ML18078A928
| ML18078A928 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 01/19/1979 |
| From: | Keimig R, Nicholas H, Norrholm L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18078A927 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-272-78-28, 50-311-78-47, NUDOCS 7903080025 | |
| Download: ML18078A928 (20) | |
See also: IR 05000272/1978028
Text
Report No.
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
50-272/78-28
50-311/78-47
50-272
Region I
Docket No. 50-311
0 PR -70
c
License No.
CPPR-53
Priority -------
Category __
....;:;;B ...... l ___ ____
Licensee:
Public Service Electric and Gas Comoany
80 Park Place
Newark, New Jersey 07101
Facility Name:
Salem Nuclear Generating Station - Units 1 and 2
Inspection at:
Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey
Inspection
16, 1978
Approved by:
Inspection Summary:
, Chief ~~actor Projects
o. 1, RO(/F Branch
I- s-- 7 7
date signed
date s'i gned
Ins ections on November 19 - December 16, 1978 (Combined Re art Nos. 50-272/78-28
and 50-311/78-47
Unit 1 Areas Inspected:
Routine inspections by the resident inspector and
regional based inspectors of plant operations including tours of the facility;
log and record reviews;.plant cleanliness; followup on licensee events; IE
Circulars; and followup on previous inspection items.
The inspections involved
29 inspector-hours by the NRC resident inspector and 38 inspector-hours by one
regional based inspector and one intern.
Unit 2 Areas Inspected:
Routine inspections by the resident inspector and a
regional based inspector of plant preoperational testing including tours of
facility; test program controls; QA/QC surveillance of testing; test program
lementation; test procedu~e review and verification; *Witnessing of Hot
ctional Testing and other selected preoperational tests; comparison of
as-built plant with FSAR description; preoperational staff training; preparedness
for operating license including startup test program; followup on IE Bulletins
Region I Form 12
(Rev. April 77)
790308 () 0 :J- ~
1-
~spection Summary
2
and Circulars; and followup on previous inspection items.
The inspections
involved 84 inspector-hours by the NRC resident inspector and 132 inspector-
hours by one NRC regional based inspector.
Results:
One item of noncompliance was identified in one area with respect
to Unit 2 (Infraction - failure to identify status of turned-over equipment
and components, Paragraph 4).
No items of noncompliance were identified with
respect to Unit 1 .
DETAILS
l.
Persons Contacted
2.
PSE&G
R. Griffith, Site QA Engineer
C. Johnson, Startup Engineer
S. LaBruna, Maintenance Engineer
A. Meyer, Site QA Engineer
E. Meyer, Project QA Engineer
H. Midura, Manager - Salem Generating Station
W. Reuther, Site QAD
F. Schnarr, Station Operating Engineer
R. Silverio, Assistant to the Manager
J. Stillman, Station QA Engineer
W. Treston, Site QAD
J. Zupko, Chief Engineer
The inspector also interviewed other licensee personnel during the
course of the inspections including management, clerical, mainten-
ance, operations, performance, quality assurance, testing, and
construction personnel.
Status of Previous Inspection Items
(Closed) Follow Item (272/77-10-02):
Control Room bezel light bulb
reliability.
Based on performance testing, the licensee had concluded
that the type 376, 28 volt bulb would provide the longest servi~e
life in control room bezel indicators. The inspector verified that
action had been taken to assure that the correct bulb is reordered
when current stock is depleted.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (272/78-14-01):
Records of emergency kit
dosimeter drift checks.
The inspector verified that emergency kit
dosimeters* drift checks were conducted and documented by sampling
two dosimeters in one emergency kit ..
4
(Closed) Unresolved Item (272/78-19-01):
Revision to AP-24 to
clearly define the area of elevation 130' in containment which is
accessible during power operation.
Revision 2 to Administrative.
Procedure 24, Radiological Safety Program, issued November 14,
1978, defines in Section 6.5 the accessible area of containment
when the plant is at power, The inspector had no further questions
on this i tern.
(Closed) Noncompliance (272/78-21-01): Failure to maintain clear
isolation zone.
The inspector verified corrective actions taken by
the licensee to ensure that a clear isolation zone is maintained in
the vicinity of the protected area boundary.
(Closed) Noncompliance (272/78-22-01): Failure to retain surveil-
lance records.
The inspector conducted a sampling inspection of
surveillance records to verify.the effectiveness of licensee cor-
rective action.
No failure to produce the required records was
- identified.
(Closed) Noncompliance (272/78-22-02): Failure to submit 30-day
report required by Technical Specifications.
The inspector reviewed
a revision to AP-6, Operational Incidents - Report Initiation,
Investigation and Followup, and the new AP-6-1 form.
The revised
procedures and form should be effective in preventing recurrence
of a failure to report items required by Technical Specifications.
No subsequent failures to report have been identified.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (272/78-24-01): Control room log minimum
operating limit for reactor coolant flow rate.
Based on a review
conducted by the licensee, Revision 9 to the Console Reading
Sheet was issued on November 7, 1978 establishing 94% as the
minimum loop flow rate. The inspector had no further questions
on this item.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (311/77-00-19): Testing of valve motor
operators. The inspector .made a random selection of thirteen
motot operated valves and verified that all had been tested com-*
pletely during Phase I tests:in April-June 1978.
The GTP-9
data sheet provided documentation of this testing for all motor
operated valves .
5
(Closed) Unresolved Item (311/78-20-01): Updating certificates of
qualification. Certificates of qualification for maintenance
department personnel have been updated to indicate currency.
In
addition, expiration dates hav~ been entered into the station
Inspection Order system to assure that future expirations of cer-
tificatiori does not octur.
- (Closed} Unreso_lved Item (311/78-35-01)':. Controls on jurisd;-cational
tagging. This item has beerr upgraded to an item of noncompliance
-~ s~-~ _Detail,_ ~_aragraph 4).
Unit 1
2.
Review of Plant Operations
a.
The inspectors reviewed representative samplings of logs
and operating records for the period of September through
November, -1978.
Examples of the types of material reviewed
inc 1 uded the fo 11 owing:
1)
Senior Sf.lift Supervisor Log Book (not official)
2)
Control Operators Narrative. Logs (#2)
3)
Control Console Logs (#3)
4)
Primary Plant Logs (#6)
5}
Secondary Plant Logs (#7)
6)
Night Order Book
7)
Operations Directive Manual
8)
Rad Waste Operators Log Book
9}
Jumper/lifted Lead Records
10)
Operations Incident Reports
6
The inspector~ verified that logs are properly filled out
and initialed, provide adequate detail, do not conflict with
Techni~al Specifications or procedures; and, are being
reviewed by the staff. The inspectors verified the retriev-
ability of logs and records placed on microfilm.
No items
of*noncompliance or deviations were identified.
b.
The inspectors made a faci 1 i ty tour concentrating on general
plant housekeeping, fire protection and prevention, evidence
of leaks, excessive vibrations, radiation controls, etc. The
tour included observations of control room activities, log
taking, alarm responses, and manning requirements.
The inspectors observed that a large number of areas in the
Auxiliary Building were contaminated, and upon discussion
with licensee representatives, it became apparent that proper
control and decontamination of these areas was questionable.
The licensee agreed to improve controls and cleanup times
in this area.
The resident inspector will observe these
efforts on a continuing basis.to ensure that proper measures
are insti.tuted.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
c.
The resident inspector conducted a continuing review of plant
operations through daily, random inspection tours of the
facility with emphasis placed on control room operations.
During these tours, inspection is made relative to compli-
ance with selected Technical Specification Limiting Conditions
for Operation, maintenance of operating logs, control room
manning in accordance with the Technical Specifications and
10 CFR 50.54(k), and follow up on operational events.
The inspector noted that the licensee has clearly defined,
in a memorandum from the Chief Engineer dated December 4,
1978, the area within the control room which must be occupied
by the assigned "operator at the controls" of the reactor.
The inspector found that the definition provided is within
the guide 1 i nes of Regulatory Gui de 1 . 114 (Gui dance on Being
the Operator at the Controls of a Nuclear Power Plant).
No
failure to comply with the guidelines has been identified
by the inspector.
The lic~nsee stated that the definition
provided currently by memorandum will be included in a
revision to AP-5 (Operating Practices) to be issued prior
to February 1, 1979.
d.
Unit 2
7
On November 27, 1978, a loss of the 18 Vital Instrument Bus
resulted in a plant trip due to loss of one Reactor Coolant
Rump breaker status indication while operating above the P8
permissive setpoint.
The loss of the instrument bus was *.
caused by fai 1 ure qf the. inverter output transformer and
two regulating r-esistors. The bus 'failure also caused. all
steam lines to *1ndicate high steam flow (1 of 2).
Following
the trip~ auctioneered average temperature went low, apparently
due to undershoot as a result of steam dump operation. This
action caused a .safety injection due to the * combination of
high steam flow and low Tave.
Several ECCS components and
- 13 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump failed to start on the safety
injection. Subsequent analysis indicated that the ECCS
failures td start were directly attributed to loss of the
instrument bus and, therefore, to be expected by design.
The failure of the automatic start for #13 Auxi 1 i ary Feed-
water Pump is attributed to a misadjustment of the over.speed
mechanism.
The plant returned to.power on November 29 after
operability of the 18 Vital Instrument Inverter and #13
Auxiliary Feedwater Pump were verified .
The above events are detailed in Licensee Event Report 78-73/
OlT.
Final review of.this event will be made by the inspector
when a more detailed analysis of the transformer failure is.
available and potentially generic considerations have been
made.
No items of noncompliance were identified during review of
the above event.
3.
Preoperational Testing Quality Assurance
During witnessing of preoperational testing, the inspector verified
that QC/QA personnel were present conducting surveillance activities
and observing mandatory witness points.
QC personnel employ check-
1 ists to ensure all required aspects of test procedures in progress
have been addressed.
8
Through review of system turnover packages (POTT 10-01, Auxiliary
Feed and POTT 95-01, Reactor Solid State Protection System),
the inspector verified that QC/QA input ts solicited to ensure
that outstanding deficiencies are identified and tracked through
the turnover process.
Deficiencies noted during tonstruction and testing were identified
and tracked to.resolution.
The inspector reviewed Site QA Audit. SC-78-825 dated November.
17, 1978, which addresses test and startup activities. Three
items requiring followup were identified .. Resolution of two
was verified by.the inspector. The third item* relating to
jurisdictional tagging had not been adequately addressed by the
licensee at the conclusion of the inspection period. This item
identified items of a nature similar to those found by the inspec-
tor and which constitute noncompliance as delineated in Detail 4
of this report.
The inspector had no further questions r~lative to this area.
4.
Preoperational Test Program Implementation Controls
a. * To review the implementation of preoperational testing
controls, the inspector reviewed the following Preoperational
Test and Turnover (POTT) packages:
POTT 10-01 Auxiliary Feedwater System
POTT 95~01 Reactor Solid State Protection System
Further review of jurisdictional controls maintained in
these and other systems which had undergone turnover included
field observations of jurisdictional tagging and verification
that all parties at the site respected jurisdictional boundaries
such that post-turnover and post-test status remained valid.
The area of jurisdictional .controls was identified as a potential
probl~m area in NRC Inspection Report 50-311/78-35.
More de-
tailed review of the jurisdictional controls program identified
the following failures to maintain adequate controls:
9
During the week of October 9, 1978, valves 2SJ135,
21SJ134, 22SJ134, and interconnecting piping were found
not to have PSSUG jurisdictiOnal tags applied.
POTT of
the Safety Injection system was accomplished September
11, 1978.
- .,._
During the week of October 2, 1978, the Safety I nj ecti on
Pump ammeter, located in the control room, was found not
to have PSSUG jurisdicti0nal tagging applied.
POTT of
the Safety Injection system was accomplished on September
11 ' 1978.
During the week of September 18~ 1978, Component Cooling
Pumps 21 and 22 4 KV breakers did not have PSSUG juris-
dictional tagging applied.
POTT of the Component Coolin~
system was accomplished on September 8, 1978.
Those portions of the Auxiliary Feed System bounded by
valves 23AF52, 23AF3, and the pipe junction downstream
of valve 23AF4 were found not to be jurisdictionally
tagged to the PSSUG on December 13, 1978.
POTT of the
system was accomplished on November 7, 1978 .
. On December 15, 1978, the 4 KV breakers for #21 and #22 *
Charging Pumps were found not to bear PSSUG jurisdictional
tags.
The pumps had already undergone preoperational
testing and POTT was accomplished on* October 31, 1978:
On December 13, 1978, construction personnel were observed
working on a suction flange for #22 Charging Pump.
The
system properly bore PSSUG orange jurisdictional tags.
No
authorization to work on the system was i'dentified.
POTT
of the system was accomplished on October 31, 1978.
10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XIV states, "Measures shall
be established to indicate by the use of markings such as
stamps, tags, labels, routing cards, or other suitable
means, the status of inspections and tests performed upon
individual items of* the nuclear power plant *.. These measures
shall provide for the identification of items which have
satisfactorily passed the required inspections and tests,
where necessary to preclude inadvertent bypassing of such
inspections and tests,
11
I --
10
Salem Startup Manual, Revision OA, Section 5.5, requires that
orange Turnover Identification Tags be applied by Public
Service at the time of Preoperational Test and Turnover
(POTT) and further states that respect for these tags is
- mandatery. to prevent degradation of previously tested systems
and components.
Together, the above listed fai'lures to provide and maintafo
status indication for turned-over systems constitute an item
of noncompliance at the -Infraction level (311)78-47-01).
b.
Additional inspection was made to verify that a schedule of
peroperational. testing was maintained, that the quality of
. chemistry in safety related systems was maintained, that
preventive maintenance of turned-over systems is specified
and accomplished, and that corrective maintenance is accom-
plished by qualified persons using approved procedures.
With respect to the last item, the inspector observed corrective
maintenance being performed on #23 Charging Pump on December
13, 1978.
The work was being performed by qualified EPD
Maintenance Department personnel under Work Order TM-1049
using an approv.ed maintenance procedure and with Qt coverage.
Retest of the pump was still outstanding and scheduled to be
performed at the end of this inspection peri ad*.
The inspector* had no questions relative to the above.
5.
Preoperational Test Procedure Review
\\
a.
The office ~f Inspection and Enforcement (IE) Preoperational
Inspection Program dealing with Test Procedure Review has.
the objective of reviewing safety related tests for consistency
with regulatory requirements, guidance, and licensee commitments.
Uniform criteria are applied in the test procedure review
to assure the technical and administrative adequacy of the
procedures. This program is a sampling program which is an
ongoing effort conducted prior to.the performance*of said
tests and prior to the issuance of an operating license.
~
11
b.
The following approved tests were reviewed and verified:
SUP 19. 1 , Revis ion 1 , Approved October 26, 1978, Auxiliary
Building Ventilation
SUP 20~1, Revision 0, Approved November 22, 1978, Reactor
Protection/Emergency Safeguards Time Response Measurement
c.
The procedures were reviewed for technical and administrative
adequacy; and, to verify that adequate testing is planned to
satisfy regulatory guidance and licensee commitments.
The procedures were reviewed for the following:
Management approval,
Appropriate Committee review,
. Procedure *format,
Test objectives,
Prerequisites,
Environmental conditions,
Acceptance criteria,
References,
Initial conditions,
Performance verification,
Recording conduct of test,
Restoration of system to normal after test,
Evaluation of test data, and,
Quality control verification.
No discrepancies were noted in the review of these procedures.
12
6.
Witnessing of Preoperational Testing
a.
On Novemb~r 6, 1978, the licensee began a heat up of the
plant using Reactor Coolant Pump heat to actiieve normal
operating temperature and pressure (547°F at 2235 psig) for
the performance of Hot Functional Testing.
The heatup
sequence and testing at normal operating temperature were
witnessed by the NRC inspectors on site.
Plant cooldown was required twice prior to the completion
of testing due to system problems requiring repair on November
21 and November 30.
The final cool down, completing the Hot
Functional Test sequence was accomplished on December 9~
1978.
For a 11 testing witnessed and described below, the fa 11 owing
aspects, as a minimum, were verified by the inspector on a
- sampling basis:
--
The latest procedure with appropriate approved changes
was available and in use by crew members .
The minimum crew requirements had been met.
Briefings had been conducted with test personnel as
required.
Adequate dry runs were held by all inspection teams.
Test prerequisites were met.
Special test equipment and instrumentation required by
the procedure was calibrated, inservice and manned by
test personnel.
- Testing was being performed as required by the procedure.
Crew actions appeared to be correct and timely during the
performance of the test.
An data were collected for final analysis, by the .cog-
nizant test* personnel.
Test results observed by the inspectors indicated that
test*acceptance criteria had been met.
13
b.
Portions of the following specific tests were witnessed by the
inspectors:
SUP 50.0 ... Hot Functional Testfog - Heatup and Cooldown
This is the overall procedure governing the evoluti-0n and
establiihes prerequisites for heatup as well as sequencing
-other specific SUP
1 s to be conducted at temperature
plateaus of 150°f, 250°F, 345°F, 450°F, and 547°F.
SUP 50.6 - Pressurizer Pressure and Level Control Test
This test verifies operation of pressurizer heaters,
spray and the level control systems.
SUP 50.8 - Steam Generator Safety Valve Test
This test verifies the lift setting of each of the twenty
installed steam generator safety-valves.
SUP 50. 11 - Chemical and Volume Centro l System - Hot
This test is a comprehensive verification of the letdown,
charging, demineralizer, pump seal supply and boration
systems at normal operating conditions.
SUP 50.14 - Auxiliary Feed System Performance Test
This test verifies the design performance of each of the
three auxiliary feedwater pumps - two motor driven and
one steam driven.
SUP 50.15 - Control Room Inaccessibility
This test is a verification that the following functions
can be performed outside the control room to maintain the
plant in a safe, hot shutdown condition: charging and
letdown, makeup, pressure control, auxiliary feedwater,
and atmospheric steam relief .
14
c.
One instance was noted by the inspector in which QC. personnel
were not present when a Mandatory Witness Point step in SUP
50.0 was performed (Step 10.1.47.3).
The master copy of the
procedure was subsequently annotated to indicate that the
point was waived.
No items of noncompliance were identified during the witnessing
of preoperational testing.
7.
Operational Staff Training
To assess preparations for Unit 2 operation the inspector attended
training being conducted for Production Department operations,
performance and maintenance personnel. These personnel, currently
assigned.to Unit l, will be working at Unit 2 when operating.
The following training was observed by the inspector:
QA Level II Training for Supervisors
One session of SRO/RO Requalification Training
Two sessions of Technician-Nuclear (HP) Refresher training
The inspector verified that:
the specified training was conducted;
personnel on the attendance list were in attendance;
an unbi~sed test was administered;
environmental conditions were not detrimental to training;
instructor was adequately prepared; and,
the presentation addressed the assigned topics.
The inspector noted that, during the 1.icensed operat6r qualifi-
.
cation session, noise levels in the classroom were extremely dis-
tracting due to construction activity in the vicinity. Thi.s obser-
. vat ion was passed on* to station management.
The inspector had no further questions relative to the training
activities observed.
J
15
8.
Plant Tour
The inspector conducted periodtc tours of all accessible areas
in the plant.
During these tours, the following specific items
were evaluated:
Hot Work.
Adequacy of fire prevention/protection measures
used.
Fire Equipment..
Operability and evidence of periodic inspec-
tion of fire suppression equipment.
Housekeeping.
Minimal accumulations of debris and maintenance
of required cleanness levels in systems under or following
testing.
Equipment preservation. Maintenance o.f special preservative
measures for installed equipment as applicable.
Component Tagging.
Implementation and observance of equipment
tagging for safety or equipment protection.
Maintenance.
Corrective maintenance in accordance with
established procedures.
Instrumentation. Adequate protection for installed instru-
mentation.
Cable Pulling. Adequate measures taken to protect cable from
damage while being pulled;
Communication.
Effectiveness of public address system in
all areas of the site.
Equipment Controls. Effectiveness of jurisdictional controls
in precluding unauthorized work on systems *in test or which
have been tested (see Detail Paragraph 4).
Logs.
Completeness of logs maintained and resolution of
identified problems.
Foreign Material Exclusion. Maintenance of controls to assure
systems which have been cleaned and flushed are not reopened
to admit foreiqn material.
.
'
~
1'6
Security. Implementation of security prov1 s1 ans.
Parti -
cular attention to maintenance of the Unit 1 protected area
boundary.
Testing.
Spot-checks of testing in progress were made.
Except as identified in other sections of this report, the inspector
had no
questiCms~r..e*la.tive:-to*- p.lan*t tours.
9.
Comparison of As-Built Plant to FSARDescription
As a continuing effort until licensing. of the unit, the inspector
is performing a verification, using construction prints and field
observations, that various safety-related systems have been con-
structed as described in the facility Final Safety Analysis Report.
During this inspection period~ the inspector made a series of field
observations related to the Emergency Diesel Generator Systems and
the Solid State Protection System, to verify that arrangements
were as described in Sections 7 and 8 of the Final Safety Analysis
Report~ These observations included diesel generator arrangement
and capacity, separation criteria for -control cable, arrangement
of pressurizer level indication piping, reactor coolant flow rate
instrumentation, measurement (independent by the inspector) of
ambient temperatures of safety related instrumentation during Hot
Functional Testing to verify temperatures less than 120°F.
In addition, the following prints were reviewed to verify that
the Solid State Protection System provides the functions stated
in the Final Safety Analysis Report:
PSBP 221050
Revision 2
PSBP 221051
Revision 2
PSBP 221052
Revision 2
PSBP 221053
Revision 2
PSBP 221054
Revision 2
PSBP 221055
-*Revision 3
PSBP.221056
Revision 2
PSBP 221057
Revision 4
PSBP 221058
Revision 1
17
10.
PSBP 221059
Revision 3
PSBP 221060
Revision 2
PSBP 221061
Revision 2
PSBP 221062
Revision 2
PSBP 221063
Revision 2
PSBP 221064
Revision 3
PSBP 221065
Revision 2
The inspector had no questions relative to the items reviewed ..
O~erational Readiness
a.
10 CFR 50.57 states that the issuance of an operating license
is, in *part, contingent upon a finding that construction of
the facility has been substantially completed, in conformity
with the construction permit and -the application, as amended,
the provision of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the
Commission; and that the facility will be operated in conformity
with the applications as amended, the provisi~ns of the Act,
and the rules and regulations of the Commission.
In order to provide a basis for this finding, the inspector
_is conducting a continuing review of licensee readiness to
operate the facility. Thi.s review includes, but is not
limited to, the following areas:
Completion of the NRC inspection program to assess construc-
tion, testing and operational preparedness.
Status of facility operating procedures and personnel
training.
Status of all enforcement items and unresolved matters.
Status of the pteoperational test program.
Status of constructibn activities. *
Review of licensee outstanding items, particularly those
identified for completion or resolution after core load.
Site
18
Implementation of corrective measures for Unit 2 as a
result of items identified in Unit 1 from Reportable Occur-
rences, inspection findings, and IE Bulletins*and Circulars.
Operational safety.concerns arising from the above reviews will
be promptly identified to facility management for resolution
prior to the inspector reaching a finding of operational
readiness.
No specific safety concerns have been identified
to date.
b.
As part of the above evaluation, the inspector selected a
sampling of 43 Design Change Requests describing changes
made to Salem Unit 1 pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59.
These 43
DCR's were .reviewed to ensure that appropriate consideration.
had been given to their applicability in the design of Salem
Unit 2.
No failure to incorporate applicable design changes
into the origirlal design, drawings, or through Engineering
.
Change Notices (ECN's) for Unit 2 were identified.
For those
determined to be non-applicable, the inspector had no questions.
c.
The inspector initiated a review of the Phase II (Startup
and Power Ascension) Test program.
The program is expected
to parallel the testing conducted for Unit 1.
However, no
documented program definition, sequence or test procedures
have been issued to date.
The inspector stated the Regulatory
Guide 1.68 requirement that test procedures should be
available for NRC review 60 days prior to proposed testing.
This was acknowledged by the licensee.
11.
IE Bulletin and Circular Followup
a.
The IE Bulletins discussed below were reviewed to verify that:
Licensee management forwarded copies of the response to
the bulletin to appropriate onsite management represen-
tatives.
Information discussed in the licensee's reply was sup-
ported by facility records or by visual examination of
the facility.
Corrective action taken was effected as de~c~ibed in the
reply.
19
The licensee's reply was prompt and within the time
period described in the bulletin.
The review included discussions with Hcensee personnel and
observation and review of items discussed in the details
below.
b.
By correspondence dated February 21, 1978, the licensee
responded to IE Bulletin 78-01 (Flammable Contact Arm
Retainers in GE CR~l20A Relays)~ stating that the subject
relays were not in use at either Salem facility. This
has been verified at Unit 1 (NRC Inspection Report 50-272/
78-09).
During the course of this inspection, the inspector
veftfied that no .GE CR-120A relays were in use at Salem
Unit 2.
c .. By correspondence dated March 23, 1978, the licensee responded
~
to IE Bulletin 78-04 (Environmental Qualification of Certain
Stem Mounted Limit Switches Located Inside Reactor Containment)
stating that seal-in circuit modifications or replacement of
the suspect switches would be accomplished prior to issuance
of an operating license for Unit 2.
The inspector reviewed
the implementing Engineering Change Notice (ECN 35195) and
noted that circuit changes only were addressed.
Inspection
of containment isolation valves indicated that several
employed NAMCO D2400X limit switches for position indication.
A licensee representative stated that the switches in ques-
tion would. also be replaced.
The inspector stated that
this item will be reviewed again when replacement of the
switches is complete (311/78-47-02).
d.
IE Circulars .di.scussed: below were reviewed to verify that
they had been reviewed for applicability by cognizant manage-
ment, and appropriate action initiated.
The review included discussions with licensee personnel and
bbservation and review of* items .discussed.in the details
below.
....
I
20.
--
IE. Circular 77-15 (Degradation of Fuel Oil Flow to the
Emergency Diesel Generators) is addressed in Safety
Evaluation SGS/M~SE-025 dated June 27, 1978 which is
further implemented by surveillance procedure SP (0)
4.8.1.1.2. The inspector had no further questions
on this item.
IE Circular 78-02 (Proper Lubricating Oil for Terry Tur-
bines) is addressed in NRC Inspection Report 50-272/78-15
for Unit 1.
The inspector had no additional concerns
relative to Unit 2 in this* area.
IE Circular 78-17 (Inadequate Guard Training/Qualification
and Falsified Training Records) had* been received and
reviewed by cognizant licensee personnel.
Despite a
concluston that the problems delineated in the Circular
do not apply to Salem Generating Station, the licensee
has elected to perform a comprehensive audit of guard
training and qualification.
In addition, the inspector
verified, through observation of security force requalifi-
cation, that scores recorded at the firing range reflected
actua 1 performance of the persons observed .. The inspector
had ho further questions in this area.
12.
Unresolved Items
Areas for which more information is required to determine accept-
ability are considered unresolved.
An unresolved item is contained
i~ Paragraph llc. of this report'.
13.
Exit Interview
At periodic intervals during the course of this inspection, meetings
were held ~lith senior facility management to discuss inspection
scope and findings .