ML19209C407

Forwards Addl Info Re Proposed Conceptual safety-grade Design for Initiating Reactor Trips Upon Loss of Main Feedwater &/Or Turbine Trip,In Response to 790907 Request

ML19209C407
Person / Time
Site:	Arkansas Nuclear
Issue date:	10/08/1979
From:	Trimble D ARKANSAS POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	Reid R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
1-109-8, NUDOCS 7910150536
Download: ML19209C407 (25)

Text

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ARKANSAS POWER & LIGHT COMPANY POST OFRCE box 551 UTTLE ROCK. ARKANSAS 72203 (50113716 October 8, 1979 l-109-8 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation ATTN: Mr. R. W. Reid, Chief Operating Reactor Branch #4 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject:

Arkansas Nuclear One-Unit 1 Docket No. 50-313 License No. DPR-51 Anticipatory Reactor Trips (File: 1510) ,

Gentlemen:

Our letter of May 21, 1979, provided a conceptual safety-grade design for initiating reacto.' trips upon loss of main feedwater and/or turbine trip. Your letter of September 7,1979, requested additional information regarding our proposed design. This letter provides the requested informa-tion.

As indicated in the enclosed responses, our schedule for equipment procure-ment allows implementation of the safety-grade design within approximately six (6) months of NRC approval. Therefore, no proposed improvements in the current control-grade trip are necessary as your safety-grade schedule can be met. -

Very truly yours, b 0-David C. Trimble Manager, Licensing DCT:DGM:nak Attachment 1145 J0,1 7 910150 ff/

MEMBEA MICDLE SCUTH UTiurrES SYSTEM

RESPONSES FOR SAFETY-GRADE ANTICIPATORY REACTOR TRIP QUESTION 1. For your proposed design, state the degree of conformance with the acceptance criteria listed in Column 7.2 of Table 7-1

(" ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA FOR CONTROLS") of the Standard Review Plan. Justify any non-conformance.

QUESTION 2. Provide a discussion of the following:

a. design basis infonnation required by Section 3 of IEEE-279-1971, and

b. conformance with the design requirements of Section 4 of IEEE-279-1971.

RESPONSES The proposed design for safety-grade anticipatory trips contains four redundant and independent channels which monitor the operation of the main feedwater pumps -

and the turbine. This equipment will initiate an RPS reactor trip on the trip-ping of both main feedwater pumps or on a turbine trip. The cabinet mounted equipment will be installed in and become an integral part of the existing four channel RPS-I. As such, the additional equipment will be designed in accordance with the design bases of the RPS and will conform with the accep-tance criteria and design requirements of the RPS. The description of the con-fannance of the RPS with the acceptance criteria and design requirements can be found in Section 7.1 of the ANO-1 FSAR.

QUESTION 3. Provide a description of any changes to and/or interfaces with the existing protection system. Include dia cation, functional and/or elementary wiring), grams (block,tolo-as necessary, clearly depict the changes and/or' interfaces. In addition, provide an analysis which demonstrates that these changes and/or interfaces will not degrade the existing protection system.

RESPONSE

The anticipatory trip equipment will be added to the RPS cabinets and will interface as new trips in the present bistable trip string. Figures 1 and 2 of the Attachment I show the functional interface of the added equipment with the RPS. Drawings 51079DGB-1 and 51079MLG-1 of the attachment describe the inputs, outputs, and logic of the new trip functions. The added modules will consist of contact buffers, bistables, and auxiliary relays, which have been tested and qualified for use in a safety system. Existing RPS power supplies, flux signals, interlock circuits, and indicators will be used as required by the added equipment. The requirements for the RPS, e.g., cool-ing, power, seismic, environmental, will be the same for the syscem with anticipatory trips as the requirements prior to addition of the new trips.

1145 002

A failure analysis of the RPS-I was performed and is contained in Topical Report BAW-10003, " Qualification Testing of Protection System Instrumentation".

This failure analysis was predicated on the use of qualified modules and con-cluded that any single failure in the RPS will not prevent perfonnance of its protection action when required. The added equipment uses qualified modules and the failure analysis of BAW-10003 is still applicable to the RPS contain-ing anticipatory trips.

The anticipatory trips provide additional protection and conservatism beyond that provided by the rest of the RPS. No credit is taken for any of these trips in the FSAR accident analyse:. Main feedwater pump trip will be sensed by four (4) redundant pressure switches for each feedwater pump turbine's con-trol oil pressure (this pressure dumps under trip conditions). Likewise, tur-bine trip will be conveyed by four (4) redundant pressure switches for the turbine's control oil pressure (this pressure also dumps under trip conditions).

Therefore, each of the four (4) RPS channels will have an additional field con-tact for each main feedwater pump turbine, and an additional field contact for turbine trip as new inputs. The sensors will be redundant, separated, and de-signed such that a single failure will not prevent them from performing their intended function. The sensors are anticipatory to other diverse parameters which will cause a reactor trip. Thus, the protection system will not be de-graded by these trips since functioning of the anticipatory trips is not re-quired to provide safety action and contact isolation of 500 volts is provided.

The sensor contacts are closed during normal operation and open to cause a -

reactor trip when both main feedwater pumps trip or the turbine trips. The contacts in conjunction with the RPS serve to interrupt power to the CRD breakers to cause a reactor trip. Loss of power to the trip circuitry will also initiate a reactor trip.

QUESTION 4. Identify equipment which is identical to equipment utilized in existing safety-grade systems. For the equipment which is not identical, briefly describe the differences.

RESPONSE

The equipment to be used are bistables, contact buffers, and auxiliary relays.

These modules are updated versions of modules already in use in B&W safety systems of the operating plants. Significant changes are: The bistable output to the RPS trip string has been converted from a relay contact to a solid state output; the contact buffer now uses one transformer with a rec-tified output to monitor the field contacts instead of two transformers with AC outputs; and transistor buffer amplifiers for driving relay coils from current limited grounded input signals have been added to the auxiliary relay. These changes were made to improve the performance of tne modules.

Although a detailed search for qualified pressure switches has not been completed, it appears these will probably be identical to those used on other safety-grade systems.

QUESTION 5. For all critical Components, provide an expected delivery date.

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RESPONSE

Reactor protection system components, contact buffers, bistables and auxiliary relay, are available from existing systems which have been delayed in construction. These components can be made available for installation within 22 weeks. (Installation is anticipated to require less than 320 MH). Pressure switch delivery is estimated to be 15-20 weeks.

QUESTION 6. In general, the equipment shall be seismically and environ-mentally qualified. Therefore, provide the following descrip-tive infonnation for the qualified test program:

a. equipment design specification requirements,

b. test plan,

c. test setup,

d. test procedures, and

e. acceptability goals and requirements.

If the above information is not available at this time, provide a scnedule for its submittal.

RESPONSE

The modules to be used have been qualified for use in B&W safety systems.

Attachment II contains the seismic and environmental summary reports for each module which describe the test programs and report the acceptability of the modules. The detailed test procedures and test data are available for audit. Detailed infonnation on the pressure switches is not known at this time because of the dependency on the vendor selected. In general, however, the same qualification criteria as other qualified pressure switches in use at the plant shall apply, with the exception of seismic qualification and mounting on equipment and structures in the Turbine Building, which is not a Seismic Category I structure. More detailed information will be provided within two (2) months after NRC approval of the design. -

QUESTION 7. Identify the portion (s) of the design which are within the scope of supply of B&W and/or other contractors.

RESPONSE

B&W scope of supply is limited to RPS modules, i.e., contact buffers bistables and auxiliary relays contained within the RSP system cabinets.

All other components will be supplied by other vendors who have not been chosen as yet.

QUESTION 8. Provide the criteria for the overall reactor protection system installation testing which will demonstrate that the new trip has been installed properly. If this in-formation is not available at this time, provide a schedule for its submittal. .

1145 004

RESPONSE

Detailed installation instructions and test procedures will be utilized to ensure that the antic 1patory trip equipment is properly installed and per-forms the functions described. In addition, the cabinet mounted equipment will be fully testable from the RPS cabinets. The equipment will have pro-visions for simulating input signals and verifying the proper response of the RPS channel. This testing will be similar to that presently performed on the RPS and will be integrated into the periodic testing of the cabinett Testing criteria will comply with IEEE 279-1971 to the extent possible.

QUESTION 9. Safety evaluations for the anticipatory trips are either missing or are incomplete. Submit supporting analysis ta justify the proposed trip signals by addressing the follow-ing items:

a. Provide an i.lalysis that quantifies the improvement in the time-to-reactor-trip for both the turbine trip and the loss of main feedwater signals;

b. Address the need to bypass these trips at 20% power versus bypass at a '.ower power (approximately 10%);

c. Discuss the adequacy of the proposed trip signals for loss of main feedwater for a variety of failure scenarios (such as feedwater valve closures), i.e., see the Oconee 1 transients of 6/11/79; and

d. Provide an evaluation of why a reactor trip on low steam generator level is not a viable anticipatery trip signal when the other signals are bypassed, i.e., see the Crystal River 3 transient of 8/2/79.

RESPONSE

a. The primary purpose of anticipatory reactor trips (ARTS) is to reduce the probability of lifting the PORV for turbine trip / loss of main feedwater type events. For a reactor high pressure trip setooint of 2300 psig, it was shown in Reference 1 that the PORV would not lift with a setpoint of

>2400 psig. The margin to the PORV setpcint can be increased, however, by use of ARTS. Figure 9a-1 shows the pressure increase from nominal operat-ing pressure as a function of time to trip for tne loss of main feedwater event. From this figure, it can be seen that an ART that detects and trips the plant at 4 seconds results in a peak pressure increase of 60 psi; where-as the high R.C. pressure trip which would occur at 8 seconds results in a peak pressure increase of 184 psi. The anticipatory trip signals which have been selected will initiate a reactor trip in less than one second. As seen on Figure 9a-1, a one second time to trip results in a 12 psi pressure in-crease, compared to a 184 psi pressure increase for the high pressure trip at 8 seconds.

The analyses presented above are for a loss of main feedwater avent which produces higher peak pressures than turbine trips produce. The time to reactor trip after a turbine trip from full power is, however, approxi-mately the same as that for a loss of main feedwater.

1145 005

b. Sensitivity studies on time to reach the PORV setpoint vs. power level for a los 6 feedwater event have been performed. Table 9b-1 displays the reso l, y these analyses. The results are for a trip on high RC pressure since that gives the shortest time to steam generator dryout assuming no auxiliary feedwater. For power levels < 25% FP, it can be seen that sufficient time for operator action exists to initiate feed-water and any bypass s;tpoint below this value should be a matter of providing sufficient operational flexibility.

For the turbine trip event, the system has sufficient responsiveness such that, at lower power levels ( 525%), a reactor trip is not anti-cipated if the turbine trips The power leve17 25% ' which the tur-bine trip-reactor trip may be bypassed is plant specific, and is depen-dent on the condenser bypass and atmospheric dump valve capacities.

c. The Oconee 1 transient of 6/11/73 was a reactor startup situation with one main feedwater pump reset and not operating. When the operating feedwater pump tripped, the reactor did not automatically trip on loss of feedwater because the low discharge pressure trip on the reset main feedwater pump was not reached prior to the operator manually tripping the plant. There are two important points to be made with respect to the above situation. First of all, a reactor trip based on feed pump operation, such as the proposed safety-grade trips will be, would have detected this loss of feedwater event. Secondly, at a startup condition cuch as this transient occurred at the ARTS would have been bypassed.

However, as discussed in Response to b. above, there is sufficient operator action time.

It should also be noted that the purpose of ARTS is to decrease the probability of PORV actuation on turbine trip / loss of main feedwater type events. Since it has been demonstrated in Reference 1 that with a reactor trip of 2300 psig and PORY setpointy 2400 psig, no lifting of the PORV will occur, the addition of ARTS only increase the margin to PORV setpoint pressure.

d. The Crystal River transient of 8/2/79 was similar to the Oconee transient briefly described in c. above, only the operating pump lost flow slowly and the reactor trip was by automatic control grade trip on low steam generator level instead of a manual trip. The RC pressure rise (* 2255 psig at time of trip) would have tripped the plant had the level trip not functioned. As was shown in Response 9b., an ARTS in this power level is not really needed, although it may indeed trip the plant before the high RC pressure trip.

REFERENCE:

1. B&W Report to the NRC, May 7,1979, " Evaluation of Transient Behavior and Small Reactor Coolant System Breaks in the 177 Fuel Assembly Plant."

1145 006

This report describes the implementation of safety-grade reactor trips into the RPS-I for loss of main feedwater and turbine trip.

Loss of Main Feedwater Trip - Control oil pcessure switches on both main feedwater pumps will input an open indication to the RPS on feedwater pump trip. Contact buffers in the RPS will sense the contact inputs and initiate an RPS trip when both pumps have tripped. This trip will be by-passed below a predetennined flux level, typically 20% FP. Referenct.

Figure 1.

Turbine Trip - Contact our puts fonn the main turbine electro-hydraulic con-trol unit will input an open indication to the RPS on turbine trip. Cen-tact buffers in the RPS will sense the contact input and initiate an RPS trip when a turbine trip is indicated This trip will be bypassed below a predetermined flux level, tvr*cally 20% FP. Reference Figure 2.

Pressure switches for both trips will be supplied by AP&L. B&W will supply all RPS cabinet mounted equipment. Attachment 1 lists the cabinet mounted equipment and gives the trip response time. Attachment 1 also gives the con-tact buffer insolation voltage and AP&L requirements for the contact inputs.

Figure 1 is a simplified drawing of the main feedwater pump trip.

Figure 2 is a simplified drawing of the turbine trip.

Drawing 51079DGB-1 shows the generic logic for the new trips.

Drawing 51079MLG-1 is a legerid for the generic logic drawing.

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ATTACHMENT I NEW SAFETY-GRADE REACTOR TRIPS FOR RPS-I 1(45 008

i TYPICAL RPS CHANNEL i

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ATTACHMENT I CABINET MOUNTED EQUIPMENT FOR ADDITION OF RPS TRIPS ON LOSS OF MAIN FEEDWATER AND TURBINE TRIP 3 Contact Buffers 2 Bistables Per Channel 2 Auxiliary Relays Modules will be installed in a pra wired mounting case and tested as a unit prior to shipment. The mounting case is to be installed in an emply row of each RPS channel and connectic.ns made to the RPS wiring.

Trip response tiine of the RPS cabinet mounted eq; sment will be 6150 ms.

Isolation of the contact buffer module is 600 volts with the contact input lines not grounded.

Customer contact input requirements:

Continuous 90 ma, P-P Surge 250 ma, P-P Voltage 118 VAC Closed contact indicates pump or turbine running Open contact indicates pump or turbine tripped

'll4

ATTACHMENT II SEISMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL

SUMMARY

REPCRTS 9

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1145 014

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Equipmen t: The Bailey Controls Company Solid State Bistable module P/N 6675492A1 was environmentally tested providing type test data. The Solid State Bistable is a standard 2-unit-wide nodule desigaed for plug-in mounti ng.

Brief Summary of Test Results: Tests were performed to verify that the performance characteristics of the Solid State Bistable Module qualify it for use in a Nuclear Power Generating Facility. The test unit failed to meet the acceptance criteria for output load voltages during humidity effect tes ting. Engineering replaced a reference amplifier. Upon retest, the module met specified acceptance criteria. Based on the test data, the Solid State Bistable meeting all the design range requirements.

e 1145 01EL

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Test title Units Units .

sequence Set up conditions Environment conditions Acceptance criteria tested acceptable Solid State Bistable

1. Repeatability of set a. Normal input / output Standard test conditions <0.02% set point span 2 2 point trip conditions configuration Temperature: 75 F

.5%

• b. Power supplies 215V dc, 25. Humidi ty: 50% 2,20% RH

c. Load: 3K ohms

2. Power supply ef fect Same as test No.1 Standard test .onditions for 1% variation <0.02% 2 2 except power supplies: set poi ~. span 215 dc with 21% var.ia-tion from references For 15% variation <0.1%

~

repeated using 25% set point span variations

3. Anbient temperaturc Same as test No.1 Tempera ture: 400 F to for 40 F to 140 0F 2 2 effect except set inte.'nal 1400F Trip point accuracy <0.1%

set point to 8.00 V dc Humi di ty: RH <50% set point span shif t~

and apply external set _

Response Time: >32 ms-low point voltage '

lvl contact volt. <0.5V dc High Ivl contact volt.

<2.0V dc

4. Anbient relative Same as tempereture Temperature: 1100F Trip point accy: <0.1% set 2 2 humidity effect tests point span chge in internal Humidity: 80% RH for set point <0.1% low lvl con-96 h tact <0.Sfdc-hi Ivl con-l 90% RH for 24 h tact 72.0V dc I Response Time: <32 ms '

[Dri f t, long term Same as test No.1 Standard test Change in trip accuracy 2 2 3

1. (30 day) except setpoint ad- conditions -

<0.07% setpoint span '

justed to 9.00V dc T

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Equipment: The Bailey Controls Company Solid State Bistable Module, P/N 6628492A1, was seismically tested providing type test data.

Test Mounting: The Solid State Bistable Module was mounted in a standard Module Mounting Case with backplate. A standard 32-blue ribbon connector was utilized to interface the module with the signal source. The standard' Module Mounting Case was then securely attached to the Seismic Test Mounting Box. The Seismic Test Mounting Box was attached to the Qualifica-tion Test Lab 45 Biaxial Test Table. The use of the 450 Biaxial Table results in equal horizontal and vertical components. Electrical interface, hardware, and mounting were equivalent to field installation.

Seismic Testing:

Exploratory Testing: The resonant survey consisted of a sinusoidal vibration input of 0.2 g's vertical peak acceleration at frequencies from 1 to 35 Hz and back to 1 Hz. The resonant survey was conducted at a sweep rate cf 1 octave /minu te. The constant input was applied to the 450 Biaxial Table and continuously monitored.

Proof Ter (i_n_g: A biaxial multifrequency excitation wat applied to the Solid State Bistable for a period of "s0 seconds. Each 30-second event consisted of dependent biaxial pseudorandum excitation T e random -

input frequencies were adjusted in 1/3-octave bandwiaths until the Test-Response Spectrum (TRS) enveloped the Required Response Spectrum (RRS) within the limits of the biaxial table displacement. A damping of 5 .

percent (Q of 10) was utilized for the control accelerometer in testing.

The TRS did not envelope the RRS (below 6.0 Hz worst case) in the low-frequency range. No resonant frequencies exist in the range not enveloped during test; therefore, this is an acceptable deviation.

Test Monitoring:

Seismic: The Solid State Bistable Module was monitored with accelerometers through appropriate signal conditioning to determine its mechanical response.

The location of the monitoring accelerometers is delineated in the seismic report. The control accelerometer was mounted directly to the biaxial test table for controlled input.

Electrical: The unit's outputs were monitored and documented on a strip chart recorder during these events.

Brief Summary of Test Results: The 3olid State Bistable Module was within the specifications cited in the module test procedure acceptance criteria section during and after the SSE tests. Consequently, the Solid State Bistable Modules are considered qualified for nuclear applications.

Specified Features Demonstrated by Test: The purpose of this test was to satisfy seismic level testing requirements before, during, and after test of the Solid State Bistable.

Module functional operability and solid-state relay state were maintained throughout the exploratory and seismic events. .

Structural integrity of enclosures was maintained.

. 1145 017

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Equipmen t: The Bailey Controls Company Contract Buffer, P/N 6628908A1 was environmentally tested providing type test data.

The Contact Buffer module is a 2-unit-wide module designed for plug-in mounting. Electrical connections are made through a standard 32-pin Blue Ribbon connector at the rear of the module. The vital bus uses a separate plug-in connector.

Brief Summary of Test Resul'ts: Tests were performed to verify that the performance characteristics of the Contact Buffer module qualify it for use in a Nuclear Power Generating Facility. .

Based on the test data, the Contact Buffer module. meets all the design range -

requi rements .

Type Test Justification: Because of the nature of application, this product consists of various types, versions, or ranges. A worst case representative sampling has been tested by BCCo Qualification Test Laboratory to veri fy that this product performs the required functions within the required operating and environmental conditions.

Part Number Nature of Difference 6628908A2 Variation of Frontplate Silkscreening

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9

Contact Buffer Test title sequence Set up conditions Units Uni ts Envir0nment conditions Acceptance criteria Tes ted acceptable

. 1. Functional test a. Normal input / output Standard test conditions No faulty operation 2 2 configuration Temperatu.e: 75 F ! 5 F

b. Power supply: 118 V ac Humidity: 50% 2 20% PJi

c. Load

2. Power supply effect Same as test No.1 Standard test condi tions Same as test No.1 2 2 except power supplies:

Minimum: 105 V ac Maximum: 130 V ac

3. kblent tempera- Same as test No. 1 Tempera ture: 40 F to No fault operation for 2 2 ture for function test 1400F function test.

Vac = 106 for re- Humidi ty: RH 1 50% $12 ms. for respc.'.e time sponse time test tes t

4. Arbient relative Sane as tes t No. 3 Tempera ture: 110 F Same as test No. 3 2 2 humidi ty ef fect Flumidi ty: 80% RH for 96 h 90% PJi for 24 h

5. Jri f t, long term Sane as les t No.1 5tandard tes t conditions .alays do not change state 2

• (30 day) 2 with both relays dur e.1 drif t period energized during, drif t test f

J C!

Equipmen t: The Bailey Controls Company Contact Buffer Module, P/N 6628908A1, was seismically tested providing type test data.

Test Mounting: The Contact Buffer Mode'e was mounted in a standard Module Moun* ng Case with backplate. A standard 32-pin blue ribbon connector and a separate standard 2-prong connector for the vital bus were utilized to interface the module with the signal source. The standard Module Mounting Case was then securely attached to the Seismic Test Mounting 3ox.- The Seismic Test Mounting Box was attached to the Qualification Test Lab 450 Biaxial Test Table. The use of the 450 Biaxial Table results in equal horizontal and vertical components.

Electrical interface, hardware, and mounting were equivalent to field installation.

Seismi_c Tes ting:

Exploratory Testing: The resonant s Jrvey consisted of a siruso: . . vibration input of 0.2 g's vertical peak acceleration at frequencies from 1 to 35 Hz and back to 1 Hz. The resonant survey was conducted at a sweep rate of 1 octave / minute. The constant input was applied to the 45 Biaxial. Table and continuousiy mopitored.

Proof Testing: A biaxial multifrequency excitation was applied to the Contact Buf fer F.adule for a period of 30 seconds. Each 30-second event consisted of .

dependent biaxial pseudorandom excitation. The random input frequencies were adjusted in ;/3-octave bandwidths until the Test Response Spectrum (TRS) .

enve'oped '.he Required Response Spectrum (RRS) within the limits of the biaxial table displacement. A damping of 5 percent (Q of 10) was utilized for the control accelerometer in testing. The TRS did not envelope the RRS (below 5.0 Hz worst case) in the low-frequency range. No resonant frequencies exist in the range riot enveloped during test; therefore, this is an acceptable devi a tion.

Test Monitoring: .

Seismic: The Contact Buffer was monitored with accelerometers through appropriate signal conditioning to determine its mechanical response. The location of the monitoring accelerometers is delineated in the seismic report.

The control accelerometer was mounted directly to the biaxial test table for controlled input.

Electrical : The unit's outputs were monitored by chatter detectors per MIL-STD-202D, Method 310.

Resul ts : The Contact Buffer was within the spec'ifications cited in the module test procedure acceptance criteria section during and after the SSE tests.

Consequently, the Contact Buffer Modules are considered qualified for nuclear applications.

Speci fied Features Demons trated by Test: The purpose of this test was to satisfy seismic level testing requirements before, during, and af ter test of the Contact Buffer. Mocule functional operability and predetermined relay state were maintained throughout the exploratory and seismic events.

Structural integrity of enclosures was maintained.

1145 320

Equipmen t:

The Bailey Controls Company Auxiliary Relay, P/N 6628807 B1 was envir nmentally tested providing type test data.

The A. iary Relay Module is a 2-unit-wide module designed for plug-in mounting.

Brief Summary of Test Results:

Tests were performed to verify that the performance characteristics of the Auxiliary Relay qualify it for use in a Nuclear Power Genera ting Facility.

Relay meets all the design range requirements. Based on the test data, the Auxiliary o

O 9

O e

e 9

4 e

1145 321

s .

i Auxiliary Relay P/N 6628807 B1  !

Test title sequence Set up conditions Unit Uni ts i Environment conditions Acceptance criteria t'sted acceptable l

1. Functional verifi- a. Nonnal input / output Standard tes t conditions Pmper operation of relays 1 l

cation configuration 1 -

Temperature: 75 F 2 50F

b. ber s pplies Humidi ty: 50% 2 20% RH

c. Load: none

2. Power supply Same as test No. 1 Standard test conditions. Same as test 1 1 1 effect (DC) except power supplies:

from -13.5 V de to .

-16.5 V de

3. Ambient temperature same as test No.1 Tempe rature: 40 F to Same as test 1 1 1 e f fec t 1400 F Humidi ty: RH < 50%

4. Ambient relative Same as test No.1 Temperature: 1100F Same as test 1 humidity effect 1 1 Humidi ty: 80% R11 for 96 h 90% R!! for 24 h

5. Ori f t, long tenn Same as test No.1 Standard test conditions Same as test 1

.(30 fsy) 1 1.

M LJ1

• O N

N

Equipment: The Bailey Controls Company Auxiliary Relay, P/N 6628807B1, was seismically testej providing type test data.

Test Mounting: The Auxiliary Relay Module was mounted in a standard Module Mounting Case with backplate. Two standard 32-pin blue ribbon -

connectors were utilized to interface the module with the voltage source.

The standard Module Mounting Case was then securely attached to the Seismic Test Mounting Box. ThegeismicTestMountingBoxwasattached togthe Qualification Test Lab 45 Diaxial Test Table. The use of the 45 Biaxial Table results in ' qual horizontal and vertical components.

Electrical interface, hardware, and mounting were equivalent to field installtion.

Seismic Test:

Exploratory Testing: The resonant survey consisted of a sinusoidal vibration input of 0.2 g's vertical peak acceleration at frequencies from 1 to 35 Hz and back to 1 Hz. The resonant survey was conducted at agsweep rate of 1 octave /ninute. The constant input was. applied to the 45 Biaxial Table and continuously-monitored.

Proof Testing: A biaxial multifrequency excitation was applied to the Auxiliary Relay Module for a period of 30 seconds. Each 30-second event consisted of . -

dependent biaxial pseudorandom excitation. The random input frequencies were adjusted in 1/3 octave bandwidths until the Test Response Spectrum (TRS) enveloped the Required Response Spectrum (RRS) within the limits of the biax,ial table displacement. A damping of 5 percent (Q of 10) was utilized for the control accelerometer in testing. The TRS did not envelope the RRS (below 7.0 Hz worst case) in the lowfrequency r'ange. No resonant frequencies exist in the range not enveloped during test; therefore, this is an accep+.able deviation.

Test Monitoring:

Seismic: The Auxilitry Relay Module was monitored with accelerometers through appropriate signal conditioning to determine its mechanical response. ,

TI e location of the monitoring accelerometei- is delineated in the seismic report. The control accelerometer was mounted directly to the biaxial test table for controlled input.

Electrical: The unit's outputs were monitored with chatter detectors per MIL-STD-202D, Method 310 during these events.

Brief Summary of Test Results: The Auxiliary Relay Module was within the specifications cited in tne module test procedure acceptance criteria section during and after the SSE tests. Consequently, the Auxiliary Relays are con-sidered qualified for nuclear applications.

Specified Features Demonstrated by Test: The purpose of this test was to satisfy seismic level testing requirements before, during, and after test of the Auxiliary Relay Module.

Module functional operability and predetermined relay state were maintained throughout the explorator / and seismic events.

1145 J23

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W.NE IN REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM .. ,

b PRESSURE Y5 TIME TO TRIP FOR q -%

A LOSS OF MIN FEEDWATER .

FROM 100% PCUER -

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Time to Trip, sec il45 024 FIG:.!RE 9a-I

TABLE 9b-1 POWER LEVEL SENSITIVITY TIME TO REACH TIME TO FILL POWER LEVEL PORV SETPOINT PRESSURIZER 100% 3 min. 10 min.

75% 6 min. min.

50% 12.3 min. ' 3 min.

25% 7715 min. 16.6 min.

NOTE: RESULTS ARE FOR THE CASE OF N0 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER INITIATION WHICH RESULTS IN THE SHORTEST ACTUATION TIMES. REACTOR TRIPS ON HIGH RC PRESSURE TRIP (2300 psig).

I145 025