ML17335A549

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Advises of NRC Plans for Future Insp Activities at Facility for Licensee to Have Opportunity to Prepare for Insps & to Provide NRC with Feedback on Any Planned Insps Which May Conflict with Plant Activities.Plant Issue Matrix Encl
ML17335A549
Person / Time
Site: Cook  American Electric Power icon.png
Issue date: 09/29/1999
From: Grobe J
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To: Powers R
AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER CO., INC.
References
NUDOCS 9910120032
Download: ML17335A549 (64)


Text

September 29, 1999 Mr. R. P. Powers Senior Vice President Nuclear Generation Group American Electric Power Company 500 Circle Drive Buchanan, Ml 49107-1395

SUBJECT:

MID-CYCLEPLANT PERFORMANCE REVIEW (PPR) - D. C. COOK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

Dear Mr. Powers:

On September 2, 1999, the NRC staff completed the mid-cycle Plant Performance Review (PPR) of the D. C. Cook Nuclear Power Plant. The staff conducts these reviews for all operating nuclear power plants to integrate performance information and to plan for inspection activities. The focus of this performance review was to identify changes in performance over the past 6 months and to allocate inspection resources over the next 7 months.

Our 6-month review of the D. C. Cook Nuclear Power Plant confirmed that your performance continues to warrant increased NRC attention.

You have made significant progress in identifying problems during this assessment period through implementation of Expanded System Readiness Reviews and other programmatic and functional area assessments.

A significant amount of work resulting from those discovery efforts remains to be accomplished prior to plant restart.

In our letter dated September 17, 1999, Case Specific Checklist Update for Restart of D. C. Cook Plant, we identified those specific issues the NRC willreview prior to Unit 2 restart.

Under the direction of the NRC Manual Chapter 0350 panel, the inspections in the near future willbe focused on ensuring that the performance issues addressed in the Case Specific Checklist are sufficiently assessed.

Therefore, we plan to conduct inspections beyond the core inspection program to ensure that plant equipment, programs and processes, and management controls are sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that the plant can be restarted and operated safely.

In addition, steam generator replacement activities on Unit 1 will be inspected concurrently. The inspection schedule has been revised and willcontinue to be revised, as necessary, to accommodate your changes in activity completion dates.

For example, in response to the information you provided to us regarding your readiness for closure of the Confirmatory Action Letter during our meeting on September 24, 1999, we have adjusted, the inspection plan. To effectively facilitate future schedule changes, you have agreed to provide the NRC four weeks notice of any need to change a scheduled inspection date.

Enclosure 1 contains a historical listing of plant issues, referred to as the Plant Issues Matrix (PIM), that were considered during this PPR process to arrive at an integrated review of licensee performance trends.

The PIM includes items summarized from inspection reports or other docketed correspondence between the NRC and the D. C. Cook Nuclear Power Plant 99iOi20032 9'F092'F PDR ADQCK. 050003i 5 8

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R. Powers from September 1, 1998, through August 31, 1999. As noted above, greater emphasis was placed on those issues identiTied in the past 6 months during this performance review. The NRC does not attempt to document all aspects of licensee programs and performance that may be functioning appropriately.

Rather, the NRC only documents issues that the NRC believes warrant management attention or represent noteworthy aspects of performance.

This letter advises you of our plans for future inspe'ction activities at your facilityso that you will have an opportunity to prepare for these inspections and to provide us with feedback on any planned inspections which may conflict with your plant activities. Enclosure 2 details our inspection plan through March 2000 to coincide with the scheduled implementation of the revised reactor oversight process in April2000. The rationale or basis for each inspection outside the core inspection program is discussed above so that you are aware of the reason for emphasis in these program areas.

Resident inspections are not listed due to their ongoing and continuous nature.

Ifcircumstances arise which cause us to change this inspection plan, we willcontact you to discuss the change as soon as possible.

Please contact Mr. Anton Vegel at 630-829-9620 with any questions you may have.

Sincerely,

/s/ J.

A. Grobe John A. Grobe, Director Division of Reactor Safety Docket Nos. 50-315; 50-316 License Nos. DPR-58; DPR-74

Enclosures:

1. Plant Issues Matrix
2. Inspection Plan See Attached Distribution DOCUMENT NAME: G:)COONPPR)09-01-99 MIDCYCLELETIER.WPD To receive e co of this document. Indicate in the box C

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OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

R. Powers cc w/encls A. C. Bakken III, Site Vice President T. Noonan, Plant Manager M. Rencheck, Vice President, Nuclear Engineering D. Cooper, Plant Manager R. Whale, Michigan Public Service Commission Michigan Department of Environmental Quality Emergency Management Division Ml Department of State Police D. Lochbaum, Union of Concerned Scientists N. Nitz, County Board Chairman J. M. Henry, Berrien County Coordinator

~ Sheriff R. Kimmerly, County Emergency Management Director The Honorable Charles Yarbrough C. Roberts, Benton Harbor City Manager The Honorable Mary Goff F. Walsh, St. Joseph City Manager The Honorable William Skiba A. Anthony, Bridgman City Superintendent The Honorable Thomas Hoetger J. Wilken, Buchanan City Manager M. Harris, President, Village of Stevensville S. Reitz, President, Village of Berrien Springs L. Larsen, President, Village of Shorham INPO Distribution:

RRB1 (E-Mail)

RPC (E-Mail)

G. Tracy, OEDO w/encls Chief, NRR/DISP/PIPB w/encls T. Boyce, NRR w/encls Project Director, NRR w/encls Project Mgr., NRR w/encls J. Caldwell, Rill w/encls B. Clayton, Rill w/encis R. Lickus, Rill w/encls SRI D. C. Cook w/encls DRP w/encis DRS w/encls Rill PRR w/encls PUBLIC IE-01 w/encls Docket File w/encls GREENS

Page:

1 of 38 09/30/1 999 17:06:47 IR Report 3 Region III COOK United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Date ENCLOSURE 1

Date Source Fun etio'nal Area Template ID Type Codes Item Title Item Description 07/30/1999 1999007 Pri: ENG Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 0500031 6 COOK 2 NRC MISC Prl: 4C Sec:

Tel.

DIscovery EffortStill Ongoing There were several instances where the team identified issues in programmatic areas which were outside the ESRR review scope.

In addition, the team determined that a number of problems had only been broadly identified by the ESRR reviews, and the corrective action process was being relied upon to identify specific deficiencies. As a result, the team conduded that although the ESRR reviews of the most safety-significant systems were complete, the total discovery effort was ongoing at the end of the inspection.

07/30/1999 1999007 Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 Pri: ENG Sec:

NRC POS Prl: 4C Sec:

.Ter:

ESSR Process Effective Overall, the implementation ofthe ESRR process was considered effective. The scope of the review areas was broad and generally consistent with the purpose of the review effort to confirm the performance of system safety functions.

Further, the breadth and depth of material reviewed was appropriate overall and resulted in the identification of substantive issues.

Although some new issues were identified by the team which were within the scope of the ESRR effort, these issues represented isolated implementation weaknesses and not broad deficiencies

. in the ESRR process.

07/30/1999 1999007 Prl: ENG Sec:

Dockets Discussed 05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 NRC WK Pri: 4C Sec:

Ter:

Continued Attention Warrented In Operability Evaluation Area The team identified an example where the licensee did not exercise appropriate sensitivity to the potential impact on operabiTity of fuse control deficiencies identified during the ESRR review of the 250 Vdc system.

This was of particular concern since a problem regarding the sensitivity to operability of equipment required for Modes 5 and 6 was identified by the NRC following two electrical faults which occurred on April 19, and April24, 1999. Two

.examples of operability evaluations which failed to adequately address structural deficiencies were also identified.

Collectively, these examples indicated that continued management attention is warranted in the operability evaluation area.

07/16/1999 1999015 Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 Prl: MAINT Sec:

NRC NEG Pri: 2B Sec:

Ter:

Minimal contractor control forthe safety-related work being performed on the Unit 1 West Component Coolin The inspectors identified that there was minimal contractor control for the safety-related work being performed on the Unit 1 West Component Cooling Water (CCW) heat exchanger.

The inspectors also determined that there was a programmatic deficiency in the licensee's understanding of quality assurance (QA) requirements.

Most licensee personnel questioned incorrectly assumed that ifa vendor had an approved QA program that the vendor was not required to followthe licensee's approved QA program.

(Section M1.2) 07/16/1999 1999015 Pri: MAINT*

Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 07/16/1999 1999015 Pri: OPS Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 NRC NEG NRC NEG Prl: 5A Sec:

Ter:

Prl: 1A Sec:

Ter:

Plant maintenance personnel have not always been effective at identifying and correcting the root cause of a Plant maintenance personnel have not always been effective at identifying and correcting the root cause of an equipment failure, and repetitive failures of safety-related component have occurred. Within the maintenance organization, the quality of troubleshooting has varied. The licensee recognized this problem and issued guidance on how to perform troubleshooting activities. The troubleshooting guidance appeared to be effective; however, only a small number of troubleshooting activities have been performed since the troubleshooting guidance was issued.

Also, the licensee had not yet developed dear expectations for when the use of the troubleshooting guidance was required.

(Section M1.3)

The operating crews did not consider the potential implications of cross-train operation..

The inspectors identified that the licensee was operating some systems in a cross-train configuration. For example, the "A"Train residual heat removal pump was providing cooling to the reactor coolant system through the "B Train residual heat removal heat exchanger.

The operating crews did not consider the potential implications of cross-train operation.

(Section 01.2) nom Tvne (Cnmnliance.Foliowun.Other). From 09/01/1 998 To 04/01/2000

Page:

2 of 38 09/30/1 999 17:06:47 IR Report 3 Region III COOK United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Date Functional Date Source Area Template ID Type Codes Item Title Item Description 07/16/1999 1999015 Pri: ppS Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 NRC NEG Prl: 1C Sec:

Ter:

Use of an extra reactor operator (Rp) was not consistent with normal plant operations.

The inspectors observed a crew In a simulator assessment and conctuded that the use of an extra reactor operator (Rp) was not consistent with normal plant operations.

The licensee had already identified questions regarding the consistent use of the extra Rp and was in the process of revising the use of the extra Rp during simulator evaluations.

(Section 05.1) 07/16/1999 1999015 Pri: ppS Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 NRC NEG Pri: 1C Sec:

Ter:

Three Instances where CRs should have been written and CRs had not been initiated.

The licensee's efforts to increase the use of the corrective action program through the initiation of more condition reports (CRs) had resulted in a lower threshold for initiating CRs. However, the inspectors identified three instances where CRs should have been written and CRs had not been initiated. (Section 07.1) 07/16/1999 1999015 Pri: ppS Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 NRC NEG Pri: 4B Sec:

Ter.

Insufficient involvement of engineering personnel in a decision by operations personnel to proceed with the The inspectors identified that the licensee had removed the Unit 1 East Essential Service Water (ESW) pump from service even though the Unit 1 West ESW pump recently failed an In-Service Test. The inspectors concluded that operations staff lacked rigor in the assessment ofthe results of the test. Additionally, the inspectors noted insufficient involvement of engineering personnel in a decision by operations personnel to proceed with the planned removal from service of the Unit 1 East ESW pump. (Section 01.4) 07/16/1999 1999015 Prl: ppS Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 07/16/1999 1999015 Prl: ppS Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 NRC POS NRC POS Prl: 1A Sec:

Ter.

Prl: 1A Sec:

Ter.

Recent actions by the licensee to restore the safety-related equipment to an operable status demonstrated an During this inspection period, the licensee restored all four (two per unit) diesel generators (D/Gs) to an operable status for Modes 5 and 6 (Cold Shutdown and Refueling). This marked the first time since January 11, 1999, that all four D/Gs were operable at the same time. In addition, the operability issues with boration control were addressed and corrected.

The operability of the D/Gs and boration control resulted in the restoration of the plant's full capabilities in reactivity control, reactor coolant system inventory control, and AC power sources.

The recent actions by the licensee to restore the safety-related equipment to an operable status demonstrated an appropriate safety focus. (Section 01.1) the licensee's conduct of the Unit 2 drain down of the reactor coolant system (RCS) was methodical and thor The inspectors observed that in preparation for defueling, the licensee's conduct of the Unit 2 drain down of the reactor coolant system (RCS) was methodical and thorough. When the licensee identified a discrepancy between the indicated RCS water level and the calculated RCS water level, the drain down was stopped until the discrepancy could be resolved.

(Section 01.3) 07/16/1999 1999015 Pri: OpS Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 NRC POS Prl: 1C Sec:

Ter:

Operations management noted a declining trend in configuration control and attention to detail.

Operations management noted a dedining trend in configuration control and attention to detail. The inspectors concluded that the use of the functional area and programmatic assessment findings to identify the declining trend was effective. In addition, the inspectors conduded that management expectations about configuration control were presented to the plant staff in a timely manner, before an anticipated increase in plant workload. (Section 7.2)

'0'l Item Type (Compliance,Followup,Other), From 09/01/1998 To 04/01/2000

Page:

3 of 38 09I30I1 999 17:06:47 IR Report 3 Region III COOK Date Source Functional Area United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Date Template Item Title ID Type Codes Item Description Dockets Discussed 05000315 COOK 1 07/16/1999 1999015-01 Prl: MAINT NRC NCV Pri: 2B FAILURETO COMPLYWITH QA PROGRAM DESCRIPTION Sec:

Sec:

A non-cited violation was issued for the licensee's failure to have a department head review and approve the vendor's procedure for pulling tubes from the Unit 1 West CCW heat exchanger.

Ter:

Dockets Discussed 0500031 5 COOK 1 07/16/1999 199901542 Pri: MAINT NRC NCV Prl: 2B FAILURETO FOLLOWPROCEDURE WHILEPULLINGTUBES FROM U1 WEST CCW HEAT EXCHANGER Sec:

Sec:

A nonmted violation was issued for an inadequate procedure which was utilized to pull tubes from the Unit 1 West CCW heat exchanger, in that the procedure did not provide guidance for removing more than one tube. (Section Ter:

M1.2) 06/11/1999 199901341 Pri:

Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 NRC NCV Pri:

FAILUREIMPLEMENTPROMPT CORRECTIVE ACTIONS FOR OVERDUE PREVENTATIVEMAINTENANCETAS Sec:

Ter:

06/11/1999 1999013 'ri:ENG NRC NEG Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 Prl: 1C Sec:

Ter:

The inspectors Identified some weaknesses in the implementation of the assessment process, specifically re The inspectors did identify some weaknesses in the implementation of the assessment process, specifically related to documentation and process deficiencies. The documentation weaknesses were most apparent in engineering assessment reports which were not stand-alone documents and did not meet the expectations established by the System Readiness Review Board (Sections 07.3, 07.5, M7.1, E7.1, and E7.2)-

Dockets Discussed 05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 06/11/1999 1999013 Pri: ENG NRC NEG Pri: 1C Sec:

Sec:

Ter.

Several process weaknesses were Identified which could impact the effectiveness of the assessment efforts.

Several process weaknesses were identified which could impact the effectiveness of the assessment efforts: the assessment procedures did not explicitly require a review to ensure past process performance problems were eliminated; the assessment methodology relied principally on interviews of departmental staff; the programmatic assessment procedure did not require review or approval of programmatic assessments by the System Readiness Review Board; the silo approach used for programmatic assessments appeared likelyto produce inconsistencies; the Cross Functional Rewew Team was not fullyeffective in identification of programs in need of a detailed self assessment; and an informal wordwf-mouth traming process was used for personnel involved in programmatic area self-assessments.

(Section 07.1).

06/11/1999 1999013 Prl: ENG NRC NEG Prl: 1C Contractor Control and Material Condition program reviews were considered vague and lacking in detail.

Sec:

.Sec:

Contractor Control and Material Condition program reviews were considered vague and tacking in detail.

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 Ter:

Item Tvoe (Compliance,Followup.Other), From 09/01/1 998 To 04/01/2000

Page:

4 of 38 09/30/1 999 17:06:47 IR Report 3 Region III COOK Date Source Functional Area United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Date Template Item Title ID Type Codes Item Description Dockets Discussed 05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 1999013 Pi'I: ENG NRC NEG Prl: 1C The Plant Fuse Control Program documentation was not sufficient to support the conclusion that adequate g Sec:

Sec:

The Plant Fuse Control Program documentation was not sufficient to support the conclusion that adequate guidance existed.

Tei-.

06/11/1999 1999013 Prl: ENG, Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 NRC NEG Pri: 4B The preventive maintenance program had been Ineffectivel implemented.

Sec:

The preventive maintenance program had been ineffectively implemented resulting in inadequate equipment maintenance and a large backlog of overdue preventive maintenance tasks.

The failure to initiate prompt corrective Ter:

actions (condition reports or deferrals) for approximately 150 overdue preventative maintenance tasks

~ and to determine ifthe operability of Unit 1 and Unit 2 safety related equipment had been affected was considered a Non-Cited Violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI. The licensee was taking appropriate corrective actions including the formation of a cross<iscipline review team to address the causes of the overdue maintenance and the performance of operability determinations to assess the impact on affected safety related equipment (Section E7.2.3).

06/11/1999 1999013 Prl: ENQ Sec:-

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 NRC POS Prl: 1C The Systems Readiness Review Board members performed their charter functions and effectively challenged Sec:

The Systems Readiness Review Board members performed their charter functions and effectively challenged internal assessments and conclusions.

The Systems Readiness Review Board process was an essential element in Ter establishing quality expectations for the functional area assessment process (Section 07.2).

06/11/1999 1999013 Prl: ENG Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 NRC POS Prh 1C The operations-related assessments were of good quality.

Sec:

The operations-related assessments were of good quality.

Ter.

06/11/1999 1999013 Pri: ENQ

-Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 NRC POS Prl: 1C The Electrical Load Control Program assessment identified substantive program issues.

, Sec:

The Electrical Load Control Program. assessment identified substantive program issues.

Ter.

06/11/1999 1999013 Prl: ENG Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 NRC POS Pri: 5A Functional area assessments in the areas of operations, maintenance and engineering and the assessment o

Sec:

Functional area assessments in the areas of operations, maintenance and engineering and the assessment of the Corrective Action Program were successful in identifying potential restart issues and engineering process Ter.

deficiencies.

k Item Tvoe /Comoliance.Followup,Other). From 09/01/1998 To 04/01/2000

Page:

5 of 38 09/30/1999 17:06:47 IR Report 3 Region III COOK United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Date Date Source Functional Area

=- Template ID Type Codes Item Title Item Description 06/03/1999 1999014 Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 Pri: PLTSUP Sec:

NRC NEG Prl: 1C Sec:

Ter:

The 1998 Annual Radioactive Effluen Release Report was not submitted to the NRC within the timeframe req The 1998 Annual Radioactive ENuent Release Report was not submitted to the NRC within the timefrarne required by technical specifications, resulting in a violation of minor safety significance not subject to formal enforcement action. Inspector identified minor discrepancies in certainliquid eNuent flowpaths described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) and ODCM and contractor audit recommendations for the development of a formal water management program were also being addressed by the licensee (Section R1.1).

06/03/1999 1999014 Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 Prh PLTSUP Sec:

NRC NEG I rl:1C Sec:

Ter:

Problems were identified with the completeness of respirator issuance logs and with the timely removal of se~

Problems were identified with the completeness of respirator issuance logs and with the timely removal of self contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) bottles from use for hydrostatic testing, both which the licensee acknowledged and planned to address.

Also, licensee derived alpha emitter conversion factors and derived air concentration and annual limitof intake values used to assess internal dose were not recalculated when new scaling factors were determined (Section R1.2).

Dockets Discussed 05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 1999014 Pri: PLTSUP NRC NEG Prh 1C Sec:

Sec:

Ter:

Inconsistencies were identified with the labeling and tagging of containers housing radioactive materials.

Inconsistencies were identified with the labeling and tagging of containers housing radioactive materials, and recent condition reports indicated that workers did not dearly understand the revised labeling program (Section R4.1).

06/03/1999 1999014 Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 Prh PLTSUP Sec:

NRC POS Prh 1C Sec:

Ter.

The radiological respiratory protection program was effectively implemented.

The radiological respiratory protection program was effectively implemented.

Systems were in place to ensure workers were qualified to use respirators, and respiratory protection equipment was in good physical condition, inspected regularly by the licensee and properly maintained and stored. A program for quality testing of station breathing air was established and was properly executed, and sources of supplied breathing air met industry quality standards (Section R1.2).

06/03/1999 1999014 Prl: PLTSUP NRC POS Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 06/03/1999 1999014 Prl: PLTSUP NRC POS Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 Prl: 1C Sec:

Ter.

Prl: 1C Sec:

Ter.

Radiological control of access to high, extreme high and very high radiation areas (HRAs) was effective.

Radiological control of access to high, extreme high and very high radiatiori areas (HRAs) was effective. Station procedures governing HRA access control and posting were developed consistent with technical specifications and regulatory requirements, inciuded administrative mechanisms to ensure proper HRA key and area access control, and were appropriately and consistently implemented (Section R1.3).

Radiological postings were well maintained and accurately reflected the area conditions.

Radiological postings were well maintained and accurately retlected the area conditions.

Radiological housekeeping in the Unit 2 containment building and the auxiliary building was generally good and had improved over the last several months (Section R4.1)

Item Type (Compliance,Followup,Other), From 09/01/1998 To 04/01/2000

Page:

6 of 38 09/30/1999 17:06:47 IR Report 3 Region III COOK Date Source United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSuE MATRIX By Date Functional Template Item Title /

Area ID Type Codes Item DescriPtion 06/03/1999 1999014 Dockets Discussed:

0500031 5 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 Prh PLTSUP Sec:

NRC STR Pri: 1C Sec:

r Ter.

Gaseous and liquid effiuents were adequately controlled, properly sampled, and quantified, and doses were Gaseous and liquid effiuents were adequately controlled, properly sampled, and quantified, and doses were determined consistent with the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM). The total radioactivity released in liquid and gaseous effiuents and associated doses reinained well below regulatory limits. Annual Radioactive Effiuent Release Reports for 1997 and 1998 included all required information, consistent with Regulatory Guide 1.21 (Section R1.1).

06/03/1999 1999014 Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 Prh PLTSUP Sec:

NRC STR Prl: 1C Sec:

Ter:

The program for the use and forthe radiological control of portable (HEPA) filtered ventilation systems and v~

The program for the use and for the radiological control of portable high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filtered ventilation systems and vacuum cleaners and of tools and associated equipment was effective. Averification process implemented by the radiation protection (RP) staff ensured that portable HEPA units were maintained operable and in good physical condition and that the equipment's radiological condition did not preclude its safe use (Section R2.1) 06/03/1999 1999014 Pri: PLTSUP Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 NRC STR Prl: 1C Recent efforts to audit and self-assess the chemistry and RP programs were effective.

Sec; Recent efforts to audit and self-assess the chemistry and RP programs were effective. Programmatic and functional area restart readiness reviews included broad scope, self-critical assessments of the RP and chemistry programs'er:

readiness.

Other recent initiatives included thorough vendor and licensee audits of the radioactive effluents management program and ODCM implementation, both which identified several findings. Assessment and audit findings were entered into the licensee's corrective action process to track resolution and were being evaluated by RP/chemistry management and staff (Section R7.1).

05/27/1999 1999010-01 Pri:

Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 NRC NCV Prl:

SURVEILLANCEPROCEDURE DID NOT DIRECT THKEOPERATORS TO RESTORE THE AES SYSTEM TO A C Sec:

Ter.

05/27/1999 19990104)2 Pri:

Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 NRC NCV Pri:

NINE U-1 MAINSTEAM SAFETY VALVESHAD LIFTSETPOINTS ABOVETHE TS ALLOWEDVALUES Sec:

Ter:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 Terr 05/27/1999 1999010 Prl: ENG NRC POS Prl: 4B Sec:

Sec:

The inspectors observed that engineering personnel provided effective support to maintenance personnel In The inspectors observed that engineering personnel provided effective support to maintenance personnel in an effort to resolve the containment spray system problems in a timely manner. As appropriate, the problem scopes were expanded and/or re-assessed to ensure adequate technical resolutions were achieved.

(Section E7.1)

Item Type (Compliance,Followup,Other), From 09/01/1998 To 04/01/2000

Page:

7 of 38 09/30/1999 17:06:47 IR Report 3 Region III COOK United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Date Functional Date Source Area Template ID Type Codes Item Title Item Description 05/27/1999 1999010 Pri: ENG Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 NRC POS Prl: 4B Sec:

Ter.

Significant progress had been made by the licensee in the Identification of technical Issues related to the Co Significant progress had been made by the licensee in the identification of technical issues related to the Containment Spray System. At the end of the inspection report period, the system remained inoperable pending resolution of the identified issues.

Case Specific Checklist item 10 remained open at the end of the inspection period. (Section E7.1) 05/27/1999 1999010 Pri: MAINT NRC NEG Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 Pri: 2A "

Sec:

Ter.

The licensee's response to the degraded ESW strainers lacked a sense of urgency commensurate their impo~

Plant material condition continued to be identified including problems with the ESW pump discharge strainers.

The licensee's response to the degraded ESW strainers lacked a sense of urgency commensurate with their importance to maintaining reactor core safety.

Following NRC inspector observations on the need to reevaluate the corrective actions on the ESW strainers, the licensee's corrective actions were appropriate.

(Section M2.1) 05/27/1999

'999010 Prl: MAINT NRC Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 POS Pri: 3A Sec:

Ter.

The inspectors concluded that the maintenance and surveillance activities observed were performed in acco The inspectors conduded that the maintenance and surveillance activities observed were performed in accordance with procedures.

The current revision of the appropriate procedures were in use at the work sites, and appropriate radiological protection practices were noted.

(Section M1.1 05/27/1999 1999010 Pri: OPS Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 NRC NEG Pri: 1A Sec:

Tei-.

During a routine tour of the control rooms, the inspectors determined that the control room operators were n During a routine tour of the control rooms, the inspectors determined that the control room operators were not fully cognizant of the status of the configuration of the source range nudear instruments.

The source range instrument alarms were treated inconsistently between the units and the licensed operators were not knowledgeable of the differences or of the reasons for the differences.

(Section 01.2) 05/27/1999 1999010 Pri: OPS Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 NRC NEG Pri: 1A Sec:

Ter.

Several examples were Identified by the inspectors where the licensee failed to consistently respond In a ma Several examples were identified by the inspectors where the licensee failed to consistently respond in a manner commensurate with the potential impact of the degraded condition on the current plant operational condition. The examp'les included degraded and inoperable Essential Service Water puinp discharge strainers, and degraded 4 kV breakers and source range nudear instruments.

Licensee management personnel recognized the need to prioritize degraded material condition issues in order to focus on items important to reactor core safety in Mode 5, but did not always ensure the corrective actions were focused towards Mode 5 items first. (Section 01.2) 05/27/1999 1999010 Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 Prl: OPS Sec:

NRC POS Prl: 1A Sec:

Ter.

Overall, plant operations were performed using approved operating procedures and reflected good operating Overall, plant operations were performed using approved operating procedures and reflected good operating practices.

The inspectors observed an operator conduct in-plant rounds and determined that the operator was knowledl)cable of system status and operation, observed proper radiological controls, and appropriately commumcated with the control room. (Section 01.1) w a.

I u~ ~ i= ll univ Aihor'i Frnm narn111aait Tn rwlntt7nnn

Page:

8 of 38 09/30/1999 17:06:47 IR Report 3 Region III COOK Date Source Functional Area United States Nuclear Regulatory Comniission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Date Template Item Title ID Type Codes Item Description

~ >

05/27/1999 1999010 Pri: PLTSUP NRC NEG Prl: 3A Delay ln the placement of plant equipment Into an appropriate Iay-up condition contributed to the degradatio Sec:

Sec:

Delay in the placement of plant equipment into an appropriate lay-up condition contributed to the degradation of some plant safety and nonsafety-related equipment.

Ter:

Dockets Discussed 05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 Dockets Discussed 05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 05/27/1999 1999010 Prl: PLTSUP NRC POS Prl: 1C The licensee had recognized the need for an effective lay-up program and had taken action to place equipme Sec:

Sec:

The licensee had recognized the need for an effective lay-up program and had taken action to place equipment in lay-up and to develop planning for lay-up during future outages.

(Section R2.1)

Ter.

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 Ter.

05/24/1999 1998%3541 Pri: MAINT Licensee LER Sec:

Sec:

ICE CONDENSER LOWER INLETDOOR SMOCK ABSORBER On July 2, 1998, during an inspection of the condition of Ice Condenser Lower Inlet Door Shock Absorber equipment, damage was identified that potentially impacted the ability of the shock absorbing bumpers to perform their intended functions. Deficient shock absorb/ng bumpers could lead to damage of the lower inlet doors and excess debris in the Containment Recirculation Sump following a postulated accident.

05/21/1999 1999012%1 Pri:

Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 NRC URI Pri:

TRACEABILITYOF NONCONFORMING MCCBS Sec:

Te r.

05/21/1999 1999012 Pri: ENG Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 NRC NEG Prl: 5A Sec:

Ter.

The inspector identified that setpoints listed in the Technical Specifications and in the Updated Final Safety A The inspector identified that setpoints listed in the Technical Specifications and in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report were not referenced or used as guidance in developing design calculations.

This was of concern because the setpoints could be less conservative.

In addition, there was no technical basis or calculations for some of the setpoints (Section E1.2, E1.3 and E1.5).

05/21/1999 1999012 Pri: ENG NRC NEG Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 Prl: 5A Sec:

Ter:

The assessment team system walkdowns were generally effective, however, the CS and the RMR teams had n The assessment team system walkdowns were generally effective, however, the containment spray and the residual heat removal teams had not taken motor nameplate information from the motor operated valves that were within the boundaries of their system.

In addition, the reactor protection system team did not verify that balance-of-plant cables were not routed with redundant channels (Section E1.4 and E1.5).

unen Tnno lf.'nrnnlionno cnunwnn A/horl Cram Oo/n1/1OO/I Tn 04/01/2000

Page:

9 of 38 09/30/1 999 17:08:47 IR Report 3 Region III COOK Date Source Functional Area United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Date Template Item Title ID Type Codes Item Description 4.

Dockets Discussed 05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 1999012 Prl: ENG NRC NEG Prl: 5B The licensee did not have administrative controls to prevent large loads from being connected to the batterie Sec:

Sec:

the licensee did not have administrative controls to prevent large loads from being connected to the batteries in modes five and six. Controls were put in place after the inspection (Section E1.1).

Ter:

Dockets Discussed 05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 05/21/1999 1999012 Pri: FNG NRC POS Pri: SA The licensee's assessments were thorough and focused on design attributes.

Sec:

Sec:

The licensee's assessments were thorough and focused on design attributes.

The assessment teams identified significant design related issues (Sections E1.1, E1.2, E1.3 and E1.4).

Ter:

05/21/1999 1999012 Prh ENG NRC POS Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 Pri: 5A Sec:

Ter.

The electrical safety bus and the 250VDC assessment teams identified a number of significant weaknesses w The electrical safety bus and the 250VDC assessment teams identified a number of significant weaknesses with design calculations.

The teams found that the emergency diesel generator loading calculations had not been updated since 1992 and the DC voltage drop calculations did not determine the available voltage to the end devices.

(Sections E1.1 and E1.2).

'ockets Discussed 05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 Pri: ENG

<<NRC POS Prl: 5A The operability of the station batteries was In question in modes one through four and as a consequence, thi Sec:

Sec:

~

The operability of the station batteries was in question in modes one through four and as a consequence, this was correctly classified as a restart issue.

Ter.

Dockets Discussed 05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 05/21/1999 1999012 Prl: ENG NRC POS Prl: 5B The licensee appropriately characterized open discrepancy reports and corrective actions items as restart or Sec:

Sec:

The licensee appropriately characterized open discrepancy reports and corrective actions items as restart or post restart (Sections E1.1, E1.2 and E1.3).

Ter:

05/05/1999 1999006 Pri: ENG Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 NRC NEG Prl: 1C As a result of observations during the Inspection, though not directly related to the Inspection's objectives, t Sec:

As a result of observations during the inspection, though not directly related to the inspection's objectives, the team noted problems in the areas of management information systems, instrumentation calibration processes, preventive Ter-'aintenance scheduling, suiveillance procedures, and maintenance practices.

Item Type (Compliance,Foilowup,Other)

~ From 09/01/1998 To 04/01/2000

Page:

10 of 38 09/30/1999 17:06:47 IR Report 3 Region III COOK Date Source Functional Area United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Date Template Item Title ID Type Codes Item Description 05/05/1999 1999006 Pri: ENG Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 NRC POS Prl: 1C Sec:

Ter:

implementation of the vertical slice components by the PA audit team resulted in a good examination of the f Although a few weaknesses were observed, implementation of the vertical slice components by the PA audit team resulted in a good examination of the four selected systems and identification of substantive issues.

Dockets Discussed 05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 05/05/1999 1'999006 Prl: ENG NRC POS Prl: 1C The broad-scope horizontal component implemented by the PA audit team resulted In an effective assessme ~

Sec:

Sec:

The broad-scope horizontal component implemented by the PA audit team resulted in an effective assessment of the ESRR implementation and making significant contnbulions to the effectiveness of the program.

Ter.

05/05/1999 1999006 Prl: ENG NRC STR Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 Prl: 1C Sec:

Ter.

The Performance Assurance (PA) department audit plan was well4esigned.

The Performance Assurance (PA) department audit plan was welldesigned.

The plan is sufficiently comprehensive that ifproperly implemented, should provide an accurate assessment of the Expanded System Readiness Review

~ (ESRR) program's implementation.

Dockets Discussed 05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 04/30/1999 1999011 I'ri: ENG NRC NEG Prl: 4B The operability basis for operability evaluations concerning the use ofAnderol 732 to address circuit breake Sec:

Sec:

The operability basis for operability evaluations concerning the use ofAnderol 732 to address circuit breaker hardened grease concerns did not have a sound technical basis.

(Section E2.2)

Ter:

04/30/1999 1999011 Pri: ENG Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 04/30/1999 1999011 Pri: ENG Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 NRC NEG Prl:.4B A number of breakers were not appropriately prioritized for refurbishment.

Sec:

A number ofbreakers were not appropriately prioritized for refurbishment.

(Section E2.3)

Ter:

NRC

~

POS Pri: 1C The planned long-term engineering-related corrective actions to address the motor control center failures we Sec:

The planned tong-term engineering-related corrective actions to address the motor control center failures were thorough and comprehensive.

Ter:

num Tv'r.nmnlisnr>,Foiiowuo.Other). From 09/01/1998 To 04/01/2000

1

Page:

11 of 38 09/30/1 999 17:06:47 IR Report 3 Region III COOK Date Source Functional Area United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Date Template Item Title ID Type Codes Item Description Dockets Discussed 05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 Pri: ENG NRC POS Prl: 4B There was reasonable assurance that the electrical distribution systems necessary for cold shutdown plant o Sec:

Sec:

There was reasonable assurance that the electrical distribution systems necessaiy for cold shutdown plant operation were capable of performing their function. (Section E2.2)

Ter.

04/23/1999 199900941 Pri:

Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 NRC NCV Pri:

FAILURETO IMPLEMENTADEQUATE DESIGN CONTROLS FOR THE UNIT 1 SG TUB PLUGGING ANDSLEEV Sec:

Ter.

04/23/1999 199900943 Pri:

Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 NRC NCV Pri:

FAILURETO FOLLOWTHE OPERABILITYDETERMINATIONPROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS FOR THE UNIT Sec:

Ter.

04/23/1999 1999009-04 Pri:

Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 NRC NCV Pri:

FAILURETO FOLLOWTHE OPERABILITYDETERMINATIONPROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS FOR THE CONC Sec:

Ter.

04/23/1999 1999009 Pri: ENG NRC NEG Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 04/23/1999 1999009 Pri: ENG NRC NEG Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 Pri: 3A Sec:

Ter.

Pri: 3A Sec:

Ter:

A change In the design fouling factor for the Unit 1 steam generator U-tubes had never been formally reviewe The inspectors identified that a change in the design fouling factor for the Unit 1 steam generator U-tubes had never been formally reviewed/ evaluated by the licensee nor incorporated into the updated final safety evaluation report Several examples of operability determinations that contained poor quality engineering assessments The inspectors identified several examples of operability determinations that contained poor quality engineering assessments.

These examples combined with the large backlog (in excess of 500 items) of operability questions which have not received timely engineering resolution, demonstrated poor engineering support for the operability determination process Item Type (Compliance,Foilowup,Other)

~ From 09/01/1998 To 04/01/2000

Page:

12 of 38 09/30/1 999 17:06:47 IR Report 3 Region III COOK United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Date Date Source Functional Area Template ID Type Codes Item Title Item Description 04/23/1999 1999009 Pri: ENG NRC POS Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 Pri: 3A Sec:

Ter.

Scope of the planned review areas for the reactor coolant system was broad.

The inspectors considered the scope of the planned review areas for the reactor coolant system to be broad and consistent with the purpose of the review effort to confirm the performance of system safety functions 04/23/1999 1999009 Prl: ENG, NRC POS Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 050M316 COOK 2 Pri: 3A Sec:

~ Ter.

Control room Instrumentatton distribution system assessments were thorough and focused on design attribu~

The control room instrumentation distribution system assessments were thorough and focused on design attributes and the control room instrumentation distribution system review team identified a number of significant design related issues.

04/23/1999

~

1999009 Prl: ENG NRC Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 POS Prl: 4B Sec:

Ter.

Breadth and depth of material reviewed forthe reactor coolant system assessments was generally appropria The breadth and depth of material reviewed for the reactor coolant system assessments was generally appropriate and the reactor coolant system review team was effective at identification of substantive design issues potentially impacting system safety functions.

04/23/1999 1999009 Pri: ENG NRC STR Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05M0316 COOK 2 Pri: 1C Sec:

Ter:

The System Indexed data base system represented a powerful resource tool.

The system indexed data base system represented a powerful resource tool that enabled the expanded system readiness review teams to review an single integrated list of system deficiencies, work or modifications and as such, represented an essential element for effective system reviews 04/23/1999 1999009 Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 Pri: ENG Sec:

NRC STR Prl: 1C Sec:

Ter:

The system readiness review board members followed a structured review process that offered a consistent The system readiness review board members followed a structured review process that offered a consistent approach for effectively reviewing the larqe amount of information contained in a typical expanded system readiness review system report. The auxiliary building ventilation systems expanded system readiness review report presentation demonstrated the team manager's thorough understanding of the system under review and of the relative significance of the system findings and assessments 04/23/1999 1999009 Prl: ENG Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 NRC STR Pri: 3A Sec:

Ter:

The licensee subsequently suspended the systems scheduled for system readiness review board review and The inspectors were concerned that performing significant additional licensing basis reviews (e.g. review of the historical design and licensing basis notebooks) following the system readiness review board approval process could change the system assessments and serve to "bypass" the system readiness review board review process step.

The hcensee subsequently suspended the systems scheduled for system readiness review board review and approval pending the receipt and review of the historical design and licensing basis notebooks by the expanded system readiness review teams.

Inspectors considered this action to demonstrate a prompt effective management response to this concern Item Type (Compliance,Followup,Other), From 09/01/1998 To 04/01/2000

Page:

13 of 38 09/30/1999 17:06:47 IR Report 3 Region III COOK Date Source Functional Area United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Date Template Item Title ID Type Codes Item Description Dockets Discussed 05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 04/23/1999 1999009 Pri: ENG NRC WK Pri: 2B The expanded system readiness review teams were being adversely affected by the ongoing problems.

Sec:

Sec:

The expanded system readiness review teams were being adversely affected by the ongoing problems created by the disparity of system designators used in system indexed data base system and other plant data bases.

Ter:

04/23/1999 1999009 Pri: ENG Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 NRC WK Pri: 3A Sec:

Ter:

Failure to Identify nonconservative assumptions for station blackout reactor coolant inventory.

However, the failure of this team to identify nonconservative assumptions for station blackout reactor coolant inventory calculations demonstrated a lapse in the technical rigor for this assessment and indicated a need for more focus on the quality of the review effort 04/23/1999 1999009 Pri: ENQ Sec:

Dockets Discussedi 05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 NRC WK Prl: 3A Lack of receipt/review of historical design and licensing data (deliverable 2 notebooks) had a potential geher Sec:

the lack of receipt/review of historical design and licensing data (deliverable 2 notebooks) had a potential generic impact on the quality of the ongoing expanded system readiness review team assessments Ter:

04/23/1999 1999009 Prl: ENQ Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 04/16/1999 1999004 Pri: ENG Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 NRC WK NRC MISC Prl: 4B Sec:

Ter:

Pri: 4B Sec:

Ter:

Lack ofcontrol of indices of vend or analysis could adversely impact the expanded system readiness review The inspectors were concerned that lack of control of Indices of vendor analysis could adversely impact the expanded system readiness review team assessments which rely on the material in these index lists to identify the up-Irate source review materials During this Inspection period, the licensee's staff continued with the discovery phase of the Expanded Syste During this inspection period, the licensee's staff continued with the discovery phase of the Expanded System Readiness Reviews (ESRRs). The ESRRs comprised a significant portion of the licensee's restart effort. In accordance with the NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0350 Inspection Plan, the NRC established an inspection team to provide oversight of the ESRR process.

The NRC oversight team willdocument their findings in a separate inspection report. (Section E1.1) 04/16/1999 1999004 Pri: MAINT NRC NEG Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 Prl: 2B Sec:

Ter:

The inspectors Identified multiple examples of deficient maintenance procedures and job orders revealing a The inspectors identified multiple examples of deficient maintenance procedures and job orders revealing a potential programmatic weakness in this area.

These maintenance procedures and job orders, which were used for performing safety-related maintenance activities, allowed workers to omit steps which they determined were not necessary without additional review and approval.

(Section M3.1)

Item Type (Compliance,Followup,Other), From 09/01/1 998 To 04/01/2000

Page:

14 of 38 09/30/1999 17:06:47 IR Report 3 Region III COOK United States Nuclear Regulatory Commis'sion PLANT ISSuE MATRIX By Date

Date, Source Functional Template Area ID Type Codes Item Title Item Description 04/16/1999 1999004 Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 Prl: MAINT Sec:

,NRC POS Prl: 3A Sec:

Ter:

The inspectors concluded that the observed work activities were performed in accordance with approved pro The inspectors concluded that the observed work activities were performed in accordance with approved procedures; the current revision of the procedures were in use at the work sites; and proper work safety and radiological protection practices were used.

The inspectors also observed a good questioning attitude on the part of.

the workers when problems were identified during maintenance activities. In particular, the inspectors noted two examples where the workers and supervisors expanded their investigation scope to include related areas not.directly affected by the identified problem. (Section M1.1) 04/16/1999 1999004 Prl: MAINT NRC POS Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 Prl: 3A Sec:

Ter:

The licensee's plan for repairing the Unit 2 chemical and volume control system cross-tie valves appeared to The licensee's plan for repairing the Unit 2 chemical and volume control system cross-tie valves appeared to include appropriate contingency actions for removing and replacing the valves ifrepairs were not possible.

While the licensee experienced minor personnel errors and unforeseen material condition issues which delayed the completion of the maintenance activities, the valves were successfully repaired.

(Section M2.1) 04/16/1999 1999004 Pri: OPS Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 04/16/1999 1999004 Pri: OPS Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 NRC NEG NRC NEG Pi'I: 1A Sec:

Ter:

Prl: 1C Sec:

Ter:

The Inspectors identifie that the licensee did not recognize that reactor coolant system temperature change The inspectors identified that the licensee did not recognize that reactor coolant system temperature changes while in cold shutdown also resulted in reactivity changes.

In response to this issue, the licensee identified that several previously performed plant activities had the potential to heat up the reactor coolant system and add positive reactivity, which was prohibited by Technical Specifications since all four emergency diesel generators were inoperable.

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's evaluation of these occurrences and concluded that the significance of performing these activities was negligible since these activities resulted in no measurable reactivity changes.

(Section 01.2)

The licensee's procedural controls on the use of overtime were weak. Specifically, the plant operations polic The licensee's procedural controls on the use of overtime were weak. Specifically, the plant operations policy procedure did not provide sufficient guidance on the use of time sheets by plant personnel; consequently, the licensee had difficultyassessing compliance with the plant overtime policy. One minor violation was identified for a licensed operator exceeding Technical Specification requirements on overtime. (Section 07.2) 04/16/1999 1999004 Pri: OPS Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 NRC POS Prl: 1A Sec:

Ter.

The operating crews demonstrated a conservative decision-making philosophy by stopping two surveillance The operating crews demonstrated a conservative decision-making philosophy by stopping two surveillance test procedures following the identification of problems.

(Section 01.1) 04/16/1999 1999004 Pri: PLTSUP NRC NEG Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 Pri: 1C Sec:

Ter:

The inspectors identlfied two minor problems with the implementation of the radiological protection program The inspectors identified two minor problems with the implementation of the radiological protection program outside the plant protected area.

The inspectors found a radiation area sign on a publicly accessible beach just outside the perimeter fence. Additionally, the steam generator storage building, used for storing the removed Unit 2 steam generators, was cluttered with tools and work debris.

No uncontrolled releases of radioactive material were identified. (Section R1)

Item Tvpe (Compliance,Followup,Other), From 09/01/1 998 To 04/01/2000

Page:

15 of 38 09/30/1 999 17:06:47 IR Report 3 Region III COOK United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Date Date Source Functional Area Template ID Type Codes Item Title Item Description 04/16/1999 1999004-01 Prl: OPS Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 NRC NCV Prl:5C Sec:

Ter:

Inappropriate Condition Report Categorization Constituted a Missed Opportunity to Evaluate Significant Con Case Specific Checklist Item 2A, "Failure to Promptiy Identify and Evaluate Conditions Adverse to Quality." The inspectors concluded that the licensee inappropriately categorized two condition reports documenting maintenance and surveillance test procedure deficiencies as conditions adverse to quality rather than as significant conditions adverse to quality. A Non<ited Violation was issued for the failure to determine the root cause of and implement corrective actions to preclude the repetition of significant conditions adverse to quality. The NRC's assessment of the licensee's effectiveness in addressing this case specific checklist item willcontinue as part of oversight of the licens'ee's restart effort. (Section 07.1) 04/16/1999 199900442 Pri: MAINT Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 NRC NCV Pri: 2B Sec:

Ter.

Failure of Surveillance Test Procedures to Contain Instructions Appropriate to the Circumstances Case Specific Checklist Item 1A, "Inadequate Instructions in Surveillance Tests." The inspectors concurred with the licensee's conclusion that three ofthe four surveillance test procedures, which were utilized to demonstrate operability of the safety-related centrifugal charging pumps, contained inadequate instructions to operate the pumps safely due to deficiencies in the procedure revision process.

A Non-Cited Violation was issued for the failure to have

. procedures appropriate to the circumstances.

The NRC's assessment of the licensee's effectiveness in addressing this case specific checklist item willcontinue as part of oversight of the licensee's restart effort. (Section M3.2) 04/16/1999 1999004-04 Pri: ENG Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000316 COOK 2 NRC NCV Pri: 4B Sec:

Ter:

Failure to Perform a Safety Evaluation Case Specific Checklist Item 4A, "Failure to Perform Safety Evaluations or Safety Evaluation Screenings."

A safety evaluation screening performed in support of a change to a surveillance procedure did not identify that the procedure change resulted in operation of the plant other than as described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report.

~Additionally, the licensee's use of 10 CFR Part 50.59 safety evaluation screenings appeared inconsistent.

A Non-Cited Violation of 10 CFR Part 50.59 was identified for the failure to perform a safety evaluation for the procedure change.

The NRC's assessment of the licensee's effectiveness in addressing this case specific checklist item willcontinue as part of oversight ofthe licensee's restart effort.

04/16/1999 1999008 Pri: PLTSUP Licensee Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

0500031 5 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 NEG Prl: 1C Sec:

Ter.

The overall effectivenes of EP training was adequate.

Two Non-Cited Violations were issued related to annu The overall effectiveness of EP training was adequate.

Two Non-Cited Violations were issued related to annual retraining, training drills, and the semi-annual augmentation drilLThese issues had been appropriately identified and tracked.

Corrective actions were initiated and completed in a timely manner.

(Section P5) 04/16/1999 1999008 Prl: PLTSUP NRC POS Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 04/16/1999 1999008 Pri: PLTSUP NRC POS Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 Pri:1C Sec:

Ter.

Pri: 1C Sec:

Ter:

The emergency implementing procedures reviewed were detailed. The Emergency Plan Administrative Track The emergency Implementing procedures reviewed were detailed. The Emergency Plan Administrative Tracking System (EPATS) was an adequate method to document, track, and dose EP issues.

The EPATS was in the process of being replaced by the Electronic Corrective Action Program.

(Section P3)

Management support and attention to the program appeared to be appropriate.

Management involvement w Management support and attention to the program appeared to be appropriate.

Management involvement was indicated with the relocation to a new Emergency Operations Facility and upgrades in the Operations Staging Area.

The increased managerial attention and specific objectives for areas of improvement for the EP program appeared to be an affective enhancement.

(Section P6)

Item Tvoe /Comoliance.Followuo.Other), From 09/01/1998 To 04/01/2000

Page:

16 of 38 09/30/1 999 17:06:47 IR Report 3 Region III COOK United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Date Date Source Functional Area Template ID Type Codes Item Title Item Description Dockets Discussed 05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 04/16/1999 1999008 Prl: PLTSUP NRC POS Prl: 1C Sec:

Sec:

Ter:

The licensee's 1998 and 1999 EP program audits provided good evaluations of the program. The audit satisf The licensee's 1998 and 1999 EP program audits provided good evaluations of the program. The audit satisfied the requirements of 10 Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(t). The performance assurance audits were of good scope and depth.

(Section P7) 04/16/1999 1999008 Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 Prl: PLTSUP Sec:

NRC POS Prl: 2A Sec:

Ter:

Emergency response facilities were well maintained and in very good material condition, with the exception o~

Emergency response facilities were well maintained and in very good material condition, with the exception of the air ~

conditioning umts in the TSC. The issue was appropriately identified, tracked, and dispositioned.

AIIemergency equipment demonstrated was verified operab'ie.

The prompt alert and notification system sirens were well maintained.

Good identification and response was observed for the loss of offsite telephone communications in the EOF. (Section P2) 04/16/1999 1999004 Pri: MAINT NRC POS Sec: ENG Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 03/26/1999 1999003 Prl: ENG NRC NEG Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

0500031 5 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 Pri: 3A Sec:

Ter:

Prl:4C Sec:

Ter:

The licensee appropriately expanded their piping cleanliness inspection when foreign material was Identified The licensee appropriately expanded their piping cteanliness inspection when foreign material was identified in the chemical and volume control system cross-tie header.

In addition, the licensee's engineering staff appropriately questioned the possibility of foreign material entering other safety systems from the refueling water storage tanks.

(Section M2.1)

Preparation steps for the expanded system readiness review waikdowns did not require the teams to review Preparation steps for the expanded system readiness review walkdowns did not require the teams to review prior modifications. This was considered a potential weakness in the program because of previously identified programmatic deficiencies in the design control process.

(Section E4.1) 03/26/1999 1999003 Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 Pri: ENG Sec:

NRC NEG Prl: 5A Sec: 5C Ter:

Examples were identified where Issues could not be consistently dispositioned due to erroneous or missing Examples were identified where issues could not be consistently dispositioned due to erroneous or missing information in the electronic database, or because limited or incorrect problem descriptions were documented in condition reports.

In particular, design requirements were not considered during one condition report disposition, that resulted in an inspector-prompted concern with improper instrument line slopes.

Collectively, these issues could result in problems not being properly resolved or prioritized. (Section E3.1) 03/26/1999 1999003 Prl: ENG NRC POS Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 Prl: 4B Sec:

Ter:

The licensee was effectively Identifying system deficiencies through the expanded system readiness review The licensee was effectively identifying system deficiencies through the expanded system readiness review process.

Programmatic and technical concerns that were identified Included cable separation, electrical breaker refurbishr/rent, and seismic mounting. The threshold for identification of problems was conservatively tow, with 80 to 100 condition reports per day being initiated by the expanded system readiness review teams.

(Section E3.1) uom Tv'r.nmnlinnnn Cnrlnwun Other'I. From 09/01/1998 To 04/01/2000

't

Page:

17 of 38 09/30/1 999 17:06:47 IR Report 3 Region III COOK United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Date Date Functional Source Area Template ID Type Codes Item Title Item Description 03/26/1999 1999003 Pri: ENG Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 NRC POS Pri: 4C Sec:

Ter:

Overall, the system walkdowns appeared effective at identifying design and configuration deficiencies, as ex Overall, the system walkdowns appeared effective at identifying design and configuration deficiencies, as exemplified by the spray header blockage concern.

Most walkdown teams used comprehensive checklists to verify design parameters such as electrical separation, protective relay settings, transformer tap settings, and grounding.

However, isolated weaknesses were identified with specific walkdowns which initiallyappeared to focus on matenel condition instead of design attributes.

(Section E4.1) 03/26/1999 1999003 Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 Pri: ENG Sec:

NRC POS Pri: 4C Sec:

Ter.

Management maintained good oversight of the expanded system readiness review process and was appropr ~

Management maintained good oversight of the expanded system readiness review process and was appropriately addressing issues.

The System Readiness Review Board provided technical rigor and consistency of approach for the expanded system readiness review team products, and identified generic issues of concern.

In addition, after adjusting their participation in system walkdowns, the Performance Assurance group maintained an active and independent oversight role in the expanded system readiness review process.

(Section E7.1)

Dockets Discussed 05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 03/19/1999 1999005 Pri: PLTSUP NRC NEG Pri: 1C Sec:

Sec:

Ter:

Deficiencies were identified with the level of detail in the licensee's PCP concerning 10 CFR 61.56 waste char Deficiencies were identified with the level of detail in the licensee's PCP concerning 10 CFR 61.56 waste characteristics, and both the PCP and the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) were not fullyconsistent with current onsite waste processing activities (Section R1.1).

03/19/1999 1999005 Prl: PLTSUP NRC NEG Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 Pri:1C Sec:

Ter.

The program for classifying waste streams and scaling difficultto measure radio-nuclides was implemented The p/ogram for classifying waste streams and scaling difficultto measure radio-nuclides was implemented in accordance with station procedures and industry guidance.

However, the procedure for the scaling factor program was not sufficiently developed to ensure consistent and appropriate implementation of the program (Section R1.2).

03/19/1999 1999005 Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 Prl: PLTSUP Sec:

NRC POS Prl:1C Sec:

Ter:

Direct licensee oversight ofvendor resin dewatering activities and extensive supervisory involvement in rad Direct licensee oversight of vendor resin dewatering activities and extensive supervisory involvement in radwaste processing ensured effective implementation of the radwaste management program. Wet solid wastes were processed in accordance with the Process Control Program (PCP) and implementing procedures, and dewatered waste streams were properly sampled and verified to ensure that regulatory limits for free standing liquid were met (Section R1.1).

03/19/1999 1999005 Pri: PLTSUP NRC POS Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 Prl: 1C Sec:

Ter:

The radwaste packaging and transportation program was effectively Implemented. Shipments of radwaste we The radwaste packaging and transportation program was effectively implemented. Shipments of radwaste were appropriately classified, vehicle and package surveys were performed as required, and manifests were completed in accordance with regulatory requirements (Section R1.2).

Item Tv'Cnrhnii~na!,Foliewuo,Other). From 09/01/1998 To 04/01/2000

Page:

18 of 38 09/30/1999 17:06:47 IR Report 3 Region III COOK Date Source Functional Area United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Date Template Item Title ID Type Codes Item Description 03/19/1999

1999005, Prl: PLTSUP NRC POS Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 Pri: 1C Sec:

Ter.

The training provided to licensee staff Involved In the preparation and shipment of radioactive materials satis The training provided to licensee staff involved in the preparation and shipment of radioactive materials satisfied Department ofTransportation requirements and imparted an adequate level of knowledge to ensure effective program implementation (Section R5.1).

03/19/1999 1999005 Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 Pri: PLTSUP Sec:

NRC POS Prl: 1C The audit and selfassessment programs for the packaging and transportation of radioactive material forthe.

Sec:

The audit and self-assessment programs for the packaging and transportation of radioactive material for the 10 CFR 71 Quality Assurance program and for the processing of radwaste were effectively implemented.

Audits and T<<:

assessments were generally properly focused and were of sufficient scope and depth to assess program performance.

Identified deficiencies were placed into the licensee's corrective action process for resolution (Section R7.1).

03/02/1999 1999001 Prl: FNG NRC Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 POS I'rl:4C The inspectors concluded that the Engineering Department Leadership Plan established a framework for per Sec:

The inspectors conduded that the Engineering Department Leadership Plan established a framework for performance improvements, and ifproperly implemented, should result in the engineering department being ready to Ter:

support plant restart.

Dockets Discussed 05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 03/02/1999 1999001 I'rl:MAINT NRC POS Prl: 2A The licensee conservatively declared all four emergency diesel generators inoperable due a question regardi Sec:

Sec:

The licensee conservatively declared all four emergency diesel generators inoperable due a question regarding the seismic qualification of the General Electric HFA safety-related relays installed in the emergency diesel generator Ter:

circuits.

03/02/1999 1999001 Prl: MAINT NRC POS

.Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 Pri: 2B Sec:

Ter:

Observed maintenance activities were performed In accordance with approved procedures.

The inspectors n Observed maintenance activities were performed in accordance with approved procedures.

The inspectors noted that the maintenance personnel performing the work activities were knowledgeable of their assigned tasks and utilized appropriate radiation protection work practices.

In addition, the inspectors observed frequent management oversight ofwork in progress.

03/02/1999 1999001 Poh MAINT NRC POS Sec:

r Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 Prl: 2B The Maintenance Proficiency Evaluation training program appeared to be thorough and focused on improvin Sec:

The Maintenance Proficiency Evaluation training program appeared to be thorough and focused on improving the performance of both the maintenance workers and supervisors.

Ter.

item Tvoe (Comoliance.Followuo.Other).

From 09/01/1 998 To 04/01/2000

Page:

19 of 38 09/30/1999 17:08:47 IR Report 3 Region III COOK Date Source Functional Area United States Nuclear Regulat'ory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Date Template Item Title ID Type Codes Item Description 03/02/1999 1999001 Prl: ppS Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 NRC NEG Pri: 1A Sec: 2A Ter:

Operators failed to recognize Indications of cavitatlon in the residual heat removal system until prompted by Operators failed to recognize indications of cavitation in the residual heat removal system until prompted by the inspectors.

The inspectors also noted that the residual heat removal system cavitation and vibration on both units appeared to be recurring, long-standing deficiencies.

The licensee subsequently took prompt action to assess possible degradation of the system and formed a multi-disciplined project team to assess the operability of the.

system.

O3/O2/1999 1999OO1 Prl: ppS Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 NRC NEG Prl: 1C Sec:

Ter:

The inspectors concluded that several contractors working for the licensing department exceeded the workin~

The inspectors concluded that several contractors working for the licensing department exceeded the working hour limitations specified by Plant Manager's Instruction 4010, "Plant Operations Policy," Revision 12. No violations of regulatory requirements occurred since the contractors were performing nonsafety-related activities.

03/02/1999 1999001 Prl: ppS Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 NRC POS Prl: 1A Establishment of the core safety priorities list was a positive step taken by the licensee to focus attention on Sec:

Establishment of the core safety priorities list was a positive step taken by the licensee to focus attention on the issues that posed the greatest risk to core safety.

Ter:

03/02/1999 1999001 Prl: ppS Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 NRC POS Pri: 1A Sec:

Ter.

Overall operator performance during this inspection report period was characterized by effective procedural Overall operator performance during this inspection report period was characterized by effective procedural compliance and conservative decision making. On two occasions operators stopped evolutions in progress until abnormal conditions could be resolved.

O3/O2/1999 1999OO1 Pri: ppS Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 NRC POS Pri: 1A Sec:

Ter:

Control room operators alertly Identified a slow level increase in the Unit 1 volume control tank and took app Control room operators alertly identified a slow level increase in the Unit 1 v'olume control tank and took appropriate action to identify and correct the source of the in-leakage.

In addition, the inspectors concurred with the licensee's conclusion that the volume control tank in-leakage resulted from the failure to fullydose the residual heat reinoval to letdown isolation valve following the previous operation.

03/02/1999 1999001 Prl: ppS Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 NRC POS Prl: 1C The Operations Department Leadership Plan established a framework for performance improvements, and if Sec:

The Operations Department Leadership Plan established a framework for performance improvements, and if properly implemented, should result in the operations department being ready to support plant restart.

Ter:

Item Type (Compliance,Followup,Other), From 09/01/1998 To 04/01/2000

1

~

Page:

20 of 38 09/30/1999 17:08:47 IR Report 3 Region III COOK United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Date Date Source Functional Area Template ID Type Codes Item Title Item Description 03/02/1999 1999001 Prl: OPS NRC POS Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 Prl:1C Sec:

Ter:

The Nuclear Safety and Design Review Committee (NSDRC) performed adequate oversight of the technical is The Nuclear Safety and Design Review Committee (NSDRC) performed adequate oversight of the technical issues discussed.

The inspectors also concurred with the hcensee's conclusion that the NSDRC meetings were of mixed quality and not always effective. In addition, the inspectors concluded that the licensee's corrective actions following the NSDRC meeting 188 appeared to be effective in improving the quality of the subsequent NSDRC meeting.

Dockets Discussed 05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 03/02/1999 1999001 Pri: PLTSUP NRC POS Prl: 1C Sec:

Sec:

Ter:

During normal resident inspection activities, routine observations were conducted ln the area ofsecurity and ~

During normal resident inspection activities, routine observations were conducted in the area of secudty and safeguards, fire protection, and health physics activities. No discrepancies were noted.

03/02/1999 1999001 02 Prl: OPS NRC Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 NCV Prh 1C Sec:

Ter:

Equipment Tagging Procedure Not Appropriate to the Circumstances The inspectors identified that the licensee's ciearance permit procedures did not address the tagging of all locations where out-of-service equipment could be operated.

As allowed by the procedures, the operations department practice was to tag only the control room and local hand switches for safety-related equipinent.

The inspectors concluded that the licensee's tagging procedures and practices did not ensure worker safety during work on out-of-service equipment.

One Non-Cited Violation was issued for the failure to have a procedure appropriate to the circumstances.

. 03/O2/1999 1999OOI-O2 Pri: OPS Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 NRC NEG Prl: 1A Sec:

Ter:

One notable example of poor operator control and monitoring of plant equipment occurred. Specifically, a n One notable example of poor operator control and monitoring of plant equipment occurred.

Specifically, a non-licensed operator failed to meet management expectations regarding operation of an emergency diesel generator starting air compressor.

03/02/1999 1999001 03 Prl: MAINT Licensee NCV Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 Prh 2B Sec:

Ter:

Failure to Perform Technical Specification Surveiliance Test for Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valve Following the identification of a missed pressurizer power operated relief valve surveillance test, the licensee's review of scheduled and event-initiated surveiHances identified that some required Mode 5 suiveillances were not being performed. The licensee also identified several weaknesses in the tracking processes to ensure that Mode 5 suiveillances were properly completed.

The inspectors concluded that the licensee's efforts to identify missed surveiilances were comprehensive and methodical.

03/02/1999 1999001 Prl: OPS Sec: ENG Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK2 NRC POS Prl: 1A Sec: 4B Ter:

In response to weaknesses previously identified with the operability determination process by both licensee In response to weaknesses previously identified with the operability determination process by both licensee and NRC personnel, the licensee instituted a number of short and long.term corrective actions.

The inspectors concluded that the licensee',s corrective actions were timely and appeared to be effective in improving both the quality and the timeliness of operability determinations.

Item Type (Compliance,Foilowup,Other), From 09/01/1998 To 04/01/2000

Page:

21 of 38 09/30/1999 17:06:47 IR Report 3 Region III COOK Date Source Functional Area United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Date Template Item Title ID Type Codes Item Description Dockets Discussed 05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 02/19/1999 1999002 Pri: ENG NRC NEG Pri: 4C The results of the diesel generator walkdown for the diesel generator were acceptable; however, the strategy Sec:

Sec:

The results of the diesel generator walkdown for the diesel generator were acceptable; however, the strategy for the walkdown was not documented and the walkdown did not include the control room.

Ter.

02/19/1999 1999002 Prl: ENG Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 NRC POS Pri: 4C The inspectors concluded that weaknesses Identified ln the original system readiness review process had be~

Sec:

The Inspectors concluded that weaknesses identified in the original system readiness review process had been corrected with one exception.

The licensee had not required the expanded system readiness review (ESRR) teams Ter:

to consider the Individual Plant Examination (IPE) in selecting system attributes for review in the original version of the ESRR procedure.

The licensee subsequently revised the ESRR procedure to include the use ofthe IPE.

Dockets Discussed 05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 02/19/1999 1999002 Pri: ENG NRC POS Prl: 4C The ESRR review scope was considered extensive and represented a substantial Improvement over the origi Sec:

Sec:

The expanded system readiness review (ESRR) scope was considered extensive and represented a substantial improvement over the original system readiness review (SRR) scope completed in early 1998.

Ter.

Dockets Discussed 05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 02/19/'l999 1999002 Prl: ENG NRC POS Prl: 4C The ESRR procedure described a systematic approach that was a substantial improvement over the original Sec:

Sec:

The expanded system readiness review procedure described a systematic approach that was a substantial improvement over the original safety readiness review guidelines completed in 1998.

Ter:

02/19/1999 1999002 Prl: ENG NRC POS Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 Pri:4C Sec:

Ter.

The data base systems used by the licensee Included a compiled data resource and an electronic data manag The data base systems used by the licensee included a compiled data resource and an electronic data management system that provided an excellent and efficient method for the expanded system readiness review teams to implement the reviews of their systems.

02/19/1999

-1999002 Prl: ENG NRC Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 POS Prl: 4C The selection of experienced personnel to staff the ESRR teams, the focused approach on identification of is Sec:

The selection of experienced personnel to staff theexpanded system readiness review teams, the focused approach on identification of issues and the licensee's decision not to project a restart date demonstrated the licensee's Ter.

commitment to an effective effort.

Item Type (Compliance,Foliowup,Other), From 09/01/1 998 To 04/01/2000

Page:

22 of 38 09/30/1999 17:06:47 IR Report 3 Region III COOK Functional Date Source United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Date Template Item Title ID Type Codes Item Description 02/19/1999 1999002 Pri: ENG Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 02/19/1999 1999002 Prl: ENG Sec:

Oockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 NRC

- POS NRC POS Prl:4C Sec:

Ter:

Prl:4C Sec:

Ter:

The ESRR training had been effectively implemented.

The inspectors concluded that the expanded system readiness review (ESRR) training had been effectively implemented.

The scope and depth of the ESRR training was adequate for the teams to perform their assigned responsibilities.

However, the onginal scope of the ESRR training did not include training for all team members pertaining to 10 CFR 50.59, operability determinations and system design basis.

This was subsequently corrected, but indicated a weakness in the scope of the original training.

The system readiness review board consisted of knowledgeable individuals. The board possessed a good fo~

The system readiness review board consisted of knowledgeable individuals. The board possessed a good focus on safety.

In general, extensive management involvement was not needed to ensure consistent application of the expanded system readiness review process with one exception.

Increased management oversight was needed in the development of the system assessment matrix.

02/19/1999 1999002 Pri: ENG Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 NRC POS Prl: 4C Sec:

Ter:

The performance assurance department was actively engaged In oversight of the expanded system readines The performance assurance department was actively engaged in oversight of the expanded system readiness review (ESRR) process.

The system readiness review oversight plan described oversight of the ESRR process and provided for prompt feedback.

02/19/1999 1999002-01 Prl: ENG Licensee NCV Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 Pri: 4C FAILURETO ESTABLISH AN NSSS VENDOR RECONTACT PROGRAM Sec:

A non-cited violation was identified concerning the failure of the licensee to establish a recontact program for the nuclear steam system supply vendors that supplied safety related plant equipment (Section E7.1.b.1).

Ter:

01/13/1999 1998027 Oockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2

~

Pri: MAINT Sec:

NRC NEG Prl: 2A Sec:

Ter:

NRC inspectors and licensee personnel identified examples of poor material condition.

Based upon an assessment of licensee corrective action requests, condition reports,'contingency action logs, and in plant observations, the inspectors concluded that the material condition of several safety-related systems had dedined during the forced outage.

The delay in addressing equipment problems was due, in part, to the licensee's focus on corrective actions to address programmatic issues that are a part of the licensee/s restart plan. (Section M2.1)

Dockets Discussed 05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 01/13/1999 1998027 Pri: MAINT NRC POS Prl: 3A OBSERVED MAINTENANCEACTIVITIESWERE PERFORMED WELL Sec:

Sec:

Observed maintenance activities were performed effectively in accordance with documented work instructions.

(Section M1.1)

Ter:

Item Type (Compliance,Followup,Other), From 09/01/1998 To 04/01/2000

Page:

23 of 38 09/30/1 999 17:06:47 IR Report 3 Region III COOK Date Source Functional Area United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Date Template Item Title ID Type Codes Item Description Dockets Discussed 05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 prl: OPS Licensee NEG Prl: 1C LARGE BACKLOGOF UNREVIEWED CONDITION REpORTS Sec:

Sec:

The licensee identified that there was a large backlog of unreviewed condition reports. The licensee's corrective action program is undergoing major assessment and corrective actions. The improvement plan includes actions to Tei".

address problems with the condition report review process.

(Section 07.1) 01/13/1999 1998027 Pri: OpS Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 NRC NEG Pri: 1C Sec:

Ter.

The licensee had no owner for plant winterization.

The licensee did not have a process for ensuring that the plant winter preparations were integrated across organizational boundaries.

The lack of integration contributed to the inadequate preparation for cold weather, especially considering the lack of process heat in the buildings due to the current shutdown condition. Cold weather preparations were untimely and severe cold weather caused multiple challenges to the plant operators.

(Section 01.3)

Dockets Discussed 05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 01/13/1999 1998027 Prl: PLTSUP NRC POS Prl: 1C During normal resident inspection activities, routine observations were conducted in the area of security and Sec:

Sec:

During normal resident inspection activities, routine observations were conducted in the area of security and safeguards, fire protection, and health physics activities. No discrepancies were noted.

Tef:

. 01/13/1999

'1998027%1 Pri: ENG Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 NRC NCV Prl: 4A Sec:4B Ter:

FAILURETO UPDATE PLANT DRAWINGS IN A TIMELYMANNER The licensee identified that following modifications not all drawings had been updated in a timely manner.

There were approximately 6,000 drawings in the backlog awaiting revision. The licensee had initiated corrective actions to ensure that the drawings were updated in a more timely fashion and to ensure that the drawings needed for day-today operation and maintenance of the facilitywere accurate.

01/13/1999 199802742 Prl: ENG Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 NRC VIOIV pri: 2A Sec: 3A Ter:

Engineering procedure guidance concerning the conduct of operability evaluations was not followed.

Engineering procedure guidance concerning the conduct of operability evaluations was not being followed. One violation for failing to followa procedure was identified. (Section 01.2) 01/13/1999 1998027 Prl: OPS Sec: ENG Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 NRC POS Prl: 2A LICENSEE PERFORMANCE ASSURANCE DEMONSTRATED GOOD QUESTIONING ATTITUDE Sec: 4A Licensee Performance Assurance personnel demonstrated a critical questioning attitude in effectively assessing the circumstances related to a broken residual heat removal system pipe bracket which resulted in the identification of Ter:

an inadequate operability evaluation.

(Section 01.2) horn Tvno rr.nmnunna, Fnllowuo.Other). From 09/01/1998 To 04/01/2000

Page:

24 of 38 09/30/1999 17:06:47 IR Report 3 Region III COOK United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Date Date Source Functional Area Template ID Type Codes Item Title Item Description 12/31/1998 1998017 Prl: ENG NRC NEG Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 Prl: 4A Sec: 4B Tel".

The Safety System Functional Inspection was a thorough examination of the AuxiliaryFeedwater system, con The Safety System Functional Inspection was a thorough examination of theAuxiliary Feedwater system, conducted in a professional manner by a strong, experienced team of inspectors and documented in a well-wntten report. The inspection identified a number of potential operability issues which must be addressed and resolved by the licensee's engineering staff. (section E1.2)

Dockets Discussed 05000315 COOK 1 12/31/1998 1998017 Prl: ENG NRC NEG Prl: 4B Sec:

Sec:

Ter.

The Level 1 System Readiness Review done on the AuxiliaryFeedwater system was ineffective in identifying The Level 1 System Readiness Review done on the AuxiliaryFeedwater system was ineffective in identifying potential operability issues as a result of the flaws in the process and a lack of technical rigor in some aspects of the review. (section E1.5) 12/31/1998 1998017%1 Prl: ENG NRC URI Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 Prl: 4B Sec:

Ter.

The special test of an AuxiliaryFeedwater system suction strainer, as written, would not support an operabil The special test of an AuxiliaryFeedwater system suction strainer, as written, would not support an operability determination, was deficient in several areas, was not auditable, and was inappropriate for a test of a safety-related system.

An unresolved item was identified in this area pending review of the completed test package.

(section E1.3) 12/31/1998 199801742 Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 Prl: ENG Sec:

NRC NCV Prl: 4B Sec: 4A Ter:

The undetected existence of the design flaw In the AFWsystem revealed that the licensee's design control m The undetected existence of the design flaw in the AFWsystem revealed that the licensee's design control measures did not adequately verify the design of the system as required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III.

While this violation would normally be categorized at Severity Level lii,the NRC has exercised discretion under Section VII.B.2of the Enforcement Policy and is not issuing a Notice of Violation. (section E1.3) 12/31/1998 1998017%3 Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 Pri: ENG Sec:

NRC NCV Prl: 4B Sec:

Ter:

The System Readiness Review process was ineffective to Identify substantive design and operability questlo The System Readiness Review process was ineffective to identify substantive design and operability questions because it was too narrow in scope, did not examine systems retrospectively, and did not integrate findings of other review programs into its condusions.

The use of an uncontrolled, administrative guideline to conduct the System Readiness Reviews was not consistent with 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V. A non-cited violation was identified in this area.

(section E1.4) 12/17/1998 1998447-00 Prl: ENG Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 Licensee -

LER Prl: 2A Sec:

Ter.

POTENTIALFOR INCREASE LEAKAGEFROM REACTOR COOLANT PUMP SEALS IDENTIFIED

, On November 17, 1998, it was determined that in some cases the Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) thermal barrier heat exchanger might not be able to be able to maintain seal ieakwff.temperatures below the 235 degree Fahrenheit (F) limitduring a loss of seal injection. Cook has operated in the past with seal Ieakwffflow less than 2 gpm, this potential condition was determined to be reportable as a condition which results in the nudear power plant being in a condition that was outside the design basis of the plant, as the plant was designed to have a certain amount of leakage along the shaft nom Tvno II.nmniinnr+ Fnllnwnn Aihorl Frnm no/n1/1998 Tn 04/01/2000

Page:

25 of 38 09/30/1999 17:08:47 IR Report 3 Region III COOK United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Date

~

p

~

Functional Date Source Area Template ID Type Codes Item Title Item Description 12/1 1/1998 1998023 Prl: OPS Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 NRC MISC Prl: 1C Sec:

Ter.

Supporting documentation for the existing EOPs was not adequate to verify expected actions.

The emergency operating procedure changes and supporting documentation planned for plant restart were still undergoing licensee revision and review during the inspection.

Consequently, the inspectors were not able to assess the quality of those documents.

Supporting documentation for the existing emergency operating procedures was not adequate to verify expected actions.

(Section 03.2) 12/1 1/1998 1998023 Pri: OPS Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 12/11/1998 1998023 Pri: OPS Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 NRC NEG NRC NEG Pri: 1B Sec:

Ter:

Prl: 1B Sec:

Ter:

Some crews were not adequately prepared for the simulator evaluations.

t The licensee evaluators were critical of crew performance during simulator scenarios.

Some crews were not adequately prepared for the simulator evaluations as evidenced by the failure rates during the steam generator tube rupture scenario.

The crews'ack of timely actions to isolate auxiliary feedwater and equalize reactor coolant system and steam generator pressures during a tube rupture was a ixincem. The training material did not adequately address the need for expediency'in completing these actions. The inspectors determined that overall operator performance, knowledge, and procedural usage during the "Loss OfAllAC Power" scenario was satisfactory, although'crew communication problems continued to exist which resulted in the unit supervisor not being fullyaware of plant conditions. Common to both scenarios communications and shift briefs were performance areas identified as needing improvement.

(Section 04.2)

NRC Restart Action Plan 0350 Item 5.D is not closed.

The implementation of actions concerning the licensee's Action Items, and the additional processes including the shift manager report and Academic Review Board had the potential to improve the preparation of operators.

However, based on the team's observations of operator performance dunng continuing training evaluated scenarios, and review ofthe shift manager'report, the actions taken to improve communications were not adequate.

NRC Restart Action Plan 0350 Item 5.D, "ApplicantAbilitiesTo Communicate And Diagnose Events During Dynamic Simulator Scenarios," is not dosed Dockets Discussed 05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 12/11/1998 1998023 Pri: OPS NRC NEG Prl: 1B Sec:

Sec:

Tef:

The Appendix-R procedure may have identified a weakness in the verification and validation process.

The team observed that operators were knowledgeable of the required 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix R actions, and carried out those actions in accordance with the approved procedure.

However, several deficiencies with the Appendix-R procedure were identified during the exercise which appeared to be a weakness in the initialverification and validation process used to develop the procedure.

(Section 05.6) 12/11/1998 1998023 Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 Prl: OPS Sec:

NRC POS Prl: 1C Sec:

Ter:

A dedicated test group to maintain the examination bank and prepare examinations was effective.

The formation of a dedicated test group to maintain the examination bank and prepare examinations was effective and adequate based on the following inspector reviews and observations:

incorporation of examination development guidelines into the training procedure, preparation of initialexaminations, and examination bank performance indicators.

NRC Restart Action Plan 0350 Item 5.A, "Training staff ability to develop technically accurate examination material in accordance with the examination guidelines," is dosed.

(Section 05.1)

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 050M316 COOK 2 Ter.

12/11/1998 1998023 Pri: OPS NRC POS Prl: 1C Sec:

Sec:

"Operator ability to determine the correct protective action recommendations foran emergency event," is cl Based on the inspectors'eview of upgraded training material ~ procedural c/adfication and simplification, and satisfactory examination results, the licensee's corrective actions have effectively improved the operators'bility to deteJmine the correct protective action recommendation.

NRC Restart Action Plan 0350 Item 5.B, "Operator ability to determine the correct protective action recommendations for an emergency event," is closed.

(Section 05.2 Item Type (Compliance,Followup,Other). From 09/01/1 998 To 04/01/2000

Page:

26 of 38 09/30/1 999 17:06:47 IR Report 3 Region fll COOK United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Date Functional Date Source Area Template ID Type Codes Item Title Item Description 12/11/1998 1998023 Prl: OPS Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 NRC POS Prl:1C Sec:

Ter:

NRC Restart Action Plan 0350 Item 5.C, "Preparation of applicants for the initial license examination" is clos The implementation of actions concerning the licensee's Action Items and the additional processes including the Curriculum Development Committee and the Academic Review Board effectively improved the preparation of initial license applicants and operators enrolled in continuing training. NRC Restart Action Plan 0350 Item 5.C, "Preparation of applicants for the initial license examination" is dosed.

(Section 05.3) 12/11/1998 1998023 Prl: OPS Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 NRC POS Pri: 1C Sec:

'Ter:

The licensee had an adequate program for ensuring that simulator configuration was consistent with the pla ~

The team determined that the licensee had an adequate program for ensuring that simulator configuration was being maintained consistent with the plant. Simulator discrepancies were addressed in an adequate fashion with consideration given to potential training impact and factors influencing the scope and schedule for such changes.

(Section 05.7) 12/11/1998 199802343 Pri: OPS Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

0500031 5 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 NRC NCV Prl: 1B Sec:

Ter:

A nonwited violation for incomplete corrective actions to a procedure for realignment of seal return.

The inspectors determined that the overall classroom training provided to the operators was satisfactory.

Lesson plans were thorough, and the trainers were well prepared.

Operators displayed a questioning attitude during training. A non~ted violation was identified for incomplete corrective actions to a procedure for realignment of seal return flowto the volume control tank. Procedural weaknesses were also identified for lack of guidance and staging of materials to support alignment of firewater as an alternate source of steam generator feed flow, and unclear

'wordinq for Response Not Obtained actions delineating placement of excess letdown in service in response to excessive reactor coolant leakage.

(Section 05.5) 12/10/1998 1998026 Pri: ENG Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 NRC POS Prl: 4B Sec: 5C Ter:

ENGINEERING ITEM CLOSURE Inspectors reviewed 15 previously opened items. Root cause evaluations were performed for each event/issue as appropriate and appropriate staff was involved in the corrective action activities.

12/03/1998 1998-04640 Pri: ENG Licensee Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 LER Prl: 4A Sec:

Ter:

AUXILIARYFEEDWATER SYSTEM UNABLETO MEET DESIGN FLOW REQUIREMENTS DURING SPECIAL TES On November 3, 1998, a special test was conducted on the Unit 1 West motor driven auxiliary feedwater (MDAFW) pump to determine the potential effect on suction strainer loading when the essential service water (ESW) is used as the suction source.

The 1 West MDAFWpump had the highest risk for stainer plugging. Approximately 60 seconds into the test the differential pressure across the strainer exceeded the maximum allowed, flowdropped below design flowvalue, and the test was terminated.

The strainer was declared inoperable...

The root cause of this condition is a failure to consider afl aspects of system operation in the design of the suction basket strainer Dockets Discussed 05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 12/03/1998 1998021 Pri: MAINT NRC POS Pri: 3A Sec:

Sec:

Ter:

Maintenance work was performed using approved work procedures and good maintenance practices.

Overall, maintenance work was performed using approved work procedures and reflected good maintenance practices.

The inspectors noted conservative decision making during a diesel generator surveillance, and the licensee's staff promptly assessed building and grounds damage following a severe wind storm.

lti m Tvne /Comoliance.Foilowuo.Other). From 09/01/1 998 To 04/01/2000

Page:

27 of 38 09/30/1999 17:06:47 IR Report 3 Region III COOK United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Date Date Source Functional Area Template ID Type Codes Item Title Item Description 12/03/1998 1998021 Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 Prl: OpS Sec:

NRC NEG Pri: 1C Sec:

Ter:

Operations department procedures did not provide for accurate signature retrieval.

The inspectors identified that operations department procedures did not provide assurance that signatures and initials on instructions and procedures can be used to identify the responsible individuals. The corrective actions taken in response to a condition report detailing missing signatures in an engineering procedure were narrowly focused. A generic problem encompassing signatures in most station procedures was not addressed until the inspectors questioned licensee corrective action program management.

12/03/1998 1998021 Prl: OpS Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1

~

05000316 COOK 2 NRC POS Pri: 1C Sec:

Ter:

The Nuclear Safety and Design Review Committee effectively questioned its own function.

The licensee identified that the Nudear Safety and Design Review Committee had failed to perform the independent review and audit functions described in the Technical Specifications.

Corrective actions were initiated and changes were promptly implemented.

The inspectors observed the Nuclear Safety and Design Review Committee effectively question its own function and perform oversight of technical issues in the meeting observed.

12/03/1998 1998021 Pri: OpS Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 NRC POS Prl: 1C Sec:

Ter:

The effectiveness of the licensee's self-assessment program has shown improvement.

The effectiveness of the licensee's self-assessment program has shown improvement since the identification of the

. issues in NRC Inspection Reports 50-315/97417,97-201, 98-004, and 98-005. The improvement resulted from the implementation of a number of corrective actions.

Plant Performance Assurance questioning of plant performance improved along with the methods that the Plant Performance Assurance group utilized.

12/03/1998 1998021-01 Pri: OPS Sec:.

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 NRC NCV Pri: 1A Sec:

Ter.

OPERATION OF 2 RESIDUALHEAT REMOVALPUMPS WITH REACTOR COOLANTSYSTEM VENTED Contrary to management expectations, the Unit 1 control room crew inappropriately used "skillof the trade" to start a second Residual Heat Removal (RHR) pump with the reactor coolant system (RCS) vented to atmosphere.

Running two RHR pumps with the RCS vented to atmosphere is contrary to site procedural requirements and Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Section 9.3.3. The licensee identified that deficiencies in communications, scheduling, and teamwork contributed to this event.

One nonwted violation of NRC requirements was identified.

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 Ter.

11/19/1998 1998024 Pri: PLTSUP NRC POS Pri:"

Sec:

Sec:

Security related activities and training were performed appropriately.

Security related activities that involved the personnel and equipment performance of the control of packages and personnel, the alarm stations, and security communications were conducted effectively (Section S1.1). Security training activities were conducted and documented in an appropriate manner.

11/19/1998 199802441 Pri: PI.TSUP Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 NRC VIOIV Prl:

Access - Control Vehicles Sec:

- The inspector identified an isolated violation regarding the inadequate search of one vehicle. The failure was caused when a security officer recognized, but failed to search an easily accessible storage compartment located Tei".

under the passenger seat in the cab of a vehicle. Individual poor performance in the search conducted by the officer was determined to be the cause of the failure. Corrective action was implemented in a timely and effective manner.

Item Type (Compliance,Followup,Other), From 09/01/1 998 To 04/01/2000

Page:

28 of 38 09/30/1 999 17:06:47 IR Report 3 Region III COOK Date Source Functional Area United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Date Template Item Title ID Type Codes Item Description 11/'l9/1998 199802442 Pri: PLTSUP Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 NRC VIOIV Pri:

Sec:

Ter:

COMPENSATORYMEASURES The inspector identified a violation involving the inadequate access control into each reactor containment caused by anineffectivelyimplementedcompensatorymeasure.

Thisfailurehadexistedfor approximately12months.

The-failure occurred because the licensee security staff had not recognized an easily exploitable pathway around posted security officers. When identified, licensee corrective action was implemented in a timely and effective manner.

Dockets Discussed 05000315 COOK 1 11/19/1998 1998025 Pri: ENG NRC MISC Prl: 2A Ice basket damage criteria was implemented into the ice basket inspection and repair procedures.

Sec:

Sec: 2B Appropriate ice basket damage criteria had been implemented into the latest revisions of ice basket inspection and repair procedures Ter:

11/19/1998 1998025 Pri: ENG NRC MISC Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 Pcl: 4B Sec:

Ter:

UFSAR Update Status Previous NRC inspections identified, that the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Appendices contained outdated descriptions and design basis information related to the ice condenser.

The licensee issued a procedure to provide a systematic approach to the incorporation of the required information Into the actively maintained sections of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report 11/19/1998 1998025 Pri: ENG Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 NRC MISC Pri: 4B Sec:

Ter:

The licensee corrective actions to repair containment spray pumps were conservative.

The licensee identified relatively small cracks in each of the containment spray system pump impellers caused by corrosion fatigue. The licensee corrective actions to weld repair or replace these impellers combined with planned periodic inspections were conservative and consistent with the metallurgical report conclusions and fracture mechanics analysis.

11/19/1998 1998025 Prl: ENG NRC MISC Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 Pri: 4C Sec:

Ter:

A recent PPA audit identified weaknesses in the grading process used for 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluations A recent Performance Assurance department audit identified weaknesses in the grading process used for 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluations, which indicated that more work is needed to effectively implement the restart metric indicator for 50.59 Quality. Additionally, the corrective action for this finding, to mentor engineering department personnel, may artificiallyinfluence the safety evaluation quality measurement for engineering 11/19/1998 1998025 Pri: OPS Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 NRC MISC Prl: 1C Sec:

Tef:

For the Self-Identification Ratio metric Indicator, more information existed at the department level.

For the Self-Identification Ratio metric indicator, more information existed at the department level, which could be used to monitor or trend sustained department level performance and may provide more restart performance insight than the current aggregate station wide Self-Identification Ratio indicator Item Tvoe (Comoliance.Followup.Other), From 09/01/1998 To 04/01/2000

Page:

29 of 38 09/30/1999 17:06:47 IR Report 3 Region III COOK United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Date Date Source Functional Area Template ID Type Codes Item Title Item Description 11/19/1998 1998025 Prl: OPS NRC POS Sec: ENG Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 Pri: 1C Sec: 4C Tef:

Restart metric performance Indicators The restart metric indicators developed by the licensee demonstrated substantive progress toward achieving a data collection system to provide semi-quantitative measurement tools for assessing plant process and programmatic readiness for restart.

The metric performance indicators with more potential value measured process product quality, such as 50.59 Quality, Calculation Quality and Root Cause Quality, or effectiveness, such as Corrective Actions Effectivenes Dockets Discussed 05000315 COOK 1 11/02/1998 1998-04440 Prl: MAINT.

Licensee LER Pri: 2B Sec:

Sec:

~ Ter.

OFFSITE POWER AVAILABILITYNOT VERIFIED AS REQUIRED BYTECHNICALSPECIFICAITON SURVEILLAN The licensee identified that Technical Specification (TS) surveillance requirements for the offsite electrical power sources were not being verified In accordance with TS 4.8.1.1.1.a. Specifically, the surveillance procedure did not require verification of breaker alignment and voltage reading for the preferred offsite power source.

10/15/1998 1998018 Prl: ENG NRC Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 NEG Pri: 4B Sec:

Ter:

An engineering memo used to help in an operability evaluation did not accurately refiect plant practices.

The inspectors conciuded that an engineering memo used to help in an operability evaluation did not accurately refiect plant operating practice. Although the particular memo reviewed by the inspectors was not used to'determine the operability of any Technical Specification related equipment, the inspectors concluded that the operability evaluation was non~nservative m that it did not account for expected operator actions 10/15/1998 1998018 Prl: MAINT NRC NEG Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 Prl: 3A Sec:

Tei".

An apparent negative trend in human performance was Identified by the licensee.

An apparent negative trend in human performance was identified by the licensee.

Although the errors affected the operation of the plant, due to the current plant conditions, the safety significance of each error was low. The licensee has implemented corrective actions for this area 10/15/1998 1998018 Pri: OPS NRC Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 NEG Pri: 1C Sec:

Ter.

Tthe workaround review board's initial direction did not meet the objective of the process.

The inspectors concluded that the workaround review board's initialdirection toward minimizing workarounds on the list to meet a goal did not meet the objective of the process as stated in the Plant Managers Instruction (PMI). After coaching by one member, the board conservatively considered items presented, and appropriately ctassified the deficiencies 10/15/1998 1998018 Pri: OPS NRC POS Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 Pri: 1B Sec:

Ter:

The operator response during the loss of reserve feed was methodical and conservative.

The operator response during the loss of reserve feed was methodical and conservative and resulted in the timely restoration of essential equipment.

The degraded material condition of some station equipment continued to challenge the operators.

Licensed operators demonstrated a nonconservative attitude when declaring the 2-AB-2 battery charger operable when the cause for the blown output fuse had not been determined Item.Type (Compliance;Followup,Other),

rom 09/01/1 998 To 04/01/2000

l, l

I

Page:

30 of 38 09/30/1999 17:06:47 IR Report 3

. Region III COOK United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Date Functional Template Item Title Date Source Area ID Type Codes Item Description 10/15/1998 199801841 Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 Prl: ENG Sec:

NRC EEI Pri: 4B Sec:

Ter:

The licensee Identified an improperly closed Request For Change (RFC) on a spent fuel pool penetration.

The licensee identified an improperly closed Request For Change (RFC) in response to inspector questions on a sealed penetration through the side of the spent fuel pool which did not appear to be in compliance with design drawings. The RFC had been in progress for some 20 years prior to closure, afl design drawings were not updated to reflect as-built conditions, and the penetration was not properly resealed.

The licensee's dosure of the RFC was weak, incomplete, and showed poor engineering practices.

Pending the review of the corrective actions, this hill remain open as an apparent violation.

attempted to restart the motor. The restart was attempted even though an instantaneous overcurrent trip was a sign of significant damage to the electrical circuit and the annunciator response procedure required that no restart be attempted. A Non-Cited Violation was issued for the failure to followthe annunciator. response procedure Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 Ter:

10/15/1998 1998018-02 Prl: OpS NRC NCV Prl: 1B Following an instantaneous overcurrent trip of a Unit 1 CV pump operators tried to restart the motor.

Sec:

Sec:

Following an instantaneous overcurrent trip of the Unit 1 West Centrifugal Charging Pump the operating crew 10/13/1998 01012-98150 Pri: ENG Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 10/13/1998 01022-98150 Pri: ENG Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 NRC VIO II Prl:

INADEQUATEINSTRUCTIONS FOR SELECTION AND INSPECTION OF UNIT 1 FLOW PASSAGES Sec:

Ter:

NRC VIOII Pri:

REPEATED ENTRIES INTO UNANALYZEDCONDITION(UNPINNINGICE BASKETS)

Sec:

Ter:

10/13/1998 01032-98029 Pri: ENG.

NRC Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 VIO II Pri:

INADEQUATECONTAINMENTINSPECTION PROCEDURE Sec:

Ter:

10/13/1998 01042-98150 Pri: ENG Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 NRC VIO II Pri:

INSUFFICIENT MARGINTO ANALYSISLIMITFOR EVALUATINGFLOW BLOCKAGES Sec:

Ter.

Item Tvoe /Comoflance.Foflowuo.Other). From 09/01/1998 To 04/01/2000

Page:

31 of 38 09/30/1999 17:06r47 IR Report 3 Region III COOK Date Source United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Date Functional Template Item Title Area ID Type Codes Item Description 10/13/1998 01052-98150 Pri: ENG Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 10/13/1998 01062-98150 Pri: ENG Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 10/13/1998 01072.98150 Pri: ENG Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 10/13/1998 01082-98150 Pri: ENG Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 10/13/1998 01092-98151 Pri: ENG Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 NRC VIO II Pri:

INSUFFICIENT MARGINTO ANALYSISLIMITON MAXIMUMGROSS ICE BASKET WEIGHT Sec:

Ter:

NRC VIOII Pri:

FAILURETO ASSESS AND CONTROL THE QUALITYOF WORK Sec:

Ter:

NRC VIO II Pri:

FAILURETO ADEQUATELYINSPECT ICE BASKET Sec:

Ter:

NRC VIO II Pri:

FAILURETO SELECT A REPRESENTATIVE SAMPLE OF ICE BASKETS FOR WEIGHING Sec:

'I Ter:

NRC VIO II Pri:

FAILURETO PROMPTLY IDENTIFYMISSING ICE BASKET SCREWS Sec:

Ter; 10/13/1998 01102-98151 Prl: ENG NRC VIOII Pri:

FAILURETO IDENTIFYOR EVALUATEMISSING ICE SEGMENTS Sec:

Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 Ter:

Itom Tv'Cnmnliance Foilowuo.Otheri. From 09/01/1998 To 04/01/2000

Page:

32 of 38 09/30/1999 17:06:47 IR Report 3 Region ill COOK Date Source Functional Area

ID United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Date Template Item Title Type Codes Item Description 10/13/1998 01112-98151 Prl: ENG NRC VIOII Pri:

FAILURETO IDENTIFYOR EVALUATEBUCKLEDWEBBING Sec:

~

Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 Ter:

10/13/1998 01122-98151 Prl: ENG NRC VIOII Prl:

'AILURETO PREVENT RECURRENCE OF LOOSE UBOLT NUTS Sec:

Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 10/13/1998

'01132-98151 Pri: ENG Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 Ter.

NRC VIOII Prl:

FAILURETO PREVENT RECURRENCE OF SEPARATED ICE BASKETS Sec:

Ter:

10/13/1998 01142-98151 Prl: ENG NRC VIOII Prl:

FAILURETO EFFECTIVELYCORRECT FAILEDFILLETWELDS Sec:

Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 Ter:

10/13/1998 01152-98152 Pri: ENG NRC VIOII Prl:

WCAP-11902 NOT INCORPORATED INTO UFSAR Sec:

Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 10/13/1998 01162-98152 Pri: ENG Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 Ter:

NRC VIO II Pri:

AS-BUILTICE BASKET BOTTOM ASSEMBLYCONFIGURATION NOT INCORPORTATED IN UFSAR Sec:

Ter:

Item Type (Compliance,Foliowup,Other), From 09/01/1998 To 04/01/2000

Page:

33 of 38 09/30/1999 17:06:47 IR Report 3 Region lll COOK Date Source Functional Area United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Date Template Item Title ID Type Codes Item Description 10/13/1998 01172-98152 Prl: FNQ

'ec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 10/13/1998 01182-98152 Prl: ENQ Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 10/13/1998 01192-981 52 Pri: ENQ Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 NRC VIOII Pri:

FAILURETO UPDATE UFSAR TO REFLECT REINFORCEMENTS OF ICE BASKETS Sec:

Ter.

NRC VIO II Pri:

FAILURETO UPDATE UFSAR TO SHOW MAXIMUMANALYZEDICE BASKETWEIGHT Sec:

Ter:

NRC VIOII Prl:

UNAUTHORIZEDMODIFICATION-BOLTINSTEADOFPIN Sec:

Ter.

10/13/1998 01202-98152 Pri: ENQ Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000316 COOK 2 NRC VIO II Pri:

UNAUTHORIZEDMODIFICATION(SHEET METALSHEATH)

Sec:

Ter.

10/13/1998 01212-98152 Pri: ENG Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000316 COOK 2 NRC VIOII Pri:

UNAUTHORIZEDMODIFICATION-INSTALLATIONOF RIVETS Sec:

Ter.

10/13/1998 01222-98029 Pri: ENQ Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 NRC VIOII Pri:

LACKOF SUFFICIENT MEASURES TO PREVENT FIBROUS FIRE SEALANTBEING USED IN CONTAINMENT Sec:

Ter:

Item Type (Compliance,Followup,Other), From 09/01/1998 To 04/01/2000

k

Page:

34 of 38 09/30/1 999 17:06:47 IR Report 3 Region III COOK Date Source Functional Area United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Date Template Item Title ID Type Codes Item Description 10/13/1998 01232-98029 Prl: ENG Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 10/13/1998 01242-98152 Pri: ENG Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 10/13/1998 01252-98152 Pri: ENG Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 10/13/1998 01262-98152 Pri: ENG Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 10/13/1998 01272-98152 Pri: ENG Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 10/13/1998 01282-98152

~

Pri: ENG Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 NRC VIO II Prl:

LACKOF SUFFICIENT MEASURES TO PREVENT INSTALLATIONOF FIBROUS INSULATION Sec:

Ter.

NRC

-VIO II Prl:

RWST LEVELINSTRUMENTATIONBIAS ERRORS Sec:

Ter.

NRC VIO II Pri:

RWST LOW LEVELSETPOINT Sec:

Ter:

NRC VIO II Prl:

CONTAINMENTSUMP LEVELUNCERTAINTIES Sec:

Ter.

NRC VIOII Pri:

CONTAINMENTSUMP DESIGN BASIS Sec:

Ter:

NRC VIOII Pri:

SUMP ROOF VENTHOLE DESIGN BASIS Sec:

Ter.

Item Tvpe (Comoliance,Followup,Other)

~ From 09/01/1 998 To 04/01/2000

Page:

35 of 38 09/30/1999 17:06:47 IR Report 3 Region lll COOK Date Source Functional Area United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Date Template Item Title ID Type Codes Item Description 10/13/1998 01292 98152 Pri: ENG Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 10/13/1998 01302-98152 Prl: ENG.

Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 NRC VIOII Prl:

SUMP 1/4 INCH POV RETENTION DESIGN BASIS Sec:

Ter:

NRC VIOII Pri:

'NADEQUATEDESIGN CONTROL FOR REVIEW FOR CONTAINMENTSPRAY RM TEMPERATURF CALCULAT Sec:

Ter:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 10/13/1998 01312.98152 Pfl: ENG NRC VIO II Prl:

UNIT 2 DUALTRAIN ESW/CCW OUTAGE Sec:

Sec:

Ter:

10/13/1998 01322-98152 Pri: ENG Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 10/13/1998 01332-98152 Pri: ENG Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 10/13/1998 01342-98152 Pri: ENG Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 NRC VIOII Pri:

EXCEEDING ULTIMATEHEAT SINK TEMPERATURE Sec:

Ter.

NRC VIOII Pri:

SINGLE FAILUREVULNERABILITY,EOPs ES-1, 3 Sec:

Ter:

NRC VIO II Pri:

EXCEEDING CCW DESIGN TEMPERATURE Sec:

Ter:

Itom Tvne /Comoliance.Followuo.Other). From 09/01/1 998 To 04/01/2000

Page:

36 of 38 Q9/3Q/1999 17:06:47 IR Report 3 Region III COOK Date Source Functional Area United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Date Template Item Title ID Type Codes Item Description 10/13/1998 01352-98152 Pri: ENG Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 10/13/1998 01362-98152 Prl: ENG Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 10/13/1998 01372-98152 Prl: ENG Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK1 05000316 COOK 2 NRC VIO II Pri:

RCP THERMALBARRIER CCW FLOW Sec:

Ter:

NRC VIOII Prl:

NO 50.59 EVALUATIONFOR INCREASE IN CCW FLOW ABOVE UFSAR ALLOWABLE Sec:

Tert NRC VIOII Prl:

CHANGE IN RWST LOWLEVELSETPOINT W/0 50.59 EVALUATION Sec:

Ter:

10/09/1998 19984)43-00 Pri: MAINT Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 Licensee LER Pri: 2B Sec:

Tei".

CONTAINMENTAIR LOCKS TESTING NOT PERFORMED IN ACCORDANCE WITHTS 4.6.1.3.A The licensee discovered that the test frequency for the containment air lock door seals for both units was not controlled in accordance with Technical Specification (TS) 4.6.1.3a.

The Regulatory Guide directs use of (NEI) 9441 to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix J Option B. The trending of air lock test data, which is requiredif Option B is used, was not performed, however the test interval was extended to 30 days. The root cause of this condition was personnel error.

10/02/1998 199844140 Prl: MAINT Licensee LER Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 Pri: 2B Sec:

Ter:

CCW PUMP SURVEILLANCETESTING HAS POTENTIALTO CAUSE UNPLANNED ENTRY INTO TS 3.0.3.

Operations personnel discovered that both trains of CCW may become inoperable under specific circumstances when the system is aligned to the test configuration. The surveillance directs the closure of the pump discharge header cross-tie valve and heat exchanger outlet valve for the CCW train that is not being tested, making the train inoperable by isolating its discharge flowpath to the safeguard headers.

Operations personnel concluded that ifthe surveillance was being performed post-maintenance to restore a pump to operable status, both trains of CCW would then be inoperable while in the test configuration. The root cause of this condition is failure to perform an adequate 10CFR50.59 safety evaluation when the surveillance procedures were revised several years ago.

10/02/1998 1998020 Pri: MAINT Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 NRC NEG P<<: 2B The MOVprogram and implementation at D. C. Cook were not sufficiently complete.

Sec:

This closeout inspection of NRC's review of Generic Letter (GL) 89-10, "Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valve (MOV)Testing and Surveillance," determined that the MOVprogram and implementation at D. C. Cook were not sufficiently complete to closeout the NRC's program review. Although some areas have been sufficiently addressed, the inspectors could not conclude that the licensee had completed verifying all GL 89-10 program MOVs would perform their intended safety functions under design-basis conditions. The three major areas requiring resolution were the 44 potentially inoperable MOVs, finalizing design-basis MOVcalculations, and updating several program documents.

Item Type (Compliance,Followup,Other), From 09/01/1 998 To 04/01/2000

Page:

37 of 38 09/30/1 999 17:08:47 IR Report 3 Region III COOK Date Source Functional Area ID United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX 8y Date Template Item Title Type Codes Item Description f

~

10/02/1998 1998020 Prl: MAINT NRC POS Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 Pri: 2B Sec:

Tef:

The recent self-assessment in the MOVarea provided numerous appropriate technical findings.

The recent self-assessment in the MOVarea provided numerous appropriate technical findings, some of which were also identified during this inspection.

The use of an outside technical MOVexpert provided additional insights into the MOVprogram.

10/02/1998 199802MH Prl: MAINT Sec:

Dockets Discussed:

05000315 COOK 1 05000316 COOK 2 NRC NCV Prl: 28 Sec:

Ter:

The licensee failed to perform design-basis calculations for the structural capability of butterfly valves One violation was identified for which enforcement discretion was exercised.

The licensee's failure to perform design-basis calculations for the structural capability of butterfly valves. This, along with not proactively assessing the effects ofwidely known industry information on the use of non~nservative assumptions in predicting MOV motor actuator output prior to it becoming an operability issue, led to a programmatic concern with the MOV program.

Item Type (Compliance,Foliowup.Other), From 09/01/1998 To 04/01/2000

Page:

38 of 38 09/30/1 999 17:06:47 IR Report 3 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Date Legend Type Codes:

Template Codes:

Functional Areas:

BU CDR DEV EEI IFI LER LIC MISC MV NCV NEG NOED NON OTHR P21 POS SGI STR URI VIO WK Bulletin Construction Deviation Escalated Enforcement Item Inspector follow-up item Licensee Event Report Licensing Issue Miscellaneous MinorViolation NonCited Violation Negative Notice of Enforcement Discretion Notice of Non-Conformance Other Part 21 Positive Safeguard Event Report Strength Unresolved item Violation Weakness 1A Normal Operations 1B Operations During Transients 1C Programs'and Processes 2A Equipment Condition 2B Programs and Processes 3A Work Performance 3B KSA 3C Work Environment 4A Design 4B Engineering Support 4C Programs and Processes 5A Identification 5B Analysis 5C Resolution ID Codes:

NRC NRC Self Self-Revealed Licensee Licensee OPS Operations MAINT Maintenance ENG Engineering PLTSUP Plant Support OTHER Other EEls are apparent violations of NRC Requirements that are being considered for escalated enforcement action in accordance with the "General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Action" (Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600. However, the NRC has not reached its final enforcement decision on the issues identified by the EEls and the PIM entries'may be modified when the final decisions are made.

URls are unresolved items about which more information is required to determine whether the issue in question is an acceptable item, a deviation, a nonconformance, or a violation. A URI may also be a potential violation that is not likelyto be considered for escalated enforcement action. However, the NRC has not reached its final condusions on the issues, and the PIM entries may be modified when the final condusions are made.

unm Tvn~ rr.nmnlinnne Fntinwnn Other). From 09/01/1998 To 04/01/2000

ENCLOSURE 2

September 30, 1999 Revision 5 DONALDC. COOK PLANNED INSPECTIONS Inspection Corrective Action Program Team Inspection (Regional Initiative (Rl))

Inspection Procedure (IP)

IP 40500 "Effectiveness of Licensee Controls in Identifying, Resolving, and Preventing Problems" Design Control Team Inspection (Rl)

IP37550 "Engineering" IP 37700 "Design Changes and Modifications" IP 37001 "10 CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluation Program" IP 92903 "Follow up - Engineering" Case Specific Checklist Items 2A (Failure to promptly identify and evaluate conditions adverse to quality) 4A (Failure to perform safety evaluation screenings) 4B (Inadequate safety evaluations)

Licensee Ready for Inspection Dates 8/1 9/99 8/1 9/99 8/1 9/99 NRC Scheduled Inspection Dates 08/30/99 through 10/01/99 09/1 3/99 through 10/01/99 Team Size 4 Inspectors 5 Inspectors Security Inspection (Core)

IP 81700, "Physical Security Program for Power Reactors" N/A N/A 09/20/99 through 09/24/99 1 Inspector 1

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tl September 30, 1999 Revision 5 DONALDC. COOK PLANNED INSPECTIONS Inspection Security Inspection IP 81?00, "Physical Security Program for Power Reactors" Case Specific Checklist Items N/A Licensee. Ready for Inspection Dates N/A NRC Scheduled Inspection Dates 02/07/00 through 02/11/00 Team Size 1 inspector Emergency Preparedness (Core)

IP 82301, "Evaluation of Exercises for Power Reactors" IP 83202, "Review of Exercise Objectives and Scenario for Power Plants" N/A N/A 10/25/99 through 10/29/99 4 Inspectors Ice Condenser Inspection (Rl)

IP 37550 "Engineering" IP 37700 "Design Changes and Modifications" IP 40500 "Effectiveness of Licensee Controls in Identifying, Resolving, and Preventing Problems" IP 92903 "Follow up - Engineering" 6 (Resolution of ice condenser issues) 12 (Resolution of containment liner pitting) 10/21/99 I'0/20/99 09/14/99 through 3 Inspectors 12/31/99 (intermittent)

September 30, 1999 Revision 5 DONALDC. COOK PLANNED INSPECTIONS Inspection Instrument Uncertainty Inspection (Rl)

IP 92903 "Follow up - Engineering" IP 93807 "Systems Based Instrumentation and Control Inspection" Motor-Operated Valve Inspection (Safety Issues)

Tl 251 5/1 09 "Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valve (MOV)Testing and Surveillance" Case Specific Checklist Items 3C (Failure to consider instrument uncertainties, setpoints and/or instrument bias) 7 (Resolution of Nonsafety-Related Cables Going to Shunt Trip Coils)

CAL item 9 (Instrument uncertainties incorporated into procedures and analysis)

CSC Item 16 (Resolution of operability of motor operated valves in the generic letter 89-10 program)

Licensee Ready for Inspection Dates Late October, 1999 10/1/99 Late October, 1999 11/15/99 NRC Scheduled Inspection Dates 11/1 5/99 through 11/19/99 11/1 5/99 through 11/1 9/99 Team Size 2 Inspectors 3 Inspectors

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September 30, 1999 Revision 5 DONALDC. COOK PLANNED INSPECTIONS Inspection Steam Generator Replacement Inspection (RI)

IP 83729, Occupational Exposure During Extended Outages"-

IP 50001, " Steam Generator Replacement Inspections" IP 73753, Inservice Inspection' Case Specific Checklist Items N/A Licensee Ready for Inspection Dates N/A NRC ScheduIed Inspection Dates 12/06/99 through 01/28/00 (intermittent) 12/13/99 through 03/31/00 (intermittent)

Team Size 2 Inspectors 2 Inspectors

September 30, 1999 Revision 5 DONALDC. COOK PLANNED INSPECTIONS Inspection Engineering Corrective Action Team Inspection (Rl)

IP 37550 "Engineering" IP 37700 "Design Changes and Modifications".

IP 40500 "Effectiveness of Licensee Controls in Identifying, Resolving, and Preventing Problems" IP 92903 "Followup - Engineering" Case Specific Checklist Items 2B (Inadequate corrective actions for previously identified conditions adverse to quality) 3A (Inadequate design control pertaining to uncontrolled and/or unintended changes in the plant design) 3B Failure to update the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report 3D (Inadequate consideration for system/component failure modes) 10 (Resolution of containment spray system operability issues) 8 (Resolution of hydrogen recombiner operability issues) 9 (Resolution of distributed ignition Technical Specification issues) 11 (Resolution of hydrogen mitigation system operability and material condition issues) 14E (Electrical protection coordination including fuse/breaker control program readiness for restart)

CALitems1,2,3,5,6,7,8 Licensee Ready for Inspection Dates 11/1 9/99 10/4/99 10/4/99 10/1 8/99 10/25/99 10/25/99 10/18/99 10/4/99 Date is currently, under review Late November NRC Scheduled Inspection Dates 11/29/99 through 12/1 7/99 Team Size 9 Inspectors

September 30, 1999 Revision 5 DONALDG. COOK PLANNED INSPECTIONS Inspection Case Specific Checklist Items Licensee Ready for Inspection Dates NRC Scheduled Inspection Dates Team Size Surveillance Testing Inspection and Emergency Operating Procedure Program Inspection (Rl) 61726 "Surveillance Observations" 61725 "Surveillance Testing and Calibration Control Program" IP 42001 "Emergency Operation Procedures" 1A (Inadequate instructions in surveillance tests) 1B (Acceptance criterion lack sufficient margin to analysis limit) 1C (Failure to meet technical specification requirements) 11/1/99 11/1/99 11/1/99 11/29/99 through 12/17/99 5 Inspectors 1D (Preconditioning of.equipment prior 11/1/99 to surveillance testing) 1E (Failure to assess and control the quality of contractors performing surveillance testing) 11/1/99 14D (Emergency operating procedures program. ready for restart)

Early December, 1999 CAL item 4 (ES-1.3 Switchover to Recirculation Sump Procedure)

Late November

September 30, 1999 Revision 5 DONALDC. COOK PLANNED INSPECTIONS Inspection Programmatic Readiness Inspection (Rl)

Contractor Control Preventative Maintenance Electrical Coordination Operability Determinations Inspection IP 40500 "Effectiveness of Licensee Controls in Identifying, Resolving, and Preventing Problems" Case Specific Checklist Items 14B (Contractor control program readiness for restart) 14C (Preventative maintenance program readiness for restart) 14F (Operability determination program readiness for restart)

Licensee Ready for Inspection Dates Date is currently under review Date is currently under review Date is currently under review NRC ScheduIed Inspection Dates December (1 week)

Team Size 5 Inspectors Restart Readiness Assessment Team Inspection (Rl)

CSC item 13B (System and containment final readiness review)

Date is currently under review 01/05/00 through 01/09/00 10 Inspectors IP 71707 "Plant Operations" IP 93802 "Operational Safety Team Inspection" IP 61726 "Surveillance Observations" IP 62707 "Maintenance Observation" IP 37550 "Engineering" 14G ( Programmatic final readiness reviews) 15B (Functional area final readiness reviews) 01/1 2/00 through 01/1 6/00 6 Inspectors

September 30, 1999 Revision 5 DONALDC; COOK PLANNED INSPECTIONS Inspection.

Licensed Operator Requalification Program Evaluation (Core)

IP 71001, "Licensed Operator Requalification Program Evaluation" Chemistry 8 REMP Inspection (Core)

IP 84750, "Radioactive Waste Treatment, and ENuent and Environmental Monitorin "

Case Specific Checklist Items N/A N/A Licensee Ready for Inspection Dates N/A N/A NRC ScheduIed Inspection Dates 01/1 7/00 through 01/21/00 03/1 3/00 through 03/1 7/00 Team Size 2 Inspectors 2 Inspectors

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