ML20095D310
| ML20095D310 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Limerick  |
| Issue date: | 06/30/1984 |
| From: | PECO ENERGY CO., (FORMERLY PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20095D296 | List: |
| References | |
| REF-GTECI-A-36, REF-GTECI-SF, RTR-NUREG-0612, RTR-NUREG-612, TASK-A-36, TASK-OR NUDOCS 8408230297 | |
| Download: ML20095D310 (175) | |
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1 LIMERICK GENERATING STATION
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OVERHEAD HANDLING SYSTENS REVIEW 4
FINAL REDORT
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i 8408230297 840813 PDR ADOCK 05000352 Revision 3 E
PDR June, 1984
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LIMERICK GENERATING STATION OVERHEAD HANDLING SYSTEMS REVIEW FINAL REPORT CONTENTS 1.
SUMMARY
/ CONCLUSIONS 2.
RESPONSES TO REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION Information Requested in Section 2.1 (Changes to previous submittal)
Information Requested in Section 2.2 (Load-handling system near spent fuel)
Information Requested in Section 2.3 (Load-handling systems near systems required for safe-shutdown or decay heat removal)
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3.
REFERENCES Table 1 - Index of Overhead Handling Systems Table 2 - Load Tabulation Table 3 - Limerick Special Lif ting Devices Table 4 - Refueling Floor Heavy Load Height Restrictions Table 5 - Special Lif ting Device Compliance with ANSI N14.6-1978 Appendix A - Systems Required for Safe Shutdown and Decay Head Removal Appendix B
, Hazard Evaluations Appendix C - Assumptions / Data for RPV Load Drops Appendix D - Information Requested in Section 2.1 j
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Attachment - Saf e Load Path Drawings
(_J 1-Revision 3 P-41(b)/9 June, 1984
V 1.
SUMMARY
/ CONCLUSIONS
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This report on overhead heavy load handling systems at Limerick was prepared in response to Sections 2.2 and 2.3 of Reference 1 (Enclosure 3 to the NRC letter to all licenses dated December 22, 1980).
It also includes minor revisions to data previously transmitted to the NRC by Reference 2.
The format of Section 2 of this report follows that of Reference 1.
Decalled information on each crane and hoist, including hazard evaluations, statistics, load / impact area matricies etc. are included in the Tables and Appendices.
This review focused on cranes and hoists in Unit 1 and the common areas of the Limerick facility and included monorails and lif ting beams for which no hoists have been purchased but which may be used occasionally for equipment replacement or repair.
Since the Unit 2 design will be similar to Unit 1 the conclusiors of this report apply to Unit 2.
An as-built review will a
be performed for both Units to verify that dif ferences in layout for Unit 2 and modifications made subsequent to this report do not affect its conclusions.
The reactor enclosure crane is the only load handling
['N system capable of carrying heavy loads which could x_
damage irradiated fuel if d ropped.
Though the crane itself generally complies with the NUREG 0612 quide-lines, its special lif ting devices and associated load attachment points do not.
This is particularly true for critical loads, where NUREG 0612 recommends twice the normal design safety factor.
Since these items have already been fabricated it is proposed to substitute proof load testing in lieu of full compliance with NUREG 0612.
All cranes and hoists were evaluated to determine whether a dropped load could affect the ability to safely shut down the plant and continue to remove decay heat from the reactor and fuel pool.
Systems required for safe shutdown and decay heat removal are listed in Appendix A and hazard evaluations are provided in Appendix B.
In most cases it was possible to show that, based on separation and redundancy of safety-related systems or other plant-specific considerations, no real hazard (J
L P-24/6 Revision 2 March, 1983
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exists.
In some cases it was found advisable to establish load carrying heigh' restrictions' or other administrative controls to eliminate concern about potential damage to safety-related systems.
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One load-handling situation which cannot be addressed-by this report is the case where movement of a heavy load is so infrequent or unexpected that no crane, hoist monorail or lifting beam has been provided.
These operations must be treated on a case-by-case basis with the load handling preparations, instructions and equipment based on NUREG 0612 guidelines, to assure that the probability of a load drop is extremely small or that the consequences are acceptable.
O O
LJ P-24/6
-111-Revision 2 March, 1983 i
List of Effective Pages for the
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Limerick Generating Station
. Overhead Handling Systems Review Final Report Page Page Page Number Revision
- Number Revision Number Revision i
3 B-1 Original B-31 Original 11 2
B-2 Original B-32 Original lii 2
B-3 1
B-33 1
iv 3
B-4 Original B-34 3
1 3
B-35 1
la 3
B-5 Original 2
Original B-6 Original B-36 Original 3
3 B-7 Original B-37 Original 4
3 B-8 2
B-38 Deleted C-1 3
5 3
B-9 3
C-2 3
6 3
B-10 Original C-3 3
7 3
B-ll Original Table 1 3
7a 3
B-12 Original Table 2 3
-bf 8
3 B-13 Original Table 3 3
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9 3
Table 4 3
9a Deleted B-14 Original Table 5 3
10 3
B-15 Original 11 Original B-16 Original Attachment (Safe 12 Original B-17 Original Load Path Drawings, 13 Original B-18 Original SK-M-6831 through 14 1
B-19 Original SK-M-6859) 14a 1
B-20 Original 15 2
B-21 1
B-22' 1
D-23 Original A-1 Original B-24 1
A-2 Original B-25 1
A-3 Original B-26 Original A-4 Original B-27 Original A-5 Original B-28 Original A-6 Original B-29 Original B-30 Original
- Original prepared September, 1981 Revision 1 prepared March, 1982 Revision 2 prepared March, 1983
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Revision 3 prepared June, 1984
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P-41(b)/9
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Revision 3 June, 1984
INFORMATION REQUESTED IN SECTION 2.1:
This information was previously submitted (see Ap'pendix D)
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and was based on a general review of the Limerick overhead handling systems.
Changes are required as a result of the detailed review which followed.
These changes are listed below by paragraph number.
Paragraph 2.1-1 Heavy Load Definition NUREG 0612 defines a heavy load as a load whose weight is greater than the combined weight of a single spent fuel assembly and its handling tool.
The original Limerick heavy load definition of greater than 700 pounds was based on the weight of a fuel assembly plus the the general purpose g rapple.
However, fuel assemblies are normally handled by the fuel grapple assembly of the refueling platform.
Since this fuel grapple assembly, which consists of the telescoping mast and grapple head, is suspended from the platform hoist 4
cables, it could be considered a handling tool.
Therefore a heavy load has been redefined as greater than 1200 pounds to include the weight of the fuel grapple assembly.
Paragraph 2.1-1 Hoist Categorization The hoists below were not identified during the initial review.
They have been incorporated in Table 1 as Items 61
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and 62.
Item 62 belongs to the group of hoists which carry Y
heavy loads in the vicinity of safety-related equipment.
During the detailed review it was determined that other hoists should also be included in this group.
These addi-
.tions are based on a change in the interpretation of the term load path to include areas below grating and hatches, and on more conservative assumptions regarding routing of electrical conduit.
Tables 1 and 2 have been revised accordingly.
Reactor Enclosure Upper Fan Room Hoists (Item 61)
Reactor Enclosure Lower Fan Room Holsts (Item 62)
Paragraph 2.1-3-a Safe Load Paths Some of the safe load path drawings have been revised to clarify the load path, or to reflect a better understanding of the load handling methods.
Ob P-24(b)/6 Revision 3 June, 1984
1 Paragraph 2.1-3-c Load Tabulation b
V Revisions have been made to Table 2, Load Tabulation, and a hazard elimination category has been assigned to each load /
impact area combination (where applicable) as required by Section 2.3-2.
Paragraph 2.1-3-d Special Lif ting Devices In the list of critical loads the number of fuel pool gates should be "two pair per unit"..
Minor changes have been made to Table 3 based on new information.
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P-24()/6
-la-Revision 3 June, 1984
_ _. _ _.. _ _. _.. _ _ _, _ _ _.. -... _.. -., _.. _ _ _ _.. _.,. _ _. _ _, _. _ -. ~
INFORMATION REQUESTED IN SECTION 2. 2:
O) 2.2 " SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS FOR OVERHEAD HANDLING SYSTEMS
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OPERATING IN THE REACTOR BUILDING NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.4, provides guidelines concerning the design and operation of load-handling systems in the vicinity of spent fuel in the reactor vessel or in storage.
Information provided in response to this section should demonstrate that adequate measures have been taken to ensure that, in this area, either the likelihood of a load drop which might damage spent fuel is extremely small, or that the estimated consequences of such a drop will not exceed the limits set by the evaluation criteria of NUREG 0612, Section 5.1, Criteria I through III."
Paragraph 2.2-1
" Identify by name, type, capacity, and equipment designator, any cranes physically capable (i.e.,
ignoring interlocks, moveable mechanical stops, or operating procedures) of carrying loads over spent fuel in the storage pool or in the reactor vessel."
Response
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The following cranes are capable of carrying loads over g
spent fuel:
a.
Reactor Enclosure Crane - Overhead bridge crane with 125 ton and 15 ton hoists, equipment number 00H201.
b.
Refueling Platform - Gantry crane with one fuel handling grapple hoist and two auxiliary 1000 lb. capacity hoists, equipment number 10S272.
c.
Fuel Pool Jib Cranes - 1000 lb. capacity, equipment numbers OAH208 and OBH208.
d.
Fuel Channel Handling Boom - Jib crane, 500 lb. capacity, equipment number 10H224.
Paragraph 2.2-2
" Justify the exclusion of any cranes in this area from the above category by verifying that they are incapable of carrying heavy loads or are permanently prevented from move-ment of heavy loads over stored fuel or into any location where, following any failure, such load may drop into the reactor vessel or spent fuel storage pool."
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P-24/(b)6
Response
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The refueling platform is excluded from the above category since its hoists do not erry heavy loads.
All loads are less than or equal to the weight of a fuel bundle.
The two auxiliary-hoists have load cells with interlocks to prevent them from lifting anything as heavy I
as a fuel bundle.
The jib cranes are excluded from the above category since do they A
E not carry heavy loads.
Their capacity is 1000 lbs.
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i The channel handling boom is excluded from the above category since it does not carry heavy loads.
Its capacity is less than the weight.of a fuel bundle.
Paragraph 2.2-3
" Identify any cranes listed in 2.2-1, above, which you have evaluated h
as having sufficient design features to make the likelihood of a load drop extremely small for all loads to be carried and the basis for this evaluation'(i.e., complete compliance with NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.6, or partial compliance supplemented by suitable alternative or addi-i tional design features).
For each crane so evaluated, provide the load-handling-system (i.e., crane-load-combination) information specified in Attachment 1."
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Response
The reactor enclosure crane has been evaluated as having sufficient design features to make the likelihood of a load drop extremely L
small for the loads listed below.
The basis for this evaluation was compliance with NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.6, except where noted.
Load Handlina System Information Item 1:
" Provide the name of the manufact:arer and the design-rated load (DRL).
If the' maximum critical load (MCL), as defined in NUREG 0554,'is not the same as the DRL, provide this capacity."
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Response
Manuf acturer - Harnischfeger Corporation.
Design-rated load (DRL) 125/15 tons.
Maximum critical load (McL) - 110/6. 7 5 tons.
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P-24/(b)/6 Revision 3 June, 1984 i
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Item 2:
" Provide a detailed evaluation of the overhead handling system with respect to the features of design, fabrication, inspection, testing and operation as delineated in NUREG 0554 and supplemented by the identifed alternatives specified in NUREG 0612, Appendix C.
This evaluation must include a point-by-point comparison for each section of NilREG 0554.
If the alternatives of NUREG 0612, Appendix C, are used for certain applications in lieu of complying with the recommendation of NUREG 0554, this should be explicitly stated.
If an alternative to any of those contained in NUREG 0554 or NUREG 0612, Appendix C, is proposed, details must be provided on the proposed alternative to demonstrate its equivalency."
Response
A detailed evaluation of the reactor enclosure crane was made with respect to the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.104 which preceded NUREG 0554.
A point-by-point comparison of the crane features with the sections of the regulatory guide is presented in Table 9.1-12 of the Limerick FSAR.
The auxiliary hoisting system does not meet all of the design criteria of either NUREG 0554 or R.G.
1.104.
Specifically, the means of load attachment is not of redundant design.
As an alternative we propose to reduce the load rating A
(~h for the auxiliary hoist from 15 tons to 6.75 tons when handling
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critical loads.
This will effectively double the design safety f actor and provide an additional margin for wear and dynamic loads.
Item.3:
"With respect to the seismic analysis employed to demonstrate that the overhead handling system can retain the load during a seismic event equal to a safe shutdown earthquake, provide a description of the method of analysis, the assumptions used, and the mathe-matical model evaluated in the analysis.
The description of assumptions should include the basis for selection of trolley and load position."
Response
Load-bearing members and main hoist equipment of the reactor enclosure crane are designed in accordance with seismic Category I criteria so that the crane can structurally withstand the Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) and maintain the fully rated A
load in a static position during or following an SSE.
The
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crane was analysed using a 41-node lumped-mass model to determine natural frequencies.
To assure that the worst case would be included, three trolley positions were analysed (end of span, 1/4
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span and center of the bridge).
Highest and lowest positions
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of the rated load were considered for each trolley position, as P-24/(b)/6 Rev. 3 June, 1984
well as a no load condition.
Accelerations at the crane supports were determined based on crane natural frequencies and reactor enclosure response spectra.
1% crane damping was assumed for the
("3 Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE) and 2% damping was assumed for
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the SSE.
Resulting crane stresses were then calculated based on the worst case seismic loads.
Design stresses were limited to 0.9 Fy in bending, 0.85 Fy in tension and 0.5 Fy in shear where Fy equals the material yield stress at the design temperature.
Restraints were installed to preclude derailment of the bridge or trolley under seismic loading.
Item 4 & 5:
" Provide an evaluation of the lifting devices for each single-failure-proof handling system with respect to the guidelines of NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.6."
" Provide an evaluation of the interfacing lift points with respect to the guidelines of NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.6."
Response
We consider lifts of the following loads to meet the criteria of NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.6.
a.
Spent Fuel Cask - A spent fuel shipping cask will be purchased j (
or leased in the future.
Since licensing under 10CFR71 is not evidence that the spent fuel shipping cask lifting device and
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lift points meet the requirements of NUREG 0612, the NUREG 0612 s,)
requirements will be a basis for selection of shipping casks and their lifting devices for Limerick.
Specifically, the design of the lifting devices will conform to ANSI N14.6-1978 and the design of interfacing lift points will conform to Section 5.1.6 of NUREG 0612.
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b.
Refueling Shield - The special lif ting device for the refuel-ing shield does not fully meet the requirements of NUREG 0612 Section 5.1.6 (See Table 5).
In particular it does not 3
satisfy the ANSI N14.6-1978 recommendation to use twice the normal design safety factor for lifting devices which carry critical loads (see Table 3).
We do not believe that an increase in safety factor will produce a proportionate improve-ment in lifting device reliability and, since this special lifting device has already been fabricated, we take exception to this requirement.
As an alternative to full compliance with NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.6, and as a demonstration of design adequacy we propose to perform a load test of the lifting device at 150% of its rated capacity, followed by non-destructive examination of its load bearing welds.
There ere four lifting points on the refueling shield itself.
They provide a minimum static factor of safety of 4.8 with
N respect to material ultimate strength.
This does not satisfy
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the NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.6, safety factor requirement.
Again, we take exception to this requirement and propose to perform a qualifying load test of the lift points.
P-24/(b)6 Rev. 3 June, 1984
c.
Fuel Pool Stop Logs - The special lifting device for the fuel
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pool stop logs does not fully meet the requirements of Section A
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5.1.6 (See Table 5).
In particular it does not satisfy the Q3 ANSI N14.6-1978 recommendation to use twice the normal design safety. factor for lifting devices which carry critical loads (see Table 3).
We do not believe that an increase in safety factor will produce a proportionate improvement in lifting device reliability and, since this special lifting device has already been fabricated, we take exception to this requirement.
As an alternative to full compliance with NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.6,.and as a demonstration of design adequacy we propose to perform a load test of lifting device at 150% of its rated capacity, followed by nondestructive examination of its load bearing welds.
There are two lifting lugs on each fuel pool stop log.
They provide a minimum factor of safety of 7.25 with respect to material ultimate strength, plus an additional margin of 25%
for dynamic loads.
This does not satisfy the NUREG 0612 safety factor requirement.
Again, we take exception to this requirement and propose to perform a qualifying load test of the lift points.
d.
Fuel Pool Gates - The fuel pool gates are carried using con-ventional slings.
These slings will be selected according to NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.6(1).
There are two lift points on
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safety of 9.3 with respect to material ultimate strength.
each fuel pool gate.
They provide a minimum static factor of i
This does not satisfy the NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.6, safety factor requirement.
We do not believe that an increase in safety factor will produce a proportionate improvement in lift point reliability and, since this item has already been fabricated, we take exception to this requirement.
As an alternative to full compliance with NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.6, and as a demonstration of design adequacy we propose to perform a 150% load test of the fuel pool gate lift points, followed by non-destructive examination of the load bearing welds.
e.
Fuel Pool Jib Crane and Channel Handling Boom - These heavy loads are carried near the reactor vessel or spent fuel pool, I
where a load drop could affect fuel.
Conventional slings are used.
These slings will be selected according to NUREG 0612, i
Section 5.1.6(1).
In each case there is one lift point on the load which has a minimum static design safety factor of 5 with respect to material ultimate strength.
This does not satisfy the NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.6, safety factor require-ments.
We do not believe that an increase in safety factor will produce a proportionate improvement in lift point reli-ability and, since these items have already been fabricated, O
we take exception to this requirement.
As an alternative to full compliance with NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.6, and as a P-24/(b)6 Rev. 3 l
June, 1984
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demonstration of design adequacy we propose to perform a load (s_/
test of each lift point at 150% of normal load followed by nondestructive examination of the load bearing welds.
f.
Spent. Fuel Storage Racks - Empty storage racks may be placed j {
in the Fuel pool when spent fuel is present.
The racks are handled using a special lifting device (Module Lifting Fixture) which is attached to either the main or auxiliary hook of the reactor enclosure crane using conventional slings.
These slings will be selected according to NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.6(1).
The special lifting device does not fully meet the requirements of NUREG 0612 Section 5.1.6
-(See Table 5).
In particular it does not satisfy the ANSI N14.6-1978 recommendation to use twice the normal design safety factor for lifting devices which carry critical loads (see Table 3).
We do not believe that an increase in safety factor will produce a proportionate improvement in lifting device reliability and, since this special lifting device has already been fabricated, we take exception to this require-ments.
As an alternative to full compliance with NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.6, and as a demonstration of design adequacy we propose to perform a load test of the lifting device at 150%
of its rated capacity, followed by non-destructive examina-tion of its load bearing welds.
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The special lifting device engages structural members of the i
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fuel rack.
The lift points provide a minimum factor of safety of 10 with respect to material ultimate strength, and include a margin for dynamic loads.
This satisfies the requirements of NUREG 0612 Section 5.1.6.
g.
RPV Service Platform - The special sling for the RPV service platform has been replaced in order to meet the double safe-ty factor roquirements of ANSI N14.6-1978 but it does not meet all the requirements of that standard (See Table 5).
As ademonstration of design adequacy it will be load tested at 300% of it required capacity. 3The lifting lugs on the service platform have a safety factor of more than 10, which meets the requirements of NUREG 0612, Sect ic, 5.1.6.
V d
\\_J Revision 3 P-24/(b)6 June, 1984 l
Paragraph 2.2-4
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"For cranes identified in 2.2-1, above, not categorized accord-ing to 2.2-3, demonstrate that the criteria of NUREG 0612, Section 5.1, are satisfied.
Compliance with Criterion IV will be demonstrated in response to Section [2.3] of this request.
With respect to Criteria I through III, provide a discussion of your evaluation of crane operation in the Reactor Building and your determination of compliance.
This response should include the following information for each crane:
a.
Where reliance is placed on the installation and use of electrical interlocks or mechanical stops, indicate the circumstances under which these protective devices can be removed or bypassed and the administrative procedures invoked to ensure proper authorization of such action.
Discuss any related or proposed technical specifications concerning f
the bypass of such interlocks.
b.
Where reliance is placed on the operation of the Stand-by Gas Treatment System, discuss present and/or proposed technical specifications and administrative or physical controls provided to ensure that these assumptions remain
- valid, c.
Where reliance is placed on other site-specific considera-()\\
tions (e.g., refueling sequencing), provide present or
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proposed technical specifications, and discuss administrative or physical controls provided to ensure the validity of such considerations, d.
Analyses performed to demonstrate compliance with Criteria I through III should conform to the guidelines of NUREG 0612, Appendix A.
Justify any exception taken to these guidelines, and provide the specific information requested in Attachment 2, 3, or 4, as appropriate, for each analysis performed."
/
Revision 3 P-24( b) /6
-7a-June, 1984
Response
kI The reactor enclosure crane, though single-failure proof itself, s
is included in this category when used to carry the following loads.
Lifting devices or lifting points which do not meet the single-failure proof criteria of NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.6, restrict the overall load handling combination to this category for these loads.
Loads Carried Over the Spent Fuel Pool The reactor enclosure crane is prevented f rom carrying loads over or near the spent fuel pool by zone travel limit switches on the bridge and trolley.
The associated electrical interlock can be bypassed by conscious operator action via a keylocked switch.
Administrative procedures will be developed prior to plant opera-tion to control bypassing of the interlock.
Loads which must be carried over the spent fuel pool will be carried by a high-reliability load handling system and are categorized according to Paragraph 2.2-3.
Therefore the potential for the load drop over the spent fuel pool is extremely small.
Loads Carried Over the Reactor Vessel The following loads must be carried over the reactor vessel.
None
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of these loads have lifting devices which meet the single-failure-
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proof criteria of NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.6.
They are therefore evaluated with respect to Criteria I through III of NUREG 0612 Section 5.1.
a.
Reactor well shield plugs - The reactor well shield plugs are carried over the reactor vessel only with the RPV head 3
in place.
The drop of a shield plug could damage the drywell head, RPV head or seal plate but would be less severe than the drop of the drywell head or the RPV head.
Therefore the drop of a shield plug will not damage fuel or cause unacceptable leakage from the reactor vessel.
b.
Drywell Head - The drywell head is carried over the reactor vessel while the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) head and insu-lation support structure are in place.
Depending on orientation a drop of the drywell head could danage the insulation support structure, rupture the RPV vent and head spray piping, damage the seal plate and impact the RPV itself.
It is assumed that the effect of a drywell head drop on the reactor vessel is no more severe than an RPV head drop which is discussed below.
This assumption is based on the fact that though the drywell head weighs about 13% more than the RPV, much of its kinetic r
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P-24/(b)6 Rev. 3 June, 1984
b.
energy will be absorbed by the' insulation support structure
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and the seal plate.
Therefore a drop of drywell head will
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not cause fuel damage or unacceptable leakage from the reactor vessel.
c.
RPV Head, Pteam Dryer, Shroud Head / Separator Assembly - General /
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Electric has analyzed the consequences of a drop of these loads over the reactor vessel.
This analysis showed that a drop of the RPV head, steam dryer or shroud head / separator assembly would not cause fuel damage or leakage from the A
i reactor vessel.
Thus, evaluation criteria I through III of
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NUREG 0612, Section 5.1 are satisfied.
No credit is taken for electrical interlocks or mechanical stops, Standby Gas Treatment System operation or site specific considerations.
A discussion of conformance with the guidelines of NUREG 0612, Appendix A and the information requested in Attachment 4 is provided in Appendix C.
d.
Service Platform Support (including seal surface protector)-
The diameter of the service platform support is too large to allow it to fit inside the reactor vessel and it is nuch lighter than the loads above.
A drop of the service plat-form support will not cause fuel damage or unacceptable leakage from the reactor vessel, e.
Refueling Shield - The refueling shield has been categorized f"')
according to Pa ragraph 2. 2-3.
d f.
Jib Crane - The J ib crane has been categorized according tc Pa rag raph 2. 2-3.
g.
Service Platform - The service platform has been categorized according to Paragraph 2.2-3.
3 h.
Other Loads Over the Reactor Vessel - There are no other heavy loads which must be carried over the open reactor vessel.
Loads which are carried over the reactor vessel only while the RPV head is on (e.g. the insulation support struc-ture, the head nut rack, the head stud rack and the head stud tensioner) will not cause damage to the fuel if dropped.
A drop of these items over the reactor vessel is less severe than a drop of the drywell head or the RPV head itself.
Therefore, there would be no unacceptable leakage from the vessel.
Heavy loads which need not be carried over the reactor well are restricted from this area during refueling (See safe load path drawings for the reactor enclosure crane).
Administra-tive procedures will be developed prior to plant operation to control the movement of loads over the reactor well.
[LJ P-24(b)/6 Revision 3 June, 1984
INFORMATION REQUESTED IN SECTION 2.3:
"2.3 SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS FOR OVERHEAD HANDLING SYSTEMS OPERATING eN IN PLANT AREAS CONTAINING EQUIPMENT REQUIRED FOR REACTOR SHUT
)
DOWN, DECAY HEAT REMOVAL, OR SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.5, provides guidelines concerning the design and operation of load-handling systems in the vicinity of equipment or components required for safe reactor shutdown and decay heat removal.
Information provided in response to this section should be sufficient to demonstrate that adequate measures have been taken to ensure that in these areas, either the likelihood of a load drop which might prevent safe reactor shutdown or prohibit continued decay heat removal is extremely small, or that damage to such equipment from load drops will be limited in order not to result in the loss of these safety-related functions.
Cranes which must be evaluated in this section have been previously identified in your response to 2.1-1, and their loads in your response 2.1-3-c."
Paragraph 2.3-1
" Identify any cranes listed in 2.1-1, above, which you have evaluated as having sufficient design features to make the likelihood of a load drop extremely small for all loads to be carried and the basis for this evaluation (i.e., complete compliance with NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.6, or partial compliance supplemented by suitable alternative or additional design features).
For each crane so evaluated, pro-
<~S vide the load-handling-system ( i.e., crane-load-combina t ion) i n f o rma-()
tion specified in attachment 1."
Response
There are no cranes in this category except the reactor enclosure crane when it is used to carry the loads listed in the response to Paragraph 2.2-3.
Paragraph 2.3-2 "For any cranes identified in 2.1-1 not designated as single-failure-proof in 2.3-1, a comprehensive hazard evaluation should be provided which includes the following informations" Subparagraph a "The presentation in a matrix format of all heavy loads and potential impact areas where damage might occur to safety-related equipment.
Heavy loads identification should include designation and weight or cross-reference to information provided 2.1-3-c.
Impact areas should be identified by construction zones and elevations or by some other method such that the impact area can be located in the plant general arrangement drawings.
r~s Figure 1 provides a typical matrix."
(
)
Response
This information is presented in Table 2 entitled ' Load Tabulation' Revision 3 P-24/6 June, 1984
S_ubp_aragraph b u
's ' "For each interaction identified, indicate which of the~ load and impact area combinations can be eliminated because of separation and redundancy of safety-related equipment, mechanical stops and/or electrical interlocks, or other site-specific considera-tions.
Elimination on the basis of the aforementioned considera-tion should be supplemented by the following specific information:
(1)
For load / target combinations eliminated because of separation and redundancy of safety-related equipment, discuss the basis for determining that load drops will not affect continued system operation (i.e., the ability of the system to perform its safety-related function.)
(2)
Where mechanical stops or electrical interlocks are to be pro-vided, present details showing the areas where crane travel will be prohibited.
Additionally, provide a discussion concern-ing the procedures that are to be used for authorizing the bypassing of interlocks or removable stops, for verifying that interlocks are functional prior to crane use, and for verifying that interlocks are restored to operability after operations which require bypassing have been completed.
(3)
Where load / target combinations are eliminated on the basis of other, site-specific considerations (e.g., maintenance sequencing), provide present and/or proposed technical specifications and discuss administrative procedure or physical constraints invoked to ensure the validity of such considerations."
Re_sponse Table 2 indicates the basis for eliminating each load / area combi-nation from the hazardous category.
Code letters used in the table correspond to the following hazard elmination categories:
a.
Crane travel for this load / area combination prohibited by electrical interlocks or mechanical stops.
b.
System redundancy and separation precludes loss of capability of system to perform its safety-related function following this load drop in this area.
Site-specific considerations eliminate the need to consider c.
load / equipment combination.
d.
Likelihood of handling system failure'for this load is extremely small (i.e. NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.6, satisfled.)
v P-24/6.. _ - - - -
Analysis demonstrates that crane failure and load drop will e.
[}
not damage safety-related equipment.
u/
A detailed evaluation of each crane / hoist which was categorized according to Paragraph 2.1-1 as potentially hazardous is presented in Appendix B.
The following method was used to evaluate the consequence of a load drop from these load handling systems:
1)
The Limerick Fire Protection Evaluation Report and the separation drawings were used to establish whether there was anything safety-related in the load path or on the next lower elevation.
Except for the refueling floor and a few other cases where there were very heavy loads or high lif ts, it was assumed that there would be no sequential failure that could affect more than one floor below the load path.
The basis of this assumption is that the presence of large quantities of reenforcing bar in the floor will prevent the formation of very large concrete spall fragments which are free to fall to the next floor.
Major safety-related items are listed in the Appendix B hazard evaluations.
2)
A more detailed study of the separation drawings was made to determine whether there was sufficient separation of safety-related items (as indicated by associated electrical divisions) to establish that, if these safety-related items were required for safe-shutdown or decay heat removal, only one method of safe shutdown or decay heat removal could be affected.
If
(/)
so, no further evaluation was required.
Generally, no attempt was made to determine whether or not the safety-related items x-were actually part of systems required for safe shutdown or decay heat removal.
Appendix A provides a discussion of safe shutdown methods and lists the systems required for safe shutdowa and removal of decay heat from the reactor vessel and spent f at i tool.
3)
If there was not sufficient separation of safety-related items in the load path and on the next lower evaluation, note was taken of which electrical divisions were predominant.
Safety-related items associated with electrical divisions which were not pre-dominant were identified to see whether they were required for safe shutdown or decay heat removal.
For exampic, if most components in the load path were associated witt electrical divisions 1 and 3 (shutdown method
'A'),
those components associated with electrical divisions 2 and 4 (shutdown method
'B') were identified to see whether they belong to systems required for safe shutdown or decay heat removal.
If not, then only one safe-shutdown or decay heat removal method could poten-tially be affected, and no further evaluation was required.
O P-24/6
/[
4 )
-If Step 3 was inconclusive safety related components associated
\\_,
with all electrical divisions were identified as necessary to establish whether there was suf ficient distance between compo-nents of the two shutdown or decay heat removal methods to preclude the possibility of a given load drop affecting both methods.
If so, no further evaluation was required.
5)
If the load handling hazard could not be eliminated by the steps above, necessary adminstrative controls were established.
For hazards on the next lower elevation, floor impact strength calculations were performed to establish what load carrying-height restrictions were needed, if any.
6)
In some cases, site-specific considerations were used to elimi-nate the need to consider some load / equipment combinations.-
For exanple, since there will be no major maintenance activities in the drywell during reactor operation, only the consequences of load drops which would affect decay heat removal or vessel integrity were considered for the drywell.
Sub, paragraph c "For interactions not eliminated by the analysis of 2.3-2-b, above, identify any handling systems for specific loads which you have evaluated as having sufficient design features to make the likelihood O
of a load drop extremely small and the basis for this evaluation (i.e.,. complete compliance with NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.6, or partial compliance supplemented by suitable alternative or additional design features).
For each so evaluated, provide the load-handling-system (i.e., crane-lead-combination) information specified in Attachment 1."
Response
There are no interactions in this category.
, Subparagraph d "For interactions not eliminated in 2.3-2-b or 2.3-2-c, above, demon-strate using appropriate analysis that damage would not preclude operation of sufficient equipment to allow the system to perform its safety function following a load drop (NUREG 0612, Section 5.1, Criterion IV).
For each analysis so conducted, the following in-formation should be provided:"
(1)
An indication of whether or not, for the specific load being investigated, the overhead crane-handling system is designed and constructed such that the hoisting' system will retain its load in the event of seismic accelerations equivalent to those of a safe shutdown earthquake (SSE).
i P-24/6 (2)
The basis for any exceptions taken to the analytical guidelines j-s of NUREG 0612, Appendix A.
- (3)
The information requested in Attachment 4.
Response
As discussed in the hazard evaluations of Appendix B analysis was used to show that load drops-from the following cranes / hoists would not jeopardize safe shutdown or decay heat removal capability.
Of this group only the reactor enclosure crane is designed to retain its L
load during a safe shutdown earthquake.
Item numbers refer to Table 1.
a.
HVAC Equipment Hatch Holst - Item 15 b.
Reactor Enclosure Crane - Item 20 c.
CRD Platform Holst - Item 33 d.
Containment Hydrogen Recombiner Cover Hoist - Item 36 e.
Control Room HVAC Equipment Hoist - Item 58 f.
Control Structure Fans Lifting Beam Hoist - Item 60 No exceptions were taken to the analytical guidelines of NUREG 0612, O
ppendix A.
A The information requested by Attachment (4) is presented below:
Initial, conditions / Assumptions a.
1)
Weight of the load is as shown in Table 2.
[
2)
Impact area of the load is as shown on the load path drawings.
l 3)
Drop height is based on the maximum lif t of the hoist except for the reactor enclosure crane where the purpose of the analysis was to establish maximum drop heights.
4)
No credit was taken for impact limiters or environmental drag forces.
5)
The heavy load is assumed to drop with a zero initial velocity.
6)
The capacity of the slab is based on yield-line theory.
7)
-The. capacity of the structural steel is based on a simple span, elasto-plastic design 14-Revision 1 P-24/6 i
March, 1982 i
1
,.c_--._
y
..,,-,,..-,,w.
.r_
_.--ymy-., - - -,,,,--,3.--,-my9
,.-m
,,,cy,v,_
,.,,m_,yy,-,-m..ey-gem.,e,..,,.,c,
'I )
8)
Slab stiffness is based on an effective moment of inertia
\\s /
of a reinforced concrete beam.
9)
Fixed and simply supported boundary conditions are used in slab analysis.
10)
Energy loss due to local deformation of the object at im-pact is disregarded.
Slab and steel framing system are assumed to take the full impact energy with spalling of concrete.
11)
The average interf ace force from the dropped load is assumed to be supported by punching shear capacity of the concrete.
12)
Existing dead load is considered insignificant compared to the impact load and is ocglected in the evaluation.
Seismic load and live load are not considered to be present at instant of load drop.
b.
Method of Analysis 1)
Structural response of the structural component is computed in terms of deformation limits, resistance functions and dynamic characteristics.
I\\
2)
Interface forcing function is used in the determination of
\\-
the applied forces.
3)
Analytical and numerical techniques as per Bechtel Power Corporation Design Guide C-2.45 are used.
4)
All calculations are done manually without computer assistance.
5)
Height of drop is measured from the lowest point of the heavy load to the floor, unless noted otherwise.
c.
Conclusion L
See the Appendix B hazard evaluations for discussions of the results of these analyses.
i O
i P-24/6 14a -
Revision 1 March, 1982
---,nn,
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_,-~,_ - --
.---~---,w.na
l O
3.
REFERENC ES
- 1. to the NRC letter to all licensees, dated December 22, 1980.
2.
Philadelphia Electric Company letter to the NRC, dated June 18, 1981.
- 3.. Limerick Generating Station Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) Section 15.7.4, " Fuel Handling Accident."
f O
I i
I i
L 1.
t O P-165/8(a)
Revision 2 March, 1983 l
1 i
Limerick Overhead Handling Systems Review i
56ptember, 1981 i
i.
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Pag f9 OVEMIEAD liANDLING SYSTEM REVIEW TABLE 1 September, 1981 INDEX OF OVERHEAD llANDLING SYSTEMS - UNIT I & OOPfiON Fire Crane Safety-Protection Safety Related Related Areas:
or Hoist Material Max.
Item In Item On Ioad Path Equip.
Req.
Vert.
Ioad Exclusion Next tower Next Iower Item Nteber Name/ Service Area
- Elev, Drwq.
Capacity Number Lift Path?
Criteria Elevation? Elevation 8
10-Hil6 Turbine 6
217' M-111 5-ton M-38BA 30'-0" 10 A
NO 94A Enclmure 89A Aux. Equip.
Ilatch floist 9
00-11117 Condensate 9
217' M-111 1-ton M-38BB 22'-9" NO A
NO 94A Filter 89A,89B Demineralizer iblding Punps Hoist l'
10 00-11118 Main Imbe Oil 1
239' M-112 4-ton M-38BA 43'-0" to A
NO 95 1
Tank Ibist 93 11 OA-lil19 Recirc. Punp 6,7 269' M-113 24-ton M-38BA 25'-0" NO A
NO 98A i
OB-fil19 M-G Set iloist ca.
88A,88C,88D,97 i
)
12 00-11120 Drywell 7
302' M-ll5 6-ton M-38BA 10'-3" NO A
NO 99A I
Chiller 98A,98C,98D lloist i
j 13 10-11122 Drywell 7
302' M-115 6-ton M-38BA 42'-0" NO A
NO 99A Chiller 98A Ilatch Iloist 1
14 00-11124 REU Filter 11 313' M-121 5-ton M-38BC 17 ' - 4 "
yn C
YES 48A l
Demineraliz( r 47A Iloist I
Page 9
OVERllEAD IIANDLING SYSTEM REVIIM TABIE 1 September, 1981 INDEX OF OVERilEAD llANDLING SYSTFMS - UNIT I & COMMON Fire Crare Safety-Protection Safety Related Related Areas:
or lbist Material Max.
Item In Item On Ioad Path D1uip.
Req.
Vert.
Load Exclusion Next Iower Next Iower Item Nunber Name/ Service Area Elev Dtwg. Capacity Number Lift Path?
Criteria Elevation't Elevation 15 00-H126 INAC D]uip.
8 350' M-124 2-ton M-38BB 53'-9" YES YES 28A 1
27A Hatch lloist 304' i
16 OA-H127 lbt Machine Admin.
217' A-7001 2-ton M-38BB 10'-11" NO A
NO N/A 0B-11127 Shop Mono-Bldg.
Sht. 1 N/A OC-H127 rail Hoists j
17 00-H129 Control Rm.
8 200' M-110 5-ton M-38BB 26'-0" YES NO IL,1M l
00-H130 Chiller M-125 4-ton 7'-4" lA,B,J,K,G,H Ibists l
18 10-H131 Reactor Encl.
16 313' M-121 6-ton M-380C 106'-6" NO C
YES 48A 47A l
Feluip. Ilatch Hoist i
I 19 Control Room 8
217' M-lli 3-ton M-38BC
- 158 YES YES 2
INAC Lift M-126 IL Beams I
20 03-11201 Reactor Bldg.
11-16 352' M-122 125/15 M-16 165'-6" YES YES 78A,B,C Overhead Crane ton 48A,B,C,7BA,30A i
21 1A-Il203 Recirculation Drywell 253' M-119 24-ton M-38A 41'-0" YES YES 30A i
13-11203 Punp Motor ca.
29A f
floists 22 0A-11208 Fuel Pool 12 352' M-122 1/2-ton M-1 50' N/A B
N/A 78A 78A 0B-11208 Jib Cranes (GE) j 1
]*Hoisttobeborrowedfromanotherlocationwhenneeded.
i D ')dn /d
Paq
>f 9 i
OVER!!EAD IIANDLItG SYSTEM REVIEW I
TABLE 1 September, 1981 INDEX OF OVER!!EAD IIANDLItC SYSTEMS - UNIT I & COMMON Fire Crane Safety-Protection or Safety '1 elated Related Areas:
floist Material Max.
Item In Item On Tcad Path Ekluip.
Req.
Vert.
Ioad
' Exclusion Next Is.Mr Next Iower Item NLm. ber Name/ Service Area Elev.
Drug. Capacity Number Lift Path?
Criteria Elevation? Elevation l
23 00-11213 CRD Punp 6
200' M-110 5-ton M-38A 7'-2" 10 A
N/A 89A Iloist N/A 24 10-II215 HPCI/RC1C 11,15 217' M-118 10-1/2 M-38BC 56'-0" YES YES 44 El]uip. Iloist ton 42A 25 11216 Core Spray 11 217' M-118 5-ton M-38BA 59'-3" YES YES 44 Punps lloist 42A,42B 26 10-11217 Core Spray 12 217' M-118 5-ton M-38BA 59'-3" YES YES 44 Punp floist 41 4
27 1NI218 Reactor Encl.
12,16 217' M-118 12-1/2 M-38BC 32'-0" YES YES 44 IBH218 Cooling Water ton ca.
56'-0" 41 I!X & Core j
Spray Punp Iloist 4
28 10-11219 RIIR Punps 15,16 217' M-118 10-ton M-38BA 55'-9" YES YES 44 lloist 31,32,42A 29 10-11220 Containment 11 253' M-119 6-ton M-38BA 16'-0" YFE YES 45A Equip. Door 44 i
iloist i
30 1A-fl221 Personnel Inck 16 253' M-119 20-ton M-38BC 16'-6" NO C
YES 45A 1B-11221 floist ca.
43,44
)
7
)
D 9An /A
O O
"~ O '
OVERIIEAD HANDLING SYSTEM REVIEW TABLE 1 September, 1981 4
INDEX OF O'ERHEAD HANDLING SYSTDiS - UNIT I & C090N Fire Crane Safety-Protection Safety Related Related Areas:
or Holst Material Max.
Item In Item On
[ cad Path RIuip.
Req.
Vert.
Ioad Exclusion Next Iower Next Iower Item Number Name/ Service Area
- Elev, Drwg. Capacity Number Lift Path?
Criteria Elevation? Elevation 31 00-li223 RWCU Heat 15 283' M-119 8-ton M-38BA 12'-7" YES YES 47,il,J,K,L Exchanger 45A,45C l
Iloist 32 10-11224 Fuel Channel 12 352' M-122 500 lb.
M-38BC 10'-3" N/A B
N/A 78A 78A l
Ilandling Bom
)
33 10-H229 CRD Platform 15 253' M-119 1-ton M-38 20'-0" YES YES 30A Hoist 29A i
i 34 1All233,* MSRV Service 11,12, 273' M-234 1-ton M-38BA 8'-0" YES YES 30A 234,235, lloists 15,16 286' 2-ton M-38BB 50'-0" 29A l
- 1BH233, PERV Removal 234,235, Hoists I
- 10H230, 232 1
35 10-11236 Disposal Cask 15 253' M-119 1-ton M-38BC 20'-7" NO C
YES 30A Cart Renoval 29A Hoist i
I 36 10-H237 Containment 11,16 283' M-120 1-ton M-38BB 10'-8" YES YES 47A Ilydrogen 45A Recombiner Cover lloist 37 10-11238
&luipnent 16 283' M-120 25-ton M-28 74'-0" NO C
YES 47A flatch Bridge 45A Crane
- Iloist trolleys to be used with cme-alongs n
'9 n f% in
Pag of 9 OVEICiEAD flANDLING SYSTEM REVIIM TABIE 1 Septmber, 1981 INDEX OF OVERllEAD llANDLIFO SYSTEMS - UNIT I & COMMON Fire Crane Safety-Protection or Safety Related Related Areas:
lioist Material Max.
Item In Item On Ioad Path Equip.
Req.
Vert.
Toad Exclusion Next Iower Next Iower j
Item Number Name/ Service Area Elev.
Drwq. Capacity Number Lift Path?
Criteria Elevation? Elevation 38 10-11239 CRD Main-15 253' M-119 1-ton M-38BA 14'-0" to C
YES 45C tenance Area 44 Crane 39 00-11302 Radwaste 22 237' M-143 20-ton M-87 23'-0" NO A
NO
_ 120N llandling 120N l
Crane i
i 40 00-11306 Product Cylin-19 195' M-141 4-ton M-38BC 22'-6" NO A
to 119A 1
der /Pipeway 117 Iloist l
41 00-11307 Radwaste Build-20 257' M-143 2-ton M-38BA 51'-0" to A
to 12111 ing flVAC Hoist 121A 42 00-11308 Radwaste Equip, 22 257' M-143 2-ton M-38B 50'-1" NO A
to 121M l
Ilatch Iloist 121A,120N 43 00-11310 Radwaste Demi-20,22 217 M-142 4-ton M-38BB 66'-0" 10 A
NO 120L neralizer &
ll80-X Ft]uip. Iloist l
44 1A-Il501 Diesel D.G.
217' M-145 15-ton M-28 20'-9" YES N/A 79-82 1B-11501 Generator Enclosurr N/A 1C-11501 Enclosure l
1D-11501 Cranes l
l 45 00-11502 Machine Shop Admin.
217' A-7001 15-ton M-28 20'-0" NO A
N/A N/A Bridge Crane Bldg.
Sht. 1 l
l l
n_94 n /4
o o
-o-O/ERilEAD llANDLItG SYSTEM REVIIM TABIE 1 Septanber,1981 INDEX OF OVERilEAD flANDLING SYS'1TNS - LNIT I & CONON Fire Crane Safety-Protection or Safety Related Related Areas:
l Hoist Material Max.
Item In Item On Ioad Path Equip.
Req.
Vert.
Ioad Exclusion Next Iower Next Iower l
Itcm Number Name/ Service Area
- Elev, Drwg. Capacity Number Lift Path?
Criteria Elevation? Elevation 46 00-11503 Circulating CWB 217' M-5101 30-ton M-28 40'-0" NO A
NO N/A l
Water Bldg.
M-5102 i
Bridge Crane M-5103
)
47 00-H508 Machine Shop Mmin.
217' A-7001 5-ton M-28 20'-0" NO A
N/A N/A i
Decon. Area Bldg.
Sht. 1 l
Bridge Crane i
l 48 00-11510 Auxiliary A.B.
217' M-1290 2-ton M-38A 30'-0" NO A
N/A N/A 1
Boiler Bldg.
Bldg.
j lloist i
49 00-11511 Spray Pond Spray 268' M-388 3-ton M-388 12'-4' YES YES 122A,D,123A,D 00-H513 Pimp Ilouse Ibnd ca.
122B,E,123B,E s
l Hoists Pump flouse 50 00-fl514 Control Ibm 8
200' M-110 3-ton Field 15' NO lL,lM,1N,ll5D YES i
chiller Ibrt-M-125 1A-lK
{
able Gantry i
Iloist j
51 00-H521 IIEPA Filter 19 191' M-141 15-ton M-388 14'-0" NO A
NO 119A lloist 117 l
l 52 00-11530 Schuylkill S. R. P. fl. 147' M-4302 5-ton M-38BA 48'-0" to A
to N/A River Bulk-4 head floist i
P-240/4
Pagc f9 OVERIIEAD HANDLING SYSTEM REVIEW TABIE 1 Septmber, 1981 INDEX OF OVER!!EAD IIANDLING SYSTETiS - UNIT I & COPNON Fire t
Crane Safety-Protection l
or Safety Related Related Areas:
l lbist Material Max.
Item In Item On Ioad Path Equip.
Req.
Vert.
Ioad Exclusion Next Iower Next Iower Item Ntriber Name/ Service Area
- Elev, Drug. Capacity Number Lift Path?
Criteria Elevation? Elevation 53 Steam Tunnel 11,12 280' M-234 35' YES NO 46, 47 8
)
Monorail 97 lloists i
54 8031-M-Refueling 11-18 352' M-122 1200 lb.
M-1 50' N/A B
N/A 78A 1-F19-Platform 1000 lb.
(GE) 488,C,78A,30A E003 Grapple &
lbists Spray Ibnd Spray 268' M-388 YES YES N/A l
55 N/A I
RilRSW & ESW Ibnd 122A,D 123A,D
}
Punps Yard Pump j
Crane llouse 56 Feedwater 2
239' M-112 25' to A
NO 88A l
Ileater Tube 86A Bundle Ibist 57
'Ibrbine Encl.
7 302' M-115 1-ton 20' 10 A
NO 99A M-G Set Area 98A,98C Supply Air i
Cooling Coils l
Ibist i
58 0011133 Control Room 8
304' M-115 3-ton M-38BC 17' YFS YES 27 l
IIVAC Equip.
M-130 25A 1
lbist i
59 Wetwell 11,12, 217' M-118 2-ton 50'
^
YES N/A l
Monorail 15,16 floist
)
- lloist/ Crane to be borrowed f ran other locations when needed i
]
TL7 An /A I
O
.a 9 of 9 TABLE 1 OVERIEAD HANDLING SYbM REVIEW kvision 3 - June,1984 i
INDEX OF OVEMiEAD HANDLING SYbM - UNIT I AND CONON i
Fire Crane Safety Protection i
or Material Safety Related iblated Areas:
Hoist Ibg. or Max.
Iten In It m On Ioat Path Equip.
Sub.
Wrt.
Ioad Exclusion Next Iower Next Lower Iten Number Name/ Service Area Elev.
Drug.
Capacity Number Lif t Path?
Criteria Elevation Elevation i
60 Control Struc.
8 321' M-124 2-ton 16' YES YES 27 l
Fans Lif ting 24A Beam Hoists i
61 Ibactor 15,16 331' M-121 2-ton
~ 20 '
YES YES 50,51 Enclosure 48A,49 i
Upper Fan Ibczn Hoists 62 Ibactor Enclosure 15,16 3 13 '
M-121 1-ton
~ 16 '
YES YES 48A,49 lower Fan Room 2-ton 47 3
Hoists
)
i P-240/4 i
3 1
i 4
I i
j I
i l
TABLE 2 LOAD TABULATION This table provides a load / impact area matrix for each crane and hoist.
Hazard elimination categories are indicated by letters which correspond to the list below.
Detailed hazard evaluations for each load handling system can be found in Appendix B.
Hazard Elimination Categories a.
Crane travel for this area / load combination prohibited
(
by electrical interlocks or mechanical stops.
b.
System redundancy and separation precludes loss of capability of system to perform its safety-related function following this load drop in this area.
c.
Site-specific considerations eliminate the need to consider load / equipment combination.
d.
Likelihood of handling system failure for this load is extremely small (i.e. section.5.1.6 NUREG 0612 satisfied).
e.
Analysis demonstrates that crane failure and load drop will not damage safety-related equipment.
Deleted P. 42 of table (Itan 63, North Stack Dtunbwaiter) o)
t
~
Revision 3 June, 1984 T-23/56
O O
"O i
TABLE 2 LOAD TABULATION i
l CRANE / HOIST:
Reactor Enclosure Overhead Crane (00-11201)*
I Location Reactor Enclosure - Unit 1 Impact Refs..eling Floor-Elevation 321' Refueling Hoistway - Elevation 217' Area Coluans 15.5-23, D-J Columns 22.5 - 23.5, D-P flazard Loads 3afety-Related
- lafety-Related Elevation Elimination Elevation Equipment Equipmc't Category Category 1
i Reactor Well Irradiated Fuel
- 217, None N/A I
Shield Plugs 352'-u" a,c f
(Up to 90 tons) i
{
Strongback I Below Recirculation Systm Below N/A N/A l
332' Electrical Otznponent:,;
b,e 217
)
Slab Fuel Pool Coolin9 Slab
$k
<e
>*- N I
EE
/\\
Drvwell l
f_Q IIead a,e Qg j
(104 tons) i
,m u
II Eh i
Ds H i
l b,e yy
- r a m
e<
Reactor Vessel ea Ilead I a,e (92 tons) l I
RPV ilead Strongback V
y b,e Y
Y If C
- Table 1 - Item 20
s
-l P.
t TABLE 2 LOAD TABULATION CRANE / HOIST:
Reactor Enclosure Overhead Crane (00-!!201)
- l
- I" Reactor Enclosure - Unit 1 Impact Refueling Floor - Elevation 353' Hefueling floistway - Elevation 217' j
Area Columns 15.5-23, D-J m ltu m s 22.5 - 23.5, D-P Loads Safety-Related llazard Safety-Relatea llazard i
Elevation Equipment Blimination Elevation Equipment Elimination Parmnrv i
rMmnrv..
A Steam Dryer l
L2.\\
(40 tons) 352'-0" Irradiated Fuel a, e 217' None N/A l
j Dryer / Separator Sling Below Recirculaticn Systen; Below l
352' Bloctrical Ccunponents ;
b, e 217' N/A N/A j
Slab Puel Pool Cooling Slab G@
- o t
l e
A Pny l
Steam Separator Dg' e (74 tons) a,e os a
E Dryer / Separator h.>
3 Sling x$
Y bue
@e;
' tn 1
Fuel Pool Stop d
l Logs
" *B
}
(35 tons)
- s 4
Lifting Assembly e
3 II r
y d
o
)'
)
V y
3 i
l i
- Table 1 - Item 20
P.
3 TABLE 2 LOAD TABULATION
)
CRANE / HOIST:
Reactor Enclosure Overhead Crane (00-11201)*
l Location Il Reactor Enclosure - Unit 1 I
Impact i
Refueling Floor - Elevation 352' Refueling floistway - Elevation 217' Area
- ~
Columns 15.5-23, D-J l
l Loads Safety-Nelan liazard Safety-Relate (1 Elevation Elevation El m nation i
Equipment Ely..
tion Equipment Category Dryer / Separator Irradiated 3
a,c 217' None N/A l
Storage Pit 352'-0" Fuel Canal Plugs I
(45 tons) l Below Recirculation System; Below Strongback II 352' Electrical Ccaponents ;
b,e 217' N/A N/A Slab Fuel Pool Cooling Slab o <:
e >t to :r Puel Pool Gates e4 om
(~3 tons each)
Y$
e
- s 3: n.
a e-d o$
- re en d
l Refueling Shield d
(22 tons)
I Refueling Shield Lift Rig I
- o i'
V V
d P-y y
if j
j i
- Table 1 - Item 20 i
o o
"rj TABLE 2 LOAD TABULATION CRANE / HOIST:
Reactor Enclosure Overhead Crane (00-11201)*
Location Reactor Enclosure - Unit 1 Impact Refueling Floor - Elevation 352' Refueling Iloistway Area Columns 15.5-23, D-J Columns 22.5-23.5, D-F i
i i
Loads Safety-nelateu liazard safety-mlatal llazard Elevation i
Equipment Eliminatim Elevation Equipment Eliminatim remnrv Cateaorv l
Spent Fuel 352'-0" Irradiated Fuel a,d 217'-0" None y73 Shipping Cask (100 tons)
Recirculation Below BelN Systom' Sl(x:trical d
217'
!^
Cask Yoke N/A 352' Caponents; Fuel Slab
$ $l Slab Pool moling ge; j
m :r,
Pe A
Service Platform O m.
D
G3 (5 tons) d wa Service Platform l
Sling y$
i d
U W i
m3-
-e, l
em e<
4 EN RPV Head a, c Insulation (9 tons)
W N
ba c Y
f i f E
I i
- Table 1 - Item 20
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j P.
11 TABLE 2 LOAD TABULATION Control Room Chiller lloists (00-11129/00-11130)*
j CRANE / HOIST:
i Location Control Structure - Corunon Impadt i
Area 8, Elevation 200' Area i
Columns 20.5-25.5, K-M Loads Safe-Shutdown Ha y d Elevation Equipment Elimination Cateoorv i
Control lbOm j
lloist Capacities?
200' Chiller Piping; l
5-ton /4-ton b
Electrical conduit 1
1 Chillers t
l Below None N/A l
200' o
I Slab
- r I
e i
en.
i
=
1 e
\\
u*
Da*
ue in Mm it ut
- I!. e:s l
r
.f.k l!
C e
l j
I l
1
- Table 1 - Item 17 i
i
]
P.
12 s
TABLE 2 LOAD TABULATION
~
CRANE / HOIST:
Reactor Enclosure Equipment llatch Iloist (10-11131) 4 Location Reactor Enclosure - Unit 1 Area 16, Elevation 313' l
IEPact Area 16, Elevation 217' j
Area Columns 21.5-22.5, D-E g i
Below IIatcfrey 1
Loads llazard Hazard Elevation Sa Elimination Elevation Elimination Equ n
E Cateqory Category lloist Capacity:
217' j
6 ton 313' None N/A None N/A Misc. Loads Below Electrical, Instr.,
Below b
217' Slab
& ESW Piping 313' Electrical Conduit b
Slab None k
Belm 201' Slab N/A e
i nr liacen Plugs e
i l
('i-1/4 ton ea. )
313' None 217' None N/A N/A e
m l
Below Electrical, Instr.,
Belm b
Electrical conduit 217' Slab
& ESW Piping
[
313 Slab b
1f Nm
/A E
1 Slab fn I
rn
{
W-a e
1 G
a a
j d
I G..N t*
C I
- Table 1 - Item 18 l
- l l
ll ll1i s
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s n
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14 l
TABLE 2 LOAD TABULATION
)
Recirculation Pump Motor lloists ( l A-li20 3, 1B-1120 3)
- CRANE / HOIST:
3 Location Reactor Enclosure (Drywell) - Unit 1 Impact Drywell, Elevation 253', Area 11 Drywell, Elevation 253', Area 16 l
l Area (floist lAll203)
(floist 1BH203) l
"""d Safety-Nelated flazard -
Safety-Belated Elimination Elevation Loads Elevation Equipment g g-gtlon Equipment Ca W ory I
g Recirculation, MSRV 254' Recirculation, E RV, 1
i piping; Electrical b,c ICIC & S/D cooling b,c j
IIolst Capacity:
253 2,4 ton each
& 238, conduit; Unit 238' pipingf Unit coolerj Electrical conduit cooler Recirc. Pump l
Motor Below Contaiment Vacutun Below Contaiment b
(23 ton) 238' Reliefs ; Suppres-b 238' Vacuum reliefs; l
Slab sion pool t& p.
Slab Suppression pool S*
tmp. sensors sensors j
Recirculation, ERV 253' Recirculation, ERV, P P ng; Electrical-b,c CIC & S/D cooling b'c Recirculation
- 253, Ii conduit; Unit 238' pipingi Unit cooler; Pump
& 238' Electrical conduit a
(13-3/4 ton) cooler 00ntalrunent vacutan g
Containment Vacutan
>e Below b
p Re1ie fs; suppres-b 2
reliefs; Suppression 1
238' sion pool tmp.
g l
pool tap. sensors Slab sensors en
)'
=
J l
l E
tn 1
$5 a
!. b
=
th 4
5
" Table 1 - Item 21
l P.
1 TABLE 2 LOAD TABULATION CRANE / HOIST:
Fuel Pool Jib Cranes ( 0 A-II20 8, 0B-1120 0)
- i i
j Location Reactor Enclosure - Unit 1 l
Impact Refueling Floor, Elevation 352' Area 1
l Loads Safe-Shutdown llazard Elevation l
Equipment g gnayion c
j lloist Capacity:
352' Irradiated Fuel N/A l
1/2 ton ea.
Fuel Bundle (700 lbs.)
O I
e
- re l
m&
e m
4 3
l O
1
>~
u e
i en
- <m rt 1
N5 t
t ;i n e
-c i
em 1
0
)
" Table 1 - Item 22 1
i
O O
1e O e.
TABLE 2 LOAD TABULATION a
CRANE / HOIST:
IIPCI/RcIc Equipment iloist (10-11215)*
1 a
l Location i
l Impact Areas 11, 15 - Elevation 217 Areas 11, 15 - Elevation 177' i
(Belm Ha W ay)
[
Columns 14-15, D-II i
Safety-Related flazard Loads Safety-Pelated nizard E lmination Elevation Elevation Equipment Equipment
- g. gnation a
q I
Electrical cable; IIPCI/BCIC l
Iioist Capacity:
217' I41R, Becirculation b
177 10-1/2 ton ccuponmts
& Core Spray b
l l
IIPCI Turbine Below Electrical cable; Below N/A N/A l
(10-1/2 ton) 217 I41R,11PCI & HCIC b
177' o
i ilPCI Pimp Slab ocponents Slab g
(8 - 1/4 ton) 1 7
i i
217' Electrical cable; IIPCI/BCIC 177'
^
SIR, Recirculation b
& Core Spray b
omponents ae D
BCIC Turbine
- Y Electrical cable; Below o.
177 N/A N/A 5
2l (2-1/2 ton)
}
141R,IIPCI & FCIC b
J Slab BCIC Ptmp couponents (3-1/4 ton) a<
Electrical cable; 217' IuIR, Becirculation 177' IIPCI/BCIC j
& Core Spray b
e cmponents b
5 1
m 4
Below Electrical cabic; Belm 6
flatch Covers 217' I41R,IIPol f, DCIC 777 j
(9-1/4, n ts b
N/A N/A
{
e Slab C
Slab 1
8-1/2 tons)
,l's i
5 i
IS i
' Table 1 - Item 24
O O
O TABLE 2 LOAD TABULATION CRANE /NOIST:
Core Spray Pumps Hoist (10-H216)
- j Location Reactor Enclosure - Unit 1 i
Isipact l
Area 11, Elevation 217' Area 11, Elevation 177' Area
(
w Hahay)
Columns 15-17, G-J J
l Loads Safety-Felated liazard Hazard Me -Re h Elevation Elimination Elevation Eliminaticr Equipment g
Categorv Category RIR, Recirculation, Hoist Capacity:
217' b
IHPCI & Core Spray HPCI, RCIC
- 177, 5,, ton Cm ponents
& Core Spray b
l Core. Spray l
Pump (3 1/2 ton)
IIPCI, RCIC, RiR, Below gyg N/A N/A i
ESvi Systen cora-b 177'
- 217, Poncnu SM Slab E
i RIR, Recirculation,
}{PCI, RCIC e
Core Spray Pump IIPCI & Core Spray b
177'
& Core Spray b
Notor
- 217, ts ae (3-1/4 ton)
E Below IIPCI, ICIC, RIR, Below N/A N/A w
217' tEW systan cam-l77' b
i Slab ponents Slab d
I en 1
l Below HliR, Recirculation, IIPCI, RCIC I
II@ @ Pluos (p
- 217' IIPCI & Core Spray b
177'
& Core Spray b
e (4-3/4 ton)
Slab w ts
[ 5 Ik I Below IIPCI, ICIC, RIR, Below 4
N/A N/A
'p 217' ESW System com-b
- 177, Slab ponents Slab p4 l
}
i 1
- Table 1 - Item 25 i
l P.
18
)
I TABLE 2 LOAD TABULATION i
j CRANE / HOIST:
Core Spray Pump floist (10-11217)*
1 i
Location Reactor Enclosure - Unit 1 l
Impact Area 12, Elevation 217' Area 12, Elevation 177' I
Area Columns 20-23, li-J (Belm Hatchway)
Loads Safety-Belated Hazard.
Safety-klated Hazard j
Elevation Elunnation Elevation j
Equipaent Equipment
@@n Category i
Core Spray and 4
177' Core Spray l
Holst Capacity:
217' Recirculation b
Sys h b
5, ton piping, Instrunen-Core Spray Pump i
(3-1/2 ton)
Below Radwaste & ESW Bc 217' Valves, pipisy assi N/A N/a Slab electrical
]
Slab l
N 1
core spray ana
- r Core Spray Pump 217e Recirculation 177' b
ii b
P P ng, instrunen-b Core Spray Motor tation & electrical System
}
(3-1/4 ton)
- s Below Radwaste & ESW Below 217' Valves, pipirg _and 177' N/A N/A Slab electrim1 b
Slab t
un i
Core Spray and re Spray
- a f
Hatch Plug Recirculation
- 177, gg b
p) l
{
(5-1/2 ton) 217' oiping; Electrica 1 3
LTnstrumontation 4
e :s Below Radwaste & ESW Below 217' valves, piping b
177' N/A N/A 7
Slab
& electrica.l.
Slab Uc 1
l
" Table 1 - Item 26
P.
19 1
TABLE 2 LOAD TABULATION CRANE / HOIST:
Cooling Water llX & Core Spray Pump Iloist (IAH218,1BH218)
Location Reactor Enclosure - Unit 1 Impact Area 12, 16 - Elevation 217' Areas 12, 16 - Elevation 177' l
i
~ Area I
}
Columns 22, E-H (Below Hatchway) j "dY Safety-klataf Hazard Loads safety-Helated Elimination Elevation Elevation Equipment Equipment h gnation Catego w ry RIR, Recirculation, Toist Capacity:~
RCIC & min Steam b
177' Core Spray r
217' 1
_ 12-1/2 ton ea..
instrunentation &
Systan b
1 electrical l
Cooling Water l
l Heat Exchanger BelN Below IEW & Radwaste 177 N/A N/A I'
(24-1/2 ton) 217e i
Pi ing, valves &
b o
l P
gg Instrunentatim o
I Slab n
l MIR, Hecirculation, I
- 177, Core Spray Pu:ap BCIC & Main Steam b
hW Fotor
- 217, instrunentation &
System b
UIm l
)
(3-1/3 ton) electrical re (3-1/4 ton)
O.n Below ESW & Radwaste Below W
b 217' piping, valves &
177' N/A N/A 8
Slab instrunentation Slab 4
i I
5 MIR, Recirculation,
-m RCIC & min Steam b
$lg r
l Hatch Plugs 217' instrunentation &
177' system b
i (8-1/4 ton) electrical l
- n t
m, Below I
W & W ste pipina. valv s &
217' b
177' N/A N/A e
1" Slab Slab 8
1
- Table 1 - Item 27
i P.
20 3
4 TABLE 2 LOAD TABULATION
,)
CPANE/ HOIST:
RilR Pumps lloist (10-11219)*
l l
Location Reactor Enclosure - Unit 1 I
f Impact Areas 15, 16 - Elevation 217' Areas 15,16-Ele (Tation 177' Area Columns 14-22, D-E (Below Hatclway) i Loads safety-aelatea Itazard Safety skaard H zard Elevation Eluntnation Elevation Equipment Equipment g en i
j Tioist Capacity:
Electrical b
~"
i 10 ton 217' conduit &
b 177' RIR System j
E 's l
RHR Pumo i
(9-1/2 ton)
Below Below RIR, ESW vale; 217' 1
l Electrical b
N/A N/A O
Slab Slab
<e N
i
- r RHR Pump Motor 217' Electrical conduit &
177 RIR Systan b
S b
j (7 ton)
MCC's is*D i
i
]
Below Below 177' N/A N/A y
Slab Electrical Slab e
to w
217e Electrical m
Hatch Plugs conduit. &
177' RIR Systan b
e b
l (8-1/4 ton)
E 's g
}
(9-1/2 ton) 1 m
- s i
Rin, tsw valves; d
b 7
3 Electrical P-e l
Slab Slab N/A N/A 4
ll g
- Table 1 - Item 28
s
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P.
25 TABLE 2 LOAD TABULATION CRANE / HOIST:
CRD Platform fioist (10-11229)*
Location Reactor Enclosure (Drywell) - Unit 1 i
Impact Area 15 (Drywell), Elev. 253' Area Loads Safety-telatal IIazard j
Elevation 4 ipment Elimination i
CatecTorv i
HIR Shutdown j
IIoist Capacity:
253' Coolire line
~
e 1 ton CRD Removal Below Suppression Pool P1atform 238' Tcmp. Sensors; b,c Slab Vacuun Beliefs
(~1350 lbs. w/CRD l i
- r. n j
ww
- r. e oa am
)
em o
I m
\\
3: sh j
su v N M oa we in HM em co av N e E
- na<e.
e4 i
- Table 1 - Item 33 l
c.
eu O
O
- 1
]
LOAD TABULATION [1A-l!233,234,235)*
TABLE 2 CRANE / HOIST:
MSRV Service / Removal lloists y],2g235
]
s Location Reactor Enclosure - Unit 1 j
Impact l
Drywell, Elevation 273' Area 286' i
l Elevation WeyIblated flazard de l
Equipment Pecory nattor 4
1 238' to Iloist Capacity:
m in Steam;
~
I ton /2 ton 286' ECCS piping e b,c l
IIain Steam Unit coolers
~
Relief Valves i
I (1200 lbs. ea. )
Below I
ugession M b
- 238, Ta p. Sensors; O
Slab Vacuum reliefs e
I N=r e
i
="
l isa D
&w De tn N
-m W
3-14[
i j
r e
l g*
?
)
l
- Table 1 - Item 34 i
l r
n n
w -
@oM:,nn :nuD'wpu8 eNoenBe :n <en' r
e
~
72 P
5 3
m
)
e 6
t 3
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H 0
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(
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t b
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O i T
I o
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T m
me
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t e t
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c r i
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li ljt'i.
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.li'i
i P.
28 1
TABLE 2 LOAD TABULATION CRANE / HOIST:
Containment Hydrogen Recombiner Cover Hoist (10-H237)*
Location Reactor Enclosure - Unit 1 i
Impact Areas 11
- Elevation 283' Area 16 - Elevation 283' i
Columns 15-17,H-J j
Area Columns 20-21, F-G j
Loads f8 " 18 W
H"**#d Sa fety-Related Elevati "
Elimination Elevation Eliminati< in Equipment Equipment Cateacrv catecorv
{
Electrical; I
Hols. t Capacity:
283' b
283' Hydrogen b
1 j
1 ton Hydrogen Re-l tT Recombiner canbiner Reco.M ner j
C[5ver i
Below j
Belw Electrical entvluit 283' Electrical e
283' b
slab conduit;
$0 Slab rRD hydraulics un W 1
r e oo j
u6 x
~$
l i
- r D.
]
A N 1
n*
o u l
We to l
'H M 4
e e i
oo ete I
w$
1 1
W I
l rat
?
i 1
- Table 1 - Item 36
)
i
P.
29 s
TABLE 2 LOAD TABULATION i
CRANE / HOIST:
Equipment flatch Bridge Crane (10-H238)*
1 Location Reactor Enclosure - Unit 1 Impact Area 15 - Elevation 253' Area 15 - Elevation 217' Area Columns 21.5 - 22.5, D-P (Below hatchway) l i
Loads Elevation Safety-Belated Hazard Safety-Belated Hazard i
tna.
Elevation Eliminatior Equipment gg.. ylon Equipment Category i
l' IIoist Capacity:
25 ton 283e None N/A None N/A I
Miscellaneous i
Loads Below Below Electrical; liiR Electrical b
Instimentation; 283
- 217, conduit ESW piping b
slab Slab o
es
- re 1
e i
A 2C
]
e i
D a
e-*
De en
$<m ete
% :na h
C
- Table 1 - Item 37 l
>t i
i'1 o<eN:reaE m=umUan m'<Nn Wo<$e i
H8W
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I 1
)
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3 l
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- Il1 leI'
P.
31 l
TABLE 2 LOAD TABULATION CRANE / HOIST:
Diesel Generator Bridge Cranes (l A-IIS 01, 1B-11501, IC-501, 1D-501)
- f, r
.l
]
Location Diesel Generator Rooms - Unit 1 l
)
Impact Elevation 217' s
i Area Columns 15.5-21.5, South of Reactor l
Enclosure Loads safety-atlatal
'Itazard Elevation Elimination Equipment g
Diesel Generators IIoist Capacity:
217' 15 ton Auxillaries Diesel Gen.
Parts Belm N/A N/A 217' o
Slab e
N reea
- n 3
l 6
I 5
3
.l l
in
- e rte9 iga g :s l
3 N
- i le I
l l
\\
l
- Table 1 - Item 44 i
O O
O TABLE 2 LOAD TABULATION CRANE / HOIST:
Spray Pond Pump Iloists (00-11511, 00-11513)*
Location Spray Pond Pump flouse - Common Columns 1-3.5,B-C Columns 3.5-6, B-C Area (00-11513)
(00-11511)
Loads Satety-relan*'
Ilazard Safety-aelated Elimination Elevation Elevation Equipment Elu.nination Equipment Category i
Iloist capacity:
268' safety-related b
258' Safety-related b
~
3 ton ea.
Electrical Electrical RIRSW & ESW Below alRSW & ESW RHR Service Be h i
Water and ESW Valves b
268' Valvec b
268 Valves (Loops A,C)
Slab (Icops B,D)
Slab e
N 1*een.
- C*
e un.
Uue en
- <m e
1 l!..H I!
E l~<
i W
?
I i
W l
- Table 1 - Item 49 i
~ _ -
I i
P.
33 1
TABLE 2 LOAD TABULATION l
j CRANE / HOIST:
Control Room Chiller Portable Gantry lloist (00-11514)*
i i
Location Control Structure - Comon Impact Area 8, Elevation 200' 1
Area i
Columns 19-27, J-N 1
Sa e W
Y Elevation nation I
Catemry 1
I Control Ibom I
j tioist Capacity:
200' Otillers:
i J ton Electrical b
i 1
Miscellaneous None Loads Below N/A 1
200 O
\\
Slab e
Pt 7e e
O.
- ss a
]
n.
i i
u e
in Mm m e b
B
,, a
- l
- .
- s*
IW <n e
i g 4:
?
=
- Table 1 - Item 50
i' I!
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3 TABLE 2 LOAD TABULATION CRANE / HOIST:
Spray Pond RilRSW/ESW Pumps Removal Crane
- Location Spray Pond Pu.v-Ilouse - Common Impact Columns 1-3.5, B-C Columns 3.5-6, B-C Area Loads Safety-Iblated llazan!
Safety-lelated liazard i
Elevation Elevation Equipment ggyion i
g nation I
268 Riisf/ESW IRSW/ESW b
RIIRSW puups; Electrical 268' pumps; Electrical b
items" items ESW Pumps l'
BelN RHRSW & ESW pp RHRSW & ESW 268' A& C b
& DMM b
i o
Slab Slab Valves
<:e 5
e i
i i
- n 1
5
- se in Mm e
i B
5
- 5.
t t
C w
- Table 1 - Item 55
P.
37 TABLE 2 LOAD TABULATION CRANE / HOIST:
Control Room IIVAC Equipment Hoist (00-11124)*
i j
Location Control Structure - Common i
i Impact i
Area 8, Elevation 302' Area 4
Columns 20.5-26, K-M i
Loads Safe > Related VM Elevation Equipment Climuution Cateqorv 4
i iloists capacity:
j 2 ton /3 ton 304' safety-related b
Electrical Misc. IIVAC i
Equipment g
Safety-related i
304 e
go Electrical; gg PGOC's
<e eN 1
m D' r*
i oD D 6 x
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N W M &
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- sa<e-e#
i
- Table 1 - Item 58 l
i 3(*~
P.
(
1 TABLE 2 LOAD TABULATION CRANE / HOIST:
Wotwell Monorail Iloista Location Reactor Enclosure - Unit 1 1
l Impact Areas 11, 12, 15, 16 - Elev. 217' Area Columns 16-21, E-J t
l Loads safety-Belatal llazard Elevation Equipment Elimination category 4
i j
182' Vacuum relief l
Holst Capacity:
to valves; Supp.
b Lton
-230' pool Temp.
l Vacuum Relief sensors Valve Assemblies PSV-57-137A,B,C,I Below i
182'
?!/A N/A o
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p-e o
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TABLE 2 LOAD TABULATION i
i CRANE / HOIST:
Control Structure Fans Lif ting Beam Iloist*
Location Control Structure - Unit 1 Impact Area 8, Elevation 321' Area l
Columns 21-24.5, K-M Loads safety-W L*1 flazard Elevation Equipment b'.limination
'ateaorv 5
304' to Electrical Holst Capacity:
321' conduit b
. ton Control Room HVAC Fans Electrical conduit; g
e
's
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ou We i
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- Table 1 - Item 60 l
j P. 40 TABLE 2 LOAD TABULATION i
CRANE / HOIST:
Reactor Enclosure Upper Fan Room Iloists
- f
)
Location Reactor Enclosure - Unit 1 Areas 15, 16 - Elevation 331' Area 15 - Elevation 313' Area (Below Hatchway)
Column 14-23, D-E 1
l Loads Safety-Related llazard Elevation Safety-Iblatal Hazard Elimination I
Equipment E13'mination Equipnent u mjorY Catayory 313' 331' Electrical b
None N/A a y, g conduit Miscellanmus i
i
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[
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TABLC 2 LOAD TABULATION
)
CRANE / HOIST:
Reactor Enclosure Lower Fan Room floist*
Location Reactor Enclosure - Unit 1 N'"
Areas 15, 16 - Elevation 313' Area i
Columns 14-23, D-E Loads Safety-Related lazard Elevation
.,11mination Equipnent j
wmnrv I
e j
HVAC Fans 313' Electrical b
& Mtscellaneous conduit I
i BelGW Standby Liquid 313' l
Control; Electrical b
O gg Items en
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un 1,
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- Table 1 - Item 62 1
1
a-Overhead Handling Systems Review Revision 3, June, 1984 TABLE 3 LIMERICK SPECIAL LIFTING DEVICES P.1/1 Load Design Complies Item Special Lifting Device
- Weight, Safety with W
Factor
- ANSI N14.6
-1978Property "ANSI code" (as page type) with input value "ANSI N14.6</br></br>-1978" contains invalid characters or is incomplete and therefore can cause unexpected results during a query or annotation process.?
1 Dryer & Separator Sling 40/74 5xW No
( GE-F19-E0 08 )
tons 2
RPV Head Strongback 92 tons 5xW No (GE-F19-E009) jh\\
3 Head Nut & Washer Rack Sling 1200 lbs.
5xW N/A**
( G E-F21-E0 01) 4 Service Platform Rack Sling 5 tons 10 x W No (GE-F21-E001) 5 General Purpose Grapple and
<1000 lbs.
5xW N/A**
p Sling (GE-F21-E001) 6 Refueling Shield Lift Rig 22 tons 3xW No (Bechtel 8031-C-90)
Reactor Well Shield Plugs &
Up to 4.5(W+25%)
No O
7 Dryer / Separator Canal Plug 90 tons Strongback I (Bechtel) 8 Dryer / Separator Canal Plugs 45 tons 4.5(W+25%)
No Strongback II (Bechtel) 9 Refueling Slot Shield Plugs 16 tons 4.5(W+25%)
No Lifting Ass'y I (Bechtel) 10 Fuel Pool Stops Logs 35 tons 4. 5 ( W+ 25 % )
No Lifting Ass'y II (Bechtel) 11 Spent Fuel Cask Yoke 100 tons See P.5 See P.5
/h 12 Module Lifting Fixture for Spent Fuel Storage Racks ( PAR, 6.67 tons 3XW No Programmed & Remote Systems)
I 13 Lif ting Rig for New Fuel 3.5 tons Per ANSI containers ( PECo)
N14.6-1978 Yes
- GE design safety factors based on material ultimate strength.
Bechtel and PAR design safety factors are conservative estimates based on minimum ASTM p material yield strengths.
Actual design stresses are based on American Institute of Steel Construction (AISC) recommended allowables which vary with type of stress and component shape.
- Not a heavy load, i
P-240(b)/4
LGS Overhead Handling Systems Review Revision 3, June, 1984 TABLE 4 (Sheet 1 of 3)
/
t k- /
REFUELING FLOOR HEAVY LOAD HEIGHT RESTRICTIONS (in feet and inches from floor to bottom of load - Note 10)
Floor Zone Weight Load (tons)
A(4)
B(7)
C Drywell Head 104T 3'-0 3'-0 3'-0 RPV Head 92T 3'-0 3'-0 2'-0 Shield Plug #11 or #12 12T 4'-0 3'-0 3'-0 (8)
Stop Log #13 or #14 59T 3'-0 3'-0 l'-9 Shield Plugs #1 thru #10
<85T 5'-0 3'-0 2'-0 Steam Dryer (9)
_40T
'4 ' - 0 5'-0 3'-0 Steam separator (9)
.__7f, T 20'-0 5'-0 2'-6 RPV Head Insulation pT 7'-0 7'-0 7'-0 Miscellaneous Loads:(6) 25T and smaller loads 25T 5'-0 5'-0 2'-6 10T and smaller loads 10T S'-6 5'-0 3'-6 ST and smaller loads ST 6'-0 6'-0 6'-0 2T and smaller loads 2T 7'-0 7'-0 7'-0 1T and smaller loads IT 7'-0 7'-0 7'-0 Notes:
1)
Only heavy loads which must be carried over reactor wells are allowed in this area, up to elevations corresponding to limits for adjacent floor (Exception:
The RPV head may be lifted to only plant elevation 353'-9", while its center of gravity is over the reactor well).
2)
No heavy loads allowed over the spent for specific loads discussed in this report. fuel pools except 3)
No height limits over the hatchway (hatch cover assumed to fail on impact).
I\\>
4)
Zone A heights are measured from the bottom of the pit or canal (a heavy load drop will cause floor grating to fail).
P-167/13 4
LGS Overhocd Handling Systcms Revicw Rsvision 3, June, 1984 TABLE 4 7
3-(Sheet 2 of 3) i
\\I-Notes, Cont'd:
5)
Height limits are based on allowing concrete spalling and yielding of reinforcing and structural steel.
6)
Height limits are based on calculations for solid steel cylinders (length = 2 x diameter) and are assumed to be conservative for most miscellaneous loads.
7)
Hatched areas of Zone B are no longer of significance.
8)
When the reactor is in cold shutdown, the Zone A height limits for stop logs 13 and 14 over the associated dryer /
separator pool may be increased to an elevation equivalent to the height limit for the adjacent floor area.
9)
Applicable to the dryer / separator pool only, when the reactor for that Unit is in cold shutdown.
10)
The height limits may also be measured from the top of~ objects located on the floor if these objects would break the fall of a dropped load.
For fs example dunnage may be used to provide an intermediate
(
)
" platform" so that the RPV head may be moved in a
\\'/
stepwise fashion onto its washdown supports.
Material or objects used for such a purpose must be located such that they will stop the acceleration of a dropped load rather than just deflect it.
3
)
P-167/13
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LGS Ovorh0Ed Hcndling Syctcm3 Ravicw R2vicion 3, Juno, 1984 Sheet 1 of 3
/"')
TABLE 5
(_,/
Compliance:with ANSI 14.6-1978 for Special Lifting Devices
'This appendix describ'es the extent of compliance of several special lifting devices.with the design, fabrication and testing require-ments of ANSI N14.6-1978.
The special lifting devices included are those for which the' likelihood of a load drop is considered to be extremely low. (Yes-general conformance; No-general non-conformance; NA-not applicable; ND-not determined, information not readily available.)
r l'
Special Lifting Device for ANSI N14:6-1978 Paragraph
~ Refueling Fuel Pool Spent Fuel RPV Service
-Number Shield Stop Logs Storage Racks Platform r'
3.1.1 Yes (1)
Yes (1)
Yes (1)
Yes
'3.1.2 No No No Yes 3.1.3 Yes (2)
Yes (2)
Yes (2)
Yes 3.1.4 Yes.
Yes Yes Yes 3.2.1.1 Yen Yes Yes Yes 3.2.1.2 Yes" Yes Yes Yes 3.2.2
.Yes Yes Yon ND 3.2.3 Yes' Yes Yes NA O
3.2.4 Yes Yes NA Yes
\\j 3.2.5 NA '
i NA Yes Yes (3) 3.2.6 No No No NA 3.3.1 Yes Yes Yes Yes 3.3.2 ND ND No ND 3.3.3 Yes NA Yes NA 3.3.4 Yes Yes Yes Yes
'. ' ' ' 3.3.5 Yes Yes Yes Yes 3.3.6 NA NA Yes NA 3.3.7 No NA No NA 3.3.8 %
No -
No No No e
3.4.1
- N A' NA (4)
Yes NA (4)
- 3.4.2
,No '
No No NA (4)
. 3. 4.-3 No No No NA (4) i 3.4.4, "No-Yes Yes NA (4) 3.4.5 ND ND ND NA (4) 3.4.6 NA NA NA NA (4)
^3.5.1 f NA NA Yes Yes
- 3. 5.'2 J
-NA NA NA NA 3.5.3 Yes f f NA (5)
No NA 3.5.4 Yes' ND ND NA 3.5.5 Yes ND ND NA
(,)
P-310/3 c
d e
r
LGS Ovorhocd Handling Sy0tCmo R3 view R;vicion 3, Juno, 1984 Sheet 2 of 3
/T TABLE 5
(,/
Compliance with ANSI 14.6-1978 for Special Lifting Devices Cont'd Special Lifting Device for ANSI N14.6-1978 Paragraph Refueling Fuel Pool Spent Fuel RPV Service Number Shield Stop Loos Storage Racks Platform 3.5.6 Yes ND Yes ND 3.5.7 Yes ND Yes NA 3.5.8 Yes ND ND NA 3.5.9 Yes NA ND NA 3.5.10 ND ND ND Yes 3.6.1 Yes NA Yes NA 3.6.2 NA NA NA NA 3.6.3 NA NA NA NA 4.1.1 Yes Yes Yes Yes t
4.1.2 Yes Yes ND Yes l
~4.1.3 Yes Yes ND Yes 4.1.4 Yes Yes Yes Yes 4.1.5 Yes Yes Yes ND l
4.1.6 Yes Yes Yes Yes 4.1.7 Yes Yes ND Yes O(_,/
4.1.8 Yes Yes Yes ND 4.1.9 Yes Yes ND Yes 4.1.10 No No No ND 4.1.11 Yes Yes Yes Yes 4.1.12 Yes Yes Yes Yes 4.2.1 Yes Yes ND ND 4.2.2 NA NA ND ND 4.2.3 Yes Yes Yes ND l
4.2.4 Yes Yes Yes ND 4.2.5 Yes Yes Yes ND 4.3.1 ND ND ND ND 4.3.2 NA NA Yes ND 4.3.3 NA NA ND ND 5.1.1 Yes Yes Yes ND 5.1.2 Yes Yes Yes ND 5.1.3 ND ND ND ND 5.1.4 ND ND Yes ND 5.1.5.1 Yes Yes Yes NA 5.1.5.2 No No No No i
5.1.6 ND ND ND ND 5.1.7 Yes Yes Yes Yes 5.1.8 ND ND ND ND 5.2.1 Yes Yes Yes Yes 5.2.2 NA NA NA NA l ((~}
5.2.3 NA NA Yes NA I
._)
l P-310/3 r
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ^ - ^ - - - - ^ ~ ^ ^ - ^ - - ^ ^ ^ - ^ - ^ - - ^ - ^ ^ ~ ~ - ~ ~
~^-- ^-
^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ~ ' ~ ~ ^ ^ ^ - ^
LGS Overhead Handling Systems Review Revision 3, June, 1984 Sheet 3 of 3 s
[/^
TABLE 5
\\-s Compliance with ANSI 14.6-1978 for Special Lifting Devices
- Cont'd Special Lifting Device for:
Paragraph Refueling Fuel Pool Spent Fuel RPV Service Number Shield Stop Logs Storage Racks Platform 5.3.1 ND ND~
ND ND 5.3.2 ND ND ND ND 5.3.3 ND ND ND ND 5.3.4 ND ND ND ND 5.3.5 ND ND ND ND 5.3.6 ND ND ND ND 5.3.7 ND ND ND ND 5.3.8 ND ND ND ND 5.4.1 ND ND ND ND 5.4.2 Yes Yes Yes ND 5.5.1 Yes Yes ND ND 5.5.2 Yes Yes ND ND
-6.1 No No No Yes 6.2.1 No No No Yes 6.2.2 No No No No
[--
~6.2.3 NA NA NA NA-6.2.4 NA NA NA NA 6.2.5 NA NA NA NA 6.2.6 Yes Yes Yes Yes 6.3.1 No No" No ND 6.3.2 Yes Yes Yes NA Notes:
(1) Design requirements for the lif ting device are covered in the design specification for the shipping container.
(2) Except that the margin of safety does not meet,the requirements of this standard.
(3) Not proof load tested by supplier as required per Section 9.2.3 of ANSI B30.9 but will be load tested by owner.
[4) Not required to be submerged into the pool.
(5) Coated with either-(l) Carbon Zine II (Carboline Company),~(2) Dimecote 6 ( Ameron' Corrosion Control Division).or (3)--Mobil Zinc (Mobil I-h Chemical).
()
i, P-310/3
I O
l L
APPENDIX A l
1 l
SYSTEMS REQUIRED FOR SAFE SHUTDOWN G
i t
I e
i 4
P-41(b)/7
?
u i
w--m'-.v~---
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___,,mm
APPENDIX A
()
SYSTEMS REQUIRED FOR SAFE SHUTDOWN AND DECAY HEAT REMOVAL The lists of systems required to achieve safe shutdown of the reactor and to remove decay heat are based on the " Analysis of Capability to Achieve Safe Shutdown", Chapter 5 of the Limerick Fire Protection Evaluation Report.
The following specific assump-tions were made for the overhead handling systems review:
1.
Offsite power is assumed to be unavailable.
2.
A single active component failure is not assumed to occur at the same time as the heavy load drop.
3.
Plant accidents and severe natural phenomena are not assumed to occur at the same time as the load drop.
The control room is assumed to remain habitable.
The following paragraphs provide descriptions of methods that can be used for reactor shutdown and cooldown from the control room without of f site power.
Each of these methods includes a system by which makeup water can be added to the reactor vessel, a system by which energy can be removed from the reactor vessel, and any support systems Os needed to accomodate energy removal to an ultimate heat sink or to return water to its supply source.
Although the safe shutdown analysis places primary emphasis on achievement of reactor shutdown using the methods described below, many alternative shutdown methods would be available.
Use of safety-related and nonsafety-related systems not addressed in the safe shutdown analysis, plus manual operation of certain equipment and controls, would provide numerous combinations of systems with adequate capability to safely shut the plant down.
For the purposes of this safe shutdown analysis, two me thods of.
shutdown that are operable without of fsite power were selected for de tailed study.
Shutdown method A requires Class IE power from Divisions 1 and 3 (both ac and de) in order to be operable.
Shutdown method B requires Class lE power from divisions 2 and 4 (both ac and de) plus de power from either Division 1 or Division 3 for ADS
. valve actuation in order to be operable.
The two methods are described below.
\\
~
P-24/6 A-1
Method A O
( j After' insertion of the control rods and closure of the main steam isolation valves, the RCIC syntcm is used to supply makeup water to the reactor vessel from the suppression chamber.
The operation of the RCIC system also removes energy from the reactor in the form of steam used to drive the RCIC turbine.
During the period in which steam is generated at a rate greater than the consumption 1
of the RCIC system, steam is relieved to the suppression pool by the automatic actuation of the main steam relief valves, which open when reactor pressure reaches the valve setpoint.
Heat is removed from the suppression pool by operating one loop of the RHR system in the suppression pool cooling mode.
In this mode, water from the suppression pool is circulated through an RHR heat exchanger and then returned to the suppression pool.
In order to initiate operation of_the shutdown cooling cooling mode of the RHR system, it is necessary to depressurize the reactor below a nominal pressure 75 psig.
This is accomplished by using the ADS valves to discharge steam to the suppression pool.
When the reactor has been depressurized below 75 psig, operation of ine RCIC system is terminated and the RHR system is switched from the suppression pool cooling mode to the shutdown cooling mode.
In both of these modes, heat is removed from the RHR heat exchanger by the RHRSW system, which in turn dissipates heat at the spray pond.
The shutdown cooling mode of RHR will maintain the reactor in a cold shutdown condition.
()-
The items of equipment that are required for this shutdown method include the following:
a.-
~ Main steam relief valves (self-actuated mode only) and main steam isolation valves, b.
ADS valves (If a compressed gas supply is needed in ad-dition to that stored in the ADS accumulators, the com-pressed gas cylinders of the primary containment instru-ment gas system will provide the necessary gas.
If the outboard containment isolation valve on the gas supply line cannot be opened by its motor operator, the valve will be opened manually.)
c.
RCIC pump and associated valves, d.
RHR heat exchanger "A"
e.
RHR pump "A" and associated valves- (The outboard isola-tion valve on the shutdown cooling return line is a motor-operated valve powered from the Division 2 switch-gear; this valve will be operated manually at the valve location if Division 2 power is not available.)
O P-24/6 A-2
, g n r. r w---e p
,v,,-g,-m
-r rvw
~-,n-,-.-n.--r-.-
-.,,---,--,__-,_____,---,,,-men a
r--
I f.
RHR shutdown cooling suction isolation valves (The out-board valve is a motor-operated valve powered from the
. (,,
Division 2 switchgear; this valve will be operated manually at the valve location if Division 2 power is not available.)
g.
RHRSW pump "A" and associated valves (for Unit 1);
RHRSW pump "C" and associated valves ( for Unit 2) h.
ESW pump " A" and associated valves ( for Unit 1);
ESW pump "C"
and associated valves (for Unit 2) i.
RHR compartment unit cooler " A" j.
RCIC compartment unit cooler "A" k.
Spray pond pump structure fan " A" 1.
Diesel-generator enclosure fans "A",
"C",
"E",
and "G" m.
Reactor vessel pressure and level recorder " A" n.
Suppression Pool Temperature Instrumentation o.
Standby diesel-generators "A" and "C"
~s p.
Class IE AC Power Distribution System, Divisions 1 & 3.
q.
Class IE DC Power Distribution System, Divisions 1 & 3.
r.
Reactor Enclosure Equipment Compartment Ventilation.
s.
Spray Pond Pump Structure Ventilation t.
Diesel Generator Enclosure Ventilation u.
Control Structure Ventilation v.
Control Structure Chilled Water w.
Control Rod Drive hydraulic control units v
P-24/6 A-3
Method B' O)
(
After insertion of the control rods and closure of the' main steam isolation valves, the HPCI system is used to supply makeup water to the reactor vessel from the suppression chamber.
The operation of the HCPI system also removes energy from the reactor in the form of steam used to drive the HPCI turbine.
During the period in which steam is generated at a rate greater than the consumption of the HPCI system, steam is relieved to the suppression pool by the automatic actuation of the main steam relief valves, which open when reactor pressure reaches the valve setpoint.
Heat is removed from the suppression pool by operating one loop of the RHR system in the suppression pool cooling mode.
In this mode, water from the suppression pool is circulated through an RHR heat exchanger and then returned to the suppression pool.
In order to initiate operation of the shutdown cooling mode of the RHR system, it is necessary to depressurize the reactor below a nominal pressure of 75 psig.
This is accomplished by using the ADS valves to discharge steam to the suppression pool.
When the reactor has been depressurized below 75 psig, the RHR system is switched from the suppression pool cooling mode to the shutdown cooling mode.
Heat is removed from the RHR heat exchanger by the RHRSW system, which in turn dissipates heat at the spray pond.
The shutdown cooling mode of RHR will maintain the reactor in a cold shutdown condition.
'}
The items of equipment that are required for this shutdown method include the following:
a.
Main steam relief valves (self-actuated mode only) and main steam isolation valves.
b.
ADS valves (If a compressed gas supply is needed in addition to that stored in the ADS accumulators, the compressed gas cylinders of the primary containment instrument gas system will provide the necessary gas.
If the outboard containment isolation valve on the gas supply line cannot be opened by its motor operator, the valve will be opened manually.)
c.
HPCI pump and associated valves d.
RHR heat exchanger "B"
e.
RHR pump "B" and associated valves O
V P-24/6 A-4
1 f.
RHR shutdown cooling suction isolation valves (The inboard valve is a motor-operated valve powered from the Division 1
(,%
switchgear; this valve will be operated manually at the (m /
valve. location if Division 1 power is not available.)
9 RHRSW pump "B" and associated valves (for Unit 1);
RHRSW pump "D" and associated valves (for Unit 2) h.
ESW pump "B" and associated valves (for Unit 1);
l ESW pump "D" and associated valves (for Unit 2) 1.
RHR compartment unit cooler "B" j.
HPCI compartment unit cooler "A" l
k.
Spray pond pump structure fan "B"
1.
Diesel-generator enclosure fans "B",
"D",
"F",
and "H" m.
Reactor vessel pressure and level recorder "B"
n.
Suppression Pool Temperature Instrumention o.
Standby diesel-generators "B"
and "D" l
p.
Class IE AC Power Distribution System, Divisions 2 & 4.
I'h q.
Class IE DC Power Distribution System, Division 2 & 4
(~)
plus 1 or 3.
r.
Reactor Enclosure Equipment Compartment Ventilation s.-
Spray Pond Pump Structure Ventilation t.
Diesel Generator Enclosure Ventilation u.
Control Structure Ventilation v.
Control Structure Chilled teater System w.
Control Rod Drive hydraulic control units The above safe shutdown analysis includes systems required for decay heat removal from the reactor vessel.
from the spent fuel pool is normally accomplished by the fuel pool cooling and cleanup system (FPCC).
Since this is not a safety-related system and does not appear on the separation
' drawings no general attempt was made to see whether the FPCC P-24b/6 A-5
f system would be affected by a load drop.
If the system is disabled by a load drop the fuel pool can be cooled using the
(')
'B' pump and heat exchanger as described in Section 9.1 x,/
of the Limerick FSAR.
The supply piping from the RHR system to the fuel pool and the return piping from the skimmer surge tank to the RHR pump suction was included in this review.
In cases where components of the RHR system which are required for backup fuel pool cooling could be damaged by a load drop, credit is taken for FPCC system operation.
A review of the area was then made to verify that the same load drop could not disable the FPCC system as well.
The FPCC system is available after a loss of offsite power.
3(V O
P-24/6 A-6
J
-~
APPENDIX B HAZARD EVALUATIONS This appendix contains detailed hazard evaluations for each crane and hoist.
Major safety-related items located in the load path or on the next lower elevation are listed.
A description of the effect of a load drop on systems required for safe shutdown or decay heat removal is provided, followed by a conclusion.
Unless otherwise noted, safe shutdown capability also includes the ability to establish or maintain a means of decay heat removal from the reactor vessel and the spent fuel pool.
A discussion of shutdown methods A and B is included in Appendix A.
Shutdown method A requires the avail-ability of electrical divisions 1 and 3.
Shutdown method B requires the availability of electrical divisions 2 and 4, plus DC power from division 1 or division 3 for ADS valve ectuation.
Where hazard evaluations conclude that electrical Jivisions 2 and 4 will remain available following a load drop, O.
a review has been made to assure that the necessary DC power is also available.
l.
l l-l
~
I l v l
P-41(b)/8 B-1 l
I
LGS Overhead Handling Systems Review September, 1981 RUCU FILTER DEMINERALIZER HOIST (Item 14, Equipment Number 00-H124)
This monorail hoist is used to remove hatch plugs and filter demineralizer elements from compartments on elevation 313' of the reactor enclosure.
The safe load path is defined on the Item 14 load path drawing.
Maior safety-related items in the load path:
None Major safety-related items on the next Ic' e r elevation:
(1)
Electrical conduit (Divisions 1, 2, 3 and 4)
Effect of a load drop on safe-shutdown or decay heat removal capability:
There are no safety-related items in the load path.
All items on the next lower elevation are associated with electrical divisions 1 and 3 except for a few conduit associated with divisions 2 and 4.
None of the division 2 and 4 electrical rT cabling is required for safe shutdown.
Therefore, at a T
minimum, shutdown method B will remain available for safe shutdown of the plant.
==
Conclusion:==
Based on separation and redundancy of safety-related sytems, a load drop by the RWCU filter demineralizer hoist will not jeopardize safe shutdown or decay heat removal capability.
O P-165(a)/6 B-2
LGS Overhead Handling Systems Review Revision 1, March 1982 g()
HVAC EQUIPMENT HATCH HOIST (Item 15, Equipment Number OOH 126)
This monorail hoist is used to carry HVAC fans and miscellaneous equipment between elevations 304' and 350' in the control structure.
The safe load path for this hoist is defined by the Item 15 load path drawing for elevation 332' and above and by the Item 58 load
. path drawing for elevation 304 '.
Major safety-related items in the load path:
(1) Electrical conduit (Divisions 1, 3 and 4)
Major safety-related items on the next lower elevation:
(Below 304' floor slab)
(1)
Remote shutdown panels, 10C201 and 20C201 (2)
Electrical cable trays and conduit associated with the remote shudown panels (Divisions 1, 2, 3& 4)
Ef fect of a load drop on safe-shutdown or decay heat removal capability:
,-_s All safety-related items in the load path (including conduit embedded in the elevation 304' floor slab) are associated with electrical divisions 1 and 3, except for one division - 4 conduit which does not carry cable required for safe shutdown ~.
Therefore, at a minimum, shutdown method B will remain available following a load drop to safely shut down the plant.
Calculations show that the elevation 304' slab cannot sustain a potential heavy load drop without-spalling.
The remote shutdown panel, and safety-related cable tray and conduit associated with all electrical divisions and both safe shutdown methods, are located below the 304' floor slab.
It is possible that both safe shutdown methods could be affected by a heavy load drop from the HVAC equipment hatch hoist.
==
Conclusion:==
It is not possible to show by analysis that both safe shutdown methods z
could not be affected by a heavy load drop from the HVAC equipment i
hatch hoist.
Therefore energy absorbing material will be used to pad the floor directly below the hoist or a redundant load bearing path will be provided when using this hoist to carry heavy loads.
These admin,istrative procedures will be developed prior to plant operation to assure that failure of the HVAC equipment hatch hoist will not jeopardize safe shutdown or decay heat removal capability.
.h P-41(b)/5 B-3
LGS Overhetd Handling Systems Review S2ptsmbar, 1981
\\
CONTROL ROOM CHILLER HOISTS (Item 17, Equpment Numbers, OOH 129, OOH 130)
These monorail hoists will be used to service control room chiller OAK 112 and handle the equipment hatch plugs on elevation 200' of the control structure.
[A portable gantry hoist (Item 50) will service control room chiller OBKil2].
The safe load path is defined by the Item 17 load path drawing.
Major safety-related items in the load path:
(1)
Chiller OAKil2 & associated piping / instrumentation (2)
Electrical conduit (Divisions 1, 2 and 3)
Major safety-related items on the next lower elevation:
None Effect of a load drop on safe-shutdown or decay heat removal capability:
All safety-related items which are necessary for safe
/N shutdown are associated with shutdown method A.
Therefore
(_,)
should a load drop occur shutdown method D will still be available to safely shut down the plant.
==
Conclusion:==
Based on separation and redundancy of safety-related systems, a load drop by the control room chiller hoists will not jeopardize safe shutdown or decay heat removal capability.
- r i
P-16S(a)
B-4 t
4 y..
LGS Overhead Handling Systems Ravicw September, 1981 O
REACTOR ENCLOSURE EQUIPMENT HATCH HOIST (Item 18, Equipment Number 10H131)
This monorail hoist is used to lift items between elevations 217' and 313' of area 16 of the reactor enclosure.
The safe load path is defined on the Item 18 load path drawing.
Major safety-related items in the load path:
None Major safety-related items on the next lower elevation:
(Below 313 slab)
(1)
Electrical conduit (Division 4)
(Below 217' slab)
(1)
Emergency Service Water Piping (Division 2)
(2)
Electrical Conduit (Divisions 2, 3 and 4)
(3)
Instrumentation (Divisions 2 & 4)
()
(Below 201' Slab)
None Effect of a load drop on safe-shutdown or decay heat removal capability:
There are no safety-related items in the load path.
All compo-nents below the floor slabs at elevation 313' and 217' are associated with electrical divisions 2 and 4 except for three conduit.
These' conduit are associated with Division 3 but are not required for safe shutdown.
Therefore a load drop could affect only shutdown method B.
Shutdown method A will remain available to safely shut down the plant.
==
Conclusion:==
Based on separation and redundancy of safety-related systems, a load drop by the reactor enclosure equipment hatch hoist will not jeopardize safe shutdown or decay heat removal capability.
- O l
P-165(a)
B-5
LGS Ovarhead Handling Systems RDview Saptsmber, 1981 (3
CONTROL ROOM HVAC LIFTING BEAM HOISTS
(,/-
(Item 19)
These hoists are used to carry HVAC fans and cooling coils
)
between elevations 217' and 229'-8" in the control structure.
The safe load path is defined on the Item 19 load path drawing.
Major safety-related items in the load path:
(1)
Chilled water piping for HVAC coils (Division 1 & 2)
(2)
Electrical conduit (Divisions 2, 3 & 4)
Major safety-related items on the next lower elevation:
(Below 217' slab)
(1)
Control room chillers OAKil2 & OBK112 and associated instrumentation and_ piping (Divisions 1 & 2)
(2)
Electrical conduit (Divisions 3 & 4)
Ef fect of a load drop on safe-shutdown or decay heat removal capability:
The chilled water piping is at the same elevation and beside the hoist load and therefore cannot be af fected by a load drop.
~'
Of the conduit in the load path, only the Division 2 conduit is required for safe shutdown.
Since this conduit passes vertically through the load path a load cannot be carried over it.
Therefore neither shutdown method would be affected by a load drop.
On the elevation below the 217' slab there is strict separation of Division 1, 3 and Division 2, 4 equipment by a wall, except for some Division 4 conduit which is not required for safe shutdown.
Therefore, at least one shutdown method would remain available after a load drop to safely shut down the plant.
==
Conclusion:==
Based on separation and redundancy of safety-related systems, a load drop by the control room HVAC lifting beam hoists will not jeopaedize safe shutdown or decay heat removal capability.
O P-165(a)
B-6
LGS Overhard Handling Systems Raview Saptembar, 1981
()
Reactor Enclosure Crane (Item 20, Equipment Number OOH 201)
The reactor enclosure crane carries a variety of heavy loads over the refueling floor at elevation 352', and to and from grade elevation 217' through the refueling hoistway.
The Item 20 load path drawings define the safe load paths.
Major safety-related items in the load path:
(1)
Reactor vessel and fuel Major safety-related items on the next lower elevation:
(Below 352' slab on elevations 313' and 331')
(1)
Reactor enclosure recirculation system fans, lAV213 &
IBV213 (2)
Load center 10B201 (Division 1) and associated conduit (3)
Load center 10B202 (Division 2) and associated conduit (4)
Recirculation system valves / instrumentation and associated electrical cabling (Divisions 2, 3 and 4)
(5)
!!otor control center 10B219 (6)
Motor control center 10B220 g~s (7)
Rigid steel conduits containing cables associated with
( )
the following:
(a)
Motor control center OOB132 (Division 4)
~
(b)
Safeguard pump room unit cooler control panel IDC208 (Division 4)
(c)
Control room HVAC (Divisions 2 and 4)
(d)
Diesel Generator HVAC control panel (Divisions 3 and 4)
(8)
Fuel Pool Cooling Piping (Below 217' slab)
None.
There is a solid concrete pedestal below the refueling hoistway which is structurally isolated from the reactor enclosure.
~.
v P.-16 5 ( a )
B-7 l
LGS Overhead Handling Systems Review Revision 2, March 1983 I
Effect of a-load drop on safe-shutdown or decay heat (p) removal capability:
' Heavy. load handling in the. vicinity of spent fuel and the. reactor vessel'is discussed elsewhere in this report.
For new fuel, A
' stored in the spent fuel pool, there is no potential for critic-Q2 ality due to a load drop for the reasons discussed in NUREG 0612, i
-Section 2.2.4.
i
'A load drop,into the reactor well could not affect safe shutdown capability since the well.is only open when the reactor is shut j
'down.
Decay heat removal capability could be threatened only by a-load large enough to damage the seal plate.
Failure of
'the-seal plate would not allow the large, heavy loads to fall into the.drywell because their size is greater than the space i-between the RPV and the drywell.
The reactor well and the drywell 4
are lined with steel plate which will retain any concrete which is fragmented by ' swinging or falling loads.
It is doubtful that other debris.large enough to damage shutdown cooling piping could fall through the labyrinth of intervening piping and structural steel.
However, in the event that one shutdown cooling loop were disabled the.other loop can maintain decay heat removal.
i Similarly, if debris from the loadLdrop were able to cause leakage from exposed reactor vessel piping, makeup water could be supplied by.any of a _ number of RHR and core spray injection lines until the leak could be: repaired.
Therefore, the-drop of a heavy load into jO
.the reactor well would not affect. decay heat removal capability.
Loads carried over the refueling floor weigh up to 104 tons.
Calculations show that maximum load carrying heights must be g
established to limit damage to the floor due to a load drop, in order to prevent a sequential failure which may ultimately
' jeopardize safe shutdown capability.. As a basis for calculating
~
-these heights, concrete failure and-bending of the floor support beams is allowed.
No failure'which could cause damage to equipment on elevations other than those immediately below the refueling floor (331' & 313') is allowed.
Refueling floor load height restrictions are described in Table 4.
Administrative procedures to implement these restrictions will be developed prior
{
to plant operation.
'The only components on the elevations below the load path that are associated with shutdown methods A and R are two load centers (10B201 and 10B202), their associated transformers and some elec-trical conduit.
The two load centers are separated by a distance
.of more than:35 feet.
All cabling which is associated with these-i.
- load-centers and is 'needed for safe shutdown enters the load cen-
-ters feom below, and is not exposed.
Therefore spalling from a i
O "P-165(a)/6 B-8 i
LGS Overhead Handling Systems Review Revision 3, March 1984 single load drop would not disable both load centers.
All conduit associated with shutdown method B is located in the immediate r~g vicinity of the
'B' load center and there is no conduit associated
(
1 with shutdown method
'A' in the same area.
Therefore a load drop on the refueling floor could cause damage to only one shutdown method.
The other method would remain available to safely shut down the plant.
An analysis was made to determine whether fuel pool decay heat removal capability could be affected by a load drop on the refueling floor.
A common line from the skimmer surge tanks (16" HCC-106) to the fuel pool cooling system pumps (and to the RHR system intertie) is located below elevation 352'.
It was concluded that, by ob-serving the Table 4 load height restrictions, a load drop on the floor area above the fuel pool cooling pumps suction line would pro-duce minimal spalling.
The spalled concrete would be contained by the steel decking and would not damage the fuel pool cooling pumps suction line.
In order to permit removal and replacement of stop logs between
/3 (
the reactor well and the dryer / separator storage pool, height limits for these areas were raised.
A load drop of a stop log onto the three-foot-thick reinforced concrete slab at the bottom of the dryer / separator pool (or adjacent to the reactor well) would result in severe local damage to the concrete and spalling of the slab.
If water were present in the pool it would seep through the cracked slab and flood elevation 313'
(~N below.
No attempt has been made to calculate the resulting
)
water flow rate but it is judged to be less than the worst t'~#
case moderate energy line break flow for that elevation (which is more than 300 gpm).
This evaluation has also been used as a basis for raising the storage pool height restrictions for the dryer and separator to permit their passage over the canal threshold, and for extending the boundary of the reactor well to include the dryer / separator canal, which will permit handling of certain loads like canal shield plugs.
For conser-vatism the higher height limits for the stop logs are restricted I I to use during cold shutdown only.
==
Conclusion:==
Based on separation and redundancy of safety-related systems, analysis of floor impact strength and the use of administrative pro-cedures to control load height, a load drop by the reactor enclosure crane in areas other than the reactor vessel and the spent fuel pool
- will not jeopardize safe shutdown or decay heat removal capability.
Heavy -load handling over the reactor vessel and over the spent fuel ptol is discussed elsewhere in this report.
I v
P-165(a)/6 B-9
LGS Overhead Handling Systems Raview Septembar, 1981 l
RECIRCULATION PUMP & MOTOR HOISTS (Item 21,. Equipment Numbers IAH203, IBH203)
These monorail hoists are used for removal of the recirculation pumps.and motors, inside the drywell at elevation 253'.
The Item 21 load path drawing defines the safe load paths.
Major safety-related items in the load path:
(Hoist'lAH203)
(1)
Electrical conduit (Divisions 1 & 3)
(2)
Recirculation system piping (Loop 'A')
(3)
MSRV discharge piping (4)
Drywell unit cooler 1GV212 (Division 1 & 3)
(Hoist 1BH203)
(1)
Electrical conduit (Divisions 2 & 4)
(2)
Recirculation system piping (Loop 'B')
(3)
MSRV discharge piping (4)
Drywell unit cooler lHV212 (Division 2 & 4)
(5)
Shutdown cooling supply piping, 12" DCA-104 (Loop 'B')
(6)
RCIC turbine steam supply piping, 4" DBA-107 Major safety-related items on the next lower elevation:
()
(1)
Primary containment vacuum relief valve assemblies 1
(2)
Suppression pool temperature sensors Effect of a load drop on safe-shutdown or decay heat removal capability:
The reactor must be in cold shutdown prior to removal of the recir-culation pump or motor.
During cold shutdown the primary safety concern is the removal of residual decay heat.
A drop of the recir-culation motor or pump could cause rupture of the recirculation pip-ing or shutdown cooling loop
'B' supply piping.
In this event RHR l
shutdown cooling loop
'A' and any one of several combinations of RHR and core spray injection loops would be available to maintain core cooling and supply makeup water until the leak could be repaired.
If suppression pool water were needed for makeup, pool temperature i
indication would still be available due to redundancy and separation of the sensors.
==
Conclusion:==
Based on separation and redundancy of safety-related systems, and the fact that load handling can be done only with the reactor in cold shutdown, a load drop by the recirculation pump and motor hoists will not jeopardize safe shutdown or decay heat removal O
l capability.
I i
i P-41(b)/5 B-10 L
_. _ -. _. _. _. _ _. - _.. _ _. _, ~,. _ _. _.
LGS Overhead Handling Systems Review September, 1981 HPCI/RCIC EQUIPMENT HOIST (Item 24, Equipment Numbers 10H215)
This monorail hoist is used to carry HPCI, RCIC and core spray system equipment on elevation 217' of the reactor enclosure, and to and from elevation 177' via hatchways.
The Item 24 load path i
-drawing defines the safe load path.
Major safety-related items in the load path:
(1)
Electrical conduit and cable trays (Divisions 1, 2, 3 & 4)
(2)
RHR piping and instrumentation (Divisions 1 & 2)
(3)
Main steam & recirculation instrumentation (Divisions 1,2 & 3)
(4)
Motor control centers 10B211 & 10D201 (Divisions 2 & 4)
Major safety-related items on the next lower elevation:
(Below 217' slab)
(1)
Electrical conduit and cable trays (Divisions 1, 2, 3 & 4)
(2)
RHR, HPCI & RCIC instrumentation (4)
Motor control center 10B217 (Division 2)
(Below hatchway 9 177')
)
(1). Core spray, HPCI & RCIC system components Effect of a load drop on safe-shutdown or decay heat removal capability:
Of the various safety-related systems that have components located in and below the load path only the HPCI system is associated with shutdown method B.
Therefore, the remaining systems associated with shutdown method B can be used to shut the reactor down,.and full shutdown capability will be retained if a system
-other than HPCI is available to depressurize the reactor.
This depressurization function can be provided by manual actuation of the automatic depressurization system (ADS).
When shutting down the reactor without the aid of either the RCIC system or the HPCI system, the ADS serves to permit the operation of a low pressure core cooling system, rather than just allowing initiation l
of the shutdown cooling mode of the RHR system.
With this scheme of operation, two RHR pumps will need to be operated simultaneously, in which case the following components must be available in addition to those listed under " Method B" in Appendix A.
(1)
RHR pump "D" and associated valves (2)
RHR compartment unit cooler "D" O
P-41(b)/5 B-ll l
LGS OverhaEd Handling Systems Raview Septembar, 1981 Since none of the above components (or their associated cabling)
(j~)
is located in or below the load path their availability is assured.
s Safe shutdown of the plant using shutdown method B modified as described above would be accomplished in the following manner.
After closure of the main steam isolation valves, the reactor is depressurized by manually controlling the valves of the automatic depressurization system.
The opening of these valves allows reactor steam to be discharged to the suppression pool.
Makeup water is supplied to the reactor vessel from the suppression pool by operating one loop of the RMR system in the LPCI mcde after reactor pressure has decreased to a nominal 295 psig.
Heat is removed from the suppression pool by operating a dif ferent loop of the RHR system in the suppression pool cooling mode.
In this mode, water from the suppression pool is circulated through an RHR heat exchanger and then returned to the suppression pool.
When the reactor has been depressurized below a nominal 75 psig, the RHR loop operating in the suppression pool cooling mode is switched to the shutdown cooling mode.
In both of these modes, heat is removed from the RHR heat exchanger by the RHRSW system, which in turn dissipates heat at the spray pond.
The shutdown cooling mode of RHR will maintain the reactor in a cold shutdown condition.
==
Conclusion:==
O Based on separation and redundancy of safety-related systems, a load drop by the HPCI/RCIC equipment hoist will not jeopardize safe shutdown or decay heat removal capability.
e e
O P-41(b)/5 B-12
LGS Overhotd Handling Syntsms Review September, 1981 7
I
]
CORE SPRAY PUMP HOIST (Item 25, Equipment Number 10H216)
This monorail hoist is used to carry Core Spray System Pumps, motors and other components on elevation 217' of the reactor enclosure, and to and from elevation 177' via hatchways.
The Item 25 load path drawing defines the safe load path.
Major safety-related items in the load path:
(1)
Electrical conduit (Divisions 1, 2, 3 and 4)
(2)
Main steam, Recirculation, Core Spray and HPCI system instru-mentation (Divisions 1, 2, 3 and 4)
(3)
RHR/ Core Spray Piping (loops A &C)
(4)
Motor Control Centers 10B215 and 10D201 (Divisions 2 & 4)
Major safety-related items on the next lower elevation:
(Below 217' slab)
(1)
Electrical Conduit & Cable trays (Divisions 1, 2, 3& 4)
(2)
Liquid Radwaste System Valves (Division 1 & 2)
(3)
Emergency Service Water, HPCI, RCIC, and Containment r;
Atmospheric Control Sytems Valves and Piping U
(Below hatchway @ elevation 177')
(1)
Core Spray, HPCI and RCIC System Components Effect of a load drop on safe-shutdown or decay heat removal capability:
The effect of a load drop is the same as for the HPCI/RCIC equipment hoist.
Conclusion:
Based on separation and redundancy of safety-related systems, a load drop by the Core Spray Pump Hoist (Item 25) will not jeopardize safe shutdown or decay heat removal capability.
n i
P-41(b)/5 B-13
LGS Overhead Handling Systems Review September, 1981 CORE SPRAY PUMP HOIST (Item 26, Equipment Number 10H217)
This monorail hoist is used to carry Core Spray system pump, motor and other components on elevation 217' of the reactor enclosure, and to and from elevation 177' via a hatchway.
The Item 26 load path drawing defines the safe load path.
Maior safety-related items in the load path:
(1)- Electrical Conduit and Cable Tray (Divisions 1, 2, 3 & 4)
(2)
Core Spray, Main Steam, Recirculation and Containment Atmospheric Control System Piping and Instrumentation (Divisions 1, 2, 3& 4)
(3)
Motor Control Center 10B212 (Division 2)
Maior safety-related items on the next lower elevation:
t (Below 217' slab)
(1)
Electrical Conduit and Cable Trays (Divisions 1, 2, 3& 4)
(2)
Emergency Service Water Valves & Piping (Divisions 2 & 4)
(3)
Liquid Radwaste Valves and Instrumentation (Divisions 1 & 2)
(Below hatchway at 177')
(1)
Core Spray System Components (Divisions 2 & 4)
Effect of a load drop on safe-shutdown or decay heat removal capability:
Most safety-related items in and below the load path are associated with electrical divisions 2 and 4.
None_of the components associated with electrical divisions 1 & 3 are required for S
Therefore shutdown method A will remain available to safely shut down the plant.
==
Conclusion:==
Based on separation and redundancy of safety-related systems, a load drop by the Core spray pump hoist (Item 26) will not jeopardize safe shut down or decay heat removal capability.
P-41/(b)/5 B-14 I
< ~ -.,
wa-.-.-.--.m-,,---------&---e--e.-
.---w-
~.e,
-.--w,%
,...,w,
,mn,%w.,--,wv----
ww.n--
4 LGS Overhead Handling Systems Review September, 1981 CORE SPRAY PUMP HOIST & REACTOR ENCLOSURE COOLING HX HOIST (Item 27, Equipment Numbers lAH218, IBH218)
These monorail hoists _are used to carry core spray system components and heat exchanger tube bundles on elevation 217' of the reactor enclosure, and to and from elevation 177' via hatchways.
4 Major safety-related items in-the load path:
(1)
Electrical Conduit and Cable Trays (Divisions 1, 2, 3& 4)
(2)
RHR Piping & Instrumentation (Division 2) 4-
-(3)
Main Steam and Recirculation instrumentation (Divisions 1,2,3 & 4)
.(4)
RCIC Instrumentation (Division 1 & 3) 4 Major safety-related items on the next lower elevation:
(Below 217' slab)
-(l)
Electrical conduit & cable trays (Divisions 1,2,3 & 4)
(2)
ESW Valves & Piping (Divisions 2 & 4)
(3) ' Liquid Radwaste System Valves & Instrumentation (Divisions 1
- _ O Containment Atmospheric Control System valves & piping
& 2) i-(4)
(Divisions 1 & 2)
(Below hatchways at 177')
(1)
Core Spray System Components (Divisions 2 & 4)
(2)
RHR Instrumentation (Division 2)
(3)
HPCI Instrumentation'(Division 2) i Effect of a load drop on safe-shutdown or decay heat removal capability:-
There are safety-related items in the load path associated with shutdown methods A and B.
There is a minimum horizontal separat-ion of 16 feet between any component of shutdown method A and any component of shutdown method B.
There is similar (and corresponding) separation below the floor slab.
Therefore only one shutdown method would be affected by a load drop and the remaining shutdown method would remain available to safely shut-down the plant.
If a load were dropped th. rough a hatch to elevation 177' only shutdown method B would be affected and method A Would remain available.
()
==
Conclusion:==
Based on separation and redundancy of safety-related systems, a load drop by the core spray & reactor enclosure cooling HX hoist will not jeopardize safe shutdown or decay heat removal capability.
P-41(b)/5 B-15
LGS Overhard Handling Systems Review September, 1981
'r RHR PUMPS HOIST
(
(Item 28, Equipment Number 10H219)
'This monorail hoist is used to carry RHR pumps & motors, HPCI, RCIC and Core Spray System components on elevation 217' of the reactor enclosure, and to and from elevation 177' via hatchways.
Major safety-related items in the load path:
(1)
Electrical conduit and cable trays (Divisions 1, 2, 3 & 4)
(2)
Motor control centers 10B222, 10D202 (Division 2)
Major safety-related items on the next lower elevation:
(Below 217' slab)
(1)
Electrical conduit and cable trays (Divisions 1, 2, 3, & 4)
(2)
RHR valves and instrumentation (Divisions 1 & 2)
(3)
ESW valves (Division 3)
(Below hatchways @ 177')
j (1)
RHR system (Divisions 1 & 2) t Effect of a load drop on safe-shutdown'or decay heat removal capability:
There is an boundary between Division 1 & 3 safety related items (west) and Division 2 & 4 items (east) at about the column 17 line, with a minimum horizontal distance of five feet between components associated with shutdown methods A and B.
l Below the 217' slab on elevations 201' and 177' there is strict separation between the electrical divisions (and shutdown method components) which is provided by a wall at the Column 18.5 line.
There are a few items which are exceptions to this separation, however none of these items are required for safe shutdown.
I The only potential hazard is that a load could be dropped between column lines 17 and 18.5, causing damage to a method B component on elevation 217' and spalling which could affect a method A component below the slab.
This possibility is discounted for the following reason.
All method B components are on the extreme south edge of the load path, at least 10 feet away from the hoist monorail (MCC 10D202 and cable trays above it).
Loads which could i
affect these components must be those which ate tall and could topple over (i.e. the ECCS pumps).
Since 'these tall loads must' of necessity be carried close to the floor (because the lif t of the O
P-41(b)/5 B-16
LGS overhead Handling Systems Review i
September, 1981 (3
V hoist above the floor is not much more than the length of the pumps) no significant spalling can occur due to initial impact if they are dropped (& if the pump falls on the MCC there will be little energy left for a secondary floor impact).
Therefore only one shutdown method can be affected by a load drop and the remaining method will be available to safely shut down the plant.
==
Conclusion:==
Based on separation and redundancy of safety-related systems, a load drop by the RHR pumps hoist will not jeopardize safe shutdown or decay heat removal capability.
O O
P-41(b)/5 B-17
LGS Overhood Handling Systsms Rnview September, 1981 CONTAINMENT EQUIPMENT DOOR HOIST (Item 29, Equipment Number 10H220)
This monorail hoist is used to remove and replace the drywell equipment access door on elevation 253'.
The safe load path is defined on the Item 29 load path drawing.
Major safety-related items in the load path:
(1)
Electrical conduit (Divisions 1 & 3)
(2)
Core spray piping (associated with Division 2)
Major safety-related items on the next lower elevationt (Below 253' slab)
(1)
Electrical conduit and cable trays (Division 1, 2 & 3)
(2)
Motor control center 10B215 (Division 1)
Effect of a load drop on safe-shutdown or decay heat removal capability:
Most safety-related components in and below the load path are associated with electrical divisions 1 and 3.
Those which are not, are not required for safe shutdown.
Therefore only shutdown
' V(g method A could be affected by a load drop and, at a minimum, shut down method B will remain available to safely shut down the plant.
==
Conclusion:==
Based on separation and redundancy of safety-related systems, a load drop by the containment equipment door hoist will not jeopardize safe shutdown or decay heat removal capability.
1 i
P-41(b)/5 B-18 i
[
f_
~
?
./
LGS' Overhead Handling Systems Review
(
September, 1981
~
J
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)
PERSONNEL _ LOCK HOIST (Item 30, Equipment Numbers 1AH221, 1BH221)
This monora'11 hoist'is used to remove and replace the personnel lock / equipment access. door assembly on elevation 253' of the reactor enclosure. -The Item 40 lo'ad path drawing defines the safe loat path.
Major safety-related' items in the load path:
None
,, ~
Major safety-related items on the next lower elevation:
s.(Below 253' slab)
(1)
Electrical conduit and cable trays (Divisions 1, 2, 3& 4)
.(2)- RHR
'B' piping and instrumentation Effect of a load drop on safe-shutdown or decay heat
~
removal capability:
There are no safety-related items in the load path.
On the next lower elevation most' safety-related items are associated h('T with electrical divisions 2 and 4.
Of the items associated with electrical divisions 1 and 3 only a few are required for safe-shutdown and these are part of the RCIC system.
Since the personnel lock assembly is part of the primary containment boundary it cannot be removed unless the reactor is shutdown.
Therefore only reactor decay heat removal is of concern.
The RHR
'B' shutdown cooling loop could potentially be affected by spalling of the 253' slab but the RHR
'A' shutdown cooling loop would remain available for decay heat removal.
' Conclusion
, Based on separation and redundancy of safety-related systems, a load drop by the personnel lock hoist will not jeopardize safe shutdown or~ decay heat removal capability.
4 O
P-41(b)/5 B-19 1
LGS Overhoad Hcndling Systsma R3 view Saptsmbar, 1981
/s REACTOR WATER CLEANUP HEAT EXCHANGER HOIST
(,)
(Item 31, Equipment Number OOH 223)
This monorail hoist is used for removal and replacement of heat exchanger tube bundles on elevation 283' of the reactor enclosure.
The Item 31 load path drawing defines the safe load path.
Major safety-related items in the load path:
(1)
Electrical conduit and cable tray (Divisions 1, 2, 3 & 4)
Major safety-related items on the next lower elevations (Below 283' slab)
(1)
Electrical conduit (Divisions 1, 2, 3 & 4)
(2)
Containment atmospheric control valves and instrumentation (Divi sions 1 & 3)
Effect of a load drop on safe-shutdown or decay heat removal capability:
Most safety-related items in and below the load path are associated with electrical divisions 1 and 3.
Those items associated with divisions 2 and 4 are not required for safe-shutdown.
Therefore
/'
only shutdown method A could potentially be affected by a load
(
drop and, at a minimum, shutdown method B will remain available to safely shut down the plant.
Conclusion Based on separation and redundancy of safety-related systems, a load drop by the RWCU heat exchanger hoist will not jeopardize safe shutdown or decay heat removal capability.
P-41(b)/5 B-20
' LGS Overhecd Handling Sys tems Review Revision 1, March 1982
+
CONTROL' ROD DRIVE PLATFORM HOIST (Item 33, Equipment Number 10H229)
Thishoistisusedtoraiseandlowerthefreeendofthehinged CRD removal platform,. located in the drywell at elevation 253'.
The ; Item 33 load path drawing defines the safe load path.
Major safety-related items insthe load path:
-t (1). RHR shutdown cooling suction line, 20" DCA-105 (2)
Drywell unit cooler ducting Major safety-related items on the next lower elevation:
(Below 338' slab) u.. s (1)
Primary Containment vacuum relief. valves assemblies (2)- ' Suppression pool ~ temperature sensors Effect of a load drop on safe-shutdown or decay heat removal capability:
s If the hoist were to fail, the free end of the CRD removal plat-j-g form would fali abo'ut six feet and strike its support.
Analysis Tj
~ hows that, with arloaded CRD removal cask on the platform, the impact s
would cause the supp' ort to fail and allow the platform to strike the shutdown cooling suction line which passes underneath.
However, the line would not rupture or be seriously deforned by the impact and shutdown cooling flow would not be interrupted.
Damage to suppression pool temperature sensors could occur due to spalling of the elevation 238' slab but there is sufficient redundancy and separation of sensors to prevent loss of temperature indication.
Conclusion Based on; separation and redundancy of safety-related systems and on impact analysis, a load drop by the CRD platform hoist.would not-jeopardize' safe shutdown or decay heat removal capability.
d 9
i li
-/-41(b)/5 B-21
LGS overhard Handling Systems Review Ravicion 1, March 1982
()s MAIN STEAM RELIEF VALVES SERVICE / REMOVAL HOISTS
(
(Item 34, Equipment Numbers lAH233, 234, 235; 1BH233,234, 235; 10H230; 10H232)
These monorail hoists, or come-alongs installed on the hoist trolleys, are used to carry main steam relief valves (MSRV's) and other valves on monorails at elevations 273' and 286' in the drywell, andEto and from elevation 253' via hatchways.
The Item 34 load path drawing defines the safe load path.
Major safety-related items in the load path and below floor grating:
(1)
Main steam relief and isolation valves (2)
ECCS system piping (including RRR shutdown cooling)
(3)
Drywell unit coolers (4)
Containment isolation valves Major safety-related items on the next lower elevation:
(Below 238' slab)
(1)
Suppression pool temperature sensors (2)
Primary containment vacuum relief valves Effect of a load drop on safe-shutdown or decay heat y,j removal capability:
In order to remove valves in the drywell the reactor must be
.in cold shutdown.
During cold shutdown decay heat removal is the primary safety concern.
Calculations show that floor grating will not withstand the impact of a falling valve from any height. -If a valve is dropped at specific locations in the drywell, damage to one shutdown cooling loop can be postulated but the other loop-will remain available to continue decay heat removal.
In the remote event that a dropped valve damaged shutdown cooling supply piping (between isolation valves and reactor vessel) or recircula-tion piping, makeup water can be supplied by the RHR or core spray systems until the leak can be repaired.
There is sufficient redundancy and separation of suppression pool temperature sensors to prevent loss of pool temperature indication due to spalling of the
. elevation 238' slab.
e a
==
Conclusion:==
Based on separation and redundancy of safety-related systems, and the fact that load handling will only be done with the reactor in cold shutdown, a load drop by the main steam relief valves serv' ice / removal hoists will not jeopardize safe shutdown or
. decay heat removal capability.
\\/
P-41(b)/5 B-22 l
LGS Overhead Handling Systems Review September, 1981 tO
\\ss/
DISPOSAL CASK CART REMOVAL HOIST (Item 35, Equipment Number 10H236)
This monorail hoist-handles the cart for the cask used for disposal of source and intermediate range detectors. It is located in the drywell between elevations 248' and 258', approximately.
The Item 35 load path drawing defines the safe load path.
Major safety-related items in the load path:
None Major safety-related items on the next lower elevation:
(Below grating)
(1)
Electrical conduit (Divisions 1, 3 & 4)
(Below 238' slab)
(1)
Suppression pool temperature monitors (2)
Primary containment vacuum relief valves Effect of a load drop on safe-shutdown or decay heat
(~'}
removal capability:
xt Safety-related conduit below load path floor grating is not required for safe-shutdown.
There is sufficient redundancy and separation of suppression pool temperature sensors so that damage resulting from possible spalling of the elevation 238' slab would not cause a loss of pool temperature indication.
==
Conclusion:==
Based on separation and redundancy of safety-related systems, a load drop by the disposal cask cart removal hoist will not jeopardize safe shutdown or decay heat removal capability.
W
(^\\
LJ P-41(b)/5 B-23
LGS Overhand Handling Systems R3 view Ravision 1, March 1982 CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN RECOMBINER COVER HOIST
-(Item 36, Equipment Number 10H237) s This monorail-hoist is used to re:nove and replace the' hatch 1
covers over the hydrogen recombiners at two locations on elevation N
283' of'the reactor enclosure.
The Item 36 load path drawing defines the safe load path.
Major safety-related items in the load path:
(Area ll) t (1)
Electrical conduit (Divisions 1, 3 and 4)
(2)
Hydrogen Recombiner
'(Area 16)
-(l)
Electrical conduit (Divisions 2, 3 and 4)
'(2)
Hydrogen Recombiner -
Major safety-related items on the next lower elevation:
(Area 11, below 283' slab)
(1)
Electrical conduit and cable trays (Divisions 1, 2 and 3)
~(Area 16, below 283' slab) 0 (1)
Electrical conduit (Divisions 1, 2 and 3)
(2)
Reactor Vessel Instrumentation Panels (Divisions 2 & 4)
(3)
Control Rod Drive Hydraulic Control Units Effect of a load drop on safe-shutdown or decay heat removal capability:
(Area 11)
.Most safety-related items in and below the load path are associated with electrical divisions 1 and 3.
Those items associated with I
electrical divisions 2 and 4 are not required for safe shutdown.
l Therefore only shutdown method A could potentially be af fected by a load drop.
Shutdown method B would remain available to safely shut down the plant.
1 (Area 16)
Most safety-related items in and below the load path are associated with electrical dvisions 2 and 4.
Of the items associated with electrical divisions 1 and 3, one conduit located below the floor slab contains cable required for safe-shutdown.
CRD piping also traverses the area below the floor.
Analysis has shown that a drop of the hydrogen recombiner cover from the maximum hoist height of 8 feet will cause minor local damage to the elevation 283' floor slab.but items below the floor will not be damaged.
i P-41(b)/7 B-24
LGS Overhead Handling Systems Review Revision 1, March 1982 q
==
Conclusion:==
O Based on separation and redundancy of safety-related systems, a load drop by the Area 11 hydrogen recombiner cover hoist will not jeopardize safe shutdown or decay heat removal capability.
Based on separation and redundancy of safety-related systems and on analysis of the floor impact strength, a load drop by the Area 16 hydrogen recombiner cover hof.st will not jeopardize safe shutdown or decay heat removal capability.
J O
i 3
<"41(b)/7 B-25 i
l LGS overbsed Hondling Systemo Raview September, 1981 i
O(_j EQUIPMENT HATCH BRIDGE CRANE (Item 37, Equipment Number 10H238)
This crane is used to carry miscellaneous loads between elevat-ions 217' and 283' of the reactor enclosure.
The Item 37 load path drawing defines the safe load path.
Major safety-related items in the load path:
None Major safety-related items on the next lower elevation:
(Below 283' slab)
(1)
Electrical conduit (Divisions 2 & 4)
(Below 217' slab)
(1)
Electrical conduit (Divisions 2, 3 & 4)
(2)
RHR Instrumentation (Division 2)
(3)
_ Emergency Service Water Piping & Valves (Associated w/ Division 2)
/g Effect of a load drop on safe-shutdown or decay heat
( )
removal capability:
There are no safety-related items in the load path.
All safety-related items below the load path are associated with electrica'l divisions 2 and 4, except for one division 3 conduit which is not required for safe-shutdown.
Therefore a load could potentially affect onl shutdown method B.
Shutdown method A will remain l
available to safely shut down the plant.
==
Conclusion:==
Based on separation arid redundancy of safety-related systems, a load drop by the equipment hatch bridge crane will not jeopardize safe shutdown or decay heat removal capability.
~.
AU P-41(b)/7 B-26
n
- a.
4 LGS Overhead Handling Systems Raview Saptembar, 1981 CONTROL ROD DRIVE MAINTENANCE AREA CRANE O
(Item 38, Equ,ipment Number 10H239) i This crane handles control rod drives in the CRD maintenance area on elevation 253' of the reactor enclosure.
The Item 38 load ' path drawing defines the safe load path.
Major safety-related items in the load path:
None Major safety-related items on the next lower elevation:
(Below 253' slab) i-(1)
Electrical conduit and cable trays (Divisions 1 & 3)
Effect of a load drop on safe-shutdown or decay heat removal capability:
There are no safety-related items in the load path.
All safety-related items below the load path are associated with electrical divisions 1 and 3.
Therefore a load drop could potentially affect only shutdown method A.
Shutdown method B will remain available to safely shut down the plant.
()
==
Conclusion:==
Based on separation and_ redundancy of safety-related systems, a load drop by the control rod drive maintenance area crane will.not jeopardize safe shutdown or decay heat removal capability.
1
\\
- O P-41(b)/7 B-27
LGS Overhsed Handling Systems Review September, 1981
(/)
DIESEL GENERATOR ENCLOSURE CRANES N-(Item 44, Equipment Numbers lAH501, IBH501, 1CH501, 1DH501)
These cranes handle diesel generator parts and miscellaneous loads.
There is a separate crane for each diesel generator enclosure.
The Item 44 load path drawing defines the safe load paths.
Major safety-related items in each load path:
(1)
Diesel generator and auxiliaries (2)
Emergency service water supply / return valves
( 3)
Diesel generator air exhaust fans (4)
Diesel generator controls & power distribution panel (5)
Electrical cable and motor control center Major safety-related items on the next lower elevation:
Not applicable Effect of a load drop on safe-shutdown or decay heat removal capability:
There is strict separation of safety-related items in the diesel generator enclosures.
The diesel generator
'A' enclosure contains only items associated with electrical division 1, the diesel s/
generator
'B' enclosure contains only items associated with electrical division 2, etc.
Therefore a load drop in any one enclosure will affect only one shutdown method.
The other shutdown method will remain available to safely shut down the plant.
==
Conclusion:==
Based on separation and redundancy of safety-related systems, a load drop by a diesel generator enclosure crane will not jeopardize safe shutdown or decay heat removal capability.
e O
P-41(b)/7 B-28 e-s
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4 LGS.Overhstd Handling Systems Raview September, 1981 SPRAY POND PUMP HOUSE HOISTS (Item 49, Equipment Numbers OOH 511, OOH 513)
These monorail hoists are used for handling of RHR service water and emergency service water system valves on elevation 268' of the spray pond. pump house, and to and from elevation 251' via hatchways.
The Item 49 load path drawing defines the safe load paths.
Major safety-related items in the load path:
(1)
Electrical conduit Major safety-related items on the next lower elevation:
(Below 268' slab)
(1)
RHR service water valves
-( 2)
Emergency service water valves Effect of a load drop on safe-shutdown or decay heat removal capability:
There is strict separation of safety-related items in the spray 7-s g
j pond pump house.
Safety-related items on the west side of the pump house'are associated only with electrical divisions 1 and
'-s 3.
Those on the east side are associated only with electrical divisions 2 and 4.
A concrete wall separates the two halves of the' building.
Therefore a load drop could affect only one 4
shutdown method.
The other shutdown method would remain available to safely shut down the plant.
Conclusion Based on separation and redundancy of safety-related systems, a load drop by the spray pond pump house hoists will not jeopardize safe shutdown or decay heat removal capability.
9 O
P-41(b)/7 B-29
LGS Overh3cd Handling Systcm3 Raview September, 1981
/3
)
( ' '
CONTROL ROOM CHILLER PORTABLE GANTRY HOIST (Item 50, Equipment Number 00H514)
This hoist will be used primarily to service control room chiller OBKil2 but can be used anywhere on elevation 200' of the control structure.
The Item 50 load path drawing defines the safe load path.
Major safety-related items in the load path:
(1)
Control room chillers OAKil2 & OBKil2 and associated piping & instrumentation (2)
Electrical conduit (Divisions 1, 2, 3 & 4)
Major safety-related items on the next lower elevation:
None Effect of a load drop on safe-shutdown or decay heat removal capability:
There is a dividing wall on elevation 200' of the control structure.
On the east side of the wall safety-related components are associated only with electrical divisions 2 and 4.
On the west (p).
side of the wall safety-related components are associated only with electrical divisions 1 and 3, except for a few division 4 conduit which are located against the south wall and are out of reach of the portable gantry crane.
Therefore a load drop can.
affect only one shutdown method.
The other shutdown method will remain available to safely shut down the plant.
==
Conclusion:==
Based on separation and redundancy of safety-related systems, a load drop by the control room chiller portable gantry crane will not jeopardize safe shutdown or decay heat removal capability.
O P-41(b)/7 B-30
LGS Overhead Handling Systems Review September, 1981
~
MAIN STEAM TUNNEL MONORAIL HOISTS (Item 53)
Monorail hoists will be borrowed from other locations for removal and replacement of main steam isolation valves or other valves and operators located in the main steam tunnel of the 1
reactor enclosure-(elevations 253' to 290').
The Item 53 load
-path drawing defines the safe load path, r
Major safety-related items in the load path:
'(1)
Main steam isolation valves (MSIV's)
(2)
RCIC system piping and valves (3)
MSIV leakage control system components Major safety-related items on the next lower elevation:
(Below 253' slab)
None Effect of a load drop on safe-shutdown or decay heat removal capability:
Heavy loads in the steam tunnel (valves and operators) can only be removed from their systems with the reactor in cold shutdown.
During cold shutdown the primary safety concern is to provide decay heat removal.
A load drop in the main steam tunnel will not af fect the shutdown cooling loop of either shutdown method.
Decay heat removal capability will not be affected.
==
Conclusion:==
Based on separation and redundancy of safety-related systems, and the fact that load handling will be done only with the reactor in cold shutdown, a load drop by the main steam tunnel monorail hoists will not jeopardize safe shutdown or decay heat removal capability.
~.
O P-41(b)/7 B-31
I LGS Overhead Handling Systems Raview Septembe r, 1981 (h
. \\,,).
SPRAY POND RHRSW AND ESW PUMPS YARD CRANE (Item 55)
A mobile yard crane will be used for removal and replacement of RHR-service water (RHRSW) and Emergency Service Water (ESW) pumps through roof hatches in the spray pond pump house.
The Item 55 load path drawing defines the safe load path.
Major safety-related items in the load path:
1 (1)
RHRSW pumps and valves (2)- ESW pumps and valves (3)
Spray pond pump structure supply air fans (4)
Motor control centers (5)
Electrical conduit Major safety-related items on the next lower elevations (Below 268' slab)
(1)
RHRSW valves (2)
ESW valves Effect of a load drop on safe-shutdown or decay heat
_ f removal capability:
. (
There is strict separation of safety-related items in the spray pond pump house.
Safety-related items on _ the west side of the -
pump house are associated only with electrical divisions 1 and 3.
Those on'the east side are associated only with electrical divisions 2 and 4.
A concrete wall separates the two halves of the building.
Therefore a load drop could affect only one shutdown method.
The other shutdown method will remain available to safely shut down the plant.
==
Conclusion:==
Based on separation and redundancy of safety-related systems, a load drop by the spray pond RHRSW and ESW pumps yard crane will not jeopardize safe shutdown or decay heat removal capability.
i
~.
O P-41(b)/7 B-32
LGS Overhard H:ndling Systems R: view Rsvision 1, March 1982
/~'s CONTROL ROOM HVAC EQUIPMENT HOIST
'\\,,).
(Item 58, Equipment Number 00H133)
'This monorail hoist is used for handling of HVAC fans on elevation 313' of the control structure and to and from elevation 304' via hatchways.
The Item 58 load path drawings defines the safe load path.
Major safety-related items in the load path:
(1)
Electrical conduit (Divisions 1, 2, 3& 4)
Major safety-related items on the next lower elevation:
.(Below 304' slab)
(1)
Electrical conduit and cable trays (Divisions 1, 2, 3& 4)
(2)
Power generation control complexes (PGCC's) for Unit 1 and Unit 2 Effect of a load drop on safe-shutdown or decay heat removal capability:
A load drop by this hoist in any area of its load path will affect cabling associated with only one shutdown method.
This includes
()
electrical cable embedded in the 304' floor slab.
The other shutdown (s,/
method would remain available to safely shut down the plant.
Analysis shows that, since the fan loads are small and the maximum drop height is just 9 feet, the safety-related items below the floor slab will not be affected by a load drop.
==
Conclusion:==
Based on separation and redundancy of safety-related systems and analysis of the elevation 304' floor slab, a load drop by the control HVAC equipment hoist will not jeopardize safe shutdown or decay roon heat removal capability.
i O)
\\~P-41(b)/7 B-33
LGS Overhacd Handling Systema Raview R2 Vision 3 - Juno, 1984
.(i WETWELL MONORAIL HOIST
- \\_s/
(Item 59)
This monorail hoist is used for maintenance activities in the wet-well of the primary ccntainment.
The Item 59 load path drawing defines the safe load path.
Major safety-relateri items in each load path:
(1)
Primary containment vacuum relief valve assemblies (2)
Suppression pool temperature sensors Major safety-related items on the next lower evaluation:
Not applicable Effect of a load drop on safe-shutdown or decay heat removal capability:
Only the suppression pool temperature sensors are required for safe shutdown.
There is sufficient separation and redundancy of sensors so that a load drop would not result in a loss of suppression pool temperature indication.
==
Conclusion:==
(_ /
Based on separation and redundancy of safety-related systems, a load drop by the wetwell monorail hoist will not jeopardize safe shutdown or decay heat removal capability.
P-41(b)/7 B-34
i l
)
LGS Overhead Handling Systems Review Revision 1, March 1982
. (}
%_/
CONTROL STRUCTURE FANS LIFTING BEAMS HOISTS l
(Item 60)
Hoists will be borrowed from other locations to carry HVAC fans between elevations 304' and 322' of the control structure.
The Item 60 load path drawings define the safe load path.
Major safety-related items in the load path s (1)
Electrical conduit (Division 1, 2, 3& 4)
Major safety-related items on the next lower elevation:
(Below 304' Slab)
(1)
Electrical conduit and cable trays (Divisions 1, 2, 3& 4)
(2)
Power generation control complexes (PGCC's) for Unit 1 and Unit 2 Effect of a load drop on safe-shutdown or decay heat removal capability:
A load drop by this hoist in any area of its load path will affect cabling associated with only one shutdown method.
This includes I) cable embedded in the 304' floor slab.
The other shutdown method
\\/
would remain available to safely shut down the plant.
Analysis 3
shows that, since the fan loads are small and the maximum drop height is just 18 feet, the safety-related items below the floor slab will not be affected by a load drop.
==
Conclusion:==
Based on separation and redundancy of safety-related systems and analysis of the elevation 304' floor sl;'_, a load drop by the control structure fans lifting beam hoists will not jeopardize safe shutdown or decay heat removal capability.
0 O
P-41( b)/ 7 B-35
LGS Overhotd Handling Systsmo Raview September, 1981 I /'~}
V REACTOR ENCLOSURE UPPER FAN ROOM HOIST
_(Item 61)
Monorail hoists will be borrowed from other locations for handling of fans and other HVAC items on elevation 331' of the reactor enclosure, and to and from elevation 313' via a hatchway.
Major safety-related items in the load path:
(1)
Electrical conduit (Divisions 1 and 2) 4 Major safety-related items on the next lower elevation:
(Below 331' Slab)
- ( l)
Electrical conduit (Divisions 1, 2, 3 & 4)
(Below 313' Slab under hatchway)
None Effect of a load drop on safe-shutdown or decay heat removal capability:
None of the safety-related items in the load path are required On the elevation below the load path most are associated with electrical
.for safe-shutdown.
items on the west side (Area 15) items on the east side (Area 16) divisions 1 and 3 and most The items which are-are associated with electrical division 4.
exceptions to this rule are not required for safe shutdown.
d Therefore only one shutdown method could potentially be by a load drop.
to safely shut down the plant.
==
Conclusion:==
Based on separation and redundancy of safety-related systems, will not jeopardize safe shutdown or decay heat rem capability.
a O
B-36 P-41(b)/7
LGS Overhsad Handling Systems Raview September, 1981 e.
REACTOR ENCLOSURE LOWER FAN ROOM HOIST (Item 62)
/
Monorail hoists will be borrowed from other locations for handling of fans and other HVAC items on elevation 313' of the reactor The Item 62 load path drawing defines the safe load enclosure.
. path.
Major safety-related items in the load paths (1)
Electrical conduit (Divisions 1, 2, 3 & 4)
Major safety-related items on the next lower elevation:
(Below 313' sjab)
(1)
Electrical conduit (Divisions 1, 2, 3 & 4)
(2)
Standby liquid control system components (3)
Load center 10B204 (4)
Motor control center 10B225 Effect of a load drop on safe-shutdown or decay heat removal capability:
()
Cafety-related items in and below the western portion of the load are generally associated with electrical divisions path (Area 15)
Safety-related items in and below the eastern portion of 1 and 3.
the load path are generally associated with electrical divisions f-2 and 4.
Items which are exceptions to this pattern are not required for safe shutdown.
Therefore a load drop could
-The other shutdown potentially af fect just one shutdown method.
method will remain to safely shut down the plant.
==
Conclusion:==
Based on separation and redundancy of safety-related systems, a load drop by the reactor enclosure lower fan room hoist will not jeopardize safe shutdown or decay heat removal capability.
I O
B-37 P-41(b)/7
~
LGS Overhead Handling Systems Raview Rnvision 3, June 1984 i
- ~
APPENDIX C ASSUMPTIONS AND DATA FOR POSTULATED
. LOAD DROPS OF THE REACTOR PRESSURE VESSEL HEAD, STEAM DRYER AND SHROUD HEAD / SEPARATOR NUREG 0612 Appendix A conformance:
The. applicable guidelines of Appendix A were followed except that the weight of the crane' load block was not always included s
in the total load, since reactor enclosure crane is single failure proof. 'The weight of the lifting device (strongback or sling) was included.
I i
i 4
i N
t' d
t 4
I
.P-165(a)/9 C-1
LGS Overhead Handling Systems Review Revision 3, June, 1984
()
Information requested by Attachment 4:
Initial Conditions / Assumptions RPV Steam Shroud /
Head Dryer Separator Load weight, tons 111.6 40 75.8 (1)
(1)
Impact area Point Distributed Distributed (1)
(1)
Drop height, feet 25.5 N/A N/A Drop location Over open Reactor Vessel Credit for No No No impact limiters?
O Thickness of walls /
N/A N/A N/A slabs (1)
(1)
Drag Forces None Water Water RPV Load combinations Dead Wt.
None None Material properties 70 Ks i 30 Ksi 30 Ksi (Steel, yield strenoth)
(1)
The RPV is assumed to be flooded up to the top flange.
The steam dryer and shroud head / separator achieve terminal velocity prior to impact on the upper flange of the top guide shroud.
1 r O
P-165(a)/9 C-2
LGS Overhead Handling Systems Raview Ravision 3, Juno, 1984 l
l Additional Assumptions:
For the RPV head drop the dynamic stress in the RPV support j
skirt is assumed to be uniform around the circumference of I
the skirt.
Potential load drops of the steam dryer or shroud head /
separator onto the RPV flange (rather than into the vessel) are enveloped by the RPV head drop.
The impact of the steam dryer is assumed to be absorbed by the shroud head / separator support structure.
No credit is taken for energy absorbed by the steam dryer support brackets or the shroud head / separator.
A 1
O y
P-165(a)/9 C-3 i
LGS Overhead Handling Systems Review Revision 3, June, 1984 APPENDIX D INFORMATION REQUESTED IN SECTION 2.1 (Text of enclosure to letter f rom J. S.
Kemper to D. G.
Eisenhut dated June 18, 1981.
Tables mentioned in this appendix refer to and are superceded by the tables in this report)
O O
Ptd1*1phia Electric Ckugeny Limerick Atmic Pener Statiert Dockat Hus. 50-352 and 5>353 Infomatim mquested in Sectim 2.1 of mclosure 3 to NBC Istter dated Decenbar 22, 1980 regardirrJ ccrpliance with tamere0612, 'Omtrol of Heavy Ioads at melaar Plants Resolution of 'mP h-36" m alosure 3 It m 2.1.1 "mport the res11ts of your zwiew of plant arrarw. As to identify all cwerhood bridling systma from Wich a lonS drop may resilt in dange to any syste reqaired for plant slutdown er decay heat rexual (taking no credit fz any intarlocks, tacinical sp eifications, agerating r W,
or detallad structural analysis)."
Essaanse
'the following cwurhoad handling systms wrre identified as potetially hazardans in that a load dropped frm then r.ight O
dmage fuel or systes requirai for safe s5.utdom or dg heat runtwal (Itm nwbers refer to Tahle 1 titled Ihdex of Onrhead Handling Systes, copy attached):
1)
Crane / hoists s ich loa $s over reacter fuel: Per Limrick, a is defined as a load greater than 700 pourds.
Anactor mclosure Wane (Itsm 20) a.
2) cranns/ hoists Wich carry hasvy loads cwar systans or
-.g sas required fcr safe shutdom er decay heat re ovalt (hatches under Iced raths are assend to be either open cr inonpable of stopping the fall of a hasvy load)e a.
Diemal Generatur w m g Dridge cranes (Itm 4441assi generaters and enemarias are wear the lom5 path).
b.
Spray Pond Pop flouse mists (Itm 49-P!m Servica
, mtse valves and under the load path).
~
spray Perd RHR and EsW Pep Yard Crane (Itsm 61-fem c.
and Em ptsps are sadme the load path).
2 3)
OranneAioists thich say carry hasvy lands in the vicinity of safety-related electrical circuits e instrumentatim.
Cbntrol Rxrt HVAC Lift Beams (Itam 19) a.
b.
heirculaticut Rsup letor Ibists (Itan 21) c.
Core spray Aug Ibist 10-II215 (Itam 25) d.
Cbre Spray Pump !bist 10-D-216 (Itm2 26)
Cbntalment nr.11pw.t Door Ibist (Its 29) e.
f.
CRD 7tecwal Platform Ibist (Itan 33)
MSRV Sorvice and herval Tbists (Itm 34) g.
h.
Omtaiment I?y:1roget Pecmbiner Cbver Ibists (Itm 3G) 1.
Omtrol Roan IN7c Djui;nent Ibist (Itm 58) 4)
Table 1 (Thdex of overhand Itandling Syster:s) identifies cranes and hoists wture saf relatal oc311;ront has been identified on the next eleva below the clevatim of tle lond path. It is assrod that a load dropped frtn these overhead handling systmc will not pemtrate the ficce, lut cny causa elling of tJe concreto inlow, O
which could affect the safety-relata! egai;nent.
mv-htre 3 Itam 2.1.2
%stify the eclusion of any overhand handling syntaa frtn the above catagary by verifying that there is sufficiant physical se;aration frtn any load-irpact point and any safetmlates ocrpwmt to pcmit a detchtico by inspection that no heavy load drop can result in darage to any syntan w mewnt requircxl for plant shutdows or decay haat renoval.'
l Destmas Delusim critaria cranes and hoists which are not listad in the response to item 2.1.1 abcne do not carry heavy loads in the vicinity of fumi w syntsms raiuired fe safe shutdows or decay heat removal. Specific rensans fx melusion of these overhand handling system aru given balow. D elusien critaria fw anch crane or hoist are listad in hble 1 O
(Inde of overhead Handling systems).
Critarien A 1he crane er hoist is located in a structure iriIc2i Riis not contain syntes er v_i.m t requizul f a safe sintdom ar decay heat renoval. Structures included are the 'harbine Enclooze, the Radwaste De lanwe, the htim BiiMig, the #5414=ey Boiler Bilidig the Cir~1= ting Ntnter Pmp House, and the scNylkill River pm p Bour.4. This designatim is named on the Limerick Fire Protection Evaluaticri Report Which identifies safetyrelated equipent in each fire area and evaluates the effect of the loss of this equipnent en plant safe aktdown ~:=N11ty (irw-li="5 decay heat renoval).
Critarion 3: the load carried by this crane or hoist is not greater than 700 pounds. Therefw e, it is not a howy load.
Critarien C: Ibr t!nso cranes and hoists there is no l
equ4 rent requiral for safe slutdam or decay heat reooval located in the load path. Absance of safe aNtdown equipnet tas datamined by review of the Fire Protection Evaluatia. Repts:t and t!c ro.211ts of the separation Frogram. Inai paths are definod cri the drawings attachud to this repcet. Daaept dure 11mitad by tedla er othat barriers loei paths are at least twice as wide as t!m wilast Inad or latch opening O
11aas, the load wi.11 still land in tle load path if swinging occurs Mfwe it is droppa!. Ibr a load whose height is nores than twice its width, it is massul that the load can tip over in any direction frun an impact point below the centarline of th normal a crans hoist. In t}uas cases tle Iced wi.11 also land within the load path. 'Iherefwe, droppe5 loads cannot i
danego safe-sNtdom er decay heat removal systes or I
w am.
l arclosure 3 Itm 2.1.3:
i "With respect to the design arx1 operat.icn of Navy-loal-handling systans in the reactor km%g and those load-systems identifimi in 2.1-1, above, ptuvide your evalus wwwr.ing complianon with the 7.u=1%es of ImL-0612, Sectim 5.1.1.
The following specific infcona-t.ica abould be incluSad in your reply's Itan 2.1.3.a.
' Drawings or sketches sufficient to clearly Adantify the locaticrs of safe load pths, spent fuel, armi safety-relatal equipent."
l
. k aponso
" ~ '"'
O aquipurit 1ccation drawings which identify h -."
safe load A ths and locations of fuel and safety related t are attachal to this rnu,. i These drawings tify each crane or hoist by the equipwit itera razaber used in Table 1.
It s 2.1.3.b "A discussion of ments taken to ensure that load-handling operations rurain within safe load paths, incluiing w-wtwus, if any, for deviation fra these paths".
mspman this infomation is not currer.tly available but will be ocmsidered in the develo; runt of load ha.x111ng procedures.
Its 2.1.3.c "A tah'latim of heavy lokls to be handled by each crane which incitzies the load idantificaticn, load weight, its designated lifting device, a.x1 verification that the of such load is governd by a written edure ha. '
, as a r.timi.va, the infomatico iden #iad in O
iWEG-0612, Section 5.1.1(2)".
cm nesponse 1)
Inad Teb 1atien A loal +=h'1aticn for each crane or Irist, including load identification, load 5.uight a.xi special lifting device (if any), is inc1MM in Table 2 titled Ioal Tabulation.
2)
Liftino Device Design Ibr purposes of this review a lifting device is defined as the load carrying connect.icn between the cranc or hoist hook and the load. A special lifting device is a lifting davioc specifically designcri to handle a par +4 mine load. Special lifting devices to be ummi at Linerick are identifiai in table 3 t.itled Limerick Special Lifting navices.
3)
Verifloation that the handling of mach loai is governed bp a trittan procedure in acconiance with rucG-0612.
sectica 5.1.1(2) will be svallah1 prior to fuel load.
l
=S-Its 2.1.3.6 "Umrificatim that liftig devices identified in 2.1.M,.
abwe corply with the requiremnts of AMEI NL4.6-1978, 330.9-1971 as w ur ista. Ftr liftlng devices cr ANSI were these standards, as suppierumtsi by NUm%;-0612, Section 5.1.1(4) m 5.1.1(5), are not nort, describe any Inzpoemd alternatives and deconstrate their equivalency in terms of load-handling z=14=h m ty."
Reseense 9a== i=1 handling devloes in Tabla 3 titled I.imarick special Lifting -h are not certifiai to NEI t+-14.6 1973 as melamnted by 1:UREG-0612 Shipping cask yakas are deal to be singla failure proof, Wich is maperior to the A!SI specification directly.
Orrent requirunents for alings utilized by Cbnstruction and 11r.intar.ance Division fz Q-listed equipment will nest ANSI N45.2 - 1972.
Pleano refer to our resp:mme to itam 3 of the crum Mtcr to this docuannt fx further h_==%
Itarn 2.1.3.e Chapter 2-2 has "Verificatica that NCI B30.2-197C,insroction, testing been invokal with respect to crane and maintenanco. Lhere any exception is taken to this standard, sufficient infacratica abould ie saxwi&s! to dronstrata the equivalancy of rt-;- - 4 alternatives."
nospanas Se Linarick facility is still being armstructed. AtEI R30.2, 1976, will be considered in the scoparaticm of the crans inspecticm, testing and maintenance swdares at the time the cranas and hoists are turrai over for plant use.
Itam 2.1.3.f
'Yorification that mens deaip carglias with the guide-lines of 09A Specificatism 70 and Chaptar 2-1 of A!EI 330.2-1976, including the denenstration of eqdvalancy of actual design requL a fm instancos eure specific compliance with thase standards is not suwidad".
O
'the pra:msn. a. sper-ifiantims for cranes identified in O
2.1.1 ruguire otmplianon with all specificatims and standards inausi by the Crane Manufacturers Ass)ciation of harlos (OH) and t}m peerican National Standards Institute (MEI) which taare in effect 3 rice to the data of the purchase order. 'Ihe rmactor enclosure crana ma purchased in 1973 and therefcase was designed to om Specification 70 and an earlier versim (1967) of M EI B30.2, 'the disani generator cranes were purchased in 1972 and designed to the same standards as the reacter siclosure crans.
i
'1he cranes were designed aootadL to Ogecr 2-1 of ANSI B30.2-1967. NUR[r,-0612,2 s var:.fication of conpliance with Chapter 2-1 ci MEI B3C.2-1976. 'Ihm tm editicns of MCI D30.2 were caTared. Based on this conpariaan and review of the crane technical specifications and manufacturers' data it is ccncluded that the cransa above ganarally comply with the appUr ahle requirements of Chantar; 2-1 of MEI B30.2-1976,iwith tie following exseptions' (listad by MEI 230.2-1976 Secr.im nartier):
_I,'
2-1. 4.1 Welded Cbnstruction
'Ihe cranes weLiing r-dures cmfccm tn MG D2.0-66 rather than AHS Dl.l.
O 2-1.5.2 d Decign of guard rulis an1 toe boards ccmplies w'th USAS A12-1932'tather than MSI A12.1.
2-1.'f.3
\\
l
\\2-1.8'.3.a.$j Wolley tar:pers designed with cncrgy abecruhig capacity for,40*. of rstad
' trolley speed rathat than 504.'
g b p-1.10.1 diring pra hiipant cxrplies with tsAS ci-1965
' f
'rathat thant uticle 610 of Nati:nal Electrical C0&. MEI C(1 (Nt1'A 70).
s We do nut consid(rM. abnve differmions to be significant Crane desi with respect Ao mi'e rpuraticn of the cranes.sbmid in residermi to be in cory11 l
s i
of M EI n30.; 1976.
\\
9 ER/auv,
i
[
1',.
1, l
s
,, __\\,_ _ _
S SAFE IDAD PA2H DRAWINGS, an Attachnent to the Limarick Generating Station Overhead nanaling systems Review Final Report i
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n 0 Page 1 Limerick Overhead Handlings Systems Final Report ( (,) Revision 3 Changes The report has been revised primarily to incorporate the following changes: 1. (Page 1) Revised the heavy load definition to greater than 1200 pounds to include the weight of the refueling platform fuel grapple assembly. The FSAR Chapter 15 fuel-handling accident analysis is being revised to be consistent with this new definition. 2. (Page 1, Tables 1 & 2, Appendix B) Deleted the North Stack Instrument Room Dumbwaiter since it is no longer included in the Limerick design. 3. (Page 4) Changed the load rating for the auxiliary hoist of the reactor enclosure crane (when handling critical loads) from 6 tons to 6.75 tons, to permit handling of the spent fuel storage racks as discussed in the revised response to Paragraph 2.2-3 items 4 and 5. 4. (Page 5) Clarified the intended design of the spent fuel cask lifting device and.the cask interfacing lift points ("N per comment in the Phase II Draft Technical Evaluation (,) Report [ Reference letter fram A. Schwencer (NRC) to E. G. Bauer, Jr. (PECo), dated February 6, 1984]. 5. '(Page 7) Added a discussion of spent fuel storage rack and RPV service platform handling. A drop of the . service platform was previously analysed and judged to be acceptable based on the use of administrative controls, as discussed in Revision 2 of the report. However, it was subsequently decided to replace the service platform sling with one which has a higher factor of safety and reclassify the service platform lift as one in which the likelihood of a load drop is extremely small. 6. (Page 8) Revised the discussion of the reactor well shield plug handling to indicate that the RPV head rather than the drywell head would always be in place. On rare occasions during maintenance operations the shield plugs may be reinstalled while the drywell head is removed. 7. (Table 3) Added the special lifting devices for the spent fuel storage racks and the new fuel containers, and made fs minor load weight and editorial changes. T-43/3 5 ( 6/18/8 4 ) Page 2 8. (Table 4) Revised to include height restrictions for all reactor well shield plugs. Revised most height ("'g restrictions based on less conservative impact analysis i,,/ assumptions. Revised notes and figure. s 9. (Table 5) Added Table 5, Special Lif ting Device Compliance with ANSI N14.6-1978, in response to a comment in the Phase II Draft Technical Evaluation Report. This table indicates the extent of compliance for the special lifting devices associated with the refueling shield, the fuel pool stop logs, the spent fuel storage racks and the RPV service platform.
- 10. (Appendix B) Revised the hazard evaluation for the reactor enclosure crane to address the higher height limits over the dryer / separator storage pool.
- 11. (Appendix D) Added Appendix D, Information Requested in Section 2.1 (of Enclosure 3 to the NRC letter to all licenses dated 12/22/81), for reference.
Ob k O o T-43/3 5 ( 6/18/8 4 ) Comments on the Draft Technical Evaluation b Report on the Control of Heavy Loads, Phase Il
Reference:
Letter from A. Schwencer (NRC) to E. G.
- Bauer, Jr. (PECo), dated February 6, 1984 The draf t Technical Evaluation Report (TER) for Limerick was prepared by EG & G, Idaho, Inc. for the NRC.
The following comments and clarifications are offered to correct minor errors contained in the draft. 1. Table 2.1 lists most, but not all Limerick overhead handling systems which are subject to NUREG 0612 criteria. See Appendix B of the Overhead Handling Systems Review final report for a complete listing. 2. Section 2.3.1.A states that, among other cases, the applicant has conducted analyses for postulated load drops of the reactor well shield plugs and the drywell head into the reactor vessel. This is not quite correct. Specific analyses were performed for load drops over the refueling floor but not over the reactor vessel.
- Rather, an evaluation concluded that these loads drops were bounded by the RPV head drop analysis.
/ '/ 3. In the list of analyzed load drops it should be noted that specific analyses were performed for the RPV head, steam dryer, shroud head / separator and service platform only. Also, the refueling shield should not be included in this list since it is categorized as a highly reliable lift per NUREG 0612 Section 5.1.6. 4. Section 2.3.3.B incorrectly implies that load drop " tests" were conducted for certain load handling systems. Analyses or evaluations were made but no tests were conducted. l ,/} __l T-43/35(6/18/84)}}