ML20083Q729

Forwards Followup Response to Items Noted in 830531 Draft Technical Evaluation Rept (Dter) Re Phase I,NUREG-0612, Control of Heavy Loads. Responses Also Provided to Open Items Identified in 831121 Dter Re Phase II,NUREG-0612

ML20083Q729
Person / Time
Site:	Catawba
Issue date:	04/19/1984
From:	Tucker H DUKE POWER CO.
To:	Adensam E, Harold Denton, Dentor H Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
REF-GTECI-A-36, REF-GTECI-SF, RTR-NUREG-0612, RTR-NUREG-612, TASK-A-36, TASK-OR NUDOCS 8404230214
Download: ML20083Q729 (10)

Text

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DUKE POWER GOMPAhT P.O.190x 33180 CIIAltLOTTE, N.C. 28242 T."J."E"

- - - April 19,1984 p"offr"E Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Attention: Ms. E. G. Adensam, Chief Licensing Branch No. 4 Re: Catawba Nuclear Station Docket Nos. 50-413 and 50-414

Dear Mr. Denton:

Ms. E. G. Adensam's letter of May 31, 1983 transmitted a draft technical evaluation report related to Control of Heavy Loads, Phase I, NUREG-0612.

My letter of June 28, 1983 provided responses to items noted in the DTER with the exception of Specia' Lifting Devices and Crane Design. A follow-up response for each of these items is attached.

Ms. E. G. Adensam's letter of November 21, 1983 transmitted a draft tecnnical evaluation report related to Control of Heavy Loads, Phase II, NUREG-0612.

A response to each of the identified open items is attached.

Very truly yours, h . hsr

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Hal B. Tucker ROS/php Attachment cc: Mr. James P. O'Reilly Palmetto Alliance Regional Administrator 21356 Devine Street U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Columbia, South Carolina 29205 Region II 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 Mr. Jesse L. Riley Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Carolina Environmental Study Group 854 Henley Place' NRC Resident Inspector Charlotte, North Carolina 28207 Catawba Nuclear Station Mr. Robert Guild, Esq.

Attorney-at-Law P. O. Box 12097 Charleston, South Carolina 29412 i

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HRD/HBT/ROS April 19,1984 Catawba Nuclear Station Control of Heavy Loads, Phase I NUREG-0612 TER Section 2.3.4 - Special Lifting Devices The following special lifting devices have been identified:

1 - Reactor Vessel Head lifting Rig 2 - Load Cell 3 - Reactor Internals Lifting Rig 4 - Reactor Coolant Pump Motor Lifting Rig 5 - Control Rod Drive Mechanism Missile Shield Lifting Rig Although not originally specified to be designed in accordance with ANSI-N14.6-1978, " Standard for Special Lifting Devices for Shipping Containers Weighing 10,000 Pounds (4500 Kg or More for Nuclear Materials)," each of the special lifting devices was provided by Westinghouse or Duke Power, i in accordance with appropriate quality assurance and quality control procedures, for a specific application. Each of the special lifting devices was load tested by Westinghouse or Duke Power based on then current industry practice. These load tests are summarized below

Device Design Capacity Test Performed by 1 Load Cell 500,000 lbs 625,000 lbs Westinghouse Internals Lifting Rig 325,000 lbs 407,000 lbs Westinghouse R.V. Head Lifting Rig 318,000 lbs 408,750 lbs Westinghouse RCP Motor Lifting Rig 110,000 lbs 87,600 lbs Duke Power CRDM Missile Shield 129,000 lbs 193,500 lbs Lifting Rig Section 2.3.7 - Crane Design Hoists identified as arrangement R0ll and R012 have been identified as under-hung cranes. Therefore, CMAA-70, " Specification for Electric Overhead Traveling Cranes," is not applicable.

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. HRD/HBT/ROS April 19, 1984 Catawba Nuclear Station Control of Heavy Loads, Phase II NUREG-0612 TER Section 2.3.2 Based on the evaluation of Safe Shutdown and Decay Heat Removal equipment, it was detemined that the following approach would satisfy the intent of NUREG-0612.

The polar crane is assumed to be capable of a drop at any point within the crane wall. Since the head is the largest item that can be dropped, all

, smaller loads would be covered by the reactor vessel head. This simplifies the analysis since we assume any/all equipment can be damaged by a load drop.

Since each load handling device has a station directive or procedure to control its use, and since flagmen and markers are used on all lifts, these cranes fully comply with NUREG-0612.

A third load drop of the reactor vessel head was considered. This case is a drop on the operating floor which causes concrete spalling and subsequent possible damage to equipment on lower levels of the Reactor Building. This case was not mentioned ir. earlier submittals covering the Reactor Building.

The three crane / load combinations are discussed below:

1) Dropping of the reactor vessel head onto the vessel flange, and

2) Oblique drop of the reactor vessel head onto the upper internals --

I These analyses were performed by Westinghouse and were documented in WCAP-9198, which concluded that the integrity of the fuel cladding, vessel and vessel nozzles is maintained. Additional analyses perfomed by Duke Power demonstrated that the primary loop piping, auxiliary piping and vessel supports are adequate to maintain core cooling capabilities.

3) Reactor vessel head drop onto the operating floor --

Initial Conditions / Assumptions

a. Weight of heavy load: 289,772 lb.; RV head, platfom and acessories, lifting rig, load cell, crane hook, block and cat'le

b. Impact area of load:

1. Flat drop on the operating floor. Impact area of 8603 in2

c. Drop height: 5.583 ft. - height of storage stand plus 6 inches

d. Drop locations: Operating floor

HRD/HBT/ROS April 19,1984

e. Credit for the action of impact limiters: No credit

f. Thickness of floor slab: 2 feet - 6 inches

g. Drag forces: No drag forces are assumed.

h. Load combinations: Impact load plus dead weight of the slab

i. Material properties: Main Reinforcing: No.11 bars, grade 40, Concrete - f'c = 5000 psi Method of Analysis:

The operating floor was modeled using a STRUDL space frame finite element model subject to the RV head impact load. The impact load, slab ductility and penetrations were determined based on methods described in Chapter 6 of ASCE manual number 58, " Structural Analysis and Design of Nuclear Plant Facilities" and Williamson and Alvy, " Impact Effect of Fragments Striking i Structural Elements." The resulting shears and moments were evaluated I

using conventional design methods.

Conclusion:

The postulated reactor vessel head drop does not penetrate the operating floor and some scabbing does occur on the underside; however, the structural stability and functional requirements are maintained.

l TER Section 2.3.3 Information on the five identified hoists is attached.

Provisions for safe load paths, procedures, crane operator training, and cranes (inspection, testing and maintenance) were previously discussed in my letter of June 28, 1983 and are applicable to these five additional hoists.

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LOAD /If1 PACT AREA f4 ATRIX AUXILIARY BUILDIslG Crane: tiotor Driven Aux. Feedwater Pump floist - A009 Capacity: 5 Ton General Arrangement Drawing flo: Cf!-1200-5.4 Approximate Uppermost Impact Area: AA,50 - El. 553+0 LOADS SAFETY-RELATED* EQUIPr!ErlT ELEVATI0tl 0F EQUIPriEflT llAZARD ELIliff!ATIOrl CATEGGRY Motor Drive Aux. Feedwater:  !!echanical/liuclear &

Electrical '

1) Pump - 3700 lbs. Train A & B < 553+0 (1) & (5)c

2) Motor - 2550 lbs.

3) Driver - 4560 lbs.

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o Equipment reo.uired for plant safe-shutdown and/or decry heat remova

-LOAD / IMPACT AREA MATRIX AUXILIARY BUILDIslG Crane: Aux. Feedwater Pump Hoist - A010 Capacity: 5 Ton General Arrangement Drawing flo: Cft-1200-5.4 Approximate Uppermost Impact Area: AA,63 - El. 553+0 LOADS SAFETY-RELATED* EQUIPMErlT ELEVATI0tl 0F EQUIP:'EflT liAZARD ELIMIflATI0il CATEGORY Motor Driven Aux. flechanical/fluclear &

Feed.4a ter: Electrical ,

1) Pump - 3700 lbs. Train A & B < 553+0 (1) & (5)c

2) Motor - 2550 lbs.

3) Driver - 4560 lbs.

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o Equipment required for plant safe-shutdown and/or decry heat removal

f LOAD / IMPACT AREA MATRIX AUXILIARY BUILDING Crane: Turbine Driven Aux. Feedwater Pump Monorail - A027 Capacity: 10 Ton General Arrangement Drawing No: CN 1200-10.5 Approximate Uppermost Impact Area: AA,60 - El. 605+0 LOADS SAFETY-RELATED* EQUIPMENT ELEVATION OF EQUIPMEllT IIAZARD ELIMillATION CATEGORY Hatch Cover - (20,000 lbs.  !!echanical/f!uclear &

Turbine Driven Aux. Electrical Feedwater:

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1) Pump - 5725 lbs. Train A & B 605+0 to 594+0 (4)a

2) Base - 1750 lbs. 594+0 to 577+0 at hatch (4)a

3) Driver - 4000 lbs 577+0 to 560+0 at hatch (4)a

. 560+0 to 543+0 at hatch (1) & (5)e

<605+0 not at batch (4)b i o Equipment required for plant safe-shutdown and/or decry heat removal

LOAD / IMPACT AREA MATRIX AUXILI ARY BUILD!i;G Crane: Turbine Driven Aux. Feedwater Pump Monorail - A028 Capacity: 10 Ton General Arrangement Drawing flo: Crl-1200-10.5

- Approximate Uppermost Impact Area: AA,51 - El. 605+0 t

LOADS SAFETY-RELATED* EQUIPitErlT ELEVATI0ft OF EQUIP:4ErlT llAZARD ELIMIflATI0il CATEGORY llatch Cover - <20,000 lbs. Mechanical /fluclear &

Turbine Driven Aux. Electrical -

Feedwater:

1) Pump -5725 lbs. Train A & B 605+0 to 594+0 (4)a

2) Base - 1750 lbs. 594+0 to 577+0 at hatch (4)a

3) Driver - 4000 lbs. 577+0 to 560+0 at hatch (4)a 560+0 to 543+0 at hatch (2)

<605+0 not at hatch (4)b l

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• Equipc'ent required for plant safe-shutdown and/or decry heat removal

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l LOAD / IMPACT AREA MATRIX AUXILIARY BUILDir:G Crane: Component Cooling Pump Monorail - A046 Capacity: 3 Ton General Arrangement Drawing Mo: CH-1200-9.1 Approximate Uppermost Impact Area: EE, 56 - El. 583+0 LOADS SAFETY-RELATED* EQUIFI!ENT ELEVATICN OF EQUIPMENT liAZARD ELIMINATION CATEGORY Cemponent Cooling: tiechanical/Huclear &

Electrical .

1) Pump - 1555 lbs. A & B Train 583+0 to 577+0 (2)

2) Motor - 4200 lbs. 577+0 to 560+0 (2)

3) Bed Plate - 1150 lbs. 560+0 to 543+0 (2) 543+0 to 522+0 (2) o Equipment required for plant safe-shutdown and/or decry heat removal

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,4, . HRD/HBT/R0S

• April 19, 1984 t

Hazard Elimination Categories

1. This system has sufficient separation and redundancy with cross connections

and/or isolations to allow it to perform its safety function in the event of a load drop in this area.

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2. The location and function of this system is separable and redundant to j~ that of the Standby Shutdown Facility, allowing the units to be shutdown in the event of a load drop in this area.

3. Site-specific considerations preclude the need to consider load / target i combinations.

! a. These cranes will only be operable during cold shutdown or refueling.

4. Analysis demonstrates that crane failure and subsequent load drop will not damage equipment required for plant safe-shutdown and/or decay heat removal.

a. Equipment identified not required.

! b. Floor slab thickness of sufficient thickness and strergth to prevent load from penetrating slab and striking equipment.

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c. Equinment identified not located in load drop area.

5. Likelihood of handling systen failure for this load is extremely small.

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