ML20059M952

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Forwards Diagnostic Evaluation Team Rept on Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station (930823-0903 & 20-30)
ML20059M952
Person / Time
Site: Quad Cities  Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 11/17/1993
From: Taylor J
NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO)
To: Connor J
COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
Shared Package
ML20059M955 List:
References
NUDOCS 9311300016
Download: ML20059M952 (6)


Text

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. o urg%g UNITED STATES 8 o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

_L j WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 (

/ November 17, 1993 Docket Nos. 50-254; 50-265 Licensee Nos. DPR-29; DPR-30 j

Commonwealth Edison Company ATTN: Mr. James J. O'Connor

  • Chief Executive Officer Post Office Box 767 Chicago, Illinois 61690 .6

Dear Mr. O'Connor:

This letter forwards the Diagnostic Evaluation Team (DET) Report for the Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station. The team assessed the effectiveness of licensed '

activities performed by Commonwealth Edison Company (CECO) in achieving safe-operation at Quad Cities and determined the causes-of performance.

deficiencies. The team of evaluators, led by a Nuclear Regulatory Commission a

.(NRC) manager, evaluated safety activities at Quad Cities from August- 23 through September.3, 1993, and September 20 through 24, 1993.

Evaluations were also conducted at the corporate offices during these periods,. and during the period of September 27 through 30, 1993. Findings were discussed with you at an exit meeting on November.8, 1993, at the Quad Cities Nuclear Power '

Station. This exit meeting was open for public observation. .

To gain an independent perspective, the team was staffed with members having no recent responsibility for the regulation of CECO. Safety performance was evaluated in the areas of operations and training, maintenance and testing,  ;

engineering and technical support, and management.

The team identified performance deficiencies in the areas of operations and training, maintenance and testing, and engineering'and technical support, and- '

found that weaknesses in management had contributed to these deficiencies.

Although senior site managers had been aware,' for some time, of'many of the ,

problems described in this report, they had not been effective in resolving. '

underlying . root causes and improving performance. Specifically, the team found that: management was willing to accept equipment problems without aggressively pursuing corrective: actions; operations management rarely.

formally evaluated operability of degraded equipment; engineering assessments

- of degraded plant hardware were.not rigorous; the work control process was.

ineffective and inefficient; the effects of vibration on_'several plant systems had not been evaluated; the large number'of uncorrected component problems-resulted in the degradation of safety systems; there were significant-leadership weaknesses in site-and corporate management; and a number of.

orevious initiatives and self-assessments to improve performance had not'been -;

successful. .;

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t 1 Commonwealth Edison Company November 17, 1993 Specific examples the team found where CECO had not acted to correct or evaluate the safety consequences include: (1) pressure isolation check valves that had failed a closure verification test in April 1993; (2) the feedwater flow element configuration that had never been calibrated even though information existed that the plant may have been operating above the core power operating limit for an extended' period of time; and (3) vibration that had caused a failure of a safety-related valve in 1983 and again in 1992, and was the subject of a 1983 information notice. Even after these plant hardware issues were elevated to the attention of Quad Cities managers, there was a lack of a sense of urgency to correct or evaluate these deficiencies. The failure to correct or evaluate potential deficiencies in level switches in the high pressure coolant injection system ccntributed to the causes of the rupture disk event in June 1993 that injured five plant personnel.

I note that many of these deficiencies had existed for several years, and that many had been previously identified both by your staff and through other assessment activities. I am concerned that a large number of equipment problems existed throughout the plant that had not been fully evaluated for safety significance. For example, the Vulnerability Assessment Team (VAT) report, completed by your staff in November 1992, identified a'large number of equipment problems. At the time of this NRC evaluation, your staff had not performed an assessment of the cumulative effects of the individual hardware issues identified by the VAT on plant safety. In fact, many of your managers were only vaguely aware of the VAT issues. As demonstrated by both the VAT and the NRC team's review of the residual heat removal system, the cumulative effect of the equipment problems that had not been corrected, the lack of rigorous and thorough evaluations for operability when equipment problems were identified, and the lack of a clear design basis emphasized the need for your prompt attention to prevent further system degradation.

In addition to the number of equipment problems that existed at the station, the NRC evaluation also identified generally poor performance in the corporate and site self-assessment initiatives and corrective action programs. Although many of the initiatives were positive, they were generally ineffective due to a lack of follow-through. These issues, in combination with ineffective site management and weaknesses in site and corporate leadership, are cause for concern. Therefore, increased management attention is needed to (1) identify and resolve accumulated equipment problems on a priority basis; (2) improve programs for identification ~ and resolution of equipment problems; (3) implement improved self-assessment and root cause analysis efforts; and (4) increase emphasis on leadership, teamwork, communications, and accountability among site managers.

I note that CECO was in a period of transition because of the February 1993 i reorganization and am encouraged by the fact that Ceco had developed a '

Management Plan to improve performance. I also note that CECO, since the announcement of this Diagnostic Evaluation, has initiated a number of efforts to improve performance. The Business Development Team performed a self-assessment of site management preceding the Diagnostic Evaluation. On August 21, 1993, your staff implemented an Integrated Reporting Program to

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1 Commonwealth Edison Company -

November 17, 1993 f I better identify and correct performance problems. In addition, some longstanding equipment problems have been fixed, and plans to enter short maintenance outages for both units to repair, test, and further evaluate existing equipment problems have recently been implemented. I urge CECO to take broad actions to ensure these initiatives are followed-through and the benefits are long lasting.

It is important that you and other CECO managers carefully review the enclosed report, and place special emphasis on the areas requiring additional management attention. Following this review, I r* quest that CECO determine the actions needed to ensure a long term resolution of poor performance by assuring you have addressed your understanding of the root causes. I also request, within 60 days of the date of this letter, that Ceco respond to my office telling how the DET findings and your further evaluations of root causes have been addressed. This DET identified a number of similar .

weaknesses to those identified at Dresden and Zion during previous' Diagnostic Evaluations. Please describe measures you are taking to assure lessons learned at one CECO nuclear facility benefit your other nuclear facilities.

The focus of your reply should be on long term improvement. To facilitate followup of equipment deficiencies for our Region III office, please include in your reply a summarized plan and schedule for resolution of accumulated equipment degradation.

Mr. Pleniewicz's letter to Mr. Jordan dated November 1, 1993 provided a sensitivity analysis of the Quad Cities Individual Plant Examination to study the overall safety significance of equipment deficiencies identified and

! compiled by the Diagnostic Evaluation at Quad Cities Station. The NRC staff I has established that the analysis does not affect the findings of the DET and will be responded to separately.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790(a), a copy of this letter and the enclosure will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room. Should you have any~ questions concerning this evaluation, we would be pleased to discuss them with you.

Sincerely, a ,

.y

. r n .r. !D JJames'M;' Tailor Executive Director for Operations

Enclosure:

Diagnostic Evaluation Team Report j for Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station cc w/ encl: See next page DISLRIBUTION See page 5 Am .4h4 0FFICE: 00/r AEO,0 00hAE00 DDqAE0D D:AE0D E00 ED0 [

1 NAME: AEhNheb RLhrt)rd ,DdRN EhlrIan JSniezek JTMlor DATE: 11/16 /93 ll/ic/93 11/16/93 ll / it,./93 11/ /93 Ik 3 mps  ;" 3 w UTFICIAL RECORD COPY B:\QUADCITY\0'CONNOR.QC

__- ____-_____________-a

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- 5'- November 17, 1993 DISTRIBtffl0N (w/ encl)

DCD/ Central: Files .

Public-ED0 R/F JMTaylor, EDO HThompson, EDO JSniezek, EDO MTaylor, EDO WBateman, EDO JFouchard, OPA JLieberman, OE TTMartin, RI SEbneter, RII JBMartin, RIII JMilhoan, RIV BFaulkenberry, RV TEMurley, NRR LJCallan, NRR CPatel, NRR JStang, NRR ,

JDyer, NRR  ;

JWRoe, NRR AE00 R/F ELJordan, AE0D DFRa s, AE00 00/ J./F RLSpessard, AE00 J ABBeach, RIV i SDRubin, AEOD l HABailey, AE0D MAMiller, AEOD RLLloyd, AE0D WRaughley, AEOD JWThompson, AE0D PJPrescott, AEOD  ;

ECollins, RIV '

AMendiola, NRR i

. LWert, RII  !

TFoley, NRR MShannon, NRR DSchultz, Contractor JDarby, Contractor RBrown, Contractor WHansen, Contractor ,

ALMadison, AEOD l MSmith, AE0D 8 DKRathbun, OCA EBeckjord, RES

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f 6 Commonwealth Edison Company November 17, 1993 better identify and correct performance problems. In addition, some longstanding equipment problems have been fixed, and plans to enter short maintenance outages for both units to repair, test, and further evaluate existing equipment problems have recently been implemented. I urge CECO to take broad actions to ensure these initiatives are followed-through and the benefits are long lasting. l It is important that you and other Ceco managers carefully review the enclosed report, and place special emphasis on the areas requiring additional  ;

management attention. Following this review, I request that CECO determine '

the actions needed to ensure a long term resolution of poor performance by assurir.g you have addressed your understanding of the root causes. I also request, within 60 days of the date of this letter,.that CECO respond to my office telling how the DET findings and your further evaluations of root causes have been addressed. This DET identified a number of similar weaknesses to those identified at Dresden and Zion during previous Diagnostic Evaluations. Please describe measures you are taking to assure lessons learned at one CECO nuclear facility benefit your other nuclear facilities.

The focus of your reply should be on long term improvement. To facilitate followup of equipment deficiencies for our Region III office, please include in your reply a summarized plan and schedule for resolution of accumulated equipment degradation.

Mr. pleniewicz's letter to Mr. Jordan dated November I, ~ 1993 provided a sensitivity analysis of the Quad Cities Individual Plant Examination.to study the overall safety significance of equipment deficiencies identified and compiled by the Diagnostic Evaluation at Quad Cities Station. The NRC staff has established that the analysis does not affect the findings of the DET and will be responded to separately.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790(a), a copy of this letter and the enclosure will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room. Should you have any questions concerning this evaluation, we would be pleased to discuss them with you.

Sincerely,

- /

N afes M. Tay r E'xecutive Director for Operations

Enclosure:

I Diagnostic Evaluation Team Report for Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station cc w/ encl: See next page

November 17, 1993 i

' cc w/ encl:

Mr. Stephen E. Shelton MichaelEI. Miller, Esquire '

Vice President Sidley and Austin Iowa-Illinois Gas and One First National Plaza Electric Company Chicago, Illinois 60690 P. 0.. Box 4350 Davenport, Iowa 52808 Mr. Richard Pleniewicz Resident Inspector i Site Vice-President Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission j 22712 206th Avenue North 22710 206th Avenue North Cordova, Illinois 61242 Cordova, Illinois 61242 Mr. Guy Campbell Station Manager 1 Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station 22710 206th Avenue North Cordova, Illinois 61242 Chairman Illinois Dept. of Nuclear _ Safety  !

l Rock Island County Board Office of Nuclear Facility Safety of Supervisors 1035 Outer Park Drive -

1504 3rd Avenue Springfield, Illinois 62704 Rock Island County Office Bldg.

Rock Island, Illinois 61201 Regional Administrator, Region III U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 799 Roosevelt Road, Bldg. #4 .;

Glen Ellyn,-Illinois 60137 ~

Mr. Robert Neumann Office of Public Counsel  !

State of Illinois Center 100 W. Randolph Suite 11-300 Chicago, Illinois 60601 '

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