ML20005D674

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LER 89-012-00:on 891108,890726,27 & 0829,diesel Generator 2B Valid Failures Discovered.Caused by Mgt Deficiency. Operations Mgt Procedure Omp 2-6 Will Be revised.W/891208 Ltr
ML20005D674
Person / Time
Site: Mcguire
Issue date: 12/08/1989
From: Mcconnell T, Sipe A
DUKE POWER CO.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-89-012-04, LER-89-12-4, NUDOCS 8912140088
Download: ML20005D674 (12)
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.ll. l Duke Mn Compa y (704) 875 4 000 ofcGuire Nuclear Station l PO Bat 188 -

,. Cornelius N C 2803104SS -

DUKEPOWER l

December 8,.1989 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk  :

Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject:

McGuire Nuclear Station Unit 2 i Docket No. 50-370 Licensee Event Report 370/89-12 Gentlemen:  ;

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73 Sections (a)(1) and (d), attached is Licensee Event Report 370/89-12 concerning a missed Diesel Generator 2B surveillance. This report is being submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B). This event is considered to be of no significance with respect to the health and safety of

the"public.

Very truly yours, 3 A 't Q

T.L. McConnell DVE/ADJ/cb1 Attachment t

xc: Mr. S.D. Ebneter American Nuclear Insurers  !

Administrator, Region II c/o Dottie Sherman, ANI Library U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission The Exchange, Suit 245 101 Marietta St., NW, Suite 2900 270 Farmington Avenue Atlanta, GA 30323 Farmington, CT 06032 INPO Records Center Mr. Darl Hood j Suite 1500 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission i

1100 circle 75 Parkway Office-of Nuclear Reactor Regulation l' Atlanta, GA 30339 Washington, D.C. 20555 M&M Nuclear Consultants Mr. P.K. Van Doorn 1221 Avenue of the Americas NRC Resident Inspector New York, NY 10020 McGuire Nuclear Station hhh7o MN PDC

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AC a{opah CAUSE Sv$7tv COMPONENT D PR El D IG lS II l S X l919l 9 Y I t 1 i f l 1 I l l l l l l l I I I l I 1 SUPPLEMENT AL REPORT SKPECTED tien MONia DAv vtAm I SL8 mis 810N vtS (99,en temovere EMPICTRO Sy060tsstON DA Til NO l l l Auf. ACT ro-., . im . . , .,,,.. ., u . , .u. . mi.u- n ei On July 26, 1989, Diesel Generator (D/G) 2B was started for a fourteen hour run to perform a heat soak and bearing deflection readings which was required because of maintenance on the D/G. The start time was greater than the 11.0 seconds allowed for a successful start. Operations (OPS) personnel classified the start as an Invalid Test, Run for Troubleshooting. On November 8, 1989, an OPS Nuclear, Production Engineer questioned the start classification while working with a Quality Assurance (QA) person on a surveillance of the D/G Logbooks. The start was reclassified as a Valid Failure. Subsequent investigations-had found a speed switch to be out of calibration. On July 27, 1989, at 0237, a Valid Failure l occurred because of two blown fuses on the voltage regulator for D/G 2B. On August t

29, 1989 at 1522, another Valid Failure occurred on D/G iB. Technical Specifications (TSs) require that the surveillance testing frequency be increased from every 31 days to every 7 days following two Valid Failures in the past twenty valid starts.

OPS personnel increased this frequency on August 29, 1989. The frequency should

. have been increased on July 27, 1989, if the start had been classified as a valid I failure. This event is classified as a Management Deficiency because OPS Management Procedure (OMP) 2-6, D/G Logbook, is not clear on how to classify D/G starts following maintenance. No guidance is given on post maintenance testing. Unit 2 was in No Mode for a refueling outage when the event occurred an,d in Mode 1, Power Operations at the time of discovery. A revision will be made to OMP 2-6 to ensure the D/G starts are classified correctly.

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0l0 01 2 0F 1l1 EVALUATION:

Background

Each unit at McGuire Nuclear Station has two independent D/Gs [EIIS:DGl. As part of the Essential Power System [E11S:EB], they provide standby AC power to the equipment required to safely shutdown the Reactors [EIIS:RCT] in the event of a major accident and to maintain the facility in the shutdown or refueling condition for extended periods of time. The D/Gs are required in a Blackout (loss of normal power) condition as well as a Blackout and Loss of Coolant Accident conditions.

TS 3.8.1.2 requires the following A.C. electrical power sources to be operable in Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown), and Mode 6 (Refueling):

A. One circuit between the offsite transmission network and the Onsite Essential Auxiliary Power System, and B. One D/G. Either D/G is capcble of meeting this requirement.

TS 4.8.1.1.2, in part, requires the D/G to start and accelerate to at least 488 RPM in less than or equal to 11 seconds. The voltage and frequency shall be at least 4160 volts and 57 HZ within 11 seconds after the start signal. This TS also requires that each D/G be demonstrated operable once per 31 days if the number of failures in the last 20 valid tests is one or none. If two or more valid failures have occurred in the last 20 valid tests, the surveillance frequency is increased to once per 7 days.

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l OMP 2-6, Diesel Generator Logbook, describes the method used to log all D/G start

( attempts and classify them as " Valid Success", " Valid Failure", " Invalid Test", or

" Invalid Test Failure". Page 10 of 11 shows the D/G Start Classification Guide.

Description of Event On July 9,1989, at 1535, D/G 2B was started, loaded, and run for approximately 30 minutes to deplete the Day Tank of fuel oil prior to maintenance. The D/G was then declared inoperable at 1600 when OPS personnel tagged the D/G out for maintenance.

Unit 2 was in Mode 5, and entered Mode 6, on July 10 at 1750.

From July 10 through July 19, maintenance was performed on D/G 2B. This maintenance included rotating the upper and lower cam bearings, replacing nine cam bearing halves, and replacing two connecting rod bearings. Unit 2 entered No Mode (Core Unloaded) on July 19 at 1729.

On July 25 at 0353, D/G 2B was started for post maintenance testing and run at no load condition for approximately 5 minutes. The time to reach 4160 volts was 11 956 seconds. This slow start was expected because of the extensive maintenance on the D/G. During this run, maintenance personnel discovered and subsequently repaired a fuel oil leak. Maintenance personnel also checked the bearings that had maintenance performed on them, and took temperature readings following each D/G start during the post maintenance break in runs.

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The following table lists post maintenance starts performed on July 25 and recorded in the D/G 2B logbook.

Start Number Run Time Seconds To 4160V 706 15 min. No Load 10.314 707 30 min. No Load 10.39 708 30 min. at 400 kN 10.45 30 min. at 1000 kN 709 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> at 2000 kN 10.83 710 30 min. at 2000 kN 10.87 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> at 3000 kN 711 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> at 3600 KW 10.11 Each of the above starts was classified as an Invalid Test, Run for Troubleshooting by OPS personnel.

On July 26 at 0249, D/G 2B was started for a 14 hour1.62037e-4 days <br />0.00389 hours <br />2.314815e-5 weeks <br />5.327e-6 months <br /> run to thoroughly heat the D/G and allow maintenance personnel to take deflection readings. This was start number 712 in the D/G logbook. The time to 4160 volts was 11.07 seconds. The start was classified as an Invalid Test, Run for Troubleshooting. OPS work request 136725 was issued to correct the cause of the slow start. Instrument and Electrical personnel (IAE) recalibrated the speed switches [EIIS: SIS) for the D/G and found them slightly out of calibration.

On July 27 at 0237, D/G 2B was started for procedure PT/2/A/4350/36B, D/G 2B 24 Hour Run. At 2024, OPS personnel manually tripped the D/G because of loss of voltage control from the Control Room and from the local panel. This was start number 713 and was classified by OPS personnel as a Valid Failure. Subsequent investigations by IAE personnel revealed two blown fuses [EIIS:FU) in the voltage regulator circuitry. The fuses were replaced and the D/G was tested to ensure the problem was corrected. The testing included procedure PT/2/A/4350/19B, D/G 2B Governor and Voltage Regulator Benchmark Test.

l. Procedure PT/2/A/4350/02B, D/G 2B Operability Test was successfully performed by l OPS personnel on July 30, at 2228. The work requests were signed complete and D/G 2B was declared operable at 1050 on July 31.

Unit 2 entered Mode 6 from No Mode on July 31 at 1255 by commencing fuel load operations. D/G 2A was declared inoperable and red tagged for maintenance on July 31 at-1605.

Unit 2 entered Mode 5 at 0628 on August 18. D/G 2A was restored to operable status at 1745 on August 24.

On August 24 at 2030, D/G 2B was again declared inoperable for battery [EIIS:BI]

replacement. The operability procedure was run on August 29 at 1102 and the D/G was declared operable at 1400 hours0.0162 days <br />0.389 hours <br />0.00231 weeks <br />5.327e-4 months <br />.

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0l0 0l4 or 1l1 At 1522 on August 29, OPS personnel started D/G 2B for a one hour run as required by che Engineered Safeguards Feature (ESF) test. The time to reach 4160 volts was 11.024 seconds as recorded in the D/G Logbook for start number 730. The start was classified as a valid failure. OPS personnel decided to continue on with the ESF test and formulate a plan for correcting the slow start time. The D/G was declared inoperable at 1655 on August 29. This ESF test was completed satisfactorily.

Upon completion of the ESF test, personnel from Mechanical Maintenance, IAE, and OPS conferred to formulate a plan for determining the cause, and correcting the problem of the slow starts on D/G 28. During the course of this investigation, IAE personnel found the speed sensor had been damaged. The speed sensor was replaced and documented on OPS work request 139534. The speed sensor is manufactured by Airpax Corporation, model number 085-101-0005. The D/G was subsequently retested and declared operable at 2300 on August 31.

Start number 730 for the ESF test was, at that time, the second Valid Failure .

within the last twenty valid starts (reference TS Table 4.8-1, page 11 of 11 of '

this LER). This TS requires the surveillance testing of this D/G to be increased from once per 31 days to once per 7 days. OPS personnel began testing D/G 2B according to this requirement.

In October, QA personnel were conducting QA surveillance 89-46 of the D/G Logbook.

During the course of this surveillance, an OPS Nuclear Production Engineer reclassified start numbers 710 and 711 from Invalid Test, Run for Troubleshooting, to Valid Success. The starting times and load requirements had been met for a Valid Success.

On November 8 at 1100, following a review of past D/G starts, the OPS Engineer and an OPS Manager reclassified start number 712 as a Valid Failure. This was a conservative determination based on the time to reach 4160 volts of 11.07 seconds.

OPS personnel stated they felt the speed sensor was the probable cause of the slow starts but the exact cause of the damage to the speed sensor or when it occurred could not be determined.

With start number 712 reclassified as a Valid Failure, the increased surveillance j should have been started when the fuse failure occurred on July 27, start number l

713. The operability test was run on July 30 at 2228, and again on August 29'at 1102. Under the seven day surveillance requirement, the operability test should have been performed on August 6; therefore, D/G 2B was technically inoperable from August 6 at 2228, until August 29 at 1102. D/G 2A was inoperable for maintenance on the D/G f rom July 31 at 1605, until August 24 at 1745. During part of this time, Busline 2B was removed from service and declared inoperable at 1130 on August

3. This Busline was restored to service and declared operable at 0759 on August 19.

Conclusion This event is assigned a cause of Management Deficiency because of Inadequate

! Directives. OMP 2-6 does not provide guidance on when post maintenance testing ends and valid challenges to the D/G begins. OMP 2-6 is written to comply with TS

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McGuire Nuclear Station, Unit 2 o ls l o j o j o l 3 l 7l 0 8l 9 0l 0 0l 5 or 1 l1 0l 1l 2 TEXT N show apace m socirost esas causostW MC Form M1(17) and with NRC Regulatory Guide 1.108, Periodic Testing of D/G Units Used As Onsite Power Systems. Regulatory Guide 1.108 addresses testing of D/G units during plant preoperational test and periodic testing of D/G units during normal plant operation.

On July 26, OPS personnel believed they had correctly classified start number 712 on D/G 2B as an Invalid Test, Run for Troubleshooting, following extensive maintenance. The classification was based on the guidance in OMP 2-6. During a subsequent surveillance of the D/G Logbook, OPS personnel conservatively decided to reclassify the start as a Valid Failure. This decision was made because the time to reach 4160 volts was 11.07 seconds which is greater than the 11.0 seconds allowed by TS. The surveillance of the D/G Logbook was being performed by McGuire Quality Assurance personnel in conjunction with OPS personnel. The reclassification came after extensive discussions over what constituted post maintenance testing as opposed to valid challenges to the D/G. The decision was made to conservatively classify the start as a Valid Failure.

TS 4.8.1.1.2, Table 4.8.1, lists the frequency of testing for a D/G based on the number of Valid Failures. By reclassifying the start performed on July 26 as a Valid Failure, the surveillance frequency for D/G 2B should have been increased to once per 7 days when the fuses failed in the Voltage Regulator circuit on July 27.

The surveillance was performed on July 30 at 2228, and again on August 29 at 1102.

l D/G 2B was technically inoperable from August 6 at 2228, until August 29 at 1102.

l In addition, D/G 2A was inoperable from July 31 at 1605 until August 24 at 1745.

I Neither D/G was technically operable between August 6, 1989 at 2228, and August 24, l

1989 at 1745, although D/G 2B would have started and assumed the required loads if j needed as shown by the operability test performed on August 29, 1989.

l' l Station personnel involved in the evaluation of this event believe the indicated slow times to reach 4160 volts following the maintenance on D/G 2B were a result of the damaged speed sensor discovered on August 31, 1989. A trend of the time to L reach 4160 volts indicates the speed sensor was damaged during or immediately following the maintenance on D/G 2B. The exact cause of the damage to the speed sensor and the time it occurred could not be determined.

A review of the McGuire Licensee Event Reports for the previous twelve months revealed no other events involving missed TS surveillances on the D/Gs because of l Inadequate Directives. Eight events did involve missed TS surveillances, therefore, missed surveillances is recurring.

A review of Special Reports for the previous twelve months shows the failure of the speed sensor to be a Recurring Problem. As documented in Special Report 2-M89-0227, this is the fifth speed sensor known to be damaged from apparent contact with the camshaft gear. Maintenance procedures have been changed to remove the speed sensors before removing or replacing the cam shaft bearing shells. This is documented in PT/0/A/4350/21, D/G Periodic Maintenance, change number 13. .

The missed surveillance on D/G 2B is not NPRDS reportable. The failure of the speed sensor is NPRDS reportable, jdg .:R a u.s. cm. ,,emo7n we

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0] O Ol6 0F ll 1 3 There were no personnel injuries, radiation overexposures, or uncontrolled releases of radioactive material as a result of this event.

i CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

Immediate: None Subsequent: 1) The damaged speed sensor was replaced.

2) PT/0/A/4350/21, D/G Periodic Maintenance was changed to remove 3 the speed sensor before removing or replacing cam shaft bearing shells.
3) IAE personnel changed procedure IP/0/A/3250/16A, D/G Speed Switch Calibration, to increase the gap between the camshaft gear er5d the speed sensor.

Planned: 1) Maintenance personnel will conduct a test at the next available D/G outage to determine how the speed sensor is being damaged by the camshaft gear. Measurements will be taken to determine if the camt. haft gear has sufficient movement to make contact with the speed sensor.

2) Operations personnel will revise Operations Management Procedure 2-6, Diesel Generator Logbook, to provide better guidance on classifying D/G starts. This will include post maintenance testing.
3) IAE personnel will reset the gap between the speed sensor and the camshaft gear on all McGuire D/Gs.

SAFETY ANALYSIS:

During the time that Busline 2B and D/G 2A were out of service for maintenance, and D/G 2B was technically inoperable, the TS requirement to have one D/G operable during Modes 5 and 6 was not met. Offsite power was available for the entire time through Busline 2A. If this offsite power supply had been lost, D/G 2B was c'apable of starting and assuming the required loads as documented by the operability surveillance test performed on August 29, 1989. The damaged speed sensor may have  ;

indicated a slow start time but the D/G would still function to supply emergency power. Also, an additional source of power was available from Unit 1 by way of a crosstie between the 4160 volt distribution centers. This source could have been manually aligned to Unit 2 by the OPS personnel. This source is described in the Final Safety Analysis Report, Section 8.2,1.4.1., Offsite Power System Operational )

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The health and safety of the public were not affected by this incident.

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Unit 2 entered Mode 5.

7/9/89 1535 D/G 2B started to deplete the day tank level.

7/10/89 1750 Unit 2 entered Mode 6.

7/10/89 thru Extensive maintenance was. performed on D/G 2B.

7/19/89 7/19/89 1729 Unit 2 core reached No Mode, core unloaded.

7/25/89 0853 D/G 2B began start no. 705 for post maintenance testing - Run 5 min. at no load condition.

1352 D/G 2B began start no. 706 - 15 min. at no load.

1448 D/G 2B began start no. 707 - 30 min. at no load.

1559 D/G 2B began start no. 708 - 30 min at 400 kN

- 30 min. at 1000 kN.

1745 D/G 2B began start no. 709 - I hr. at 2000 kN.

1930 D/G 2B began start no. 710 - 30 min. at 2000 kN

- 2 hrs. at 3000 kN.

2323 D/G 2B began start no. 711 - 2 hrs, at 3600 kN.

7/26/89 0249 D/G 2B began start no. 712 - 14 hrs. at 3000 kN. Start time 11.07 sec. .

N0800 W.R. 136725 was issued to correct cause of slow start.

N2000 IAE recalibrated speed switches.

7/27/89 0237 D/G 2B began start no. 713 for 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> run.

N2015 D/G 2B experienced voltage control failure.

2024 D/G 2B was manually tripped.  ;

7/28/89 ---- IAE discovered and replaced blown fuse in voltage regulator circuit.

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-tart u -. . , w wc w as .nni 7/29/89 1336 D/G 2B began start no. 718 for 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> run.

7/30/89 2228 D/G 2B began start no. 725 for operability test.

7/31/89 1050 D/G 2B was declared operable.

1255 Unit 2 entered Mode 6 - fuel load commenced.

1605 D/G 2A was declared inoperable and tagged for maintenance.

8/3/89 1130 Busline 2B was tagged and declare inoperable for maintenance.

8/18/89 0628 Unit 2 entered Mode 5.

8/19/89 0759 Busline 2B was restored to operable.

8/24/89 1745 D/G 2A was restored to operable.

2030 D/G 2B was declared inoperable and tagged for D/G battery replacement.

8/29/89 1102 D/G 2B began start no 729 for operability test.

1400 D/G 2B was declared operable.

1522 D/G 2B began start no. 730 for ESF test. Time to 4160V 11.024 sec. 1655 D/G 2B was declared inoperable.

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N2300 ESF test was completed satisfactorily

, 8/30/89 ----

Mechanical Maintenance, IAE, and OPS personnel met on slow i starts of D/G 2B.

i 8/31/89 ----

D/G 2B Speed sensor was discovered damaged and replaced.

l 2300 D/G 2B was declared operable.

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  • LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION unovto owe =o mo.ew .

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0 l0 1l 1 or 1 j1 tan u = , . anc w an ,,im DIESEL GENERATOR TEST SCHEDULE NUMBER OF FAILURES NUMER OF FAILURES IN IN LAST 100 VALIO LAST 20 VALIO TESTS

  • TESTS
  • TEST FREQUENCY i1 14 Once per 31 days 3 &" 15 Once per 7 days t

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  • Criteria for determining number of failures and number of valid tests shall l be in accordance with Regulatory Position C.2.e of Regulatory Guide 1.108, but determined on a per diesel generator basis.

For the purposes of determining the required test frequency, the previous test failure count may be reduced to zero if a complete diesel overhaul to like-new conditions is completed, provided that the overhaul including appro-priate post-maintenance operation and testing, is specifically approved by the manufacturer and if acceptable reliability has been demonstrated. The reliability criteiTon shall be the successful completion of 14 consecutive tests in a single series. Ten of these tests shall be in accordance with the routine surveillance requirements of Specifications 4.8.1.1.2.a.4 and 4.8.1.1.2.a.5; the remaining four tests in accordance with the 184-day requirements specified in the footnote to Specification 4.8.1.1.2.a.4 and

- Speci fi cation 4. 8.1.1. 2. a. 5. If this criterion is not satisfied during the first series of tests, any alternate criterion to be used to transvalue the failure count to zero requires NRC approval.

    • The associated test frequency shall be maintained until seven consecutive failure free demands have been performed and the number of failures in the last 20 valid demands has been reduced to 7 e.

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