
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PHOTOGRAPHS !
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F APPENDIX C CRDR TEAM RESUMES
Resume THOMAS J. CAEREY Mr. Cabrey received his B.S. in Electrical Engineering from the Pennsylvania State University in the Spring of 1979.
His Experience Includes:
One year (1983-Present): Limerick Controls Group, Electrical Engineering Division, responsible for reviewing, approving, and commenting on Electrical Schematics, P &ID's, QAD's, Functional Descriptions, Assigned Equipment Specifications, and various documents received from other Divisions of PECo, Bechtel Corp., and the NRC for the Systems for which he is responsible. Another project for which he has responsibility is the Limerick Control Room Design Review.
Three years (1980-1983): Shift Technical Advisor, at the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, responsible for monitoring plant operations and tranisents to insure safe operation of the plant. As part of this assignment he participated in a intensive six month training program conducted by the General Physics Corp., of Columbia, Maryland and approved by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. This training program dealt with the Theory of Nuclear Eeactions, Nuclear Power Plant Operations, Transient Analysis, Mitigating Core Damage and a three week session on
'the Limerick Plant Simulator.
One Year (1979-1980): Conventional Plant Controls Group, Electrical Engineering Division, responsibile for investigating and engineering various modification to the different Generating Stations throughout the Philadelphia Electric Company System.
}
i i
4 IESUMM Michael J. Leahy Philadelphia Electric Co. ;
Education Droxol University, DSEE, 1974 Rogistored Profossional Engincor - Ponna, 1978 ,
Continuing Education Coursos:
Instrument and Control Systems Application Engincoring, Mooro Products, 1976 Automatic Proccus Control Loops, Instrument Socioty of America,
^
1977 Control Eystems Engincoring, Foxboro, 1978 Fundamontals of BWR Operations, General Electric, 1978 Design and Control of Turbino - Generator Systems, Georgo Washington Univorsity, 1980 Applied lluman Factors in Power Plant Design and Oporation, General Physics, 1983 Profossional Activition Panol Member at IEEE/ASME Joint Power Symposium,1981; lluman Factors Experience in Non-Nuclear Facilities.
Author / speaker at ISA Power Instrumentation Symposium, 1982 Employment Philadelphia Electric Company 1974 to 1982 Engincor - Electrical Engineering Division -
Computer and Controls Section - Conventional Plant Control Group Responsible for various instrumentation and control systems (e.g feedwater, combustion control) at fossil fueled power plants and non-safety related I & C systems (e.g. feedwater, reactor recirculation, turbine control) at nuclear power plants. Responsit itties included design, design review, specificatic writing, and bid evaluation.
P O
1982 to present Engineer - Electrical Engineering Division -
Computer and Controls Section - Peach Bottom Control Group.
Same responsibility as above for various I & C systems at PBAPS, Units #2 and 3, including nuclear safety-related systems. Currently assigned to .
, NUREC-0737 supplement 1, Control Room Depign Review initiative.
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SB82983M1020
. 8/83 t
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Professional Qualification Garrett D. Edwards Engineer Philadelphia Electric Company My dame is Garrett D. Edwards. I am an Engineer in the Electric Production Department of the Philadelphia Electric Company presently serving as the Power Generation Engineer at the Limerick Generating Station. In that capacity I have overall responsibility for the operation of the major electrical equipment throughout the power plant including both the 500 KV and 220 KV substations and associated equipment. I have a Dachelor of Electrical Engineering degree from Villanova University. I have been employed by Philadelphia Electric Company since 1970 and have been involved in power plant design ..
or operations since that time as detailed below:
- 1. June 1970 - July 1973 - Electric Production Department, Test Engineer Barbadoes Generating Station - Responsible for (1) running and evaluating plant performance tests, (2) maintenance, calibration and troubleshooting plant control systems.
- 2. July 1973 to February 1976 - Engineering and Research Department Electrical Engineering Division Station Engineering Section - Responsible for design and review of modifications to Generating Station Power Systems.
- 3. February 1976 - December 1983 - Engineering and Reucarch Department Electrical Engineering Division Computer and Controls Section - Responsible for the design of the Safety Related Control Systems at Peach Bottom and Limerick.
- 4. December 1983 - Present - Electric Production Depar tment -
Power Generation Engineer, Limerick Generating Station I was the Co-Chairman of the BWR Owners Group Control
- Room Improvements Subcommittee from January 1980 to January 1983.
This committee was responsible for formulating the DWR position on control room design related TMI items.
I was the PECo responsible engineer for implementation of the following TMI related items at Limerick:
- 2. Control Room Design Review
- 4. Emergency Response Facility Data System I van the PECO technical representative with the NRC -
Instrut.antation and Control System Branch during the Final Safety Analysis Repor t review process .
A
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SHIFT SUPERINTENDENT l
. DATE APPOINTED: December 31, 1979 h NAME: William N. Barnshaw, Jr.
EDUCATION AND TRAINING l 1956 Graduated from Mastbaum Vocational Technical High School ; !
- in Philadelphia,'Pa. - majored in machine !
1957-1959 . United States Army l Completed Combat Engineer Training and Airborne Heavy i Weapons Infantry Training. Discharged with the rank :
of corporal 1960 Mechanical Training Course - Philadelphia Electric ;
1962-1963 Nuclear Theory and Plant Systems Course i i Phase "A" - Philadelphia Electric Company !
1964 Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Unit 1 (HTGR) "On Site !
Training Program" - Philadelphia Electric Company 1966 Health Physics Training - Philadelphia Electric Company 1967-1960 Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Unit 1 (HTGR) formal preparation for A.E.C. Licensing by completing on !
site pre-licensing training, pre-licensing sel.f l study program and pre-licensing simulator training l April 1970 Completed the General Electric Six Week BWR Simulator l Operator Experience Program and BWR Technology Tape !
Program at the General Electric BWR simulator-Morris, Illinois l l Nov 1971 Basic algebra course - Harford Junior College, Harford County, Maryland l l 1971-1972 In preparation for taking the AEC Senior Operator '
License (BWR) examinations. The following training Programs were completed: 1
- 1) NUS Corporation Nuclear Power Preparatory Training .
Course
- 2) On site review classes :
- 3) Off site observation training at Oyster Creek i Nuclear Station l
- 4) BWR Simulator Refresher Program at the General !
Electric Simulator - Morris, Illinois
- 5) General Physics Corporation written audit ,
examination
- 6) General Electric Company written audit and oral examinations i Dec 1973 Participated in tk.e Operator Requalification Program '
through that was initiated on site in Dec 1973 as follows: l Dec 1979 1) Monthly reading assignments
- 2) Monthly lecture sessions ;
- 3) Minimum of ten reactivi'ty changes ligged each year l
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- 4) Annual written examination
- 5) Annual oral examination Dec 1975 Fire fighting - two day training course at West Conshocken-Philadelphia Electric Company Fire School Oct 1976 Management Training three day course presented for Philadelphia Electric Company by American Management Association Nov. 1976 Red Cross multimedia first aid course and annual
- refresher qualification training - Philadelphia Electric Company Basic Nuclear Concepts, two week course presented for Feb 1978 Philadelphia Electric Company by NUS Corporation Feb 1979 Management Training - two day refresher course presented for Philadelphia Electric Company by Management Development Programs Nov. 1979 Solid radwaste burial training - Department of Transportation (DOT) and NRC requirements - presented for Philadelphia Electric Company by General Physics Corporation Annually Cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) training and fire fighting hands on training - presented by Philadelphia Electric Company WORK EXPERIENCE 8/75 to 12/79 Shift Supervisor - Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station (BWR) Units 2 & 3 Duties: Second senior licensed vperator on shift. Responsible for supervising operating personnel in all aspects of plant operation and administration. Actively participated in and supervised all phases of SWR operations including reactor start-ups, shutdowns, planned tests, plant transients, refueling operations, ILquid radioactive waste releases, issuance of radiation work permits and safety j
blocking permits. Occasionally 4
worked as radweste supervisor, supervising off site shipping of solid radweste.
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2/71 to 8/75 Control Operator - Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station (BWR) Units 2 & 3 Duties: Participated in writing operating procedures and working as the control room operator when equipment and systems were placed into service during initial start-up activities and pre-operational testing. ,
Directed plant operations, operated major equipment, performed electrical switching, wrote blocking permits and directed their '
application and, on a regularly scheduled basis, worked as an assistant control operator at the reactor console manipulating the controls during plant startups, shutdowns or steady state operations.
9/70 to 2/71 Plant Mechanic - Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station (HTGR) Unit 1 Duties: Performed or directed shift operations outside the control room.
! These included equipment blocking, system surveillance and operations.
11/68 to 9/70 Mechanical Operator (Reactor Operator) Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Unit 1 (HTGR)
Duties: Manipulated the reactor controls during reactor start ups, shutdowns and plant transients. Operated major plant equipment including reactor fuel handling equipment.
l 7/68 to 11/68 Health Physics Technician - Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Unit 1 (HTGR)
Duties: Qualifiebforthispositionin August 1966 and relieved the regular Health Physics Technicians during heavy work loads. Performed routine radiation surveys, prepared and issued radiation work permits, monitored personnel working on contaminated: equipment in radiation I
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areas, calibrated radiation survey
- instrumentation and analyzed radioactive liquid waste samples in
. connection with processing of liquid waste for discharge.
10/63 to 7/68 Auxiliary Operator - Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Unit 1 (HTGR) ,
Participated in the initial plant Duties:
startup activities and assisted in the work of preparing operating
- procedures and enecking construction progress; operated equipment outside the control room such as chlorine handling systems, demineralizers and water treatment systems; performed normal equipment sureveillance duties; and applied safety blocking.
12/59 to 10/63 Various Positions - Southwark Generating Station Duties: As auxiliary operator, operated chlorine handline systems, dkmineralisers, and water treatment systems. As mill operator, operated mills and subsystems and ash and slag removal equipment. As boiler house helper, performed general boiler room duties.
LICENSES AND CERTIFICATES Sept 1968 Received AEC Operators License for Peach Bottom, Unit 1 (HTGR).
May 1973 Received AEC Senior Operators License for Peach Bottom Unit 2 (BWR).
June 1974 Peach Bottom Unit 2 Senior Operators License was amended to include Peach Bottom Unit 3.
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4 APPENDIX D SUPPLEMENTARY OPERATOR EXPERIENCE QUESTIONNAIRE 1
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APPENDIX D Supplementary Operator Experience Qucationnaire l l
QUEST!0NNAIRE INSTRUCTIONS i A design review of the Limerick 1 control room is being performed, as required by the NRC. Its purpose is to identify and correc't design deficiencies in operator-control room inter- r face. The best sources of information for this review are the operators who will be working in the unit. A preliminary review of operater experience ha's already taken place. Since then, I
however, we realize that design changes have been implemented and that operators have gained more experience in the control room since the original survey was completed. The attached question-naire is being administered in order to incorporate these changes into the review.
l Please respond to the cuestions as they apply to your job or position, and in relation to your experience. Where you feel unqualified to answer, please indicate so, and explain. Full explanatory sentences are much more informative and useful than yes-no answers, so please use them whenever possible.
Feel free to ask The Interlock Group and/or the PE project team any questions that you may have concerning the question-naire. Thank ydu for your cooperation. ,
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PERSONAL INFORMATION:
Education (Include schooling currently in progress):
Associate degree:
Under Graduate degree: l l
Major area of study: (Engineering, Physte.s. etc.) '
Position
Title:
l Years experience in industry:
Years with Philadelphia Electric (include any Peach Bottom experience):
Years at Limerick Training in Current Positiont School / Facility (name):
Course Title (s):
Length of Training (weeks / months)
- Job Related Erperience! -
Military Other 4
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- 1. Could controls and indicators be better arranged to support operation in (a) normal conditions and (b) casualties /
emergencies? Please comment on your responses. j i
- 2. What would a general suggestion be for improvements in panel arrangement and location relationships of controls and indicators?
- 3. Where would it be easy to become confused regarding the association between indicators and controls? (Please give at least four specific situations.) '
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
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4 Significant nucbers of controls and indicators are located on the vertical boards. As specifically as possible, j
indicate how you feel this would impact both normal and !
casealty/emergenc.y operations.
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- 5. In the symptom oriented context, do procedures guide you in coordinating operations when information from several r indicators must be integrated into actions on several different panels (e.g. expected information and possible ;
operator actions)?
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I l 6. Are controls and indications clearly labeled in j conj unction with procedures and their functional name, ;
easy to locate and read? Indicate the type, or where the ,
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- 7. Comment on panel mimicing -
are they clear and not ,
confusing?, do they aid in operation?, are more or less needed? (P. lease explain.) '
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- 8. Comment on the location of annunciator panels and how they [
are arranged to respond effer.tively to alarms.
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- 9. Have you found that audible alarms aid or distract you kn plant operations? Explain the situation or experience.
Include simulator sessions. '
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- 10. Do you feel the CRT displays you have seen have actually i
helped you in operating a nuclear power plant or have they provided extraneous data that do not aid your !
interpretation? Please provide an explanation. !
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- 11. Have you found the panel arrangement aid mimics consistent with system diagram's (P& ids) and training diagrams of the l same system?
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- 12. What proportion of normal operations require coordination between individuals at different panels? How is it '
different for casualty situations? -
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APPENDIX E !
OPERATOR EXPERIENCE REVIEW, LICENSEE EVENT REPORT
SUMMARY
APPENDIX E Licensee Event Report Summary
- PECO-LIMERICK LER REVIEW METHOD Plant specific LER data generated since the BWROG review of the Peach Bottom plant were reviewed for their applicability to the Limerick CRDR. Emphasis was placed on LERs resulting from the following: plant procedural / operational deficiencies such as changes or updates of plant technical specifications; inadequacies in operator training; and inadequate or improper instrumentation, such as a missing display or alarm. Of some 195 LERs reviewed, only 32 fell into one or more of the above categories.
PROCEDURAL / OPERATIONAL LERs LERs resulting from procedural inadequate made up only 16%
of the LERs reviewed (5 LERs). The majority of these involved instrument malfunction that occurred due to missed surveillance or monitoring procedures (3 occurrances). The remainder involved failure of personnel to update plant technical specifications as called for by procedures (2 occurrances).
TRAINING-RELATED LERs Training-related LERs made up 28% of the LERs applicable to the Limerick CRDR (9 LERs) . The most common cause of these events was failure on the part of the operator to perform tasks in accordance with procedures (6 occurrances).
Operators were either unaware of specific procedures (4 occurrances) or performed tasks without following the procedures (2 occurrances). Other LERs occurred because the operator was not familiar enough with procedures to complete tasks within the required time (1 occurrance), or because the operator inadvertently manipulated the incorrect control (2 occurrances).
J INSTRUMENTATION-RELATED LERs The most common causes of LERs were instrumentation inadequacies and failures (56%, 18 occurances) . Of these, eight resulted from faulty electronics such as incorrect grounding of components. An additional eight were due to instrument drift, primarily of flow indicators. Two LERs resulted from instrument failure that was un-noticed by the operator. In both caces, the instruments had no failure or off-scale indication.
RESULTS Several LERs were resolved through panel enhancements and class improvements. Copies of the remaining LERs were presented to the appropriate departments for further consideration.
APPENDIX F SCALE GRADUATIONS SPECIFICATION
APPENDIX F Scale Graduation Specification Clear, accurate scale markings and graduations aid the control room operator immensely in task performance. To evaluate the Limerick. control room display scales, accepted human performance criteria were consulted (MIL-STD 1472C, NUREG 0700) and scale graduation specifications developed.
In general, the scale on a display should be selected so that it is consistent with the degree of precision required for the operator to properly perform the task. The scale should not require operator conversion or calculation to determine the information required, and should span the expected range of ope ra tion .
Scale Markings No more than nine graduations should exist between numerals on a scale. Major and minor graduations should be used if four or fewer graduations are used between numerals. Major, minor, and intermediate graduations should be used if five or more graduations are used between numerals. Graduation height is considered a function of viewing distance (see Table 1.) An example of major, minor and intermediate graduations can be found in Figure 1.
Graduation height is determined as a function of viewing distance. Figure 1 demonstrates graduation height at a viewing distance of three feet. Figure 2 depicts graduations at a viewing distance of nine feet.
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Characters on scales should conform to the same recommendations made for label and annunciator characters, and should sublend a minimum visual angle of 15 minutes of arc (or .004 x viewing distance) with a visual angle of 20 minutes (.006 x viewing distance) preferred.
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VIEWING INDEX HEIGHT DISTANCE (inches)
(feet) MAJOR INTE RMEOa ATE MINOR 1% or less 0.22 0.16 0.09 3 or less 0.40 0.28 0.17 6 or leis 0.78 0.56 0.34 12 or less 1.57 1.12 0.65 20 or less 2.63 1.87 1.13 TABLE 1: Scale Graduation Heights in inches for various viewing distances (NUREG 0700).
Major scafe marker 3 Major scale marker 3 1
1 r 0.0125 ntermediate scale marker .j po,0375 Intermediate scale marker '
~0.0125 *0.0375
{ Minor { Minor -
O, q r o.0125 scale m rker7 g r 0.0375
, , , scafe m rker7 o [ ' m, ~~
T '*.
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l :_ i L ._ E L b Minimum separation besween b nimum Mi separation between
! centers (0.05) c en te r s (0.15 )
FIGURE 1: Graduation dimensions in FIGURE 2: Graduation dimensions in inches for 3' viewing distance inches for 9' viewing distance (adapted from McCormick, 1976), (adapted from McCormick, 1976).
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APPENDIX G LABELING FONT SPECIFICATION FOR THE PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY'S LIMERICK PLANT 7 - w - - - -.- -
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, APPENDIX G LABELING FONT SPECIFICATION i FOR THE PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY'S '
LIMERICK PLANT The following are the labeling font styles and size hierarchy for
-the1 Philadelphia Electric Company's Limerick plant. The selection of font style and size was based on specific human engineering criteria. The criteria established was based on letter-height vs. viewing distance relationships, (H = 0.002C + K
+ K ), width-height ratios (1:1 to 3:5 W-H ratio), and operational requirements.
H = height of letter in inches 1
D =-viewing distance K- = correction factor for illumination and viewing condition K = correction for importance (for emergency labels K = .075 all other conditions K = .0) l
' Reference documents such as NUREG 0700, EPRI Report NP-2411 (Human Engineering guide for Enhancing Control Rooms), and McCormack's Human Factors in Engineering and Design were con-
., sulted' when establishing the criteria and making the font style
-and size selection.
The font proposed is Helvetica Medium for all functional
, groupings and components. The individual component identifier t
numbers.are Helvetica. Regular. The rationale for the difference is based on operational considerations. The functional groupings and- components are of paramount operational concern, therefore 4
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identifier numbers are primarily used for non-operational main- l r
tenance and calibration, they are the smallest size and the l E
lighter Helvetica Regular font.
Six font sizes are used throughout all control panel labels.
Each font is discussed below:
t o Three quarter (3/4) inch Helvetica Medium (H.M.) - Panel Identifiers Each individual control panel should be identified by a functional name. Three quarter inch letters are recom-L
, mended for this. As an example, panel 10C603 functional ;
name is the REACTOR panel. These labels are centered on each individual panel, and below the angle annunciator break on vertical boards, o 36 point H.M. - Channel / Train identification When channel and/or train distinctions are required, they i are identified using this font. '
o 30 point H.M. - Major groupings The concept of color shaping for enhancements, groups
- functionally related controls and indicators within a f
particular color shape. To identify these major groupings, this font is used. The convention requires that sub-groupings must exist within the color shaping for the 30 point font to be used. ,
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i o 24 point H.M. - Major Subgroupings i In consonance with the above, the subgroupings within each i
major grouping are identified using this font. The con-vention requires that if a color shape has no major sub-groupings (only related individual components) this font I is used to identify that shape alone.
o 14 point H.M. - Component labels 1
Two basic uses of this font are specified. The enhance-ment design requires bracketing with or without the use of I 1
color fields. This font is used with these brackets. The l F
second use is for individual components. Each component '
(switch, indicator, etc.) has been assigned a functional name or designation. These component labels are designed to facilitate operator identification, location and ,
operation without having to refer to a numbering scheme.
This font has been used to label all panel components. i o 8 point Helvetica Regular - Component and Power Supply Identifiers Recognizing that extensive documentation such as the FSAR, i
P& ids and Technical Specifications refer to and require specific numerical designations, each component has been labeled with the appropriate numerical identifier. These correspond directly with all technical documentation. As indicated previously, since these numbers are not rou-tinely used in the operational context, they will be less prominent so as not to interfere with efficient functional operation.
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Examples of this labeling scheme are illustrated in Figures 1, 2, 3.
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FONT SPECIFICATIONS (ACTUAL SIZE)
HELVETICA MEDIUM 36 PT l
HELVETICA MEDIUM 30 PT !
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HELVETICA MEDIUM 24 PT l
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HELVETICA MEDIUM 14 PT i
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