ML18037A364
| ML18037A364 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Nine Mile Point  |
| Issue date: | 09/09/1981 |
| From: | Lempges T NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORP. |
| To: | Ippolito T Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| IEB-79-01B, IEB-79-1B, NUDOCS 8109140221 | |
| Download: ML18037A364 (480) | |
Text
REGULATORY ORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYS (RIDS)
ACCESSION NBR 8 1 09 1 I 022 1'OC ~ DATE
Point Nuclear 81 /09/09 Stationi Unit NOTARIZED NO ii, Niagara Powe 05000220 220 Nine Mile DOCKE~T'ACILii50 AUTH~,NAME'UTHOR AFFILIATION LEMPGESiT ~ Et, Niagara Mohawk~ Poweri Corp, RECIPiNAMEi RECIPIENT AFFILIATION IPPOLC~TO'i TeAe Operating Reactors Branch 2
SUBJECT:
. Forwards response to NRC 810608 safety evaluation for~
environ qualification of safety-related electrical
~as wae4.
DISTRIBUTION CODE: AOABS COPIES RECEIVED: LTR 'NCL SIZE':
TITLE(; EQuipment Qualification (OR L PRE.'-OL)
NOTES: Ly ~ rmak. Q,i~QiQ~'4O~
RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAMEI LTTR ENCL' ID CODE/NAME LTTR~ ENCL"'
ACTIONS" ORB: 02 BC, 10. 7 INTERNAL@ DIR/DOL( 17 1 1 EQUIP QUAL BR05 5~
I8Et 18 3 3 20 1 1 OGCl 21 ~ 1 1 REG FILE 1 1 WILLIAMSi Me H ~ 22" 1 1 EXTERNALi: ACRS 23 II 16 16 LPDR 03 NRC. 02< 1 1 NSIC~ 00 PDR'TIS 1 1
@p yg 1SB~:
TOTAL NURBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 00 ENCL 40
1 W
ih
NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION/300 ERIE BOULEVARD WEST, SYRACUSE, N.Y. 13202/TELEPHONE (315) 474-1511 September 9, 1981 Mr. Thomas A. Ippolito, Chief ~
'=
Operating Reactors Branch No. 2 E<K.Ktl Division of Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation spp].11981I -I
~~~~ ssg~AIo'Ls U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission +S'SIWSSPN /g/
Washington, D.C. 20555 Re: Nine Mile Point Unit 1 Docket No. 50-220
Dear Mr. Ippolito:
Your June 8, 1981 letter transmitted the safety evaluation for the environmental qualification of safety related electrical equipment at Nine Mile Point Unit l. It was requested therein that Niagara Mohawk provide the information identified in Sections 3 5 4 of the safety evaluation within 90 days ~
Attached is a report which provides the requested information. Our response includes item by item justification for continued operation, which supports our previous conclusion that the continued operation of Nine Mile Point Unit 1 does not present an undue safety hazard to the public.
Very truly yours, c.
Thomas E. Lempges Vice President Nuclear Generation DKG:bd Attach.
~ ~
g yP gif 8109140221 810909 PDR ADOCK 05000220 P PDR
/.
~ /
'rg lp Ir I
NIAGARA MOHANK POHER CORPORATION RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT OF JUNE 8, 1981 FOR NINE MILE POINT UNIT 1 SEPTEMBER 8, 1981
~ g,
't p
S'w e ~
r j tlg '%at 0
TABLE OF CONTENTS Section and Title Pacae No LIST OF TABLES
1.0 INTRODUCTION
2.0 BACKGROUND
3.0 RESPONSE TO STAFF'S EVALUATION 3.1 Com leteness of Saft Related E ui ment 3.2 Service Conditions 3.3 Tem erature Pressure, and Humidit Conditions Inside Containment 3.4 Tem erature Pressure, and Humidit Conditions Outside Containment 9 9
3.6 Chemical S ra 9 3.7 AcCincC 10 3.8 Radiation Inside and Outside Containment) 14 4.0 QUALIFICATION OF EQUIPMENT 14 5~0 DEFERRED REQUIREMENTS 17
6.0 CONCLUSION
S 18 11
LIST OF TABLES Table No. Title 3-1 Master Parts List and Qualification Status Summary 3-2 Items Deleted From the Current 79-01B Scope 3-3 Display Instrumentation 4-1 Limiting Pressure and Temperature 6-1 Justification for Continued Operation APPENDICES Appendix A Component Evaluation Worksheets Appendix B Component Deletion Justification Summary
1.0 INTRODUCTION
Nine Mile Point Unit One (NMP-1) is a 610 Mwe Boiling Water Re-actor (BWR), owned and operated by the Niagara Mohawk Power Corpor-ation (NMPC), located on Lake Ontario near Oswego, New York. The Nuclear Steam Supply System (NSSS) was designed by General Electric (GE) and NMPC acted as architect-engineer for the plant, using Stone and Webster as the constructor.
Initial application for a Construction Permit (CP) was made in April 1964 and a CP was issued by the AEC on April 12, 1965. An Operating License (OL) was granted on August t
22, 1969 and the plant was placed in commercial operation late that year.
2.0 BACKGROUND
By an Order for Modification of License dated August 29, 1980, NMPC was required to submit, by November 1, 1980, all information to support a safety evaluation of the environmental qualification of safety related electrical equipment exposed to a harsh environment resulting from an accident. In response, NMPC submitted an assess-ment of NMP-1 electrical equipment environmental qualification by a letter dated November 3, 1980.
The NRC staff's Safety Evaluation Report (SER) on the environ-mental qualification of safety related electrical equipment at NMP-1 was transmitted by a letter dated June 8, 1981. The scope of the SER was limited to an evaluation of the equipment which must func-tion in order to mitigate the consequences of a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) or a high energy line break (HELB) accident, inside or outside containment, while subjected to the hostile environments associated with these accidents.
The purpose of the SER was to identify equipment whose qualifi-cation program does not provide sufficient assurance that the equipment is capable of performing the design function in hostile environments. Accordingly, the SER identified specific information
and actions required by the staff to comply with plant technical specification evnrionmental qualification requirements. The SER requests were clarified in a meeting with utilities on July 7-10, 1981.
NMPC was requested to provide a response to the SER within 90 days including additional information, corrective actions, and justifi-cation for continued operation.
3.0 RESPONSE TO STAFF'S EVALUATION The staff evaluation addressed the areas outlined below. NMPC's response to requests for additional information is provided.
3.1 Com leteness of Safet Related E ui ment Based on the NMPC submittal (November 3, 1980 assess-ment), the staff concluded that the information on safety related systems was insuffj.cient to verify that systems considered were all the systems required to achieve or support the following functions:
- 1) emergency reactor shutdown
- 2) containment isolation
- 3) reactor core cooling
- 4) containment heat removal
- 5) core residual heat removal
- 6) prevention of significant release radioactive mate-rial to the environment The list of NMP-1 systems presented in the November 3, 1980 submittal included all systems, both inside and out-side potentially harsh areas, necessary to provide the six functions listed above. The following systems list includes the safety functions provided by each system.
4 0 Common Electrical Equipment (CEE): includes elec-trical components common to all systems, e.g.,
cable, connectors, etc., and therefore supports all six functions o Reactor Isolation (RI): provides function 6 o Automatic Depressurization System (ADS): provides functions 3 and 5 o Containment Isolation Drywell (CID): provides functions 2 and 6 o Containment Isolation Torus (CIT): provides func-tions 2 and 6 o Core Spray (CS): provides functions 3 and 5 o Reactor Vessel Instrumentation (RVI): initiates functions 1, 2, 3, 4 and 6 o Additional Instrumentation (AI): initiates func-tions 1, 4 and 6 o Reactor Building Closed Loop Cooling (RBCLC):
supports functions 3 and 4 o Control Rod Drive (CRD): provides function 1 o MG Sets 162 and 172: support all 6 functions o Power Distribution (PD): supports all 6 functions o Containment Spray (CoS): provides functions 4 and 5 It should be noted that the systems list originally pro-vided in the November 3, 1980 submittal has been revised.
The following six systems have been deleted for the reasons provided.
o HPCI System Reason The HPCI system is not powered from emergency power supplies and is not taken credit for in safety analyses. Its safety-related function is duplicated by core spray in conjunction with ADS.
o Emergency Condenser System Reason The main purpose of the emergency condenser sys-tem is to assure long term cooling during isolation events by maintaining coolant inventory. Credit is not taken for this system in LOCA/HELB safety analyses.
o CAD and H 02 Monitoring Systems Reason The purpose of the inerting systems is to pro-vide an inert nitrogen atmosphere in the drywell and torus in case the core spray system does not function properly following a ZOCA; i.e., these systems only serve as a backup to the core spray system. Possible use of the H202 monitoring system for radiation sampling of dry-well air falls under the scope of R.G. 1.97, and the NRC has indicated that those items will be evaluated sep-arately from the IEB 79-01B response.
o Reactor Building Emergency Ventilation System Reason According to the NMP-1 FSAR, the reactor build-ing emergency ventilation system is not a required engi-neered safeguard. A postulated 100% core meltdown with-out reactor building emergency ventilation will approach 10 CFR 100 limits only if the reactor building integrity
is such that it leaks 1800% of its volume per day at 0.25 inches of water differential pressure. The reactor building is designed for maximum leakage of 1008 of building volume per day at a -0.25 inches of water dif-ferential pressure.
o MG Sets 162-172 Reason The MG system has been removed from the 79-01B scope because it has been determined that its components are not subjected to harsh environments. Our definition of mild environment is discussed in Section 3.2.
Thus, with the exception of the MG sets, the systems list provided beforehand represents the 79-01B systems list for NMP-l.
B. Dis la Instrumentation The staff requested that NMPC provide a complete list of display instrumentation mentioned in LOCA and HELB emer-gency procedures. Component evaluation worksheets were requested for all components of display instrumentation exposed to harsh environments with the exception of non-safety related equipment and post-accident sampling, monitoring and radiation monitoring equipment. Justifi-cation for considering an instrument as non-safety re-lated and assurance that its subsequent failure will not mislead the operator or adversely affect accident miti-gation are'required. Post accident sampling and monitor-ing equipment will be reviewed in conjunction with TMI Lessons-Learned modifications.
Table 3-3 provides a listing of display instruments men-tioned in the NMP-1 special operating procedures for LOCA and HELB. The table includes a column listing the asso-ciated instrument components currently within the 79-01B
workscope, i.e., in harsh environments. Component eval-uation worksheets are provided for these items in Appen-dix A.
For the remaining display instruments NMPC will defer environmental qualification until these procedures have been revised using emergency procedure guidelines which are currently being reviewed by the staff. This defer-ment is considered justified in that the components being qualified now are considered sufficient to ensure safe handling of the plant by the operator.
C. Safet Related Electrical Com onents A component-by-component review has been performed by NMPC to more closely define component safety-related functions and revise the master parts list presented in the previous (November 3, 1980 assessment) report.
Revision of the master parts list of the safety-related electrical components essential to LOCA/HELB mitigation is based on the following considerations:
o Analysis of components safety-related functions and deletion of those components whose operations are not essential to LOCA/HELB mitigation o Review of accident environments and deletion of those components which are located in the mild envi-ronments.
A current listing of safety-related electrical compo-nents considered by NMPC to be necessary to mitigate the consequences of a LOCA/HELB is provided in Table 3-1.
Display instruments located in the harsh environments are noted in Table 3-3 and included in Table 3-1.
A listing of the components previously considered in the scope of IEB 79-01B but now deleted based on the above reasons is provided in Table 3-2, and a component-by-component justification is provided in Appendix B.
3.2 Service Conditions In the previous NMPC submittal (November 3, 1980 assessments), a detailed procedure for developing the environmental envelopes, rel-ative to the temperature, pressure, and the containment spray, in accordance with the guidelines delineated in the IEB 79-01B and the NUREG-0588 "For Comment," was presented.
For the purpose of this report, a harsh environment is intended to represent those service conditions which result from a LOCA or HELB and are outside the equipment's specified operating band.
Mild environment qualification guidelines have not yet been issued.
At the NRC staff meeting on July 7-10, 1981, one definition pre-sented by the NRC staff indicated that the equipment would be con-sidered in the mild environment category as long as the environ-mental conditions resulting from a LOCA/HELB do not exceed: (1) the range originally specified for the equipment, or (2) the design range specified by the manufacturer of the equipment. For the pur-pose of this report this definition has been applied to exempt the equipment now considered located in the mild environments from the current scope of IEB 79-01B.
In conjunction with the review of environmental conditions result-ing from line breaks inside containment, the staff requested NMPC verify that the NMP-1 containment spray system is not subject to a disabling single-component failure. The NMP-1 FSAR states the con-tainment spray system consists of two independent and separate full
capacity systems supplied by station reserve powers or from either of the two emergency diesel generators. One system will start automatically, the other is started by the operator in the control room.
Limiting service conditions have been determined for postulated accident conditions including LOCA/HELB inside containment, and HELB outside containment. These service conditions include pres-sure, temperature, humidity and radiation dose.
3.3 Tem erature Pressure, and Humidit Conditions Inside Containment The limiting temperature/pressure versus time profiles submitted were different from the profiles in the FSAR. Consequently, the staff requested that the related analysis be provided.
In lieu of providing the analysis, NMPC has revised the limiting containment temperature/pressure profiles to those provided in the FSAR for recirculation line break, with 20 F added as margin to account for the possibility of local superheat. The FSAR curves were previously provided in the November 3, 1980 submittal, and are summarized in Table 4-1 and shown in Figures 4-12A and 4-12B of this report.
NMPC considers use of the FSAR curves plus 20 F appropriate for the following reasons:
A) The FSAR states that the actuation of containment sprays would eliminate the possibility of superheat temperature in the bulk of the drywell.
B) The NRC Guidelines, Section 4.2, allows that the LOCA environment envelopes main steamline break environments in plants with automatic containment spray systems not subject to disabling single failures.
3.4 Tem erature Pressure and Humidit Conditions Outside Containment The staff reviewed the service conditions defined for HELB's out-side containment and verified that the parameters identified are acceptable. These service conditions are summarized in Table 4-1 and shown in Figures 4-1 through 4-ll: of this report.
3.5 Submer ence The staff evaluation of the submergence service condition indicated that it was not evident that NMPC had considered the effects of all steamline breaks, both inside and outside containment.
The previous NMPC conclusion that accidental submergence of re-quired Class lE equipment in containment is not a concern was based on consideration of all line breaks in containment.
Consideration of submergence of equipment outside containment was not a requirement of X.E. Bulletin 79-01B. However, submergence outside containment does not appear. to be a concern due to the limited amount of fluid discharged from postulated HELB's outside containment before break isolation, and because of equipment sep-aration. For example, the lowest elevation in the NMP-1 reactor building is divided into four separate compartments; the safety related equipment at this elevation is redundant and located in separate compartments. NMPC will investigate the submergence service condition further and submit any new information as it be-comes available.
3.6 Chemical S ra The staff requested NMPC to address the effects of demineralized water spray in its equipment qualification efforts.
The NMP-1 containment spray system is the only source of spray.
This spray is demineralized water taken from the torus. The spray header nozzles are arranged to minimize the impact on equipment and the nozzles produce fine spray droplets less than 1000 microns in size.
Various electrical components located inside containment were tested using various mixtures of chemical spray which, in -fact, was a more severe simulation than the demineralized water spray. For example, boric acid and boron were used in the chemical spray/LOCA tests for Limitorque Valve Operators, Raychem cables and GE cables.
Furthermore, various electrical components are sealed in NEMA 4 watertight enclosures which open from the bottom only; for example, the Dresser 1525VX relief valve and solenoid are contained in such enclosures. Therefore, spray could not affect operation of these components.
NMPC will consider the effects of demineralized water spray in its qualification of equipment located inside containment.
3.7 AcC incC Section 7 of the DOR Guidelines does not require that a qualified life be established for all safety-related electrical equipment.
However, as required by the NRC staff, the supplemental information to verify and identify the degree of conformance to the following requirements has been submitted.
- 1. NRC Requirement Make a detailed comparison of existing equipment and the materials identified in Appendix C of the DOR Guidelines.
NMPC Action NMPC has engaged NUS Corporation in an extensive qualification assessment program to collect environmental qualification data, and to determine the expected life of each safety-related electrical component. This qualification 10
assessment program has been implemented in the following man-ner:
A. Obtain Complete Equipment Description The material receipt forms, purchase requisition forms, master parts lists, and various other documents were reviewed to identify proper model number, serial number and rating of each component. This informaion was used to obtain each compo-nent's materials data.
B. Contact Vendors to Obtain Materials, Design and Qualifi-cation Data Each vendor was contacted to obtain the following information:
0 Bill of Material and Materials Designation Data If the bill of materials could not be provided, then a list of age-sensitive (non-metallic) materials was requested.
o Manufacturer catalogs and manuals.
0 Environmental Qualification Reports If no qualif-ication or materials data for the subject component could be provided, then complete qualification in-formation (qualification data, materials/parts description, catalog and manuals) for a replacement model which is qualified or qualifiable was re-quested.
C. Perform a Study to Environmentally Qualify Equipment Using the data obtained from the above tasks, an expected life analysis based upon the following applicable criteria was per-formed for each component.
0 Operational Cycling Effects Wherever in-service operational cycling was identified, it was compared with the manufacturer's recommended cycles and with the actual operational cycling tests that were per-formed.
0 Time/Temperature Effects The expected life was calculated based upon the time/temperature effects of the weakest material of the component using the Arrhenius Theory, as follows:
ln(t) = Ea Kb
( 1 T ) + A
- where, ln = Natural Logarithm t = Expected Life (Hours)
E = Activation Energy (eV)
Kb = Boltzmann's Constant (8.617 x 10 eV/ K)
T = Service Temperature ( K)
A = Constant If an accelerated aging simulation test was per-formed, the equivalent life at the service temper-ature was calculated using the Arrhenius Theory as follows:
exp (
Ea Kb
)( 1 T2 1
T ) (2)
- where, tl = Time at Aging Temperature (Hours) t2 = Time at Service Temperature (Hours)
E = Activation Energy (eV) 12
Kb = Boltzmann's Constant (eV/ K)
Tl = Aging Temperature ( K)
T2 = Service Temperature ( K)
Humidity Effects A literature search to evaluate the effects of relative humidity on the life of the subject component and its ability to perform its safety-related functions was performed.
0 Radiation Effects Specified radiation dosage was compared with the assessed qualification test data and with the damage threshold level of each material in the subject component.
0 Harsh Environment Effects Using the vendor design data, test data, aging analysis and the Arrhenius Theory, an evaluation was made to determine if the subject component can be safely operated under these conditions.
D. Qualification Assessment Summary Report Based on the results of the above tasks, a report was prepared for each component where such an analysis was conducted. The expected life determined from the anal-ysis has been noted on the component evaluation work-sheets.
This effort is continuing for these components noted as "Assessment On-Going" in Table 3-1.
- 2. NRC Requirement Establish an on-going program to review sur-veillance and maintenance records to identify age-related degradations.
13
NMPC Action NMPC/NUS has established an on-going program to review surveillance and maintenance records of the safety related components. Primarily, this program has been exer-cised to more closely define the safety-related functions of the electrical components essential to LOCA/HELB mitigation.
In the future, this program will be expanded to identify age-related degradations.
- 3. NRC Requirement Establish component maintenance and replace-ment schedules which include considerations of aging char-acteristics of, the installed components.
NMPC Action Wherever practical, the maintenance records and replacement schedules will be modified to include the consid-erations of aging characteristics for the safety-related com-ponents.
3.8 Radiation Inside and Outside Containment) r The staff evaluation stated that the integrated radiation dose values for inside and outside containment are acceptable. These values were determined in accordance with prescribed criteria in the DOR Guidelines and Supplement No. 2 to I.E. Bulletin 79-01B.
Outside containment integrated radiation dose values include con-tributions from post-LOCA recirculating fluid lines.
4.0 QUALIFICATION OF EQUIPMENT This section of the SER presented the staff's assessments based on the November 3, 1980 submittal of the qualification status of NMP-1 safety-related equipment. The staff separated the safety-related equipment into three categories: (1) equipment requiring immediate corrective action, (2) equipment requiring additional qualifi-cation information and/or corrective action, and, (3) equipment considered acceptable if the staff's concern identified in Section 3.7 is satisfactorily resolved.
14
0 The staff did not identify any equipment in the first. category.
That is, no equipment was determined to be unqualifiable or which have been found to fail under the test conditions which are less severe than the harsh environmental conditions specified. There-fore, no Licensee Event Report (LER) has been submitted in this'eport.
NMPC has taken the following actions and has provided the following information to resolve the deficiencies identified in the remaining two categories.
Since December 1980, NMPC/NUS has been engaged in an extensive qualification assessment program. The methodology employed to determine the qualified life, which goes far beyond the scope of the DOR guidelines, is described in Paragraph 3.7 of this report.
Equipment qualification data was obtained from the following sources:
A. Test Reports Identical equipment or generic equipment was environmentally qualified by type testing.
B. Evaluation and Analysis Equipment qualification by analysis (noted as NUS Reports in the worksheets) con-sists of:
o Similarity Analysis with qualified equipment o Qualification Analysis in accordance with the pro-cedures described in Paragraph 3.7.
o Qualification Analysis based on the effects of equipment degradation to its functional operability in the harsh environments.
15
o Qualification Analysis based on the design specifi-cations recommended by the vendor.
Component evaluation worksheets for the components located in the harsh environments have been revised and are presented in Appendix A. The specific harsh environmental conditions asso-ciated with component locations have been utilized rather than the worst case harsh environmental conditions which were used in the previous report. Components qualification data sources and their qualification status have also been noted on these worksheets.
A review of the component worksheets was performed to sum-marize the qualification status of the components located in the harsh environments. The results of this review are pre-sented in Table 3-1. The following points regarding Table 3-1 should be noted:
A. Equipment indicated as "Qualified" includes consider-ation of aging, radiation, and its ability to function in the specified harsh environments.
B. Equipment indicated as "Qualification Assessment On-Going" has four parts:
o Equipment for which assessment is continuing with other utility subgroups, like BWR Owners'ub-groups, GE subgroups, etc.
o Equipment for which the materials data is currently being evaluated.
o Equipment for which materials and qualification data has been requested but not yet received.
16
o A determination has been made to qualify the equip-ment by type testing. Proposals for testing have been requested.
C. Equipment indicated as "To Be Replaced by a Qualified Component" has two parts:
o Equipment is obsolete; therefore, materials and qualification data can not be obtained.
o Assessed qualification data does not envelop the specified harsh environments.
- 3. As discusssed in Paragraph 3.1, NMPC performed the systems review and component-by-component functional review to elim-inate non-essential systems and electrical components from the scope of IEB 79-01B. Furthermore, various electrical compo-nents are eliminated because of their locations in the mild environments. These components are noted in Table 3-2, and justifications for elimination are provided in Appendix B 'of this report.
5.0 DEFERRED REQUIREMENTS Mild environmental qualification guidelines have not yet been issued by the NRC. However, NMPC will continue its efforts to assess qualification data for those electrical components which were previously considered within the IEB 79-01B scope but now are considered located in the mild environments.
NMPC will take necessary actions after receiving supplemental safety evaluations addressing NMPC submission of the information associated with TMI lessons-learned modifications. Cold shutdown equipment was included in the November 3, 1980 NMPC submittal'nd is therefore addressed herein.
17
6.0 CONCLUSION
S Information provided by NMPC in response to the NRC requirements identified in the NRC SER for NMP-l, dated June 8, 1981, can be sum-mar ized as follows:
0 The listing of essential systems and associated elec-trical components is provided in Table 3-1. The listing of electrical components deleted from the current scope of IEB 79-01B is provided in Table 3-2, and their justi-fications are provided in Appendix B. Display instru-mentation is included in Table 3-3.
0 Component evaluation worksheets are revised and are pre-sented in Appendix A. The specific harsh environmental conditions associated with component locations are util-ized rather than the worst case harsh environmental con-ditions which were utilized in the previous report.
The methodology employed to assess qualification of equipment is provided in Sections 3 and 4 of this report.
The component evaluation sheets are revised to include the assessed qualification data.
0 Resolutions of the component qualification deficiencies such as further assessment on-going, component to be tested, or to be replaced, have been properly identified in the component worksheets and are summarized in Table 3-1.
o Item-by-item justification for continued operation of these components not completely qualified at this time is provided in Table 6-1.
o NMPC has not found any outstanding item which would re-quire immediate corrective action to insure the safety of plant operation.
18
/
/
/
Based upon the above noted status and justifications noted in Table 6-1, NMPC concludes that there is a reasonable assurance of con-tinued safe operation of NMP-1 pending completion of the corrective actions chosen.
Master Parts List and Qualification Status Summary
Page 1 of TABL -1 Revision 2 September 1, 1981 SYSTEM COMMO TO L SYSTEMS NMP-1 COMPONENTS LOCATION STATUS Inside Outside Qualification To Be Replaced PLANT IDENTIFICATION Primary Pr imary Assessment By a Qualified NUMBER GENERIC NAME Containment Containment Qualified On-Going Component Power Cable (5KV) Kerite 5KV Various Sizes Quadruplex Ass'y.
Power Cable 600V G.E. Vulkene Various Sizes Quadruplex Ass'y.
Control Cable G.E. Vulkene (1000V) Various 512 Control Cable Multiple Makeup Coaxial Inst. Cable Raychem Type RG59B/U El. Penet. D.G. O'rien 'Elect.
Assemblies (Various Connectors X Configurations)
Multipoint Terminal G.E. Type EB-5 Boards EB-25 Ground Connector Burndy, Type GABC-B Ground Connector Burndy, Type GZ Control Cable AMP Pre-Ins.
Splices Butt Connectors Cable to Copper OZ- Type XL Bar Terminal Cable to Cable OZ Type XW Connector Connection Terminal Burndy, Type QA-B
TABL -1 Page 2 Revision of 2
~
September 1, 1981 SYSTEM ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT COMMON TO ALL SYSTEMS NMP-1 COMPONENTS LOCATION STATUS Inside Outside Qualification To Be Replaced PLANT IDENTIFICATION Primary Primary Assessment By a Qualified NUMBER GENERIC NAME Containment Containment Qualified On-Going Component Cable Termination G.E. No. 8380 Insulating Tape Tape Cable Termination No. 88 Scotch Insulating Tape Brand Tape 5KV Cable Termina- Kerite Cement tion Insulation Undercoat for 5KV 3/4" Kerite Term. Filler Friction Tape Filler for 5KV G.E. 5227 Filler Term. Compound Filler for 5KV J-M Duxseal Term.
Part of 5KV Kerite Splicing Term. Insulation Compound Tape Part of SKV 01309 Black Term. Insulation Ins. Varnish Ring Tongue Amp. Inc.
Terminal Ring Tongue Terminal
TABL -1 Page 3 Revision of 2
~
September 1, 1981 SYSTEM REACTOR ISOLATION NMP-1 COMPONENTS LOCATION STATUS Inside Outside Qualification To Be Replaced PLANT IDENTIFICATION Primary Primary Assessment By a Qualified NUMBER GENERIC NAME Containment Containment Qualified On-Going Component Main Steam I.V.
(In) Motor 01-02 Main Steam I.V.
(In) Motor 01-03 Main Steam I.V.
(Out) PoS 01-04 Main Steam I.V.
(Out) PoS X 01-05 Main Steam I.V.
By-Pass I.V. PoS 01-05 Main Steam I.V.
By-Pass I.V. SOVs(2 01-06 Main Steam I.V.
By-Pass I.V. PoS 01-06 Main Steam I.V.
By-Pass I.V. SOVs(2 39-07 Emerg. Cond. I.V.
(Out) Motor-Oper.
39-08 Emerg. Cond. I.V.
(Out) Motor-Oper.
39-09 Emerg. Cond. I.V.
(In) Motor-Oper.
TABL -1 Page 4 Revision of 2
~
~
September 1, 1981 SYSTEM REACTOR ISOLATION NMP-1 COMPONENTS LOCATION STATUS Inside Outside Qualification To Be Replaced PLANT IDENTIFICATION Primary Primary Assessment By a Qualified NUMBER GENERIC NAME Containment Containment Qualified On-Going Component 39-10 Emerg. Cond. I.V. X (In) Motor 39-05 Emerg. Cond. I.V. X X (Return) PoS 39-05 Emerg. Cond. I.V. X (Return) SOVs 39-06 Emerg. Cond. I.V. X (Return) PoS 39-06 Emerg. Cond. I.V. X (Return) SOVs 33-02 Reactor Clean-Up Outlet I.V. Motor- X X Oper.
33-04 Reactor Clean-Up Outlet I.V. Motor- X Oper.
33-01 Reactor Clean-Up Inlet I.V. Motor-Oper.
01-01 (MS IV) Position Switch 01-02 (MS IV) Position Switch X
0 Page 5 of TABL -1 Revision 2 September 1, 1981 SYSTEM ADS NMP-1 COMPONENTS LOCATION STATUS Inside Outside Qualification To Be Replaced PLANT IDENTIFICATION Primary Primary Assessment By a Qualified NUMBER GENERIC NAME Containment Containment Qualified On-Going Component 1D33A F.W. Control Sys.
Flow Transmitter 1D33B F.W. Control Sys.
Flow Transmitter NR-108A Main Steam PSV Position Switch and SOV NR-108B Main Steam PSV Position Switch X.
and SOV NR-108C Main Steam PSV Position Switch and SOV NR-108D Main Steam PSV Position Switch and SOV NR-108E Main Steam PSV Position Switch and SOV NR-108F Main Steam PSV Position Switch X and SOV
TABL -1 Page 6 Revision of 2
~
September 1, 1981 SYSTEM CONTAINMENT ISOLATION DRYWELL NMP-1 COMPONENTS LOCATION STATUS Inside Outside Qualification To Be Replaced PLANT IDENTIFICATION Pr imary Primary Assessment By a Qualified NUMBER GENERIC NAME Containment Containment Qualified On-Going Component 80-36 Cont. Sp. Inlet IV 112 SOVs (2) 201-09 Drywell Vent &
Purge IV Motor-Op X 201-10 Drywell Vent &
Purge IV PoS X 83.1-09 Drywell Equip. Dr Pumps Disch. I.V.
Motor Oper.
83.1-11 Drywell Floor Dr.
Pumps Disch. I.V.
Motor Oper.
83.1-10 Drywell Equip. Dr Pumps Disch. I.V. X PoS 83.1-12 Drywell Floor Dr.
Pumps Disch. I.V. X PoS 201-32 Drywell N2 Vent
& Fill IV PoS 201-31 Drywell N2 Vent
& Fill IV Motor X X Oper.
TABL -1 Page 7 Revision of 2
~
September 1, 1981 SYSTEM CONTAINMENT ISOLATION (DRYWELL) NMP-1 COMPONENTS LOCATION STATUS Inside Outside Qualification To Be Replaced PLANT IDENTIFICATION Primary Primary Assessment By a Qualified NUMBER GENERIC NAME Containment Containment Qualified On-Going Component 201.2-03 Drywell N 2
Make-u I.V. SOVs (2) 201.2-03 Drywell N 2
Make-u I.V. PoS 201.2-32 Drywell N 2
Make-u I.V. SOVs (2) 201.2-32 Drywell N2 Make-u I.V. PoS 80-15 Cont. Sp. Inlet IV 121 SOVs (2) 80-16 Cont. Sp. Inlet IV ill SOVs (2) 80-16 Cont. Sp. Inlet IV 121 PoS 80-35 Cont. Sp. Inlet IV 122 SOVs (2) 201.2-25 Drywell 02 Sample I.V. SOV Type 201.2-27 Drywell 02 Sample I.V. SOV Type 201. 2-29 Drywell 02 Sample I.V. SOV Type
Page 8 of TABLE .1 Revision 2 September 1, 1981 SYSTEM CONTAINMENT ISOLATION DRYWELL NMP-1 COMPONENTS LOCATION STATUS Inside Outside Qualification To Be Replaced PLANT IDENTIFICATION Primary Primary Assessment By a Qualified NUMBER GENERIC NAME Containment Containment Qualified On-Going Component 201.2-28 Drywell 02 Sample I.V. SOV Type 201. 2-26 Drywell 02 Sample I.V. SOV Type 201. 2-30 Drywell 02 Sample I.V. SOV Type
TABL -1 Page 9 Revision of 2
~
September 1, 1981 SYSTEM CONTAINMENT ISOLATION (TORUS) NMP-1 COMPONENTS LOCATION STATUS Inside Outside Qualification To Be Replaced PLANT IDENTIFICATION Primary Primary Assessment By a Qualified .
NUMBER GENERIC NAME Containment Containment Qualified On-Going Component 201-07 Vent & Purge I.V. Motor- Oper. X 201-08 Vent & Purge I.V. Position X Switch 201. 2-06 N2 Make-up I.V. P 201. 2-06 N2 Make-up I.V.
SOVs (2) 201.2-33 N2 Make-up I.V. P X 201.2-33 N2 Make-up I.V.
SOVs (2) 201-16 Vent & Purge I.V. POS X 201-17 Vent & Purge I.V. X X Motor Oper.
201.2-23 02 Sampling I.V. OV X X 201.2-24 02 Sampling I.V. OV X X 68-08 Torus/Drywell Vac Relief I.V.s PO X 68-09 Torus/Drywell Vac Relief I.V.s PO X
Page 10 of TABL -1 Revision 2 September 1, 1981 SYSTEM CONTAINMENT ISOLATION TORU NMP-1 COMPONENTS LOCATION STATUS Inside Outside Qualification To Be Replaced PLANT IDENTIFICATION Primary Primary Assessment By a Qualified NUMBER GENERIC NAME Containment Containment Qualified On-Going Component 68-10 Torus/Drywell Vac.
Relief I.V.s POS68-08C Torus/Drywell Vac.
Relief I.V.s SOV (1)68-09C Torus/Drywell Vac.
Relief I.V.s SOV (1)68-10C Torus-Drywell Vac.
Relief I.V.
SOV (1)68-11A Torus Vac. Switch 68-11B Torus Vac. Switch 68-12A Torus Vac. Switch 68-12B Torus Vac. Switch 68-13A Torus Vac. Switch 68-13B Torus Vac. Switch
TABL -1 Page ll of Revision 2 September 1, 1981 SYSTEM CORE SPRAY NMP-1 COMPONENTS LOCATION STATUS Inside Outside Qualification To Be Replaced PLANT IDENTIFICATION Primary Primary Assessment By a Qualified NUMBER GENERIC NAME Containment Containment Qualified On-Going Component 81-23 Pump gill Motor 81-50 Topping Pump fillMotor RV-26A Loop ll Disch.
Flow Transmitter 40-06 Loop ll Test Retur I.V. Motor Operato 40-11 Loop ll Inlet Insi I.V. Motor Operato 40-10 Loop ll Inlet Insi X I.V. Motor Operato 40-80 C.S. Loop 12 Disch Pressure Switch 40-07 Loop ll Disch.
Pressure Switch 58-05 Level Transmitter 58-06 Level Transmitter 81-04 C.S. Pump 5122 81-52 Topping X Pump $ 122 Motor
TABL -1 Page 12 Revision of 2
~
~
September 1, 1981 SYSTEM CORE SPRAY NMP-1 COMPONENTS LOCATION STATUS Inside Outside Qualification To Be Replaced PLANT IDENTIFICATION Primary Primary Assessment By a Qualified NUMBER GENERIC NAME Containment Containment Qualified On-Going Component 81-03 Pump 5121 Motor 81-51 Toppx.ng Pump f121 Motor 40-05 Loop 12 Test Return I.V. Motor Operator 40-01 Loop 12 Inlet Insid I.V. Motor Operator 40-09 Loop 12 Inlet Insid I.V. Motor Operator 81-24 Pump 4112 Motor 81-49 Topping Pump 5112 Motor
TABL -1 Page 13 Revision of 2
~
~
September 1, 1981 SYSTEM REACTOR VESSEL INSTRUMENTATION NMP-1 COMPONENTS LOCATION STATUS Inside Outside Qualification To Be Replaced PLANT IDENTIFICATION Primary Primary Assessment By a Qualified NUMBER GENERIC NAME Containment Containment Qualified On-Going Component lD46A Rx Vessel Press. XM ID46B Rx Vessel Press. XM ID45 Rx Vessel Press. XM 36-03A Rx Vessel Level XMT R.36-03B Rx Vessel Level XMT R.36-03C Rx Vessel .Level XMT R.36-03D Rx Vessel Level XMT R.36-04A Rx Vessel Level XMT R. X 36-04B Rx Vessel Level XMT R.36-04C Rx Vessel Level XMT 36-04D Rx Vessel Level XMT R.36-05A Rx Vessel Level XMT R.36-05B Rx Vessel Level XM R.36-05C Rx Vessel Level XM R.36-05D Rx Vessel Level XM R.
lA12 Rx Vessel Level XM
J Page 14 of TABL 3-1 Revision 2 September 1, '1981 SYSTEM REACTOR VESSEL INSTRUMENTATION NMP-1 COMPONENTS LOCATION STATUS Inside Outside Qualification To Be Replaced PLANT IDENTIFICATION Primary Primary Assessment By a Qualified NUMBER GENERIC NAME Containment Containment Qualified On-Going Component 36-03 A-D Trip Units (4)
Master 36-03 A-D Trip Units (4) X Slave 36-04 A-D (4) Trip Unit (Master) 36-08 A-D (4) Trip Unit (Master) X 36-08 A-D (4) Trip Unit (Slave) 36-05 A-D Trip Unit (Master) X 36-07 A-D (4) Trip Unit (Master) X 36-07 A-D (4) Trip Unit (Slave) 36-07 A-D Press. Trans.36-08A Press. Trans.36-08B Press. Trans.36-08C Press. Trans.36-08D Press. Trans.
TABL -1 Page 15 Revision of 2
~
~
September 1, 1981 SYSTEM ADDITIONAL INSTRUMENTATION NMP-1 COMPONENTS LOCATION STATUS Inside Outside Qualification To Be Replaced PLANT IDENTIFICATION Primary Primary Assessment By a Qualified NUMBER GENERIC NAME Containment Containment Qualified On-Going Component 1B10A Temp. Switch 1BlOB Temp. Switch 1B10C Temp. Switch 1B10D Temp. Switch 1B10E Temp. Switch 1B10F Temp. Switch 1B10G Temp. Switch 1B10H Temp. Switch lB10 J Temp. Switch 1B10K Temp. Switch 1B10L Temp. Switch 1B10M Temp. Switch 1BlON Temp. Switch 1B10P Temp. Switch 1B10Q Temp. Switch 1B10R Temp. Switch
TABL~ -1 Page 16 Revision September 2 ~
oft+
1, 1981 SYSTEM ADDITIONAL INSTRUMENTATION NMP-1 COMPONENTS LOCATION STATUS Inside Outside Qualification To Be Replaced PLANT IDENTIFICATION Primary Primary Assessment By a Qualified NUMBER GENERIC NAME Containment Containment Qualified On-Going Componen" 201. 2-476A-D (4) Trip Unit (Master) X 36-06A-D (4) Trip Unit (Master) X 01-26A-H (8) Trip Unit (Master) X 01-26A-H (8) D/Press. Transmitte .
X X
TABL -1 Page 17 Revision of 2
~
~
September 1, 1981 SYSTEM REACTOR BUILDING CLOSED LOOP COOLING NMP-1 COMPONENTS LOCATION STATUS Inside Outside Qualification To Be Replaced PLANT IDENTIFICATION Primary Primary Assessment By a Qualified NUMBER GENERIC NAME Containment Containment Qualified On-Going Component 70-01 Rx Cooling Water Pump Ill Motor 70-02 Rx Cooling Water Pump 512 Motor 70-03 Rx Cooling Water Pump 513 Motor 70-137 E/P to TCV/70-137 70-23 Temp. Element in Cool Water Line After Heat Exchange
TABL -1 Page 18 Revision of 2
~
~
September 1, 1981 SYSTEM CONTROL ROD DRIVE NMP-1 COMPONENTS LOCATION STATUS Inside Outside Qualification To Be Replaced PLANT IDENTIFICATION Primary Primary Assessment By a Qualified NUMBER GENERIC NAME Containment Containment Qualified On-Going Component NCOSA CRD Pump Oil X Motor NCOSB CRD Pump 512 Motor X NC16A CRD Scram SOV NC16B CRD Scram SOV NC15A CRD Scram SOV NC15B CRD Scram SOV X X
TABL -1 Page 19 Revision of 2
~
~
September 1, 1981 SYSTEM POWER DISTRIBUTIO NMP-1 COMPONENTS LOCATION STATUS Inside Outside Qualification To Be Replaced PLANT IDENTIFICATION Primary Primary Assessment By a Qualified NUMBER GENERIC NAME Containment Containment Qualified On-Going Component N/A Power Board (PB) 16B N/A PB 17B N/A PB 167 N/A PB 161B N/A PB 171B N/A PB 1671
TAB -1 Page 20 Revision of 2
~
~
September 1, 1981 SYSTEM EMERGENCY CONDENSERS NMP-1 COMPONENTS LOCATION STATUS Inside Outside Qualification To Be Replaced PLANT IDENTIFICATION Primary Pr imary Assessment By a Qualified NUMBER GENERIC NAME Containment Containment Qualified On-Going Component 36-06 (A-D) (4) PT (RPS) X X IB06-23 Emer. Conds.
Area TE X IB06-24 Emer. Conds.
Area TE X IB06-13 Emer. Conds.
Area TE IB-6-14 Emer. Conds.
Area TE
Page 21 of TABL 3-1 Revision 2 September 1, 1981 SYSTEM CONTAINMENT SPRAY NMP-1 COMPONENTS LOCATION STATUS Inside Outside Qualification To Be Replaced PLANT IDENTIFICATION Primary Primary Assessment By a Qualified NUMBER GENERIC NAME Containment Containment Qualified On-Going Component 80-47 Pump Sill Disch.
Press. Transmitter 80-69 Pump 5112 Disch.
Press. Transmitter 80-54 Pump 5121 Disch.
Press. Transmitter 80-75 Pump 5122 Disch.
Press. Transmitter X 80-04 Containment Spray Pump fill Motor 80-24 Containment Spray Pump 5112 Motor 80-03 Containment Spray Pump 5121 Motor 80-23 Containment Spray Pump 4122 Motor 80-61 Pump 5112 Disch.
Press. Switch 80-60 Pump 5121 Disch.
Press. Switch 93-25 R.W. Pump Sill Disc B.V. Motor Operator X
TABL -1 Page 22 Revision of 2
~
~
September 1, 1981 SYSTEM CONTAINMENT SPRAY NMP-1 COMPONENTS LOCATION STATUS Inside Outside Qualification To Be Replaced PLANT IDENTIFICATION Primary Primary Assessment By a Qualified NUMBER GENERIC NAME Containment Containment Qualified On-Going Component 93-50 R.W. Pump 5112 Dis B.V. Motor Operator 93-28 R.W. Pump gll2 Dis B.V. Motor Operator 93-49 R.W. Pump 5121 Dis B.V. Motor Operator 93-26 R.W. Pump 5121 Dis B.V. Motor Operator 93-27 R.W. Pump 5122 Dis B.V. Motor Operator 201.2-476A Drywell Press.
Trans. (RPS) 201.2-476B Drywell Press.
Trans. (RPS) 201.2-476C Drywell Press.
Trans. (RPS) X 201.2-476D Drywell Press.
Trans. (RPS)
TABLE 3-2 Items Deleted from the Current 79-01B Scope
Page 1 of 22 TABLE 3-2 Revision 2 September 1, 1983.
TEM: ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT COMMON TO ALL SYSTEMS NMP-1 COMPONENTS DELETED BASED ON PLANT IDENDTIFICATION GENERIC NAME MILD ENVIRONMENT SAFETY RELATED NUMBER FUNCTION Flexible Watertite Sealtite Conduit Electrical Cond. Various Sizes X (metallic)
Flex. Cond. Fittings Sealtite Fittings Various Sizes X (me tallic)
J. B. 5XXXXX-A Junction Boxes Thru ZZZ Various Sizes X (metallic) pe Traymaster Cable Trays ble Tray Various Sizes X (metallic)
Cope Cable Tray Cable Tray Fittings Fittings Various Sizes X (metallic)
Thermocouple Cable Cu-Cn Type T (Single Pr.) S.S. Sheath X (metallic)
Rigid Elec. Conduit Galvanized Conduit and Fittings X (metallic)
Page 2 of 22 TABLE 3-2 Revision 2 September 1, 1981 TEM: REACTOR ISOLATION NMP-1 COMPONENTS DELETED BASED ON PLANT IDENDTIFICATION GENERIC NAME MILD ENVIRONMENT SAFETY RELATED NUMBER FUNCTION 01-03 Main Steam I.V.
(Ou t) SOVs (2) 01-04 Main Steam I.V.
(Out) SOVs (2)
Page 3 of 22 TABLE 3-2 Revision 2 September 1, 1981 STEM: CONTAINMENT ISOLATION (DRYWELL) NMP-1 COMPONENTS DELETED BASED ON PLANT IDENDTIFICATION GENERIC NAME MILD ENVIRONMENT SAFETY RELATED NUMBER FUNCTION 80-36 Cont. Sp. Inlet IV 112 PoS 201-10 Drywell Vent & Purg IV SOVs (2) 70-94 Drywell Cooling Out IV Motor oper.
70-92 Recirc. Pump Coolin Outlet IV Motor-ope 83.1-10 Drywell Equip. Dr. oS Pumps Disch. I.V. S V 83.1-12 Drywell Floor Dr. P S Pumps Disch. I.V. S V 201-32 Drywell N Vent 80-15 'ont. & Fill IV SOVs (2)
IV 121 Sp.
PoS Inlet 80-16 Cont. Sp. Inlet IV ill PoS 80-35 Cont. Sp. Inlet IV 122 PoS
Page 4 of 22 TABLE 3-2 Revision 2 September 1, 1981 TEM: CONTAINMENT ISOLATION (TORUS) NMP-1 COMPONENTS DELETED BASED ON PLANT IDENDTIFICATION GENERIC NAME MILD ENVIRONMENT SAFETY RELATED NUMBER FUNCTION 201-08 Vent & Purge I.V. SOVs (2)
- 58. 1-01 Cond. Make-up I.V. POS 58.1-01 Cond. Make-up I.V. SOVs (2) X 201-16 Vent 6 Purge I.V. SOVs (2) X 68-01 Torus/Drywell Vac.
Relief I.V.s POS X 68-02 Torus/Drywell Vac.
Relief I.V.s POS X 68-03 Torus/Drywell Vac.
Relief I.V.s POS 68-04 Torus/Drywell Vac.
Relief I.V.s POS 68-05 Torus/Drywell Vac.
Relief I.V.s POS 68-06 Torus/Drywell Vac.
Relief I.V.s POS 68-07 Torus/Drywell Vac.
Relief I.V.s POS
Page 5 of 22 TABLE 3-2 Revision 2 September 1, 1981 STEM: CONTAXNMENT ISOLATION (TORUS) NMP-1 COMPONENTS DELETED BASED ON PLANT IDENDTIFICATION GENERIC NAME MILD ENVIRONMENT SAFETY RELATED NUMBER FUNCTION 68-01C Torus/Drywell Vac.
Relief I.V.s SOV 68-02C Torus/Drywell Vac.
Relief I.V.s SOV 68-03C Torus/Drywell Vac.
Relief I.V.s SOV 68-04C Torus/Drywell Vac.
Relief I.V.s SOV 68-05C Torus/Drywell Vac.
Relief I.V.s SOV 68-06C Torus/Drywell Vac.
Relief I.V.s SOV 68-07C Torus/Dywell Vac.
Relief I.V.s SOV
Page 6 of 22 TABLE 3-2 Revision 2 September 1, 1981 TEM: CORE SP RAY NMP-1 COMPONENTS DELETED BASED ON PLANT IDENDTIFICATION GENERIC NAME MILD ENVIRONMENT SAFETY RELATED NUMBER FUNCTION RV-03A Loop 11 Disch.
Press. Transmitter X (RG1.97 item) 81-21 Pump ill Suction I.V. Motor Operator 58-04 Level Transmitter X (RGl. 97 i tern) 93-51 Raw Water to Core Spray BV Motor -ope 93-52 Raw Water to Core Spray BV Motor -ope 81-02 C.S. Pump 5122 Suction I.V. Motor Operator RV-03B C.S. Loop 12 Disch. II Press. Transmitter X (RG1. 97 item) 81-01 Pump 5121 Suction I.V. Motor Operator RV-26B Loop 12 Disch.
Flow Transmitter X (RG1.97 item) 81-22 Pump 5112 Suction I.V. Motor Operator 201.2-07D Level Switch -Elec.
Torus Lvl Alarm
Page 7 of 22 TABLE 3-2 Revision 2 September 1, 1981 TEM: REACTOR VESSEL INSTRUMENTATION NMP-1 COMPONENTS DELETED BASED ON PLANT IDENDTIFICATION GENERIC NAME MILD ENVIRONMENT SAFETY RELATED NUMBER FUNCTION P101 Rx Vessel Press.
XM X (RG1,.97 item)
IA07 Rx Vessel D/Press.
XM 1D13A Level Transmitter lD13B Level Transmitter RE16A Pressure Indicating Switch RE16B Pressure Indicating Switch RV-30 Rx Vessel D/Press.
Indicating Switch
Page 3 of 22 TABLE 3-2 Revision 2 September 1, 1981 TEM: ADDITIONAL INSTRUMENTATION NMP-1 COMPONENTS DELETED BASED ON PLANT IDENDTIFICATION GENERIC NAME MILD ENVIRONMENT SAFETY RELATED NUMBER FUNCTION IJ-12 Clean-up System Flow Transmitter IJ-90 Clean-up System Flow Switch RN-05A through RN-05D Hain steam line radiation elements
Page 9 of 22 TABLE 3-2 Revision 2 September 1, 1981 TEM: REACTOR BUILDING CLOSED LOOP COOLING NMP-1 COMPONENTS DELETED BASED ON PLANT IDENDTIFICATION GENERIC NAME MILD ENVIRONMENT SAFETY RELATED NUMBER FUNCTION 70-19 Cooling Water Line Temp. Element 71-127A C.L.C. Make-up Tank Level Switch
Page 10 of 22 TABLE 3-2 Revision 2 September 1, 1981 TEM: FEEDWATER FLOW HIGH PRESSURE (HPCI) NMP-1 COMPONENTS DELETED BASED ON PLANT IDENDTIFICATXON GENERIC NAME MILD ENVIRONMENT SAFETY RELATED NUMBER FUNCTION System deleted base on safety related f notions
TABLE 3-2 Page ll of 22 Revision 2 September 1, 1981 TEM: FEED WATER FLOW LOW PRESSURE (HPCI) NMP-1 COMPONENTS DELETED BASED ON PLANT IDENDTIFICATION GENERIC NAME MILD ENVIRONMENT SAFETY RELATED NUMBER FUNCTION System deleted base t
on safety related f notions
Page 12 of 22 TABLE 3-2 Revision 2 September 1, 1981 QpTEM: FEED WATER FLOW (HPCI) NMP-1 COMPONENTS DELETED BASED ON PLANT IDENDTIFICATION GENERIC NAME MILD ENVIRONMENT SAFETY RELATED NUMBER FUNCTION System deleted base on safety related f notions
Page 13 of 22 TABLE 3-2 Revision 2 September 1, 1981 TEM: CONTROL ROD DRIVE NMP-1 COMPONENTS DELETED BASED ON PLANT IDENDTIFICATION GENERIC NAME MILD ENVIRONMENT SAFETY RELATED NUMBER FUNCTION RD68A CRD Pump 511 Press. Switch RD68B CRD Pump 512 Press. Switch 55-05 Demin. Water Storag Tank SOV for BV/55-05 NC30A CRD Water Position Switch for FCV/NC30 NC30A E/P for FCV/NC30A NC30B CRD Water Position Switch for FCV/NC30 NC30B E/P for FCN/NC30B RD35 CRD Water Flow Xm NC22 Scram Discharge Volume SOV 55-05 Demin. Water Storag Tank Position Switc for BV/55-05
Page 14 of 22 TABLE 3-2 Revision 2 September 1, 1981 TEM: RPS UNINTERRUPTIBLE POWER SUPPLY NMP-1 MG SET 162 & 172 COMPONENTS DELETED BASED ON PLANT IDENDTIFICATION GENERIC NAME MILD ENVIRONMENT SAFETY RELATED NUMBER FUNCTION System deleted base on mild environment
Page 15 of 22 TABLE 3-2 Revision 2 September 1, 1981 STEM: POWER DISTRIBUTION NMP-1 COMPONENTS DELETED BASED ON PLANT IDENDTIFICATION GENERIC NAME MILD ENVIRONMENT SAFETY RELATED NUMBER FUNCTION N/A PB 11 N/A PB 12 N/A PB 101 N/A PB 13 X N/A PB 14 N/A PB 131 N/A PB 141 N/A RPS Bus ll, 12
page 16 of 22 TABLE 3-2 Revision 2 September 1, 1981 TEM: REACTOR BUILDING NMP-1 EMERGENCY VENTILATION COMPONENTS DELETED BASED ON PLANT IDENDTIFICATION GENERIC NAME MILD ENVIRONMENT SAFETY RELATED NUMBER FUNCTION System deleted base on safety related f notion
a <'
Page l7 of 22 TABLE 3-2 Revision 2 September l, l981 EMERGENCY CONDENSERS NMP-l COMPONENTS DELETED BASED ON PLANT IDENDTIFICATION GENERIC NAME MILD ENVIRONMENT SAFETY RELATED NUMBER FUNCTION System deleted based on Plant ID safety related f nction except for No. 36-06( D)~ IB06-23, 24, l3 l4
Page 18 of 22 TABLE 3-2 Revision I
2 September 1, 1981 TEM: CONTAINMENT SPRAY NMP-1 COMPONENTS DELETED BASED ON PLANT IDENDTIFICATION GENERIC NAME MILD ENVIRONMENT SAFETY RELATED NUMBER FUNCTION 80-49A Pump Illl Disch.
Flow Transmitter 80-50 Pump fill Disch.
Temp. Element 80-52 Pump gill Disch.
Temp. Element 80-71A Pump 1112 Disch.
Flow Transmitter 80-56A Pump I121 Disch.
Flow Transmitter 80-76A Pump 1122 Disch.
Flow Transmitter 80-62 Pump 5121 Disch.
D/P Switch 80-85 Pump I112 Disch.
D/P Switch 93-30A R.W. Pump Nlll Disc Flow Transmitter RN-38A 1 R.W. Pump Nlll Disc Radiation Element X (RG1.97 item)93-32A R.W. Pump 1112 Disc Flow Transmitter
0 Page 19 of 22 TABLE 3-2 Revision 2 September 1, 1981 TEM: CONTAINMENT SPRAY NMP-1 COMPONENTS DELETED BASED ON PLANT IDENDTIFICATION GENERIC NAME MILD ENVIRONMENT SAFETY RELATED NUMBER FUNCTION RN-38A 2
R.W. Pump 5112 Disc Radiation Element X (RG1.97 item)93-33A R.W. Pump 5121 Disc Flow Transmitter RN-38B 1
R.W. Pump 5121 Disc Radiation Element 93-34A R.W. Pump 5122 Disc Flow Transmitter X RN38B2 R.W. Pump 5122 Disc Radiation Element 80-106 Torus Area East Level Transmitter 80-109 Torus Area West Level Transmitter 201.2-01 Drywell Press.
Trans. (RPS) 201. 2-13 Drywell Press.
Trans. (RPS)
Page 20 of 22 TABLE 3-2 Revision 2 September 1, 1981 TEM: H2 02 MONITORING SYSTEM Sll NMP-1 COMPONENTS DELETED BASED ON PLANT IDENDTIFICATION GENERIC NAME MILD ENVIRONMENT SAFETY RELATED NUMBER FUNCTION System deleted base on safety related f notion
9 Page 21 of 22 TABLE 3-2 Revision 2 September 1, 1981 "TEM: H2 02 MONITORING SYSTEM 512 NMP-1 COMPONENTS DELETED BASED ON PLANT IDENDTIFICATION GENERIC NAME MILD ENVIRONMENT SAFETY RELATED NUMBER FUNCTION System deleted base on safety related f notion
Page 22 of 22 TABLE 3-2 Revision 2 September 1, 1981 TEM: CAD NMP-1 COMPONENTS DELETED BASED ON PLANT IDENDTIFICATION GENERIC NAME MILD ENVIRONMENT SAFETY RELATED NUMBER FUNCTION System deleted base on safety related f notion
TABLE 3-3 Display Instrumentation
TABLE 3-3 DISPLAY INSTRUMENTATION Instrumentation Component Items Listed in in Harsh Environment Evaluation LOCA and/or HELB Procedures Sheet Included in Appendix A Vessel level 36-03A-D, 36-04A-D, 36-05A-D, IA-12 Vessel pressure ID46A, ID46B, ID45 High drywell pressure alarm 202.2-476 A-D High drywell temperature Drywell leak detector Drywell high rate of rise Drywell sump pump excessive operation Steam flow/feed flow mismatch All rods in Neutron flux decreasing Containment isolation Containment isol. systems list position switch Vessel isolation l
Reactor isol. system list position switch Tbl 3-3 Page 1
Instrumentation Component Items Listed in in Harsh Environment Evaluation LOCA and/or HELB Procedures Sheet Included in Appendix A Stop, intercept valves closed Containment and reactor isol.
systems position switch DC oil pumps running Emergency seal oil pump running Breaker R-ill open CRD pump running Loss of 115KV Breakers R-1012 and R-1013 open Auto. depressurization NR-105 A-F position switches Core spray running 40-80, 40-07 pressure switches Condensate pump running Core spray flow Feedwater flow Torus water temperature Containment 02 and H2 Condensate surge and storage tank levels Torus water level 58-05, 58-06 Tbl 3-3 Page 2
Instrumentation Component Items Listed in in Harsh Environment Evaluation LOCA and/or HELB Procedures Sheet Included in Appendix A Automatic actions RVI and AI system trip units and transmitter Drywell pressure 201.2-476 A-D Demin. water tank level Emergency condenser makeup tank level Diesel generdator start Reactor bldg. emergency ventilation operating 345KV power trip Disconnect 18 open Emergency condenser in service Tbl 3-3 Page 3
1' TABLE 4-1 Limiting Pressure and Temperature
TABLE 4-1 Limiting Pressure and Temperature Location Elev. Peak Peak Profile Pressure Temgerature (psig) ( F)
- 1. S team Tunnel 240 17. 3 308 Fig. 4-1
- 2. Condenser Area of Turbine 243- 2.3 285 Fig. 4-2 Building< 297
- 3. Remainder of Turbine All, 0. 4 133 Fig. 4-3 Building Elev.
4 ~ Emer. Cooling 340 0.5 307 Fig. 4-4 Condenser Area
- 5. Containment Spray 318 5 305 Fig. 4-5 Heat Exchanger Area Emer. Cond. Iso. 298 305 Fig. 4-6 Valve Cubicle
- 7. Emer. Cond. Return 281 278 Fig. 4-7 Valve Cubicle
- 8. Clean Up System 261 224 Fig. 4-8 Cubicles
- 9. Floor-Area 340 0.4 205 Fig. 4-9
- 10. Floor Area 318 1 300 Fige 4-9 ll. Floor Area 298 1 300 Fig. 4-9
- 12. Floor Area 281 1 212 Fig 4-9 o
- 13. Floor Area 261 1 202 Fig. 4-9
- 14. East Instr. Rm. 281 1 212 Fig.
- 15. West Instr.
4-9'ig.
Rm. 281 1 212 4-9
- 16. Instr. Rm. 237 1 165 Fig. 4-10
- 17. Floor Area 237 1 126 Fig 4-11 o
- 18. Floor Area 198 1 110 Fig. 4-11
- 19. Inside Containment 35 301 Fig. 4-12 P, 4-12B
LIMITING TRANSIENT TEMPEf ATURE AND PRESSURE IN STEAM TuNNEL CO'00 III UJ Vg Z 444 a R 4
gO uv Z<
'44 Qg C4I
LIMITING TRANSIENT TEMPERATURE AND PRESSURE IN CONDENSATE AREA OF TURBINE BUILDING C)
CV m
Vl vJ 4
Og4
)C $
gO o"
Z+
Od I
0~ l4 4
Xg o~
LIMITING TRANSIENT TEMPERATURE AiVD PRESSURE IN THE TURBINE BUILDING C) m zo ou Z+
Vl
<<Q 0~4 ae4 X~
o~Y
LBfITING TEMPERATURE AND PRESSURE IN
%2KRGENCY COOLING CONDENSER AREA
l J1
)
LIMITING 'ANSIENT TEMPERATURE AND PRESSURE IN CONTAIxiENT SPRAY HEAT EXCHANGER AREA o
CU 0)
VI 4I Vg Z~
O R xg t
zO o"
ZÃ~
0'0 l4 o~Y 1
LIMITING TRANSIENT TEMPERATUTE AND PRESSURE IN EMERGENCY CONDENSER ISOLATION VALVE CUBICLE C) m C) 0E 4
E xg o'"0 zF
'",III 4d 04 OIE 4
Xg
LIMITING TRANSIENT TEMPERATURE AND PRESSURE IN EMERGENCY CONDENSER RETURN PALVE CUBICLE o
m Cl VI 4I Vg Vl oa xg
LIMITING TRANSIENT TEMPERATURE Ai%) PRESSURE IN CLEAN-UP SYSTEM CUBICLE
gjl LIMITING TEMPERATURE AND PRESSURE IN OPEN FLOOR AREAS NOT NEAR BREAK LOCATIONS Ol uJ Vg Zp Xg
~O o"
gC vl Og I
OUI 4
X~
oB Y
Fitt.j4-,10 I
..I:.:.
I I ~ ~
"i << I ~
"LIIIN
~ tl ~
~ ~ ~ I~ ~
I
.'EMPE TPRE I ~
I I I I ~ I >>
":, INSTRUME Nf'$00 -I BR@4K I ISO LA'TED AT/30 MIN
"".I"" I ~
~
I 1 ~ ~ ..i:...:.
I' I..:.:...:. ~ . -I ~
~ '
.'I 4
~ ~
. ~ ~
I ~ 1
~ ~ ~ ~
~
~ ~ ~
~ ~
~
r~ I
~ I 1
~ ~
'I
~
~;!; I<<
1 \ ~ 1 ~
I I
~
~ ~
1 I 'l l t ~
t' ~ ~
~ ~ ~ ~ I ~ ~ 1 ~ ~ I I
~ I
~ 1 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ i ~ ~
t I' ~ <<t/. ~
~ I ~ I ~
~ 1 II t
/I
~ / ~ ~ ~ ~
- gg l < I I
~ ~ I ~ 1 Q
I ~ ~ I ~
- I
~
~ ~
~
L' I 1
~ ~
'... I".'.
~ I t i ~ ~ / I ~
~ ~ ' 'I I I ~ ~ I I ~ ~ ~
I ~
.. t ~ ~
I
~ ' ~ ~ <<
I I
~ ~ ~
I ~ ~
\ ~ 1 ~
I 1 + t ~ t ~ ~
~ ~ ~ ~ ~
~ ~
/ ~ ~ t 1 ~ ~
~ ~ ~ I ~ I I 1 fl ~ 1 I
~ I ~ ~ ~ tr ~ ~ ~
1 ~ ~ ~
~ f " \ '1 ~
1 I~
~ I
~ ~ I ~
~ ~ I
- I-~
-'ZPfE '(GEc'o s $ ::
~ ~
~ ' ' 'I ' ~
I ~ ~
~ I ~ ~ . ~ ~ I
~ ~
~ I ~
1 r
~
1 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
~ ~ I
~ / ~
I ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
-"CHAN E- ZN'- ~ I ~
~ ~ I ~ ~ ~ ~
~ ~ ~ I
~ I ~ ~
~
~
~ ~
t
<< ~ <<
~ '
~ ~ ~ ~
I ~ ~
~ ~
<< ~ I ~ << I ~
I ~
1 I ~ <<
~ ~ 1 ~ I ~ I
~ ~ 1 ~ 1 ~ ~ ~
I ~
/ ~
t
~ I~
c << ~ t t 1 1 ~ t
':I I ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
t ~ I
<< ~
~ ~ I I ~
r C I
~ ~ I
/ ~ I ~ ~
CQ ~ I I ~
I
- "I
~
CF1 I ~ ~ ' ~
<< ~ t ~ r
~ ~ I I ~ ~
J f ~ ~ I ~,
I
~
~
1 << ~ \ ~
I I
~ I . ~
I ~
~ ~
1 ~ ~ I
~ ' i ~
/I
~ I 'I ~ ~ << ~ ~
-/ ~
1
~
I// I
~ I I
I
~
/ / ~ I
/I /
1 1 I ~
1 1
~ 1 ~ t
~ I
- t
' I
~ 1 / ~ / 1 ~
~ ~ ~
~ ~
I
/
'oo!.'..: .:3 00' oaj QO."I
~ t
~ ~
- l::: I 1 ~
~ ~
I I
'\
~ 1 ~
~ ~ /
~ \ // 1 ~
~ ~ I
LIMITING TEMPERATURE AND PRESSURE IN OPEN FLOOR AREAS NOT NEAR BREAK LOCATIONS C)
CV th 4J V~
Og X$
z<
o~
ZU:
vl Og I
04I
~
IL X~
o~Y
F I GLIRE 4-12A LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT CONTAINMENT TEMPERATURE ('IITH CORE SPRAY STRETCH POY/ER 300 DRYWELL 200 IJJ I-SU PP ESSION CHAMe 100 10 102 103 104 TIME AFTER ACCIDENT SEC
FIGURE 0-12B LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT DRYNELL PRESSURE STRETCH POSER 30 C9 20 CL NO CORE S PRAY 10 CORE SPRAY 10 102 '0 104 TIME AFTER ACCIf)ENT SEC
Justification for Continued Operation
TABLE 6-1 JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUED OPERATION Function/Justification Com onent ID for Continued 0 eration 201 32'01 2 03/
201 2 Ol 05/ Position switches on containment and 01 06'l39-06Olg 32@
Ol 02'9-05, reactor isolation valves; valve posi-tion can be deduced from other indica-tions, accident mitigation is not directly affected by component failure.
201.2-33, 201.2-06 Solenoid operated containment isol.
(ASCO), 01-05, 01-06 valves are normally closed and fail (Decco) closed on loss of power, normally de-energized; if open, RPS contacts in mild environment deenergize the coil and close the valve; coil isolated from RPS by fuses.68-08C, 68-09C,68-10C Solenoid operated (ASCO) butterfly valve in torus to atmosphere vacuum breaker line; normally closed, fails open, containment isolation provided by check valves.
39-05, 39-06 Solenoid operated (ASCO) emergency con-denser return isol. valves, normally closed, fail open, backup reactor iso-lation provided by check valves.
Tbl 6-1 Page 1
Function/Justif ication Com onent ID for Continued 0 eration 201.2-23, 201.2-24, Containment. solenoid operated isol.
201.2-25, 201.2-26 valves on samp'le lines; normally open, 201.2-27, 201.2-28, 201.2-29, 201.2-30 RPS signal to close, likely will close 1
before harsh environment.
80-15,. 80-16, 80-35 CoS system inlet solenoid operated 80-36 isol. valves; normally open, key oper-
~
ated, no RPS signal.
80 03'0 04'081-04, CoS, CS and RBCLC systems'ump motors; 81-03, 23'0-24, motor insulation system is 81 23~ 81 24'1 pump CS 49'1 51'1 52/
70-01, 70-02, 70-03 50'1 qualified; CoS pump motors are similar to qualified motors; RBCLC pump motors are not directly required for mitiga-tion; also, CS and CoS.pump motors ex-perience relatively mild service condi-tions, i.e., less than 150 o F.
~ ql ID45 g ID46A g ID46B g Var ious indica tion-only components IA 12'0 47'0 (Pump disch. pressure switches, vessel 75'0 69'0 60/ 54'0 80 61'B06 23'4/ pressure, area temp. elements), not
-13,
.14 directly needed for accident miti-gation.
Tbl 6-1 Page 2
Function/Justification Com onent ID for Continued 0 eration Ol Olg Ol 02'3 Ol 33-02, 83.1-09, 83.1-Limitorque motor operated valves; will ll~ 40 Olg 40 09'0 likely operate before harsh environ-10, 40-11 ment, once operated fail as is on loss of power.
PB16B g PB17B g PB167 g Motor control centers and switchgear in PB161B, PB1671, PB 171 reactor building; equipment is enclosed and HELB temperature peaks (maximum 212 F) are of short duration (less than 1 minute); therefore, expect little heat-up of components.
NR-108A through ADS electromatic relief valve solenoids NR-108F and position switches; enclosed in NEMA 4 enclosures and will likely operate before harsh environment.68-11A, 68-11B, 68-12Ag Vacuum switches actuating blocking 68 12Bg 68 13Ag 68 13B valve between torus and atmosphere for vacuum relief; fails open for vacuum relief, containment isol. provided by check valve.
70-23 Temperature element signaling control-ler for RBCLC heat exchanger bypass flow; RBCLC not directly used for acci-dent mitigation.
Tbl 6-1 Page 3
f Function/Justification Com onent ID for Continued 0 eration Splicing compound, Common electrical equipment used for filler N227, insu- splice and terminations; materials lating tape N8380, friction tape, cement, known to be capable of withstanding splicing tape accident temperature; also, enclosed and peak temperatures are of short dur-ation.
DG O'rien Connectors have been tested; only out-Connectors standing items are aging and radiation.
Rosemount trip Qualified except for radiation; will units function before harsh environment.
39 07'9 08'9 09'9 Limitorque Valve Operators qualified 10g 201 3lg 93 25/ for radiation; tested for aging and 93-26, 93-27, 93-28, 93-49, 93-50 harsh environment; assessment on-going for determining the expected life; thermal degradation resulting from the harsh environment test (250 F for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />) is more severe than the in-service harsh environment (305 F for 40 seconds) .
33 04'01 09/ 40 05/ Limitorque Valve Operators qualified 40 06 g 201 17 g 201 07 for harsh environments and radiation; tested for thermal aging; however, assessment on-going for determining the expected life.
Tbl 6-1 Page 4
APPENDIX A Component Evaluation Norksheets
0
~ ~
~ I' '
~ ~ ~
I ~
~ ~
~ ~
~ ~ ~
I '. I
~ ' ~ I I I ~ ~
~ I'
~ ~
I ~
I \ '
~ III
~ ~
I I
~ ~ ~
~ ~ ' '
I I
~ ~
~ I'
~ ~ ~
I~
~ I t '
I ~
~ ~ ~
I . ~
I '
RH~
WW
~: ~ I ~ ~
~ I I
~ ~
~ I ~ I I
~ ~
~ ~
~ ~
I I j '
I ~
I I
~ ~ ~
I ' e I '
~5M I: s i ~ ' ~ ~ ~ ~
I ' ~ ~
~ I'
~ ~ ~
~ ~
It 'I I ~
~ ~ I
~ ~ I '
0 ~
~ ~
~ I' I I I
~ ~
~ ~
~ ~ ~
~ ~ ~
~ ~
I ' I '
~ ' ~ ' ~ ~
~ I ~ I
~ ~ ~ ~
~ I'
~
~ ~
~ ~ ~
~ ~ ~ I
~ ~ t I '
I ~
~ ~
I: .re
\ ~ ~
~ ' I I ~ ~ ~
~ ' ~
~ ~ ~
~ ~
~ ~
I'I ' '
I ~
~ ~ ~
~ '
~ I'
~ ~ ~
~ ~
~ ~
~ ~
~ 0 ~
~ lI I ~
I ' I' I
~ " I ~ ' I .'
~ ~ ~ I i ~ ~
~ I ~
~ ~ ~
~ ~
~ ~
I ~
~ ~ ~
I ~
I '
mmlSR
~ ~
~ ~
~ I' I
~ ~ ~
I~
~ I I ~
~ ~ ~
I I ' I I
WW WW I~
~ '
~ ~ ~
~ ~
I ' I I ~
~ ~ ~
I ~
~
~ ' I~I I Il ~
~ I'
~ ~ ~
~ ~
~ ~
'I ~
~ ~ I I ~ I ' I
~ggg I: <<
&RE
~ ' ~ ~
I ~
~ ~
I~
I
~ ~
I ~
~ ~ ~
I
' I WRW I~ - '
&W ~ I ~ I I
~ ' ~ ~
I' I ' .
~
~ ~
I ~
~ I I ' I'
~
~ ~ ~
I ~
~ ~ ~ ~ ~
~ ~ ..I 'v wI
~ ~
~ I'
~ ~
~ ~
~ ~
I ~
~ ~ ~
I ~
WAR I I e s
~
~ I ~
&SR
~
~ ' ~I I I I '<<IIil ~ ~
~ I'
~ ~ ~
~ ~
~ ~
I ~
~ ~ ~
I ~
I '
~ ' ~ ~
~ '
~ I
~ ~ ~
~ ~
~ ~
I I'I I
~ ~ ~
I '
I '
WAR I ~ I i e I ~ ~ ~ ~ I I ' '
~ '
~ 'I ~
~ ~ ~
I ~
~ ~ ~
I '
I e e
'. I
~
' ~
~ ' I ~
~ I'
~ ~ ~
~ ~
~ ~
~ ~
~ ~ ~
~ ' ~ ~
~ I ~
~ ~
~ ~
~ I ~ ~ ~
~ ~
I ' I I ~
~ ~ ~
~ '
I ' I I '
~
I:
+ ~
~
I i
I ~, '
~ ~ '
~ ' I, la I'
~ ~
~
~ ~ ~
~ ~
~ ' ~ ~
I ' I I ~
~ 0 I I ~
I ' I I RWIRR
' ' f '
II ~ ~
~ ~ e ~
~
II ~; ~
s
' I ' I ~ ~ ~I I
~
~ I'
~ ~
I ~
~ ~
~ I ~
~
e'
NAMCO SL 3 SYSTEM IDENT. NO.
RI Oa 03 oa - oc
i
~
' I' I ~ ~
~ I'
~ t ~
I~
~ ~
~I
~ ~
~ ~ ~
~ ~
I ' I '
1 NAMCO D2400X SYSTEM IDENT. NO.
RI 01 - 05 01 06
0' I ' I ~ ~
~ ~
~ I ~ I I I I'
~
~ ~
~ ~
~ ~
~ ~
I I I ~
~ ~ I
~ '
~ I ~ I ' ~ I
~ ' ~ ~
~ ' I ' I I' I
~ ~ ~
I ~
~ ~
~ ~
I ~
~ ~ ~
~
\
~
~
&W
N
~ ~
~ I'
~ ~ ~
I~
~ ~
~
' I t ~
~ ~
I I I I~ ~
~ ~
SMACK I I WW III t ~
~ ~
~ ' ~ ~
~ I'
~ ~
~ I I I ~ ~ ~
~
' I I '
~ ~
I I II I
~ I I ~
I~
I ~
I ~
I ~
~ ' ~
~ I'
~ ~
~ ~
~ ~
~ ~ ~ I I ~
II I I ' ~
~ ~
~I I I
~ ~ I
~ ~
I~ ~
i ~
I I ~
~ ~
~ II I I I
~ ~
~ I
~ ~ 4
~ I
~ ~ ~ I ~
j '
I '
RW!5%
I~
I I: ~
~ ~
II I
~ ~ :III :: ~
' I' I ~ ~
~
~ I'
~ ~ ~
~ ~
I ~
~ ~ I I ~
I '
I '
e NAMCO SL3 SYSTEM IDENT. NO.
RI 39 05 39 - 06
~ ' I ' I ~ ~
~ I' I I I
~ ~ ~
I~
~ I
~ >> ~
I Il '
I ~
~ ~ I I ~
I '. I WR15
',I I~
~ ~ I
~
~
~
'l'>>
~ >> I
~
~ ~
II
~ ~ I >> ' I I >> l I >> ~
AS CO 8300 Valve SYSTEM IDENT. NO. MODEL 8 RI 39 . 05 (2) HT8300B58RU 39 06 (2) HT8300B58RU
~ ' ~ ~
~ I
~ ~ ~
~ ~
~ ~
I I ~
~ ~ ~
I '
' I I ~
~ ~ ~
~ '
Sll~
I ' I I '
I i i ~ ~ ~
i ~
- ~ II
~
~
' ~
~ ~ ~
~ ~
~ ~
I ' I
~ ~ ~
I ~
I ~ I '- I I; ~
~ ~
~ ~; II ~ I
~ ' ~ ~
~ I' I ' I I ~
~ ~
~ ~ ! ~
~ ~
I' I
~ ~
I I
~ ~ I
~ ~
I ' I I I '
HRSRRS
~ ~ ~ I ' \
WIR
I, t
~ ' I: I; I
~ ~ I I ~ I
~ I ~
~ ~ ~
I~
~ ~
~ ~
~
I
~ ~
~ ~ ~
I ~
I I 11
C I I ' ~
~ I ~
~ ~ ~
~ ~
~ ~
I II I
~ I I I '
I I
~ ~ ~
I ~
I~ I ~
11'
ROSEMOUNT 1151 DP SYSTEM IDENT. NO.
ID 33A ID 33B
0 0 ~
~ I'
~ ~ ~
~ ~
~ I
~ '
\ ~
~ l
~ ~ I
~ I ~
' ~
~ ~
~ ~
~ ~
' ~
el al I
~ I' I I I I' I 4 ~ ~
~ ~
~ I ~
~ ~ I I ~
I WHR I ~ I ~
II: ~ j I WW
~
~ ~
~ I'
~ ~
~ ~
~ ~
I' I I I ' I I ~
~ ~ ~
~ '
~ ' ~ ~
~ I ~
~ ~ ~
~ ~
~ I I ~
~ ~ I
~ ~
WW
~ ~
NAMCO D2400X SYSTEM IDENT. NO.
CID 201 10 83.1 10 83.1 12 80 - 16
~ ' I . II ~ ~
~ I' I' I
~ ~
I~
~ ~
I I I I
'III I ' I I ~
~ ~ ~
~ . ~
~ ~
I I
~ I' I ' I
~ ~
I~
~ ~
\ ~
I I I I I ' I
~ ~
I I
~ ~ ~
I ~
~ ' I gg I Ii ~ ~
I ' I'
~ ~ ~
I ~
~ I
~I
~ ~
~ ~ I I ~
I '
~
NAMCO D2400X SYSTEM IDENT. NO.
CID 201 32 201.2 - 03 201.2 32
V
~ ' ~ ~
~ I' I~
~ I
~ ~ ~ ~ I ~
~ t I' I I ~
I I
~ ~ ~
I ~
I~ I . ~
I '
~ '
~ ~ ~
I ~
~ ~ ~
I I '
0 ~ ~
I '
I ~ I ~
I I ' Sl ~ i ll
~ ~
I s
' ~
ASCO 8300 VALVE SYSTEM IDENT. NO. MODEL 8 CID 201.2 - 03 (2) VPLB8300B72F 201.2 32 (2)
~ ' I I g
~ ~
~ I' I 8 I I
~ ~ ~
I ~
~ I I ~
~ ~ ~
I '
WAR I
I
~
I
~
WW
~ ' I I ~ ~
~ I' I I I I
~ ~ ~
~ ~
~ ~
\ I ~
~ ~
I I
~ ~
~ ~ I
~ ~
~R55 II ',
I: ~
WW
~ ' I I ~ ~
~ I ~ I I I I' 'I
~ ~
~ ~
~ ~
~ ~
~ \
I ~
~ ~ I
~ 0 I '
WRR I e i ' I ~ ~ ~ ' ~
I I
0
~ ~
~ ~
~ \ ~
~ I I
II I ~
~ ~ I I '
I~
II ~ I I
~ ~ ~ I
gl
~ I ~
~ ~
I '
~ ~ ~
Ii o I I I I I
\
~ I I ', ~
~ ~
~ ~
I I
~ I
~
I I
~
I I'. I
~ ~ ~
'I ~
~ I
~ ' I ~
I le
~ I
~ II
~ ~
I ~
~ ~ I 0
~ ~
~ ~
~ '
I ~
I e I I
~, ~
I I
~ ~ I
~ ~
~ ~
~ I
~ ~
~ ~
II ~
I ~
I' I I ~ I~ I ~ ~ \
II '
I I ~ I I '
~ ~ I I
~ 0 I' I I I I' I
~ ~ 0 I ~
~ I
~ ~
I
~ I I I ~
~ ~ 1 I ' '
I I WW
~ ~
I I
~ ~ II
~ ' I I I I
~ ~
~ ~
~ I I
~ ~
~ ~
I I
~ 0 I I 0 I I '
I I ~ I ~
~ '
~
I I
I, II
~ ' ~ ~
~ I ~
~ ~
~ ~
~ ~
I' ~
~ ~
~ ~ I I ~
I I~ . ' ~
II' I
~ ~
~ ~; II
~ I I .. ~
~
~ ' I I ~
~ I'
~ ~
I~
I ~
~ ~ ~
~ ~
' I '
I
NAMCO D2400X SYSTEM IDENT. NO.
CIT '201 08 201.2 06 201.2 33 201 16
~ ~ ~ ~ 5 I t I
~ I I I I
~ ~ ~
~ ~
~ I
~ 'I I ~
I I '
~ ~
~ ~
~ ~ I t
I t 558~
I~ I ~ I . ~
~I tt ll I I: ~
t ~
~ ~ I I I I I '
~ I t ~ ~ I ~
ASCO 8300 VALVE SYSTEM IDENT . NO. MODEL No..
CIT 201.2 06 (2) 8300B61RU 201.2 33 (2)
~ \ ~ ~ t ~
I ~ ~ . ~
I I
' I o ~ ~
~ ~
.so balll
~ ~ ~ ~
' ~
I'.
~
~
I ~
I
~ I' II I I
~ ~ ~
~ ~
~ I I I I I I
~ ~
~ ~ I
~ ' ~ ~ I I Ii I I I' ~
I
~ ~
~ ~
~ I
~ I ~
~
~ ~ ~
I '
I s e
~ ~
II i ~
o I I
p I
~ ' I I ~ ~
~ ~
~ ~ ~
I~
~ 1
~ ~
~ ~ I
~ ~
I ' I '
~ ' I I ~ ~
~ I' I I
~ ~
I ~
~ ~
~ 11 I ~
~ I
~ ~ I
~ ~
I 1
~ ' ~ ~
~ I ~
~ ~ ~
~ ~
~ ~
~ ~
~ ~ I I ' I ' '
I RH~
WRR I
~
~ ' ~
~ I I I I
~ ~
I ~
I ~
~ ~
~ ~ I I
I I RRW
~ I ~ ~
I
'l' '
WW
~
I I I I '
ASCO 8300 VALVE SYSTEM IDENT. NO. MODEL /I CIT 68 - 08C WPLB8300B68F 68 - 09C 68 - 10C
~ ~
~ I'
~ ~ ~
I~
~ ~
I ~
~ tt I '
WRSS
~ ~ ~ I ~
~ ~
~ I'
~ ~ ~
~ ~
~ ~
~ I ~
~ ~
~ ~ I I ~
I '
~ ~ ~
\ '
~
~
~ ' ~ ~
~ I'
~ ~ ~
~ ~
~ ~
\ I ~
I ~
~ ~ ~
I ~
~ ~
~ ~
~
' ~ ~
~ I'
~ ~ ~
I ~
~ ~
I ~
~ ~ I
~ ~
RRR 555 I ~
~ I ~
MRS I I
~
GENERAL ELECTRIC TYPE K SYSTEM IDENT. NO. MODEL NO.
CS 81 - 04 5K6336XC166A, HP 450, 1775RPM, 4000V, 30 81- 23 81 - 03 81- 24 Per Comments From WYLE/NUTECH. The 5K6 Series Motors are Generic.
~ ' ~ ~
~ I ~ I' I
~ ~ ~
~ ~
~ ~
I' I
~ ~
~ ~ ~
I ~
I '
~ I ~ 'I ~ ~ ~
~ ~
~ ~
~ I ~
~ ~ ~
I ~
~ ~
'I II I
~ ~
~ ~ ~
I . ~
ROSEMOUNT 1151 DP SYSTEM IDENT. NO. MODEL NO.
CS 58 - 05 1151DP4B22RLMME 58 - 06 1151DP4B22RLMME RV - 26 1151DPSB22MBGE-1
~ ~
~ ~
~ I
~ I \
~ ~
I ' I I ~
~ ~ ~ I
LIMITORQUE SMB SYSTEM IDENT. NO.
CS 40 05 40 - 06
~ ~
j I ~
I ' I I l i ~ ~ ~ 'I
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ II
~, I
~ ~
~ ~
~ ~ ~
~ ~
~ ~
I I '
K%55%
I ~ ~
~ ~ ~ ~
' I I 1; ~
~ ~ ~ I ~
~ ~
~ I'
~ ~ ~
I ~
~ ~
~ ~
~ ~ ~
~ ~
I '
~ '
~ ' 0 ~
~ I'
~ ~
I ~
~ I I
I'I I ~
~ ~ ~
~ ~
WAR WW
~ ~
~ ~
I
~ ~
~ I' I' I
~ ~ ~
~ ~
~ ~
I ~
~ ~ I i ~
mme%
il:
&W ~ ~
~ I ~
~ ~ ~ ~
~ I' I' I'
~ ~
~ ~
~ I I' I'
~
~ 0 ~
~ ~
I '
WW ~ I I ~ I ~ ~
. ~ I ~; I I ~ ~ ~
~ ' ~ ~
~ I'
~ ~ ~
~ ~
~ I
~ ~
I ' I
~ ~
~ ~ ~
~ '
I ' I I Nmm 558 I '
~:
o ~ ~
I I ~ ~
~
~ ~
~ I ~
~ ~ ~
I~
~ ' ~
~ ~ ' ~
I ~
a ~ s
' ~
I ' I I '
I l
~
e s I I ~ ~ . ~
~
~ I ~ '
&RE
~ ~
~ ~ ' ~ 0 ~
~ ~ ~ ~
~ I'
~ ~ ~
~ ~
I' I '
~
~ ~ ~
~ ~
~ ~
~ ~
~ ~
I '
I s
' 'I ~ ~ ~
~ t ~ ~ I ' ~ ~ ~ ~
I ~ 'I ~ ~ I ~
GENERAL ELECTRIC 6 GENERAL/MAC 551 SYSTEM IDENT. NO.
RVI ID-45 ID 46A ID 46B
~ ' ~ ~
~ I
~ ~ ~
I ~
' I
~ ~
~ I I ~
I I
~ ~ ~
I '
ROS EMOUNT 1151 DP SYSTEM IDENT. NO. MODEL NO.
RVI 36 03A 4E22T0003PB 36 03B 36 03C 36 03D 36 04A 36 04B 36 04C 36 04D 36 - 05A 5E22T0003PB 36 05B 36 05C 36 05D 36 07A 9E22T0003PB 36 07B 36 07C 36 07D 36
- 08A'6 08B 36 08C 36 08D
0
~ ~
~ I
~ 0 ~
~ '
~ ~
~ ~
~R58
~ \ ~ I ~ ~ ~ ~
~ ~, ~ ~ I ' ~ i I' I
GE 6 GE/MAC 553 SYSTEM IDENT. NO.
RVI IA 12
~
I I
~
~ I'
~ ~ ~
I~
~ ~
~ I ~
I I I
'I I
~ ~ I I ~
I~ ~ !
I ~
~ I ~
' 'I I, ~
ROSEMOUNT 510 DU SYSTEM IDENT. NO. DESCRIPTION RVI 36-03 (A-D) Master 36-03 (A-D) Slave 36-04 (A-D) Master 36-08 (A-D) Master 36-08 (A-D). Slave 36-05 (A-D) Master 36-07 (A-D) Master 36-07 (A-D) Slave
~'
~ ~
~ I'
~ ~ ~
I~
~ ~
II I
~ ~
~ ~ I
~ '
~ ~ I'
FENWAL 17002 40 SYSTEM IDENT NO.
AI 1B 10 A 1B 10 B 1B 10 C 1B 10 D 1B 10E 1B 10 F 1B 10 G 1B 10 H 1B 10 J 1B 10 K 1B 10 L 1B 10 M 1B 10 N 1B 10 P 1B 10 Q 1B 10 R
t+ F
~ ~
~ I ~
~ ~
I~
~ ~
~ ~
I I I I I
~ ~
~ ~ ~
I ~
855~
I ~
\ 4 0 ~
~ ~
~ ~
ROS EMOUNT 510 DU SYSTEM IDENT. NO. DESCRIPTION AI 201.2-476 (A-D) Master 36-06 (A-D) Master 01-26 (A-H)
~ ' I I ~ I I ~ ~
~ I ~
~ ~
I ~
I 0 I I ~
ROSEMOUNT 1151 DP SYSTEM IDENT. NO.
AI 01 26A 01 26B 01 26C 01 26D 01 26E 01 26F
'01 26G 01 26H
~ ' I' I I I
~ I I' I' I
~ ~ ~
~ ~
~ ~
I I'
I II I'
'II I I I I' I
~ ~ I II '
e I
~ ~ ~
WW
~ ~
It'l I j '
~ I'
~ ~
I' I'
~ ~
~ ~
~ ~
I I'
I II'I I'
~
I I I I'
~ I
~ '
WW
~ ~ j j
~ j ~ ~
~ ~ I ', I~
I ~
~ I' I' I
~ ~ ~
I~
I I'
I II I'
'I
~
I I Il'
~ I
~ . ~
N
~ ' ~ I II ' ~
~ I ~
~ ~ ~
~ ~
~ ~
~ ~ I
~ ~
I ' I
~ ' I \ I II' ~ ~ ~
~ I ~
~ ~
~ ~
~ I I ~
I I ~
I' I I
~ I' l
~ ~ ~
~ '
WE55 t ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ '
~ ~ tl e
~ I' I' l
~ ~ ~
l~
~ l l 'I 'l l I
~
'I 'll l
~ ~ l
~ ~ e. e I ~ 'I e ~ e e e
I ' ' l ~ ~
~ ~
~ I'
~ ~ ~
I~
~ ~
~ ~ ~
ASCO HVA-90-405-2A SYSTEM IDENT. NO.
NC 15A NC 15B**
- This item is Model 8HVA-90-405-8A, which is generic to the Model HVA-90-405-2A.
~
' ~ ~
~ I ~
~ ~
~ ~
~ ~
~ ~ I
~ ~
I ' \
WICKS I~ <<.; I, ~ \ '
I ~
~
~
~ ~
~
~
! ~
~
! - ~ ~ I' ~
GE ADK 5 CIRCUIT BREAKER SYSTEM IDENT. NO.
PD 16B Power Board 17B
~ 0
~ I I I' 'I
~ ~ ~
I~
~ ~
~ ~
I '
WR55 I ~
ll; ~ ~ ~
~ I ~ s I '. ~ ~ i I'
~ ~
I ~ I ~ I '
~
G.E. IC-7700 MOTOR CONTROL CENTER SYSTEM IDENT. NO.
PD POWER BD. 161B 171B 1671 167
~ ' ~ ~
~ I
~ ~
~ ~
~ I
~ ~
I I
~ 0 I
~ ~
CH~
~ ~
ROSEMOUNT 1151 DP SYSTEM IDENT. NO.
EC 36 - 06A 36 06B 36 06C 36 06D
~ ' ~ ~
~ I ~ ~ I
~ ~ ~
~ ~
~ I I I I t ~
~ tI I '
~MR I I ~ ~ '
. ~
f>
~ ~
~ ~
~ I'
~ ~ ~
~ ~
~ ~
I I I I ~
~ ~ I
~ ~
I '
I I ~ ~ ~
0 ~
~ ~ ~I qll
~ I'
~ ~ ~
I~
I I I ~
~ ~ ~
I '
wmm I ~ ~
' ~ ~
0 ~ ~ ~
~ '
~ ~ ~
~ I
~ ~
I I I
~ ~
~ ~ ~
~ '
WAR II:
WW ~ '
~ ~
~ ~
~ ~ I I '
Ii '
I~ o
':I I ~ s ~ ~ 1 I
~ ~
II:
~ ~ I I I, I I ~
~ i
~ ~
I ~
GE & GE/MAC 551 SYSTEM IDENT. NO.
COS 80 47 80 69 80 - 54 80 75
~ ~ ~ ~
~ I ~
~ ~
I ~
~ I
! ~
~ ~
t ~
~ ~ I I ~
Qggggg
! ~ ~
WW~ ~
I I ~ ~ ~ ~
~ ~ ~
~ ~
GENERAL ELECTRIC TYPE K SYSTEM IDENT. NO. MODEL NO.
COS 80 - 04 5K6328XC136A, 4000V, 30 1775RPM 80- 24 80 03 80 23 Per Comments Fro WYLE/NUTECH. The 5K6 Series Motors are Generic.
~ '
~ I'
~
I~
~ ~
~ ~
~ ~ ~
~ ~
WR%
I ~ ~ ~
~ ~ ~ ~ I ' ~ I
~:
I'.
~ I ~ I o ~ ~
~ ~
~ ~
~ \ ~
I ~
I '
~555 I o .: I.
II' I I I c WW
~ ~
I' ~ ~
~
I ~
t, ~
~ s
~ I ' ~
I.
0 ' ~ ~
I~
~ ~
~ ~ ~ ~ ~
I ~
I I' I 0 ~ ~
~ ~
WW
\
i I ~
~ ~
LIMITORQUE SMB SYSTEM IDENT. NO.
COS 93 25 50 28
'49 26
III
~
~I ~
~ ~
~ I'
~ I
~ ~
~ I ~ ~ ~ ~
~ ~
I ~
I I ~
~ ~ ~
I ~
I ~
I I '
~
~ '
~ ~ ~
I ~
~ ~
I I I I
~ ~ ~
i' ROS EMOUNT 1151 Dp SYSTEM IDENT. NO.
COS 201.2 476A 201.2 476B 201.2 476C 201.2 476D
C APPENDIX B Component Deletion Justification Summary
Equipment items deleted from the NMP-1 master parts list and the associated basis for exemption from qualification are provided below.
Com onent No. Function Basis for Exem tion 80-15, 80-16, 80-35 g Position indication for CoS isolation 80-36 valves which are normally open (NO),
manually operated by key (KO), and re-ceive no signal from reactor protec-tion system (RPS) 58.1-01 (incorrectly Position indication for condensate noted as 58.1-08 in makeup to torus block valve (BV),
SER Appendix B) valve is normally closed (NC), fails closed (FC) and receives no RPS signal.
68 Olg 68 02'8 03/ Position indication for air operated 68 04'8 05'8 06'8-07 stop check valves on torus vacuum breaker system, NO, no RPS signal 83.1-10, 83.1-12 Drywell isolation, solenoid operated valve (SOV), NO, deenergized to close by RPS, isolation from RPS by fuses, closes before harsh environment, FC, isol. backed up by motor operated valve to be qualified 201 10 g 210 32 g Containment isol., SOV, NC, FC, de-201-08, 201-16 energized to close by RPS, isol.
backed up by motor oerated valve (MOV) to be qualified
Com onent No. Function Basis for Exem tion 68-Olc thru 68-07c SOV controlling air operated stop check valve for torus vacuum relief, NO, normally deenergized, no RPS signal
- 58. 1-01 Condensate makeup to torus SOV, backed up by check valve, NC, FC, no RPS signal 01-03, 01-04 Main steam isolation, SOV's, NO, FCg deenergize to close by RPS, isolated from RPS by fuses, isol. is backed up by MOV to be qualified 55-05 Demineralized water to CRD system SOV, NC, non-scram function 80-85 Strainer differential pressure switch, non-safety related function RV-30 Core spray line break inside reactor vessel indication; also, modification planned for non-qualification reasons Burndy GZ,GA-B, All metallic construction GABC-B connectors NC-30A, NC-30B Position indicators and electro-pneumatic converters for CRD system flow control valve, non-scram function Fittings Cable Tray All metallic construction 58-04 Level transmitter for torus level alarm, not referenced in LOCA/HELB procedures B-2
Com onent No. Function Basis for Exem tion RE-16A, RE-16B Pressure switch which bypasses low condenser vacuum and mainsteam IV closure scrams at less than 600 psig, non-safety related RN-38Al 'N-38A2 Radiation monitoring of CoS raw water system, R.G. 1.97 item NC-08A, NC-08B CRD pump motors, non-scram function RV-03A, RV-03B CS pump discharge pressure indication, function duplicated by vessel level instrumentation RV-26Bi RV-26A CS flow transmitter, function dupli-cated by vessel level inst.
P-101 Pressure transmitter feeding process computer, R.G. 1.97 item IA-07 Core differential pressure, non-safety related ID-13A, ID-13B Level transmitter for feedwater con-trol, non-safety related 80 49Ag 80 71Ag CoS flow transmitters, function dupli-80-56A,80-76A cated by pump discharge pressure transmitter to be qualified 93 32Ag 93 30Ag CoS raw water flow transmitters, not 93-33A,93-34A referenced in emergency procedures80-106, 80-109 Level transmitters for tripping sump pumps, non-safety related B-3
Com onent No. Function Basis for Exem tion 201.2-01, 201.2-13 l
Containment pressure transmitters feeding CAD system, indication func-tion duplicated by RPS containment pressure transmitters IJ-12 Reactor water cleanup system flow transmitter, function backed up for isol. valve position indication RD-35 CRD system flow transmitter, non-scram, function lSA Thermocouple All metallic construction Sheaths 70-92, 70-94 Drywell cooling closed loop motor operated isol. valves, NO, no RPS signal 81 Olg 81 81-22 02'1 2lg Core spray pump suction isol. valves, NO, fail as is, no RPS signal 93-51, 93-52 Raw water to core spray block valve, NC, fail as is, no RPS signal 71-127A'evel switch on makeup tank to RBCLC, feeds level control valve, check valve prevents backflow from RBCLC system RD-68A, RD-68B CRD pump pressure switches, non-scram function 80-62 CoS strainer differential pressure switch B-4
Com onent No. Function Basis for Exem tion 55-05 Demineralized water to CRD system block valve position switch, non-scram function 70-19 RBCLC pump disch. temp. element, backed up by element to be qualified Sealtite conduit All metallic construction MG Set 162-172 Deleted based on mild environment; Switchgear manufacturer specification envelopes PB-ll, 12, 13, Switchboard specified temperature of 133 F for 12 RPS Buss No. 11, 12 sec. requirement. Radiation is spec-Motor Control Center ified but negligible.
Power Master PB 16'7'3'4 NC-22 CRD SOV used to isolate scram dis-charge volume used for testing only.
Junction Boxes All metallic construction.
RN-05A through RN-050 Main steam line radiation elements; not used to detect or mitigate LOCA/HELB B-5