ML18338A423

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LAR-18-008 Audit Plan
ML18338A423
Person / Time
Site: Vogtle  Southern Nuclear icon.png
Issue date: 12/06/2018
From: Chandu Patel
NRC/NRO/DLSE/LB4
To: Jennifer Dixon-Herrity
NRC/NRO/DLSE/LB4
PATEL C/415-3025
References
LAR 18-008
Download: ML18338A423 (13)
v • d • e


Text

December 6, 2018 MEMORANDUM TO: Jennifer L. Dixon-Herrity, Chief Licensing Branch 4 Division of Licensing, Siting, and Environmental Analysis Office of New Reactors FROM: Chandu Patel, Senior Project Manager /RA/

Licensing Branch 4 Division of Licensing, Siting, and Environmental Analysis Office of New Reactors

SUBJECT:

AUDIT PLAN FOR VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT UNITS 3 AND 4, REQUEST FOR LICENSE AMENDMENT:

PHYSICAL SECURITY PLAN, APPENDIX E ADDITIONS FOR UNIT 3 TRANSITIONAL SECURITY MEASURES AND UNIT 4 PLANT SPECIFIC EMERGENCY PLANNING INSPECTION, TEST, ANALYSIS, AND ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA REVISION (LAR 18-008)

By letter dated September 28, 2018 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML18271A116, Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) submitted a request for a license amendment to Combined License (COL) Numbers NPF-91 and NPF-92, for the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP) Units 3 and 4, respectively. The requested amendment proposes changes to Appendix E of the VEGP Units 3 and 4 Physical Security Plan (COL PSP) to describe the Transitional Security Measures (TSMs) that will be implemented in the event that Unit 3 is ready to load fuel and begin operation with a contiguous Protected Area boundary and vehicle barrier system and a secure boundary is needed between Units 3 and 4.

The Reactor Security Branch staff in the Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response plans to conduct an audit to gain a better understanding of the proposed changes and to review related documentation and non-docketed information in order to evaluate conformance with the Standard Review Plan or technical guidance. The audit plan is enclosed.

Docket Nos.: 52-025 and 52-026

Enclosure:

Regulatory Audit Plan cc: See next page

ML18338A423 NRO-008 OFFICE DLSE/LB4/PM DLSE/LB4/LA DLSE/LB4/BC NAME CPatel RButler JDixon-Herrity DATE 12/06/18 12/6/18 12/06/18 Vogtle Units 3 & 4 Mailing List (Revised 08/16/2018) cc:

Office of the Attorney General Resident Inspector 40 Capitol Square, SW Vogtle Plant Units 3 & 4 Atlanta, GA 30334 8805 River Road Waynesboro, GA 30830 Resident Manager Oglethorpe Power Corporation Mr. Barty Simonton Alvin W. Vogtle Nuclear Plant Team Leader 7821 River Road Environmental Radiation Program Waynesboro, GA 30830 Air Protection Branch Environmental Protection Division Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. 4244 International Parkway, Suite 120 Document Control Coordinator Bin N-226-EC Atlanta, GA 30354-3906 3535 Colonnade Parkway Birmingham, AL 35243 George B. Taylor, Jr.

2100 East Exchange Pl Anne F. Appleby Atlanta, GA 30084-5336 Olgethorpe Power Corporation 2100 East Exchange Place Brian H. Whitley Tucker, GA 30084 3535 Colonnade Parkway, Bin N-226-EC 42 Inverness Center Parkway, BIN B237 County Commissioner Birmingham, AL 35243 Office of the County Commissioner Burke County Commission Mr. Michael Yox Waynesboro, GA 30830 Site Regulatory Affairs Director Vogtle Units 3 & 4 Mr. Wayne Guilfoyle 7825 River Road, Bin 63031 Commissioner District 8 Waynesboro, GA 30830 Augusta-Richmond County Commission 4940 Windsor Spring Rd Hephzibah, GA 30815 Gwendolyn Jackson Burke County Library 130 Highway 24 South Waynesboro, GA 30830 Mr. Reece McAlister Executive Secretary Georgia Public Service Commission Atlanta, GA 30334 Page 1 of 3

Vogtle Units 3 & 4 Mailing List Email acchambe@southernco.com (Amy Chamberlian) agaughtm@southernco.com (Amy Aughtman)

ALPUGH@southernco.com (Amanda Pugh) awc@nei.org (Anne W. Cottingham) becky@georgiawand.org (Becky Rafter) bhwhitley@southernco.com (Brian Whitley)

Bill.Jacobs@gdsassociates.com (Bill Jacobs) bjadams@southernco.com (Brad Adams) bwwaites@southernco.com (Brandon Waites) castelca@westinghouse.com (Curtis Castell) comerj@westinghouse.com (James Comer) crpierce@southernco.com (C.R. Pierce) dahjones@southernco.com (David Jones) david.hinds@ge.com (David Hinds) david.lewis@pillsburylaw.com (David Lewis) dgbost@southernco.com (Danny Bost) dlfulton@southernco.com (Dale Fulton) drculver@southernco.com (Randy Culver) durhamdc@westinghouse.com (David Durham) ed.burns@earthlink.net (Ed Burns) edavis@pegasusgroup.us (Ed David) erg-xl@cox.net (Eddie R. Grant) fdhundle@southernco.com (Forrest Hundley) fhwillis@southernco.com (Fred Willis)

G2NDRMDC@southernco.com (SNC Document Control) graysw@westinghouse.com (Scott W. Gray) jadwilli@southernco.com (J.D. Williams) james1.beard@ge.com (James Beard) jannina.blanco@pillsburylaw.com (Jannina Blanco) jantol1dj@westinghouse.com (David Jantosik) jenmorri@southernco.com (Jennifer Buettner)

JHaswell@southernco.com (Jeremiah Haswell) jim@ncwarn.org (Jim Warren)

John.Bozga@nrc.gov (John Bozga)

Joseph_Hegner@dom.com (Joseph Hegner) jpredd@southernco.com (Jason R. Redd) jranalli@meagpower.org (Jerry Ranalli) karen.patterson@ttnus.com (Karen Patterson) karlg@att.net (Karl Gross) kmstacy@southernco.com (Kara Stacy)

KSutton@morganlewis.com (Kathryn M. Sutton) kwaugh@impact-net.org (Kenneth O. Waugh) markus.popa@hq.doe.gov (Markus Popa)

Page 2 of 3

Vogtle Units 3 & 4 Mailing List Matthew.Williams@hq.doe.gov (Matthew Williams) mdmeier@southernco.com (Mike Meier) media@nei.org (Scott Peterson)

Melissa.Smith@Hq.Doe.Gov (Melissa Smith)

Michael.Kuca@hq.doe.gov (Michael Kuca) mike.price@opc.com (M.W. Price)

MKWASHIN@southernco.com (MKWashington) mlgraves@southernco.com (Michelle Graves)

MSF@nei.org (Marvin Fertel) myox@southernco.com (Mike Yox) nirsnet@nirs.org (Michael Mariotte)

Nuclaw@mindspring.com (Robert Temple) patriciaL.campbell@ge.com (Patricia L. Campbell)

Paul@beyondnuclear.org (Paul Gunter) pbessette@morganlewis.com (Paul Bessette) r.joshi15@comcast.net (Ravi Joshi)

RJB@NEI.org (Russell Bell)

Ronald.Jones@scana.com (Ronald Jones) rwink@ameren.com (Roger Wink) sabinski@suddenlink.net (Steve A. Bennett) sara@cleanenergy.org (Sara Barczak) sblanton@balch.com (Stanford Blanton)

Shiva.Granmayeh@hq.doe.gov (Shiva Granmayeh) sjackson@meagpower.org (Steven Jackson) skauffman@mpr.com (Storm Kauffman) sroetger@psc.state.ga.us (Steve Roetger) stephan.moen@ge.com (Stephan Moen) stephen.burdick@morganlewis.com (Stephen Burdick) tom.miller@hq.doe.gov (Tom Miller)

TomClements329@cs.com (Tom Clements)

Vanessa.quinn@dhs.gov (Vanessa Quinn) vcsummer2n3@gmail.com (Brian McIntyre) wasparkm@southernco.com (Wesley A. Sparkman) wayne.marquino@gmail.com (Wayne Marquino) weave1dw@westinghouse.com (Doug Weaver) x2gabeck@southernco.com (Gary Becker) x2kmseib@southernco.com (Kristin Seibert)

Page 3 of 3

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION/ OFFICE OF NUCLEAR SECURITY AND INCIDENT RESPONSE DIVISION OF SECURITY OF PHYSICAL AND CYBER SECURITY POLICY REACTOR SECURITY BRANCH SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY, INC VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANTS UNITS 3 AND 4 DOCKET NO.: 52-025 AND 52-026 LICENSE NOS.: NPF-91 AND NPF-92 REGULATORY AUDIT PLAN DECEMBER 11-12, 2018

Background

By letter dated September 28, 2018, (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No.: ML18271A116); Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC), Inc.

(Southern Nuclear, the licensee), submitted to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)

Proposed Changes to Licensing Basis Documents, Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP),

Units 3 and 4 - Request for License Amendment: Physical Security Plan, Appendix E Additions for Unit 3 Transitional Security Measures (TSM) and Unit 4 Plant-Specific Emergency Planning, Inspection, Test, Analysis, and Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC) Revision (LAR-18-008) under the provisions of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulation (10 CFR) 50.54(p) and in accordance with 10 CFR 50.90.

Also by letter dated October 21, 2016, (ADAMS Accession No. ML17100A125 (Non-public)), SNC, Inc. submitted to the NRC the current VEGP, Units 3 and 4 Security Plan, Revision 3, (which consisted of Physical Security Plan (PSP), Training and Qualification Plan (T&QP), and Safeguards Contingency Plan (SCP)) under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.54(p)(2).

The current SNC Fleet Security Plan (which consists of a combined PSP, T&QP, and SCP for the Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, and Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2) was submitted to the NRC by letter dated August 13, 2018 (ADAMS Accession No. ML18228A541(Non-public)), under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.54(p)(2).

The current information on the docket does not provide clear understanding and basis to evaluate the proposed changes to the licensing basis documents to address LAR-18-008.

During the initial review of SNCs VEGP Units 3 and 4 Combine Operating License application (COLA) (calendar years 2008 through 2011) and Physical Security Plan review process; the applicant did not provide a site-specific Security Assessment as part of the application. In turn, the Enclosure

Westinghouse Electric Company (Westinghouse), AP1000 Design Control Document (DCD)

(NUREG-1793 Vol 2, [Final Safety Evaluation Report] FSER AP1000 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11293A073), and TR-94 (APP-GW-LR-066) Security Assessment were used.

  • TR-94 described how the licensee would provide additional data once the target sets were identified.
  • NUREG-2124, Vol 2 (pages 13-88/13-89) Final Safety Evaluation Report Related to the Combined Licenses (COL) for Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 3 and 4, September 2012:

The staff identified several RAIs [Request for Additional Information]

relating to target sets for the purpose of reviewing the Westinghouse physical protection program. Westinghouse provided design details as background information to assist the applicant with the development of site-specific target set analyses. The staff evaluated the applicants [Westinghouse] responses, and found them to be acceptable for the DC [design certification] review of the AP1000 physical protection program. Westinghouse stated in TR-94 that target sets were created to aid in the development of the AP1000 physical security system, and that final target sets will be developed by the COL applicant prior to fuel onsite (inside PA).

Clarification documentation and a site-specific tour are needed for the NRC staff to properly understand the scope of LAR-18-008.

The details of security plans and implementing procedures contain safeguards and security-related information and are withheld from the public in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, Public inspections, exemptions, requests for withholding.

Regulatory Audit Bases The VEGP Units 3 and 4 audit is required to identify and to review technical information needed to address the design bases and assumptions for the site physical protection system within the scope of the licensing basis for the physical security plan.

10 CFR 50.90, Application for amendment of license, construction permit, or early site permit.

states:

Whenever a holder of a license, including a construction permit and operating license under this part, and an early site permit, combined license, and manufacturing license under part 52 of this chapter, desires to amend the license or permit, application for an amendment must be filed with the Commission, as specified in §§ 50.4 or 52.3 of this chapter, as applicable, fully describing the changes desired, and following as far as applicable, the form prescribed for original applications.

2

10 CFR 50.54(p)(1) states:

The licensee shall prepare and maintain safeguards contingency plan procedures in accordance with appendix C of part 73 of this chapter for affecting the actions and decisions contained in the Responsibility Matrix of the safeguards contingency plan. The licensee may not make a change which would decrease the effectiveness of a physical security plan, or guard training and qualification plan, prepared under Subsection 50.34(c) or part 73 of this chapter, or of the first four categories of information (Background, Generic Planning Base, Licensee Planning Base, Responsibility Matrix) contained in a licensee safeguards contingency plan prepared under Subsection 50.34(d) or part 73 of this chapter, as applicable, without prior approval of the Commission.

A licensee desiring to make such a change shall submit an application for amendment to the licensees license under § 50.90.

10 CFR 50.54(p)(2), states in part: the licensee may make changes to the plans referenced in paragraph (p)(1) of this section, without prior Commission approval if the changes do not decrease the safeguards effectiveness of the plan.

The performance-based requirements of 10 CFR 73.55(b) require that a licensees physical protection system will have as its objective to provide high assurance that covered activities are not inimical to the common defense and security and do not constitute an unreasonable risk to public health and safety. For the scope of this audit the staff evaluation criteria will focus on the reasonable assurance of adequate protection standard (ADAMS Accession No. ML18240A410).

10 CFR 73.55(b)(4) requires a licensee to analyze and identify site-specific conditions, including target sets, that may affect the specific measures needed to implement the requirements of 10 CFR 73.55 and account for these conditions in the design of the physical protection program.

10 CFR 73.55(c)1(i) describes how a licensee will implement requirements of 10 CFR 73.55 through the establishment and maintenance of a security organization, the use of security equipment and technology, the training and qualification of security personnel, the implementation of predetermined response plans and strategies, and the protection of digital computer and communication systems and networks.

As described in 10 CFR 73.55(f)(1), the licensee shall document and maintain the process used to develop and identify target sets, to include the site-specific analyses and methodologies used to determine and group the target set equipment or elements.

10 CFR Part 73, Appendix B, Section VI, Nuclear Power Reactor Training and Qualification Plan for Personnel Performing Security Program Duties, describes minimum training and qualification requirements that must be implemented through a Commission-approved training and qualification plan to ensure that those individuals who are assigned to perform duties and responsibilities required for the implementation of the Commission-approved security plans, licensee response strategy, and implementing procedures are properly suited, trained, equipped, and qualified to perform their assigned duties and responsibilities.

3

Part 73, Appendix C,Section II.B.3.c (v), requires licensees to develop, implement, and maintain a written protective strategy to be documented in procedures that describes in detail the physical protection measures, security systems and deployment of the armed response team relative to site specific conditions, to include but not be limited to, facility layout, and the location of target set equipment and elements. The protective strategy should support the general goals, operational concepts, and performance objectives identified in the licensees safeguards contingency plan.

10 CFR Part 73, Section 73.58, Safety/security interface requirements for nuclear power reactors, requires that the licensee shall assess and manage the potential for adverse effects on safety and security, including the site emergency plan, before implementing changes to plant configurations, facility conditions, or security.

NUREG-0800, Standard Review Plan, 13.6.1 Physical Security-Combined License and Operating Reactors, Revision 2, August 2018, (ADAMS Accession No. ML17291B265).

Regulatory Audit Scope The objective of this audit is to verify via independent evaluation, the performance requirements, assumptions, and supporting documents for the following site-specific descriptions for physical protection described.

The scope of this audit neither includes Cyber Security nor Fitness for Duty (FFD).

The following items will form the scope of the audit:

1. Physical Protection Program:
  • Site Protective Strategy for Vogtle Unit 3, with integration of Vogtle Units 1 and 2 to include Response Force Training (Westinghouse Technical Reports (TR) review and discussion).

(TR)-49, AP1000 Enhancement Report (APP-GW-GLR-062), describes areas of physical security enhancements that are incorporated to enhance the ability of an applicant to meet the general performance objectives of 10 CFR 73.55(b).

TR-94 AP1000 Safeguards Assessment Report Revision 5, (APP-GW-GLR-66), describes the security measures credited in defending the AP1000 against the Design Basis Threat (DBT).

TR-96, Interim Compensatory Measures Report (APP-GW-GLR-067), includes information on compliance with the various sections of the Commission Order on Interim Compensatory Measures, issued to NRC Power Reactor Licensees on February 25, 2002.

2. TR-94, Section 2.1, Identification of Initial target sets (AP1000 Safeguard Assessment (APP-GW_GLR_066, Revision 5, (TR-94)), and standoff distance review, to identify target sets.
  • TR-94, Section 3.1, Development Identify target sets; final target sets for each site/developed by the COLA, prior to fuel on site (inside the PA)

Review initial Target Set Analysis:

o DCD Table 7.4-1 4

o DCD Chapter 15 o Vital equipment list (APP-SES-M3C-001)

Site Walk down:

o Unit 3: Initial Target Sets, o Vehicle Barrier System Units 1 through 3 o TSM Barrier Units 3 and 4

3. Unit 3 Security Plan integration with Fleet Security Plan review and discussion:
  • Security Plan Vogtle Unit 3 and Unit 4, Revision 3
  • Security Plan Vogtle Unit 1 and Unit 2 (Fleet Plan), Revision 17
  • The below Security Plan section list is not intended to be all-inclusive, but will be reviewed and considered as topics for discussion during the audit:

PSP Section 1.1 - Facility Physical Layout PSP Section 9 - Security Personnel Equipment PSP Section 11 - Physical Barriers PSP Subsection 11.2.2 - Protection Against a Vehicle Bomb PSP Section 11.5 - Target Set Equipment, Documents and maintains the process to develop and Identify targets sets.

PSP Section 12.0 - Security Posts and Structures PSP Section 14.5 - Vital Area listing Pages 35 and 35 (reference only)

PSP Section 15.1 - Illumination PSP Section 15.4 - Central Alarm Station (CAS) and Secondary Alarm Station (SAS) Operation PSP Section 18 - Response Requirements SCP Section 6 - Protective strategy identifies the response positions and area of responsibility by post assignment.

SCP Section 6 - Security officers are available for CAS/SAS.

SCP Section 6 - Response weapons/equipment identified in facility procedures.

SCP Section 7 - Primary Security Functions SCP Section 7 - Strategy is design to provide adequate target set protection.

SCP Section 7 - Details of the strategy are located in facility procedures

4. Common CAS and new location for SAS (PS-ITAAC).
5. Vulnerability Assessment: Simulation Software (Vanguard) Strategy Development Information needed ahead of visit (if any)

No additional information is required ahead of visit.

  • Discussion concerning pertinent portions of SNC security development schedule Estimate date to submit of LAR PSP- 2 Future Security-Related LARs

Construction units Operating Units 5

Information and Other Material Necessary for the Regulator Audit The following documentation, presentations and supporting materials will be required for performance of this audit. Hard copies of these documents shall be available for review to the audit team upon arrival at the SNC VEGP site.

  • LAR 18-008, Enclosure 2, (page 3): baseline defensive strategy that combines the strategy and structural features,
  • LAR 18-008, Enclosure 2, (page 3): Westinghouse document APP-GW-GLR-066, AP1000 Safeguards Assessment Report (TR-94)
  • LAR 18-008, Enclosure 2, (page 3): existing fleet strategy of utilizing external Bullet Resistance Enclosures to provide enhanced coverage of the site footprint.
  • LAR 18-008, Enclosure 2, (page 3): physical plant and expand the range of potential engagement and interdiction opportunities.
  • LAR 18-008, Enclosure 2, (page 4): overlapping lines of sight and fields of fire
  • Table Top presentations for defense-in-depth of the combined strategy.

Security representative preferably from Units 1 and 2 to provide an overview of the combined strategy.

  • Defense-in-Depth: Vulnerability Assessment Software Security representative to demonstrate how the combined strategy was developed and evaluated using the Vulnerability Assessment Software.

The NRC staff requests SNC to provide a brief overview of design and performance requirements and key assumptions of a physical protection system (as described above) to meet regulatory requirements. A tour of the VEGP Units 1 through 3, site-specific areas of interest is requested for the afternoon of Tuesday, December 11, 2018, to include the TSM. A tour of the VEGP Unit 3, target sets areas should be scheduled for the afternoon of Wednesday, December 12, 2018.

The following are additional supporting documents requested:

  • Design drawings (D-size if available) showing plan and elevation views of all defensive positions for the minimum numbers that are identified in the VEGP Units 1 through 3 PSP and overlapping fields-of-fire of plant areas from the PA boundary to the nuclear island and structures (e.g., designated vital areas).
  • Design drawings showing locations and configurations of: active and passive vehicle barriers system; sally port and roadway barriers; passive and active vehicle barriers; PA intrusion detection systems; Access Control Building.
  • All referenced documents identified in the Units 3 and 4 PSP and LAR-18-008 submittal.

Team Assignments NRC audit Staff:

  • Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response/Division of Security of Physical and Cyber Security Policy/Reactor Security Branch: Security Specialists:

John Frost, (301) 287-3695 6

Judy Petrucelli, (301) 287-3805

  • NRC/Region II/ (pending availability)

Randy Paterson, RGN II/DRS/PSB, (404) 997-4534 Larry Jones, R-II/DRS/EB2, (404) 997-4837 No quality assurance support is required for this audit. Any materials deemed to be suitable for submittal or citation will be identified for future quality assurance program audit activities. The audit is expected to last for 2 days.

Logistics The audit will be conducted at the SNC VEGP Units 1 through 4, in Waynesboro, Georgia.

The audit is scheduled to begin on December 11, 2018 and end on December 12, 2018. Each day the audit team is scheduled to work from 8 a.m. to. 5 p.m. Participating individuals will meet at the audit location. Entrance and exit briefings can be scheduled at the licensees conveniences.

VEGP Units 3 and 4 (SNC Fleet Plan) that defines security-related measures for VEGP Units 1 and 2.

Special Requests Appropriate handling and protection of Safeguards Information shall be acknowledged and implemented throughout the audit in accordance with 10 CFR 73.21 and 10 CFR 73.22.

Deliverables An audit report will be generated after the completion of the audit. The audit outcome will be used to identify information not currently addressed in the security plan that may be required to be submitted on the docket as additional information to support the NRCs security findings and regulatory decisions.

Within 90 days of the completion of the audit, a regulator audit summary will be completed and documented in ADAMS.

The audit will support NRC staff in preparation of the safety evaluation on Proposed Changes to the Licensing Basis Documents and provide clarification for future staff reviews of SNCs 10 CFR 50.54(p)(2) Security Plan (PSP, T&QP, and SCP) submittal to incorporate the COL Security Plan for Units 3 and 4 into the SNC Fleet Plan, for demonstration of a reasonable assurance of adequate protection of VEGP Units 1 through 4. The audit will assist NRC staff in the preparation, issuance, and resolution of any potential Request for Additional Information (RAI) for the licensing reviews Proposed Changes to Licensing Basis Documents (LAR-18-008).

References:

7

The references listed below are applicable to this audit. The licensee does not need to provide copies of these references to the NRC staff during this audit.

  • NRC, RG 5.68, Protection Against Malevolent Use of Land Vehicles at Nuclear Power Plants, (ADAMS Accession No. ML003739379), August 1994.
  • NRC, RG 5.69, Guidance for the Application of the Radiological Design Basis Threat in the Design, Development and Implementation of a Physical Security Program that Meets 10 CFR 73.55 Requirements, August 13, 2018, (ADAMS Accession No. ML13151A355 (Non-public)). (Includes security related or safeguards information and is not publicly available)
  • NRC, RG 5.81, Target Set Identification and Development for Nuclear Power Reactors, May 29, 2013, (ADAMS Accession No. ML13151A355 (Non-public)). (Includes security related or safeguards information and is not publicly available)
  • NUREG-1959, Intrusion Detection Systems and Subsystems: Technical Information for NRC Licensees, March 2011, (ADAMS Accession No.: ML11112A009)
  • NUREG/CR-6190, Vol. 2, Rev. 1, 1994: Protection Against Malevolent Use of Vehicles at Nuclear Power Plants: Vehicle Barrier System Selection Guidance (Includes security related or safeguards information and is not publicly available)
  • NUREG/CR-6190, 2004, Protection Against Malevolent Use of Vehicles at Nuclear Power Plants: Vehicle Barrier System Selection Guidance
  • SAND2007-5591 Nuclear Power Plant Security Assessment Technical Manual September 2007, Sandia National Laboratory, Albuquerque, NM
  • SAND77-0777, Barrier Technology Handbook, Sandia National Laboratory, Albuquerque, NM 8
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