ML20012D659

LER 90-002-00:on 900215,discovered That Train C Auxiliary Feedwater Sys Actuation Relay K266 Improperly Tested.On 900216,discovered That Automatic Diesel Generator Electrical Trip Not Tested.Testing performed.W/900316 Ltr

ML20012D659
Person / Time
Site:	Vogtle
Issue date:	03/16/1990
From:	Hairston W, Odom R GEORGIA POWER CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
ELV-01434, ELV-1434, LER-90-002-02, LER-90-2-2, NUDOCS 9003280200
Download: ML20012D659 (5)

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, Post OHice Box 1295 B:rmmpham. A!abama 35201 bephone POS D6B 5581 the wa!%m cuctoc screm W. C. Hairston, lit Sorwot Vcc Prewtent Nuclear Operatons March 16, 1990 ELV-01424 0292 Docket No. 50-424 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555 Gentlemen:

V0GTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT PROCEDURE INADEQUACY LEADS TO INADEQUATE SURYEILLANCE TESTS In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, Georgia Power Company hereby submits the enclosed report related to events which were discovered on February 15 and 16, 1990.

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Enclosure:

LER 50-424/1990-02 xc: Georaia Power Company p Mr. C. K. McCoy Mr. G. Bockhold, Jr.

Mr. R. M. Odom Mr. P. D. Rushton NORMS U. S. Nuclear Reaulatory Commission-Mr. S. D. Ebneter, Regional Administrator

! Mr. T. A. Reed, Licensing Project Manager, NRR Mr. R. F. Aiello, Senior Resident Inspector, Vogtle m

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3 As a follow-up corr,eective action to LERs 50-424/1988-028-01 and 50-424/1988-031-011 plant personnel were reviewing test procedures for' adequacy.

During the course of.this review, on 2-15-90, at 0800 CST, a system engineer discovered that the Train C Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System actuationsrelay K266 had not been properly tested in accordance with Technical Specific'ation (TS) 4.7.1.2.1.b.1 & 2 k The Shift Supervisor (SS) was advised and a limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) was entered. The required testing was performed and Train C of the AFW' System was returned to service. ]

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Continuingthereviekon/-16-90,at1122 2 CST,thesystemengineerdiscovered that the automatic Diesel Generator (DG) electrical trips that are bypassed upon loss of voltage on the= emergency bus, concurrent with a Safety injection e not tested to verify that they would actually bypasp in actuation accordancesignal, with TSwere,1 4.8. 1.2.h 6.c. The SS was advised and a LCO was entered.

The appropriate testing,,was performed and both DG trains were returned to J service, h

The procedures did not/specify adequate testing for the DG automatic elect'ical r trip bypass functions'or the Train C AFW actuation relay and these procedural inadequacies caused thest' events. The appropriate procedures have been revised for Unit 1 and will be revised for Unit 2. ,

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A. REQUIREMENT FOR REPORT This report is required per 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(i) because the unit operated in a condition outside of Technical Specification (TS) requirements when surveillance tests were not performed in a timely manner.

Technical Specifications 4.7.1.2.1.b.1 and 4.7.1.2.1.b.2 require testing of the Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System pump and valve automatic actuation at least once per 18 months during shutdown. Likewise, TS Section 4.8.1.1.2.h.6.c requires testing of the bypass function for automatic diesel generator (DG) trips.at least once per 18 months during shutdown.

B. UNIT STATUS AT TIME OF EVENT At the time of discovery of these events on 2-15-90 and 2-16-90, Unit I was in hode 1 (power operation) at approximately 96% of rated thermal power.

There was no inoperable equipment which contributed to the occurrence of these events. '

C. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT As a follow-up corrective action to LERs 50-424/1988-028-01 and 50-424/1988-031-01, plant personnel were reviewing test procedure 54055-1,

" Train A Diesel Generator And ESFAS Test", for adequacy. During the course of this review on 2-15-90, at 0800 CST, a system engineer discovered that the Train A & B sequencer loss-of-power relay K266 had not been properly tested during the Fall 1988 refueling outage in accordance with TS 4.7.1.2.1.b.1 and TS 4.7.1.2.1.b.2. This relay provides an automatic start signal to Train C of the AFW System. The Shift Supervisor (SS) was advised and a Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) was entered. The required testing was performed and Train C of the AFW system was returned to service at 1830 CST.

After continuing his review on 2-16-90, at 1122 CST, the system engineer discovered that the automatic DG electrical trips that are automatically bypassed upon loss of voltage on the emergency bus, concurrent with a Safety Injection actuation signal, were not tested during the Fall 1988 refueling outage to verify that they.would actually bypass in accordance with TS 4.8.1.1.2.h.6.c. The SS was advised and a LC0 was entered. The appropriate testing was performed and both DG trains were returned to service by 2335 CST.

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2. Previous Similar Events:

LER 50-424/1988-028-01, dated 2-1-89.

LER 50-424/1988-031-01, dated 12-1-88.

Implementation of the corrective actions from these LER's led to the discovery of the inadequate surveillance tests.

3. Energy Industry Ident;fication System Code:

Diesel Generator System - LK Auxiliary Feedwater System - BA a- . e . . . m , i ... . s u. . . . m w

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0l0 0 l3 or 0 l4 TEXT (# mee space 4 sociaost use em N8tc # arm Jube al(th D. CAUSE OF EVENT The procedures did not call out adequate testing for the DG automatic electrical trip bypass functions or the Train C AFW actuation relay and these procedural inadequacies caused these events. Due to the length of time since these procedures were written and the fact that the personnel who wrote the procedures are no longer employed by Georgia Power Company, we are unable to determine the cause of these procedural inadequacies.

E. ANALYSIS OF EVENT Although they were not required to perform their safety related functions during the period from the Fall 1988 refueling outage to 2-15-90, the tests conducted on the DG automatic electrical trip bypass functions and on the AFW actuation relay verified that they were capable of performing their functions had it been required. Based on this consideration, it is concluded that there was no adverse effect on plant safety or public health and safety as a result of these events.

F. CORRECTIVE ACTION

1. The required testing of Train C of the AFW System and the DG automatic electrical trip bypass functions was performed and the results were satisfactory.

2.- The procedure review was completed with no other inadequate surveillance tests found. In addition, the Unit 1 and Unit 2 preoperational tests associated with the DG automatic electrical trips and the Train C AFW actuation relay were reviewed and found to be adequate.

3. Provisions for performing the tests for the DG automatic electrical trips and the Train C AFW actuation relay have been added to procedures 54055-1 (Train A) and 54065-1 (Train B). The Unit 2 procedures will be revised by September 1,1990 which is prior to their next scheduled use.

G. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

1. Failed Components.

None i

i WS FORW Seta ' 'U.S. CPoi 1988 520 5D9 00079