IR 05000272/1978028
| ML18078A988 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 01/09/1979 |
| From: | Keimig R, Nicholas H, Norrholm L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18078A984 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-272-78-28-01, 50-272-78-28-1, 50-311-78-47, NUDOCS 7903130596 | |
| Download: ML18078A988 (20) | |
Text
Report N U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT 50-272/78-28 50-311/78-47 50-272 Region I Docket N DPR-70 c
CPPR-53 Priority -------
Category Bl
---"'-'-----
License N Licensee:
Public Service Electric and Gas Company 80 Park Place Newark, New Jersey 07101 Fae i 1 ity Name:
Salem Nuclear Generating Station - Units l and 2 Inspection at:
Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey Inspection 16, 1978 I*-.S-- 7 7
date signed Approved date s'igned Inspection Summary:
Ins ections on November 19 - December 16, 1978 (Combined Re art Nos. 50-272/78-28 and 50-311/78-47 Unit 1 Areas Inspected:
Routine inspections by the resident inspector and regional based inspectors of plant operations includin~ tours of the facility; lcig and record reviews; plant cleanliness; followup on licensee events; IE Circulars; and followup on previous inspection item The inspections involved 29 inspector-hours by the NRC resident inspector and 38 inspector-hours by one regional based inspector and one inter Unit 2 Areas Inspected:
Routine inspections by the resident inspector and a regional based inspector of plant preoperational testing including tours of facility; test program controls; QA/QC surveillance of testing; test program ementation; test procedure review and verification; witnessing of Hot tional Testing and other selected preoperational tests; comparison of as-built plant with FSAR description; preoperational staff training; preparedness
- for operating license including startup test program; followup on IE Bulletins Region I Form 12 (Rev. April 77)
7 9 0 3 1 3 0 5<f <O
spection Summary
and Circulars; and followup on previous inspection item The inspections involved 84 inspector-hours by the NRC resident inspector and 132 inspector-hours by one NRC regional based inspecto Results:
One item of noncompliance was identified in one area with respect to Unit 2 (Infraction - failure to identify status of turned-over equipment and components, Paragraph 4).
No items of noncompliance were identified with respect to Unit 1.
DETAILS Persons Contacted PSE&G R. Griffith, Site QA Engineer C. Johnson, Startup Engineer S. LaBruna, Maintenance Engineer A. Meyer, Site QA Engineer E. Meyer, Project QA Engineer H. Midura, Manager - Salem Generating Station W. Reuther, Site QAD F. Schnarr, Station Operating Engineer R. Silverio, Assistant to the Manager J. Stillman, Station QA Engineer W. Treston, Site QAD J. Zupko, Chief Engineer The inspector also interviewed other licensee personnel during the course of the inspections including management, clerical, mainten-ance, operations, performance, quality assurance, testing, and construction personne Status of Previous Inspection Items (Closed) Follow Item (272/77-10-02): Control Room bezel light bulb reliability. Based on performance testing, the licensee had concluded that the type 376, 28 volt bulb would provide the longest service life in control room bezel indicators. The inspector verified that action had been taken to assure that the correct bulb is reordered when current stock is deplete (Closed) Unresolved Item (272/78-14-01):
Records of emergency kit dosimeter drift check The inspector verified that emergency kit dosimeters* drift checks were conducted and documented by sampling two dosimeters in one emergency kit..
(Closed) Unresolved Item (272/78-19-01):
Revision to AP-24 to clearly define.the area of elevation 130' in containment which is accessible during power operatio Revision 2 to Adininistrativ Procedure 24, Radiological Safety Program,.issued November 14, 1978, defines in Section 6.5 the accessible area of containment when the p:l ant is at power. The inspector had no further questions on this ite (Closed) Noncompliance (272/78-21-01): Failure to maintain clear isolation zone. *The inspector verified corrective actions taken b the licensee to ensure that a clear isolation zone is maintained in the vicinity of the protected area boundar (Closed) Noncompliance (272/78-22-01): Failure to retain surveil~
lance record The inspector conducted a sampling inspection of surveillance records to verify.the effectiveness of licensee cor-rective actio No failure to produce the required records was i denti fi e (Closed) Noncompliance (272/78-22-02): Failure to submit 30-day report required by Technical Specification The inspector reviewed a revision to AP-6, Operational Incidents - Report Initiation, Investigation and Followup, and the new AP-6-1 for The revised procedures and form should be effective in preventing recurrence of a failure to report items required by Technical Specification N6 subsequent failures to report have been identifie (Closed) Unresolved Item (272/78-24-01): Control room log minimum operating limit for reactor coolant flow rat Based on a review conducted by the licensee, Revision 9 to the Console Reading Sheet was issued on November 7, 1978 establishing 94% as the minimum loop flow rate. The inspector had no further questions on this ite (Closed) Unresolved Item (311/77-00-19): Testing of valve motor operator The inspector made a random selection of thirteen motet operated valves and verified that all had been tested com-.
pletely during Phase I tests:in April-June 197 The GTP-9 data sheet provided documentation of this testing for all motor operated valve (Closed) Unresolved Item (311/78-20-01): Updating certificates of qualification. Certificates of qualification for maintenance department personnel have been updated to indicate currenc I addition, expiration dates have been entered into the station Inspection Order system to assure that future expi rati ans of cer-ti fi cation does not occu (Closed) Unresolved Item (311/78-35-~)~ Controls on jurisdtcational taggin This item has been upgraded to an item of noncompliance (see Detail,_~_a'._agr_-_aph 4).
Unit 1 Review of Plant Operations The inspectors reviewed representative samplings of logs and,operating records for the period of September through November,,197 Examples of the types of material reviewed included the following:
1)
Senior Shift Supervisor Log Book (not official)
2)
Control Operators Narrative Logs (#2)
3)
Control Console Logs (#3)
4)
Primary Plant Logs (#6)
5}
Secondary Plant Logs (#7}
6)
Night Order Book 7)
Operations Directive Manual 8)
Rad Waste Operators Log Book 9)
Jumper/Lifted Lead Records 10)
Operations Incident Reports
- The inspectors verified that logs are properly filled out and initialed, provide adequate detail, do not conflict with Techni~al Specifications or procedures, and, are being reviewed by the staf The inspectors verified the retriev-abil ity of logs and records placed on microfil No items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie The inspectors made a facility tour concentrating on general plant housekeeping, fire protection and prevention, evidence of leaks, excessive vibrations, radiation controls, etc. The tour included observations of control room activities, log taking, alarm responses, and manning requirement The inspectors observed that a large number of areas in the Auxiliary Building were contaminated, and upon discussion with licensee representatives, it became apparent that proper control and decontamination of these areas was questionabl The licensee agreed to improve controls and cleanup times in this are The resident inspector will observe these efforts on a continuing basis to ensure that proper measures are institute No items of noncompliance were identifie The resident inspector conducted a continuing review of plant operations through daily, random inspection tours of the facility with emphasis placed on control room operation During these tours, inspection is made relative to compli-ance with selected Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for Operation, maintenance of operating logs, control room manning in accordance with the Technical Specifications and 10 CFR 50.54(k), and follow up on operational event The inspector noted that the licensee has clearly defined, in a memorandum from the Chief Engineer dated December 4, 1978, the area within the control room which must be occupied by the assigned 11operator at the controls" of the reacto The inspector found that the definition provided is within the guidelines of Regulatory Guide 1.114 (Guidance on Being the Operator at the Controls of a Nuclear Power Plant).
No failure to comply with the guidelines has been identified by the inspecto The lic~nsee stated that the definition provided currently by memorandum will be included in a revision to AP-5 (Operating Practices) to be issued prior
. to February l, 1979.
7 On November 27, 1978, a loss of the lB Vital Instrument Bus resulted in a plant trip due to loss of one Reactor Coolant Bump breaker status indication while operating above the PB permissive setpoin The loss of the instrument bus was Unit 2 caused by failure qf the inverter output transformer and two regulating resistors. The bus failure also caused all steam lines to indicate high steam flow (1 of 2).
Following the trip, auctioneered average temperature went low, apparently due to undershoot as a result of steam dump operation. This action caused a safety injection due to the 'combination of high steam flow and low Tav Several ECCS-components and
- 13 Auxi 1 i ary Feedwater Pump failed to start on the safety injection. Subsequent analysis indicated that the ECCS failures to start were directly attributed to loss of the instrument bus and, therefore, to be expected by desig The failure of the automatic start for #13 Auxiliary Feed-water Pump is attributed to a misadjustment of the overspeed mechanis The plant returned to power on November 29 after operability of the 18 Vital Instrument Inverter and #13 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump were verified.
The above events are detailed in Licensee Event Report 78-73/
Ol Final review of this event will be made by the inspector when a more detailed analysis of the transformer failure is available and potentially generic considerations have been mad No items of noncompliance were identified du~ing review of the above even.
Preoperational Testing Quality Assurance During witnessing of preoperational testing, the inspector verified that QC/QA personnel were present conducting surveillance activities and observing mandatory witness point QC personnel employ check-lists to ensure all required aspects. of test procedures in progress have been addressed.
- Through review of system turnover packages (POTT 10-01, Auxiliary Feed and POTT 95-01, Reactor Solid State Protection System),
the inspector verified that QC/QA input is solicited to ensure that outstanding deficiencies are identified and tracked through the turnover proces Deficiencies noted during construction and testing were identified and tracked to resolutio The inspector reviewed Site QA Audit SC-78-825 dated November 17, 1978, which addresses test and startup activities. Three items requiring followup were identifie Resolution of two was verified by the inspecto The third item relating to jurisdictional tagging had not been adequately addressed by the licensee at the conclusion of the inspection perio This item identified items of a nature similar to those found by the inspec-tor and which constitute noncompliance as delineated in Detail 4 of this repor The inspector had no further questions relative to this are.
Preoperational Test Program Implementation Controls a., To review the implementation of preoperational testing controls, the inspector reviewed the following Preoperational Test and Turnover (POTT) packages:
POTT 10-01 Auxiliary Feedwater System POTT 95-01 Reactor Solid State Protection System Further review of jurisdictional controls maintained in these and other systems which had undergone turnover included field observations of jurisdictional tagging and verification that all parties at the site respected jurisdictional boundaries such that post-turnover and post-test status remained vali The area of jurisdictional controls was identified as a potential problem area in NRC Inspection Report 50-311/78-3 More de-tailed review of the jurisdictional controls program identified the foll~wing failures to maintain adequate controls:
During the week of October 9, 1978, valves 2SJ135, 21SJ134, 22SJ134, and interconnecting piping were found not to have PSSUG jurisdicticinal tags applie POTT of the Safety Injection system was accomplished September 11, 197 During the week of October 2, 1978; the Safety Injection Pump ammeter, located in the control room, was found not to have PSSUG jurisdicti0nal tagging applie POTT of the Safety Injection system was accomplished on September 11, 197 During the week of September 18, 1978, Component Cooling Pumps 21 and 22 4 KV breakers did not have PSSUG juris-dictional tagging applie POTT of the Component Cooling system was accomplished on September 8, 197 Those portions of the Auxiliary Feed System bounded by valves 23AF52, 23AF3, and the pipe junction downstream of valve 23AF4 were found not to be jurisdictionally tagged to the PSSUG on December 13, 197 POTT of the system was accomplished on November 7~ 197 On December 15, 1978, the 4 KV breakers for #21 and #22 Charging Pumps were found not to bear PSSUG jurisdictional tag The pumps had already undergone preoperational testing and POTT was accomplished on October 31, 1978:
On December 13, 1978, construction personnel were observed working on a suction flange for #22 Charging Pum The system properly bore PSSUG orange jurisdictional tag No authorization to work on the system was i*denti fi e POTT of the system was accomplished on October 31, 197 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XIV states, 11Measures shall be established to indicate by the use of markings such as stamps, tags, labels, routing.cards, or other suitable means, the *status of inspections and tests performed upon individual items of-the nuclear power plant... These measures shall provide for the identification of items which have sati s*factori ly passed the required i nspecti ans and tests, where necessary to preclude inadvertent bypassing of such inspections and tests.
Salem Sta~tup Manual, Revision OA, Section 5.5, requires that orange Turnove*r Identification Tags be applied by Public Service at the time of Preoperational Test and Turnover (POTT) and further states that respect for these tags is mandatory to prevent degradation of previously tested systems and component Together,- the above 1 i sted fa i 1 ures to pro vi de and ma i nta i:.n status iridication for turned-over systems constitute an item of noncompliance at the -Infraction level (311/78-47-01). Additional inspection was made to verify that a schedule of peroperational testing was maintained, that the quality of chemistry in safety related systems was maintained, that*
preventive maintenance of turned-over systems is specified and accomplished, and that corrective maintenance is accom-plished by qualified persons using approved procedure With respect to the last item, the inspector observed corrective maintenance being performed on #23 Charging Pump on December 13, 197 The work was being performed by qualified EPD Maintenance Department personnel under Work Order TM-1049 using an approved maintenance procedure and with QC coverag Retest of the pump was still outstanding and scheduled to be performed at the end of this inspection period*.
The inspector had no questions relative to the abov.
Preoperational Test Procedure Review The office of Inspection and Enforcement (IE) Preoperational Inspection Program dealing with Test Procedure Review has the objective of reviewing safety related tests for consistency with regulatory requirements, guidance, and licensee commitment Uniform criteria are applied in the test procedure review to assure the technical and administrative adequacy of the procedure This program is a sampling program which is an ongoing effort conducted prior to.the performance of said tests and prior to the issuance of an operating licens The* following approved tests were reviewed and verified:
SUP 19.1, Revision 1, Approved October 26, 1978, Auxiliary Building Ventilation SUP 20.1, Revision 0, Approved November 22, 1978, Reactor Protection/Emergency Safeguards Time Response Measurement The procedures were reviewed for technical and administrative adequacy; and, to verify that adequate testing is planned to satisfy regulatory guidance and licensee commitment The procedures were reviewed for the following:
Management approval,
. Appropriate Cammi ttee review, Procedure format, Test objectives, Prerequisites, Environmental conditions, Acceptance criteria, References, Initial conditions, Performance verification, Recording conduct of test, Restoration of system to normal after test, Evaluation of test data, and, Quality control verificatio No discrepancies were noted in the review of these procedure.
Witnessing of Preoperational Testing On November 6, 1978, the licensee began a heat up of the plant using Reactor. Coolant Pump heat to achieve normal operating temperature and pressure (547°F at 2235 psig) for the performance of Hot Functional Testin The heatup sequence and te£ting at normal operating temperature were witnessed by the NRG inspectors on sit Plant cooldown was required twice prior to the completion of testing due to system problems requiring repair on November 21 and November 3 The final cooldown, completing the Hot Functional test sequence was accomplished on December 9, 197 For all testing witnessed and described below, the following aspects, as a minimum, were verified by the inspector on a sampling basis:
The latest procedure with appropriate approved changes was available and in use by crew member The minimum crew requirements had been me Briefings had been conducted with test personnel as require Adequate dry runs were held by all inspection team Test prerequisttes were me Special test equipment and instrumentation required by the procedure was calibrated, inservice and manned by test personne Testing was being performed as required by the procedur Crew actions appeared to be correct and timely during the performance of the tes All data were collected for final analysis, by the cog-nizant test personne Test results observed by the ihspettors indicated that test acceptance criteria had been me *
13 Portions of 0 the following specific tests were witnessed by the inspectors:
SUP 50.0 - Hot Functional Testing - Heatup and Cooldown This is the overall procedure governing the evolution and establishes prerequisites for heatup as well as sequencing other specific SUP 1s to be conducted at temperature plateaus of 150°f, 250°F, 345°F, 450°F, and 547° SUP 50.6 - Pressurizer Pressure and Level Control Test This test verifies operation of pressurizer heaters, spray and the level control system SUP 50.8 - Steam Generator Safety Valve Test This test verifies the lift setting of each of the twenty installed steam generator safety valves.
SUP 50.11 - Chemical and Volume Control System - Hot This test is a comprehensive verification of the letdown, charging, demineralizer, pump seal supply and boration systems at normal operating condition SUP 5Q.14 - Auxiliary Feed System Performance Test This test verifies the design performance of each of the three auxiliary feedwater pumps - two motor driven and one steam drive SUP 50.15 - Control Room Inaccessibility This test is a verification that the following functions can be performed outside the control room to maintain the plant in a safe, hot shutdown condition: charging and letdown, makeup, pressure control, auxiliary feedwater, and atmospheric steam relief.
14 One instance was noted by the inspector in which QC personnel were not present when a Mandatory Witness Point step in SUP 50.0 was performed (Step 10.1.47.3). The master copy of the procedure was subsequently annotated to indicate that the point was waive No items of noncompliance were identified during the witnessing of preoperational testin.
Operational Staff Training To assess preparations for Unit 2 operation the inspector attended training being conducted for Production Department operations, performance and maintenance personnel. These personnel, currently assigned to Unit 1, will be working at Unit 2 when operatin The following training was observed by the inspector:
QA Level II Training for Supervisors One session of SRO/RO Requalification Training Two sessions of Technician-Nuclear (HP) Refresher training The inspector verified that:
the specified training was conducted; personnel on the attendance list were in attendance; an unbiased test was administered; environmental conditions were not detrimental to training; instructor was adequately prepared; and, the presentation addressed the assigned topic The inspector noted that, during the licensed operator qualifi-cation session, noise levels in the classroom were extremely dis-tracting due to construction activity in the vicinity. *This obser-vation was passed on to station managemen The inspector had no further questions relative to the training activities observe.
Plant Tour The inspector conducted periodic tours of all accessible areas in the plan During these tours, the following specific items were evaluated:
Hot Wor Adequacy of fire prevention/protection measures use Fire Equipmen Operability and evidence of periodic inspec-tion of fire suppression equipmen Housekeepin Minimal accumulations of debris and maintenance of required cleanness levels in systems under or following testin Equipment preservation. Maintenance of special preservative measures for installed equipment as applicabl Component Taggin Implementation and observance of equipment tagging for safety or equipment protectio Maintenanc Corrective maintenance in accordance with established procedure Instrumentation. Adequate protection for installed i nstru-mentati o Cable Pulling. Adequate measures taken to protect cable from damage while being pulle Communicatio Effectiveness of public address system in all areas of the sit Equipment Controls. Effectiveness of jurisdictional controls in precluding unauthorized work on systems in test or which have been tested (see Detail Paragraph 4).
Log Completeness of logs maintained and resolution of identified problem Foreign Material Exclusion. Maintenance of controls to assure
- systems which have been cleaned and flushed are not reopened to admit foreign materia *
Securit Implementation of security provision Parti-cular attention to maintenance of the Unit 1 protected area boundar Testin Spot-checks of testing in progress were mad Except as identified in other sections of this report, the inspector had no questibns~relati~~ to plant tour.
Comparison of As-Built Plant to FSAR Description As a continuing effort until licensing of the unit, the inspector is performing a verification, using construction prints and field observations, that various safety-related systems have been con-structed as described in the facility Final Safety Analysis Repor During this inspection period*, the inspector made a series of field observations related to the Emergency Diesel Generator Systems and the Solid State Protection System, to verify that arrangements were as described in Sections 7 and 8 of the Final Safety Analysis Repor These observations included diesel generator arrangement*
and capacity, separation criteria for control cable, arrangement of pressurizer level indication piping, reactor coolant flow rate instrumentation, measurement (independent by the inspector) of ambient temperatures of safety related instrumentation during Hot Functional Testing to verify temperatures less than 120° In addition, the following prints were reviewed to verify that the Solid State Protection System provides the functions stated in the Final Safety Analysis Report:
PSBP 221050 Revision 2 PSBP 221051 Revision 2 PSBP 221052 Revision 2 PSBP 221053 Revision 2 PSBP 221054 Revision 2 PSBP 221055 Revision 3 PSBP 221056 Revision 2 PSBP 221057 Revision 4 PSBP 221058 Revision
1 *
PSBP 221059 Revision 3 PSBP 221060 Revision 2 PSBP 221061 Revision 2 PSBP 221062-Revision 2 PSBP 221063 Revision 2 PSBP 221064 Revision 3 PSBP 221065 Revision 2 The inspector had no questions relative to the items reviewe O~erational Readiness CFR 50.57 states that the issuance of an operating license is, in part, contingent upon a finding that construction of the facility has been substantially completed, in conformity with the construction permit and the application, as amended,
- the provision of the Act, and the rules and regulations df the Commission; and that the facility will be operated in conformity with the applications as amended, the provisions of the Act,*
and the rules and regulations of the Commissio In order to provide a basis for this finding, the inspector
- is conducting a continuing review of licensee readiness to operate the facility. This review includes, but is not limited to, the following areas:
Completion of the NRC inspection program to assess construc-tion, testing and operational preparednes Status of facility operating procedures and personnel trainin Status of all enforcement items and unresolved matter Status of the preoperational test progra Status of construction activities..
Review of licensee ouistanding items, particularly those identified for completion or resolution after core loa *
Site
Implementation of corrective measures for Unit 2 as a result of items identified in Unit 1 from Reportable Occur-rences, inspection findings, and IE Bulletins and Circular Operational safety concerns arising from the above reviews will be promptly identified to facility management for resolution prior to the inspector reaching a finding of operational readines No specific safety concerns have been identified to dat As part of the above evaluation, the inspector selected a sampling of 43 Design Change Requests describing changes made to Salem Unit 1 pursuant to 10 CFR 50.5 These 43 DCR 1 s were reviewed to ensure that appropriate consideration had been given to their applicability in the design of Salem Unit No failure to incorporate applicable design changes into the original design, drawings, or through Engineering Change Notices (ECN 1 s) for Unit 2 were identifie For those determined to be non-applicable, the inspector had no question The inspector initiated a review of the Phase II (Startup and Power Ascension} Test progra The program is expected to parallel the testing conducted for Unit However~ no documented program definition, sequence or test procedures have been issued to dat The inspector stated the Regulatory Guide 1.68 requirement that test procedures should be available for NRC review 60 days prior to proposed testin This was acknowledged by the license.
IE Bulletin and Circular Followup The IE Bulletins discussed below were reviewed to verify that:
Licensee management forwarded copies of the response to the bulletin to appropriate onsite management represen-tative Information discussed in the licensee's reply was sup-ported by facility records or by visual examination of the facilit Corrective action taken was effected as described in the reply.
The licensee's reply was prompt and within the time period described in the bulleti The review included discussions with* licensee personnel and observation and review of items discussed in the d~tails belo By correspondence dated February 21, 1978, the licensee responded to IE Bulletin 78-01 (Flammable Contact Arm Retainers in GE CR-120A Relays)~. stating that the subject relays were not in use at either Salem facility. This has been verified at Unit 1 (NRC Inspection Report 50-272/
78-09).
During the course of this inspection, the inspector ve~tfied that no GE CR-120A relays were in use at Salem Unit By correspondence dated March 23, 1978, the licensee responded /
to IE Bulletin 78-04 (Environmental Qualification of Certain Stem Mounted Limit Switches Located Inside Reactor Contajmment)
stating that seal-in circuit modifications or replacement of the suspect switches would be accomplished prior to issuance of an operating license for Unit The inspector reviewed the implementing Engineering Change Notice (ECN 35195) and noted that circuit changes only were addresse Inspection of containment isolation valves indicated that several employed NAMCO D2400X limit switches for position indicatio A licensee representative stated that the switches in ques-tion would also be replace The inspector stated that this item will be reviewed again when replacement of the switches is complete (311/78-47-02). IE Circulars discussed below were reviewed to verify that they had been reviewed for applicability by cognizant manage-
- ment, and appropriate action initiate The review included discussions with licensee personnel and bbservation and review of items discussed in the details belo.
IE Circular 77-15 (Degradation of Fuel Oil Flow to the Emergency Diesel Generators) is addressed in Safety Evaluation SGS/M-SE-025 dated June 27, 1978 which is further implemented by surveillance procedure SP (0)
4.8.l.1.2. The inspector had no further questions on this ite IE Circular 78-02 (Proper Lubricating Oil for Terry Tur-bines) is addressed in NRC Inspection Report 50-272/78-15 for Unit The inspector had no additional concerns relative to Unit 2 in this are IE Circular 78-17 (Inadequate Guard Training/Qualification and Falsified Training Records) had* bee~ received and reviewed by cognizant licensee personne Despite a concluston that the problems delineated in the Circular do not apply to Salem Generating Station, the licensee has elected to perform a comprehensive audit of guard training and qualificatio In addition, the inspector verified, through observation of security force requalifi-cation~ that scores recorded at the firing ran~e reflected actual performance of the persons observe The inspector had no further questions in this are ~ Unresolved Items Areas for which more information is required to determine accept-abi 1 ity are considered unresolve An unresolved item is contained i~ Paragraph llc of ~his repor.
Exit Interview At periodic intervals during the course of this inspection, meetings were held with senior facility management to discuss inspection scope and findings.