ML19329F059
| ML19329F059 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Midland |
| Issue date: | 04/21/1976 |
| From: | CONSUMERS ENERGY CO. (FORMERLY CONSUMERS POWER CO.) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19329F058 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8006190856 | |
| Download: ML19329F059 (24) | |
Text
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. t INTERIM 50.55(e) REPORT ON MISSING REDAR AT THE MIDLAND SITE INTRODUCTION This report describes three instances of deficient rebar placement in the Auxiliary Building at the Midland Site.
It is the opinion of Consumers Power Company that the first two of these cases (#396, #398 and #399) are not required to be reported per 10CFR50.55(e); however, based on instructions from the NP.C Staff, they are being reported under the 10CFR50.550(e) famat. The safety analysis of the third case (#260) is currently being perfomed, therefore, the reportability of this item is indetenainate at this time.
The deficiencies will be identified by reference to the Bechtel Quality Control Nonconfomance Report numbers. The report is divided into three sections respectively relating to a description of each deficiency, an analysis of the safety implications of each deficiency, and the corrective action taken in response to the deficiencies.
I. DESCRIPTION OF THE DEFICIENCIES A. Nonconfomance Report #396 Bechtel Engineering Drawing #C-205, Revision 4, includes a typical detail which would, when applied to the intersections of 5.6 wall with the "A" line wall and 7.4 wall with the "A" line wall, require the vertical rebar on each face of 5.6 line wall and 7.4 line wall to continue through the "A" line wall rather than stopping at the intersection of the walls (which would be normal practice). Contrary to this requirement, the bars were not continued through the "A" line wall. This resulted in six (6)
- 3 bars being cmitted at each of the two intersections. This was not discovered until after concrete had been placed in the "A" line wall at these intersections. Bechtel NCR #396 was written upon discovery of this problem. A total of twelve (12) #8 bars were omitted. As indicated in Section III-A, Remedial Action, the omission of these bars does not affect plant safety, there-fore, replacement was not necessary.
B. Nonconfomance Renorts #398 and #399 Bechtel Engineering Drawing #C-281, Revision 3, calls for l five (5) additional horizontal #11 bars at 2'-3" spacing each !
face in 7.8 line wall at the intersection with "K" line wall l 'DocNAT 50- Y2R/Mo bTb 4 - 7. W %
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immediately above Elevation 614'-0". Also, Drawing fC-275, Revision 3, calls for five (5) additional horizontal #11 tars at 2'-3" spacing each face in 7.8 line wall at the intersection with "J" line wall immediately above Elevation 614'-0".
Contrary to the requirements above, concrete was olaced for 7.8 line wall which included both these areas without the additional bars having been installed. Eechtel NCR #398 was written to cover this problem. A total of twenty (20) #11 bars were omitted. As indicated in Section III-A, Remedial Action, the twenty (20) missing #11 bars will be replaced with forty (40) #8 bars. The decision to drill and grout the #8 bars as replacement for the missing #11 bars was made to expedite construction pending' completion of a detailed safety analysis. The analysis discussed in Section II-B has been completed and indicates that the omitted bars would not have affected plant safety.
Bechtel Engineering Drawing #C-281, Revision 3, also calls for five (5) additional horizontal bars each face in 5.3 line wall at "J" line immediately above Elevation 614'-0". During a concrete placement which would have included this area, Bechtel Quality Control found that these ten (10) bars had been omitted and stopped the placement before this area was reached. They had, however, signed the preplacement inspection plan for that place-ment, indicating that all bar was in. This area is a mirror-image of the intersection of 7.8 line and "J" line. Bechtel NCR #399 was written to cover this problem. A total of ten (10) #11 bars were omitted. _These bars were added before the concrete was placed.
C. Nonconformance Report #260 !
l Bechtel Engineering Drawing #C-284, Revision 1, which shows !
elevations of walls 29, 30, 31 and 32 at their intersections with I the 5.6 and 7.4 line walls, states: " Additional rebar arrangement for top and end walls similar to walls 27 and 28. See Drawing #C-283".
Drawing #C-283, Revision 2, in turn calls for additional horizontal l
- 8 bars at 12" spacing each face for a seven-foot high oortion of walls 27 and 28. Therefore, these bars should have been added to walls 29, 30, 31 and 32 but were not prior to pouring concrete.
Bechtel NCR #260 was written to cover this problem.
Since sixteen (16) bars would have been involved at each inter-section, it would appear that sixty-four (64) bars were omitted.
However, since the walls were not placed to full heiaht, only twelve (12) bars were omitted in wall 29, twelve (12) in wall 30, i
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3 fourteen (14) in wall 31, and fourteen (14) in wall 32---a tctal of fifty-two (52) #8 bars. As indicated in Section III-A, Remedial Action, these bars have been reolaced by drilling and grouting. The effect on safety if the omission had gone undetected is currently being evaluated.
II. ANALYSIS OF SAFETY IMPLICATIONS A. Nonconformance Report #396 The attached report, " Investigation of Reported Missing Reinforcing Steel for Midland Auxiliary Building 5.6 and 7.4 Line Shear Walls at Line ' A'," Revision 0, prepared by Bechtel Associates Professional Corporation analyzes this case and provides justification for accepting the as-built condition.
B. Nonconformance Reports #398 and #399 -
The attached report, " Investigation of Reinforcing Steel -
Requirements for Auxiliary Building 'K' and 'J' line walls at Line 7.8," Revision 0, prepared by Bechtel Associates Professional Corporation analyzes Nonconformance Report #398 and provides justification for accepting the as-built conditions. Since the case reported by Honconformance Report #399 is a mirror-image of the case covered by the above-referenced report, the originally omitted rebar would not have been a safety problem if it had gone undetected.
C. Nonconformance Reoort #260 The safety analysis of Nonconformance Report #260 is currently being performed and will be covered by a future report.
III. CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN A. Remedial Action An analysis was made of Nonconformance Reparts #396, #398,
- 399 and #260 resulting in the following remedial corrective actions:
(1) Honconformance Report #396 Since the analysis of the safety imr'.ications discussed in Section II-A above demonstrated that the safety of the plant would not be affected, no remedial action was required.
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4 (2)_ Nonconformance Reoort #398 In lieu of the twenty (20) missing #11 bars, forty (40)
- 8 dowels will be drilled and grouted into the 7.8 line wall.
(3) Hanconformance Pecort #399 Since the concrete in the vicinity of the 5.3 line wall intersection with the "J" line had not been poured at the time this nonconformance report was issued, the missing ten (10) bars were installed.
(4) Nonconformance Reoort #260 The walls in question were drilled and the missing horizon-tal rebars were grouted in.
B. Corrective Action to Preclude Repetition An analysis was also made of Nonconformance Reports #396, #398,
- 399 and #260 to identify the underlying causes of these nonconform-ances so that a program of corrective action could be developed to prevent repetition of these nonconformances.
Based on this analysis, the following underlying causes were found to be applicable to some or all of these four nonconformance reports:
(1) All four nonconformance reports represented instances where the missing rebar were not called for in the drawing requirements for the wall being poured but were called for in the drawing requirements for an intersecting wall which would be poured at some later time.
(2) In the case of Nonconformance Report #396 the Quality 1 Control Field Inspection Plan did not reference a drawing 1 which contained requirements for the missing rebar. This !
lack of referencing may in turn h ce been due to the lack of l a cross-referencing of the same dr awing on another Bechtel !
Engineering Drawing. !
1 (3) In the case of Nonconformance Reports #398, #399 and i
- 260, it was found that the rebar requirements had been included in revisions of the Bechtel Engineering Drawings which were issued subsequent to the preparation of the rebar fabrication drawings. These rebar fabrication drawings were ;
i then used as basis documents for the installation of the rebar I and inspection of the rebar placement by Bechtel Field Engineers. I 1
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5 (4) All four nonconfomance reports may have been related to the lack of familiarity with rebar placement requirements by the personnel involved in the installation and inspection of rebar. This is especially true of Nonconformance Reports
- 396, #398 and #399 which occurred during a period v: hen the site construction force was being increased after a year's sicwdown of the Midland Project.
In response to these underlying causes, the following actions have been taken (or are being taken) to preclude repetition of these instances of missing rebar:
(1) Bechtel Quality Control has provided additional detail in the requirements for insocction of rebar placements prior to the concrete pour. This additional detail places special emphasis on inspecting for rebar requirements which are called out on drawing requirements for structures (walls and slabs) which will intersect with the structure (wall or slab) being poured.
(2) Bechtel Field Engineers have been provided with documented instructions on the mechanisms for obtaining clarification of Bechtel Engineering Drawing requirements. Particular attention will be paid to completeness of referencing interfacing drawings.
(3) A system has been established to assure that when changes to Bechtel Engineering Drawing requirements are made, these changes will be factored into the use of rebar fabrication drawings during rebar installation activities at the iiidland Site.
Further, Field Engineers and Quality Control Engineers have been instructed that final inspections for rebar placement are to be based on the Bechtel Engineering Design Drawing with the use of the rebar fabrication drawings being limited to use for reference only.
(4) Craft Supervision (responsible for direction of rebar placement), Field Engineers and Quality Control Engineers have been instructed in the problems associated with missing rebar and in the measures taken to preclude repetition.
In order to assess the effectiveness of these corrective actions, either the Bechtel Project Field Quality Control Engineer or the Lead Civil Quality Centrol Engineer will review the inspection criteria and the rebar placement for a minimum of twenty (20) con-crete placements. This review will be in addition to the normal review by the Quality Control Engineer responsible for the inspection.
6 In order to provide Consumers Power the necessary assurance that instances of missing rebar will be minimized, the Civil Engineering Section of the Consumers Power Project Engineering Services Department has been sent copies of Bechtel nonconformance reports relating to missing rebar. This group has been requested 1 to investigate these nonconformance reports, determine the under-lying causes, and develop mechanisms to preclude repetition (if more mechanisms are required beyond those discussed above). The results of this investigation will be reported in the next 50.55(e) report on this subject.
1 In order to further evaluate the effectiveness of the corrective action program discu'ssed above, and in order to assure that instances of missing rebar will not recur during the time period when the Consumers Pcwer Civil Engineering Section investigation is being conducted, Consumers Power will inspect each "Q-List" rebar place-ment prior to pouring concrete. This activity will continue at least until the completion of the Consumers Power Civil Engineering Section investigation into the causes and corrective actions.
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1 INVESTIGATION OF REPORTED MISSING REINFORCING STEEL FOR MIDLAND AUXILIARY BUILDING 5.6 & 7.4 LINE SHEAR WALLS AT LINE A (NCR 396)
Prepared By:
J r. W Checked By: b. 012 j i
Approved.By:
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Approved By: gQ,f f;.2-BECHTEL ASSOCIATES PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION Revision No: 0 Date: April 21, 1976
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i TABLE OF CONTENTS 4
1.' O STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 2.0 DESIGN PROCESS FOR THE SHEAR WALLS 3.0 JUSTIFICATION OF THE ACCEPTABILITY OF THE AS-BUILT CONDITION
4.0 CONCLUSION
APPENDICES i A LIST OF REFERENCED DOCUMENTS .
B DESIGN VERIFICATION
SUMMARY
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4 1.0 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 1.1 The areas of the auxiliary building under .
consideration are the intersections of the A line wall with the 5.6 and 7.4 line shear walls, between elevation 614'-0" and 634'-6".
The condition reported by the QC inspectors in NCR 396 in the subject areas was that 6 #8 vertical rebars were left out for each of the 5.6 and 7.4 line shear walls continuing through the "A" line wall, between elevation 614'-0" and 634'-6".
1.2 For the subject walls, the requirements for placement of rebar are shown in drawings 7220-C-277 Revision 4 and 7220-C-278 Revision 4.
The typical details in drawing 7220-C-285 Revision 4 show that the vertical bars must '
continue through the intersecting walls.
. 1.3 The purpose of this report is to investigate the adequacy of the subject walls and show that they are structurally adequate without the 6 #8 vertical rebars and meet the provisions of the design criteria.
2.0 DESIGN PROCESS FOR TH$ SHEAR WALLS 2.1 DESIGN BASES 2.1.1 Design Philosophy and Codes The analytical methods used to design the shear walls in the auxiliary building is described below as it applies to the missing rebars in the subject shear walls.
The vertical reinforcing bars in the center portion of the shear walls provide resistance to shear forces acting along the line of the walls, while the vertical reinforcing bars concentrated in the ends of the shear walls provide resistance to bending moments acting about an axis perpendicular to the line of the walls.
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The loading condition producing maximum i moments and shears includes live load, dead load and the design basis earthquake loads. The north-south earthquake loading will produce the shears and moments that need to be considered, since the longitudinal axis of the 5.6 and 7.4 line shear walls are in the i north-south direction. 1 The analysis of the auxiliary building shear walls is based upon the design criteria stipulated in the Midland PSAR, Section 5.2 and appropriate appendices, and upon the requirements l of ACI 318-71.
2.2 CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS SPECIFIED The materials used in the design of the auxiliary building shear walls is based on the following criteria:
Material Design Strength Reference
, Concrete fe' = 5000 psi Specification C-230 Reinforcing fy = 60,000 psi Specification C-39 Steel 2.3 METHOD OF ANALYSIS The analysis compares actual moment and shear forces and their resulting stresses to the maximum stresses given by the design requirements in ACI 318-71. If the actual stresses are less than the allowables, the design is acceptable.
f 3.0 JUSTIFICATION OF THE ACCEPTABILITY OF THE AS-BUILT CONDITION The north-south earthquake produces large shears and moments in the 5.6 and.7.4 line shear walls and only nominal shears and moments in the A line wall. Thus, the reinforcement in the A line wall in the vicinity of the 5.6 and 7.4 line wall intersection is not required to resist shear during a north-south earthquake and is available to resist the bending moments present in the ends of 5.6 and 7.4 line shear walls. The i
reinforcement required for the bending moment produced i by the north-south earthquake in the 5.6 and 7.4 line l
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shear walls is 5.8 sq. in. The amount of reinforcement available to resist bending in the as-built condition of A line wall is 6.24 sq. in. i . .
Since the amount of reinforcement available in the as-built condition for bending is greater than the amount required, the 5.6 and 7.4 line shear walls are structurally adequate.
4.0 CONCLUSION
From the foregoing analysis, it is concluded that the subject walls as-built are adequate to use as is and meet the provisions of the design criteria.
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APPENDIX A List of References
- 1. ACI 318-71 " Building Code Requirements for Reinforced . .
Concrete" 2.. BAPC Technical Specification 7220-C-39, Rev. 7,
" Furnishing, Detailing, Fabricating and Delivering Reinforcing Steel:
- 3. BAPC Technical Specification 7220-C-230, Rev. 6, " Operating On-Site Batch Plant and Furnishing Concrete"
- 4. BAPC Drawing 7220-C-140, Rev. 7, " Concrete Standard Details and General Notes"
- 5. BAPC Drawing 7220-C-285, Rev. 4, " Shear Wall Elevations at Column Line 4.55 and 8.7"
- 6. Midland Plant Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR)
Section 5.2 and appropriate appendices.
- 7. Nonconformance Report Number 396 .
- 8. BAPC Drawing 7220-C-277, Rev. 4, " Shear Wall Elevation at Column Line 5.3 and 5.6"
- 9. BAPC Drawing 7220-C-278, Rev. 4, " Shear Wall Elevation at Column Line 7.4 and 7.8" 1
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APPENDIX B Design Verification Summary . -
The various calculations in support of this report, were verified in conformance with Bechtel Engineering Procedures (EDPs 4.34 and 4.37). Specifically, this verification included the following steps:
C-1 A check of the referenced materials and criteria (i.e.
PSAR and specification requirements) used in the original design, as well as in the review.
s C-2 Verification that this criteria was properly input to the design process, that the input was correct, and that the results were accurate and properly interpreted.
In addition to the design verification, a thorough review of the written report by the checker, civil design group supervisor, the Midland project engineer and by the Chief Civil Engineer was performed. This review also confirmed that appropriate documentation of this review had been prepared (i.e. signoff of calculation sheets and design review notices).
Revision 0:
- Checker: (g , (glo Approved By: .
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Approved By: ~ dN""]
s April 21, 1976
l INVESTIGATION OF REINFORCING STEEL REQUIREMENTS FOR lTXILIARY BUILDING K AND J LINE WALLS AT LINE 7.8 (NCR 398)
Prepared By: ,,g.g Checked By: to .
k 'I ~
4/28/ 7 6 ,
Approved By:
Approved By: /hLMJ-*
BECHTEL ASSOCIATES PROFESSIONAL CORPORTION Revision No: 0 Date: April 21, 1976
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TABLE OF CONTENTS .
- 1.0 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 2.0 DESIGN AND ANALYSIS OF THE AUXILIARY BUILDING WING 3.0 JUSTIFICATION OF ADEQUACY OF ASSUMED REINFORCEMENT
4.0 CONCLUSION
APPENDICES A) REFERENCES B) DESIGN VERIFICATION
SUMMARY
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t 1.0 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 1.1 The walls under cor.cideration are part of the auxiliary building east wing and are the K and J-line walls at their intersection with the 7.8 line shear wall. The area of concern is between elevations 614' 0" and 628'-6" (References 5 through 11).
As reported in NCR 398, five (5) No. 11 horizontal bars at 2'3" o.c. vertically from El. 614'-0" on each face of the K and J line walls were not placed prior to casting the shear wall aleng line 7.8.
i 1.2 Details of the reinforcement in the subject walls are given in Bechtel drawings 7220-C-275 and 7220-C-281, (the subject bars are identified as additional in these drawings).
Requirements for the amount of reinforcing steel needed for sections subjected to combined flexure, torsion and shear are given in ACI 318-71, Chapters 10 and 11. l l
1.3 The purpose of this report is to summarize the ,
investigation of the adequacy of the K and J l line walls assuming that the equivalent of 5 No. 11 bars on each face are not included in i the construction. Further, this investigation determines if the apparent deficiency "which, l were it to have remained uncorrected. could have affected adversely the safety of operations !
of the nuclear power plant at any time throughout l the expected lifetime of the plant..."(1) '
2.0 DESIGN AND ANALYSIS OF THE AUXILIARY BUILDING WING l
2.1 DESIGN BASES !
2.1.1 The philosophy used to design the auxiliary building is described in l Section 5.2 of the Midland PSAR. The l loading conditions are listed in Appendix I SA of the PSAR.
2.1.2 Maximum stresses at the locations of J concern were determined to occur under the following loading condition:
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D : Dead Load.
L : Live Load E' : Design Ba3is Earthquake Load , ,
To: Normal Thermal Effects Load Ho : Thermal Load from Pipe Expansion, and R : Local Load from Rupture of Any One Pipe (Pipe-Whip) 2.1.3 Appendix 5A of the PSAR states that under the SSE and pipe whip condition the maximum allowable stress of the reinforcement is the yield stress.
2.2 CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS The specified concrete strength is 5000 psi, and the yield stress of the reinforcement is 60,000 psi.
2.3 METHOD OF ANALYSIS 2.3.1 Forces in Subject Walls The design of the subject walls is dependent on the flexure, shear and torsional loads acting on those walls.
Because' of the configuration of the auxiliary building with the two wings along the K and J lines, the loading of ,
the subject walls depends on the overall response of the east wing structure to seismic and pipe whip forces. The original and current analyses are j described in the following:
2.3.2 Original Analysis The original analysis modeled the eastern auxiliary building wing as a beam grillage fixed to the main portion of the auxiliary building along line 7.8. The horizontal beams of the model are the floor slabs while the vertical beams are the end wall and line 9.1 l wall. The soil beneath the slab at e'.evation 609'-0" provided horizontal and vertical support.
9 b Horizontal seismic and pipe whip loads i
were applied perpendicularly to the
' beam grillage. Analysis yielded moments, . -
shears and torsions for the beam members.
Reinforcement design was based on these l moments, shears and torsions. For the
- subject walls, particular attention was 1
paid to the torsion loads because those i ' walls were the sides of an effective
" box-beam" which had a high torsional I rigidity. The reinforcement pattern I for the K and J line walls at the
! intersection with 7.8 line wall was based on the torsion and shear requirements of Sections 11.7, 11.8, 11.9 and 17.5 i of ACI 318-71. Based on these requirements
' the subject 5 No. 11 bars were required according to the original analysis.
l 2.3.3 Current Analysis - Description of .
Structure Model l . A more representative structural model
! of the eastern auxiliary building wing
! was used in the current analysis from that us,ed in:the original analysis. In the first portion of the current analysis, the horizontal slabs, the vertical i walls and the 3'-6" thick K line wall were modeled as a vertical plate subject to horizontal seismic'and pipe-whip forces-in a manner similar to that of a floor slab subjected to vertical loads.- This plate behavior substantially increases the torsional resistance of i the entire wing and influences the distribution of local moments, shears and torsions. Therefore,.the auxiliary.
building wing was.modeled as a vertical plate stiffened with beams. This plate l-was assumed fixed along a vertical axis i at the 7.8 line wall since the main
- _ portion of the auxiliary building is much more rigid than the narrow wing i portion. The section of the wing above !
[ elevation 628'-6" has much :less torsional rigidity' compared to the box beam which is horizontal'and located below elevation 628'-6" at the base of the structure.
For the initial portion of the analysis,
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it was assumed that the plate is fixed -
at the centerline of this box beam. .
Therefore, the resulting model of the wing is a rectangular plate fixed along two adjacent edges and free along the other two edges.
For the second portion of the current analysis, the box beam was modeled as -
a beam fixed at line 7.8. The fixed-end moment and shear reactions found from the first portion of the analysis were then applied as loads to the beam.
2.3.4 Current Analysis - Calculation of Plate Reactions Reference 3 was used to determine the reactions of the plate structure. The plate was loaded with equivalent static seismic forces and pipe whip loads to yield the maximum forces at the subject walls.
2.3.5 Current Analysis - Box Beam Forces In the,second portion of the analysis the box beam at the base of the wall was loaded with the reactions obtained from the plate analysis. The torsional moment at the fixed end of the beam is the sum of the applied twisting moments.
Horizontal reactions applied to the box beam were resisted by flexure and shear of the box beam and by friction between the beam and the foundation soil. The ,
i soil friction resistance was determined on the basis of Reference 4 following standard, conservative foundation engineering practice. Normal loads on 1 the soil were based upon dead load plus l actual live load within the auxiliary I building wing.
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2.4 CODE REQUIREMENTS AND STRESSES IN THE K AND J LINE WALLS AT THEIR INTERSECTION WITH AXIS 7.8 (CURRENT ANALYSIS) I i
2.4.1 Design Requirements for Box Beam ..
ACI 318-71 (2) Sections 10.2, 10.3, 11.2, 11.4, 11.7 and 11.8 were used to determine the amount of transverse and longitudinal steel required in the box beam at its intersection with 7.8'line wall based upon forces determined from the current analysis. The reinforcement shown on the drawings (10, 11) without the 5 No. 11 bars at each face of the K and J line walls exceeds the requiremants of the ACI code.
2.4.2 Stresses in the K and J Line Walls Because the amount of existing longitudinal reinforcing steel exceeds that required, the stress in the reinforcement in all sections of the box beam at the 7.8 line intersection are less than the yield stress of the reinforcement; i therefore, the stress is less than the allowable stress under the severe seismic plus concurrent pipe whip design bases condition.
3.0 JUSTIFICATION OF ADEQUANCY OF ASSUMED REINFORCEMENT 3.1 ASSUMED REINFORCEMENT (AREA REQUIREMENT)
The reinforcement assumed for the current analysis does not include the 5 No. 11 bars on each face of the K and J line walls at line 7.8. This current analysis has shown that the assumed reinforcement in the walls of the box beam satisfies the ACI 318-71 code requirements for the bending, shear and torsional forces created by seismic and pipe whip horizontal loads plus seismic, dead and live vertical loads. Therefore, the reinforcement is adequate.
3.2 STRESS IN ASSUMED REINFORCEMENT The stress in the reinforcement was found to be less than the yield stress and hence satisfies the requirement of Appendix 5A of the PSAR.
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4.0 CONCLUSION
j This analysis has indicated that the walls referenced in NCR-398 are adequate without the additional 5 ~ ,
horizontal No. 11 bars at 2'3" o.c. spacing vertically from elevation 614'0" in the K and J line walls at the 7.8-line wall and satisfy all the requirements specified in the governing documents. Therefore, the omission of these bars is not a deficiency "...which, were it to have remained uncorrected, could have affected adversely the safety of operations of the nuclear power plant at any time throughout the expected lifetime of the plant. . . " (1)
Nevertheless, in order to permit construction to proceed while this analysis was in progress, corrective action was taken. NCR 398 has been dispositioned such that 10 No. 8 dowels were drilled and grouted at 7.8 line wall for each face of J and K line walls.
This replacement provides a steel area equivalent to that of 5 No. 11 bars.
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,- m APPENDIX A !
REFERENCES
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- 1. 10 CFR .50.55 (e)
- 2. American Concrete Institute, Committee 318 " Building Code Requirements for Reinforced Concrete (ACI 318-71) "
American Concrete Institute, Detroit, Michigan 1971
- 3. " Moments and Reactions for Rectangular Plates,"
Engineering Monograph No. 27, U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Reclamation, Washington, D.C.,
1970
- 4. " Design Manual, Soil Mechanics, Foundations and Earth
< Structures," NAVFAC DM-7, Department of the Navy, Naval Facilities Engineering Command, Washington, D.C.,
March 1971
- 5. BAPC Drawing 7220-C-204, Rev. 4, " Floor Plan at Elevation 614'-0"
~ 6. BAPC Drawing 7220-C-205, Rev. 4, " Floor Plan at Elevation 634'-6" i
- 7. BAPC Drawing 7220-C-213, Rev. 4, " Floor Reinforcement Plan at Elevation 614,'-0"
- 8. BAPC Drawing 7220-C-214, Rev. 5, " Floor Reinforcement Plan at Elevation 634'-6"
- 9. BAPC Drawing 7220-C-274, Rev. 5, " Concrete Sections and Details Sheet 5"
- 10. BAPC Drawing 7220-C-275, Rev. 3, " Concrete Sections and Details Sheet 6"
- 11. BAPC Drawing 7220-C-281, Rev. 4, " Shear Wall Elevations at Column Line F, G, K and Kc" l
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'GPENDIX B Design Verification Summary The various calculations in support of this report, were verified in conformance with Bechtel Engineering Procedures (EDPs 4.34 and 4.37). Specifically, this verification included the following steps:
C-1 A check of the referenced materials and criteria (i.e.
PSAR and specification requirements) used in the original design, as well as in the review.
C-2 Verification that this criteria was properly input to the design process, that the input was correct, and that the results were accurate and properly interpreted.
In addition to the design verification, a thorough review of the written report by the checker, civil design group supervisor, the Midland project engineer and by the Chief Civil Engineer was performed. This review also confirmed that appropriate documentation of this review had been prepared (i.e. signoff of calculation sheets and design review notices).
Revision 0:
M ro By:
Approved By: 4gfc l
i April 21, 1976 1 I
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DESCRIPTION ENCLOSU RE 1
LTR ADVISING A FINAL OR TFTERIM REDORT (1) INTERM 50.55(E) REPORT ON MISSING REBAR '
PERTAINING TO MISSING RE$AR WILL BE SUB- AT THE MId.AND SITE MITTED 5-21-76.....TRANS THE FOLLOWING..
-(2) INVESTIGATION OF REPORTED MISSING REIN-FORCING S' EEL FOR MIDL*J!D AUXILL*?Y DISTRIBUTION: M. SERVICE...... PUIL9ING 5.4 & 7.4 LINF' SHEAR WALLS AT LINE A --REV NO: 0 DATE'D 4-21-76.....
(3) INVESTIGATION OF REINFORCING STEEL bb .4b[ .b5[ m[W
, --- W Cb, .
REQUIREMENTS FOR AUXILLARY BUILDING K AND J LINE WALLS AT LINE 7.8 (NRC 398)
REV NO: SO DTD 4-21-76.......
PLANT NAME: MIDLAND 1 & 2 SAFETY ly FOR ACTION /INFORMATION ENVIRO %27-76rkb ~~ ~
ASSIGNED AD : M/ nun (., ASSIGFED AD :
y BRAhCH CHIEF : V n i E L- BRANCH CHIEF :
ly '
PROJECT MANAGER: cjoc,,JQg, PROJECT MANAGER :
y- LIC. ASST. : tyw Sg,p,g d LIC. ASST. :
INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION v CREG FTTO bYSTEMS SAFETY T)IMIT RYSTEMR UMVTun TFru L,. NRC PDR u -
MEE{EMAN TEnFsco ERNST I&E SCMROEDER BENAROYA BALIARD OELD LAINAS SPANGLER COSSICK & STAFF ENGINEERING IPPOLITO MIPC v MAccrRy SITE TECH CASE KNIGHT _ OPERATING REACTORS CAMMILL HANAUER e SIliWEIL(R) STELLO STEPP MARLESS PAWLICKI HUIJtAN OPERATING TECH PROJECT MANAGEMENT REACTOR SAFETY EISENHUT SITE ANALYSIS BOYD ROSS SHAO VOLIJIER P. COLLINS NOVAK BAER BUNCH HOUSTON ROSZTOCZY SCHWENCER J. COLLINS PETERSON CHECK GRIMES KREGER MELTZ y HELTEMES AT & I SITE SAFETY & ENVIRC y SKOVHOLT SALTZMAN ANALYSIS RUTBERG DENTON & MULLER EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION CONTROL NUMBER ,
A LPDR; MIDLAMD, MI NATL LAB BROOKHAVEN NATL LAB TIC REG. V-IE ULRIKSON(ORNL)