|
---|
Category:GENERAL EXTERNAL TECHNICAL REPORTS
MONTHYEARML20209G0211999-06-30030 June 1999 GE-NE-B13-02010-33NP, Evaluation of Limerick Unit 2 Shroud Cracking for at Least One Fuel Cycle of Operation ML20207H8331999-05-31031 May 1999 Non-proprietary Rev 0 to 1H61R, LGS - Unit 2 Core Shroud Ultrasonic Exam ML20236X7641998-07-31031 July 1998 Rev 0 to SIR-98-079, Response to NRC RAI Re RPV Structural Integrity at Lgs,Units 1 & 2 B110078, GE-NE-B1100786-02, Surveillance Specimen Program Evaluation for Limerick Generating Station,Unit 21998-06-30030 June 1998 GE-NE-B1100786-02, Surveillance Specimen Program Evaluation for Limerick Generating Station,Unit 2 ML20202B6231998-01-23023 January 1998 Non-proprietary Version of Rev 1 to ER-9605NP, Missile Probability Analysis Methodology for Limerick Generating Station,Units 1 & 2,w/Siemens Retrofit Turbines ML20198B3351997-06-30030 June 1997 Annual 10CFR50.59 & Commitment Rev Rept for 960701-970630, for Limerick Generating Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20135D7721996-04-30030 April 1996 Non-proprietary, Evaluation of Limerick Initial Core Channels for Re-Use on Ex-Shoreham Fuels Bundles ML20101F1901996-02-29029 February 1996 Evaluation of Limerick Unit-1 Core Shroud Insps (Refuel Outage 6) ML20099L6331995-06-30030 June 1995 Annual 10CFR50.59 & Commitment Rev Rept 940701 - 950630 ML20094H0521995-06-30030 June 1995 Pyrolysis Gas Chromatography Analysis of 21 Thermo-Lag Fire Barrier Samples ML20086B1681995-06-26026 June 1995 Ipeee ML20083K6611995-04-26026 April 1995 Rev a to Upgraded Eals ML20078S3351994-02-10010 February 1994 Evaluation of Abnormal Wear at Limerick ML20059K6261993-10-26026 October 1993 SAR Licensing Rept for Spent Fuel Storage Capacity Expansion,Lgs Units 1 & 2 ML20046B5011993-06-27027 June 1993 Evaluation of Potential Internal Radiation Exposures Associated W/Contamination Events in Handling Traversing In-Core Probe (TIP) Tubing at Limerick Nuclear Generating Station & Recommendations for Evaluation & Control of . ML20034F4781993-02-28028 February 1993 Thermal Variance Request for Point Pleasant Diversion NPDES Permit PA-0052221 ML20127N8811992-12-31031 December 1992 LLRW Shipment Insp Repts 50-352/PA-92-02 & 50-353/PA-92-02 on 921116-18.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee LLRW Shipment to Burial Site Including Shipping Documentation,Package Insp & Contamination Surveys ML20113D9801991-11-30030 November 1991 Industry Approach to Seismic Severe Accident Policy Implementation, for Nov 1991 ML20082N0471991-08-28028 August 1991 Annual Plan Mod Rept,Jul 1990 Through June 1991 ML20072R0121991-03-15015 March 1991 Common Plant Summary of ASME Section XI Repairs & Repalcements Completed from 890520-901217,Rept 3 ML20072R0071991-03-14014 March 1991 Common Plant Summary Rept for 890520-901217,Periodic Insp Rept 3 ML20066K7201991-01-31031 January 1991 Simulator Certification Submittal, Providing Supporting Info to Form NRC-474 ML20055J3291990-07-20020 July 1990 Decommissioning Rept of Philadelphia Electric Co ML20042E0901990-03-31031 March 1990 Description of Limerick Inadvertent Spray Actuation Analysis ML20246A8511989-08-15015 August 1989 Common Plant Summary of ASME Section XI Repairs or Replacements from 870901-890519,Rept 2 ML20248A0261989-06-30030 June 1989 Rev 1 to Response to NRC Bulletin 88-05 for Limerick Generating Station,Unit 2 ML20247J0521989-05-31031 May 1989 Vol Ii,Book 1 to Limerick Generating Station,Unit 2 Independent Design & Const Assessment, Hazards Program Evaluation Suppl ML20245A1031989-04-30030 April 1989 Vol II to Books 2,3 & 4 to Independent Design & Const Assessment,Design Observation Repts,DOR-001 to DOR-118 ML20245A0951989-04-30030 April 1989 Vol I of Book 1 to Independent Design & Const Assessment, Assessment Summary ML20245A0801989-04-30030 April 1989 Vol II of Book 1 to Independent Design & Const Assessment, Design Assessment ML20246P5671989-03-22022 March 1989 Safety Evaluation of Limerick 1,Cycle 3 Revised Core Loading Pattern ML20235Z5981989-02-28028 February 1989 Extension of Equipment Qualification Programs to Limerick Generating Station Unit 2 ML20235Y3811989-02-28028 February 1989 Rev 11 to Design Assessment Rept ML20206K3101988-10-31031 October 1988 Rev 1 to Impact of Reg Guide 1.99,Rev 2 on Limerick Generating Station Unit 1 ML20148R7511988-03-0808 March 1988 Readiness Program Assessment for Limerick 2 ML20236V6631987-08-31031 August 1987 Summary of ASME Section XI Repairs & Replacements Completed from 840928-870831,Rept 1 ML20153G3091986-02-24024 February 1986 Summary of Validation Program for Spds ML20129C3861985-06-30030 June 1985 Control Room Design Review Supplemental Rept 2 to Final Rept of June 1984 ML20112E4491985-02-11011 February 1985 BNL Technical Review Rept & Handwritten Notes of 850121-25 Insp ML20083L7691984-12-31031 December 1984 Descriptive Rept of Archeological Investigation for 220-60 Transmission Line Right-of-Way in Association W/Limerick Nuclear Generating Station,Montgomery & Chester Counties, Pa ML20083L7901984-12-31031 December 1984 Descriptive Rept of Archeological Investigation for 220-61 Transmission Line Right-of-Way in Association W/Limerick Nuclear Generating Station,Montgomery & Chester Counties, Pa ML20107G6421984-10-31031 October 1984 Control Room Design Review, Final Rept,Suppl 1 ML20098E9061984-09-30030 September 1984 Rev 10 to Design Assessment Rept ML20129D7351984-09-30030 September 1984 Evaluation of Feedwater Containment Isolation Check Valves for Hypothetical Pipe Rupture Condition for Limerick Generating Station ML20093C9921984-09-17017 September 1984 Independent Design Review of Limerick Generating Station 1, Core Spray Sys, Bimonthly Status Rept 8 for Period Ending 840915.Related Correspondence ML20096C7651984-08-31031 August 1984 Environ Qualification Rept ML20095A6021984-08-0909 August 1984 Rev 0 to Raceway Separation Criteria. Raceway Separation Test Program Discussion Encl ML20093N6651984-07-31031 July 1984 Nonproprietary Rev 9 to Vol 1 of Design Assessment Rept ML20095D3101984-06-30030 June 1984 Rev 3 to Final Rept Overhead Handling Sys Review ML20092K9461984-06-30030 June 1984 Control Room Design Review,Final Rept 1999-06-30
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20217D1211999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1999 for Lgs,Units 1 & 2. with ML20217A1691999-09-22022 September 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Engine Sys,Inc Controllers,Manufactured Between Dec 1997 & May 1999,that May Have Questionable Soldering Workmanship.Caused by Inadequate Personnel Training.Sent Rept to All Nuclear Customers 05000353/LER-1999-010, :on 990820,manual Actuation of Main CR Chlorine Isolation Mode Was Noted.Caused by Faint Chlorine Odor in Reactor Encl.Conducted Investigation & Was Unable to Locate Source of Odor1999-09-16016 September 1999
- on 990820,manual Actuation of Main CR Chlorine Isolation Mode Was Noted.Caused by Faint Chlorine Odor in Reactor Encl.Conducted Investigation & Was Unable to Locate Source of Odor
ML20212A8861999-09-13013 September 1999 Safety Evaluation Authorizing First & Second 10 Yr Interval Inservice Insp Plan Requestss for Relief RR-01 05000352/LER-1999-009, :on 990802,maint Was Performed That Required Disabling Certain Monitoring Capabilities on Safeguard Sys. Caused by Failure to Properly Use Plant Procedure.Monitoring Capability Was Restored to Svc & Tested1999-09-0101 September 1999
- on 990802,maint Was Performed That Required Disabling Certain Monitoring Capabilities on Safeguard Sys. Caused by Failure to Properly Use Plant Procedure.Monitoring Capability Was Restored to Svc & Tested
ML20212A4481999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1999 for Limerick Generating Station,Units 1 & 2.With ML20211E9891999-08-20020 August 1999 LGS Unit 2 Summary Rept for 970228 to 990525 Periodic ISI Rept Number 5 05000353/LER-1999-005-02, :on 990712,PCIV Isolation & Esfa Occurred Due to Blown Fuse.Caused by Mechanical Failure of Cold Solder Joing.Reset Isolation within Three Hours & 22 Minutes & Replaced Fuse1999-08-10010 August 1999
- on 990712,PCIV Isolation & Esfa Occurred Due to Blown Fuse.Caused by Mechanical Failure of Cold Solder Joing.Reset Isolation within Three Hours & 22 Minutes & Replaced Fuse
ML20210L7051999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for July 1999 for Limerick Generating Station,Units 1 & 2.With ML20210H7391999-07-29029 July 1999 Safety Evalution Supporting Amends 136 & 101 to Licenses NPF-39 & NPF-85,respectively 05000353/LER-1999-004-02, :on 990701,determined That Thirteen MSRVs Failed to Meet 1% Setpoint Tolerance Due to Setpoint Drift.Caused by Corrosion Induced Bonding Between Pilot Disc & Seat.All Fourteen Srvs Pilot Valves Were Replaced1999-07-23023 July 1999
- on 990701,determined That Thirteen MSRVs Failed to Meet 1% Setpoint Tolerance Due to Setpoint Drift.Caused by Corrosion Induced Bonding Between Pilot Disc & Seat.All Fourteen Srvs Pilot Valves Were Replaced
05000352/LER-1999-007, :on 990617,inadvertent Emergency Svc Water Start During Test Equipment Installation Occurred.Caused by Personnel Error.Procedure Revised.With1999-07-14014 July 1999
- on 990617,inadvertent Emergency Svc Water Start During Test Equipment Installation Occurred.Caused by Personnel Error.Procedure Revised.With
05000352/LER-1999-005, :on 990611,RPS & ESF Actuations Were Noted. Caused by Personnel Error During Turbine Routine Testing. Revised Backup Overspeed & Power/Load Unbalance Test Routine Test Procedure.With1999-07-0909 July 1999
- on 990611,RPS & ESF Actuations Were Noted. Caused by Personnel Error During Turbine Routine Testing. Revised Backup Overspeed & Power/Load Unbalance Test Routine Test Procedure.With
05000353/LER-1999-003-02, :on 990607,bypass of RW Cleanup Sys Leak Detection Sys Isolation Functions on Three Separate Occasions Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Review & Approval of Change to Sys Procedure.Procedure S44.7.C Revised1999-07-0707 July 1999
- on 990607,bypass of RW Cleanup Sys Leak Detection Sys Isolation Functions on Three Separate Occasions Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Review & Approval of Change to Sys Procedure.Procedure S44.7.C Revised
05000352/LER-1999-004-01, :on 990606,ADS Was Inoperable During Planned Maint & Applicable TS Was Not Met.Caused by Inadequate Review Operability Requirements.Clearance Was Removed from Backup ADS Gas Bottles & Sys Was Returned to Service1999-07-0101 July 1999
- on 990606,ADS Was Inoperable During Planned Maint & Applicable TS Was Not Met.Caused by Inadequate Review Operability Requirements.Clearance Was Removed from Backup ADS Gas Bottles & Sys Was Returned to Service
ML20209G0211999-06-30030 June 1999 GE-NE-B13-02010-33NP, Evaluation of Limerick Unit 2 Shroud Cracking for at Least One Fuel Cycle of Operation ML20209D7741999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for June 1999 for Limerick Generating Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20207H8331999-05-31031 May 1999 Non-proprietary Rev 0 to 1H61R, LGS - Unit 2 Core Shroud Ultrasonic Exam ML20195G4651999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Lgs,Units 1 & 2 ML20209D7791999-05-31031 May 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Repts for May 1999 for Limerick Generating Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20209F2381999-05-24024 May 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 135 & 100 to Licenses NPF-39 & NPF-85,respectively ML20206U6911999-05-19019 May 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 99 to License NPF-85 05000352/LER-1999-003-01, :on 990420,RPS & PCRVICS Actuations Were Noted, Due to Loss of FW Transient.Caused by Spuriously Opening Breaker.Deep Bed Condensate Deminerlizer Sys Was Replaced1999-05-19019 May 1999
- on 990420,RPS & PCRVICS Actuations Were Noted, Due to Loss of FW Transient.Caused by Spuriously Opening Breaker.Deep Bed Condensate Deminerlizer Sys Was Replaced
05000353/LER-1999-002-03, :on 990419,various ESF Actuations Due to Loss of Power to 2A Rps/Ups Distribution Panel,Occurred.Caused by Loose Bus Bar Connection in RPS Breaker panel.Bus-bar Connection Inspected,Cleaned & re-tightened1999-05-18018 May 1999
- on 990419,various ESF Actuations Due to Loss of Power to 2A Rps/Ups Distribution Panel,Occurred.Caused by Loose Bus Bar Connection in RPS Breaker panel.Bus-bar Connection Inspected,Cleaned & re-tightened
ML20206U4991999-05-17017 May 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 98 to License NPF-85 ML20206P8871999-05-14014 May 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 97 to License NPF-85 ML20206N5761999-05-13013 May 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 134 & 96 to Licenses NPF-39 & NPF-85,respectively ML20195B3021999-05-0606 May 1999 Rev 0 to PECO-COLR-L2R5, COLR for Lgs,Unit 2 Reload 5 Cycle 6 ML20195G4761999-04-30030 April 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1999 for Lgs,Units 1 & 2 ML20206N2901999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1999 for Limerick Generating Station,Units 1 & 2.With ML20206D8971999-04-22022 April 1999 Rev 2 to PECO-COLR-L1R7, COLR for Lgs,Unit 2 Reload 7, Cycle 8 ML20205N8341999-04-0101 April 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Automatic Switch Co Nuclear Grade Series X206380 & X206832 Solenoid Valves Ordered Without Lubricants That Were Shipped with Std Lubrication to PECO & Tva.Affected Plants Were Notified 05000352/LER-1999-002-01, :on 990303,failure to Perform TS Surveillance Required Locked Valve Insp Occurred.Caused by Personnel Error.Procedures Revised.With1999-04-0101 April 1999
- on 990303,failure to Perform TS Surveillance Required Locked Valve Insp Occurred.Caused by Personnel Error.Procedures Revised.With
ML20205N9311999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Mar 1999 for Limerick Generating Station,Units 1 & 2.With 05000352/LER-1999-001-02, :on 990217,old Rev of LGS PSP Was Discovered on Hard Drive of self-contained Computer in Security Ofc Area. Caused by Less than Adequate Ac.Security Force Was Placed on Heightened Awareness to Compensate for Compromise of SG1999-03-16016 March 1999
- on 990217,old Rev of LGS PSP Was Discovered on Hard Drive of self-contained Computer in Security Ofc Area. Caused by Less than Adequate Ac.Security Force Was Placed on Heightened Awareness to Compensate for Compromise of SGI
ML20204G9851999-03-11011 March 1999 Safety Evaluation Re Revised Emergency Action Levels for Limerick Generating Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20207J7461999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Feb 1999 for Limerick,Units 1 & 2.With ML20199G2371999-01-31031 January 1999 Rev 0 to NEDO-32645, Limerick Generating Station,Units 1 & 2 SRV Setpoint Tolerance Relaxation Licensing Rept ML20199L5301999-01-19019 January 1999 Special Rept:On 981214,seismic Monitor Was Declared Inoperable.Caused by Spectral Analyzer Not Running.Attempted to Reboot Sys & Then Sent Spectral Analyzer to Vendor for Analysis & Rework.Upgraded Sys Will Be Operable by 990331 ML20199D8321999-01-12012 January 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 133 & 95 to Licenses NPF-39 & NPF-85,respectively ML20206R7881999-01-12012 January 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 94 to License NPF-85 05000353/LER-1998-008-02, :on 981209,plant Personnel Identified That Unit 2 RCIC Turbine Steam Supply Line warm-up Bypass Valve Had Been in Partially Open Condition.Caused by Intermittment Control Circuit Anomaly.Control Circuit Replaced1999-01-0707 January 1999
- on 981209,plant Personnel Identified That Unit 2 RCIC Turbine Steam Supply Line warm-up Bypass Valve Had Been in Partially Open Condition.Caused by Intermittment Control Circuit Anomaly.Control Circuit Replaced
ML20205K0381998-12-31031 December 1998 PECO Energy 1998 Annual Rept. with ML20199F9611998-12-31031 December 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Dec 1998 for Limerick Generating Station.With 05000352/LER-1998-019, :on 981202,noted Unescorted Access to Contract Employee Who Had Tampered with Drug Test Specimen.Caused by Incorrect Computer Data Entry for pre-access Drug Screening. Will Develop Formal Training Program for Data Entry Clerk1998-12-23023 December 1998
- on 981202,noted Unescorted Access to Contract Employee Who Had Tampered with Drug Test Specimen.Caused by Incorrect Computer Data Entry for pre-access Drug Screening. Will Develop Formal Training Program for Data Entry Clerk
ML20198E0191998-12-14014 December 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 132 & 93 to Licenses NPF-39 & NPF-85,respectively ML20198A3871998-12-10010 December 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Licensee Response to GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power- Operated Gate Valves ML20198C7151998-12-10010 December 1998 Rev 1 to COLR for LGS Unit 1,Reload 7,Cycle 8 ML20206N4061998-11-30030 November 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Nov 1998 for Limerick Generating Station,Units 1 & 2.With ML20199E3281998-11-23023 November 1998 Rev 2 to PECO-COLR-L2R4, COLR for Lgs,Unit 2,Reload 4,Cycle 5 1999-09-30
[Table view] |
Text
vu..a u.outu.o N
/
PAGE
- E, ENGINEERING REPORT sur 1 or 79 mo.
_1 Fpirt enke Morse H2 mm R-5.15-8660 Engine civision "U
Pump Drive Gears 8-1/8 x 10 0.P. Engines r"
dk/
aspoar "8
Evaluation of Abnormal Wear at Limerick sr G. Gutoski introduction Coltec Industries, Fairbanks Morse Engine Division manufactured, tested and delivered a skidded engine-generator set serial number 879060 to Limerick Generating Station in 1980. In August 1994, during scheduled maintenance of the diesel generator (unit D22),
excessive wear was noted on the flex-drive gear (16200747) and its mating gears'. The greatest wear was on the driven, lube-oil-pump gear (16300443). At that time, the engine had experienced 474 hours0.00549 days <br />0.132 hours <br />7.837302e-4 weeks <br />1.80357e-4 months <br /> of operation. The flex-drive gear, its mating gears and the lube-oil-pump, governor-drive bracket (16403129) were removed and replaced. 'ihe 1
parts were examined and reports written by PECO, Technicon Enterprises, and 2
Philadelphia Gear Corporation. They concluded that the abnormal wear was due to misalignment of the driven, lube-oil-pump gear resulting from an out of square tube-oil-pump, governor-drive bracket. In their judgment failure of the gears was not imminent. The parts were returned to Fairbanks Morse for further evaluation and possible part 21 report.
Evaluation by Fairbanks Morse Fairbanks Morse concurs with the evaluation by PECO and their consultants. Our inspection indicates that the lube-oil-pump, govenor-drive bracket does not meet the drawing requirements for squareness of the bracket bolting face to the centerline of the gear shaf t bone. The result of this error was loading on ends the gear teeth of the flex-drive gear Ond driven, lube-oil-pump gear. This caused high contact stresses and eventual pitting as was observed on these gears. If the gears had not been replaced the wear would have continued to the point of failure.
The steps leading to the observed pitting and then to the projected failure are as foilows.
- 1. At the start, the misalignment reduces the size of the tooth contact area and moves the area away from the center of the tooth resulting in high contact stresses.
- 2. Repeated cycles of high contact stress f atigues the material causing pits to form in the loaded area.
- 3. The loss of material due to pitting shifts the contact area away from the loaded side of the tooth and toward the unloaded end of the tooth.
- 4. The newly loaded area of the tooth is also highly stressed so in time it fatigues and pits and shif ts the load further toward the unloaded end of the tooth, in this manner the pitted area of the tooth walks across the length of the tooth.
- 5. At this point misalignment is no longer an issue since the teeth make contact along their whole length. However, the load is only carried on the high points 9502240088 950215 PDR ADOCK 05000352 P
pop i
N
.y\\
PAGE ENGINEERING REPORT snar 2 or 79 mo.
2 s
Falfbanks C~ ore.
FEI m8ER R-5.15-8660 Engn. olvi ion s m ect Pump Drive Gears 8-1/8 x 10 0.P. Engines February 10, 1995 rmEPARED 8Y D.P. Beck BEPORT Evaluation of Abnormal Wear at Limerick
^ ' ', "
r G. Gutoski between the pits and the gear runs roughly since the tooth profile is no longer an involute. The small contact area and the additional load due to speed variation causes relatively rapid loss of material across the whole tooth f ace.
- 6. As the gear wears, the strength of the tooth decreases and the bending stresses in the root of the tooth increase.
- 7. Fatigue cracks develop and spread in the root of the tooth causing the teeth to break off and the gear to fail.
The gears at Limerick did not fail but the above scenario was in process on two gears, the flex drive gear and the driven, lube-oil-pump gear. These two gears saw high contact stresses and the resultant pitting. The flex drive gear teeth saw 25 million cycles of high stress and was at the start of step 5, it had lost 0.006" of material from the tooth profile'. The driven, lube-oil-pump gear saw 45 million cycles of high stress and was wellinto step 5. It had lost 0.025" of material from the tooth profile *. Neither gear was near failure since we have seen such gears loose 0.045" of material without breaking '.
Recommendations for Action At Nuclear Plants Fairbanks Morse knows of no other governor drive bracket with this machining error and thinks that it is unlikely that other engines in nuclear plants will have the same problem.
However, if such a problem did exist and the problem was not detected early enough, serious consequences would result.
The recommended service procedures include a visual inspection of these gears every 12 5
8 to 18 months. Between inspections, up to 238 hours0.00275 days <br />0.0661 hours <br />3.935185e-4 weeks <br />9.0559e-5 months <br /> of operation are possible. If properly performed, these inspections will detect this problem in the first inspection after significant off-center pitting occurs (step 2). The rate of wear from step 2 to step 4 depends upon misalignment and therefore will vary. The rate of wear from step 5 to step 7 is independent of misalignment and is estimated to be over 300 hours0.00347 days <br />0.0833 hours <br />4.960317e-4 weeks <br />1.1415e-4 months <br /> 7. Since the operating time from first detectable indication to failure exceeds the operating time between inspections, we can conclude that visual inspections if properly done will prevent a failure due to misalignment.
A proper visual inspection must be able to distinguish between the destructive pitting 8
described above and initial or corrective pitting. Initial pitting is a wear-in phenomena which corrects itself by spreading the load more evenly on the tooth. Initial pitting is common on these gears and is not a cause for concern. In fact, flex-drive gears with initial pitting have run for 10s of thousands of hours without problem.
me PAGE ENGINEERING REPORT sm 3 or 79 mo.
3 Folebenks Corse rug NtW BER R-5.15-8660 Engine Divlelon Pump Drive Gears 8-1/8 x 10 0.P. Engines February 10, 1995 N
sY D.P. Beck BEsoff N
Evaluation of Abnormal Wear at Limerick APPaoVED Greg Gutoski Visualinspections were performed at Limerick at the required intervals. The first time 2
signs of this problem were reported was during their August 1994 inspection. At that time, the problem was progressing through step 5. Given the wear rate calculated for step 5, abnormal gear damage should have been evident at a prior inspection in February 1993. However none was reported. It is likely that in February 1993, pitting was observed but was thought to be initial pitting. In August 1994, this mistake was not made, the pitting was identified as abnormal and action was taken.
If misalignment is a possibility, then the inspection must be performed by someone expert enough to distinguish between initial pitting which is acceptable and destructive pitting which is not acceptable. The differences are subtle and identifying them calls for considerable experience with gears. To help make the distinction, it is recommended that gear lash measurements be taken and tracked to determine the rate of wear. When using visualinspection of wear patterns, the problem must be identified before step 5, that is before the pitting has progressed all the way across the tooth.
There are two other methods that could be used to identify this problem.
1.The tooth contact patterns could be generated in place, under load and evaluated to determine the degree of misalignment. Again, the inspection must be performed by someone expert enough to distinguish between acceptable and unacceptable misalignment.
- 2. The lube-oil-pump and govenor-drive bracket could be removed and the alignment between the bracket f ace and gear-shaft centerline measured.
Once it is established that misalignment is not a problem, it is our experience that these gears will perform reliably for 10s of thousands of hours. Any deterioration cf these gears will progress very slowly and can be easily detected before it is dangerous by a competent mechanic taking gear lash measurements and performing visualinspections.
ammes PAGE ENGINEERING REPCRT sunT 4 or 79 wo.
4 Fairbanks Corse TILE msER R-5.15-8660 Engine Olviolon February 10. 1995 Pump Drive Gears 8-1/8 x 1- 0.P. Engines r ErrsEn nr D.P. Beck N
Evaluation of Abnormal Wear at Limerick
^PP,"o*
y Greg Gutoski CONCLUSION The excessive gear tooth wear observed on diesel generator D22 at Limerick was due to misalignment caused by improper machining of the tube-oil-pump and governor-drive bracket. The gears were wearing rapidly and presented a dangerous situation. Fairbanks Morse does not expect other engines to have this problem. However, in critical installations, the possibility of misalignment must be eliminated. This can be done through inspection of wear patterns, inspection of tooth contact patterns or inspection of the bracket. Whichever method is employed, it must be performed by competent persons. In particular, the examination of wear patterns requires experience with gear failures.
Footnotes
- 1. Drawings of this assembly can be found in Appendix A
- 2. Reports by PECO, Technicon Enterprises and Philadelphia Gear are contained in Appendix B 3.The Fairbanks Morse inspection report is in Appendix C 4.The Gear Tooth Thickness measurements and Calculations are in Appendix D
- 5. Letter from Tom Skinner of Fairbanks Morse to " Owners of Fairbanks Morse EDG
-Nuclear Industry" dated February 27,1985
- 6. The expected plant operating requirements are given in Appendix E
- 7. The wear rate calculations are given in Appendix F 8 Guidelines for inspection of the Flex-Drive Gear and its Mating Gears are given in Appendix G
conec mouunes
[h-em PAfE
@/,
ENGINEERING REPORT 8mf 79 or 79 No.
ES
.Fhlrtmenks Morse I1LE Engine Divlelon M BER R-5.15-8660 Pump Drive Gears 8-1/8 x 10 0.P. Engines February 10, 1995
" 'C' PREPARED sr D.P. Beck REPORT tmz Evaluation of Abnormal Wear at Limerick APPROVED G. Gutoski APPENDIX G Inspection Guidelines for the Flex-Drive Gear and it Mating Gears The gears in the lube-oil and water pump drives are visually inspected every 12 to 18 months. The inspection should look for gear problems as detailed in standard references such as Metals Handbook. Failure Analvsis and Prevention', or Handbook of Practical 2
G93LQeSign_by Dudley or Fundamentals of Gear Desian by Drago.
It is particularly important to look for evidence of misalignment on the flex drive gear (16200747) and its mating gears since these gears are not case-hardened and misalignment has been found to cause rapid wear of their teeth. The first indication of significant misalignment will probably be tooth-end pitting on the mating gear. As the damage progresses, it will be possible to classify the pitting as destructive pitting. The pits will become larger and the pitted area will travel across the length of the teeth. It is important to detect and replace gears with this condition before the destructive pitting has progressed across the length of the teeth.
Although pitting can indicate a gear problem, on the flex gear and its mating gears a condition known as initial pitting or corrective pitting is common and is not a cause for concern. This kind of pitting will be located on the pitch line and the pits will be shallow and under 1mm in diameter. Gears with initial pitting can be safely run, but the condition should be noted and followed at the scheduled inspections. Within 200 hours0.00231 days <br />0.0556 hours <br />3.306878e-4 weeks <br />7.61e-5 months <br /> the pits should heal over, that is they should smooth out slightly. However, if the pitted area continues to Orow af ter 200 hours0.00231 days <br />0.0556 hours <br />3.306878e-4 weeks <br />7.61e-5 months <br />, or grows into the tooth dedendum or the pits grow in size, then the gear should be replaced and the cause determined.
Gear lash measurements can be used to help distinguish between destructive and initial pitting. If initial pitting is present, the rate of change in gear lash should decrease during wear-in. On the other hand, if destructive pitting is present the rate of change in gear lash should remain the same or increase. Note that the maximum allowed gear lash is 0.012".
References:
- 1. Metals Handbook, 8th Edition, Vol 10, Failure Analysis and Prevention; American Society for Metals; Metals Park, Ohio: 1975
- 2. Dudley, Darle W.; Handbook of Practical Gear D_esian; McGraw-Hill Book Co.; New York: 1984
- 3. Drago, Raymond J.; hindamentals of Gear Desinn; Butterworth-Heinemann; Stoneham MA; 1988
__