Regulatory Guide 5.68

(Draft Issued as DG-5006) Protection Against Malevolent Use of Vehicles at Nuclear Power Plants

ML003739379
Person / Time
Issue date:	08/31/1994
From:	Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research
To:
References
DG-5006 RG-5.68
Download: ML003739379 (8)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION August 1994 REGULATORY GUIDE

"OFFICEOF NUCLEAR REGULATORY RESEARCH

REGULATORY GUIDE 5.68 (Draft was issued as DG-5006)

PROTECTION AGAINST MALEVOLENT USE OF VEHICLES AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS

A. INTRODUCTION

criteria in 10 CFR 50.109, demonstrating that the costs of fully meeting the design goals and criteria are not In the amended 10 CFR Part 73, "Physical Protec justified by the added protection that would be pro tion of Plants and Materials," the new Section vided. The alternative measures must be submitted to

73.1 (a) (1) requires a licensee to protect against a de the Commission for approval. The rule does not apply termined violent external assault, attack by stealth, or to licensees who are in the process of decommissioning deceptive actions by several persons using a four-wheel and have amended their operating licenses to posses drive land vehicle for the transport of personnel and sion-only status. The rule would apply to licensees who their hand-carried equipment to the proximity of vital plan to decommission in the near future but do not areas. The new 10 CFR 73. 1(a) (1) (iii) requires licens have a possession-only license. The Commission would ees to protect against a four-wheel drive land vehicle need to evaluate each of these licensees individually to bomb. In 10 CFR 73.55, "Requirements for Physical determine whether an exemption from the rule is ap Protection of Licensed Activities in Nuclear Power propriate.

Reactors Against Radiological Sabotage," the new 10 CFR 73.55(c)(7) requires a licensee to establish ve The new 10 CFR 73.55 (c) (9) requires licensees to hicle control measures, including vehicle barriers, to submit to the Commission summary descriptions of protect against the use of a land vehicle, as specified by their proposed control measures as required by 10

the Commission, as a means of transportation to gain CFR 73.55 (c) (7) and the results of their vehicle bomb unauthorized proximity to vital areas. The new 10 CFR comparison. The new 10 CFR 73.55(c)(10) pertains

73.55 (c) (8) requires a licensee to compare the vehicle to applicants for a license to operate a nuclear power control measures established in accordance with 10 reactor.

CFR 73.55(c)(7) to the Commission's design goals This regulatory guide is being developed to pro and criteria for protection against a land vehicle bomb. vide guidance acceptable to the NRC staff by which the Also, 10 CFR 73.55(c)(8) provides for a process to licensee can meet the requirements of the amended 10

use alternative measures for protection against a land CFR 73.1(a)(1) and 73.55(c)(7), (8), (9), and (10).

vehicle bomb, for example, for those licensees with a This regulatory guide will be used by licensees in particularly difficult site configuration. These alterna conjunction with separate Safeguards Information that tive measures must provide substantial protection has already been provided to affected licensees, but against a land vehicle bomb and must be supported by this Safeguards Information is not available to the gen a licensee analysis, using the essential elements of the eral public. Also available is NUREG/CR-6190,

USNRC REGULATORY GUIDES The guides are Issued in the following ten broad divisions:

Regulatory Guides are issued to describe and make available to the public such Information as methods acceptable to the NRC staff for implement ing specific parts of the Commission's regulations, techniques used by 1. Power Reactors 6. Products the staff In evaluating specific problems or postulated accidents, and 2, Research and Test Reactors 7. Transportation data needed by the NRC staff in Its review of applications for permits and 3. Fuels and Materials Facilities 8. Occupational Health licenses. Regulatory Guides are not substitutes for regulations, and com 4. Environmental and Siting 9, Antitrust and Financial Review pliance with them Is not required. Methods and solutions different from 5. Materials and Plant Protection 10. General those set out In the guides will be acceptable If they provide a basis for the findings requisite to the issuance or continuance of a permit or license by Copies of Issued guides may be purchased from the Government Printing the Commission, Office at the current GPO price. Information on current GPO prices may This guide was issued after consideration of comments received from the be obtained by contacting the Superintendent of Documents, U.S.

public. Comments and suggestions for Improvements In these guides are Government Printing Office, Mail Stop SSOP, Washington, DC

encouraged at all times, and guides will be revised, as appropriate, to 20402-9328, telephone (202)512-2249 or (202)512-2171.

accommodate comments and to reflect new Information or experience.

Written comments may be submitted to the Rules Review and Directives Issued guides may also be purchased from the National Technical Infor Branch, DFIPS, ADM, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washing mation Service on a standing order basis. Details on this service may be ton, DC 20555-0001. obtained by writing NTIS, 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, VA 22161.

"Protection Against Malevolent Use of Vehicles at Nu Passive vehicle barriers are appropriate for those clear Power Plants," Volumes 1 and 2, which provides portions of the barrier system that are not needed for acceptable measures to satisfy the requirements of this vehicle access. The passive barriers may make use of rule. natural topographic features and structures provided these features, along with other segments of the barri Any information collection activities mentioned in er, provide a continuous vehicle barrier against land this regulatory guide are contained as requirements in access to the facility's vital area

s. In considering a bar

10 CFR Part 73, which provides the regulatory basis rier, natural features or devices that limit vehicle direc for this guide. The information collection requirements tion and speed also may be appropriate to simplify or in 10 CFR Part 73 have been approved by the Office of reduce the performance required of the vehicle barrier Management and Budget, Approval No. 3150-0002. system.

The public reporting burden for this collection of Active vehicle barriers are appropriate for those information is estimated to average 500 hours0.00579 days <br />0.139 hours <br />8.267196e-4 weeks <br />1.9025e-4 months <br /> per portions of the barrier system that need to provide for response, including the time for reviewing instructions, vehicle access. Active vehicle barriers have two posi searching existing data sources, gathering and main tions: one position that denies passage of a vehicle and taining the data needed, and completing and reviewing a second position that allows passage. Barriers remain the collection of information. Send comments regard in the denial position to prevent entry and are moved ing this burden estimate or any other aspect of this to allow entry only after authorization for the vehicle collection of information, including suggestions for has been confirmed.

reducing the burden, to the Information and Records The energy-absorbing capability of various vehicle Management Branch (T-6 F33), U.S. Nuclear Regu barriers and the speed-reducing capability of natural latory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001;

and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and and man-made obstacles can be based on presently Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-3019 (3150-0002), Office available test data developed for other Federal agen cies or by national laboratories or barrier manufactur of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503.

ers. Much of the available data is included in the Safe guards Information that has already been provided to

B. DISCUSSION

affected licensees. For vehicle barriers and obstacles for which test data are not available, licensees can per MEASURES TO PROTECT AGAINST form engineering analyses to determine their effective I

UNAUTHORIZED USE OF A LAND VEHICLE ness in stopping or slowing a vehicle.

AS A MEANS OF PERSONNEL TRANSPORT

Access control measures for vehicles crossing the Protection against use of a land vehicle as a means boundary of the established vehicle barrier system to gain unauthorized proximity to vital areas can be need to be sufficient to provide assurance that the ve provided by establishing a continuous barrier system hicle is appropriately authorized and not transporting that encompasses vital areas of the facility. The fea an explosive device. In addition to barriers, access tures and structures that form the barrier system would control measures include required vehicle searches, need to be sufficient to stop the forward motion of a personnel searches, and escorts (if necessary). It land vehicle with the design characteristics established would be expected that, at most facilities, one active by the Commission. These design characteristics have vehicle barrier would be established for at least one of been provided to affected NRC licensees in a separate the present protected area vehicle access points.

document that is Safeguards Information, and there Searches of vehicles for explosives, and other person fore is not available to the public. nel access control measures that remain in effect for protected area entry, are rigorous and provide assur Since the protected area perimeter serves as an ance against unauthorized vehicle entries. Vehicle outer barrier to vital areas, one approach would be to searches may be conducted inside the vehicle barrier establish the vehicle barrier contiguous with or in close system (VBS) at previously established search points proximity to the protected area perimeter. At many after proper authorization of the vehicle has been facilities, natural terrain features such as water barri obtained. For barrier system layouts that have vehicle ers, steep cliffs, large rocks, or existing structures such denial barriers located outside the protected area as buildings or cooling towers located adjacent to the boundary, vehicle access control measures, including protected area would be well suited and may be linked searching for explosives, would have to be provided for with barriers to serve as part of the continuous barrier. vehicles permitted access inside the barrier, even if the As a matter of economy and convenience, the barrier vehicle did not enter the protected area.

system would likely include the present vehicle access points to the protected area. At these locations, active Portions of the VBS located outside the protected barriers that would allow controlled vehicle entry areas should be periodically observed to identify dam would need to be installed. age, deterioration, or indications of tampering that

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impact the effectiveness of the barrier. These observa In addition to the protection afforded by distance tions may be performed as part of routine security pa from the blast, vital equipment at most sites is provided trols. substantial protection by structures containing the equipment. Vital equipment is frequently located with The NRC anticipates that vehicle barriers, particu in seismic structures (often reinforced concrete walls).

larly passive barriers, will normally remain functional once installed. For those infrequent cases of failure, "Safe standoff" distance is the distance between any compensatory measures should take into consider vital equipment or a structure housing vital equipment ation the type and cause of the problem and the time and the point of detonation of the design basis threat the barrier will be nonfunctional. For example, for bomb that would protect the equipment or equipment short-term problems with active or passive barriers, within the structure to a medium level of protection.

compensatory measures would not be expected to be Safe standoff distances can be determined by blast extensive. When barriers are nonfunctional for longer effect analyses that take into account the size of the periods, appropriate compensatory measures may in explosive, the distance between the explosive and the clude placement of heavy vehicular equipment, place affected structure, and the characteristics of the struc ment of concrete highway median bounces in a serpen ture. These analysis techniques are described in the tine fashion, installation of strands of airplane arresting separate Safeguards Information document that has wires, or positioning an officer armed with a high been sent to licensees.

power contingency weapon. When the blast analysis shows that a vital area bar rier structure would be damaged, further analysis may MEASURES TO PROTECT AGAINST USE OF be able to demonstrate that vital equipment within the A VEHICLE AS A MEANS OF TRANSPORT OF structure is not damaged. For example, the vital equip AN EXPLOSIVE DEVICE

ment may be located in a separate cubicle within the main structure that is unaffected by the analyzed blast The design goal for protection against explosive damage to an outer wall or a roof. If the blast effect devices transported by a vehicle is to protect equip analysis indicates that the explosion could damage vital ment, systems, devices, or material if its failure, de equipment, the ability to shut down and maintain the struction, or release of which could directly or indirect facility in a safe shutdown condition may be demon ly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to strated by identifying alternative plant equipment that radiation. Such equipment, systems, devices, or mate could serve the same safety function as the equipment rial are designated by licensees as vital equipment and analyzed as being damaged by the explosion. Also, it are required by 10 CFR 73.55(c)(1) to be located may be demonstrated that damage control measures within vital areas. Vital areas in turn are required to be can be taken that could support plant shutdown and located inside protected areas. At many facilities the maintain the plant in a safe shutdown condition.

vital area barrier, which separates vital equipment from the protected area, is located at a considerable If the blast effects analysis demonstrates that vital distance from the protected area barrier. Further, vital equipment would be damaged, that alternative equip area barriers generally are quite substantial. These fea ment is not available, and that damage control meas tures, assuming the vehicle barrier system is located ures can not adequately support plant shutdown and along or adjacent to the protected area barrier, pro maintaining shutdown conditions, other measures (in vide substantial protection for vital equipment from an addition to those required to protect against the use of explosive blast. Many of the issues discussed in the a land vehicle as a means of transportation to gain previous section related to active and passive barriers proximity to vital areas) may be needed. To fully meet apply to the protection against explosives. the Commission's design goals and criteria for protec tion against a land vehicle bomb, additional measures The effects of an explosive device diminish rapidly that can be taken include (1) extending the vehicle with distance. The distance of the structure or equip barrier location out from those positions shown by the ment from the explosive blast is referred to as "stand analysis that the barrier does not provide sufficient safe off distance." If a vehicle is transporting an explosive standoff distance for vital area structures from the ex device and the device is detonated at the vehicle barri plosive, (2) constructing structures that shield the vital er, the standoff distance would be that distance be area barrier from blast effects, (3) installing equipment tween vital equipment and the closest exterior point of to back up that equipment assumed to be damaged, or the vehicle barrier system. Different vital areas have (4) interconnecting other systems to the damaged I

different standoff distances depending on the postu equipment.

lated locations of the vehicle barriers. Considering typ Certain security-related electric power supplies ical plant layouts and the placement of vehicle barriers and the central alarm station are required by 10 CFR

at or adjacent to the protected area, vital area barriers Part 73 to be protected within vital areas; however, in at many facilities would be afforded sufficient protec the absence of safety-related equipment necessary for tion against a relatively large explosive device. plant shutdown, these vital areas need not be consid-

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ered as areas needing protection in the licensee's Design Basis Threat Bomb: An explosive device analysis. with the TNT-equivalent force that is described to li censees in the separate Safeguards Information.

ALTERNATIVE MEASURES TO PROTECT

AGAINST A VEHICLE BOMB Design Basis Threat Land Vehicle: A vehicle with design characteristics described to licensees in the sep As provided in 10 CFR 73.55 (c) (8), under certain arate Safeguards Information.

circumstances a licensee may propose measures other Design Goals and Criteriafor ProtectionAgainst a than those needed to meet the design goals and criteria Land Vehicle Bomb: The design goal is to protect specified for protection against a land vehicle bomb. equipment, systems, devices, or material, the failure, This does not relieve the licensee of the requirement to destruction, or release of which could directly or protect against use of a vehicle to gain proximity to vi indirectly endanger the public health and safety by ex tal areas. Alternative measures developed by a licensee posure to radiation. The criteria are the protection will be acceptable to the NRC staff if it can be demon needed to protect against the design basis threat land strated that they, along with measures that protect vehicle and the design basis threat bomb.

against vehicle intrusions, provide substantial protec tion against a land vehicle bomb and if the licensee Level of Protection:The degree of protection from demonstrates by an analysis, using the essential ele a bomb blast that a structure provides to equipment ments of 10 CFR 50.109, that the costs of fully meeting housed inside the structure.

the design goals and criteria are not justified by the Safe Standoff Distance: The distance between vi protection added by these additional measures. These tal equipment or a structure housing vital equipment alternative measures must be approved by the NRC and the point of detonation of the design basis threat staff. bomb that would protect the equipment or equipment within the structure to a medium level of protection. A

Factors to be considered in assessing proposed al medium level of protection is afforded vital equipment ternative measures to protect against a vehicle bomb when there is a low probability of damage to the equip include: ment from an explosion occurring at the vehicle

"* The characteristics (e.g., size, location, and mo barrier.

bility) of the vehicle bomb that the alternative Standoff Distance: The distance between vital

"*

measure would protect against.

The percent of the perimeter that would be vul equipment or a structure housing vital equipment and the closest exterior point of the vehicle barrier system.

[___________

nerable to a design basis vehicle explosion. Vehicle BarrierSystem (VBS): A continuous barri er, which may include buildings, natural barriers, com

"* The amount of time that the reactor could be mercially available barriers, and any combination of maintained in a safe condition if subjected to a these items, utilized to stop a land vehicle used as design basis vehicle explosion at the most vulner transportation to gain proximity to vital areas or used able portion of the barrier system. to transport a bomb.

"* The licensee's severe accident management pro

C. REGULATORY POSITION

gram.

1. MEASURES TO PROTECT AGAINST

"* The offsite consequences of a design basis ve UNAUTHORIZED VEHICLE INTRUSION

hicle explosion at the most vulnerable portion of A vehicle barrier system (VBS) that is capable of the barrier system.

preventing forced access of a land vehicle to gain prox

"* The cost difference between the proposed alter imity to vital areas should be established at each nu native measures and measures that would fully clear power reactor site. The VBS should provide a meet the design goals and criteria for protection perimeter around vital areas of the facility such that no against a vehicle bomb. location along the perimeter would permit forced entry of a land vehicle. The VBS, regardless of the type of The NRC's approval of the licensee's proposal for barriers used, should be of a design capable of stopping alternative measures will be based on the extent that the forward motion of the design basis land vehicle the vehicle barrier system, including alternative meas (DBV). The VBS may be incorporated as part of the ures added to enhance protection against a vehicle protected area perimeter system but should not dimin bomb, provides protection against a vehicle transport ish or remove any requirements established for the ing an explosive device. protected area.

Definitions 1.1 Passive Barriers The following are definitions of terms used in this The passive barrier portion of the VBS may in guide. clude natural terrain features such as steep cliffs and

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large rocks, alone or in combination with man-made 2. MEASURES TO PROTECT VITAL AREAS

structures or barriers, provided the overall effective AGAINST A LAND VEHICLE BOMB

ness of the barrier at any point is capable of stopping The new 10 CFR 73.55(c)(8) requires a licensee the forward motion of the DBV. Man-made or natural to compare the vehicle control measures established in features that limit the direction and speed of the DBV accordance with 10 CFR 73.55(c) (7) with the design may be used in conjunction with a barrier design. The goals and criteria for protection against a land vehicle separate Safeguards Information, which has already bomb specified by the Commission. The design basis been sent to affected licensees, provides design guid bomb size is specified in the separate Safeguards Infor ance that is acceptable to the NRC on the performance mation that has already been provided to affected li capabilities of barriers and specifications for measures censees.

that reduce vehicle speed.

2.1 Blast Effect Analysis The comparison of vehicle control measures with

1.2 Active Barriers the design goals and criteria for protection against a land vehicle bomb should consist of an analysis that Access by vehicles to locations inside the VBS establishes that the capability of vital equipment to should be through active vehicle denial barriers that, in maintain the plant in a safe condition is not lost as a the denial position, are capable of stopping the forward result of a detonation of a design basis bomb at the motion of the DBV. Operational design features of the VBS boundary. Depending on the VBS design and active barrier or barrier system, when allowing access site-specific considerations, this comparison could for authorized vehicles, should be capable of prevent result in a determination that the design goals and cri ing being bypassed and allowing access of unauthor teria for protection against a land vehicle bomb are sa ized vehicles. A single active barrier may be used in tisfied at the conclusion of any one of the following conjunction with other vehicle control measures to en measures.

sure denial of an unauthorized vehicle. The separate Safeguards Information that was sent to affected li 2.1.1 Screening Analysis censees provides design guidance that is acceptable to This screening process determines whether a more the NRC on the performance capabilities of barriers detailed analysis of the effects of an explosive blast of and specifications for measures that reduce vehicle the size of the design basis bomb is required.

speed.

For each location along the VBS perimeter the standoff distance (distance between vital equipment or a structure housing vital equipment and the closest ex

1.3 Vehicle and Personnel Access Authorization Measures terior point of the VBS) should be determined. Cer tain security-related electric power supplies and the Vehicles and their operators should be authorized central alarm station are required by 10 CFR Part 73 to for entry prior to being permitted access inside the be protected within vital areas; however, in the ab VBS. Vehicle authorization should also include confir sence of safety-related equipment necessary for plant mation that the vehicle has a legitimate purpose for shutdown, these vital areas need not be considered as entering the VBS. Authorization for the vehicle opera areas needing protection in the licensee's analysis.

tor should include confirmation that the individual has Licensees should determine whether the standoff a legitimate purpose for operating the vehicle inside distances for each location along the VBS provide a the VBS. For VBS designs that are adjacent to the pro safe standoff distance. This determination should be tected area boundary and whose active vehicle barrier made by an analysis that takes into account the size of access points are the same as the protected area ve the explosive; both reflective and side-on blast loads hicle access points, vehicle and personnel authoriza on walls, roofs, and supporting members; the distance tion measures for entering the protected area provide between the explosive and the affected structure; and adequate authorization controls. the characteristics of the structure. Vital equipment can be assumed to remain operational if the structure containing the equipment provides such a level of pro

1.4 VBS Description tection that there is a low probability of damage to the equipment from an explosion occurring at the vehicle The security plan should contain an attachment barrier. The separate Safeguards Information that has that describes the VBS. The description should in already been provided to affected licensees specifies clude site drawings that identify the VBS, the various approaches acceptable for determining safe standoff components and combinations of components that distances.

compose the VBS, and access authorization measures If vital area structures and equipment are found to for vehicle and personnel within the VBS. be located at distances equal to or greater than the safe

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standoff distance, the design goals and criteria for pro If analysis of the effects of additional measures tection against a land vehicle bomb are considered finds that vital equipment remains functional or that fully met and no further analysis is necessary. the ability to shut down and maintain the facility in a safe condition can be provided, the design goals and criteria for protection against a land vehicle bomb are

2.1.2 Detailed Analysis considered fully met and no further analysis is neces If the screening analysis described in Section 2. 1.1 sary.

of this guide cannot establish that vital equipment As provided in 10 CFR 73.55(c)(8), the licensee would be protected from damage by detonation of the may propose to the NRC additional measures other design basis bomb at any location along the VBS than ones needed to fully meet the design goals and boundary, the analysis should then consider: criteria, provided this approach provides substantial protection against a vehicle bomb and it can be dem

(1) Whether any obstructions in the blast path would onstrated that the costs of measures to fully meet the affect the level of protection provided to vital design goals and criteria are not justified by the added equipment. The analysis may incorporate the ef protection that would be provided. If so, the actions in fects of natural topography that diminish the ef Regulatory Position 2.2 should be taken.

fects of the bomb blast effect. The analysis may also include an assessment of interior building

2.2 Alternative Measures To Protect Against designs (e.g., interior walls, supports) that may Explosives protect vital equipment even if the outer wall or structure is significantly damaged. The analysis As provided in 10 CFR 73.55(c)(8), a licensee should show whether or not the blast damage im may propose to the NRC additional measures other pacts the functional operability of the vital equip than the ones needed to meet the design goals and cri ment. teria, provided this approach provides substantial pro tection against a vehicle bomb and provided it can be

(2) Whether the plant can be shut down and main demonstrated that the costs of measures to fully meet tained in a shutdown condition with equipment the design goals and criteria are not justified by the not damaged by the explosion. The evaluation added protection that would be provided. This submit may allow for damage control actions to mitigate tal should include:

the consequences of the explosion. These dam age control actions should be included in appli (1) The findings regarding the extent of the protec tion against a vehicle bomb provided by the I

cable station operating procedures and refer enced in the safeguards contingency procedures. vehicle control measures designed to meet the In addition, the analysis should consider loss of requirements of 10 CFR 73.55(c)(7). These off-site power, an assumption that is compatible findings should be expressed in explicit terms with the basic premise that equipment not desig such as the size of explosive for which the meas nated and protected as vital is vulnerable to dam ures provide protection and the locations along age and is not available. the barrier system perimeter where the design goals for protection against a vehicle bomb can If the detailed analysis determines that all vital not be fully met.

equipment remains functional or that the ability to shut (2) A description and analysis of additional meas down the facility and maintain it in a shutdown condi ures needed to fully meet the design goals and tion can be provided even with the loss of vital equip criteria for protection against a vehicle bomb.

ment identified in the screening analysis, the design The description should include an estimate of goals and criteria for protection against a land vehicle the cost of the measures.

bomb are considered fully met and no further analysis is necessary. (3) A description and analysis of additional meas ures, alternative to those needed to fully meet the design goals and criteria, that are proposed to

2.1.3 Additional Protection Measures be taken. The analysis should address the en hanced protection provided by the additional If the screening and detailed analyses determine measures. The description should include an es that the design goals and criteria for protection against timate of the costs of the measures.

a land vehicle bomb cannot be fully met, a determina tion should be made concerning additional measures (4) A comparison of the costs of the measures de needed to fully achieve the design goals and criteria. scribed in (2) and (3) above and an assessment Additional measures may include installing blast supporting a finding that additional costs of fully shields, changing planned vehicle barriers to extend meeting the design goals and criteria are not standoff distances, strengthening current structures, or justified by the added protection that would be installing or relocating plant equipment or systems. provided.

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3. DOCUMENTATION 4. CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR

SURFACE VEHICLE BOMBS

In accordance with 10 CFR 73.55(c) (9), each li Once implemented, the control measures required censee authorized to operate a nuclear power reactor to meet these amendments to Part 73 supersede is required to submit to the Commission a summary contingency requirements initiated in response to description of the proposed vehicle control measures Generic Letter 89-07, "Power Reactor Safeguards and the results of the vehicle bomb comparative analy Contingency Planning for Surface Vehicle Bombs," *

sis. The summary description should include identifi of April 28, 1989. However, licensees whose vehicle cation of active and passive components of the VBS control measures do not fully meet the NRC's design and any natural terrain features or man-made obstruc goals and measures may choose to maintain vehicle tions that complete the VBS. A site drawing or diagram bomb contingency planning as one element of pro that outlines the VBS should be included with the de posed alternative measures.

scription. The results of the vehicle bomb comparative analysis should identify the basis for determining that the Commission's design goals and criteria for protec tion against a land vehicle bomb are fully met. When

D. IMPLEMENTATION

applicable, the results of the comparison should in The purpose of this section is to provide informa clude damage control actions that must be taken and tion to licensees and applicants regarding the NRC

additional security measures taken to protect against staff's plans for using this regulatory guide.

the design basis bomb.

Except in those cases in which an applicant pro poses an acceptable alternative method for complying Licensees whose comparative analysis determines with specified portions of the Commission's regula that they do not fully meet the design goals and criteria tions, the methods described in this guide will be used for protection against a vehicle bomb and who propose in the evaluation of submittals in response to the alternative measures should submit the analysis and amendments to 10 CFR Part 73.

justification for the alternatives as specified in Regula tory Position 2.2. *Copies are available for inspection or copying for a fee from the NRC Public Document Room at 2120 L Street NW., Washing ton, DC; the PDR's mailing address is Mail Stop LL-6, Wash Details of the "as built" VBS and of the land ve ington, DC 20555; telephone (202)634-3273; fax hicle bomb analysis should be maintained on site. (202)634-3343.

REGULATORY ANALYSIS

A separate regulatory analysis has not been pro "Regulatory Analysis for Malevolent Use of Vehicles vided for this regulatory guide. The regulatory analysis at Nuclear Power Plants" is available for inspection that was prepared for the rule provides the basis for and copying for a fee at the Commission's Public Doc this regulatory guide and examines the costs and bene ument Room, 2120 L Street NW., Washington, DC,

fits of the rule as implemented by this guide. A copy of under Regulatory Guide 5.68.

Printed on recycled paper Federal Recycling Program

5.68-7

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