ML17249A380
| ML17249A380 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Ginna  |
| Issue date: | 12/31/1979 |
| From: | ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17249A379 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7912310394 | |
| Download: ML17249A380 (99) | |
Text
R. E. GZNNA SAFE SHUTDOWN FjRE STUDY DECEMBER, 1979
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CONTENT I. Introduction II. Pire Areas III. Method of Analysis IV. General Shutdown Methods V. Specific Shutdown Methods VI. Proposed Modifications
I. INTRODUCTION This report identifies various means of bringing the plant to and maintaining the plant at a safe shutdown condition during and after a fire in a fire area. The analysis assumes all equipment in the fire area fails in the worst direction. The pressure boundary integrity of a valve, pump casing, pipe, or tank is assumed not to be affected by the fire., The containment purge system and containment, cooling system are not necessary for plant cooldown and not addressed in this analysis.
Since this analysis assumes all equipment and cables within a fire area fail as a result of the fire a separate'cable separation analysis is not required.
Abbreviations RC System Reactor Coolant System RHR System Residual Heat Removal System RWST Refueling Water Storage Tank PO RV Power Operated Relief Valve
'AVT All Volital Treatment S.I. Safety Injection R5N Reactor Makeup Nater
II ~ FIRE AREAS The entire plant has been divided into fire areas. Each building is assumed to be a separate fire area because they are separated by fire barriers or distance. Each floor within a building was examined individually and in many cases broken up into smaller fire areas within the floor zone. In general, these areas were broken out along walls or column lines and were primarily designed to ease the gathering of data as to the contents of a given area. The fire areas are illustrated in the attached drawings.
In general, fire barriers or space is used to maintain separation between fire areas. Cable trays that go from one fire area to another may require fire stops to prevent fire from spreading from one area to the adjacent area. Other "fixed" combustible sources are not credible proliferation agents due to containment (oils, charcoal, wood, paper, etc.). Excessive transient combustibles will require a fire watch to be posted during the interim time period that the transient is present.
III. METHOD OF ANALYSIS The information from all plant circuit schedules was placed in a computer file. This information initially included the connected equipment and cable tray and conduit, but not physical location. The file was then supplemented with the physical location of the cable trays and conduit, and coded to indicate the associated fire zones. At this point it was possible for the computer to identify all systems and equipment which would potenti-ally be affected by a fire in any particular fire zone.
A systems analysis was then performed to determine the complement of equipment normally available to bring the plant to a safe (cold) shutdown condition. The equipment complement was then compared with the list of equipment which could potentially be affected by a fire in each zone. The equipment that could potentially be lost was then reviewed with respect to the conse-quences of actual fire effects. Conservative assumptions were made for fire induced effects on the circuits. Effects due to shorts, opens, and impressed voltages equal to the highest voltage carried in the tray system where evaluated and the "worst case" used for the analysis.
The system level consequences of these circuit effects were then evaluated on a "worst case" basis. It was assumed that all active components (MOVs, solenoid op-valves, circuit breakers, etc) could fail in any position (state), or spuriously change state due to the fire. No credit was taken for physical separation within the fire zone although in many cases the physical separation exceeds the requirements of IEEE-384. Shutdown methods for each fire zone were then developed based on this analysis and recommenda-tions for system functional modifications made. These methods and functional recommendations are presented in Section V.
A specific set of equipment hardware modifications was then proposed to implement the recommended functional modifications.
These are presented in Section VI.
As work proceeds on specific systems, additional approaches to resolve some of these problems may be found on a case by case basis.
IV. GENERAL SHUTDOWN METHODS The following is a series of shutdown and cooldown methods that can be used at Ginna Station to achieve cold shutdown.
These methods may be modified in Section V when applied to a specific fire area.
Normal Shutdown and Cooldown Off Site Power Available Turbine load and reactor power are reduced at a prescribed rate automatically dependent upon the rate selected on the E-H governor control. Normal boron addition may take place before and during load reduction. At 50 l1W of generator load, the main feedwater valves are closed, one feedwater pump is removed from service, and the feedwater valve bypass valves are used for feedwater control. As generator load is removed, steam dump to the condenser is initiated and the "hot standby" condition is achieved.
If a faster power decrease is desired the reactor may be manually tripped. If the steam dump controller is set on auto, automatic steam dump will occur. If the steam dump controller is set on manual, steam pressure will be regulated. At this time all control rods are fully inserted, the turbine governor and throttle valves are closed, and the main feedwater valves conditions are open. Soon (5 minutes) after reactor trip, hot shutdown are achieved.
At this point normal boration and makeup can be, performed dependent upon final RC system condition to be achieved.
To initiate cooldown, the amount of steam dump to the condenser is increased. Steam dump to the condenser is maintained until air ejector can no longer maintain condenserinitiated. vacuum (approximately 350'F) and then atmospheric steam dump is As the volume of reactor coolant shrinks due to temperature decrease, automatic makeup to the system is provided by the pressurizer level control of the charging and makeup system.
The RFIR system is aligned and started to recirculate through the RWST. Upon verification that the boron concentration of the RHR system is compatible to the RC system the RHR system is stopped. When the RC system reaches 360 psi and 350'F, the RHR system is pressurized to the pressure of the RC system through HCV-133= at a slow rate. The RHR system is'then aligned for normal cooldown to the RC system, and the RHR pumps started while the RC system pressure is maintained by sprays and heaters. As the cooldown continues, the pressurizer is slowly filled to the solid condition at which time pressure control is assumed by PCV-135 and the RC pumps may be taken out of service. Charging pump flow is slowly reduced as cooldown continues to insure pressure of the RCS is maintained at, 360 psi by PCV-135. Just prior to achieving 150'F the reactor coolant pumps are taken out h
of service. Auxiliary feedwater pumps are used to maintain steam generator level. The remainder of the cooldown is performed and maintained with the RHR system. Anytime after the RC pumps are
'taken out, the charging pumps can be taken out and RC system pressure reduced to atmospheric.
Normal Shutdown and Cooldown Off Site Power Not Available Loss of off site power is assumed to occur simultaneous with plant trip, the diesels and turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pumps will start automatically. The diesels automatically tie to the 480v class 1E buses energizing the component cooling water, service water, and motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps. Bus 13 is manually tied to Bus 14 and bus 15 manually tied to 16 to provide power for the air compressors. Other loads such as the charging pumps and containment fan coolers are manually energized if necessary.
system utilizing Heat the removal will atmospheric be accomplished power operated by the secondary relief valves (PORV's). Steam generator level is maintained by the auxiliary feedwater pumps or standby auxiliary feedwater pumps. As decay heat decreases all auxiliary feedwater pumps are not needed and are removed from service at operator discretion. Primary system volume is maintained by the charging flow and letdown rate.
Pressure control of the primary system is provided by auxiliary spray and pressurizer heaters. Cooldown is initiated by manipu-lation of the steam relief rate. The primary system is cooled to 360 psi and 350'F at which time the RHR system is put into operation as described above. The RHR system is utilized to achieve and maintain the cold shutdown condition.
Shutdown and Cooldown No Steam Dum Off Site Power Available The method is identical to the Normal method off site power, available except heat removal will be accomplished by the secondary system utilizing the PORV's.
Shutdown and Cooldown No Steam Dum Off Site Power Not Available The method is identical to the Normal method off site power not available.
Shutdown and Cooldown No Instrument Air Off Site Power Available The plant is tripped and the secondary system safety valves will stabilize the RC system near hot shutdown conditions. The turbine driven, motor driven or standby auxiliary feedwater pumps can be used to supply auxiliary feedwater. Charging will be done through the RC pump seals and valves 392A and B acting as relief valves. Charging water will come from the emergency boration path or from the RNST by opening manual valve 358. Letdown is
isolated by the loss of Instrument Air. If primary system relief is required the Pressurizer PORV's can be operated manually. The component cooling water system and the RHR system are not affected by the loss of Instrument Air.
Shutdown and Cooldown No Instrument Air Off Site Power Not Available This method is identical to the above method with off site power except all AC power is supplied from the diesel generators and the RC pumps are off.
Shutdown and Cooldown No Instrument Air to Containment Off Site Power Available The plant is tripped and the secondary system PORV's can be used to stabilize the RC system at hot shutdown conditions. The turbine driven, motor driven or standby auxiliary feedwater pumps can be used to supply auxiliary feedwater. Charging will be done through the RC pump seals and valves 392A and B acting as relief valves. Charging water will come from the normal boration paths or the emergency boration path. Letdown is isolated by the loss of Instrument Air. If primary system relief is required the Pressurizer PORV's can be operated manually. The component cooling water system and the RHR system are not affected by the loss of Instrument Air.
Shutdown and Cooldown No Instrument Air to Containment Off Site Power Not Available This method is identical to the above method with off site power except all AC power is supplied from the diesel generators.
The RC pumps are therefore off and Buses 13 and 15 must be supplied from Buses 14 and 16.
Shutdown and Cooldown Solid Steam Generators No RHR Off Site Power Available The plant is brought to the point where RHR cooling is normally initiated by the methods described in Normal Shutdown and Cooldown with off site power. Since the RHR is unavailable, the reactor coolant system is cooled below the 350'F point by the secondary system. After a time, the secondary system will approach 225'F and decay heat in the primary system has become small enough to not significantly increase temperature and pressure of the primary system with heat removal accomplished by using the steam generators as water to water heat exchangers. The main steam line supports can be pinned. This would be done to prevent damage to the supports with the piping filled with water. To continue the cooldown after 225'F is achieved in the secondary system, the main steam isolation valves are closed, the steam generator blowdown lines are aligned to the blowdown flash tank for discharge to the circulating water canal, the turbine driven auxiliary feedpump is secured with all drains open, the main steam line drains and bypass valves are opened, and the water
level is brought up in the steam generators until the steam piping is filled to the main steam isolation valves. Heat removal is now accomplished through the drains and steam generator blowdown lines. As the steam piping is filled, the hot water can be drained through the main steam line drains and turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump drains. The steam generator blowdown syst: em drains hot water directly from the steam generators to the circulating water discharge canal. The rate of cooldown, which in this mode of operation is slow, is regulated by the amount of demineralized water available. Secondary system cooldown of the primary system can be augumented by "feed and bleed" of the primary system utilizing the safety injection or charging pumps with refueling water and the pressurizer relief valves. Before exhaustion of the demineralized water supply, efforts are made to transfer water from the hot well or AVT condensate storage tanks before restoring to service water as supply for the auxiliary feedwater pumps. It should be noted that since the RHR heat exchangers are not in use, Cooling Water System be in it is not imperative that the Component operation. This method of cooling is used until the primary system has been cooled to the cold shutdown condition.
Shutdown and Cooldown Solid Steam Generators No RHR Off Site Power Not Available This method is identical to the above method with off site power except all AC power is supplied from the diesel generators.
Shutdown and Cooldown Ino erable RHR Valves Off Site Power Available This method is used in the event that one of the RHR suction valves (V-700, V-701) or RHR return valves (V-720, and V-721) are stuck. closed. The reactor coolant system has been brought to the 350'F point using normal methods. If one of the suction valves is stuck closed, the other letdown valve is closed and the two return valves are opened. In this mode of operation, the return line will provide suction for the RHR pumps through the three inch recirculation line of the RHR pumps. The return route to the reactor coolant system is established by closing valves 624, and 625, RHR heat exchanger outlet valves, and V-626, RHR heat exchanger bypass valves and their respective guard valves V-717, V-715 and V-712B and opening valves 857 AiBi and C to the suction of the Safety Injection pumps. To assure circulation through the core, valves 878 B and D are closed and valves 878 A and C are opened. When this path of flow has been established the RHR system pressure is equalized with HCV-133 to the reactor coolant system pressure. The RHR pumps and Safety Injection pumps are started. Cooldown is continued to cold shutdown with rate of cooldown controlled by the number of safety injection pumps running. If one of the return valves is stuck closed, the other return valve is closed, both suction valves are opened and the remainder of system alignment and operation remains the same, except the recirc line will not be necessary.
Shutdown and Cooldown Ino erable RHR Valves Off Site Power Not Available This method is identical to the above method with off site power except all AC power is supplied from the diesel generators.
Shutdown and Cooldown No Char in Pum s Off Site Power Available This method of cooldown is used when the charging pumps are not available for maintaining the RC system inventory. The hot shutdown condition is achieved using normal methods. Cooldown is initiated using the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump (the motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps are used when required) with steam dump to atmosphere. The safety injection pumps are aligned to take suction from the RNST providing the necessary boration and makeup. Reactor coolant system pressure is reduced by opening the pressurizer PORV's to a point where the discharge pressure of the safety injection pumps is higher than the RC system pressure. A safety injection pump is then started. RC system pressure is controlled with pressurizer heaters, the pressurizer relief valves, and letdown. Nhen the RC system reaches 360 psi and 350'F, the safety injection pumps are stopped.
The RHR system is aligned for normal letdown and cooling of the RC system and the RHR pumps are started. The safety inejction pumps still have suctions aligned to the R)1ST and are started .as required to makeup to the RC system.
Shutdown and Cooldown No Char in Pum s Off Site Power Not Available This method is identical to the above method with off site power except all AC power is supplied by the diesel generators.
Shutdown and Cooldown with no Service Hater Off Site Power Not Available There is no service water until portable alternative sources can be installed. Until service water is available the Diesel Generators should not be run because of lack of cooling. Cooling can be provided by installing a prefabricated hose connection to each diesel generator. Then fire hoses are connected between city fire hydrant outside the diesel generator rooms and the hose diesels now can be run connection on each diesel generator. The normally.
There is no source of cooling for the Instrument Air com-pressors so cooldown will have to be done without Instrument Air.
The Component Cooling Hater System is inoperable until service water can be. restored. To provide service water to a component cooling water heat exchanger an elbow in the service water line is removed and replaced with a prefabricated plate containing fire hose connections. Fire hoses are then connected between the plate and portable pump/pumps near the lake capable IV-5
of pumping a minimum of 1000 gpm. Valves are then aligned so that only one component cooling water heat exchanger receives the water making one train of the component cooling water system available for cooldown.
Until the diesel generators are available the plant must. be operated from the batteries. The plant is designed to operate several hours in this mode.
Auxiliary feedwater will be supplied by the turbine driven pump until the diesel generators can be operated. After the diesel generators are operating the motor driven pumps or the standby pumps can be used. An adequate supply of feedwater is stored in the Condensate Storage Tanks. If additional water is required it can be obtained from a fire hose connected to> a city fire hydrant located outside the Service Building.
The b1ain Steam Isolation Valves and the steam line PORV's will fail closed because of no Instrument Air. Steam pressure will remain at the safety valve setpoint, until the PORV's are open manually for cooldown.
Diesel generators must be operating for charging to the primary system. The only source of leakage should be out of the reactor coolant pump seals. The flow should be small and should not drain the pressurizer prior to operating the diesel generators.
Once the diesel generators are operating the charging pumps can be operated. Charging can be done through the reactor coolant pump seals, V-392A and V-392B (Since Instrument Air is not available these valves will be operated as relief valves).
Charging water can be supplied from the emergency boration path or from the RWST.
Since Instrument must be done by manually Air is not available, letdown, if operating the pressurizer PORV's.
required, When water is available to one of the component cooling water heat exchangers cooldown can be started. The steam system should be used to cooldown the plant to the point where RHR can be initiated. The RHR system with one component cooling water heat exchanger has sufficient capacity to remove decay heat and slowly cool the plant down.
Shutdown and Cooldown with no Service Water Off Site Power Available There is no service water until portable alternative sources can be installed. Until service water is available the Diesel Generators should not be run because of lack of cooling. Since off site power is available the diesel generators are not required.
IV-6
There is no source of cooling for the Instrument Air com-pressors so cooldown will have to be done without Instrument Air.
The Component Cooling Water System is inoperable until service water can be restored. To provide service water to a component cooling water heat exchanger an elbow in the service water line is removed and replaced with a prefabricated plate containing fire hose connections. Fire hoses are then connected between the plate and portable pump/pumps near the lake capable of pumping a minimum of 1000 gpm. Valves are then aligned so that only one component cooling water heat exchanger receives the water. Now one train of the component cooling water system is available for cooldown.
Auxiliary feedwater will be supplied by the turbine driven pump, motor driven pumps, or the standby pumps. An adequate supply of feedwater is stored in the Condensate Storage Tanks.
If additional water is required it can be obtained from a fire hose connected to a city fire hydrant located outside the Service Building.
The Main Steam Isolation valves and the steam line PORV's will fail closed because of lack of Instrument Air. Steam pressure will remain at the safety valve setpoint until the PORV's are open manually for cooldown.
Since the component cooling water system is not, initially available the reactor coolant pumps should be off and natural circulation used to remove decay heat.
Since off site power is available the charging pumps can be operated. Charging can be done through the reactor coolant pump seals, V-392A and V-392B (Since Instrument Air is not, available these valves will be operated as relief valves).
Charging water can be supplied from the emergency boration path or from the RWST.
Because of the loss of Instrument Air letdown is not available.
Letdown should not be necessary while sitting at hot shutdown cooldown. If primary system relief is necessary the or'uring PORV's can be operated manually.
When water is available to one of the component cooling water heat exchangers cooldown can be started. The steam system should be used to cooldown the plant to the point where RHR can be initiated. The RHR system with one component, cooling water heat exchanger has sufficient capacity to remove decay heat and slowly cool the plant down.
IV-7
0 V. SPECIFIC SHUTDOWN METHODS The following are shutdown methods for a fire in a fire area.
In most cases the same method can be used with off site power available or not, available. Cases dependent on the availability of off site power are noted here or in Section IV.
'IRE AREA TURBINE BUILDING OPERATING FLOOR Shutdown Method:
Normal shutdown and cooldown methods can be used. The fire may affect the turbine stop valves which would require closing the main steam isolation valves.
Modifications:
No modifications are required to use the above shutdown method.
FIRE AREA TURBINE BUILDING MEZZANINE NEST Shutdown Method:
Normal shutdown and cooldown methods can be used.
Modifications:
In order to ensure that the above shutdown method can be used, the following systems require modification:
Steam Generator Level.
FIRE AREA TURBINE BUILDING MEZZANINE MID-SECTION Shutdown Method:
Normal shutdown and cooldown methods without, steam dump.
Modifications:
No modifications are required to use the above shutdown method.
V-2
FIRE AREA TURBINE BUILDING MEZZANINE NORTH Shutdown Method:
Shutdown and cooldown without Instrument Air. Some service water valves may require manual repositioning.
Modifications:
In order to ensure that the above shutdown method can be used, the following systems require modification:
Electrical Distribution for offsite power Electrical Distribution for onsite power FIRE AREA TURBXNE BUILDING MEZZANINE SOUTH Shutdown Method:
Shutdown and cooldown without Instrument Air and no offsite power. Offsite power may be disabled by the fire. Some service water valves may require manual repositioning.
Modifications:
order to ensure that the above shutdown method can
'n be used, the following systems require modification:
Electrical Distribution for onsite power FIRE AREA TURBINE BUILDING FEEDPUMP ROOM Shutdown Method:
Normal shutdown and cooldown methods can be used.
Modifications:
No modifications are required to use the above shutdown method.
V-3
FIRE AREA TURBINE BUILDING BASEMENT NEST Shutdown Method:
Normal shutdown and cooldown methods without steam dump.
Some service water valves may require manual repositioning.
Modifications:
No modifications are required to use the above shutdown method.
FIRE AREA TURBINE BUILDING BASEMENT MID-SECTION Shutdown Method:
Normal shutdown and cooldown methods without steam dump.
Modifications:
No modifications are required to use the above shutdown method.
FIRE AREA TURBINE BUILDING BASEMENT EAST Shutdown Method:
Shutdown and cooldown without Instrument Air and no offsite power. Offsite power may be disabled by the fire. Some service water valves may require manual repositioning. Auxiliary feedwater will be supplied by the motor driven pumps and the Standby System.
Modifications:
In order to ensure that the above shutdown method can be used, the following systems require modification:
Electrical Distribution for onsite power Steam Line PORV, V-4
FIRE AREA DIESEL GENERATOR ROOM 1A Shutdown Method:
Operating from offsite power normal shutdown an'd cooldown methods. Some service water valves may require manual repositioning.
Operating from onsite power normal shutdown and cooldown methods except all AC power will come from Diesel Generator 1B.
Some service water valves may require manual repositioning.
Modifications:
In order to use the above shutdown method the following systems require modification:
Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Transfer Pumps FIRE AREA DIESEL GENERATOR ROOM 1B Shutdown Method:
Operating from offsite power normal shutdown and cooldown methods. Some service water valves may require manual repositioning.
The service water pumps may have to be operated locally.
Operating from onsite power normal shutdown and cooldown methods except all AC power will be supplied from Diesel Generator 1A. Some service water valves may require manual repositioning.
The service water pumps may have to be operated locally and Bus 17 is isolated.
Modifications:
In order to use the above shutdown method the following systems require modification:
Service Water Pumps Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Transfer Pump Electrical Distribution for offsite power Electrical Distribution for onsite power V-5
FIRE AREA DIESEL GENERATOR 1A VOLT Shutdown Method:
Operating from offsite power normal shutdown and cooldown methods. Some service water valves may. require manual repositioning.
Operating from onsite power normal shutdown and cooldown methods except all AC power will be supplied from Diesel Generator 1B. Some service water valves may require manual repositioning.
Modifications:
In order to use the above shutdown method the following systems require modification:
Electrical Distribution for offsite power Electrical Distribution for onsite power FIRE AREA DIESEL GENERATOR 1B VOLT Shutdown Method:
Operating from offsite power normal shutdown and cooldown methods. Some service water valves may require manually reposition ing and the service water pumps may have to be operated locally.
Operating from onsite power normal shutdown and cooldown methods except all AC power will be supplied from Diesel Generator 1A. Some service water valves may require manual repositioning and the service water pumps may have to be operated locally.
Modifications:
In order to use the above shutdown method the following systems require modification:
Service tfater Pumps Diesel Generator 1A Fuel Oil Transfer Pump Diesel Generator 1A Electric Distribution for offsite power Electric Distribution for onsite power V-6
FIRE AREA AUXILIARY BUILDXNG OPERATXNG FLOOR WEST Shutdown Method:
Normal shutdown and cooldown methods can be used. One of the pressurizer PORV block valves may fail due to the fire.
Since this PORV should not be needed for shutdown or cooldown the loss of the block valve is acceptable.
Modifications:
No modifications are required to use the above shutdown method.
FIRE AREA AUXILIARY BUILDING OPERATXNG FLOOR NORTH Shutdown Method:
A modified normal shutdown and cooldown method is required for a fire in this area. The modification is necessary because vital Bus 14 is lost. This affects charging, auxiliary feedwater component cooling and RHR. Some service water valves may require manual repositioning. Auxiliary feedwater will be supplied by the turbine driven pump, B-motor driven pump, or D-standby pump.
The normal charging paths will be used except only the B and C charging pumps are available. Charging water will be taken from the RWST through manual valve 358. The normal letdown paths will be used if repositioning required. The RHR valves will require manually and only one RHR pump and one component cooling water pump will be operational. One of the pressurizer PORV block valves may fail due to the fire. Since this PORV should not be needed for shutdown or cooldown the loss of the block valve is acceptable.
Modifications:
In order to ensure that the above shutdown method can be used, the following systems require modification:
Valving between RWST and Sump B or Waste Holdup Tanks.
Inadvertent valve movement could result in draining the RWST into the Sump and/or Waist Holdup Tank.
V-7
FIRE AREA AUXILIARY BUILDING OPERATING FLOOR SOUTH Shutdown Method:
Use the shutdown and cooldown methods for solid steam generators without RHR with the following exceptions: Auxiliary feedwater will be supplied by the turbine driven pump, motor driven pumps, and D loop of the standby system. The component. cooling water pumps are in the fire area and assumed to fail. Therefore, RHR is disabled.
Modifications:
No modifications are required to ensure that the above shutdown method can be used.
FIRE AREA AUXILIARY BUILDING MEZZANINE FLOOR WEST Sh'utdown Method:
Use the shutdown and cooldown methods for solid steam generators without RHR with the following exceptions: Auxiliary feedwater will be supplied from- the Auxiliary Feedwater System. The Standby System is disabled by the fire. The normal charging path is disabled but the alternate charging line is useable. The normal sources of borated water are available. Letdown, can be done through the pressurizer PORV's.
if required, Modifications:
In order to ensure that the above shutdown method can be used, the following systems require modification:
Valve 200A, 200B, and 202 to provide letdown isolation.
Pressurizer PORV and block valves to prevent. inadvertent operation.
Valve 720 and 721 to prevent inadvertent operation.
Pressurizer Backup Heaters.
RWST Level Indication.
Steam Generator Level Indication.
V-8
FIRE AREA AUXILIARY BUILDING MEZZANINE MID-SECTION Shutdown Method:
Use the shutdown and cooldown methods for solid steam generators without RHR with the following exceptions: Some service water valves may require manual repositioning. Bus 16 is disabled by the fire. When operating on onsite power Bus 15 is also lost which also disables steam dump. Auxiliary feedwater will be supplied from the turbine driven pump and the A-motor driven pump. The Standby System is disabled by the fire. The normal charging path is disabled but the alternate charging line is useable. Only the A charging pump is operable with a local on/off control. Charging water will be taken from the RNST through manual valve 358.
Letdown, if required, can be done using the pressurizer PORV's.
Modifications:
In order to ensure that the above shutdown method can be used, the following systems require modification:
Auxiliary Building DC Distribution Panel 1A A-motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump A-charging pump Pressurizer PORV and block valves to prevent inadvertent.
operation.
Valve 720, 721, 700 and 701 to prevent inadvertent operation Valving between RUST and Sump B Valving between RHST and Haste Holdup Tank S.I. pumps Pressurizer Backup Heaters S.I. Header Pressure Indication RNST Level Indication RCS Pressure Indication Pressurizer Level Indication Steam Generator Level Indication Electric Distribution for offsite power Electric Distribution for onsite power V-9
FIRE AREA AUXILIARY BUILDING MEZZANINE EAST Shutdown Method:
Use the normal shutdown and cooldown methods with the follow-ing exceptions: Some service water valves may require manual repositioning. Auxiliary feedwater will be supplied by the turbine pump and the motor driven pumps. The Standby System is disabled by the fire. The normal charging paths can be used with borated water coming from the RWST through manual valve 358.
Letdown, if required, can be done using normal paths. The RHR system may require manual valve repositioning prior to use.
Modifications:
In order to ensure that the above shutdown method can be used, the following systems require modification:
Auxiliary Building DC Distribution Panels 1A 6 1B Reactor Makeup Water Pumps Electric Distribution for onsite power FIRE AREA AUXILIARY BUILDING BASEMENT WEST Shutdown Method:
Use the shutdown and cooldown methods for solid steam generators without 'RHR with the following exceptions: The normal charging, path is disabled but the alternate charging line is useable. The normal sources of charging water are available. Letdown, if required, can be done using the excess letdown path.
Modifications:
In order to ensure that the above shutdown method can be used, the following systems require modification:
Valving between RWST and Sump B Valving between RWST and Waste Holdup Tank RWST Level Indication V-10
FIRE AREA AUXILIARY BUILDING BASEMENT NORTH Shutdown Method:
Use the shutdown and cooldown methods for solid steam generators without RHR with the following exceptions: Auxiliary feedwater will be supplied from the turbine driven pump, A-motor driven path is disabled pump, and/or standby pumps. The normal charging but the alternate charging line is useable. Charging pumps will require local on-off operation. Charging water will be taken from the RWST through manual valve 358 or the emergency boration path (V-350). Letdown, if required, can be done using the excess letdown path. One of the pressurizer PORV block valves may fail due to the fire. Since this PORV should not be needed for shutdown or cooldown the loss of the block valve is acceptable.
Modifications:
In order to ensure that the above shutdown method can be used, the following systems require modification:
Charging Pump Cooling System Entrance into Charging Pump Room Valving in RMW path to charging pumps V-202 to isolate letdown Valving between RWST and Waste Holdup Tank RWST Level Indication Pressurizer Level Indication FIRE AREA AUXILIARY BUILDING BASEMENT SOUTH Shutdown Method:
Normal shutdown and cooldown methods can be used.
Modifications:
In order to ensure that the above shutdown method can be used, the following systems require modification:
RHR Pump Fans Valving between RWST and Waste Holdup Tank 'I
FIRE AREA AUXILIARY BUILDING BASEMENT EAST'hutdown Method:
Use the shutdown and cooldown methods with the following exceptions: Letdown, using the excess letdown path.
iffor no charging pumps required, can be done Modifications:
In order to ensure that the above shutdown method can be used, the. following systems require modification:
Pressurizer Level Indication FIRE AREA - AUXILIARY BUILDING RHR ROOM Shutdown Method:
Use the shutdown and cooldown methods for solid steam generators without RHR with the following addition:
During the initial stage of the fire re-institute power to V-856 and close the valve to prevent draining the R>jST into the disabled RHR system.
Modifications:
No modifications are required to use the above shutdown method.
FIRE AREA INTERMEDIATE BUILDING TOP LEVEL Shutdown Method:
Use normal shutdown and cooldown methods.
Modifications:
No modifications are required to use the above shutdown method.
V-12
FIRE AREA - INTERMEDIATE BUILDING UPPER LEVEL SOUTH Shutdown Method:
Use normal shutdown and cooldown methods.
Modifications:
No modifications are required to use the above shutdown method.
FIRE AREA - INTERMEDIATE BUILDING UPPER LEVEL NORTH Shutdown Method:
Use normal shutdown and cooldown methods.
Modifications:
No modifications are required to use the above shutdown method.
FIRE AREA INTERMEDIATE BUILDING UPPER LEVEL EAST Shutdown Method:
Use normal shutdown and cooldown methods.
Modifications:
No modifications are required to use the above shutdown method.
FIRE AREA INTERMEDIATE BUILDING MEZZANINE SOUTH Shutdown Method:
Use normal shutdown and cooldown methods with the following exceptions: The steam generator blowdown system is disabled by the fire.
Modifications:
No modifications are required to use the above shutdown method.
PIRE AREA INTERMEDIATE BUILDING MEZZANINE NORTH Shutdown Method:
This fire area includes both steam line PORV's. Since there is approximately 50 feet between the PORV's and there are no permanent combustibles will affect both valves.
between The them it is inadvertent unlikely opening that, of a a fire PORV would be covered by the steam line break analysis. The mitigation system used in this analysis (SI System) is not affected by the fire. The normal shutdown and cooldown methods would be used unless the PORV inadvertently opened in which case the procedures for a steam line break would be followed. The auxiliary feedwater for both methods would be supplied by the motor driven pumps and .
the standby pumps.
Modifications:
In order to ensure that the above shutdown method can be used; the following systems require modifications:
Steam Line PORV's Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Steam Generator Pressure Indication PIRE AREA INTERMEDIATE BUILDING BASEMENT SOUTH Shutdown Method:
Use normal shutdown and cooldown method. The fire may cause one stean line PORV to inadvertently open. If this should happen manual block valves can be closed to isolate steam flow. The fire also disables the Steam Generator Blowdown system. This is acceptable because this system is not needed for cooldown..
Modifications:
No modifications are required to ensure that the above shutdown method can be used.
PIRE AREA INTERMEDIATE SUB-BASTMENT Shutdown Method:
Use normal shutdown and cooldown methods.
Modifications:
No modifications are required to ensure that the above shutdown method can be used.
V-14
FIRE AREA INTERMEDIATE BUILDING BASEMENT NORTH Shutdown Method:
Use the shutdown and cooldown methods for loss of Instrument Air to containment with the following exceptions: Some service water valves may require manual repositioning. The service'water pumps are operable from local on/off controls. Auxiliary feedwater will be supplied by the Standby Auxiliary Feedwater pumps. If the main steam line isolation valves close steam dumps will not be available. Steam Generator blowndown is not available. The backup pressurizer heaters are operable from local on/off controls.
Modifications:
In order to ensure that the above shutdown method can be used, the following systems require modifications.
Service Water Pumps Steam Line PORV's Pressurizer Backup Heaters Pressurizer Level Indication Steam Generator Pressure Indication Steam Generator Level Indication i
FIRE AREA INTERMEDIATE BUILDING BASEMENT EAST Shutdown Method:
Use the shutdown and cooldown methods for loss of Instrument Air to containment with the following exceptions: Some service water valves may require manually repositioning. The service water pumps are operable from local on/off controls. Auxiliary feedwater will be supplied by the Standby Auxiliary Feedwater pumps. Steam dump is isolated by the main steam line isolation valves. Steam Generator blowdown is not available. The backup pressurizer heaters are operable from local on/off controls.
Some RHR valves may require manual repositioning prior to,initiating RHR.
Modifications:
In order to ensure that the above shutdown method, can be used, the following systems require modifications.
Service Water Pumps Steam Line PORV's Standby Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Pressurizer PORV's Pressurizer Backup Heaters Reactor Coolant System Temperature Indication Pressurizer Level Indication Steam Generator Pressure Indication Steam Generator Level Indication
FIRE AREA CABLE TUNNEL NORTH-SOUTH Shutdown Method:
Use the normal shutdown and cooldown methods with the following exceptions: Some service water valves may require manual repositioning.
Auxiliary feedwater will be supplied by the turbine pump. After the service water valves have been repositioned, the Standby Auxiliary Feedwater pumps can be if operated necessary, from local on/off controls. The normal charging path is disabled but the alternate charging line is useable. The charging pumps may require operation from local on/off controls. Charging water will be taken from the RWST through manual valvePORV's. 358. Letdown, if required, can be done using the pressurizer cooling water pumps may require operation from local on/off Component controls. RHR pumps may require operation from local on/off controls. Some RHR valves may require manual repositioning prior to initiating RHR. The backup pressurizer heaters are operable from local on/off controls.
Modifications:
In order to ensure that the above shutdown method can be used, the following systems require modifications.
Standby Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Charging Pumps V-427, V-200A, V-200B and V-202 to isolate letdown Pressurizer PORV's Component Cooling Water Pumps RHR Pumps V-700, V-701, V-720, and V-721 to prevent, inadvertent operation Valving between RWST and Sump Valving between RWST and Waste Holdup Tank S.I. Pumps Pressurizer Backup Heaters Charging Pump Flow Indication RWST Level Indication Reactor Coolant System Pressure Indication Pressurizer Level Indication Standby Auxiliary Feedwater Flow Indication Steam Generator Level Indication Electrical Distribution for off site power Electrical Distribution for on site power Diesel Generator 1A Diesel Generator 1B V-16
FIRE AREA CABLE TUNNEL ELBOW Shutdown Method:
Use the .shutdown and cooldown methods for loss of Xnstrument Air to containment with the following exceptions: Some service water valves may require manual repositioning. The service water pumps may require operation from local on/off controls. Auxiliary.
feedwater will be supplied by the Standby Auxiliary Feedwater pumps operated from local on/off controls after the service water admission valves have been manually repositioned. Steam Generator blowdown is not available. The charging pumps may require operation from local on/off controllers. The component cooling water pumps and the RHR pumps may require operation from local on/off controllers.
Some RHR valves may require manual repositioning prior to initiating RHR. The backup pressurizer heaters are operable from local on/off controls.
Modifications:
Xn order to ensure that the above shutdown method can be used, the following systems require modifications.
Service Water Pumps Steam Line PORV's Standby Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Charging Pumps V-427, V-200A, V-200B and V-202 to isolate letdown Pressurizer PORV's Component Cooling Water Pumps RHR Pumps V-700, V-701, V-720 and V-721 to prevent inadvertent operation Valving between RWST and Sump Valving between RWST and Waste Holdup Tank S.I. Pumps Pressurizer Backup Heaters RWST Level Indication Reactor Coolant System Temperature Xndication Reactor Coolant System Pressure Indication Pressurizer Level Indication Standby Auxiliary Feedwater Flow Indication Steam Generator Pressure Indication Steam Generator Level Indication Electrical Distribution for offsite power Electrical Distribution for onsite power V-1.7
0 FIRE AREA CABLE TUNNEL EAST-WEST Shutdown Method:
Use the shutdown and cooldown method for loss of Instrument Air to containment with the following exceptions: Some service water valves may require manually repositioning. The service water pumps may require operation from local on/off controllers.
Auxiliary feedwater will be supplied by the Standby Auxiliary Feedwater pumps operated from local on/off controllers after the service water admission valves have been manually repositioned.
Some Standby Auxiliary Feedwater system valves may also require manual repositioning. Generator blowdown is not, available. The charging pumps may require operation from local on/off controllers.
The component cooling water pumps and the RHR pumps may require operation from local on/off controllers. Some RHR valves may require manual repositioning prior to initiating RHR. The backup pressurizer heaters are operable from local on/off controllers.
Modifications:
In order to ensure that the above shutdown method can be used, the following systems require modifications.
Service Water Pumps Steam Line PORV's Standby Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Charging Pumps V-427, V-200A, V-200B and V-202 to isolate letdown Pressurizer PORV's Component Cooling Water Pumps RHR Pumps V-700, V-701, V-720 and V-721 to prevent inadvertent operation Valving between RWST and Sump Valving between RWST and Waste Holdup Tank S.I. Pumps Pressurizer Backup Heaters RWST Level Indication Reactor Coolant System Temperature Indication Reactor Coolant System Pressure Indication Pressurizer Level Indication Standby Auxiliary Feedwater Flow Indication Steam Generator Pressure Indication Steam Generator Level Indication Electrical Distribution for offsite power Electrical Distribution for onsite power V-18
FIRE AREA RELAY ROOM Shutdown Method:
Use the shutdown and cooldown methods for loss of Instrument Air with the following exceptions: Some service water valves may require manual repositioning. The service water pumps may require operation from local on/off controls. Auxiliary feedwater will be supplied by the Standby Auxiliary Feedwater pumps operated
=from local on/off controls after the service water admission valves have been manually repositioned. Some Standby Auxiliary Feedwater systems valves may also require manual repositioning.
The charging pumps may require operation from local on/off controllers.
The component. cooling water pumps and the RHR pumps may require operation from local on/off controllers. Some RHR valves may require manual repositioning prior to initiating RHR. The backup pressurizer heaters are operable from local on/off controls.
Power to the Main Control Board Instrumentation from the batteries is lost. Instrument Buses, lA, 1B, and 1D are also lost. Instrument Bus 1C is operable; however, the major loads are in cabinets in the relay room.
Modifications:
In order to ensure that the above shutdown method can be used, the following systems require modifications.
Service Water Pumps Steam Line PORV's Standby Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Charging Pumps Pressurizer PORV's Component Cooling Water Pumps RHR Pumps V-700, V-701, V-720 and V-721 to prevent inadvertent, operation Valving .between RWST and Sump Valving between RWST and Waste. Holdup Tank S.I. Pumps Pressurizer Backup Heaters RWST Level Indication Reactor Coolant System Temperature Indication Reactor Coolant System Pressure Indication Pressurizer Level Indication Standby Auxiliary Feedwater Pressure and Flow Indication Steam Generator Pressure Indication Steam Generator Level Indication Electrical Distribution for offsite power Electrical Distribution for onsite power Power to required instrumentation must be obtained independent of the Relay Room.
V-19
FIRE AREA AIR HANDLING ROOM Shutdown, Method:
Use the shutdown and cooldown methods for loss of Instrument Air to containment with the following exceptions: Some service water valves may require manual repositioning. The service water pumps may require operation from local on/off controls. Auxiliary feedwater will be supplied by the Standby Auxiliary Feedwater pumps operated from local on/off controls after the service water admission valves have been manually repositioned. Some Standby Auxiliary Feedwater system valves may also require manual reposition-ing. Steam Generator blowdown is not available. The charging pumps may require operation from local on/off controllers. The component cooling water pumps and the RHR pumps may require operation from local on/off controllers. Some RHR valves may require manual repositioning prior to initiating RHR. The backup pressurizer heaters are operable from local on/off controls.
Modifications:
In order to ensure that the above shutdown method can be used, the following systems require modifications.
Service Water Pumps Standby Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Charging Pumps Pressurizer PORV's Component Cooling Water Pumps RHR Pumps V-700, V-720 and V-721 to prevent inadvertent operation Valving between RWST and Sump Valving between,RWST and Waste Holdup Tank S.I. Pumps Pressurizer Backup Heaters RWST Level Indication Reactor Coolant System Temperature Indication Reactor Coolant System Pressure Indication Pressurizer Level Indication Standby Auxiliary Feedwater Flow Indication Steam Generator Pressure Indication Steam Generator Level Indication Electrical Distribution for offsite power Electrical Distribution for onsite power Battery Chargers V-20
FIRE AREA BATTERY ROOM 1A Shutdown Method:
Use the normal shutdown and cooldown methods noting that one of the two DC trains is inoperable. The normal shutdown and cooldown can be used with the following exceptions: Steam dump is not available. Auxiliary feedwater will be supplied by one other loop of the Standby Auxiliary Feedwater system. The loop and the turbine driven pump can be operated after manual valve repositioning. Charging water will be taken from the emergency boration path or from the RWST through manual valve 358. To prevent charging water from the RNW system, manual isolation valves may have to be closed. Letdown, if required, can be done using local transfer switches. Only one pressurizer PORV is operable. Only one RHR pump is operable. Some RHR valves may require manual repositioning prior to initiating RHR.
Modifications:
In order to ensuxe that the above shutdown method can be used, the following systems require modifications.
Main Steam Isolation Valve S.I. Pumps Electrical Distribution in offsite power Electrical Distribution for onsite power FIRE AREA BATTERY ROOM 1B Shutdown Method:
A fire in this area disables one for of the two DC trains. The normal shutdown and cooldown methods loss of Instrument Air to containment can be used with the following exceptions: Some service water valves may require manual repositioning. Two service water pumps are available to supply service water.
Auxiliary feedwater will be supplied by one loop of the Standby Auxiliary Feedwater system. The other loop and the turbine driven pump can be operated after manual valve repositioning.
Charging water will be taken from the RWST through manual valve 358. To prevent charging water from the RMW system, manual isolation valves may have to be closed. One of the PORV block valves may fail as is. Since this PORV should not be needed for shutdown or cooldown the loss of the block valve is acceptable.
Only one RHR pump is operable. Some RHR valves may require manual repositioning prior to initiating RHR. Instrument Buses 1C and 1D are lost.
Modifications:
Auxiliary Building DC Distribution Panel 1A Electrical Distribution offsite power Electrical Distribution onsite power
FIRE AREA CONTAINMENT VESSEL OPERATING FLOOR-$ '/EST Shutdown Method:
Use normal shutdown and cooldown methods.
I Modifications:
No modifications are required to use the above shutdown method.
FIRE AREA CONTAINMENT VESSEL OPERATING FOOR-MID-SECTION Shutdown Method:
Use normal shutdown and cooldown methods.
Modifications:
No modifications are required to use the above shutdown method.
FIRE AREA - CONTAINMENT VESSEL OPERATING FLOOR-EAST Shutdown Method:
The only equipment affected by a fire in this area is the pressurizer PORV's and the associated block valves. These valves are in the pressurizer compartment. Since combustables are not stored in this compartment it is unlikely that a fire in the fire area would spread into this compartment. If a fire did exist in this compartment the worst case failure would be for the valves to fail closed or fail open.
If these valves failed closed normal shutdown and cooldown methods could be used. Primary system pressure could be reduced by using pressurizer spray and/or letdown If these valves failed open a small if LOCA necessary.
would result and SI could be used as designed to bring the plant to a safe condition.
Normal LOCA procedures would be used in this case.
Modifications:
No modifications are required to use the above shutdown methods.
V-22
FIRE AREA CONTAINMENT VESSEL MEZZANINE-WEST Shutdown Method:
Use the normal shutdown and cooldown methods with the following exceptions: The normal letdown path is useable; however, the excess letdown path is disabled. Some RHR valves may require manual repositioning prior to initiating RHR.
Modifications:
In order to ensure that the above shutdown method can be used the following systems require modifications.
V-700 and V-701 to prevent inadvertent operation Reactor Coolant System Temperature Indication Pressurizer Level Indication Steam Generator Level Indication FIRE AREA CONTAINMENT VESSEL MEZZANINE-EAST Shutdown Method:
Use the normal shutdown and cooldown methods with the following exceptions: The normal charging path is disabled but the alternate charging line is useable. The normal sources of charging water can be used.
PORV's.
Letdown, if required,'can be done using the pressurizer Some RHR valves may require manual repositioning prior to initiating RHR.
Modifications:
In order to ensure that the above shutdown method can be used the following systems require modifications.
V-427, V-200A, V-200B and V-202 to isolate letdown Pressurizer PORV's and Block Valves V-700, V-701, V-720, and V-721 to prevent inadvertent operation Steam Generator Level Indication Reactor Coolant System Pressure'ndication FIRE AREA CONTAINMENT VESSEL BASEMENT-WEST Shutdown Method:
Use the shutdown and cooldown methods for inoperable RHR valves with the following exceptions: Valves 878A and B are not affected by the fire but valves 878C and are in the fire area and assured to fail in the worst. direction.
D Since it is necessary to ensure circulation through the core and valves 878C and D may fail open, flow to these valves should be isolated. Close valve 871A and do not operate the SI pump that feeds valves 878C and D.
V-23
Modifications:
In order to ensure that the above shutdown method can be used the following systems require modifications.
Steam Generator Level Indication FIRE AREA CONTAINMENT VESSEL BASEMENT-EAST Shutdown Method:
The shutdown and cooldown method used for a fire in this area depends upon which side of the shield wall the fire is in.
Installation of the Reactor Coolant Pump Oil Collection System will remove the possibility of spreading a fire from inside the shield wall to outside the shield wall or visa versa. There is then no fire loading path for a fire to follow from inside the shield wall to outside.
Fire Inside Shield Hall Use the normal shutdown and cooldown methods with the following exceptions: The normal charging path is disabled but charging can be done through the Reactor Coolant Pump seals and V-392B in the relief mode. Letdown, if required, can be done using the pressurizer PORV's. RHR valves 700, 701, and 852B may require manual openings The RHR flow path will be through valve 700 and 701 to the RHR pumps through the RHR heat exchangers through valve 852B back to the reactor vessel.
Fire Outside Shield Wall Use the shutdown and cooldown methods for solid steam generators without RHR with the following exceptions: The normal charging path is disabled but charging can be done through the Reactor Coolant Pump seals and V-392B in the relief mode. Letdown, if required, can be done using the pressurizer PORV's. The RHR system is disabled by the fire.
Modifications:
In order to ensure that the above shutdown methods can be used the following systems require modifications.
Reactor Coolant Pump Oil Collection System V-427, V-200A, V-200B, and V-202 to isolate letdown Pressurizer PORV's V-720, V-721 and V-700 to prevent inadvertent operation Reactor Coolant System Pressure Indication Pressurizer Level Indication Steam Generator Level Indication V-2 4
0 FIRE AREA SERVICE BUILDING BASEMENT Shutdown Method:
Use the normal shutdown and cooldown methods with the following exceptions: The normal source of auxiliary feedwater is in the fire area. This source of water will be available during the initial stage of the fire. Since the can it standby auxiliary feedwater system is not affected by the fire be used to supply feedwater. Also, the alternate source of water to the auxiliary feedwater system is not affected by the fire.
Modifications:
No modifications are required to use the above shutdown methods.
FIRE AREA SCREEN HOUSE OPERATING FLOOR-SCREENS Shutdown Method:
Use the normal shutdown and cooldown methods.
Modifications:
No modifications are required to use the above shutdown method.
FIRE AREA SCREEN HOUSE OPERATING FLOOR-BOILER Shutdown Method:
Use the normal shutdown and cooldown methods.
Modifications:
No modifications are required to use the above shutdown method.
V-25
FIRE AREA SCREEN HOUSE OPERATING FLOOR-PUMPS Shutdown Method:
A fire in this area results in a complete loss of service water. The shutdown method used is dependent upon the availability of offsite power.
Operating from offsite power Use shutdown and cooldown methods for no service water with offsite power available.
Operating from Diesel Generators - Use shutdown and cooldown methods for no service water with no offsite power available.
Modifications:
In order to ensure that the above shutdown method can be used the following modification is required.
Prefabricated Diesel Generator Hose Connection Prefabricated Service Water Hose Connection FIRE AREA SCREEN HOUSE OPERATING FLOOR-EAST Shutdown Method:
A fire in this area disables Bus 17 and 18. Since these buses supply the service water pumps a complete loss of service water is assumed. The shutdown method used is dependent upon the availability of offsite power.
Operating from offsite power Use shutdown and cooldown methods for no service water with offsite power available.
Operating from Diesel Generators Use shutdown and cooldown methods for no service water with no offsite power available.
Modifications:
In order to ensure that the above shutdown methods can be used 'the following systems require modifications:
Prefabricated Service Water Connection Prefabricated Diesel Generator Hose Connection Electrical Distribution on site power V-26
FIRE AREA - SCREEN HOUSE MIDDZE FZOOR Shutdown Method:
A fire in this area disables Bus 17 and 18. Since these buses supply the service water pumps a complete loss of service water is assumed. The shutdown method used is dependent, upon the availability of offsite power.
Operating from offsite power Use shutdown and cooldown methods for no service water with offsite power.
Operating from Diesel Generators - Use shutdown and cooldown methods for no service water with no offsite power available.
Modifications:
In order to ensure that the above shutdown methods can be used the following systems require modifications.
Prefabricated Service Water Hose Connections Prefabricated Diesel Generator Hose Connection Electrical Distribution offsite power Electrical Distribution onsite power FIRE AREA SCREEN HOUSE BASEMENT Shutdown Method:
Use the normal shutdown and cooldown methods.
Modifications:
No modifications are reguired to use the above shutdown method.
FIRE AREA STANDBY AUXIZIARY FEEDWATER ROOM Shutdown Method:
Use the normal shutdown and cooldown methods with the following exceptions: The standby auxiliary feedwater system is disabled by the fire. Auxiliary feedwater will be supplied by the normal auxiliary feedwater system.
Modifications:
No modifications are reguired to use the above shutdown method.
V-27
~ I!
0
FIRE AREA CONTROL ROOM Shutdown Method:
This method of cooldown employs equipment remote from the control room. Provisions have been made to afford control of the plant from "full power" to "cold shutdown" by duplicating required instrumentation and controls at stations remote from the control room. There are essentially three remote stations throughout the plant. Control of plant functions at these stations is achieved by operating transfer switches located at the remote stations.
Once control has been transferred to the remote stations, the control room controls have no effect on selected equipment.
The transfer switch and associated circuitry are designed such that when the transfer switch is in the local position any malfunction of control circuitry at the control board associated with the selected equipment will not affect the operation of that selected equipment.
Remote station location is as follows:
- 1. Auxiliary Feedwater Station basement of Intermediate Building.
- 2. Charging Pump Station charging pump room at basement level of Auxiliary Building.
- 3. Boric Acid Pump Station boric acid storage tank zoom at operating level of Auxiliary Building.
In the event the operator has been unable to activate the.
turbine trip or reactor trip buttons located on the control board before evacuation, a local turbine trip button at the high pressure end of the turbine can be activated and the reactor trip breakers can be deenergized at the breaker cabinets located near the Auxiliary Feedwater Station. A turbine trip with greater than fifty percent load on the turbine will cause an automatic reactor trip.
trip. A reactor trip at any load will cause a turbine An operator will be dispatched to each one of the control stations with communication available between them. The Auxiliary Feedwater Station operator will first trip the reactor trip breakers at the breaker cabinets then transfer control of the containment recirculation fans and service water pumps to the Auxiliary Feedwater Station. Some service water valves may require manual repositioning. Instrument aiz may be lost as a result of the fire.
Steam generator level and pressure indicators are located at the Auxiliary Feedwater Station to enable the operator to monitor and control the steam generators. Over pressurization of the secondary system is prevented by the main steam safety valves which open automatically on high pressure.
After the operator has verified an oil pump is operating and manually repositions any valves that may have inadvertently moved, the operator may manually start the turbine pump. The transfer switch will allow the operators to start the motor driven pumps from the remote control station. This can be done after proper valve alignment has been verified. The standby pumps can be operated locally after proper valve alignment has been verified.
V-28
Local flow indicators provide a means to monitor pump perform-ance while the discharge valves of these pumps are adjusted manually for desired flow. By locally controlling the auxiliary feedwater pumps, the operator can maintain steam generators level thereby maintaining the necessary heat sink.
The reactor coolant system pressure is also controlled at the Auxiliary Feedwater Station. The operator will transfer control of the pressurizer backup heaters to the Auxiliary Feedwater Station.
The pressurizer backup heaters on-off switch and pressurizer pressure indication located at this station are all that is required to main-conditions.
reactor coolant system pressure for the postulated 'ain A second operator will man the Boric Acid Pump Station. Boric acid pump control is transferred from the control room to the Boric Acid Pump Station enabling the operator to start and stop the boric acid pumps as required.
The third operator will operate. the Charging Pump Station which has the primary function of controlling reactor coolant inventory.
Control of the charging pumps is transferred from the control room to the charging pump room by turning the transfer switch for each pump from remote to local control. Pressurizer level instrumenta-,
tion is provided at this station enabling the operator to monitor the reactor coolant system coolant inventory. A pneumatic con-troller for each pump provides the operator with means to control charging pump speed which affects rate of flow. RWST level is indicated at the Charging Pump Station. Open-close switches for the three letdown orifice isolation valves are located in the charging pump room. These valves allow the operator to control the amount of outflow from the reactor coolant system. Because of the loss of Instrument Air and the fire, the normal charging and letdown paths cannot be used. Charging will be done through the RC pump seals and valves 392A and B acting as relief valves.
Borated water will be charged from the RWST through valve 358.
The loss of Instrument Air isolated the letdown paths. Therefore, letdown, PORVs.
if required, will be through manually operated pressurizer Cooldown to the point where RHR can be initiated can be achieved by manually operating the steam line PORVs. The RHR system can be manually aligned and locally operated. The remainder of the cooldown is performed and maintained with the RHR system.
This shutdown method assumes off site power is available.
If off site power is not available, the operated locally. Once AC power is diesel generators can be available from the diesel generators, this shutdown method can be used.
modifications:
In order to ensure that the above shutdown method can be used, the following systems require modifications:
Service Water Pumps Steam Line PORV Auxiliary Feedwater System Standby Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps V-200A, V-200B and V-202 Pressurizer PORVs Boric Acid Transfer Pumps V-29
Component Cooling Water Pumps RHR Pumps V-700, V-701, V-720, and V-721 to prevent inadverte nt opening Valving between RNST and Sump Valving between RNST and Waste Holdup Tank S.I. Pumps Pressurizer Backup Heaters Steam Generator Level Indication Steam Generator Pressure Indication Auxiliary Feedwater Flow Indication Reactor Coolant System Pressure Indication Pressurizer Level Indication Reactor Coolant System Temperature Condensate Storage Tank Level Indication Charging Pump Flow Indication Boric Acid Tank Level Indication RWST Level Indication Standby Auxiliary Feedwater Flow Indication Standby Auxiliary Feedwater Pressure Indication Auxiliary Feedwater Pressure Indication Electrical Distribution for off site power Electrical Distribution for on site power Diesel Generators 1A and 1B FIRE AREA: Computer Room AVT Room Hydrogen Storage Room Oil Storage Room Service Building Of fices Shutdown Method:
Since these areas do not contain any vital equipment or associated circuitry normal shutdown methods can be used.
V-30
VI. PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS Several approaches to the design of modifications are proposed.
These approaches are classified as follows:
Plant Procedures Plant operating procedures and Technical Specfications have been revised in the past to prevent unacceptable failure modes in certain equipment under LOCA conditions. It is proposed that the method of removing power during power operation of the plant be extended to certain additional equipment where unacceptable failure modes have been demon-strated under fire conditions. Also, a method is suggested for restoring certain equipment to service following a fire.
The following approaches are proposed:
A. Require certain breakers to be racked out during power operation of the plant. This will prevent the unacceptable failure mode of inadvertent closing of these breakers during a fire, so that additional modifications would not be required. For equipment, that is required to be operational following a fire, see (C) below.
B. Require certain motor operated valves to have AC power i removed at the motor control center, with the valves .in the safe position, during power operation of the plant.
This will prevent the unacceptable failure mode of in-advertent operation of'hese valves during a fire, so that additional modifications would not be required.
For valves that are required to be operational following a fire, see (C) below.
Note that four of the valves requiring modification by the Safe Shutdown Analysis already have AC power removed during power operation by procedure 0-1.1. .These valves, V700, V701, V720, and V721 are de-energized in the close position and therefore no further modifications for these valves are proposed.
C. Establish emergency procedures for restoring equipment to service following a fire which involves circuits of that equipment. The availability of manpower and amount materials of to perform these operations within an acceptable time must be demonstrated.
- 2. Isolation Devices Certain circuits can be effectively isolated from equipment so that. the equipment will fail safe in the event of cir-cuit failure. The following approach is proposed:
A. Install isolation amplifiers in instrumentation cir-cuits such that the failure of the circuits will not affect equipment required by the Safe Shutdown Analysis.
- 3. Transfer Devices Circuits that can be transferred include control circuits and low power AC and DC circuits. Transfer switches shall be manually operated. When operated locally, the availability of manpower to perform the manual operations within an acceptable amount of time must be demonstrated. Remote manual transfer switches are acceptable for the transfer of a load to an emergency power supply. The following approaches to the design of transfer switches are proposed:
A. For DC control circuits the transfer switch should be located in proximity to the control fuses. For example, the switch could be mounted on the switchgear or motor control center breaker cubicle. The transfer would be to local control using the normal control power source.
B. For low-power AC and DC circuits, the transfer switch should be located in proximity to the load. For example, the switch could be mounted in a panel adjacent to a motor or solenoid operated valve or pump motor. The transfer would be to local control using a second source of AC power. The availability of the second source of power must be demonstrated, in addition to the manpower requirements.
C. For low-power DC circuits with local or remote manual transfer, the transfer switch should be located in proximity to the load. For example, the switch could be mounted inside a motor control center or in an adjacent panel. The transfer would be made to a second source of DC power. The availability of the second source of power must be demonstrated.
- 4. Se aration Re uirements The following approach to the design of adequate separation is proposed:
A. Re-route the circuit out of the fire area, and demonstrate by analysis that failure of the circuit is acceptable in the fire areas of the new routing.
- 5. Additional Se aration Anal sis The cable separation study conducted in conjunction with the Safe Shutdown Analysis was performed based on the assumption that all circuits within a given fire area have failed. No credit is taken for existing separations that may meet or exceed IEEE 384-1977 requirements within a fire area. Credit is taken only for the separation between the fire areas, since the circuits in
adjacent areas may conservatively assumed not to fail. The existing separations between fire areas generally exceed the minimum separation requirements of IEEE 384, and are therefore preferable. However, there are some circuits for which there are not acceptable modifications which can prevent the unacceptable failure of equipment, under the assumptions of the Safe Shutdown Analysis. For these circuits, the separation requirements of IEEE 384 will be imposed within the fire area.
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